

National Archives and Records Service  
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT  
APRIL - MAY 1944

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York

~~SECRET~~

*To State Department,  
24, 25, 26, for information  
and suggestions as to  
Mikolajczyk's visit.*

1 April 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 632

Filed 011100Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 632.

Personal and ~~SECRET~~

1. I send you in my immediately following the recent telegrams I have received from UJ. The War Cabinet did not think there was much use in going on with the personal correspondence on this subject at this time as evidently he is determined to find fault and pick a quarrel on every point. We are therefore instructing Ambassador Clark Kerr as in my next following telegram.

2. I have a feeling that the bark may be worse than its bite and that they have a great desire not to separate themselves from their British and American allies. Their conduct about Finland has been temperate and their attitude towards Rumania and Bulgaria seems to be helpful. It may be that, while unwilling to say anything of a reassuring nature to us about Poland, they will in fact watch their step very carefully. This may be of great benefit to the Poles in Poland. It would, I believe, help

1  
File Copy

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. Sec. Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0390

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 632

Filed 011100Z

the situation if you invited Monsieur Mikolajczyk to pay his visit to the United States on your return from your holiday, and thus show the Russians the interest which the United States takes in the fate and future of Poland.

No Sig

*Rec'd 011345Z-05C*

*To Pres with morning news.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

0391

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell  
Hull about these?

F. D. R.

Messages from the Prime Minister  
to the President, dated April 1, 1944,  
Nos. 632 and 634.

0392



2 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies), received yesterday by the President from the Prime Minister, are forwarded for your information and for your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Incls.

Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#632, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#633, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#634, 1 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

0393

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 632, 1 April 1944.

1. I have received from Stalin the following two telegrams which I send you in my number 633. Since Stalin has evidently determined to pick a quarrel and find fault on every point, the War Cabinet did not think there was much use in going on with the personal correspondence on this subject at this time. In my number 634, I give you our instructions to Ambassador Clark Kerr.

2. I feel that they have a great desire not to disassociate themselves from their American and British Allies, and that their bark may be worse than their bite. The Soviet attitude towards Bulgaria and Rumania seems to be helpful, and their conduct concerning Finland has also been moderate. It seems that they will carefully watch their step while being unwilling to give us any reassurance concerning Poland. The Poles in Poland may receive great benefits from this. When you return from your holiday the situation would be helped, I think, if you would invite Monsieur Mikolajczyk to pay his visit to the U.S., thus showing the Russians the interest which America takes in the Polish fate and future.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0394

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 632	DATE 1 April 1944
DATE/TIME 011100Z OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 011345Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Polish-Russian relations.	

ACTION

Shown to President with morning news by Admiral Brown.

Referred to Admiral Leahy by the President, 1 Apr 44, with notation, "Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?" Paraphrased copies sent to State Department 2 Apr 44, "for information, and for suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here."

Letter received from Amb Halifax, 4 Apr 44, asking President's approval of PM #634, containing suggested reply to Stalin. Referred to Admiral Leahy, who prepared draft reply; approved by President 5 Apr 44; sent to PM as PM #513. 5 APR 44.

May 12, 44, Admiral Leahy said that no further action would be taken on this message relative to visit of Mikolajczyk.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
052 Russian-Polish relations.		

0395

*To State Department,  
on Apr 4, for information  
and suggestions as to  
Mekolajczyk's visit.*

1 April 1944

~~SECRET~~  
From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 633.

Personal and ~~SECRET~~.

My immediately preceding telegram. Following are recent telegrams I have received from UJ. Begins.

"1. Premier J. V. Stalin to Mr. Prime Minister W. Churchill 23.3.44 recd 25.3.44.

"I have recently received from you two messages on the on the Polish question and have studied the statement which Sir A. Clark Kerr made to V. M. Molotov on your instructions on the same question. I was unable to reply at the time as matters at the front often take me away from non-military questions.

"I now reply on these questions.

"It is patent that your messages, and especially the statement of Sir A. Clark Kerr, are full of threats concerning the Soviet Union. I should like to draw your attention to this fact, as the method of threats is not only incorrect in the mutual relations of allies but is also harmful and can lead to contrary results.

~~SECRET~~

REGR/DED  
UNCLASSIFIED

File Copy

0396

~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

"In one of your messages, you qualified the efforts on the Soviet Union in the matter of the maintenance and realization of the Curzon Line as a policy of force. This means that you now seek to qualify the Curzon Line as inequitable and the struggle for it as unjust. I can, on no account, agree with such an attitude. I cannot but remind you that at Teheran you, the President, and I agreed as to the justice of the Curzon Line. You considered then the attitude of the Soviet Union regarding this question as perfectly just, and you said that the representatives of the Emigre Polish Government would be mad to refuse the Curzon Line. Now you maintain something which is directly the contrary. Does this not mean that you no longer acknowledge what we agreed upon at Teheran, and that by this very fact you are breaking the Teheran agreement? I have no doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly, as before, by the attitude you adopted at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish Emigre Government would already have been settled. As for myself and the Soviet Government, we continue to stand by the attitude we adopted at Teheran and

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0397

~~SECRET~~  
From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 3

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

have no intention of departing from it, since we consider that the realization of the Curzon Line is not a manifestation of a policy of force but a manifestation of the policy of the restoration of the legal rights of the Soviet Union to those territories which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers recognised in 1919 as being non-Polish.

"You state in your message of the 7th March that the question of the Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be deferred until the summoning of the armistice conference. I think we have here some misunderstanding. The Soviet Union is not waging war and has no intention of waging war against Poland. The Soviet Union has no dispute with the Polish people and considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people. For this very reason, the Soviet Union is shedding blood for the sake of the liberation of Poland from German oppression. For this reason, it would be strange to speak of an armistice between the USSR and Poland. But the Soviet Government has a dispute with the Emigre Polish Government, which does not reflect the interests of the Polish people and does not express its hopes. It would be even more strange to identify

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0398

~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 4

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

with Poland the Emigre Polish Government in London separated (literally "torn away") from Poland. I find it difficult even to point to the difference between the Emigre Government of Poland and the similar Emigre Government of Yugoslavia, or between certain Generals of the Polish Emigre Government and the Serbian General Mikhailovich.

"In your message of the 21st March you state that you intend to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all questions of territorial changes must be deferred until the armistice or the peace conference of the victorious powers, and that, until then, you cannot recognise any transferences of territories carried out by force. I understand this to mean that you represent the Soviet Union as a power hostile to Poland, and that the essence of the matter is that you deny the emancipatory character of the war of the Soviet Union against German aggression. This is equivalent to attempting to ascribe to the Soviet Union what is not in fact the case and to discrediting it thereby. I have no doubt

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0399



~~SECRET~~  
From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 5

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

that such a statement of yours will be taken by the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion as an undeserved insult directed at the Soviet Union.

"Of course, you are free to make whatever statement you please in the House of Commons - that is your affair. But if you do make such a statement, I shall consider that you have committed an unjust and unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union.

"In your message you express the hope that failure over the Polish question will not influence our collaboration in other spheres. As for myself, I stood for, and continue to stand for collaboration. But I fear that the method of threats and discrediting, if it continues in the future, will not conduce to our collaboration." Stalin.

"2. Premier Stalin to Prime Minister 25.3.44.

"I have carried out a thorough enquiry into your statement that the disclosure of the correspondence between us occurred between the fault of the Soviet Embassy in London and of Ambassador F. T. Gousev personally.

~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0400



~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 6

Number 633

Filed 011139Z

"This enquiry has shown that neither the Embassy nor F. T. Gousev personally were at all guilty in this matter and that they did not even have in their possession certain of the documents the contents of which were published in the English newspapers. Thus the leakage occurred not on the Soviet but on the English side.

"Gousev is willing to undertake any investigation of this matter in order to prove that he and the members of his staff are in no way implicated in the matter of the disclosure of the contents of our correspondence. It seems to me that you have been led astray with regard to Gousev and the Soviet Embassy." Stalin.

No Sig

Rec'd 011700 Z-060

~~SECRET~~  
Hold for adm Leaky.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

0401

~~SECRET~~

2 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies), received yesterday by the President from the Prime Minister, are forwarded for your information and for your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Incls.

Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#632, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#633, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#634, 1 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0402

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 633, 1 April 1944.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

Following are the telegrams received from Stalin as mentioned in my #632.

1. Message from Stalin to Churchill, dated 23 March 1944.

"Your two messages on the Polish question have been received, and I have studied the statement which Ambassador Kerr made to Mr. Molotov on the same question pursuant to your instructions. Since matters at the front quite often take my attention from non-military questions, I was unable to reply immediately.

"My reply now follows:

"It is evident that the statement of Ambassador Clerk Kerr and your messages are full of threats toward the Soviet Union. As the method of threats is not only incorrect in the mutual relations of Allies, but is also harmful and can lead to harmful results, I should like to draw your attention to this fact.

"One of your messages contained a qualification of the efforts of the Soviet Union on the question of the maintenance or realization of the Curzon line as a policy of force. This indicated that you now are trying to call the Curzon line as inequitable and the fight for it as not just. On no account can I agree with your attitude. At Teheran, I must remind you, the President, you and I agreed as to the rightness of the Curzon line. At that time you felt that the attitude of the Soviet Union on this question was perfectly just, and you stated that the refusal of the Curzon line would be an act of madness on the part of the representatives of the Emigre Government. At this time,

~~SECRET~~

0403

you are maintaining something that is directly opposite. Can this mean that you no longer acknowledge our agreement at Teheran and that you are by this very fact breaking that agreement? I feel sure that if you had continued to stand firmly, as before, upon the attitude you took at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish Emigre Government would have already been finished. Since we consider that the realization of the Curzon line is not a manifestation of a policy of force, but one of restoration of the legal rights of the Soviet Union to those territories which even the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers and Curzon regarded in 1919 as not being Polish, we continue to uphold the attitude which we assumed at Teheran and have no thought of departing from it.

"In your message of 7 March, you said that the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier would have to be postponed until an Armistice Conference should convene. It seems that we have some misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not now waging war against Poland, and has no intention of waging such a war. The Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people, and has no dispute with them. The Soviet Union, for this very reason, is shedding blood in order to liberate Poland from the oppression of Germany. Therefore, it seems strange to mention an armistice between Poland and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Government does have a dispute with the Emigre Polish Government, which does not express the hopes of the Polish people and does not reflect their interests. It seems even stranger to identify with Poland the Emigre Polish Government in London which is separated from Poland. It is hard for me to indicate the difference between the Emigre Government of Poland and the similar Emigre Government of Yugoslavia, or between the Serbian General Mikhailovich and

~~SECRET~~ **REGRADED**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

0404

certain generals of the Polish Emigre Government.

"You state in your message of 21 March that you intend to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that you consider all territorial changes must be deferred until the armistice or the peace conference of victorious powers, and that until that time you cannot recognize any transferences of territories which are carried out by force. This means to me that you refer to Soviet Union as a power hostile to Poland, and that the meat of the matter is that you deny the emancipatory character of the Soviet Union's war against the aggression of Germany. This is similar to trying to ascribe to the Soviet Union that which is not in fact the case, and thereby to discredit it. Such a statement you yourself have no doubt will be taken by the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion as an undeserved insult directed at the U.S.S.R. You are free, of course, to make whatever statement you please to the House of Commons--that is your affair. However, should you make such a statement, I shall consider that an unjust and unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union has been committed by you.

"You also express the hope in your message that a breakdown over the Polish question will have no influence on our collaboration on other matters. I have stood for and I continue to stand for collaboration between us. If the method of threats and discrediting continues in the future, I fear that this will not act in favor of our collaboration. STALIN."

2. Stalin to Churchill, dated 24 March 1944.

"A thorough inquiry into your statement that the disclosure of the messages between us was the fault of the Soviet Embassy in London and of Ambassador Gousav has been carried out.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0405

"The result of this inquiry shows that neither Mr. Gousav personally or the Soviet Embassy were at all guilty of this matter, and that they did not even have in their possession certain of the documents, the contents of which were published in the English newspapers. The leakage, therefore, occurred on the English side and not on the Soviet.

"In order to prove that he and the representatives of the staff are in no way implicated in the disclosure of the contents of these messages, Mr. Gousav is willing to undertake any investigation whatsoever in this matter. I think that with regard to Gousav and the Soviet Embassy, you have been led astray. STALIN." End of message.

~~SECRET~~  
- 4 -

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

0406





~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

*To State Department,  
2 Apr 44, for information  
and suggestions as to  
Mikolajczyk's visit.*

1 April 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~REDACTED~~ Number 634.

My telegram number 632. Following is text of  
telegram which we propose sending to Ambassador Clark  
Kerr. Begins.

"1. Please inform Monsieur Molotov that the Prime  
Minister thought it necessary to refer Marshal Stalin's  
message of March 23 about Poland to the War Cabinet whose  
considered views are set out below for communication to  
the Soviet Government.

"2. Marshal Stalin's references to power politics  
and threats are not understood here. The Prime Minister  
had only thought it necessary to say what he would have  
to do to make the position of His Majesty's Government  
quite clear to the British Parliament and public if no  
settlement of the Polish problem could be agreed now.  
He felt that his personal relations with Marshal Stalin  
and Anglo-Soviet relations in general demanded that degree  
of frankness. It is regretted that Marshal Stalin should  
characterise this as a threat.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. Sec. of Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 5 1972

File Copy

0406



~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

"3. To avoid any possible misunderstanding the Soviet Government should be informed that the Prime Minister has not departed in any way from what he regarded as just and reasonable at Teheran. His attitude has the approval of the War Cabinet. The Prime Minister has never suggested that the Poles should refuse to accept the Curzon Line. On the contrary, he has most strongly urged them to do so. His exchange of messages with Marshal Stalin related however to what he had been able to do in mediating between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government in London. In his message of February 21st, he explained in particular why it was difficult for a government and especially a government in exile to agree publicly to the Curzon Line in isolation from other important issues concerning the future of Poland, which cannot be finally settled now. He had, therefore, proposed a de facto working arrangement to get around this difficulty. This was as far as he had been able to bring the Poles and he had hoped that it might have been considered acceptable to the Soviet Government.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 8 1972

0409

~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 3

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

"4. His Majesty's Government felt very strongly that it was of the utmost importance, more particularly in order that means might be found to ensure the full cooperation of the Polish underground movement, controlled by the Polish Government in London, in the common struggle against the Germans, to find some working arrangement for the purposes and for the duration of the war. They still considered that coordination of the Polish underground movement with the advancing Soviet forces would be of immediate value to the war effort and a real advantage to future relations between Poland and the USSR.

"5. The Prime Minister and the War Cabinet therefore deeply regret Marshal Stalin's inability to accept the proposals of February 21st.

"6. His Majesty's Government welcome Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people and they trust that means can still be found providing for the active cooperation of the Soviet forces and the Polish population in the liberation of Poland from German oppression. It had never, of course,

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0410

~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 4

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

been the Prime Minister's intention to suggest that any war was being waged between the Soviet Union and Poland or that there was any need for a peace between the two countries. He had only referred to the practical difficulties which are likely to arise in the absence of a working arrangement on the lines suggested in his message of February 21st. His reference to the peace conference was, of course, based upon the fact that all the future territorial arrangements in Europe, and not only the frontiers between enemy states, will eventually require the formal ratification and sanction of the victorious powers. His Majesty's Government would have preferred to reach some de facto understanding on this question now, but, in view of the Soviet Government's inability to accept a working arrangement now, the formal settlement, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, must clearly await ratification and agreement at the peace conference. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government can only maintain the attitude they have hitherto consistently adopted and publicly stated in regard to the non-recognition of territorial

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0411

~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 5

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

changes effected since the war other than by agreement between the parties concerned.

"7. In the present circumstances, His Majesty's Government must continue to regard the Polish Government in London as the legitimate government of Poland, with whom their relations have never been interrupted since the Germans attacked Poland in 1939 and so brought this country into the war. Quite apart from this consideration, the Polish Government controls important armed forces now actively engaged with us in the struggle against our common enemy. These are, in themselves, sufficient reasons for our continued recognition of and co-operation with the Polish Government. Furthermore, our information goes to show that it is they who control the general resistance in Poland to the German oppressor and more particularly that of the organized underground movement.

"8. If, as His Majesty's Government now understand, the Soviet Government see no prospect of further discussion between them leading to a settlement, His Majesty's Government can only retire from the ungrateful role of mediator

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., F.O. & Dept. of Int., 3-29-72  
/ R. H. 1-100 Date

MAY 6 1972

0412

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 6

Number 634

Filed 011225Z

and announce their failure. In any statement the Prime Minister will make it plain that he has not departed from the views he has hitherto held regarding the proper settlement of this question. His Majesty's Government have, however, never disguised from the Soviet Government the important factor in all this of public opinion, more particularly here and in America. Public opinion, which would have welcomed a working arrangement on the lines proposed in the Prime Minister's message of February 21st, will be sadly disappointed that the Soviet Government have not been able to accept these proposals. The Prime Minister must, therefore, make the position of the British Government perfectly plain, although he does not think anything which he will say will be of a character to arouse adverse reactions in the Soviet Union. As he has already told M. Stalin in an earlier message, nothing is further from the intention of His Majesty's Government than to insult or discredit our Soviet ally.

No Sig

*Recd 011700Z-05C*

*TPVW*

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. S. and Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0413

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell  
Hull about these?

F. D. R.

# 632 + 634.

0414

~~SECRET~~

2 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies), received yesterday by the President from the Prime Minister, are forwarded for your information and for your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Incls.

Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#632, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#633, 1 April 1944.  
Msg, Prime Minister to President,  
#634, 1 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. ....  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0415

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 634, 1 April 1944.

The message referred to in my 632 which I proposed sending to Ambassador Kerr is as follows:

"1. Kindly tell Mr. Molotov that I thought it necessary to refer Stalin's message of 23 March concerning Poland to the War Cabinet whose considered views are set forth below for transmittal to the Soviet Government.

"2 We do not understand the Marshal's references to threats and power politics. If no settlement of the Polish question could be reached now, I had only considered it necessary to indicate what I would have to do to make the position of His Majesty's Government entirely clear to the British public and Parliament. I felt that that degree of frankness was demanded by my personal relations with Stalin and the Anglo-Soviet relations in general. That Stalin should take this as a threat is to be regretted.

"3. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding you should inform the Soviet Government that I have in no way departed from what I thought reasonable and just at Teheran. The War Cabinet approves of my attitude. That the Poles should refuse to accept the Curzon line has never been suggested by me. I have, on the contrary, most strongly urged that they do accept it. The exchange of messages with Stalin related however to what I had been able to do in mediating between the Polish Government in London and the Soviet Government. I explained in my message of 21 February in particular

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0416



why it was hard for a government, and especially a government in exile, to agree publicly to the Curzon line in isolation from other important issues concerning the future of Poland, which cannot be finally settled now. To get around this difficulty, I had proposed a de facto working arrangement. I had hoped that it might be considered acceptable to the Soviet Government since this was as far as I had been able to bring the Poles.

"4. It was felt very strongly by his Majesty's Government to be of the utmost importance to find some working arrangement for the purposes and for the duration of the war, more particularly in order that means might be found to ensure the full cooperation of the Polish underground movement, controlled by the Polish Government in London, in the common struggle against the Germans. Coordination of the Polish underground movement with the advancing Soviet forces, they still feel, would be of immediate value to the war effort and a true advantage to future relations between the Soviet Government and Poland.

"5. The War Cabinet and I deeply regret the inability of the Marshal to accept our proposals of 21 February.

"6. We trust that means can still be found providing for the active cooperation of the Soviet forces and the Polish population in the liberation of Poland from German oppression and we welcome the Marshal's statement that the Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people. I had no intention to suggest that there was a need for peace between Poland and the U.S.S.R. or that a war was being waged between them. I had referred only to the practical difficulties which can arise in the absence of a working arrangement along the lines set forth in my message of 21 February.

~~SECRET~~  
- 2 -

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0417

Of course my reference to the peace conference was based on the fact that the formal ratification and sanction of the victorious powers will be required for all the future territorial arrangements in Europe, and not only the frontiers between enemy states. In view of the Soviet Government's inability to accept a working arrangement now, the formal settlement, as far as we are concerned, must clearly await ratification and agreement at the peace conference, although we would have preferred to reach some de facto understanding on this question at this time. In the meantime, we can only maintain the attitude we have up to now adopted consistently and stated publicly in regard to the non-recognition of territorial changes effected since the war other than by agreement between the parties concerned.

"7. Under the circumstance the Polish Government in London, with whom our relations have never been interrupted since the Germans attacked Poland in 1939 and so brought this country into the war, must continue to be regarded by us as the legitimate government of Poland. Aside from this consideration important armed forces now actively engaged with us in the struggle against our common enemy are controlled by the Polish Government. In themselves these are sufficient reasons for our continued recognition of and cooperation with the Polish Government in London. Moreover, our information indicates that the general resistance in Poland and more particularly that of the organized underground movement is controlled by them.


"8. We can only retire from the ungrateful role of mediator and announce our failure, if, as we now understand, the Soviet Government sees no prospect of further discussion leading to a settlement. I will make it clear in any statement that I have not departed from the views I have hitherto held regarding the proper settlement of this question. However, we have never

~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0418

hidden from the Soviet Government the important factor of public opinion in all this, more particularly here and in America. Public opinion will be sadly disappointed that the Soviet Government have not been able to accept these proposals, since it would have welcomed a working arrangement on the lines proposed in my message of 21 February. Therefore, Although I do not think that anything I will say will be of a nature to arouse adverse reactions in the Soviet Union, I must make the position of his Majesty's Government entirely clear. Nothing is further from the intention of our government than to insult or discredit our Soviet ally, as I had already told Marshal Stalin in an earlier message."

  
- 4 -  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0419

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1944

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Re: PH # 513.  
Replying to your personal note of April third, you may inform Mr. Anthony Eden that I have this date dispatched by telegraph, a reply to the Prime Minister's messages 632 and 634.

Thank you for your good wishes for my Easter vacation which has every promise of completely eliminating the remains of my recent influenza.

Very sincerely,

FDR

His Excellency  
The Ambassador from Great Britain  
British Embassy  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

0420

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you run this down?

F.D.R.

0421

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Govt. telegram 1/12/72  
By RHP Date MAY 6 1972

3rd April, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

You will have seen the Prime Minister's messages to yourself Nos. 632 and 634 of the 1st April. I have now just had a telegram from Anthony Eden, asking me to make it clear to you that the instructions to Sir A. Clark Kerr in No. 634 have not yet been sent to Moscow. Action will have to be taken soon, and I gather that Winston is hoping for your comments as early as you can let him have them.

I hope you will soon be quite fit again, and that when you can get a well-deserved holiday, it may do the trick. I shall much look forward to the opportunity of a talk with you a bit later.

Yours very sincerely,

*Haifax*

The Honorable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America.

0422

FROM	the Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	634	DATE	1 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	011225Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	011700Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish relations.		

ACTION (Continuation of #632, and #634.)

To President via usher.

Referred to Admiral Leahy by the President, 1 Apr 44, with notation, "Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?" Paraphrased copies sent to State Department 2 Apr 44, "for information, and for suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here."

Letter received from Amb Halifax, 4 Apr 44, asking President's approval of PM #634, containing suggested reply to Stalin. Referred to Admiral Leahy, who prepared draft reply; approved by President 5 Apr 44; sent to Pm as PRES #513, 5 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
052 Russian-Polish relations	

0423

*To President via  
usher, 01/2315Z FHG.  
Proposed reply drafted  
by Adm Leahy, to President  
2 Apr 44.*

~~SECRET~~

From: U. S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 635

Filed 01/2147Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

~~SECRET~~

Para 1. As I expect you will now be going off to a "Suitable climate" may I express the earnest hope that you will be accessible to my personal telegrams and that full arrangements will be made for their speedy transmission to you. I shall be sending a lot of stuff unless you tell me not to, which would be disastrous. I am so relieved to hear through Louise that Harry has borne the operation well and that they are pleased with the progress he has made so far.

Para 2. I have had some little trouble here which has been coming to a head for some time and at length forced me to fall back upon the House of Commons which as usual showed itself steadfast in the cause and put all malignants in their proper places. It is an immense comfort to me to feel this mighty body behind me when troubles like Singapore, Tobruk or untimely yearnings for reconstruction come along. I wonder whether this solidity in our

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks

MAY 6 1972

File Copy

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

0424



~~SECRET~~  
-2-

Legislature will be helpful on your side.

Para 3. I have seen a lot of your splendid troops over here lately. As you know I harden for it the nearer I get to it. Eisenhower is a very large man.

Para 4. Every good wish to you on your journey, and please keep the wires open to me.

No Sig

Rec'd 01/23/52  
to Pres JFK  
and others

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0425

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

No. 635 pink from the PM to the President

0426

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	635	DATE	1 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	01/21472		
TOR MAP ROOM	01/2315Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Prime Minister hopes President will "keep wires open" on forthcoming trip; Prime Minister's relations with Parliament and vote of Confidence.		

## ACTION

To President via usher, 01/2315Z.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy in Map Room, 2 Apr 44; taken to President via usher. This was not used by the President, however; President dictated message to Miss Tully, 4 Apr 44; sent to PM as PRES #511, 4 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: <i>000.9 The President; 000.1</i>		FILED:

20 Pairs via  
number 0410552  
"Sent to JCS for  
study WOL"  
amc.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

WDOC  
4 Apr  
0933 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: MA London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 636 Filed: 040905 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. ~~TOP SECRET~~

and personal.

Our Chiefs of Staff are telegraphing to yours on the subject of LST. A review of our requirements for amphibious operations against Japan clearly shows that LST will be the limiting factor. We are trying every expedient to increase our own output, but it appears inevitable that for operations in the spring of 1945 we shall have a shortage between 80 and 100 of these ships.

I understand that on your present programme you will reach an output of 55 per month by June, and that thereafter your monthly rate drops to about 40. If you could see your way to maintain the monthly rate at 55, then by the 1st December the greater part of the shortage would be met.

It is my earnest wish to operate against the Japanese as soon as our amphibious resources are released

File Copy

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0428

(2)  
~~TOP SECRET~~

from the European theatre and I very much hope you will  
find it possible to meet this request.

No Sig

Read 041055Z-080  
TPVU

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0429

~~SECRET~~ April 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland:

The attached paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 4 April, containing a request for additional LST for use in Southeast Asia in 1945, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and preparation of a draft reply.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith  
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.  
Aide

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

0430

4 April 1944

Paraphrase

From: Prime Minister

To: President Roosevelt

Our Chiefs of Staff are sending a dispatch on the subject of LST to your Chiefs of Staff. Reviewing our requirements for amphibious operations against Japan, it is clear that LST will be the limiting factor. We are doing our best to increase our own output, but it appears inevitable that we shall have a shortage between 80 and 100 of these ships for operations in the Spring of 1945.

It is understood that on your present program you will reach an output of 55 per month by June, and that your monthly rate drops to about 40 thereafter. If you could see your way to maintain the monthly rate of 55, then the greater part of the shortage would be met by the first of December.

I earnestly want to operate against the Japanese as soon as our amphibious resources are released from the European theater and I very much hope you will be able to meet this request.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. Defence Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0431





~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

To Sir, of War Information,  
and Sir, of Relations  
May Dept, for comments.

5 April 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 637

Filed: 05/1308Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt  
personal and ~~most secret~~. Number 637.

I propose the following joint statement  
regarding U-Boat warfare in March for issue on  
April 10. I am also telegraphing the text to  
MacKenzie King. Begins.

March was an active month in the war against  
the U-Boats which operated in widely dispersed areas  
from the Barents Sea to the Indian Ocean.

The enemy has persevered vainly in strenuous  
endeavours to disrupt our flow of supplies to Russia  
by the northern route.

Our merchant shipping losses were mainly  
incurred in far distant seas: Though a little  
higher than in February they were still low and  
the rate of sinking U-Boats was fully maintained.

The Allied merchant fleet continues to im-  
prove both in quantity and quality but the strength  
of the U-Boat force remains considerable and calls  
for powerful efforts by surface and air forces.

Received Map Room  
1030 9, 5 Apr 44.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0433

~~SECRET~~

5 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Office of War Information.  
Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.

The following suggestion for the March Submarine Warfare Statement has been received from the Prime Minister this date. The President desires any comments you may have to make on this statement.

It is requested that your reply to the President be addressed to the Map Room, The White House.

"March was an active month in the war against the U-Boats which operated in widely dispersed areas from the Barents Sea to the Indian Ocean.

"The enemy has persevered vainly in strenuous endeavours to disrupt our flow of supplies to Russia by the northern route.

"Our merchant shipping losses were mainly incurred in far distant seas. Though a little higher than in February, they were still low and the rate of sinking U-Boats was fully maintained.

"The Allied merchant fleet continues to improve both in quantity and quality, but the strength of the U-Boat force remains considerable and calls for powerful efforts by surface and air forces."

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By E. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0434



*To Admiral Leahy  
for action, 6 Apr 44.*

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No: 638,                      Filed 06/1010Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

It is said that OSS have received instructions, which have been approved by you, to arrange for a small Intelligence Mission to be infiltrated to General Mihailovic's Headquarters, and we have been asked to organize the necessary arrangements.

We are now in process of withdrawing all our missions from Mihailovic and are pressing King Peter to clear himself of this millstone, which is dragging him down in his own country and works only to the assistance of the enemy. If, at this very time, an American Mission arrives at Mihailovic's Headquarters, it will show throughout the Balkans a complete contrariety of action between Britain and the United States. The Russians will certainly throw all their weight on Tito's side, which we are backing to the full. Thus we shall get altogether out of step. I hope and trust this may be avoided.

No Sig

*Re 061120Z Nuk  
check for tray*

File Copy

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks      MAY 6 1972

0436

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland:

The attached paraphrased copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 6 April 1944, dealing with the establishment of a small O.S.S. intelligence mission to General Mihailovic, is forwarded for the limited distribution of this message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they can discuss it at the informal meeting on Friday, April 7, 1944.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

0437

~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 638, 6 APRIL 1944.

O.S.S. have received instructions which you have approved, it is said, to arrange for infiltration to General Mihailovic's Headquarters of a small Intelligence Mission; we have been asked to make the necessary arrangements.

All our missions to Mihailovic are now in the process of being withdrawn, and we are pressing King Peter to clear himself of this millstone, which is only assisting the enemy and is dragging him down in his own country. Should an American Mission arrive at Mihailovic's Headquarters at this very time, throughout the Balkans it will show a complete contrariety of action between Britain and the United States. All the weight of the Russians will certainly be thrown on Tito's side, which we are backing to the full. Thus we shall get altogether out of step. I hope and trust for the avoidance of this.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0438



~~SECRET~~  
6 April 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 639 Filed: 06/1705Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt  
personal and ~~secret~~. Number 639.

Your number 512.

Thank you so much. I am entirely in  
agreement with you on the principle: But, I  
think we can get more out of it by the method  
you now approve.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd: 06/18/07. PAB*  
*TPVU " PAB*

File Copy

~~SECRET~~

0440



FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 639	DATE 6 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME 06/1705Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 06/1810Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Wolfram exports from Spain to Germany.	

ACTION

Answers PM #512.

To President via usher.

President does not wish to answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
601 Wolfram.		

0441

~~TOP SECRET~~

WDCC  
7 Apr  
0910 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

From: MA London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 640

Filed: 070900 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~MA~~

NOT SENT THROUGH  
MAF ROOM State Dept  
Lafayette - State Dept  
Lafayette - State Dept  
Lafayette - State Dept

I thank you for your message dated April 5th about  
Ireland.

We considered the question of stopping Irish  
shipping and came to the conclusion which you yourself  
have reached that there was no need to interfere with the  
transatlantic sailings to North America. Only their  
direct services from Southern Ireland to the Iberian  
Peninsula will, therefore, be suspended. They have accept-  
ed this and there is no question of their regarding this  
as the imposition of economic sanctions.

I note that you are considering the despatch of a  
further message to Mr. De Valera. It is very good of you  
to say that you would let us see it in advance, if you  
decided to send it.

1  
Recd. 7/10/00 24nd

Held for May

Reference not identified other than that on 20 mar 44 a copy of Mr. & Paton  
#624 as subject of Ireland was sent to State for preparation of a reply.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No Sig

0442

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, replying to State Department's #2591, 3 April 1944, to Ambassador Winant, is forwarded for your information.

Respectfully,

HENRY W. PUTNAM,  
Captain, A. C.,  
White House Map Room.

1 Incl.  
Msg, Prime Minister to  
President, #640, 7 Apr 44.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 -

0443

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 640, 7 APRIL 1944

Your message of April 5 about Ireland. Thank you very much.

The question of stopping Ireland's shipping was considered by us, and we reached the same conclusion which you yourself came to--that there was no necessity to interfere with trans-Atlantic sailings to North America. Therefore, their direct services from southern Ireland to the Iberian Peninsula only will be suspended. This has been accepted by them and there is no question of their considering this as economic sanctions imposition.

I have noted that you are contemplating sending to Mr. De Valera a further message. We appreciate your saying you would let us see it in advance if you do decide to despatch such a message.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0444

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL #640	DATE 7 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Restrictions against Ireland.	

ACTION

Answers message of 3 Apr 44. sent by PRESS to PM through State Department channels.

To President on breakfast tray.

To State for information 9 Apr 44; President returned original 8 Apr 44; no further action.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
052. Ireland		

0445

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

8 April 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Nr: 641

Filed 081940Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and  
~~SECRET~~

Your telegram No. 501.

Para 1. The proposals of your government for a limited relief scheme were put forward by Mr. Riefler on March 29th and have been most earnestly considered by my colleagues and by myself. I share your desire to do everything possible to ameliorate the lot of the peoples of the occupied countries in so far as this is possible without detriment to the war effort. I find it however difficult to accept the view that the maintenance of our blockade policy is likely to hurt our friends more than our enemies.

Para 2. The whole question seems to me to be governed by the impending military operations for the invasion of Europe. Our experience of the working of the Greek relief scheme has conclusively shown that it causes considerable difficulties for, and imposes restrictions on, our naval and air forces, and these difficulties will increase as new

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0446

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

operations are begun. The opening of further channels of importation into Europe at the present moment would, in our view, be wholly incompatible with the naval and military situation which is developing. It would involve not only the granting of safe-conducts for ships to sail to designated ports within the operational zones, but also the preservation of routes of inland transport from those ports to the countries in which the food is to be distributed. It would clearly be impossible to undertake to keep any ports or routes to them open, or to keep intact any railways between now and the end of this year: and if it were possible to give such an undertaking we should thereby give the Germans valuable information as to our military intentions. Any relief action now undertaken would therefore inevitably hamper impending military operations.

Para 3. Even if military considerations were not decisive there are also grave objections from the blockade point of view. These are being explained in detail to Mr. Winant and I do not think I need trouble you with them, if we are agreed that nothing can be allowed to hamper or interfere with forthcoming operations.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Britie:  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Rec'd 084430Z-osc*

*To Pres and State Office  
Referred to Adm. Secy  
for possible reference JCS  
with President's comment "I don't know but what Prime is right on that."*

~~TOP SECRET~~

0447

8 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President has directed that the attached message (Prime to President #641) be referred to the Admiral for possible discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With regards to this message, the President made the comment: "I don't know but what the Prime is right on that."

Very respectfully,

BOYCE P. PRICE  
Captain, C. E.

0448



FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	641	DATE	8 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME	08/1940Z		
OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	08/2230Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Relief program for German-occupied countries.		

ACTION

Answers PRES-PM 501. 15 Mar 44.

Taken to President in Dr's office. President directed it be given to Adm Leahy for action by the JCS if necessary; President made comment, "I don't know out what the Prime is right on this."

Admiral Leahy prepared answer in Map Room without referring message to JCS. Reply sent as PRES-PM #519. 8 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<u>See Germany</u>	

0449

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London

To: The President of the United States

No: 642, Filed 09/0910Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

I am most deeply grateful to you for your  
number 515.

(withdrawing contemplated  
OSS mission to Michalove are) No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd. 09/1210Z. BCP.

Reut as White 1 09/1310Z Huf

~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0450

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	642	DATE	9 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	09/0910Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	09/1210Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT OSS Intelligence Mission to Mihailovic.			

ACTION

Answers PRKS-Pm #515.

To President in So. Car. as WHITE 1, 09/1310Z.

No further action necessary.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<u>See OSS.</u>	

0451

**SECRET**

*To President at Macassar  
as File 22, 13/02452.  
g*

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

*12 April 1944*

Number 643

12/NFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt private  
personal and ~~SECRET~~

Your number 518.

Para 1. I was very glad to read Hull's references to the French Committee of National Liberation in which I observed your guiding hand. His Majesty's Government will take an early opportunity of making clear that we are in full accord with this declaration. I take it that it modifies in some respects, though not in principle, the form of the enclosure to your letter of March 21st, which presented some difficulties here. These might be talked over between the Foreign Office and State Department before issue.

Para 2. In the first phase of OVERLORD there will be no opportunity for the French Civil Government to function, as the ground captured by our troops will be the battlefield, and it may be some time before we have advanced far enough to be clear of what was called in the last war

**SECRET**

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. S.D.S. Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0452

~~SECRET~~

by the French "The Zone of the Armies" and often extended some 50 miles from the front. I agree cordially with you that nothing must hamper the freedom of action of the Supreme Commander and that no disturbing political agitation should be allowed until we have got well inland.

Para 3. I am becoming very hard set upon OVERLORD. On Good Friday I gave a talk to all the Generals, British and American, who were gathered at General Montgomery's Headquarters, expressing my strong confidence in the result of this extraordinary but magnificent operation. I understand that you will have received some account of this from General Eisenhower, Mr. McCloy and General McNarney who were present. I do not agree with the loose talk which has been going on on both sides of the Atlantic about the undue heavy casualties which we shall sustain. <sup>P+II</sup> in my view it is the Germans who will suffer very heavy casualties when our band of brothers gets among them.

Para 4. I agree that the PCNL should not be made a party in any way to the details of OVERLORD. I have tried to further their earnest wish to have the Leclerc armoured division included in the forthcoming battle. But the presence of this single division will not give them any

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

right to be informed of our secrets, and they should be told so without delay. A different situation might arise if ANVIL were to materialize at the new date. In this operation I believe 6 or 7 French divisions were to be employed, in fact they would be more than half of the Allied Army. There I think they should be made full partners. The 74,000 men they have already in Italy have fought very well and have a very small proportion of missing to killed. These facts give them claims to be taken into our confidence in that theatre with of course proper restrictions and safeguards such as we ourselves impose at home. I suggest an answer on these lines. Shall I draft for your agreement or vice versa?

Para 5. You will also have received the demand of the FCNL about our giving them a portion of the Italian fleet. If they had brought their own fleet over, as Badoglio did, they would not be short of ships. I am inclined to think it would be best to leave their unwarrantable demand unanswered, at any rate for some weeks to come.

Para 6. Your number 516 last sentence. I think it would be a very good thing if De Gaulle came over to see

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-28-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

-4-

you but obviously you must know where you are with a man like this before you send an invitation. I have asked Ambassador Duff Cooper to put the point to him in the following way: "Mr. Churchill is worried about the danger of bad relations growing between you (De Gaulle) and the United States Government. He (Mr. Churchill) thinks that after Mr. Hull's important speech which has been welcomed by the FCNL it would be a very good and important thing for you to pay a short visit to the President and make a personal contact there. This would be helpful also to our British relations with the FCNL for you (De Gaulle) will readily understand that it is the foundation of our British policy to keep in step with the United States with whom we are sharing such great war schemes. If you felt like making this visit and would let me (Duff Cooper) know, Mr. Churchill would suggest to the President that he send you a formal invitation".

Prime

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 8-22-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0455

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	643	DATE	12 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT French National Committee			

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #518.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 22, 13/0245Z.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as BLACK 13, 13/1915Z.
4. Sent to the PM as PRES #521. 13 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
011 FNC; 000.9; 310 OVERLORD	

0456



~~TOP SECRET~~

*Sent to President at Macmanaw 12  
White 28, 14/1330Z Apr.  
President, in Black 11, 14/1850Z Apr.  
directed it be referred to General  
Marshall.  
answered by Polus to Pm #522 - 16 Apr 44*

WDCC  
14 Apr  
0957 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: MA London England  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 644 Filed: 140905 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~TOP SECRET~~.

Would it not be well for you and me to send a  
notice to Uncle J. about the date of OVERLORD? I do not  
see why this particular communication should not go from  
us both unitedly. I suggest for your consideration, the  
following message. Message begins:

1. Pursuant to our talks at Teheran, the general  
crossing of the sea will take place around the date  
mentioned in my immediately following, with 3 days margin  
on either side for weather. We shall be acting at our  
fullest strength.

2. Our action in the Mediterranean Theatre will  
be designed to hold the maximum number of German divisions  
away from the Russian front and from OVERLORD. The exact  
method by which this will be achieved will depend on the  
outcome of the heavy offensive which we shall launch in

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Italy with all our strength about mid-May.

3. Since Teheran your armies have gained and are gaining a magnificent series of unforeseen victories for the common cause. Even in months when you thought they would not be active they have gained these great victories. We ask you to let us know, in order to make our own calculations, what scale your effort will take in the 3 months following the date mentioned, when we shall certainly strike. We send you our very best wishes and hope we may all fall on the common foe together. Message ends.

Please let me have your amendments to this and I will send it off signed Roosevelt-Churchill.

No Sig

*Rec'd 14/1200 Z*  
*Sent as White 28*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0450

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	644	DATE	14 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	140905Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	14/1200Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD.			

ACTION

Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 28, 14/1330Z Apr. In BLACK 17, 14/1850Z Apr, the President directed: "Obtain Gen Marshall's advice without delay in regard to PM's 644, and inform us by telegraph. Reply to PM will be delayed until we hear from General Marshall."

General Marshall's suggested reply sent to the President by Gen Marshall via courier, 15 Apr 44. In BLACK 27, 16 Apr 44, the President sent Gen Marshall's message, unchanged, to the Map Room for transmission to the PM. Answer sent to PM as PRES #522, 16 Apr 44.

In BLACK 28, 16 Apr 44, the President directed General Marshall be informed that his message (BLACK 27 above) had been sent without change. See attached memo fr Capt Wood to Gen Marshall.

(See PRES #522)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Gen Marshall	14 Apr 44	The President

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
310 Contd	

0459

*To President at Macamaw,  
as White 4, 1505002.*

April 14, 1944

From: Military Attache London, England  
For: President of the United States  
No. 645, Filed 140930Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt [REDACTED]  
and personal. No. 645. Your No. 520.

Para 1. I am sorry you cannot help in this way. Our only wish is to help you as much as possible in the war against Japan in accordance with our pledge. There is no possibility of increasing our LST programme here and this may well be a limiting factor. I hope you will bear this in mind if there are any complaints hereafter. Considering we are freely engaging five sixths of the naval forces to be used at OVERLORD much of which may be destroyed by the mines and short shore batteries, and that our merchant ship building is down to a bare million a year, I hope you will reconsider keeping your mass production of LST going on a little longer at the high levels it is about to attain. You will certainly want them even if you do not give any to us.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt. Dept. tel., 3-2-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0430

Para 2. We are working very hard to prepare plans for amphibious operations destined to support your left flank against Japan, and I hope soon to have definite proposals to make to your Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps you will allow me to recur to the above topic then.

Para 3. Your number 521. I regret the Committees action in dismissing General Giraud, and have done all I could to prevent it. I have acceded to Giraud's request to grant him and his daughter of seventeen asylum over here. I am very conscious of the dangers of an unfriendly France on the morrow of its deliverance by the English dash speakers.

Para 4. I hope you are benefitting from your rest. I am very glad to hear frequent and good accounts of Harry's progress.

No Sig.

*Recd 150005 Z - OSC*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0461

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL #645	DATE 14 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 140900Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 15/0005Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT LST production and assignment.	

ACTION

Answers PRES-PM #520.

Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 34,  
15/0500Z.

In BLACK 44, 20/0220Z, the President stated:  
"No acknowledgment or reply will be made to WHITE 34."

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
401		

0462

~~TOP SECRET~~

To President at  
Waccamaw as  
White 41, 15 2010 Z

~~SECRET~~

15 April 1944

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 646

Filed 151735Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~to~~ Number 646.

To safeguard the security of "OVERLORD", we have decided to prohibit foreign representatives in this country from sending or receiving uncensored communications, whether cypher telegrams or diplomatic bags. We shall also forbid couriers or other members of diplomatic staffs from leaving the country. The ban will come into force from midnight Monday, April 17, and continue until after the launching of the operation. It will not, of course, apply to your representatives or to the Soviet representative; but it will cover both neutral representatives and representatives of other Allied Governments, including representatives of the French Committee of Liberation and exiled governments in this country.

Rec'd 151920Z  
Encl. White 41 - 152010 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0463

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 646 Filed 151735Z

Page 2

We are imposing this ban because of our desire to leave nothing undone which might promote the success of "OVERLORD", and we have been much influenced by the view of General Eisenhower, who pressed strongly for it.

We shall explain to the foreign governments that the ban is being imposed for compelling military reasons and that many other restrictions are being imposed on our own people in the interests of security.

We hope that no foreign government will be tempted to retaliate by forbidding our diplomatic representatives to send uncensored communications. If, however, any were to do so, may we count on the help of your representative in the country concerned to enable us to continue to send and receive uncensored communications?

So much information about military plans is constantly passing between here and Washington that valuable information might well reach the enemy through cypher telegrams sent by representatives of foreign governments in the United States.

~~TOP SECRET~~

0464

RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED BY British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972



~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 646 Filed 151735Z

Page 3

I have no doubt that you will be ready to consider whether some corresponding action should be taken to prevent leakages through diplomatic representatives in the United States.

No Sig

*Recd 15/1920 Z.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 8-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0465

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

By direction of Admiral Leahy, there is transmitted herewith a carefully paraphrased copy of the Prime Minister's message Number 646 to the President for advice in regard to the last paragraph commencing "I am sure....." and ending ".....in your country".

Admiral Leahy states that the President is inclined to agree with the suggestion contained therein.

It is respectfully suggested that the reply can best be transmitted through the White House Map Room.

Respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc. (HW)

1. Msg. Prime Minister to President, #646.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0466

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~PARAPHRASE~~

15 April 1944

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 646

In order to protect the security of forthcoming operations, we have reached a decision to prohibit representatives of foreign countries in this country from receiving or sending uncensored communications, whether diplomatic bags or cypher telegrams. In addition we shall forbid couriers or other members of diplomatic staffs from departing this country. This action becomes effective from midnight Monday, 17 April, and will continue until after the operation has been launched. Of course it will not apply to either your representatives or to the representatives of the Soviet; however, it will cover both representatives of other Allied Governments and representatives of neutral countries. Allied Governments as used here includes representatives of allied governments in this country and those of the French Committee of Liberation.

This ban is being imposed by us due to our desire to do everything possible to promote the success of the operation. General Eisenhower has pressed strongly for it and we have been influenced greatly by his view.

To the Foreign Governments we shall explain that, for compelling military reasons, this ban is being imposed and that our own people are having many other restrictions imposed upon them for security reasons.

It is our hope that no foreign government will be tempted, by forbidding our diplomatic representatives to transmit uncensored communications, to retaliate. However, in the event that any were to take this step, may we count on the assistance of your representative in whatever country is

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-28-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

0467

concerned to enable us to receive and send communications uncensored?

Between here and Washington so much information concerning military plans is passing constantly that information of value might well get to the enemy through cypher telegrams sent by Foreign Government representatives in your country.

I am sure that you will be ready to take under consideration whether some corresponding action should be taken to prevent leakages through diplomatic representatives in your country.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972

April 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland

The attached letter from the Secretary of State addressed to Admiral Leahy, dated April 18, 1944, enclosing a copy of a paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President on the subject of censorship of Foreign Representatives, is forwarded to you for appropriate action.

Initially Admiral Leahy, through Captain Wood, requested the advice of the State Department on this subject, and by this letter the State Department has sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith  
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.  
Aide

0469

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*

May 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

*STMT* *not believe would stoppage of telegram good*

I am not sending the attached message but will you take up with the State Department at the proper time the holding up of code telegrams and the censoring of other telegrams going out from here.

26 May-

F.D.R.

President informed that  
P.C.S. does not believe that  
additional stoppage of telegrams  
would be advantageous

*WAL*

0470

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has not been sent and the Secretary of State says it is up to you whether it should be sent or not.

GGT/v

0471



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to Captain Wood's memorandum of April 16, 1944, I enclose a draft reply to the Prime Minister's message number 646 of April 15, for your consideration.

C. H.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to  
the Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, MAY 6 1972  
By J. Schauble Date \_\_\_\_\_



0472



~~SECRET~~

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO BE SENT

To: Prime Minister Churchill, London.  
From: President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C.

The factors set forth in your 646 have been carefully considered, and much thought has been devoted to the probable results of the imposition of similar restrictive measures on the privileged communication channels of diplomatic officials accredited to this country. The special circumstances that necessitated such action in the case of Great Britain are fully appreciated, but in view of the geographical location of this country it seems clear that the military justification for such restrictive measures is not nearly so strong in our case. In England there is vital information to be observed at first hand, the lines of communication which have been closed are short and direct, and the measures in question can be made effective; with us, on the other hand, vital information concerning the invasion would not be obtainable by observation, lines of mail

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

0473

communication are long and slow, and the restrictions in question would not be fully effective in preventing information from crossing the border.

Our observation of the reaction in other countries to your recently imposed measures indicates the likelihood that if we take similar action retaliatory measures will be imposed against us and we will lose our privileged channels of communication. Not only are these channels proving highly valuable but their retention will enable us to afford our facilities to your representatives wherever this may be helpful or desirable. There seems little doubt that the imposition of such measures by us would cause such resentment in this Hemisphere that it would be negative to a substantial degree whatever contribution the various countries therein are making to the war effort.

For the reasons given, I have come to the conclusion that there is more to be lost than gained by a change in our

-3-

present procedures. We will, of course, continue to lend our full support to the measures that you have so wisely placed in effect.

*Rosen*

0475

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 646	DATE 15 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 151735Z	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Ban on diplomatic traffic from England.	

ACTION

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 41, 15/2010Z.
2. In BLACK 25, 16/0300Z, Adm Leahy directed, "Give copy to Sec State for advice. President is inclined to agree with suggestion contained in Para 6."
3. In WHITE 65, 18/1945Z, Sec State sent draft reply to be sent thru Amb Winant to PM.
4. President, in BLACK 41, 19/0230Z, stated, "Your message proposed to Winant in WHITE 65 is approved." State Dept immediately informed by Capt Price via telephone. Confirming memorandum sent to Sec State 19 Apr 44.
5. Answer sent as State Dept message #3112. Midnight, 18 Apr 1944, via State Dept channels to Winant for delivery to PM. (COPY IN THIS FOLDER)
6. In above message to PM, President informed he was "consulting military people on the point." On 4 May 44 State Dept submitted draft message to PM; this was not sent, but was referred to Admiral Leahy to take up again with the State Department at proper time."

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:
310 <i>Amended</i>		

0476

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

To President at  
Vaccamaw as  
White 44/1521/02

15 April 1944

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 647

Filed 151920Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and  Number 647.

Your messages numbers 476 and 477 (of the 24th February). I agree that we should clear our minds on the question of which economic matters might profitably be discussed internationally before the end of the war. Mr. Stettinius' visit to London should provide an opportunity for discussing, anyhow in a preliminary way, the procedure best calculated to ensure that all these economic questions are dealt with at the right time and in the right order.

On the subject of combined boards, and their future status, (your 477) I entirely agree with you that the boards have done very good work and that the part which they could and should play in our future arrangements should be further studied between us. I think that the initial discussions on this had better take place in Washington between our representatives there

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

0477

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England

For:- The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 647

Filed 151920Z

and the appropriate United States agencies; and I propose to send instructions to our representatives in Washington accordingly.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0478

18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copies of messages between the President and the Prime Minister on post-war economic collaboration are forwarded for your information.

The Secretary of the Treasury is also being furnished copies of these messages.

It is requested that copies of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

OGDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant, USNR,  
White House Map Room.

3 Incls.

Msg, Pres. to PM, #476,  
23 February 1944.  
Msg, Pres. to PM, #477,  
23 February 1944.  
Msg, PM to Pres., #647, ✓  
15 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
MAY 8 1972  
By W. J. Stewart Date \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

- 1 -

0479

18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copies of messages between the President and the Prime Minister on post-war economic collaboration are forwarded for your information.

The Secretary of State is also being furnished copies of these messages.

It is requested that copies of any reply made or action taken by the Treasury Department to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

OGDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant, USNR,  
White House Map Room.

3 Incls.

Msg, Pres. to PM, #476,  
23 February 1944.

Msg, Pres. to PM, #477,  
23 February 1944.

Msg, PM to Pres., #647, ✓  
15 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME-MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 647, 15 APRIL 1944

Reference your 476 and 477. I am in agreement that we should clear our minds on the question as to which matters might profitably be discussed internationally before the end of the war. In a preliminary way at least, the visit of Mr. Stettinius to London should provide an opportunity for discussing the procedure best calculated to ensure that all these economic questions are dealt with in the right order and at the right time.

Reference your 477, on the subject of combined boards and their future status, I entirely agree with you that the boards have done good work and that we should further study the part which they could and should play in our future arrangements. I propose to send instructions to our representatives in Washington as I think that the initial discussions on this had better take place in Washington between the appropriate United States agencies and our representatives there.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 8 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0481



To President as  
White 49, 162302.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

To President at Yaccoway  
as White 49, 162302.  
Answered by Black, 32.

16 April 1944

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 648

Filed 161603Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and for [redacted]. Number 648.

1. You will be aware of the disturbances which  
have broken out among the Greek Armed Forces in the  
Middle East and of the difficulties which have arisen  
with the Greek Government in Cairo.

2. The outbreak in the Greek Army and Navy fol-  
lowed closely on the establishment in the mountains of  
Greece of the political committee sponsored by E.A.M.  
and there is little doubt that the extremist elements  
who have long been working to subvert the allegiance of  
the Greek forces to their legitimate King and Government  
seized on this as a heaven-sent opportunity for open and  
violent action. The dissident elements are undoubtedly  
opposed to the King and in favour of a republic but,  
through the disturbances, there have been almost no di-  
rect attacks on the King's personal position and the only  
specific demand put forward is that the Greek Government  
should take immediate and effective steps to recognize and  
associate with themselves the political committee in Greece.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Brittel  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-74  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0463

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States  
Number 648

Page 2

Filed 161603Z

3. This crisis came at a particularly unfortunate moment since Monsieur Tsouderos had already sent an invitation to a number of moderate politicians in Athens, urging them to come to Cairo to join the government. He had also invited representatives of E.A.M., the Communist-controlled organization which has created and now dominates the political committee. Tsouderos was thus doing everything in his power to create a truly representative Greek Government.

4. In this programme, he had the support of his colleagues and they appear to have had no hand in provoking the disturbances in the Greek forces. But they were extremely jealous of Tsouderos' position and used the trouble in the Greek Army, which was at first on a small scale, to get rid of him. Feeling that he had lost control of the situation, Tsouderos resigned and proposed Venezelos for the Premiership. The trouble in the Greek Army rapidly spread to the Navy and assumed proportions of a full scale mutiny in both forces. The politicians

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0484

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72  
By R. H. Parks  
Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Page 3

Number 648

Filed 161603Z

in Cairo realized that the matter had gone beyond one of personal rivalries or ambitions and their only thought was to find some candidate for the Premiership sufficiently notorious for his left-wing views to be acceptable to the mutinous elements in the forces.

5. The King of Greece was reluctant to accept a new government whose composition was in effect dictated by the mutineers. He considered that order in the Greek Armed Forces must be restored before any lawful reconstruction of the government could be undertaken. I entirely agreed with him and instructed our ambassador to the Greek Government to do his utmost to induce the Greek Ministers to remain at their posts until the King could get back to Cairo and take stock of the situation. This, I am glad to say, they agreed to do. I also gave instructions to the military authorities in the Middle East to deal firmly with indiscipline in the Greek Forces under their command. Order in the Greek Army and Navy has not been completely reestablished but the dissident elements are being isolated and once the ring leaders are under arrest the mutiny should rapidly subside.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. Tel. 3-23-72  
By R. H. Farnsworth Date MAY 6 1972

0485

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Page 4

Number 648

Filed 161603Z

6. The King of Greece has now reached Cairo and, after studying the position for himself, has formed a government under Monsieur Venezelos. For the future, I have informed our ambassador to the Greek Government that he should be guided by the following considerations: -

"Our relations are definitely established with the lawfully-constituted Greek Government headed by the King, who is the ally of Britain and cannot be discarded to suit a momentary surge of appetite among ambitious emigres nonentities. Neither can Greece find constitutional expression in particular sets of Guerillas, in many cases indistinguishable from banditti, who are masquerading as the saviours of their country while living on the local villagers. If necessary, I shall denounce these elements and tendencies publicly in order to emphasise the love Great Britain has for Greece whose suffering she shared in a small measure being, alas, not then armed as we are now. Our only desire and interest is to see Greece a glorious, free nation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 5-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0486

~~SECRET~~

Page 5

"In the same way the Greek Navy, which is full of daring seamen and is playing a worthy part upholding its country's good name, should not suddenly have tried to

MAY 6 1972

0487



~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Page 6

Number 648

Filed 161603Z

meddle with politics and presume to dictate a constitution to the Greek people. I believe that both of these two forces can be brought back to a high sense of national honour and duty if courageous leadership is forthcoming backed by overwhelming force in reserve.

"All the time I have been planning to place Greece back high in the counsels of the victorious nations. Witness how we have included them in the Italian Advisory Council and tried to send a brigade to take part in the impending victories in Italy. Greeks who are in safety in Egypt under our protection equipped with our vessels or armed with our weapons or otherwise in security under the military authority of the British Commander in Chief, Middle East, will place themselves in an abject and shameful position before all history if they allow their domestic feuds to mar their performance of the solemn duties to their country of which they have become the heirs. They may easily, by selfish excitable behaviour reduce Greece to a country without expression either at home or abroad and their names will be stained as long as history is written.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY Erit  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-22-12  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0460



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Page 7

Number 648

Filed 161603Z

"The King is the servant of his people. He makes no claim to rule them. He submits himself freely to the judgment of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. He places himself and his royal house entirely at the disposition of the Greek Nation. Once the German invader has been driven out, Greece can be a republic or a monarchy, entirely as the people wish. Why then cannot the Greeks keep their hatreds for the common enemy who has wrought them such cruel injuries and would obliterate them as a free people, were it not for the resolute exertions of the great Allies?"

7. In sending these instructions, I have asked Ambassador Leeper to make use of all these arguments freely in my name, if necessary, both to the troops and to the sailors as well, of course, as to the politicians, who have been clattering around him. In making it clear to them that this is the policy of His Majesty's Government, I have asked him to emphasize that we seek no advantage for ourselves and have no interests but in the upholding of Greek independence, freedom and honour.

No Sig

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 309-32007  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1981

0483

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 648	DATE 16 Apr 1944
DATE/TIME 161603Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Greek disturbances.	

ACTION

1. To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 49, 16/2300W.
2. In BLACK 32, 18/0405Z, the President sent reply to Map Room for transmittal to PM.
3. Answer sent to PM as PRES #523, 18 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
See Encls.	

0490

~~SECRET~~

*In President as  
White 51, 0915/175  
Black 36, 180405, directed  
this to sent to Sec State  
for draft reply.*

17 April 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

*649*  
~~unclassified~~

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

~~SECRET~~ and personal. Subject: Spanish  
Wolfram.

1. The only difference outstanding between our 2 countries and the Spaniards is that we should like to accept Jordana's final offer of 60 tons between now and the end of June in rising monthly installments of 15, 20, and 25 tons, the remaining 240 tons to be sent in monthly installments of 40 tons between July and December.

2. When considering what turned out to be an unauthorized proposal from the Duke of Alba, you have agreed that 51 tons might go to Germany in monthly installments of 17 tons between now and the end of June. This is the most important period and the difference between us is 9 tons on the 3 months.

3. For the sake of this trifle we ought not surely to run the risk of the Spaniards sending

1  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0491

~~SECRET~~

-2-

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered

in to Germany nearly a thousand tons which is waiting at the frontier, as well as lose all the other points which are of very great interest to us both. I do hope you will be able to give the point your personal consideration.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 2-33-72  
By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0492

18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message #649 from the Prime Minister, dated 17 April 1944, be given to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

It is respectfully suggested that the reply can best be transmitted to the President through the White House Map Room.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Prime Minister to President  
#649, 17 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By U. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 649, 17 APRIL 1944

When considering what turned out to be an unauthorized proposal from the Duke of Alba, you have agreed that 51 tons of wolfram might go to Germany in monthly installments of 17 tons between now and the end of June.

The only difference outstanding between our two countries and the Spaniards is that we should like to accept Jordana's final offer of 60 tons between now and the end of June in rising monthly installments of 15, 20, and 25 tons; the remaining 240 tons to be sent in monthly installments of 40 tons each between July and December.

The period between now and the end of June is the most important, and the difference between us is 9 tons on the 3 months. We ought not, for the sake of this trifle, to run the risk of the Spanish sending into Germany nearly a thousand tons of wolfram which is waiting at the frontier, as well as losing all the other points in which we are greatly interested. I trust that you will personally consider this point.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

**SECRET**

- 1 -

0494

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 649	DATE 17 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Spanish wolfram.	

ACTION

1. (Last msg on this was PRES #639). Sent to President as WHITE 51, 171315Z.
2. In BLACK 36, 18/0405, President directed this be sent to Sec State for draft reply. Sent by memo, 18 Apr 44.
3. Draft reply sent to the President via pouch, 20 Apr 44, as Special Telegram #2 from Sec State to the President.
4. President's reply, quoting Sec State's Special Telegram #2, received in Map Room as BLACK 53, 212135Z. Reply sent to the PM as PRES #529, 21 Apr 44.
5. Sec State notified by telephone evening 21; confirmed by memo 22 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:
601 <i>Thelham.</i>		

0495

To President at  
Harcamaw as  
White 60, 18/12/52

18 April 1944

From: London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 650

Filed 180940Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and [redacted] et. Number 650.

Your number 522.

I certainly think that it would be a good thing  
to send the message as redrafted by you beginning at "1.  
Pursuant to our talks" and ending "will crush the Hitlerites".  
This engages Stalin's direct personal attention and is more  
worthy of the tremendous event to which we are committed  
heart and soul than a Staff notification. It may even be  
followed by a friendly response. I have ventured to omit  
the word "soon" as it seems safer, and have sent it off over  
our joint signatures.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0496



FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 650	DATE 18 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD	

ACTION

Answers PRES-PM #522. 16 Apr 44.

Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 60, 18/1245Z.  
 Answered by the President in BLACK 39, 18/0230Z, Reply  
sent to the PM as PRES #525. 18 Apr 44.

(Resulting message to Stalin extracted from PRES  
 #522 and filed in PRES-STALIN file. Message to Stalin  
 was sent from London to Moscow via British channels,  
 18 Apr 44.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 310 OVERLORD.		FILED:

0497

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

*To President at Kaccamen  
as White #62, 18/16052.*

April 18, 1944

From: Military Attache London, England  
For: President of the United States  
No. 651, Filed 171504Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and [REDACTED] number 651.

Your number 523.

Thank you so much. I have told our people to make use of your message to the King and his new Ministers, and to read it to the mutinous brigade and recalcitrant ships. It may have a most salutary effect. I am not publishing anything here.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. R. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0498

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 651	DATE 18 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER.	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Greek disturbances.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES-Pm #523, 18 Apr 44, which was sent from the President at Waccamaw to the Map Room as BLACK 32, 18/0405Z, for transmittal to the PM.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 62, 18/1605Z.
3. In BLACK 44, 20 Apr 44, informed, "No acknowledgment or reply will be made to WHITE 62."

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>571 Drake.</i>	FILED:
--	--------

0499

*To President at Haslemere  
as White 72, 191535*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 652

Filed 19/0856Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt [REDACTED]  
and personal.

Your 514. (*Assume reference is 510 as that  
covers my Bevin whereas 514 is  
sub statement*)

Para 1. I have talked to Mr. Bevin upon this.

Personally he would like to come and greatly appreciates  
the kindness of your invitation and references to him.  
He very much regrets that he finds it impossible. What  
with the demands of "OVERLORD" and its follow-up and  
with the very delicate situation here with labour unrest,  
he feels he would not be doing his duty in quitting his  
post. I must say that he is so much in the centre of our  
affairs here at this time that I should find it very  
difficult to spare him.

Para 2. On the other hand the labour M.P., George  
Tomlinson, a minister of the Crown, is going with a pretty  
strong team and we hope that they will make a good con-  
tribution towards solving our international problems.  
Great pains have been taken here by Mr. Bevin and other  
labour leaders to make sure that our people have a con-  
structive case to present.

No Sig

*Recd  
19 1350 = [unclear]*

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

0500

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 652	DATE 19 Apr 44
DATE/TIME 19/0856Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 19/1350Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT British representation on International Labor Conference.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES-PM #510. 3 Apr 44.
2. Sent to President at Waccimaw as WHITE 72, 19/1535Z.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as BLACK 46, 21/0300Z.
4. Answer sent to PM as PRES #526. 20 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 210 IL0		FILED:

0501

~~TOP SECRET~~

WDCC  
20 Apr  
0009 Z

From: MA London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 653

Filed: 192350 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and

General De Gaulle would like to inquire, through his representative in Washington, whether a visit from him to you would be agreeable when you return from your holiday. I hope in these circumstances you will tell me I may encourage him to take this course. You might do him a great deal of good by paternal treatment and indeed I think it would be a help from every point of view.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd: 200055Z*

*Sent as White 77 - 200130Z. Rub.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

0502

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	653	DATE	20 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	19/2350Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA		
SUBJECT	French National Committee; visit of De Gaulle.		

## ACTION

1. Answers PRES #521. 13 Apr 44.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 77, 200130Z.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as BLACK 47, 210300Z.
4. Sent to PM as PRES #527. 20 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:

0503

*To President at Maccamaw  
as numbered White via  
pouch, 20 Apr 44.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Br  
Govt., State Dept, tel., S-26-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

*20 April 44.*

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 654

Filed 201253Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. [REDACTED]

and personal.

Many thanks for your 517.

Following is text of telegram I have sent to  
Mackenzie King.

"Many thanks for your telegrams numbers 34 and 35  
of the 10th March. I have now examined these with the  
Chiefs of Staff and I have seen a copy of the reply which  
President Roosevelt has sent you. We welcome the pro-  
posal for the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff  
Mission in London to act as a link with the British Chiefs  
of Staff and with the Supreme Allied Commanders. Our  
Chiefs of Staff will work out detailed arrangements for  
the necessary liaison between themselves and the Canadian  
Joint Staff Mission as soon as we hear that it has been  
appointed.

President Roosevelt has explained that the appropriate  
channels of communication between the Canadian Chiefs of  
Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Chiefs of Staff and not directly through your Joint Staff Mission. You will I think understand that is is essential not to disturb the well-established chain of command whereby the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions on all subjects from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There will of course be no objection to your Joint Staff Mission having contact on day to day liaison matters with the Supreme Commands, but all matters of high policy can only be dealt with through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In your telegram number 34 you expressed the opinion that it would be desirable that appropriate announcements should be made to make clear that General Wilson and General Eisenhower are Commanders in Chief of the participating forces of the United Nations. I agree with President Roosevelt that on military grounds there is no call for such an announcement. I am inclined to doubt its desirability on other grounds. The Supreme Command in the Mediterranean has been in existence for 18 months and has been directing the forces of many nations, which have been placed at its disposal, under arrangements

~~TOP SECRET~~

0505

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

satisfactory to all. Any general announcement at the present time might give rise to misunderstandings and cause difficulties with the many participants in the European campaigns. I suggest therefore that if you desire to announce the authority of General Eisenhower over the Canadian Forces under his command, that you should do so on behalf of the Canadian Government alone, rather than that we should seek to get agreement from all concerned for a general announcement."

No Sig

*Received 20/1430 Z.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0506

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 654	DATE 20 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 201253	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Canadian Joint Staff Mission to London; and relationship to supreme commanders of theatres.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #517. 8 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw via pouch as unnumbered White, 20 Apr 44.
3. President's reply received in the Map Room as BLACK 52, 21 Apr 44. Sent to PM as PRES #528. 21 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>210 Canadian Jt. Staff Mission</i>	FILED:
--	--------

0507

To President at Macman as  
White 22 Apr 44 (2211412)  
To State for action (Black 55).

White 91 -

April 22, 1944

From: Military Attache London, England  
To: President of the United States  
No. 655, Filed 221543Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and [REDACTED] Number 655.

Your number 529 (of April 22nd: Spanish Wol-  
fram).

1. Since I sent you my number 649, Lord Halli-  
fax has been discussing this question with Mr Cordell  
Hull who, after drawing attention to your difficulties  
with your public opinion, proposed that we should our-  
selves sponsor Spanish oil shipments on the basis of  
our special strategic interests and supply needs in  
Spain. The United States Government would not be di-  
rectly concerned with this arrangement but Mr Hull in-  
timated that we would be able to make a much better  
case for it than for the same action taken by you. He  
concluded that this was the best way we could help  
you.

2, As I have already explained to you, I am

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Recd 221725Z

Re White 91-221840Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0508

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

convinced that the present Spanish offer is a good one, which I shall be glad to sponsor as a practical and prestige victory over our enemies. I am also sure that it is the best we can get. Our latest information indicates that if we do not close on it within a day or two the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs will resign and there will be a temporary swing away from us in Spain. This will automatically bring about all the disadvantages which I have set out in my earlier messages, including an immediate increase in Spanish Wolfram exports to Germany. I have no doubt that Sir Samuel Hoare has already done all that is possible to prevent the 60 tons, to which you attach such importance, going to Germany before the end of June. The course you now suggest would only mean future delay which might prove very dangerous.

3. As regards your references to the other neutrals, I cannot believe that they will be deterred from meeting our wishes by the fact that a negligible quantity of Wolfram (a few lorry loads) goes to Germany from Spain before the end of June. On the

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

contrary, a settlement with Spain which will be a clear victory for us could, in my view, only have a good effect on the other neutrals, more particularly as Spain has hitherto been the most pro-German among them. In fact, I regard an immediate settlement with Spain on the lines now proposed as offering the best prospects for bringing about a reduction in Portuguese Wolfram exports. Some here fear that your recent decision to raise your legation at Lisbon to an embassy may give Salazar the impression that we do not mean business. We already dealing with Turkey separately and I am not aware of any demands that we are now making upon Switzerland. If Switzerland did not exist it would have to be invented.

4. I understand difficulties about public opinion. It is for that reason that I have already instructed Lord Halifax to inform Mr Hull that I am ready to fall in with his wishes, and take upon myself the whole responsibility for this settlement. I have already instructed Sir S Hoare to make a communication accordingly to the Spanish Government as soon as I receive confirmation that the United States Gov-

~~TOP SECRET~~

0510

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

-4-

ernment would acquiesce in the above arrangement as suggested by Mr Hull. It is important that Sir S Hoare should act early next week and I therefore hope that either you or Mr Hull will confirm United States acquiescence in the above procedure before then.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1977

~~SECRET~~

0571

~~TOP SECRET~~

23 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 655 from the Prime Minister, dated 22 April 1944, is forwarded to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Msg, PM-PRES #655,  
22 April 1944.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
- 1 -

0512



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
22 April 1944

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 655

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

With reference to your number 529 received on April 22 regarding Spanish wolfram:

1. Since my number 649 was sent to you, Lord Halifax has been talking over this problem with Mr. Cordell Hull who, after emphasizing your difficulties with your public opinion, suggested that we ourselves should sponsor shipments of oil to Spain on the basis of our supply needs and special strategic interests in that country. Your Government would not be concerned directly with such an arrangement but Mr. Hull intimated that a much better case for it could be made by us than if you took the same action. He concluded that this was the best manner in which we could assist you.

2. I am, as I have already explained to you, convinced that the present offer from the Spanish Government is a good one, which I shall be glad to back as a prestige and a practical victory over the Axis. In addition, I am sure we can get nothing better. According to our most recent information indications are that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs will resign if we do not close the deal within a day or two and that in Spain there will be a temporary trend away from us. Automatically this will bring about all the disadvantages which have been set out by me in earlier messages, including an immediate increase in exports of wolfram to Germany from Spain. That Sir Samuel Hoare has already done all that is possible to prevent the sixty tons, to which such importance is

1

attached by you, going to Germany before the end of June, I can have no doubt. Only future delay, which might prove very dangerous would result from the course you now suggest.

3. I cannot believe, as regards your references to the other neutrals that they will be deterred from meeting our wishes by the fact that a few lorry loads of wolfram, a negligible quantity, goes from Spain before the end of June to Germany. Quite the opposite, a settlement with the Spanish Government which for us will be a clear victory could, as I see it, have on the other neutrals only a good effect. More particularly as among them Spain has hitherto been the most pro-German. As a matter of fact, an immediate settlement with Spain on the basis now suggested I regard as offering the best prospects of effecting a reduction in exports of wolfram from Portugal. Your recent decision to raise to an embassy your legation at Lisbon has caused some here to fear that the impression that we do not mean business may be given to Salazar. With Turkey we are already dealing separately and of any demands upon Switzerland that we are now making, I am not aware. Switzerland would have to be invented if it did not exist.

4. About public opinion difficulties I understand. I have already for that reason given instructions to Lord Halifax to inform Mr. Hull that I am ready to fall in with his desires, and assume the whole responsibility for this settlement myself. Sir Samuel Hoare has already been instructed by me to make a communication accordingly to the Government of Spain as soon as I receive confirmation that the above arrangements as suggested by Mr. Hull would be acquiesced in by the United States Government. In view of the fact that it is important that Sir Samuel Hoare should act early next week I hope, therefore, that, either Mr. Hull or yourself

~~TOP SECRET~~

will before then confirm United States acquiescence in the above procedure.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0515

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 655	DATE 22 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 221543Z	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Spanish wolfram	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #529, 21 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 91, 221840Z.
3. In BLACK 55, 230145Z, referred to Sec State for preparation of reply.
4. Sec States proposal sent to the President as WHITE 113, 250100Z.
5. BLACK 66, 251715, approves WHITE 113.
6. BLACK 67, 251715, forwards to Map Room President's reply to PM. Sent to PM as PRES #531.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 601 Wolfram.	FILED:
-----------------------------------	--------

0516

~~TOP SECRET~~

*To President at  
Nauyas on White 92,  
2220007.*

April 22, 1944

From: Military Attache London, England  
To: President of the United States  
No. 656, Filed 221/302.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and [REDACTED] Number 656.

Your 52/.

From our previous correspondence, especially number 518 on which I took action, I had hoped you would go a little further with this. After all this man, whom I trust as little as you do, commands considerable forces including Naval Forces and the Richelieu, which are placed most freely at our disposal and are in action or eager for action. He presides over a vast empire, all the strategic points in which are at our disposal. May I send the following:

"Prime Minister to General De Gaulle. The President tells me that he will be very much pressed with work immediately after his return to Washington. But if the French Representative in Washington raises the question after the middle of May, your visit would

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0517

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

be agreeable to him, subject of course to the unforeseeable events of war."

I hope you can go as far as this.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0518

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 656	DATE 22 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Visit of De Gaulle.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #527, 20 Apr 44.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 92, 222000Z.
2. President's reply received in the Map Room as  
BLACK 60, 232220Z. Sent to PM as PRES #530, 23 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
0009: [unclear]		

~~TOP SECRET~~

White 107

Apr 24

Rec'd 24/1835Z

White 107 24/2045

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 657

Filed 24/1557Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal private and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Your number 530.

Para 1. You started me off on this by your number 518. However I press it no more, especially as the date you mention is one round about which I am hoping you will remember you have a prior engagement.

Para 2. I have had very good talks with Berle, McCloy and above all Stettinius. I am most relieved by what I have heard about Harry.

Para 3. I am glad we sent our joint telegram to UJ because it is a great thing to have on record that he accepts what we are going to do as fulfillment of the Teheran undertakings and in addition that he himself will move accordingly.

Para 4. Thank you very much for your message about the Greeks. I have made use of it in all quarters concerned. The Greek naval mutineers have now surrendered unconditional to a boarding attack by loyal Greek sailors. I think the

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

mutionous brigade will be brought to its bearings tomorrow. At any rate if it is not, we shall have to use artillery against its batteries, which are pointing at us. There are two small heights to be taken during the night. With the dawn comes a heavy shower of leaflets. Smoke is then dropped so as to leave a quarter of an hour when all will be in darkness and when it is hoped a large number of these gentry will make their way out from the abodes of the guilty. By these means we hope to establish order without bloodshed. King George has shown great steadfastness and has got hold of a Greek named Papandreou, said to be a man of high and firm character and of public distinction, who has lived in Greece all the time and consequently is one up on the earlier emigres. I expect he will make Papandreou Premier. Generally the position seems to be clearing up.

Para 5. It will be well to get these Greek matters out of the way, as His Majesty King Farouk is on his high horse. He wishes to dismiss the Nahas government, which has a large majority in the chamber, the chamber having 3 years to run. Nahas as you know represents the WAFD party of the democracy and the peasants, and is viewed with much distaste by the palace circles and the wealthy Pashas and it is believed by the Egyptian army. We are quite ready to have an

~~TOP SECRET~~

0521

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

election and so is Nahas, provided it can take place at once. This the King thinks is a horrible idea: he wishes to put his palace minister Hassanein in as Prime Minister with a court clique around him to rig the election in the next 3 or 4 months. We cannot allow this, as it would make great enemies of the working class and peasant parties who stood so firm and steady when the enemy was but 60 miles from Cairo and when Farouk might have slipped off any day to join the Italians or Germans. Here again we are proceeding with great caution but also with force behind. To be quite fair I must admit that Nahas and company fall below the standards which idealists have always hoped for in Oriental democracy. He and his party are corrupt, incompetent but fully capable, I blush to say, influencing elections otherwise than by oratory.

Para 6. I am very glad at what has happened in Italy. It seems to me that we have both succeeded in gaining what we sought. The only thing now lacking is a victory. I had long talks with Alexander when he was here for a few days consultation. He defended his actions or inactions with much force, pointing out the small plurality of his army, its mixed character, there being no fewer than 7 separate nationalities against the homogeneous Germans, the vileness of the weather and the extremely awkward nature of the ground. At latest by the date in my immediately following he will

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

attack and push everything in as hard as possible. If this battle were successful or even going at full blast it would fit in very well with other plan.

Para 7. I hope that you have benefitted by your rest and that a sea voyage may be prescribed in due course to consolidate the effects of your holiday. I have had a busman's holiday myself having been acting Foreign Secretary and leader of the house as well as my other odd jobs.

Every good wish to you and yours.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0523

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 657	DATE 24/April 1944
DATE/TIME	
OR FILE NUMBER 24/15574	
FOR MAP ROOM 24/1835	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT DeGaulle visit; joint telegram to UJ re OVERLORD; Greeks; Wogs; Italian offensive.	

ACTION

1. Answers PMA 530; and others.
2. To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 107, 242045Z.
3. Answered by ~~PRM~~ #532, received in Map Room as  
BLACK 69, 260230Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 000.9; 310 <del>British</del> ; - 310 <del>Amend</del> ; 300 Italy 057 Egypt.	FILED:
---	--------

0524

~~TOP SECRET~~

White 109.

Recd 24/2030Z

Sent 24/2121Z

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 658

24/NFT

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~TOP SECRET~~

My immediately preceding telegram, para 6. May  
14th is date.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0525

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	658	DATE	24 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	24/NFT		
TOR MAP ROOM	24/2030Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT D-Day for Italian offensive.			

# ACTION

1. This message is further to PM #657, which see for action.
2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 109, 242121Z.
3. Answered by PRES #532, received in the Map Room as BLACK 69, 260230Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
30 Italy		

0526

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd - 24/2030Z

Sent as White 110  
24/2125Z

BP.

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 659

24/NFT

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and

Have just read Rear Admiral Francis Low Chief of Staff of US 10th Fleet about anti submarine warfare. All this matter might have come in very well in our monthly statement as agreed. You instituted, with my agreement, the monthly statements which seem to have worked pretty well on the conventions agreed. Would you consider whether this pronouncement is not rather outside the scope of our arrangement. Tell me if anyone here has offended.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0527





~~SECRET~~

WDCC  
24 Apr  
2048 Z

White 111  
at 24/2145 Z

Rec'd - 24/2130 Z  
BP?

From: MA London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 660

Filed: 242030 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and [REDACTED].

Further to my number 657 I have just heard from General Paget that British troops occupied key positions on the ridge overlooking the Greek camp last night and encountered slight opposition. There were no Greek casualties but one British Officer was killed. The Greek brigade surrendered this morning and laid down its arms. The brigade is now being evacuated to a prisoner of war cage where the ring leaders will be arrested.

The mutinous Navy surrendered unconditionally 24 hours earlier.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0529



[REDACTED]

25 April 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 661

Filed: 25/1032Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt  
personal and [REDACTED] Number 661.

My telegram number 650.

I have received following telegram  
dated April 22 from Premier Stalin in reply to  
our joint message. Begins:

I have received your message of the 18th  
April. The Soviet Government is satisfied with  
your statement that in accordance with the Tehe-  
ran agreement, the crossing of the sea will take  
place on the date planned regarding which Generals  
Deane and Burrows had already informed our General  
Staff and that you will be acting at your fullest  
strength. I express my confidence in the success  
of the planned operations.

I, also, hope for the success of the  
operation to be undertaken by you in Italy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Rec'd 25/1217 Z*  
*White 114 (pouch)*

[REDACTED]

0531

~~SECRET~~

-2-

From: U. S. Military Attache London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 661 Filed: 25/10322

As we agreed at Teheran, the Red Army will undertake at the same time its new offensive in order to give the maximum support to the Anglo-American operations.

I beg you to accept my thanks for the wishes which you express regarding the success of the Red Army. I subscribe to your declaration that your armies and ours supporting one another will crush the Hitlerites and fulfil their historic missions. Ends.

I am not inclined to press them for details of their operations as we are such a great distance apart and they certainly have played up with grand vigour.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0532


FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 661	DATE 25 April 1944
DATE/TIME 25/1032Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM 25/1217Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD	

ACTION

1. Further to Pa 650, PRES 525.)
2. To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 114 (via pouch), 25 Apr 44.
3. Answered by PRES #532, received in the Map Room as BLACK 69, 260230Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
710 <i>Overland.</i>		

0533

  
26 April 1944

Rec'd 26/0825 Z  
White 123 26/1200 Z.

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 662

Filed: 26/0727Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

personal and . Number 662.

Your number 531.

We are all here greatly obliged for your  
consideration.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

  
0534

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 662	DATE 26 April 1944
DATE/TIME 26/0727Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Spanish wolfram.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES 531.
2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 123, 261200Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: Col Helman	FILED:
---------------------------------	--------

0535

~~TOP SECRET~~  
26 April 1944

Recd. 26/1240Z  
Sent white 124  
26/1320Z  
BP

From: US Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 663

Filed 2611145Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~TOP SECRET~~ No. 663.

King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broad-based administration not obnoxious to the Partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible? He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy.

No Sig

red to Sec State (Black 76)  
Apr 4 for preparation  
draft reply.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0536



~~SECRET~~

28 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached message from the President for the Secretary of State was received in the White House Map Room this date.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl.  
Msg, Pres to Sec of  
State, 28 Apr 44.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date ~~MAY~~ 6 1972

~~SECRET~~  
- 1 -

0537

~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

28 APRIL 1944.

FOR : THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have received the following message from Churchill:

"King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broadbased administration not obnoxious to the partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible? He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy."

I am perfectly willing to help the Prime Minister but do not know where the Ban is.

Please prepare a draft reply and also read King Peter's letter to me.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0538

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 663	DATE 26 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 26/1240Z	
TO: MAP ROOM 26/1320Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT King Peter's government--the Ban of Croatia.	

ACTION

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 124, 26/1320Z.
2. BLACK 76 refers msg to Sec State for draft reply.
3. On 12 May 44, State Department advised that the Ban has been located and had gone to England as suggested by Prime Minister and King Peter.
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, taken to President at Shangri-La in pouch by Captain Wood. BLACK 1. 131645Z, approving Leahy's draft with additions, received in Map Room.
2. Answer to PM as PRAS #539. 13 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 051 Yugoslavia	FILED:
-------------------------------------	--------

0539

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 April 1944

Recd. 26/1240Z  
Sent White 125  
26/1320Z (P?)

From: US Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 664

Filed 26/1149Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~to~~ No. 664.

Your 532.

The Egyptian political crisis is at an end as the King has agreed not to make any changes at present. An attempt is being made to patch up things between him and the government.

Thank you so much for all your kindness. I am greatly delighted that your health has improved.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0540

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 664	DATE 26 April 1944
DATE/TIME 26/1240Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Egyptian political crisis.	

ACTION

1. Answerd PRES #532. 25 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 125, 261320Z.
3. No reply required.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 052 Cyphel	FILED:
---------------------------------	--------

0541

*Black 86, 30/1900, directed  
this msg be forwarded Sec  
State for draft reply after con-  
sultation with JCS.*

*WZ*

29 April 1944

*White 145*

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 665

29/NFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

**[REDACTED]**  
*Para 1.* I am seriously concerned about the food situation in India and its possible reactions on our joint operations. Last year we had a grievous famine in Bengal through which at least 700,000 people died. This year there is a good crop of rice, but we are faced with an acute shortage of wheat, aggravated by unprecedented storms which have inflicted serious damage on the Indian spring crops. India's shortage cannot be overcome by any possible surplus of rice even if such a surplus could be extracted from the peasants. Our recent losses in the Bombay explosion have accentuated the problem.

*Para 2.* Wavell is exceedingly anxious about our position and has given me the gravest warnings. His present estimate is that he will require imports of about one million tons this year if he is to hold the situation, and so meet the needs of

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Sent: 1535Z/29. RUS*

**[REDACTED]**

0542

[REDACTED]

the United States and British and Indian troops and of the civil population especially in the great cities. I have just heard from Mountbatten that he considers the situation so serious that, unless arrangements are made promptly to import wheat requirements, he will be compelled to release military cargo space of SEAC in favour of wheat and formally to advise Stilwell that it will also be necessary for him to arrange to curtail American military demands for this purpose.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1 Para 3 By cutting down military shipments and other means, I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to India from Australia during the first nine months of 1944. This is the shortest haul. I cannot see how to do more.

Para 4 I have had much hesitation in asking you to add to the great assistance you are giving us with shipping but a satisfactory situation in India is of such vital importance to the success of our joint plans against the Japanese that I am impelled to ask you to consider a special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia without reducing the assistance you are now providing for us, who are at a positive minimum if war efficiency is to be maintained. We have the wheat (in Australia) but we lack the ships. I have resisted

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

for some time the Viceroy's request that I should ask you for your help, but I believe that, with this recent misfortune to the wheat harvest and in the light of Mountbatten's representations, I am no longer justified in not asking for your help. Wavell is doing all he can by special measures in India. If however he should find it possible to revise his estimate of his needs, I would let you know immediately.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0544





*Apr 11 1944*

29th April 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 666

29/NFT

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

I have learned with great sorrow of the sudden death of Colonel Knox. If you will allow me to say so, His Majesty's Government and especially the Admiralty feel his loss acutely, for no-one could have been more forthcoming and helpful in all our difficult times than was this distinguished American Statesman and War Administrator.

The War Cabinet have desired me to express their sympathy with you in losing so invaluable a colleague, to which I add my own expressions of sincere sorrow.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd 291900Z*

*Sent 291915Z*

0546

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 666	DATE 29 April 1944
DATE/TIME 29/NFT	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM 291900Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Statement on Secretary of Navy Knox's death.	

ACTION

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 147, 291915Z.
2. (See also PM 667, requesting that statement be published.)
3. Answered by PRAS #533, 29 Apr 44, which was received in the Map Room as BLACK 83, 300240Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
-------------------	--------

140

0547

~~SECRET~~  
29th April 1944

*White 116*  
From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 667

29/NFT

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~SECRET~~

My immediately preceding telegram. We propose that  
this message should be published, unless you have any  
objections.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0548



*Sent to President at 20  
as White 149. 29/21302 - osc  
Black 84, 302220, directed copy  
to given JCS for information.*

29 April 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 668

Filed 29/1640Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and [REDACTED]

Para 1. We are deeply grateful for a statement made by Admiral King reported to us in our JSM 23, holding out the hope that the L.S.T's which have been considered in relation to some form of "ANVIL" may even yet be made available to us for the greatest amphibious operation we can stage after the big battle in Italy is decided. This has followed our COS (W) 16 of April 27th and gives me hope that the difficulties are clearing away. Admiral King is being informed that as soon as the conference between Wilson, who is coming home, Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff has reached a definite point, we will submit our proposals.

Para 2. Let me repeat that I do not consider that the objective of the forthcoming battle in Italy called "DIADEM" is the taking of Rome good though that would be or even the joining of the bridgehead which is indispensable.

*Received 29/2015Z.*

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks

DATE MAY 6 1972

0550

Its prime purpose is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, and if by mid-May we find the enemy before us in present strength I have every hope we shall be so closely engaged and entangled with them, we being the superior force, that much of the life may be struck out of this German army. Meanwhile everything not wanted for this battle is being prepared for the biggest amphibious operation we can mount on which decisions will be taken and laid before you as soon as Wilson arrives on Monday.

Para 3. Like the United States C.O.S. I too fear a sudden and swift withdrawal through the tunnels of the Alps, but I do not consider on the whole that it is very likely. Hitler obstinate by habit vide Stalingrad, the Crimea, Tunis etc and also he would be very much afraid of his position in the Balkans. If he let us get swiftly up to the north of Italy he would not be able to tell which way we would go. Moreover he must now be very expectant of an "OVERLORD" move in the favourable moon and tide period at the beginning of May as indeed was originally aimed at by us. Notwithstanding this, he has made no move to withdraw the eight extra divisions sucked down to the south of Rome by the "SHINGLE" operation and our joint fighting there.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0051

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 668	DATE 29 Apr 1944
DATE/TIME 29/1640Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 29/2015Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT LST assignment; DIADema (Italian offensive) operation.	

ACTION

1. To the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 149.
2. BLACK 84, 301900Z Apr, directed copy be given Joint Chiefs for information.
3. May 18, 44, Admiral Leahy informed Map Room that all action on this had been taken by the JCS, and that no reply would be necessary.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 412 + 300 Italy.		FILED:

0552



~~TOP SECRET~~

*To President via  
rusher 0721202*

7th May 1944

*5/9/44*

*To Adam Leahy  
for action.*

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 669,

07/1720Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and [REDACTED] Number 669.

Para 1. The War Cabinet have been much concerned during the last three weeks about the number of Frenchmen killed in the raids on the railway centres in France. We have had numerous Staff meetings with our own officers and I have discussed the matter with Generals Eisenhower and Bedell Smith. There were and are great differences of opinion in the two Air Forces not between them but criss cross about the efficacy of the "Railway Plan" as a short term project. In the end Eisenhower, Tedder, Bedell Smith and Portal all declare themselves converted. I am personally by no means convinced that this is the best way to use our Air Forces in the preliminary period, and still think that the G.A.F. should be the main target. The matter has been discussed in very great detail on the technical side, and it would not be wise to dismiss lightly the arguments for or against.

~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0053

REGRADU UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

Para 2. When this project was first put forward a loss of 60,000 French civilian casualties including injured, say 20,000 killed was mentioned. The War Cabinet could not view this figure without grave dismay on account of the apparently ruthless use of the Air Forces, particularly of the Royal Air Force on whom the brunt of this kind of work necessarily falls, and the reproaches that would be made upon the inaccuracy of night bombing. The results of the first, say, three-sevenths of the bombing have however shown that the casualties to French civil life are very much less than was expected by the commanders, in fact Air Chief Marshal Tedder has now expressed the opinion that about 10,000 killed, apart from injured, will probably cover the job.

Para 3. I am satisfied that all possible care will be taken to minimize this slaughter of friendly civilian life. Nevertheless the War Cabinet share my apprehensions of the bad effect which will be produced upon the French civilian population by these slaughters, all taking place so long before OVERLORD D Day. They may easily bring about a great revulsion in French feeling towards their approaching United States and British liberators. They may leave a

~~TOP SECRET~~

0554

1  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

legacy of hate behind them. I have just now received the telegram contained in my immediately following from our Ambassador at Algiers, which I am pretty sure represents a serious wave of opinion in France. It may well be that the French losses will grow heavier on and after D Day, but in the heat of battle, when British and United States troops will probably be losing at a much higher rate, a new proportion establishes itself in mens minds. It is the intervening period that causes me most anxiety. We are of course doing everything in our power by leaflets etc to warn the French people to keep clear of dangerous spots, and this may prove beneficial in the remaining interval. However both on technical and political grounds, which latter are very gravely involved, the War Cabinet feel very great distress and anxiety.

Para 4. Accordingly they ask me to invite you to consider the matter from the highest political standpoint and to give us your opinion as a matter between governments. It must be remembered on the one hand that this slaughter is among a friendly people who have committed no crimes against us, and not among the German foe with all their record of cruelty and ruthlessness. On the other hand we naturally feel the hazardous nature of operation OVERLORD

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-25-72  
By R. H. Furke Date MAY 5 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0555

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

and are in deadly earnest about making it a success. I have been careful in stating this case to you to use only the most moderate terms, but I ought to let you know that the War Cabinet is unanimous in its anxiety about these French slaughters, even reduced as they have been, and also in its doubts as to whether almost as good military results could not be produced by other methods. Whatever is settled between us, we are quite willing to share responsibilities with you.

No Sig

Rec'd 072120Z

L

to Ad Leahy for action.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0556

8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy

The President has directed that the attached Prime Minister messages number 669 and number 670 be delivered to Admiral Leahy for action.

RICHARD PARK, JR.  
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc.(HW)

1. Msg. PM to Pres. ✓  
#669, 7 May 44.
2. Msg. PM to Pres.  
#670, 7 May 44.

0557



~~TOP SECRET~~

To President via  
E/8/44 Fisher-0721202  
To Admiral Leahy  
for action  
7th May 1944

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 670

Filed 07/1730Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~REDACTED~~ Number 670.

The text of the telegram referred to in my number  
669 follows:

"Massigli handed me this morning a memorandum concerning Allied bombardments of French targets, expressing the serious psychological effect they are having on the French population and French resistance groups when the loss of human life involved does not seem to correspond with the results obtained, notably in the case of stations and factories in populated districts. It is suggested that sabotage operations would achieve a better result without risk of life.

Para 2. Massigli told me that he had had a letter from a friend of his in France in whom he has complete confidence, speaking of reactions amongst the French population particularly with regard to Rouen and Paris.

Para 3. The memorandum ends with a request that the French and Allied high commands should collaborate in the  
~~REDACTED~~

File Copy

0559

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

choice of targets on French territory.

Para 4. I do not know whether a French expert from their mission in London is consulted by target committee. If this is not the case, I think it would have a good psychological effect here if a French transport expert several of whom are now in London, could be co-opted on target committee for consultation when targets in France are being examined. He might have useful information to communicate."

Para 5. Text of note goes to you by bag.

*Rec'd 072120Z*

*L*

*Do Ad Sahy  
for action.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0560



8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy

The President has directed that the attached Prime Minister messages number 669 and number 670 be delivered to Admiral Leahy for action.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc.(HW)

1. Msg, PM to Pres,  
#669, 7 May 44.
2. Msg, PM to Pres, ✓  
#670, 7 May 44.

0561



*WTH*

~~SECRET~~

May 8, 1944

From: U S Military Attache London, England  
To: President of the United States  
No. 671, NPT/8th

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal  
and ~~SECRET~~ Number 671.

I hope you will be able to find time to have a  
talk with Sir W. Citrine. As a Privy Councillor and  
leader of the British Trades Union Congress he is a  
person of consequence with us.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Recd: 081345Z. RAB  
Gen. Watson has for action.*

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

0563

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1944.

Dear Navy:

Glad you are back --  
hope it was somewhat of a rest  
for you too. The General has  
had me phone Embassy on the  
attached, and we will get him  
in when he returns to Washington.

Roberta B.

0564

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 671	DATE 8 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER NPT/8th.	
TOR MAP ROOM 081345Z.	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Talk with Sir W. Citrine.	

# ACTION

1. To the President via Admiral Brown.
2. To General Watson for action.
3. Note from Roberta Barrows, Gen Watson's secretary, 8 May 44, stated: "The General has had me phone Embassy on the attached, and we will get him in when he returns to Washington."
4. Answered by PREB #535, 8 May 44, which was given to Captain Wood by the President on the south lawn, 8 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
000.9	

0565

WAL

~~SECRET~~

8th May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 672, 8th May 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and [REDACTED] number 672.

Thank you for the joint U-boat warfare statement  
for April. I have no alterations to suggest and Mackenzie  
King, to whom I showed it, agrees with its terms. We will  
accordingly release it on May 10th.

No Sig

*Received in MR 1925Z.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Perks Date MAY 6 1972

10 Copy

~~SECRET~~

0566

8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Office of War Information.  
Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.

The following statement has been approved by the President and the Prime Minister for release on May 10:

"The following joint Anglo-American statement on submarine and anti-submarine operations is issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister.

"In April 1944, the United Nations anti-submarine activity continued at a highly satisfactory level. Again for another month the extraordinary fact continues that the number of enemy submarines sunk exceeds the number of Allied merchant ships sunk by submarines."

Respectfully,

CHESTER WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 672	DATE 8th May 1944
DATE/TIME	8th/NFT
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT	April monthly sub statement.

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #534, 5 May 44.
2. Shown to President with evening news, 8 May 1944.
3. By memo to Directors of Office of War Information and Bureau of Public Relations, Navy Department, 8 May 44, for release on 10 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

20.7

0568



~~SECRET~~

WBC

additions & changes by Poland

536

From: U S Military Attache, London England

To: The President of the United States

No. <sup>673</sup>~~Unnumbered~~ 11 May 1944

Prime Minister to President personal and ~~SECRET~~

Your No. 563. The Chiefs of Staff suggest the amendments contained in the following text. They seem to strengthen our statement.

"From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin.

In order to give maximum strength to the attack across the sea against northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France <sup>(in conjunction)</sup> simultaneously with the OVERLORD assault. <sup>(expecting)</sup> We are planning to make such an attack later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from northern France

File Copy  
Sent as White 1-  
120300Z. RUC

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0569

and the eastern front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France. Signed Roosevelt Churchill.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Jones Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0570

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 673	DATE 11 May 1944
DATE/TIME 11/NFT	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Informing Stalin of cancellation of ANVIL	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #536. 10 May 44.
2. To President at Shangri-La as WHITE 1, 120200Z.
3. WHITE 5, Admiral Leahy sent message to President suggesting PM #673 be approved.
4. Miss Tully returned WHITE 5 with President's approval. Sent to PM as #538. 12 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:
310 ANVIL		

0571

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

*To President at Shangri La as White 2, 11 May 44.  
Admiral Leahy's first draft of reply sent as  
White 4; modified in White 6.*

12th May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 674

Filed 12/1116Z

To President Roosevelt from Prime Minister personal  
and ~~TOP SECRET~~ number 674.

As the hour approaches we feel it indispensable to have some kind of understanding with the French National Committee. Owing to the restrictions we have found it necessary to put on cypher communications and on comings and goings from this island, which gained your approval, we find it impossible to allow any French who have come or may be permitted to come to this island in order to join in the Eisenhower-Koenig conversations, to leave it again before the event. De Gaulle and his committee refuse to accept these conditions and state that no reasonable discussion is possible.

Para 2. In these circumstances we must presently be faced with a public complaint that no kind of arrangement has been made with the French National Committee for the employment of French forces outside or inside France. We could quite well dispense with French aid from outside in

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0572

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

the operation, because the LeClerc Division does not reach the scene until D plus 90, and as the FNCL will have no troops till then the military aspect would not be involved. However General Eisenhower says that he attaches great importance to the action to be taken by the French resistance groups on and after D Day, and undoubtedly we must take care that our joint troops do not suffer heavier losses owing to the fact that no agreement has been made for the employment of the French resistance groups. The French Committee state that the resistance army numbers 175,000 men and they intend to incorporate them officially in the French Army under the name of French Forces of the Interior.

Para 3. I therefore propose to you that General De Gaulle, together with one or two of his committee, should be invited to come here on say May 18th in the utmost secrecy: That you should either entrust your case to General Eisenhower or send over someone specially to meet them: That we should discuss outstanding matters affecting military and political collaborations together face to face, showing all our substantial reasons against any extreme demands but endeavouring to reach a working arrangement. The Foreign Secretary or I would conduct the discussion with De Gaulle and any of your

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0573

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

representatives you may choose. We will make the best proposals we can to you without agreeing to anything until we have heard from you. It may be that no agreement will be reached because they are unreasonable, in which case we have done our best, and he will have put himself hopelessly in the wrong. In any case we shall have done our duty by the soldiers and you will have the fullest opportunity of seeing the best lay-out we can get for you to consider.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0574

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	674	DATE	11 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	12/1116Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA		
SUBJECT Pre-OVERLORD meeting with French National Committee in London.			

ACTION

1. Sent to the President at Shangir-La as WHITE 2, 12 May 44.
2. Admiral Leahy sent proposed reply to President as WHITE 4, 12 May 44.
3. WHITE 6, 121820Z, forwards modified draft reply for President's approval. Draft altered after consultation between Adm Leahy and Gen Marshall.
4. Miss Tully returned Adm Leahy's draft with President's approval. Also directed that message be quoted to Gen Eisenhower with further notations by the President.
5. Msg sent to PM as #538, 13 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>On France</i>		

0575

[REDACTED]

13th May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 675

Filed 13/1534Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and [REDACTED] Number 675.

Your 538. Joint message to Uncle Joe has been  
despatched.

No Sig

*Sent to President at  
Shangri-La as  
While 9, 131700Z.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

[REDACTED]

File Copy

0576





~~SECRET~~

WOL

14th May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 676

Filed 14/1422

Prime Minister to President personal and  
Number 676.

Ban duly lifted and safely received.

No Sig

*Recd 141645Z -osc*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

0578

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 676	DATE 14 May 1944
DATE/TIME	
OR FILE NUMBER 14/1442Z.	
FOR MAP ROOM 14/1645Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Ban of Croatia	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES # 539. 13 May 1944.
2. To President at Shangri-La as WHITE 12, 131710Z.
3. No reply. (See PM-PRES 677 for further correspondence on Ban.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 051 Yugoslavia		FILED:

0579

~~SECRET~~

WS

WDCC  
18 May  
1806 Z

From: U S Military Attache, London England  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 677 Filed: 181450 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and  
Number 677.

I send you herewith a message which I have sent to Marshal Tito, which I hope you will like. The King hopes to announce his new government on Monday. He has just left me, and seems in very good form. Telegram runs as follows:

This morning, as the result of British advice, King Peter II dismissed Monsieur Puric's administration, which included General Mihailovic as Minister of War. He is now about to form a small government under the Ban of Croatia. This course has the strong approval of his Britannic Majesty's Government.

We do not know what will happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic certainly holds a powerful position locally as Commander in Chief, and it does not follow that his ceasing to be Minister of War will rob him of his influence. We cannot predict what he will do. There is also a very large body, amounting perhaps to 200,000, of Serbian peasant proprietary who are anti-German but strongly Serbian and who naturally hold the views of a peasants owner-

*To Pres via Gen Watson*

**File Copy**

*Recd 1615 Z/18*

*Pres has seen*

*19232/18*

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72  
By R. N. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0580

~~SECRET~~

ship community. My object is that these forces may be made to work with you for a united, independent Yugoslavia which will expel from the soil of Yugoslavia the filthy Hitlerite murderers and invaders till not one remains.

It is of importance to the common cause and to our relations with you that these changes should be given a fair chance to develop in a favourable way to the main object. I should greatly regret it if you were at all in a hurry to denounce them in public. Crucial events impend in Europe. The battle in Italy goes in our favour.

WS, General Wilson assures me of his resolve to aid you to the very utmost. I feel therefore that I have a right to ask you to forbear any utterance adverse to this new event, at least for a few weeks till we can have exchanged telegrams upon it.

Brigadier Maclean, who is with me now, will be with you in less than 3 weeks with all the views he has gathered here, and I hope that at the very least you will await his return.

Meanwhile, I congratulate you once more upon the number of enemy divisions which you are holding gripped on your various fronts. You will realize, Marshal Tito, that the war will soon come to a very high pitch of intensity and that British, American and Russian forces will all hurl themselves on the common foe. You must be at your strongest during this climax. While I cannot guarantee a speedy breakdown of the enemys power, there is certainly a chance of it.

No Sig

~~SECRET~~  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0581

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a copy of a message sent by Marshal Tito to Prime Minister Churchill in reply to the latter's message to Marshal Tito. Mr. Churchill informed you of his message in his telegram No. 677 of May eighteenth.

This copy is transmitted to you at the request of Sir Ronald Campbell in the absence of Lord Halifax, under instructions of the British Foreign Office.

File  
WB.

QIT

0582

~~SECRET~~

"JAL" has seen  
anc.

Text of Marshal Tito's reply to a message  
from the Prime Minister

Your Excellency I have received your message referring to dismissal of Monsieur Puric's Government and intended formation of new Government of Monsieur Subasic. I can inform you that you will meet with no difficulties from our side on the subject. The more so as the dismissal of the Puric Government has a positive echo with us. I have undertaken necessary measures that our press and broadcast station should not make any comment on that matter until we get a clearer picture of the newly created situation. I am sure that Brigadier Maclean will be able to inform me in greater detail. I think it would be very useful if General Velebit chief of our military mission could inform you on things you wish to know.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Dept of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972

SECRET  
JAL:JAL HARS Date 12-8-73

3-7-73

0583

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL #677	DATE 18 May 1944
DATE/TIME 18/1450Z	
OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM 1615/18Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Ltr to Tito re King Peter's new government.	

ACTION

1. To the President via General Watson.
2. President's reply brought to the Map Room by Mrs. Brady evening 18 May 44. Sent to PM as #540.  
18 May 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 051 Yugoslavia	FILED:
-------------------------------------	--------

0584



16

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

WZ

WDCC  
19 May  
1242 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

From: U S Military Attache, London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 678

Filed: 191235 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and  
Number 678.

In your No. 538 you assented to my idea of asking De Gaulle over here. On further reflection I think the following course would be better: Namely, once D-day has started, I will send him a cordial invitation to come and talk things over. There will then be no chance of his making difficulties about going back with any entourage he has brought with him, or sending back individual members, or demanding, as head of a considerable Empire, Free French cypher communication with them. Our ban will be off and anybody can cable or come and go as they please.

In the meantime, I recommend that we allow Koenig or Vienot to send a few messages in their own cypher, subject to their giving us the substance of these messages and giving their word that they do not refer to military affairs other than those specifically affecting French troops. Neither will be informed of D-day or anything military.

There will be plenty of time after De Gaulle arrives here (if he

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0585

~~TOP SECRET~~

deigns to come) when the show has started, to settle up the French collaboration in their own country. It seems probable to me that for a week, or perhaps a fortnight, it will be a shot-torn, bomb-crumbled battlefield, and I cannot see any question of a civil government arising there. If you agree with me I will hold to this decision. At the same time if you agree, I will telegraph to General Wilson to take the French more into their confidence about the battle in Italy. Considering the fine performance of the two French Corps they deserve to be consulted. There would, I think, be feeling here that we were treating them roughly if we do not act in comradeship with them in this Italian battle.

I do not think we are called upon to notice at all the Algiers declaration that they are the provisional Government of France unless or until the Committee inform us officially. We will of course consult you then. Meanwhile, our <sup>action</sup> ~~delay~~ remains regulated by the terms of recognition we, in unison, have already given them. It may be that the Russians will recognize them as what they now call themselves. In this case it is important that we should be together. Personally I do not think the Russians will dare to draw such dangerous lines of demarcation, but I may well be wrong.

Further about the Russians. I have found it practically impossible to continue correspondence with them, but I note that after each very rude message they send to me, they have done pretty well

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

what was asked. For instance, I do not think they have done any great harm to the Poles, and the tide seems to have turned in favor of the Polish Government here making themselves less disagreeable to the Soviets. Again, although Molotov was most insulting about Rumania, they have today told us they accept the broad principle that they take the lead in the Rumanian business and give us the lead in Greece. I am quite content with this. A portent of the Soviet policy is to be found in the gushing message which I have received from the Representatives of EAM gathered, with all other Greek parties, in the Lebanon. I do not think it at all impossible that we may get a united Greece which we can support in accordance with what I know are your heart-felt wishes. Your message, backing up my message, and a little firmness in putting down the mutiny, may prove to have had a salutary effect.

The battle in Italy has been very good and may be still better. We are most grateful to your Chief's of Staff for sending the LST's as desired. This battle is being fought, not so much to join with the bridgehead army or even to take Rome-valuable though that may be-but rather to destroy the German Armies which have been sent by Hitler away from "OVERLORD".

The moment the Italian battle is over and we can see clear on the chess board, every effort will be made to mount the largest and strongest amphibian we can conceive and to direct it upon the point which will best help "OVERLORD".

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

All goes well here, and everything will be hurled in at the  
appointed hour. Kindest regards.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0588

WDCC  
19 May  
1813 Z

From: U S Military Attache, London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 678 Filed: 191800 Z

Amendment to telegram number 678 follows:

In Paragraph 4 Line 5 change the word "delay" to read  
action.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0589

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 678	DATE 19 May 1944
DATE/TIME 19/1235Z.	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 19/1435Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT OVERLORD discussion with FNC; correspondence to Russians; Italian battle.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #538, ~~which~~ Sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 16, 19 May 44.
2. Draft reply which had been prepared by Admiral Leahy sent simultaneously as RED 17.
3. President approved with minor changes, BLUE 3. Sent to PM as #542, 19 May 1944.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>all items; for Italy;          also 2. <del>Overl. Battle</del>; 051. Greece; 051. Roumania; 051. Balkans.</i>	FILED:
--	--------

0590

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAB

CORRECTED COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 679, 22nd May 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~██████████~~

Your number 541. I will bring this matter  
before the Cabinet today Monday. Personally I  
think it would be best you should speak for all three  
of us. I can easily do a follow-up on some of the  
points later on. But the main principle of the note  
we should strike towards Germany seems to require  
considerable thought. Also the time of any such  
statement should have relation to the success or  
otherwise of our operation.

original sent as Red 28/221642Z (red 221635Z) No Sig  
"Today" was omitted - correction as indicated above  
was sent - unnumbered as 221845Z (red 221840Z)

~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0591



FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 679	DATE 22 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 22/NFT	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Statement by President to German people on D-day.	

# ACTION

1. Answers PRES #541, 18 May 1944.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 28, 22/1642Z.
3. BLUE 6, 222140Z, President directed copy be given to Admiral Leahy.
4. BLUE 7, 222255Z, President directed statement be sent to Stalin with notation "Churchill has agreed to follow up with similar message along same lines."
5. Continued in PM #680, 25 May 44, disapproving proposed statement by President.
6. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; sent to the PM as PRES #543, 27 May 44.
7. Msg also sent to Stalin, 27 May 44, informing him that President would not make statement.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 OV RLORD		FILED:



*It President via  
usher 25/4/42  
JHC*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

*113*

From: U S Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 680

Filed: 25/NFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt ~~██████████~~

~~██████████~~ and personal no 680.

I brought your No. 541 before the Cabinet yesterday, Curtin and Smuts also being present. Considerable concern was expressed at the tone of friendship shown to the Germans at this moment when the troops are about to engage. There was a feeling that the message, if sent before the battle is won, might be distorted by the enemy into a sort of peace appeal. If there were nothing between us except that the Germans have an evil philosophy, there would be little ground for the war going on. I think myself that the message might conceivably be taken as a peace feeler, and that the Germans might reply that they accepted your note as a basis for further discussion.

In truth there is much more between them and us than a philosophy. Nearly all Europe cries for vengeance against brutal tyranny. At Teheran my

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy

0593

~~TOP SECRET~~

suggestion for the isolation of Prussia was considered far too modest by you and U.J. Everybody expects complete forcible disarmament of Germany, possibly extending to civil aviation, to be made and maintained. There are other very grave questions open. For instance, how are the Poles going to be compensated if they do not get East Prussia and certain territories up to the line of the Oder in return for the Curzon Line which the Russians will certainly demand?

I do not know what U.J. will say about your declaration, but we here earnestly hope you will not make it in its present form and, above all, at this present time. There was also a feeling that a document so grave addressed to the enemy, should emanate from the three principal Allies. I may add that nothing of this document would get down to the German pillboxes and front line in time to affect the fighting troops.

The battle is going well in Italy and Alexander has high hopes. Up to the present, so far from trying to bolt to the northwards, Hitler has been bringing down at least three more divisions, one from Istria and two from the north of Rome. Even the Hermann Goering Division which is in Hitlers Special General Reserve may be drawn in. All our Allied troops are fighting magnificently and everywhere the enemy has been pressed

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

back. I think myself tomorrow and the day after may be very important days.

I go every weekend to see the armies preparing here and I have visited some of your finest divisions. Even more striking are all the extraordinary structures and mass of craft already prepared. The weather is a great gamble but otherwise I am full of hope.

All this brings me to my great hope, which is that you will yourself be able to come over. It could not now I suppose be till after D Day as your movement would be taken as heralding it. But if you could start as soon as the signal has been given, the very greatest advantages might be derived from our close talks about all matters including any address to the <sup>GERMANS</sup> ~~Commons~~ by you. This is <sup>MEETING</sup> ~~is~~ also becoming a practical necessity in respect of the Chiefs of Staff. We have the whole Far Eastern Campaign to discuss and our execution of our promise to help in it to the very utmost of our strength. We need you here so much as the great battle will be of a profound and heart-shaking character, not by any means only in its opening phase. The King will of course send you a formal invitation at any moment that you let me know.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

There is a very good place in London which would give you perfect safety and comfort. I greatly desire to see you again. It is six months since we met.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd 252440Z  
F.N.S.

0596

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 680	DATE 25 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 25/NFT	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Statement by President to German people on D-day; Italian battle; joint conference.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #541. (Continuation to PM #679, 22 May 44.)
2. To President via usher, 25/2440Z.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral; approved by the President with minor changes; sent to PM as PRES #543.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 OVERLORD; 300 Italy; 210 Rev-PH		FILED:

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

50 Park Road  
New York 22/1/57

May 26, 1944

From: U S Military Attache, London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 681, Filed 260930Z

WR

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~TOP SECRET~~ Number 681.

I am letting you know that we have decided to  
appoint Robert Brand, who has been head of our Food  
Mission in Washington and the British Representative on  
the Combined Food Board, to the post of Treasury Repre-  
sentative in succession to the late Sir Frederick  
Phillips.

Halifax has explained to Morgenthau our reasons  
for choosing Brand for this very important appointment,  
even at the cost of loosing him from his work on the  
Food Board and Food Mission.

Brand is known to you personally and I think  
you will agree that we have chosen the right man for  
a difficult post. Brand got on very well with the  
Administration on his work for our Ministry of Food

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy

0598

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

and I have no doubt that he will soon be on equally  
good terms in his new work. I vouch for him.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd 24/11572  
Z.N.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0599



FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	681	DATE	26 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	260930Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	26/1157Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Appointment of Robert Brand to post of Treasury representative to succeed Sir Frederick Phillips.		

ACTION

1. To President via usher.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy 1 June 44; approved by the President; sent to PM as PRES #547. 1 June 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:


ACTION COMPLETED:

100 Brand, Robert; 130

FILED:



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

MAY 27

W. H. L.  
"ame"

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 682, Filed 26/1615Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~TOP SECRET~~

1. You will have seen what has passed about De Gaulle coming here and what I said in Parliament on the subject. There is a very strong feeling here after their recent fighting in Italy in favour of the French. We are going to liberate France at the cost of much British and American blood. The feeling is that she should be with us in this. But who is "She"? When this works out in the person of De Gaulle, all those difficulties which you and I know so well, emerge.

2. I feel, however, that we should be in a difficulty if it were thought that more British and American blood was being spilt because we had not got the French national spirit working with us. There is a strong French movement here and of course they do not know, nor can we tell them, all the faults and follies

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

File Copy

0601

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

of De Gaulle. This is only another reason why you and I should consult together in the near future. Of course I shall keep you informed every day about any talks that may occur with De Gaulle. He has lately shown some signs of wishing to work with us and after all it is very difficult to cut the French out of the liberation of France. I should be grateful for a full expression of your views and any other points.

No Sig

*Recd: 261725Z. BPP*

*TPVU*

*"*

*"*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

0602

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The President
SERIAL 682	DATE 26 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 26/1615Z	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Discussions with De Gaulle and FNC	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #542, 19 May 1944.
2. To President via usher, 261725Z.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with minor changes; sent to PM as PRES #544.
- 27 May 44
4. *Further answered in Pres # 546, 31 May 44.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: 011 FRANC <sub>E</sub>	FILED:
---	--------

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 683, Filed 27/1315Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and personal.

I have noticed a bad mistake in paragraph 6 of my telegram number 680. For "address to the commons by you" read "address to the Germans by you". Also insert "meeting" before "is also becoming" in the next sentence.

I am so sorry about this mistake.

No Sig

*Recd: 271445Z RAB  
Je Pres via Cap4 Wood.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy

0604

FROM The Prime Minister

TO The President

SERIAL 683

DATE 27 May 1944

DATE/TIME

OR FILE NUMBER 27/1315Z

TOR MAP ROOM 27/1445Z

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Correction of PM #680, re joint conference.

ACTION

1. Correction to PM #680.
2. To President via Captain Wood. No further action.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

00 210 Pres-PM

FILED:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] WSL  
27 May 1944

From: US Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 684

Filed 272043Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. [REDACTED]  
and personal. Number 684.

1. I do not propose to invite De Gaulle who is bringing three members of his Cabinet with him till D day at dawn. I would earnestly ask you to send over someone of the rank of Stettinius to express your point of view. I see the growth of opinion very powerful here and the feeling that France should be with us when we liberate France. Naturally, there is a great wave of sentiment for France on account of the bravery and success of French troops mainly African but well led by French officers, in our Italian battle. There is also the sense that they should share in the work we have in hand. No one will understand their being cold-shouldered. I feel I ought to let you know how things are moving. The word "leadership" in Hull's speech has been very helpful here.

*To the President at  
Shanghai as Red 37,  
2230.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy

0606

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

-2-

2. The Anzio bridgehead looks like paying a dividend six months later than I hoped, but none the less welcome. Besides we have enticed about ten divisions down into the south of Italy and not all of them will see their homes in Germany again unmauled.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0607



FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	684	DATE	27 May 1944
DATE/TIME	27/2043Z		
OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA		
SUBJECT Conversations with De Gaulle; Italian campaign.			

ACTION

1. To President at Shangri-La as RED 37, 27/2230.
2. Answered by PRES #546, 31 May 44, which was written by the President from a draft message prepared by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: Oll FRANCE: 300 ITALY.		FILED:

0608



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

W5

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 685, Filed 28/1723Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt [REDACTED]  
and personal.

1. Cabinet and I are most grateful to you for  
your number 543 about my 680.

2. I still think that a short visit is, above  
all things, desirable for the Staffs and above all for  
you, but any time after D+14 might be convenient to you,  
and would be received with rejoicing by us. I am  
delighted at what you say and that you are keeping this  
in view. Doctor Churchill informs you that a sea voyage  
in one of your great new battleships would do you no  
end of good.

3. Your number 544 and the fact that you will not  
be here at the time, make it all the more necessary that  
you should send someone who will express your views. I  
do not think it is impossible that De Gaulle will subscribe  
to the last two sentences of 544, but of course there

*Sent to President at  
Shanghai. Saw as  
led 40, 28 19452.  
File Copy*

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

0609

ought to be a responsible United States representative at all the discussions. I will help all I can to act in harmony with our long association on this subject, but the situation and my sentiment are somewhat changed by the substantial fighting of the French troops in these Italian battles.

4. Finally I am hoping that Alexander will turn his battle into left-handed hook so as to get as many as possible.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0610

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	685	DATE	28 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	28/1723Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA		
SUBJECT Visit to UK; De Gaulle conference; statement to Germans on D-day; Italian campaign.			

ACTION

1. Answers PRES 543 and 544.
2. Sent to the President at Shangri La as RED 40, 281945Z.
3. Answered by PRES #546, 31 May 44, which was written by the President from a draft message prepared by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 OVERLORD; 210 PRES-PM; 011 FRANCE; 300 ITALY.	FILED:
--	--------

~~TOP SECRET~~

31 May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 686

Filed 31/0708Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and top secret. Number 686.

Reference your number 545. As you had not re-  
verted to the question of the zones of occupation by  
our respective forces since I sent you my number 589  
of 23rd February, I had the impression that all this  
was settled.

It has however occurred to me that in sending  
your number 545 you might possibly have overlooked the  
arguments in my number 589 which, in our view, are just  
as cogent now as they were in February last.

I hope that if there has been a misunderstanding  
we can clear it up, as a change of policy such as you  
now propose would have grave consequences.

No Sig

*Recd 31/0850Z - HWH*

*To Potter via usher with references.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

0612

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	686	DATE	31 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	31/0708Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	31/0850Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Zones of occupation			

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #686.
2. To President via usher.
3. Answer prepared by the President; sent to PM as #549. 2 June 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
_____	_____	

0613

~~SECRET~~  
Recd 31/1310Z - Hnd  
To Potus via usher.  
To State Dept, 31 May 44.  
for preparation of reply.

WDCC  
31 May  
1144 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

From: U S Military Attache, London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 687

Filed: 31/1050 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal  
and ~~SECRET~~ number 687.

There have recently been disquietening signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the lead in Roumanian affairs, while we would take the lead in Greek affairs, each government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation since Roumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Ambassador here told Eden on May 18th  
~~SECRET~~

File Copy

0614

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
(2)

that the Soviet Government agreed with this suggestion but before giving any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether we had consulted the United States Government and whether the latter had also agreed to this arrangement.

I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing. We do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it applied only to war conditions and did not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. The arrangement would of course involve no change in the present collaboration between you and us in the formulation and execution of Allied policy towards these countries. We feel, however, that the arrangement now proposed would be a useful device for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkans.

Meanwhile Halifax has been asked to raise this matter with the State Department on the above lines.

No Sig  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0015



June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

Enclosures:

1. Prime Minister to President #687 ✓
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570

~~TOP SECRET~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

0616



~~SECRET~~  
PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 687, 31 MAY 1944.

Disquietening signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and Russia in regard to the Balkan countries and particularly toward Greece recently have appeared. Therefore we suggested to the Russian Ambassador here in London that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Russian Government would take the lead in the affairs of Roumania, while we would take the lead in the affairs of Greece, each government giving the other assistance in the respective countries. Since the Roumanian territory falls within the area of the Red Armies and the Greeks within the sphere of the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General Wilson, an arrangement such as this would be a natural development of the existing military situation.

On May 18th, the Russian Ambassador informed Mr. Anthony Eden that the Soviets were in agreement with this suggestion, but before any final assurances in the matter were given, they would like to know whether we had consulted the Government of the United States and whether the latter was also in agreement with this arrangement. I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing.

Of course we do not wish to cut up the Balkans into areas of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it did not affect the rights and responsibilities which the United States, Great Britain and the Soviets will have to exercise at the peace settlement and later on in regard to Europe as a whole, but that it applied only to war conditions. There would of course be no change involved by this arrangement in the present collaboration between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain in the formulation and execution of the policy of the Allies toward these countries. However we feel that the now proposed arrangement would be a device useful for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkan countries.

In the meantime I have requested Lord Halifax to take up this matter with the Department of State along the lines indicated above.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0617

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**TOP SECRET**  
May 31, 1944.

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE.**

The President requests that the State Department prepare a reply, for his signature, to the enclosed paraphrased message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President,  
By direction.

Attachment:  
Paraphrased copy PM 687.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

① Direct Capt Hener to  
pls make necessary  
arrange ad NY

to have change made  
in the elevator of  
the pres cor as  
desired by D. Long.

② Send on Fri. whether men  
attend to W. may request  
for week-end.

WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM <b>The Prime Minister</b>	TO <b>The President</b>
SERIAL <b>687</b>	DATE <b>31 May 44</b>
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER <b>21/1050Z</b>	
TOR MAP ROOM <b>31/1310Z</b>	VIA <b>Army Code Room</b>
SUBJECT <b>Policy of Russia and Britain in regard to Balkan countries— Roumania and Greece.</b>	

**ACTION**

1. To President via usher,
2. To State Department by direction of the President 31 May 44.
3. *Answered in Pres # 557, 10 June 44.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: ~~052 RUSSIA-OT BRITAIN~~ FILED:  
**051 GREECE; 051 ROUMANIA; 051 Balkans.**