CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
APRIL - MAY 1944
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 632 Filed 0111002
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 632.
Personal and confidential

1. I send you in my telegram immediately following the recent telegrams I have received from WJ. The War Cabinet did not think there was much use in going on with the personal correspondence on this subject at this time as evidently he is determined to find fault and pick a quarrel on every point. We are therefore instructing Ambassador Clark Kerr as in my next following telegram.

2. I have a feeling that the bark may be worse than its bite and that they have a great desire not to separate themselves from their British and American allies. Their conduct about Finland has been temperate and their attitude towards Rumania and Bulgaria seems to be helpful. It may be that, while unwilling to say anything of a reassuring nature to us about Poland, they will in fact watch their step very carefully. This may be of great benefit to the Poles in Poland. It would, I believe, help
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 632

the situation if you invited Monsieur Nikolajczyk to pay his visit to the United States on your return from your holiday, and thus show the Russians the interest which the United States takes in the fate and future of Poland.

No Sig

Reid 011245-052
To read with morning news.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

SECRET

0391
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?

F. D. R.

Messages from the Prime Minister to the President, dated April 1, 1944, Nos. 632 and 634.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies), received yesterday by the President from the Prime Minister, are forwarded for your information and for your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Inc1s.
Mag, Prime Minister to President,
#632, 1 April 1944.
Mag, Prime Minister to President,
#633, 1 April 1944.
Mag, Prime Minister to President,
#634, 1 April 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 632, 1 April 1944.

1. I have received from Stalin the following two telegrams which I send you in my number 633. Since Stalin has evidently determined to pick a quarrel and find fault on every point, the War Cabinet did not think there was much use in going on with the personal correspondence on this subject at this time. In my number 634, I give you our instructions to Ambassador Clark Kerr.

2. I feel that they have a great desire not to disassociate themselves from their American and British Allies, and that their bark may be worse than their bite. The Soviet attitude towards Bulgaria and Rumania seems to be helpful, and their conduct concerning Finland has also been moderate. It seems that they will carefully watch their step while being unwilling to give us any reassurance concerning Poland. The Poles in Poland may receive great benefits from this. When you return from your holiday the situation would be helped, I think, if you would invite Monsieur Nikolajczyk to pay his visit to the U.S., thus showing the Russians the interest which America takes in the Polish fate and future.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister

SERIAL 632

DATE/TIME 011100Z

TO The President

OR FILE NUMBER VIA Army Code Room

TOR MAP ROOM 011345Z

SUBJECT Polish-Russian relations.

ACTION Shown to President with morning news by Admiral Brown.

Referred to Admiral Leahy by the President, 1 Apr 44, with notation, "Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?" Paraphrased copies sent to State Department 2 Apr 44, "for information, and for suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here."

Letter received from Amb Halifax, 4 Apr 44, asking President's approval of PA #634, containing suggested reply to Stalin. Refered to Adimir Leahy, who prepared draft reply; approved by President 5 Apr 44; sent to PA as File #513. 5 Apr 44.

May 12, 44, Admiral Leahy said that no further action would be taken on this message relative to visit of Mikolajczyk.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

0:2 Russian-Polish relations.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 633 Filed 01113392
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 633.
Personal and secret.
My immediately preceding telegram. Following are recent telegrams I have received from UJ. Begins.
"1. Premier J. V. Stalin to Mr. Prime Minister W. Churchill 23.5.44 recd 25.5.44.
"I have recently received from you two messages on the on the Polish question and have studied the statement which Sir A. Clark Kerr made to V. M. Molotov on your instructions on the same question. I was unable to reply at the time as matters at the front often take me away from non-military questions.
"I now reply on these questions.
"It is patent that your messages, and especially the statement of Sir A. Clark Kerr, are full of threats concerning the Soviet Union. I should like to draw your attention to this fact, as the method of threats is not only incorrect in the mutual relations of allies but is also harmful and can lead to contrary results.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 633  

"In one of your messages, you qualified the efforts on the Soviet Union in the matter of the maintenance and realization of the Curzon Line as a policy of force. This means that you now seek to qualify the Curzon Line as inequitable and the struggle for it as unjust. I can, on no account, agree with such an attitude. I cannot but remind you that at Teheran you, the President, and I agreed as to the justice of the Curzon Line. You considered then the attitude of the Soviet Union regarding this question as perfectly just, and you said that the representatives of the Emigre Polish Government would be mad to refuse the Curzon Line. Now you maintain something which is directly the contrary. Does this not mean that you no longer acknowledge what we agreed upon at Teheran, and that by this very fact you are breaking the Teheran agreement? I have no doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly, as before, by the attitude you adopted at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish Emigre Government would already have been settled. As for myself and the Soviet Government, we continue to stand by the attitude we adopted at Teheran and
have no intention of departing from it, since we consider that the realization of the Curzon Line is not a manifestation of a policy of force but a manifestation of the policy of the restoration of the legal rights of the Soviet Union to those territories which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers recognised in 1919 as being non-Polish.

"You state in your message of the 7th March that the question of the Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be deferred until the summoning of the armistice conference. I think we have here some misunderstanding. The Soviet Union is not waging war and has no intention of waging war against Poland. The Soviet Union has no dispute with the Polish people and considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people. For this very reason, the Soviet Union is shedding blood for the sake of the liberation of Poland from German oppression. For this reason, it would be strange to speak of an armistice between the USSR and Poland. But the Soviet Government has a dispute with the Emigre Polish Government, which does not reflect the interests of the Polish people and does not express its hopes. It would be even more strange to identify
With Poland the Emigre Polish Government in London separated (literally "torn away") from Poland. I find it difficult even to point to the difference between the Emigre Government of Poland and the similar Emigre Government of Yugoslavia, or between certain Generals of the Polish Emigre Government and the Serbian General Mihailovich.

"In your message of the 21st March you state that you intend to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all questions of territorial changes must be deferred until the armistice or the peace conference of the victorious powers, and that, until then, you cannot recognise any transfers of territories carried out by force. I understand this to mean that you represent the Soviet Union as a power hostile to Poland, and that the essence of the matter is that you deny the emancipatory character of the war of the Soviet Union against German aggression. This is equivalent to attempting to ascribe to the Soviet Union what is not in fact the case and to discrediting it thereby. I have no doubt
From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 633

that such a statement of yours will be taken by the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion as an undeserved insult directed at the Soviet Union.

"Of course, you are free to make whatever statement you please in the House of Commons - that is your affair. But if you do make such a statement, I shall consider that you have committed an unjust and unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union.

"In your message you express the hope that failure over the Polish question will not influence our collaboration in other spheres. As for myself, I stood for, and continue to stand for collaboration. But I fear that the method of threats and discrediting, if it continues in the future, will not conduce to our collaboration." Stalin.

"2. Premier Stalin to Prime Minister 25.3.44.

"I have carried out a thorough enquiry into your statement that the disclosure of the correspondence between us occurred between the fault of the Soviet Embassy in London and of Ambassador F. T. Gougev personally.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

0400
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 633  Filed 0111392

"This enquiry has shown that neither the Embassy nor F. T. Gousev personally were at all guilty in this matter and that they did not even have in their possession certain of the documents the contents of which were published in the English newspapers. Thus the leakage occurred not on the Soviet but on the English side.

"Gousev is willing to undertake any investigation of this matter in order to prove that he and the members of his staff are in no way implicated in the matter of the disclosure of the contents of our correspondence. It seems to me that you have been led astray with regard to Gousev and the Soviet Embassy." Stalin.

No Sig
2 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies),
received yesterday by the President from the Prime
Minister, are forwarded for your information and for
your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking
Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.
Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Incls.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#632, 1 April 1944.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#633, 1 April 1944.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#634, 1 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6-1972
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 633, 1 April 1944.

Following are the telegrams received from Stalin as mentioned in my #632.


"Your two messages on the Polish question have been received, and I have studied the statement which Ambassador Kerr made to Mr. Molotov on the same question pursuant to your instructions. Since matters at the front quite often take my attention from non-military questions, I was unable to reply immediately.

"My reply now follows:

"It is evident that the statement of Ambassador Clark Kerr and your messages are full of threats toward the Soviet Union. As the method of threats is not only incorrect in the mutual relations of Allies, but is also harmful and can lead to harmful results, I should like to draw your attention to this fact.

"One of your messages contained a qualification of the efforts of the Soviet Union on the question of the maintenance or realization of the Curzon line as a policy of force. This indicated that you now are trying to call the Curzon line as inequitable and the fight for it as not just. On no account can I agree with your attitude. At Teheran, I must remind you, the President, you and I agreed as to the rightness of the Curzon line. At that time you felt that the attitude of the Soviet Union on this question was perfectly just, and you stated that the refusal of the Curzon line would be an act of madness on the part of the representatives of the Enigre Government. At this time,
you are maintaining something that is directly opposite. Can this mean that you no longer acknowledge our agreement at Teheran and that you are by this very fact breaking that agreement? I feel sure that if you had continued to stand firmly, as before, upon the attitude you took at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish Emigre Government would have already been finished. Since we consider that the realization of the Curzon line is not a manifestation of a policy of force, but one of restoration of the legal rights of the Soviet Union to those territories which even the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers and Curzon regarded in 1919 as not being Polish, we continue to uphold the attitude which we assumed at Teheran and have no thought of departing from it.

"In your message of 7 March, you said that the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier would have to be postponed until an Armistice Conference should convene. It seems that we have some misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not now waging war against Poland, and has no intention of waging such a war. The Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people, and has no dispute with them. The Soviet Union, for this very reason, is shedding blood in order to liberate Poland from the oppression of Germany. Therefore, it seems strange to mention an armistice between Poland and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Government does have a dispute with the Emigre Polish Government, which does not express the hopes of the Polish people and does not reflect their interests. It seems even stranger to identify with Poland the Emigre Polish Government in London which is separated from Poland. It is hard for me to indicate the difference between the Emigre Government of Poland and the similar Emigre Government of Yugoslavia, or between the Serbian General Mikhailovich and
certain generals of the Polish Emigre Government.

*You state in your message of 21 March that you intend to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that you consider all territorial changes must be deferred until the armistice or the peace conference of victorious powers, and that until that time you cannot recognize any transfers of territories which are carried out by force. This means to me that you refer to Soviet Union as a power hostile to Poland, and that the meat of the matter is that you deny the emancipatory character of the Soviet Union's war against the aggression of Germany. This is similar to trying to ascribe to the Soviet Union that which is not in fact the case, and thereby to discredit it. Such a statement you yourself have no doubt will be taken by the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion as an undeserved insult directed at the U.S.S.R. You are free, of course, to make whatever statement you please to the House of Commons—that is your affair. However, should you make such a statement, I shall consider that an unjust and unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union has been committed by you.

*You also express the hope in your message that a breakdown over the Polish question will have no influence on our collaboration on other matters. I have stood for and I continue to stand for collaboration between us. If the method of threats and discarding continues in the future, I fear that this will not act in favor of our collaboration. STALIN.*


*A thorough inquiry into your statement that the disclosure of the messages between us was the fault of the Soviet Embassy in London and of Ambassador Goussav has been carried out.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

0405
"The result of this inquiry shows that neither Mr. Gousav personally or the Soviet Embassy were at all guilty of this matter, and that they did not even have in their possession certain of the documents, the contents of which were published in the English newspapers. The leakage, therefore, occurred on the English side and not on the Soviet.

"In order to prove that he and the representatives of the staff are in no way implicated in the disclosure of the contents of these messages, Mr. Gousav is willing to undertake any investigation whatsoever in this matter. I think that with regard to Gousav and the Soviet Embassy, you have been led astray. STALIN." End of message.
FROM        The Prime Minister  TO        The President

SERIAL  #633  DATE  1 April 1944

DATE/TIME  1111392  OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM  0117002  VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT  Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION

(See also PM #632 & #634.) This is repeat of message sent directly by Marshal Stalin to the President on 23 Mar 44.

Received 01/1700; not shown to President but by direction of Admiral Brown held for Admiral Leahy's attention on Sunday morning, 2 Apr 44. Shown to President, 2 Apr 44. Paraphrased copy to State Department, together with PM #632 & #634, on 2 Apr 44, with notation, "For information, and for suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikolajczyk to come over here."

Letter received from Amb Halifax, 4 Apr 44, asking President's approval of PM #634, containing suggested reply to Stalin. Referred to Admiral Leahy, who prepared draft reply; approved by President 5 Apr 44; sent to PM as PMO #513, 5 Apr 44.

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ACTION COMPLETED: 052 Russian-Polish relations  FILED:
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 634
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 634.

My telegram number 632. Following is text of telegram which we propose sending to Ambassador Clark Kerr. Begins.

"1. Please inform Monsieur Molotov that the Prime Minister thought it necessary to refer Marshal Stalin's message of March 23 about Poland to the War Cabinet whose considered views are set out below for communication to the Soviet Government.

"2. Marshal Stalin's references to power politics and threats are not understood here. The Prime Minister had only thought it necessary to say what he would have to do to make the position of His Majesty's Government quite clear to the British Parliament and public if no settlement of the Polish problem could be agreed now. He felt that his personal relations with Marshal Stalin and Anglo-Soviet relations in general demanded that degree of frankness. It is regretted that Marshal Stalin should characterise this as a threat."
"3. To avoid any possible misunderstanding the Soviet Government should be informed that the Prime Minister has not departed in any way from what he regarded as just and reasonable at Teheran. His attitude has the approval of the War Cabinet. The Prime Minister has never suggested that the Poles should refuse to accept the Curzon Line. On the contrary, he has most strongly urged them to do so. His exchange of messages with Marshal Stalin related however to what he had been able to do in mediating between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government in London. In his message of February 21st, he explained in particular why it was difficult for a government and especially a government in exile to agree publicly to the Curzon Line in isolation from other important issues concerning the future of Poland, which cannot be finally settled now. He had, therefore, proposed a de facto working arrangement to get around this difficulty. This was as far as he had been able to bring the Poles and he had hoped that it might have been considered acceptable to the Soviet Government.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 634

Page 3
Filed 011225Z

"4. His Majesty's Government felt very strongly that it was of the utmost importance, more particularly in order that means might be found to ensure the full cooperation of the Polish underground movement, controlled by the Polish Government in London, in the common struggle against the Germans, to find some working arrangement for the purposes and for the duration of the war. They still considered that coordination of the Polish underground movement with the advancing Soviet forces would be of immediate value to the war effort and a real advantage to future relations between Poland and the USSR.

"5. The Prime Minister and the War Cabinet therefore deeply regret Marshal Stalin's inability to accept the proposals of February 21st.

"6. His Majesty's Government welcome Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people and they trust that means can still be found providing for the active cooperation of the Soviet forces and the Polish population in the liberation of Poland from German oppression. It had never, of course,
been the Prime Minister's intention to suggest that any war was being waged between the Soviet Union and Poland or that there was any need for a peace between the two countries. He had only referred to the practical difficulties which are likely to arise in the absence of a working arrangement on the lines suggested in his message of February 21st. His reference to the peace conference was, of course, based upon the fact that all the future territorial arrangements in Europe, and not only the frontiers between enemy states, will eventually require the formal ratification and sanction of the victorious powers. His Majesty's Government would have preferred to reach some de facto understanding on this question now, but, in view of the Soviet Government's inability to accept a working arrangement now, the formal settlement, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, must clearly await ratification and agreement at the peace conference. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government can only maintain the attitude they have hitherto consistently adopted and publicly stated in regard to the non-recognition of territorial
changes effected since the war other than by agreement between the parties concerned.

"7. In the present circumstances, His Majesty's Government must continue to regard the Polish Government in London as the legitimate government of Poland, with whom their relations have never been interrupted since the Germans attacked Poland in 1939 and so brought this country into the war. Quite apart from this consideration, the Polish Government controls important armed forces now actively engaged with us in the struggle against our common enemy. These are, in themselves, sufficient reasons for our continued recognition of and co-operation with the Polish Government. Furthermore, our information goes to show that it is they who control the general resistance in Poland to the German oppressor and more particularly that of the organized underground movement.

"8. If, as His Majesty's Government now understand, the Soviet Government see no prospect of further discussion between them leading to a settlement, His Majesty's Government can only retire from the ungrateful role of mediator.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 634
and announce their failure. In any statement the Prime Minister will make it plain that he has not departed from the views he has hitherto held regarding the proper settlement of this question. His Majesty's Government have, however, never disguised from the Soviet Government the important factor in all this of public opinion, more particularly here and in America. Public opinion, which would have welcomed a working arrangement on the lines proposed in the Prime Minister's message of February 21st, will be sadly disappointed that the Soviet Government have not been able to accept these proposals. The Prime Minister must, therefore, make the position of the British Government perfectly plain, although he does not think anything which he will say will be of a character to arouse adverse reactions in the Soviet Union. As he has already told M. Stalin in an earlier message, nothing is further from the intention of His Majesty's Government than to insult or discredit our Soviet ally.

No Sig

Red 017002-02

0413
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?

F. D. R.

# 632 + 634.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages (paraphrased copies),
received yesterday by the President from the Prime
Minister, are forwarded for your information and for
your suggestions in regard to the matter of asking
Mikolajczyk to come over here, referred to in #632.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHEY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

3 Incls.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#632, 1 April 1944.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#633, 1 April 1944.
Msg, Prime Minister to President,
#634, 1 April 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 634, 1 April 1944.

The message referred to in my 632 which I proposed sending to Ambassador Kerr is as follows:

"1. Kindly tell Mr. Molotov that I thought it necessary to refer Stalin's message of 23 March concerning Poland to the War Cabinet whose considered views are set forth below for transmittal to the Soviet Government.

"2. We do not understand the Marshal's references to threats and power politics. If no settlement of the Polish question could be reached now, I had only considered it necessary to indicate what I would have to do to make the position of His Majesty's Government entirely clear to the British public and Parliament. I felt that that degree of frankness was demanded by my personal relations with Stalin and the Anglo-Soviet relations in general. That Stalin should take this as a threat is to be regretted.

"3. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding you should inform the Soviet Government that I have in no way departed from what I thought reasonable and just at Teheran. The War Cabinet approves of my attitude. That the Poles should refuse to accept the Curzon line has never been suggested by me. I have, on the contrary, most strongly urged that they do accept it. The exchange of messages with Stalin related however to what I had been able to do in mediating between the Polish Government in London and the Soviet Government. I explained in my message of 21 February in particular
why it was hard for a government, and especially a government in exile, to
agree publicly to the Curzon line in isolation from other important issues
concerning the future of Poland, which cannot be finally settled now. To
get around this difficulty, I had proposed a de facto working arrangement.
I had hoped that it might be considered acceptable to the Soviet Government
since this was as far as I had been able to bring the Poles.

"4. It was felt very strongly by his Majesty's Government to be of
the utmost importance to find some working arrangement for the purposes and
for the duration of the war, more particularly in order that means might
be found to ensure the full cooperation of the Polish underground movement,
controlled by the Polish Government in London, in the common struggle
against the Germans. Coordination of the Polish underground movement with
the advancing Soviet forces, they still feel, would be of immediate value
to the war effort and a true advantage to future relations between the
Soviet Government and Poland.

"5. The War Cabinet and I deeply regret the inability of the Marshal
to accept our proposals of 21 February.

"6. We trust that means can still be found providing for the active
cooperation of the Soviet forces and the Polish population in the liberation
of Poland from German oppression and we welcome the Marshal's statement that
the Soviet Union considers itself the ally of Poland and the Polish people.
I had no intention to suggest that there was a need for peace between Poland
and the U.S.S.R. or that a war was being waged between them. I had referred
only to the practical difficulties which can arise in the absence of a
working arrangement along the lines set forth in my message of 21 February."
Of course my reference to the peace conference was based on the fact that the formal ratification and sanction of the victorious powers will be required for all the future territorial arrangements in Europe, and not only the frontiers between enemy states. In view of the Soviet Government's inability to accept a working arrangement now, the formal settlement, as far as we are concerned, must clearly await ratification and agreement at the peace conference, although we would have preferred to reach some de facto understanding on this question at this time. In the meantime, we can only maintain the attitude we have up to now adopted consistently and stated publicly in regard to the non-recognition of territorial changes effected since the war other than by agreement between the parties concerned.

"7. Under the circumstance the Polish Government in London, with whom our relations have never been interrupted since the Germans attacked Poland in 1939 and so brought this country into the war, must continue to be regarded by us as the legitimate government of Poland. Aside from this consideration important armed forces now actively engaged with us in the struggle against our common enemy are controlled by the Polish Government. In themselves these are sufficient reasons for our continued recognition of and cooperation with the Polish Government in London. Moreover, our information indicates that the general resistance in Poland and more particularly that of the organized underground movement is controlled by them.

"8. We can only retire from the ungrateful role of mediator and announce our failure, if, as we now understand, the Soviet Government sees no prospect of further discussion leading to a settlement. I will make it clear in any statement that I have not departed from the views I have hitherto held regarding the proper settlement of this question. However, we have never
hidden from the Soviet Government the important factor of public opinion in all this, more particularly here and in America. Public opinion will be sadly disappointed that the Soviet Government have not been able to accept these proposals, since it would have welcomed a working arrangement on the lines proposed in my message of 21 February. Therefore, Although I do not think that anything I will say will be of a nature to arouse adverse reactions in the Soviet Union, I must make the position of his Majesty's Government entirely clear. Nothing is further from the intention of our government than to insult or discredit our Soviet ally, as I had already told Marshal Stalin in an earlier message."
April 4, 1944

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Replying to your personal note of April third, you may inform Mr. Anthony Eden that I have this date dispatched by telegraph, a reply to the Prime Minister's messages 632 and 654.

Thank you for your good wishes for my Easter vacation which has every promise of completely eliminating the remains of my recent influenza.

Very sincerely,

FDR

His Excellency
The Ambassador from Great Britain
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Leahy:

Will you run this down?

F.D.R.
My dear Mr. President,

You will have seen the Prime Minister's messages to yourself Nos. 632 and 634 of the 1st April. I have now just had a telegram from Anthony Eden, asking me to make it clear to you that the instructions to Sir A. Clark Kerr in No. 634 have not yet been sent to Moscow. Action will have to be taken soon, and I gather that Winston is hoping for your comments as early as you can let him have them.

I hope you will soon be quite fit again, and that when you can get a well-deserved holiday, it may do the trick. I shall much look forward to the opportunity of a talk with you a bit later.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>Russian-Polish relations.</td>
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**ACTION** *(Continuation of #632, and #634.)*

To President via usher.

Referred to Admiral Leahy by the President, 1 Apr 44, with notation, "Will you talk with Cordell Hull about these?" Paraphrased copies sent to State Department 2 Apr 44, "for information, and for suggestions in regard to the matter of asking Mikołajczyk to come over here."

Letter received from Amb Halifax, 4 Apr 44, asking President's approval of PM #634, containing suggested reply to Stalin. Referred to Admiral Leahy, who prepared draft reply; approved by President 5 Apr 44; sent to PM as Peace #513, 5 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

052 Russian-Polish relations
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and secret.

Para 1. As I expect you will now be going off to a "Suitable climate" may I express the earnest hope that you will be accessible to my personal telegrams and that full arrangements will be made for their speedy transmission to you. I shall be sending a lot of stuff unless you tell me not to, which would be disastrous. I am so relieved to hear through Louise that Harry has borne the operation well and that they are pleased with the progress he has made so far.

Para 2. I have had some little trouble here which has been coming to a head for some time and at length forced me to fall back upon the House of Commons which as usual showed itself steadfast in the cause and put all malignants in their proper places. It is an immense comfort to me to feel this mighty body behind me when troubles like Singapore, Tobruk or untimely yearnings for reconstruction come along. I wonder whether this solidity in our
Legislature will be helpful on your side.

Para 3. I have seen a lot of your splendid troops over here lately. As you know I harden for it the nearer I get to it. Eisenhower is a very large man.

Para 4. Every good wish to you on your journey, and please keep the wires open to me.

No Sig
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

No. 635 pink from the PM to the President
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL 635

DATE 1 April 1944

DATE/TIME 01/2147Z

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 01/2315Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Prime Minister hopes President will "keep wires open" on forthcoming trip; Prime Minister's relations with Parliament and vote of confidence.

ACTION

To President via usher, 01/2315Z.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy in Map Room, 2 Apr 44; taken to President via usher. This was not used by the President, however; President dictated message to Miss Tully, 4 Apr 44; sent to PM as Press #511, 4 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

000.9 As Directed; 000.1
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 636 Filed: 040905 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
and personal.

Our Chiefs of Staff are telegraphing to yours on
the subject of LST. A review of our requirements for
amphibious operations against Japan clearly shows that
LST will be the limiting factor. We are trying every
expedient to increase our own output, but it appears in-
evitable that for operations in the spring of 1945 we shall
have a shortage between 80 and 100 of these ships.

I understand that on your present programme you
will reach an output of 55 per month by June, and that
thereafter your monthly rate drops to about 40. If you
could see your way to maintain the monthly rate at 55, then
by the 1st December the greater part of the shortage would
be met.

It is my earnest wish to operate against the
Japanese as soon as our amphibious resources are released.
from the European theatre and I very much hope you will find it possible to meet this request.

No Sig

Read 0410552 - 02
TUU

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks  Date: MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
April 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland:

The attached paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 4 April, containing a request for additional LST for use in Southeast Asia in 1945, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and preparation of a draft reply.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
4 April 1944

Paraphrase

From: Prime Minister
To: President Roosevelt

Our Chiefs of Staff are sending a dispatch on the subject of LST to your Chiefs of Staff. Reviewing our requirements for amphibious operations against Japan, it is clear that LST will be the limiting factor. We are doing our best to increase our own output, but it appears inevitable that we shall have a shortage between 80 and 100 of these ships for operations in the Spring of 1945.

It is understood that on your present program you will reach an output of 55 per month by June, and that your monthly rate drops to about 40 thereafter. If you could see your way to maintain the monthly rate of 55, then the greater part of the shortage would be met by the first of December.

I earnestly want to operate against the Japanese as soon as our amphibious resources are released from the European theater and I very much hope you will be able to meet this request.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by BritishGovt., Sec. 203 Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 636 DATE 4 April 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT LST requirements.

ACTION

To President via usher, 04/10552.

Referred to Admiral Leahy for study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 Apr 44.

Reply received from President at Waccamaw as Black 12, 13 Apr 44. Reply sent to the PM as Field #520, 13 Apr 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
To: The President of the United States
Number 637    Filed: 05/13082

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
personal and secret. Number 637.

I propose the following joint statement
regarding U-Boat warfare in March for issue on
April 10. I am also telegraphing the text to

March was an active month in the war against
the U-Boats which operated in widely dispersed areas
from the Barents Sea to the Indian Ocean.

The enemy has persevered vainly in strenuous
endeavours to disrupt our flow of supplies to Russia
by the northern route.

Our merchant shipping losses were mainly
incurred in far distant seas: Though a little
higher than in February they were still low and
the rate of sinking U-Boats was fully maintained.

The Allied merchant fleet continues to im-
prove both in quantity and quality but the strength
of the U-Boat force remains considerable and calls
for powerful efforts by surface and air forces.
MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Office of War Information,
Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.

The following suggestion for the March Submarine Warfare Statement has been received from the Prime Minister this date. The President desires any comments you may have to make on this statement.

It is requested that your reply to the President be addressed to the Map Room, The White House.

"March was an active month in the war against the U-Boats which operated in widely dispersed areas from the Barents Sea to the Indian Ocean.

"The enemy has persevered mainly in strenuous endeavours to disrupt our flow of supplies to Russia by the northern route.

"Our merchant shipping losses were mainly incurred in far distant seas. Though a little higher than in February, they were still low and the rate of sinking U-Boats was fully maintained.

"The Allied merchant fleet continues to improve both in quantity and quality, but the strength of the U-Boat force remains considerable and calls for powerful efforts by surface and air forces."

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6, 1972
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL #637

DATE 5 April 1944

DATE/TIME 05/13082

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 05/1430Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT March Submarine Warfare Statement.

ACTION

By memo to Mr. Elmer Davis and Captain Lovette for comments on proposed statement submitted by British.

Statement approved without change by ONI and Navy; approved by President 7 Apr 44. Draft reply prepared by Captain Wood, sent to PM as PRES #514.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 638, Filed 06/1002

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

It is said that OSS have received instructions, which have been approved by you, to arrange for a small Intelligence Mission to be infiltrated to General Mihailovic's Headquarters, and we have been asked to organize the necessary arrangements.

We are now in process of withdrawing all our missions from Mihailovic and are pressing King Peter to clear himself of this millstone, which is dragging him down in his own country and works only to the assistance of the enemy. If, at this very time, an American Mission arrives at Mihailovic's Headquarters, it will show throughout the Balkans a complete contrariety of action between Britain and the United States. The Russians will certainly throw all their weight on Tito's side, which we are backing to the full. Thus we shall get altogether out of step. I hope and trust this may be avoided.

No Sig
MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland:

The attached paraphrased copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 6 April 1944, dealing with the establishment of a small O.S.S. intelligence mission to General Mihailovic, is forwarded for the limited distribution of this message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they can discuss it at the informal meeting on Friday, April 7, 1944.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 638, 6 APRIL 1944.

O.S.S. have received instructions which you have approved, it is said, to arrange for infiltration to General Mihailovic’s Headquarters of a small Intelligence Mission; we have been asked to make the necessary arrangements.

All our missions to Mihailovic are now in the process of being withdrawn, and we are pressing King Peter to clear himself of this millstone, which is only assisting the enemy and is dragging him down in his own country. Should an American Mission arrive at Mihailovic’s Headquarters at this very time, throughout the Balkans it will show a complete contrariety of action between Britain and the United States. All the weight of the Russians will certainly be thrown on Tito’s side, which we are backing to the full. Thus we shall get altogether out of step. I hope and trust for the avoidance of this.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM | The Prime Minister
---|---
TO | The President
SERIAL | #638
DATE | 6 Apr 1944

**TOR MAP ROOM 06/1120Z VIA Army Code Room**

**SUBJECT** | Intelligence Mission to Mihailovic.

**ACTION**

To President via breakfast tray.

President directed Admiral Leahy take action, 6 Apr 44. Paraphrased copy to Adm Leahy to be taken up by JCS. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 8 Apr 44. Answer sent to PM as PRES #515, 8 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

20 055

0439
To: The President of the United States
Number: 639

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
personal and urgent. Number 639.

Your number 512.

Thank you so much. I am entirely in agreement with you on the principle: But, I think we can get more out of it by the method you now approve.

No Sig
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL  639  DATE  6 Apr 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER  06/1705Z

TOR MAP ROOM 06/1810Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT  Wolfram exports from Spain to Germany.

ACTION

Answers Pa #512.

To President via usher.

President does not wish to answer.

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<th>COPIES TO</th>
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ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

601 Wolfram
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 640 Filed: 070900 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal
and

I thank you for your message dated April 5th about Ireland.

We considered the question of stopping Irish shipping and came to the conclusion which you yourself have reached that there was no need to interfere with the transatlantic sailings to North America. Only their direct services from Southern Ireland to the Iberian Peninsula will, therefore, be suspended. They have accepted this and there is no question of their regarding this as the imposition of economic sanctions.

I note that you are considering the despatch of a further message to Mr. De Valera. It is very good of you to say that you would let us see it in advance, if you decided to send it.
9 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, replying to State Department's #2591, 3 April 1944, to Ambassador Winant, is forwarded for your information.

Respectfully,

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.,
White House Map Room.

l Incl. Mag, Prime Minister to President, #640, 7 Apr 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6, 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 660, 7 APRIL 1944

Your message of April 5 about Ireland. Thank you very much.

The question of stopping Ireland's shipping was considered by us, and we reached the same conclusion which you yourself came to—that there was no necessity to interfere with trans-Atlantic sailings to North America. Therefore, their direct services from southern Ireland to the Iberian Peninsula only will be suspended. This has been accepted by them and there is no question of their considering this as economic sanctions imposition.

I have noted that you are contemplating sending to Mr. De Valera a further message. We appreciate your saying you would let us see it in advance if you do decide to despatch such a message.
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<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<td></td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Restrictions against Ireland.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Answers message of 7 Apr 44, sent by Piss to Pia through State Department channels.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To President on breakfast tray.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To State for information 9 Apr 44; President returned original 8 Apr 44; no further action.</td>
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<td>052. Ireland</td>
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</table>
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 641

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
Your telegram No. 501.

Para 1. The proposals of your government for a
limited relief scheme were put forward by Mr. Riefler on
March 29th and have been most earnestly considered by my
colleagues and by myself. I share your desire to do every-
thing possible to ameliorate the lot of the peoples of the
occupied countries in so far as this is possible without
detriment to the war effort. I find it however difficult
to accept the view that the maintenance of our blockade
policy is likely to hurt our friends more than our enemies.

Para 2. The whole question seems to me to be governed
by the impending military operations for the invasion of
Europe. Our experience of the working of the Greek relief
scheme has conclusively shown that it causes considerable
difficulties for, and imposes restrictions on, our naval
and air forces, and these difficulties will increase as new
operations are begun. The opening of further channels of importation into Europe at the present moment would, in our view, be wholly incompatible with the naval and military situation which is developing. It would involve not only the granting of safe-conducts for ships to sail to designated ports within the operational zones, but also the preservation of routes of inland transport from those ports to the countries in which the food is to be distributed. It would clearly be impossible to undertake to keep any ports or routes to them open, or to keep intact any railways between now and the end of this year: and if it were possible to give such an undertaking we should thereby give the Germans valuable information as to our military intentions. Any relief action now undertaken would therefore inevitably hamper impending military operations.

Para 3. Even if military considerations were not decisive there are also grave objections from the blockade point of view. These are being explained in detail to Mr. Winant and I do not think I need trouble you with them, if we are agreed that nothing can be allowed to hamper or interfere with forthcoming operations.
8 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President has directed that the attached message (Prime to President #641) be referred to the Admiral for possible discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With regards to this message, the President made the comment: "I don't know but what the Prime is right on that."

Very respectfully,

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
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<th><strong>FROM</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TO</strong></td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SERIAL</strong></td>
<td>641</td>
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<td><strong>DATE</strong></td>
<td>8 Apr 44</td>
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<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT</strong></td>
<td>Relief program for German-occupied countries.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers FRSC-FM 501, 15 Mar 44.

Taken to President in Dr's office. President directed it be given to Adm Leahy for action by the JCS if necessary; President made comment, "I don't know what the Prime is right on this."

Admiral Leahy prepared answer in Map Room without referring message to JCS. Reply sent as FRSC-FM #519, 8 Apr 44.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

See Germany

**FILED:**

---

0449
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 6142, Filed 09/0910Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
I am most deeply grateful to you for your number 515.

(unwedding contemplated OSS mission to Munich area) No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd. 09/1210Z. BPE.
Read at White 09/1310Z. Hpk

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<td>DATE</td>
<td>9 Apr 44.</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>OSS Intelligence Mission to Mihailovic.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PRES-Pa 6515.

To President in So. Car. as WITH 1, 09/1310Z.

No further action necessary.
To: The President of the United States
Number 643
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt private personal and

Your number 518.

Para 1. I was very glad to read Hull's references to the French Committee of National Liberation in which I observed your guiding hand. His Majesty's Government will take an early opportunity of making clear that we are in full accord with this declaration. I take it that it modifies in some respects, though not in principle, the form of the enclosure to your letter of March 21st, which presented some difficulties here. These might be talked over between the Foreign Office and State Department before issue.

Para 2. In the first phase of OVERLORD there will be no opportunity for the French Civil Government to function, as the ground captured by our troops will be the battlefield, and it may be some time before we have advanced far enough to be clear of what was called in the last war.
by the French "The Zone of the Armies" and often extended some 50 miles from the front. I agree cordially with you that nothing must hamper the freedom of action of the Supreme Commander and that no disturbing political agitation should be allowed until we have got well inland.

Para 3. I am becoming very hard set upon OVERLORD. On Good Friday I gave a talk to all the Generals, British and American, who were gathered at General Montgomery's Headquarters, expressing my strong confidence in the result of this extraordinary but magnificent operation. I understand that you will have received some account of this from General Eisenhower, Mr. McCloy and General McNarney who were present. I do not agree with the loose talk which has been going on on both sides of the Atlantic about the undue heavy casualties which we shall sustain. In my view it is the Germans who will suffer very heavy casualties when our band of brothers gets among them.

Para 4. I agree that the FCNL should not be made a party in any way to the details of OVERLORD. I have tried to further their earnest wish to have the Leclerc armoured division included in the forthcoming battle. But the presence of this single division will not give them any
right to be informed of our secrets, and they should be
told so without delay. A different situation might arise
if ANVIL were to materialize at the new date. In this
operation I believe 6 or 7 French divisions were to be employed,
in fact they would be more than half of the Allied Army.
There I think they should be made full partners. The
74,000 men they have already in Italy have fought very well
and have a very small proportion of missing to killed.
These facts give them claims to be taken into our confidence
in that theatre with of course proper restrictions and safeguards such as we ourselves impose at home. I suggest an
answer on these lines. Shall I draft for your agreement or
vice versa?

Para 5. You will also have received the demand of
the FCNL about our giving them a portion of the Italian
fleet. If they had brought their own fleet over, as Badoglio
did, they would not be short of ships. I am inclined to
think it would be best to leave their unwarrantable demand
unanswered, at any rate for some weeks to come.

Para 6. Your number 516 last sentence. I think it
would be a very good thing if De Gaulle came over to see
you but obviously you must know where you are with a man like this before you send an invitation. I have asked Ambassador Duff Cooper to put the point to him in the following way: "Mr. Churchill is worried about the danger of bad relations growing between you (De Gaulle) and the United States Government. He (Mr. Churchill) thinks that after Mr. Hull's important speech which has been welcomed by the FCNL it would be a very good and important thing for you to pay a short visit to the President and make a personal contact there. This would be helpful also to our British relations with the FCNL for you (De Gaulle) will readily understand that it is the foundation of our British policy to keep in step with the United States with whom we are sharing such great war schemes. If you felt like making this visit and would let me (Duff Cooper) know, Mr. Churchill would suggest to the President that he send you a formal invitation".

Prime
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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**ACTION**

1. **Answers** PR5 #518.
2. **Sent to** President at Waccamaw as Whalts 22, 13/0245Z.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as Black 13, 13/1915Z.
4. **Sent to** the PM as PR5 #521, 13 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

011 FNG; 000.9; 310 OVERLORD

**FILED:**

0456
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 644 Filed: 140905 2

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and TOP-SECRET.

Would it not be well for you and me to send a notice to Uncle J. about the date of OVERLORD? I do not see why this particular communication should not go from us both unitedly. I suggest for your consideration, the following message. Message begins:

1. Pursuant to our talks at Teheran, the general crossing of the sea will take place around the date mentioned in my immediately following, with 3 days margin on either side for weather. We shall be acting at our fullest strength.

2. Our action in the Mediterranean Theatre will be designed to hold the maximum number of German divisions away from the Russian front and from OVERLORD. The exact method by which this will be achieved will depend on the outcome of the heavy offensive which we shall launch in
Italy with all our strength about mid-May.

3. Since Teheran your armies have gained and are gaining a magnificent series of unforeseen victories for the common cause. Even in months when you thought they would not be active they have gained these great victories. We ask you to let us know, in order to make our own calculations, what scale your effort will take in the 3 months following the date mentioned, when we shall certainly strike. We send you our very best wishes and hope we may all fall on the common foe together. Message ends.

Please let me have your amendments to this and I will send it off signed Roosevelt-Churchill.

No Sig

Read 14/1200 E
Send as White 28

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972
Sent to the President at Macomber as WH2s 28, 14/1330Z Apr. In block 17, 14/1850Z Apr., the President directed: "Obtain Gen Marshall's advice without delay in regard to PM's 644, and inform us by telegraph. Reply to PM will be delayed until we hear from General Marshall."

General Marshall's suggested reply sent to the President by Gen Marshall via courier, 15 Apr 44. In block 27, 16 Apr 44, the President sent Gen Marshall's message, unchanged, to the Map Room for transmission to the PM. Answer sent to PM as PMs #522, 16 Apr 44.

In block 28, 16 Apr 44, the President directed General Marshall be informed that his message (block 27 above) had been sent without change. See attached memo fr Capt Wood to Gen Marshall.

Copies To:
Gen Marshall

Date:
14 Apr 44

By Direction Of:
The President

Action Completed:
0459
From: Military Attache London, England
For: President of the United States
No. 645, Filed 240930Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt and personal. No. 645. Your No. 520.

Para 1. I am sorry you cannot help in this way. Our only wish is to help you as much as possible in the war against Japan in accordance with our pledge. There is no possibility of increasing our LST programme here and this may well be a limiting factor. I hope you will bear this in mind if there are any complaints hereafter. Considering we are freely engaging five sixths of the naval forces to be used at OVERLORD much of which may be destroyed by the mines and short shore batteries, and that our merchant ship building is down to a bare million a year, I hope you will reconsider keeping your mass production of LST going on a little longer at the high levels it is about to attain. You will certainly want them even if you do not give any to us.
Para 2. We are working very hard to prepare plans for amphibious operations destined to support your left flank against Japan, and I hope soon to have definite proposals to make to your Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps you will allow me to recur to the above topic then.

Para 3. Your number 521. I regret the Committees action in dismissing General Giraud, and have done all I could to prevent it. I have acceded to Giraud's request to grant him and his daughter of seventeen asylum over here. I am very conscious of the dangers of an unfriendly France on the morrow of its deliverance by the English dash speakers.

Para 4. I hope you are benefitting from your rest. I am very glad to hear frequent and good accounts of Harry's progress.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0461
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>15/0005Z</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PRes-Pm #520.

Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 34, 15/0500Z.

In BLACK 44, 20/0220Z, the President stated: "No acknowledgment or reply will be made to WHITE 34."

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From: London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 646

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top Number 646.

To safeguard the security of "OVERLORD", we have decided to prohibit foreign representatives in this country from sending or receiving uncensored communications, whether cypher telegrams or diplomatic bags. We shall also forbid couriers or other members of diplomatic staffs from leaving the country. The ban will come into force from midnight Monday, April 17, and continue until after the launching of the operation. It will not, of course, apply to your representatives or to the Soviet representative; but it will cover both neutral representatives and representatives of other Allied Governments, including representatives of the French Committee of Liberation and exiled governments in this country.
We are imposing this ban because of our desire to leave nothing undone which might promote the success of "OVERLORD", and we have been much influenced by the view of General Eisenhower, who pressed strongly for it.

We shall explain to the foreign governments that the ban is being imposed for compelling military reasons and that many other restrictions are being imposed on our own people in the interests of security.

We hope that no foreign government will be tempted to retaliate by forbidding our diplomatic representatives to send uncensored communications. If, however, any were to do so, may we count on the help of your representative in the country concerned to enable us to continue to send and receive uncensored communications?

So much information about military plans is constantly passing between here and Washington that valuable information might well reach the enemy through cypher telegrams sent by representatives of foreign governments in the United States.
I have no doubt that you will be ready to consider whether some corresponding action should be taken to prevent leakages through diplomatic representatives in the United States.

No Sig

Received 15/1920 Z

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

By direction of Admiral Leahy, there is transmitted herewith a carefully paraphrased copy of the Prime Minister's message Number 646 to the President for advice in regard to the last paragraph commencing "I am sure..........." and ending ".........in your country".

Admiral Leahy states that the President is inclined to agree with the suggestion contained therein.

It is respectfully suggested that the reply can best be transmitted through the White House Map Room.

Respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aides to the President.

Enc. (HH)
1. Mag. Prime Minister to President, #646.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAY 6 1972
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No. 646

15 April 1944

In order to protect the security of forthcoming operations, we have reached a decision to prohibit representatives of foreign countries in this country from receiving or sending uncensored communications, whether diplomatic bags or cypher telegrams. In addition we shall forbid couriers or other members of diplomatic staffs from departing this country. This action becomes effective from midnight Monday, 17 April, and will continue until after the operation has been launched. Of course it will not apply to either your representatives or to the representatives of the Soviet; however, it will cover both representatives of other Allied Governments and representatives of neutral countries. Allied Governments as used here includes representatives of allied governments in this country and those of the French Committee of Liberation.

This ban is being imposed by us due to our desire to do everything possible to promote the success of the operation. General Eisenhower has pressed strongly for it and we have been influenced greatly by his view.

To the Foreign Governments we shall explain that, for compelling military reasons, this ban is being imposed and that our own people are having many other restrictions imposed upon them for security reasons.

It is our hope that no foreign government will be tempted, by forbidding our diplomatic representatives to transmit uncensored communications, to retaliate. However, in the event that any were to take this step, may we count on the assistance of your representative in whatever country is

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
concerned to enable us to receive and send communications uncensored?

Between here and Washington so much information concerning military plans is passing constantly that information of value might well get to the enemy through cypher telegrams sent by Foreign Government representatives in your country.

I am sure that you will be ready to take under consideration whether some corresponding action should be taken to prevent leakages through diplomatic representatives in your country.
April 16, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland

The attached letter from the Secretary of State addressed to Admiral Leahy, dated April 16, 1944, enclosing a copy of a paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President on the subject of censorship of Foreign Representatives, is forwarded to you for appropriate action.

Initially Admiral Leahy, through Captain Wood, requested the advice of the State Department on this subject, and by this letter the State Department has sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.
Aide
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I am not sending the attached message but will you take up with the State Department at the proper time the holding up of code telegrams and the censoring of other telegrams going out from here.

26 May - F.D.R.
President informed that R.S.S. does not believe that additional stoppage of telegrams would be advantageous

W.A.L.
May 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has not been sent and the Secretary of State says it is up to you whether it should be sent or not.

GGT.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to Captain Wood's memorandum of April 18, 1944, I enclose a draft reply to the Prime Minister's message number 646 of April 18, for your consideration.

Enclosure:
Draft telegram to the Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter MAY 6 1972
By J. Schleske Date
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO BE SENT

To: Prime Minister Churchill, London.
From: President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C.

The factors set forth in your 646 have been carefully considered, and much thought has been devoted to the probable results of the imposition of similar restrictive measures on the privileged communication channels of diplomatic officials accredited to this country. The special circumstances that necessitated such action in the case of Great Britain are fully appreciated, but in view of the geographical location of this country it seems clear that the military justification for such restrictive measures is not nearly so strong in our case. In England there is vital information to be observed at first hand, the lines of communication which have been closed are short and direct, and the measures in question can be made effective; with us, on the other hand, vital information concerning the invasion would not be obtainable by observation, lines of mail.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  MAY 6 1976
By W. J. Stewart Date
communication are long and slow, and the restrictions in question would not be fully effective in preventing information from crossing the border.

Our observation of the reaction in other countries to your recently imposed measures indicates the likelihood that if we take similar action retaliatory measures will be imposed against us and we will lose our privileged channels of communication. Not only are these channels proving highly valuable but their retention will enable us to afford our facilities to your representatives wherever this may be helpful or desirable. There seems little doubt that the imposition of such measures by us would cause such resentment in this Hemisphere that it would negative to a substantial degree whatever contribution the various countries therein are making to the war effort.

For the reasons given, I have come to the conclusion that there is more to be lost than gained by a change in our
present procedures. We will, of course, continue to lend
our full support to the measures that you have so wisely
placed in effect.

[Signature]

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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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**SUBJECT:** Ban on diplomatic traffic from England.

**ACTION**

1. Sent to the President at Washington as WALTZ 41, 15/72010Z.
2. In BLACK 25, 16/0300Z, Adm Leahy directed, "Give copy to Sec State for advice. President is inclined to agree with suggestion contained in Para 6."
3. In WALTZ 65, 18/1945Z, Sec State sent draft reply to be sent thru Amb Winant to PM.
4. President, in BLACK 41, 19/0230Z, stated, "Your message proposed to Winant in WALTZ 65 is approved." State Dept immediately informed by Capt Price via telephone. Confirming memorandum sent to Sec State 19 Apr 44.
5. Answer sent as State Dept message 2112, Midnight, 18 Apr 1944, via State Dept channels to Winant for delivery to PM. (Copy in this folder)
6. In above message to PM, President informed he was "consulting military people on the point." On 4 May 44 State Dept submitted draft message to PM; this was not sent, but was referred to Admiral Leahy to take up again with the State Department at proper time.

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

3/0 Omland
From: London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 647

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your messages numbers 476 and 477 (of the 24th February). I agree that we should clear our minds on
the question of which economic matters might profitably
be discussed internationally before the end of the war.
Mr. Stettinius' visit to London should provide an op-
portunity for discussing, anyhow in a preliminary way,
the procedure best calculated to ensure that all these
economic questions are dealt with at the right time and
in the right order.

On the subject of combined boards, and their
future status, (your 477) I entirely agree with you that
the boards have done very good work and that the part
which they could and should play in our future arrange-
ments should be further studied between us. I think
that the initial discussions on this had better take
place in Washington between our representatives there.
From: London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 647

and the appropriate United States agencies; and I propose to send instructions to our representatives in Washington accordingly.
18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copies of messages between the President and the Prime Minister on post-war economic collaboration are forwarded for your information.

The Secretary of the Treasury is also being furnished copies of these messages.

It is requested that copies of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

ODGEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant, USNR,
White House Map Room.

3 Incls.

Mag, Pres. to PM, #476,
23 February 1944.
Mag, Pres. to PM, #477,
23 February 1944.
Mag, PM to Pres., #647, ✓
15 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 8 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date

SECRET
- 1 -
18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copies of messages between the President and the Prime Minister on post-war economic collaboration are forwarded for your information.

The Secretary of State is also being furnished copies of these messages.

It is requested that copies of any reply made or action taken by the Treasury Department to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

OGDEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant, USNR,
White House Map Room.

3 Incls.
Msg, Pres. to PM, #476,
23 February 1944.
Msg, Pres. to PM, #477,
23 February 1944.
Msg, PM to Pres., #647,
15 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 15-2-72

SECRET

- 1 -
FROM: THE PRIME-MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 647, 15 APRIL 1944

Reference your 476 and 477. I am in agreement that we should clear our minds on the question as to which matters might profitably be discussed internationally before the end of the war. In a preliminary way at least, the visit of Mr. Stettinius to London should provide an opportunity for discussing the procedure best calculated to ensure that all these economic questions are dealt with in the right order and at the right time.

Reference your 477, on the subject of combined boards and their future status, I entirely agree with you that the boards have done good work and that we should further study the part which they could and should play in our future arrangements. I propose to send instructions to our representatives in Washington as I think that the initial discussions on this had better take place in Washington between the appropriate United States agencies and our representatives there.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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### ACTION

1. Answered PRES #476 & 477, 23 Feb 44.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE #4, 152040Z, Apr.
3. In BLACK 26, 160300Z, Adm Leahy requested copies of PRES #476 & 477 be sent by telegraph; sent as WHITES 45 & 46, 161330Z.
4. In BLACK 33, 180405, President directed following be sent to PM: "Yr #647 read and delvd to Hull and Morgenthau for information." This was sent to PM as PRES #524, 18 April 1944.
5. In BLACK 34, 180405, directed that copies of PRES #s 476 & 477, and PM #647 be given to Sec's State and Treasury for their information. Paraphrased copies sent by memo, 18 Apr 44.
6. In BLACK 62, 24 Apr 44, Admiral Brown stated that he considered matter finished at least until return to Washington.

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Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Confidential. Number 648.

1. You will be aware of the disturbances which have broken out among the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East and of the difficulties which have arisen with the Greek Government in Cairo.

2. The outbreak in the Greek Army and Navy followed closely on the establishment in the mountains of Greece of the political committee sponsored by E.A.M. and there is little doubt that the extremist elements who have long been working to subvert the allegiance of the Greek forces to their legitimate King and Government seized on this as a heaven-sent opportunity for open and violent action. The dissident elements are undoubtedly opposed to the King and in favour of a republic but, through the disturbances, there have been almost no direct attacks on the King's personal position and the only specific demand put forward is that the Greek Government should take immediate and effective steps to recognize and associate with themselves the political committee in Greece.
3. This crisis came at a particularly unfortunate moment since Monsieur Tsouderos had already sent an invitation to a number of moderate politicians in Athens, urging them to come to Cairo to join the government. He had also invited representatives of E.A.M., the Communist-controlled organization which has created and now dominates the political committee. Tsouderos was thus doing everything in his power to create a truly representative Greek Government.

4. In this programme, he had the support of his colleagues and they appear to have had no hand in provoking the disturbances in the Greek forces. But they were extremely jealous of Tsouderos' position and used the trouble in the Greek Army, which was at first on a small scale, to get rid of him. Feeling that he had lost control of the situation, Tsouderos resigned and proposed Venezelos for the Premiership. The trouble in the Greek Army rapidly spread to the Navy and assumed proportions of a full scale mutiny in both forces. The politicians
in Cairo realized that the matter had gone beyond one of personal rivalries or ambitions and their only thought was to find some candidate for the Premiership sufficiently notorious for his left-wing views to be acceptable to the mutinous elements in the forces.

5. The King of Greece was reluctant to accept a new government whose composition was in effect dictated by the mutineers. He considered that order in the Greek Armed Forces must be restored before any lawful reconstruction of the government could be undertaken. I entirely agreed with him and instructed our ambassador to the Greek Government to do his utmost to induce the Greek Ministers to remain at their posts until the King could get back to Cairo and take stock of the situation. This, I am glad to say, they agreed to do. I also gave instructions to the military authorities in the Middle East to deal firmly with indiscipline in the Greek Forces under their command. Order in the Greek Army and Navy has not been completely reestablished but the dissident elements are being isolated and once the ring leaders are under arrest the mutiny should rapidly subside.
6. The King of Greece has now reached Cairo and, after studying the position for himself, has formed a government under Monsieur Venezelos. For the future, I have informed our ambassador to the Greek Government that he should be guided by the following considerations:

"Our relations are definitely established with the lawfully-constituted Greek Government headed by the King, who is the ally of Britain and cannot be discarded to suit a momentary surge of appetite among ambitious emigres nonentities. Neither can Greece find constitutional expression in particular sets of Guerillas, in many cases indistinguishable from banditti, who are masquerading as the saviours of their country while living on the local villagers. If necessary, I shall denounce these elements and tendencies publicly in order to emphasise the love Great Britain has for Greece whose suffering she shared in a small measure being, alas, not then armed as we are now. Our only desire and interest is to see Greece a glorious, free nation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the
honoured friend and ally of the victorious powers. Let all, therefore, work for this objective and make it quite clear that any failure in good conduct will not be overlooked.

"I had been working very hard to arrange the movement of the Greek Brigade in Italy. Here they might still take part in the entry into Rome which is to be expected during the summer. This brigade, the First Greek Brigade, representatives of the army which had beaten back the Italian invader and were only felled by the treacherous and brutal intervention of the German hoardes, had and still has the chance of raising the name of Greece high in the world. It is a lamentable fact that they should have signalised this opportunity by an undignified, even squalid, exhibition of indiscipline which many will attribute to an unworthy fear of being sent to the front.

"In the same way the Greek Navy, which is full of daring seamen and is playing a worthy part upholding its country's good name, should not suddenly have tried to
meddle with politics and presume to dictate a constitution to the Greek people. I believe that both of these two forces can be brought back to a high sense of national honour and duty if courageous leadership is forthcoming backed by overwhelming force in reserve.

"All the time I have been planning to place Greece back high in the counsels of the victorious nations. Witness how we have included them in the Italian Advisory Council and tried to send a brigade to take part in the impending victories in Italy. Greeks who are in safety in Egypt under our protection equipped with our vessels or armed with our weapons or otherwise in security under the military authority of the British Commander in Chief, Middle East, will place themselves in an abject and shameful position before all history if they allow their domestic feuds to mar their performance of the solemn duties to their country of which they have become the heirs. They may easily, by selfish excitable behaviour reduce Greece to a country without expression either at home or abroad and their names will be stained as long as history is written.
From: London, England
For: The President of the United States

Number 648

"The King is the servant of his people. He makes no claim to rule them. He submits himself freely to the judgment of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. He places himself and his royal house entirely at the disposal of the Greek Nation. Once the German invader has been driven out, Greece can be a republic or a monarchy, entirely as the people wish. Why then cannot the Greeks keep their hatreds for the common enemy who has wrought them such cruel injuries and would obliterate them as a free people, were it not for the resolute exertions of the great Allies?"

7. In sending these instructions, I have asked Ambassador Leeper to make use of all these arguments freely in my name, if necessary, both to the troops and to the sailors as well, of course, as to the politicians, who have been clattering around him. In making it clear to them that this is the policy of His Majesty's Government, I have asked him to emphasize that we seek no advantage for ourselves and have no interests but in the upholding of Greek independence, freedom and honour.
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<td>648</td>
<td>16 Apr 1944</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Greek disturbances</td>
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**ACTION**

1. To President at Wacanaw as WHITE 49, 16/2300W.
2. In BLACK 32, 18/0405Z, the President sent reply to Map Room for transmittal to PM.
3. Answer sent to PM as PRES #523, 18 Apr 44.

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

FILED:

See blank.
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

and personal. Subject: Spanish wolfran.

1. The only difference outstanding between our 2 countries and the Spaniards is that we should like to accept Jordana's final offer of 60 tons between now and the end of June in rising monthly installments of 15, 20, and 25 tons, the remaining 240 tons to be sent in monthly installments of 40 tons between July and December.

2. When considering what turned out to be an unauthorized proposal from the Duke of Alba, you have agreed that 51 tons might go to Germany in monthly installments of 17 tons between now and the end of June. This is the most important period and the difference between us is 9 tons on the 3 months.

3. For the sake of this trifle we ought not surely to run the risk of the Spaniards sending
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered

in to Germany nearly a thousand tons which is
waiting at the frontier, as well as lose all the
other points which are of very great interest to
us both. I do hope you will be able to give the
point your personal consideration.

No Sig
18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message #649 from the Prime Minister, dated 17 April 1944, be given to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

It is respectfully suggested that the reply can best be transmitted to the President through the White House Map Room.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
Prime Minister to President
#649, 17 April 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 649, 17 APRIL 1944

When considering what turned out to be an unauthorized proposal from the Duke of Alba, you have agreed that 51 tons of wolfram might go to Germany in monthly installments of 17 tons between now and the end of June.

The only difference outstanding between our two countries and the Spaniards is that we should like to accept Jordana's final offer of 60 tons between now and the end of June in rising monthly installments of 15, 20, and 25 tons; the remaining 240 tons to be sent in monthly installments of 40 tons each between July and December.

The period between now and the end of June is the most important, and the difference between us is 9 tons on the 3 months. We ought not, for the sake of this trifle, to run the risk of the Spanish sending into Germany nearly a thousand tons of wolfram which is waiting at the frontier, as well as losing all the other points in which we are greatly interested. I trust that you will personally consider this point.
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**ACTION**

1. (Last magic on this was PABE #639). Sent to President as White 51, 1713152.
2. In BLACK 36, 18/0405, President directed this be sent to Sec State for draft reply. Sent by memo, 18 Apr 44.
3. Draft reply sent to the President via pouch, 20 Apr 44; as Special Telegram #2 from Sec State to the President.
4. President's reply, quoting Sec State's Special Telegram #2, received in Map Room as BLACK 53, 2121352. Reply sent to the PM as PABE #529, 21 Apr 44.
5. Sec State notified by telephone evening 21; confirmed by memo 22 Apr 44.
18 April 1944

From: London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 650 Filed 180940Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Secret. Number 650.
Your number 522.

I certainly think that it would be a good thing to send the message as redrafted by you beginning at "1. Pursuant to our talks" and ending "will crush the Hitlerites". This engages Stalin's direct personal attention and is more worthy of the tremendous event to which we are committed heart and soul than a Staff notification. It may even be followed by a friendly response. I have ventured to omit the word "soon" as it seems safer, and have sent it off over our joint signatures.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM | The Prime Minister | TO | The President
---|---|---|---
SERIAL | 650 | DATE | 18 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME | VIA | OR FILE NUMBER | 
TOR MAP ROOM | SUBJECT | Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD
ACTION | Answer PM-PRES #522, 16 Apr 44.
| Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 60, 18/1252. Answered by the President in BLACK 39, 18/02302. Reply sent to the PM as PM-PRES #525, 18 Apr 44.
| (Resulting message to Stalin extracted from PRES #522 and filed in PRES-STALIN file. Message to Stalin was sent from London to Moscow via British channels, 18 Apr 44.)

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ACTION COMPLETED: | 310 OVERLORD.
FILLED:
April 18, 1944

From: Military Attache London, England
For: President of the United States
No. 651, Filed 171504Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 651.

Your number 523.

Thank you so much. I have told our people to make use of your message to the King and his new Ministers, and to read it to the mutinous brigade and recalcitrant ships. It may have a most salutary effect. I am not publishing anything here.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PRES-Fm #523, 18 Apr 44, which was sent from the President at Waccamaw to the Map Room as black 32, 18/04052, for transmittal to the PM.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as White 62, 18/16052.
3. In black 44, 20 Apr 44, informed, "No acknowledgment or reply will be made to White 62."

---

**ACTION COMPLETED**: Not filled.

**FILED**: Not filled.
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

and personal.

Para 1. I have talked to Mr. Bevin upon this.

Personally he would like to come and greatly appreciates the kindness of your invitation and references to him. He very much regrets that he finds it impossible. What with the demands of "OVERLORD" and its follow-up and with the very delicate situation here with labour unrest, he feels he would not be doing his duty in quitting his post. I must say that he is so much in the centre of our affairs here at this time that I should find it very difficult to spare him.

Para 2. On the other hand the labour M.P., George Tomlinson, a minister of the Crown, is going with a pretty strong team and we hope that they will make a good contribution towards solving our international problems. Great pains have been taken here by Mr. Bevin and other labour leaders to make sure that our people have a constructive case to present.

No Sig

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>19 Apr 44</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>19/0856Z</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>19/1350Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>British representation on International Labor Conference.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers P505-Pw #510, 3 Apr 44.
2. Sent to President at Wangen as White 72, 19/1535Z.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as Black 46, 21/0300Z.
4. Answer sent to PM as P505-Pw #526, 20 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

210 ILO

**FILED:**

0501
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 653 Filed: 192350 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal

General De Gaulle would like to inquire, through his representative in Washington, whether a visit from him to you would be agreeable when you return from your holiday. I hope in these circumstances you will tell me I may encourage him to take this course. You might do him a great deal of good by paternal treatment and indeed I think it would be a help from every point of view.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Red: 2060552
Sent on White 77 - 200/303. Red.
FROM
The Prime Minister

TO
The President

SERIAL
653

DATE
20 Apr 44

DATE/TIME
19/2350Z

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM
VIA

SUBJECT
French National Committee; visit of De Gaulle.

ACTION
1. Answered PRES #521, 13 Apr 44.

2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as W/IT 77, 200130Z.

3. President's reply received in Map Room as BLACK 47, 210300Z.

4. Sent to PM as PRES #527, 20 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

000.9

0503
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

Many thanks for your 517.

Following is text of telegram I have sent to Mackenzie King:

"Many thanks for your telegrams numbers 34 and 35 of the 10th March. I have now examined these with the Chiefs of Staff and I have seen a copy of the reply which President Roosevelt has sent you. We welcome the proposal for the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London to act as a link with the British Chiefs of Staff and with the Supreme Allied Commanders. Our Chiefs of Staff will work out detailed arrangements for the necessary liaison between themselves and the Canadian Joint Staff Mission as soon as we hear that it has been appointed.

President Roosevelt has explained that the appropriate channels of communication between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Command must be through the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and not directly through your Joint Staff Mission. You will I think understand that is is essential not to disturb the well-established chain of command whereby the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions on all subjects from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There will of course be no objection to your Joint Staff Mission having contact on day to day liaison matters with the Supreme Commanders, but all matters of high policy can only be dealt with through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In your telegram number 34 you expressed the opinion that it would be desirable that appropriate announcements should be made to make clear that General Wilson and General Eisenhower are Commanders in Chief of the participating forces of the United Nations. I agree with President Roosevelt that on military grounds there is no call for such an announcement. I am inclined to doubt its desirability on other grounds. The Supreme Command in the Mediterranean has been in existence for 18 months and has been directing the forces of many nations, which have been placed at its disposal, under arrangements.
satisfactory to all. Any general announcement at the present time might give rise to misunderstandings and cause difficulties with the many participants in the European campaigns. I suggest therefore that if you desire to announce the authority of General Eisenhower over the Canadian Forces under his command, that you should do so on behalf of the Canadian Government alone, rather than that we should seek to get agreement from all concerned for a general announcement."

No Sig

Received 20/4/32

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By A. H. Parks  DatMay 6 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>654</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>20 April 1944</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>201253</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Canadian Joint Staff Mission to London; and relationship to supreme commanders of theatres.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers PRES #517, 8 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw via pouch as unnumbered White, 20 Apr 44.
3. President's reply received in the Map Room as BLACK 52, 21 Apr 44. Sent to PM as PRES #528, 21 Apr 44.
From: Military Attache London, England
To: President of the United States
No. 655, Filed 221543Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 655.

Your number 529 (of April 22nd: Spanish Wolfram).

1. Since I sent you my number 649, Lord Halifax has been discussing this question with Mr. Cordell Hull who, after drawing attention to your difficulties with your public opinion, proposed that we should ourselves sponsor Spanish oil shipments on the basis of our special strategic interests and supply needs in Spain. The United States Government would not be directly concerned with this arrangement but Mr. Hull intimated that we would be able to make a much better case for it than for the same action taken by you. He concluded that this was the best way we could help you.

2. As I have already explained to you, I am
convinced that the present Spanish offer is a good one, which I shall be glad to sponsor as a practical and prestige victory over our enemies. I am also sure that it is the best we can get. Our latest information indicates that if we do not close on it within a day or two the Spanish Minister for foreign affairs will resign and there will be a temporary swing away from us in Spain. This will automatically bring about all the disadvantages which I have set out in my earlier messages, including an immediate increase in Spanish wolfram exports to Germany. I have no doubt that Sir Samuel Hoare has already done all that is possible to prevent the 60 tons, to which you attach such importance, going to Germany before the end of June. The course you now suggest would only mean future delay which might prove very dangerous.

3. As regards your references to the other neutrals, I cannot believe that they will be deterred from meeting our wishes by the fact that a negligible quantity of wolfram (a few lorry loads) goes to Germany from Spain before the end of June. On the
contrary, a settlement with Spain which will be a clear victory for us could, in my view, only have a good effect on the other neutrals, more particularly as Spain has hitherto been the most pro-German among them. In fact, I regard an immediate settlement with Spain on the lines now proposed as offering the best prospects for bringing about a reduction in Portuguese wolfram exports. Some here fear that your recent decision to raise your legation at Lisbon to an embassy may give Salazar the impression that we do not mean business. We already dealing with Turkey separately and I am not aware of any demands that we are now making upon Switzerland. If Switzerland did not exist it would have to be invented.

4. I understand difficulties about public opinion. It is for that reason that I have already instructed Lord Halifax to inform Mr Hull that I am ready to fall in with his wishes, and take upon myself the whole responsibility for this settlement. I have already instructed Sir S Hoare to make a communication accordingly to the Spanish Government as soon as I receive confirmation that the United States Gov-
erronment would acquiesce in the above arrangement as suggested by Mr Hull. It is important that Sir S Hoare should act early next week and I therefore hope that either you or Mr Hull will confirm United States acquiescence in the above procedure before then.

No Sig.
23 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 655 from the Prime Minister, dated 22 April 1944, is forwarded to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

RICHARD PEARL, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
Msg, PM-PRES #655,
22 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6, 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 655

With reference to your number 529 received on April 22 regarding Spanish wolfram:

1. Since my number 649 was sent to you, Lord Halifax has been talking over this problem with Mr. Cordell Hull who, after emphasizing your difficulties with your public opinion, suggested that we ourselves should sponsor shipments of oil to Spain on the basis of our supply needs and special strategic interests in that country. Your Government would not be concerned directly with such an arrangement but Mr. Hull intimated that a much better case for it could be made by us than if you took the same action. He concluded that this was the best manner in which we could assist you.

2. I am, as I have already explained to you, convinced that the present offer from the Spanish Government is a good one, which I shall be glad to back as a prestige and a practical victory over the Axis. In addition, I am sure we can get nothing better. According to our most recent information indications are that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs will resign if we do not close the deal within a day or two and that in Spain there will be a temporary trend away from us. Automatically this will bring about all the disadvantages which have been set out by me in earlier messages, including an immediate increase in exports of wolfram to Germany from Spain. That Sir Samuel Hoare has already done all that is possible to prevent the sixty tons, to which such importance is
attached by you, going to Germany before the end of June, I can have no doubt. Only future delay, which might prove very dangerous would result from the course you now suggest.

3. I cannot believe, as regards your references to the other neutrals that they will be deterred from meeting our wishes by the fact that a few lorry loads of wolfram, a negligible quantity, go from Spain before the end of June to Germany. Quite the opposite, a settlement with the Spanish Government which for us will be a clear victory could, as I see it, have on the other neutrals only a good effect. More particularly as among them Spain has hitherto been the most pro-German. As a matter of fact, an immediate settlement with Spain on the basis now suggested I regard as offering the best prospects of effecting a reduction in exports of wolfram from Portugal. Your recent decision to raise to an embassy your legation at Lisbon has caused some here to fear that the impression that we do not mean business may be given to Salazar. With Turkey we are already dealing separately and of any demands upon Switzerland that we are now making, I am not aware. Switzerland would have to be invented if it did not exist.

4. About public opinion difficulties I understand. I have already for that reason given instructions to Lord Halifax to inform Mr. Hull that I am ready to fall in with his desires, and assume the whole responsibility for this settlement myself. Sir Samuel Hoare has already been instructed by me to make a communication accordingly to the Government of Spain as soon as I receive confirmation that the above arrangements as suggested by Mr. Hull would be acquiesced in by the United States Government. In view of the fact that it is important that Sir Samuel Hoare should act early next week I hope, therefore, that, either Mr. Hull or yourself
will before then confirm United States acquiescence in the above procedure.
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<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>22 April 1944</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Spanish wolfram</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PReS #529, 21 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 91, 221840Z.
4. Sec States proposal sent to the President as WHITE 113, 250100Z.
5. BLACK 66, 251715, approves WHITE 113.
6. BLACK 67, 251715, forwards to Map Room President's reply to PM. Sent to PM as PRES #531.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

6/1 Wolfman.
From: Military Attaché London, England
To: President of the United States
No. 656,Filed 22/302.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 656.

Your 527.

From our previous correspondence, especially number 518 on which I took action, I had hoped you would go a little further with this. After all this man, whom I trust as little as you do, commands considerable forces including Naval Forces and the Richelieu, which are placed most freely at our disposal and are in action or eager for action. He presides over a vast empire, all the strategic points in which are at our disposal. May I send the following:

"Prime Minister to General De Gaulle. The President tells me that he will be very much pressed with work immediately after his return to Washington. But if the French Representative in Washington raises the question after the middle of May, your visit would
be agreeable to him, subject of course to the unforeseeable events of war."

I hope you can go as far as this.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks    Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
DATE 22 Apr 44
DATE/TIME
OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM
VIA
SUBJECT Visit of De Gaulle.

ACTION
1. Answers PR 527, 20 Apr 44.
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as W 92, 2220002.
3. President's reply received in the Map Room as
   BLACK 60, 2322002. Sent to PA as file # 530, 23 Apr 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
000.9
To: The President of the United States
Number 657

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal private and
Your number 530.

Para 1. You started me off on this by your number 518. However I press it no more, especially as the date you mention is one round about which I am hoping you will remember you have a prior engagement.

Para 2. I have had very good talks with Berle, McCloy and above all Stettinius. I am most relieved by what I have heard about Harry.

Para 3. I am glad we sent our joint telegram to UJ because it is a great thing to have on record that he accepts what we are going to do as fulfillment of the Teheran undertakings and in addition that he himself will move accordingly.

Para 4. Thank you very much for your message about the Greeks. I have made use of it in all quarters concerned. The Greek naval mutineers have now surrendered unconditional to a boarding attack by loyal Greek sailors. I think the
mutionous brigade will be brought to its bearings tomorrow. At any rate if it is not, we shall have to use artillery against its batteries, which are pointing at us. There are two small heights to be taken during the night. With the dawn comes a heavy shower of leaflets. Smoke is then dropped so as to leave a quarter of an hour when all will be in darkness and when it is hoped a large number of these gentry will make their way out from the abodes of the guilty. By these means we hope to establish order without bloodshed. King George has shown great steadfastness and has got hold of a Greek named Papandreou, said to be a man of high and firm character and of public distinction, who has lived in Greece all the time and consequently is one up on the earlier emigres. I expect he will make Papandreou Premier. Generally the position seems to be clearing up.

Para 5. It will be well to get these Greek matters out of the way, as His Majesty King Farouk is on his high horse. He wishes to dismiss the Nahas government, which has a large majority in the chamber, the chamber having 3 years to run. Nahas as you know represents the RAPD party of the democracy and the peasants, and is viewed with much distaste by the palace circles and the wealthy Pashas and it is believed by the Egyptian army. We are quite ready to have an
election and so is Nahas, provided it can take place at once. This the King thinks is a horrible idea: he wishes to put his palace minister Hassanein in as Prime Minister with a court clique around him to rig the election in the next 3 or 4 months. We cannot allow this, as it would make great enemies of the working class and peasant parties who stood so firm and steady when the enemy was but 60 miles from Cairo and when Farouk might have slipped off any day to join the Italians or Germans. Here again we are proceeding with great caution but also with force behind. To be quite fair I must admit that Nahas and company fall below the standards which idealists have always hoped for in Oriental democracy. He and his party are corrupt, incompetent, but fully capable, I blush to say, influencing elections otherwise than by oratory.

Para 6. I am very glad at what has happened in Italy. It seems to me that we have both succeeded in gaining what we sought. The only thing now lacking is a victory. I had long talks with Alexander when he was here for a few days consultation. He defended his actions or inactions with much force, pointing out the small plurality of his army, its mixed character, there being no fewer than 7 separate nationalities against the homogeneous Germans, the vileness of the weather and the extremely awkward nature of the ground. At latest by the date in my immediately following he will
attack and push everything in as hard as possible. If this battle were successful or even going at full blast it would fit in very well with other plan.

Para 7. I hope that you have benefitted by your rest and that a sea voyage may be prescribed in due course to consolidate the effects of your holiday. I have had a busman's holiday myself having been acting Foreign Secretary and leader of the house as well as my other odd jobs.

Every good wish to you and yours.

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<th>FROM</th>
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<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<td>24/1835</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>DeGaulle visit; joint telegram to UJ re OVERLORD; Greeks; Wogs; Italian offensive.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers File 530; and others.
2. To President at Waccamaw as WULIE 107, 2420L52.
3. Answered by File #532, received in Map Room as Cunch 69, 260230Z.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

000.9; 316 British; 316 Canadian; 316 Italy

**FILED:**

0524
To: The President of the United States
Number 658
24/JRT
From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
My immediately preceding telegram, para 6. May
14th is date.

NO SIG

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks      Date MAY 6 1972
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<td>TO</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>24/NFT</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>24/2030Z</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>D-Day for Italian offensive.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

1. This message is further to PM #657, which see for action.
2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WhIT# 109, 24/2121Z.
3. Answered by PRES #512, received in the Map Room as BLACK 69, 260230Z.

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ACTION COMPLETED: 30 May 1944  
FILED: 0526
To: The President of the United States
Number 659

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Have just read Rear Admiral Francis Low Chief of Staff of US 10th Fleet about anti submarine warfare. All this matter might have come in very well in our monthly statement as agreed. You instituted, with my agreement, the monthly statements which seem to have worked pretty well on the conventions agreed. Would you consider whether this pronouncement is not rather outside the scope of our arrangement. Tell me if anyone here has offended.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks DATE MAY 6 1972

0527
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<td>24/2030</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Admiral Low's speech.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 110, 24/21252.
2. Answered by PRES #532, received in the Map Room as BLACK 69, 2602302.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

048.7
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

Further to my number 657 I have just heard from General Paget that British troops occupied key positions on the ridge overlooking the Greek camp last night and encountered slight opposition. There were no Greek casualties but one British officer was killed. The Greek brigade surrendered this morning and laid down its arms. The brigade is now being evacuated to a prisoner of war cage where the ring leaders will be arrested.

The mutinous Navy surrendered unconditionally 24 hours earlier.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
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<td>24/2130Z</td>
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<td>VIA MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA Army Cod. Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Greek disturbance.</td>
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</tbody>
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**ACTION**

1. Further to PM 657.
2. To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 111, 24.2145Z.
3. Answered by PM #532, received in the White House Map Room as BLACK 69, 260230.

**SERIAL NUMBER**

0530
25 April 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 661 Filed: 25/10322
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 661.
My telegram number 650.
I have received following telegram dated April 22 from Premier Stalin in reply to our joint message. Begins:

I have received your message of the 18th April. The Soviet Government is satisfied with your statement that in accordance with the Teheran agreement, the crossing of the sea will take place on the date planned regarding which Generals Deane and Burrows had already informed our General Staff and that you will be acting at your fullest strength. I express my confidence in the success of the planned operations.

I, also, hope for the success of the operation to be undertaken by you in Italy.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972

Reid 25/1217Z 2114 (Hand)
To: The President of the United States
Number 661 Filed: 25/10322

As we agreed at Teheran, the Red Army will undertake at the same time its new offensive in order to give the maximum support to the Anglo-American operations.

I beg you to accept my thanks for the wishes which you express regarding the success of the Red Army. I subscribe to your declaration that your armies and ours supporting one another will crush the Hitlerites and fulfil their historic missions. Ends.

I am not inclined to press them for details of their operations as we are such a great distance apart and they certainly have played up with grand vigour.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 661
DATE 25 April 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 25/1032Z

TO MAP ROOM 25/1217Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD

ACTION
1. Further to Pa 650, P/M 525.
2. To President at Waco in pouch as 114 (via pouch), 25 Apr 44.
3. Answered by P/M 532, received in the Map Room as Blake 69, 260230Z.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

__________________________________________

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

[Signature]

0533
26 April 1944

Rec'd 26/0825
White 123 26/1200 Z.

To: The President of the United States
Number 662 Filed: 26/0727Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
personal and ___ Number 662.
Your number 531.

We are all here greatly obliged for your consideration.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
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<td>1. Answers PRES 531.</td>
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<td>2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHIT5 123, 261200Z.</td>
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0535
26 April 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 663

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 663.

King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broad-based administration not obnoxious to the Partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible? He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By H. N. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0536
28 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached message from the President for the Secretary of State was received in the White House Map Room this date.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
Msg, Pres to Sec of State, 28 Apr 44.
I have received the following message from Churchill:

"King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broad-based administration not obnoxious to the partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible? He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy."

I am perfectly willing to help the Prime Minister but do not know where the Ban is.

Please prepare a draft reply and also read King Peter's letter to me.

ROOSEVELT
FROM The Prime Minister      TO The President

SERIAL 663                        DATE 26 Apr 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 26/1210Z

TOR MAP ROOM 26/1320Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT King Peter's government—the Ban of Croatia.

**ACTION**

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 124, 26/1320Z.
2. Black 76 refers msg to Sec State for draft reply.
3. On 12 May 44, State Department advised that the Ban has been located and had gone to England as suggested by Prime Minister and King Peter.
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, taken to President at Shangri-La in pouch by Captain Wood. Black 1, 131645Z, approving Leahy's draft with additions, received in Map Room.
5. Answer to PA as PROO #539, 13 May 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

ACTION COMPLETED: 05/1 Yugoslavia

FILED: 0539
26 April 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 664

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and No. 664.

Your 532.

The Egyptian political crisis is at an end as the King has agreed not to make any changes at present. An attempt is being made to patch up things between him and the government.

Thank you so much for all your kindness. I am greatly delighted that your health has improved.

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<td>26/1240Z</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Egyptian political crisis.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answer PHS #532, 25 Apr 44.
2. To the President at Waccamaw as W.1T2 125, 261320Z.
3. No reply required.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

052 Egyptian

**FILED:**
To: The President of the United States
Number 665 29/NFT
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Para 1. I am seriously concerned about the food situation in India and its possible reactions on our joint operations. Last year we had a grievous famine in Bengal through which at least 700,000 people died. This year there is a good crop of rice, but we are faced with an acute shortage of wheat, aggravated by unprecedented storms which have inflicted serious damage on the Indian spring crops. India's shortage cannot be overcome by any possible surplus of rice even if such a surplus could be extracted from the peasants. Our recent losses in the Bombay explosion have accentuated the problem.

Para 2. Wavell is exceedingly anxious about our position and has given me the gravest warnings. His present estimate is that he will require imports of about one million tons this year if he is to hold the situation, and so meet the needs of
the United States and British and Indian troops and of the civil population especially in the great cities. I have just heard from Mountbatten that he considers the situation so serious that, unless arrangements are made promptly to import wheat requirements, he will be compelled to release military cargo space of SEAC in favour of wheat and formally to advise Stilwell that it will also be necessary for him to arrange to curtail American military demands for this purpose.

Para 3 By cutting down military shipments and other means, I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to India from Australia during the first nine months of 1944. This is the shortest haul. I cannot see how to do more.

Para 4 I have had much hesitation in asking you to add to the great assistance you are giving us with shipping but a satisfactory situation in India is of such vital importance to the success of our joint plans against the Japanese that I am impelled to ask you to consider a special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia without reducing the assistance you are now providing for us, who are at a positive minimum if war efficiency is to be maintained. We have the wheat (in Australia) but we lack the ships. I have resisted
for some time the Viceroy's request that I should ask you for your help, but I believe that, with this recent misfortune to the wheat harvest and in the light of Mountbatten's representations, I am no longer justified in not asking for your help. Wavell is doing all he can by special measures in India. If however he should find it possible to revise his estimate of his needs, I would let you know immediately.

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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>291525Z</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Request for ships to transport Australian wheat to India.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 145, 291525Z.
2. BLACK 86, to Sec State for preparation of draft reply after consultation with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Draft reply, prepared by State Dept after consultation with JCS, submitted to President 31 May 44; approved without change by the President; sent to FM as BRES 4568. 1 June 44.
To: The President of the United States
Number 666

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

I have learned with great sorrow of the sudden death of Colonel Knox. If you will allow me to say so, His Majesty's Government and especially the Admiralty feel his loss acutely, for no-one could have been more forthcoming and helpful in all our difficult times than was this distinguished American Statesman and War Administrator.

The War Cabinet have desired me to express their sympathy with you in losing so invaluable a colleague, to which I add my own expressions of sincere sorrow.

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<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement on Secretary of Navy Knox's death.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as White 147, 291915Z.
2. (See also Pd 667, requesting that statement be published.)
3. Answered by Pd 533, 29 Apr 44, which was received in the Map Room as Black 83, 300240Z.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

N/O
From: U.S. Military Attaché London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 667
From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
My immediately preceding telegram. We propose that this message should be published, unless you have any objections.

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement on Secretary of Navy amex's death.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. (Further to PM #666, 29 Apr 44.)
2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 146, 2919152.
3. Answered by PM #533, 29 Apr 44, which was received in the Map Room as BLACK 83, 3002402.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
To: The President of the United States
Number 668

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal

Para 1. We are deeply grateful for a statement made by Admiral King reported to us in our JSM 23, holding out the hope that the L.S.T.'s which have been considered in relation to some form of "ANVIL" may even yet be made available to us for the greatest amphibious operation we can stage after the big battle in Italy is decided. This has followed our COS (w) 16 of April 27th and gives me hope that the difficulties are clearing away. Admiral King is being informed that as soon as the conference between Wilson, who is coming home, Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff has reached a definite point, we will submit our proposals.

Para 2. Let me repeat that I do not consider that the objective of the forthcoming battle in Italy called "DIadem" is the taking of Rome good though that would be or even the joining of the bridgehead which is indispensable.
Its prime purpose is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, and if by mid-May we find the enemy before us in present strength I have every hope we shall be so closely engaged and entangled with them, we being the superior force, that much of the life may be struck out of this German army. Meanwhile everything not wanted for this battle is being prepared for the biggest amphibious operation we can mount on which decisions will be taken and laid before you as soon as Wilson arrives on Monday.

Para 5. Like the United States C.O.S. I too fear a sudden and swift withdrawal through the tunnels of the Alps, but I do not consider on the whole that it is very likely. Hitler obstinate by habit vide Stalingrad, the Crimea, Tunis etc and also he would be very much afraid of his position in the Balkans. If he let us get swiftly up to the north of Italy he would not be able to tell which way we would go. Moreover he must now be very expectant of an "OVERLORD" move in the favourable moon and tide period at the beginning of May as indeed was originally aimed at by us. Notwithstanding this, he has made no move to withdraw the eight extra divisions sucked down to the south of Rome by the "SHINGLE" operation and our joint fighting there.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 668 DATE 29 Apr 1944

DATE/TIME 29/1640Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 29/2015Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT LOT assignment; Diadem (Italian offensive) operation.

ACTION

1. To the President at Waccamaw as WALT 149.
2. Black 84, 301900Z Apr, directed copy be given Joint Chiefs for information.
3. May 18, 44, Admiral Leahy informed Map Room that all action on this had been taken by the JCS, and that no reply would be necessary.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

__________________________________________

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
412 + 300 Italy.
To: The President of the United States
Number 669, 07/17202
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and Number 669.

Para 1. The War Cabinet have been much concerned
during the last three weeks about the number of Frenchmen
killed in the raids on the railway centres in France. We
have had numerous Staff meetings with our own officers and
I have discussed the matter with Generals Eisenhower and
Bedell Smith. There were and are great differences of
opinion in the two Air Forces not between them but criss
cross about the efficacy of the "Railway Plan" as a short
term project. In the end Eisenhower, Tedder, Bedell Smith
and Portal all declare themselves converted. I am person­
ally by no means convinced that this is the best way to use
our Air Forces in the preliminary period, and still think
that the G.A.F. should be the main target. The matter has
been discussed in very great detail on the technical side,
and it would not be wise to dismiss lightly the arguments
for or against.
Para 2. When this project was first put forward a loss of 80,000 French civilian casualties including injured, say 20,000 killed was mentioned. The War Cabinet could not view this figure without grave dismay on account of the apparently ruthless use of the Air Forces, particularly of the Royal Air Force on whom the brunt of this kind of work necessarily falls, and the reproaches that would be made upon the inaccuracy of night bombing. The results of the first, say, three-sevenths of the bombing have however shown that the casualties to French civil life are very much less than was expected by the commanders, in fact Air Chief Marshal Tedder has now expressed the opinion that about 10,000 killed, apart from injured, will probably cover the job.

Para 3. I am satisfied that all possible care will be taken to minimize this slaughter of friendly civilian life. Nevertheless the War Cabinet share my apprehensions of the bad effect which will be produced upon the French civilian population by these slaughters, all taking place so long before OVERLORD D Day. They may easily bring about a great revulsion in French feeling towards their approaching United States and British liberators. They may leave a
legacy of hate behind them. I have just now received the telegram contained in my immediately following from our Ambassador at Algiers, which I am pretty sure represents a serious wave of opinion in France. It may well be that the French losses will grow heavier on and after D Day, but in the heat of battle, when British and United States troops will probably be losing at a much higher rate, a new proportion establishes itself in men's minds. It is the intervening period that causes me most anxiety. We are of course doing everything in our power by leaflets etc to warn the French people to keep clear of dangerous spots, and this may prove beneficial in the remaining interval. However both on technical and political grounds, which latter are very gravely involved, the War Cabinet feel very great distress and anxiety.

Para 4. Accordingly they ask me to invite you to consider the matter from the highest political standpoint and to give us your opinion as a matter between governments. It must be remembered on the one hand that this slaughter is among a friendly people who have committed no crimes against us, and not among the German foe with all their record of cruelty and ruthlessness. On the other hand we naturally feel the hazardous nature of operation OVERLORD
and are in deadly earnest about making it a success. I have been careful in stating this case to you to use only the most moderate terms, but I ought to let you know that the War Cabinet is unanimous in its anxiety about these French slaughters, even reduced as they have been, and also in its doubts as to whether almost as good military results could not be produced by other methods. Whatever is settled between us, we are quite willing to share responsibilities with you.

No Sig

[Redacted]

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 6 1972

0556
8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy

The President has directed that the attached Prime Minister messages number 669 and number 670 be delivered to Admiral Leahy for action.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc. (HW)
1. Mag. PM to Pres. #669, 7 May 44.
2. Mag. PM to Pres. #670, 7 May 44.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 669 DATE 7 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 07/1720Z
TO MAP ROOM 07/2120Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Bombing of French civilian population incident to OVERLORD.

ACTION
1. To President via usher, 07/2120Z.
2. By direction of President, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. (See also PM 670 on same subject.)
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President as submitted; sent to PM as #537.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

343
From: U.S. Military Attaché London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 670

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Number 670.

The text of the telegram referred to in my number 669 follows:

"Massigli handed me this morning a memorandum concerning Allied bombardments of French targets, expressing the serious psychological effect they are having on the French population and French resistance groups when the loss of human life involved does not seem to correspond with the results obtained, notably in the case of stations and factories in populated districts. It is suggested that sabotage operations would achieve a better result without risk of life.

Para 2. Massigli told me that he had had a letter from a friend of his in France in whom he has complete confidence, speaking of reactions amongst the French population particularly with regard to Rouen and Paris.

Para 3. The memorandum ends with a request that the French and Allied High Commands should collaborate in the
choice of targets on French territory.

Para 4. I do not know whether a French expert from their mission in London is consulted by target committee. If this is not the case, I think it would have a good psychological effect here if a French transport expert several of whom are now in London, could be co-opted on target committee for consultation when targets in France are being examined. He might have useful information to communicate.

Para 5. Text of note goes to you by bag.
8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy

The President has directed that the attached Prime Minister messages number 669 and number 670 be delivered to Admiral Leahy for action.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc. (HW)
1. Msg, PM to Pres, #669, 7 May 44.
2. Msg, PM to Pres, #670, 7 May 44.
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Bombing of French civilian population incident to OVERLORD.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. To President via usher, 07/2120Z. (See also PM 669 on same subject.)
2. By direction of President, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply, 8 May 44.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President without change; sent to PM as #537.

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May 8, 1944

To: President of the United States
No. 671, NFT/6th

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 671.

I hope you will be able to find time to have a talk with Sir W. Citrine. As a Privy Councillor and leader of the British Trades Union Congress he is a person of consequence with us.

No Sig.

File Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Park Date MAY 6 1972
May 8, 1944.

Dear Navy:

Glad you are back -- hope it was somewhat of a rest for you too. The General has had me phone Embassy on the attached, and we will get him in when he returns to Washington.

Roberta B.
FROM The Prime Minister          TO The President

SERIAL 671                       DATE 8 May 1944

DATE/TIME MPT/8th.

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 0813452. VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Talk with Sir W. Citrine.

ACTION

1. To the President via Admiral Brown.
2. To General Watson for action.
3. Note from Roberta Barrows, Gen Watson's secretary, 8 May 44, stated: "The General has had no phone Embassy on the attached, and we will get him in when he returns to Washington."
4. Answered by Page #535, 8 May 44, which was given to Captain Wood by the President on the south lawn, 8 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

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ACTION COMPLETED:        FILED:
000.9
To: The President of the United States
Number 672, 8th May 1944
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 672.

Thank you for the joint U-boat warfare statement for April. I have no alterations to suggest and Mackenzie King, to whom I showed it, agrees with its terms. We will accordingly release it on May 10th.

No Sig

Received in MR 1925B.
MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Office of War Information.
Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.

The following statement has been approved by the President and the Prime Minister for release on May 10:

"The following joint Anglo-American statement on submarine and anti-submarine operations is issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister.

"In April 1944, the United Nations anti-submarine activity continued at a highly satisfactory level. Again for another month the extraordinary fact continues that the number of enemy submarines sunk exceeds the number of Allied merchant ships sunk by submarines."

Respectfully,


CHESTER WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.
FROM The Prime minister TO The President

SERIAL 672

DATE/TIME 8th/NI

OR FILE NUMBER 08/19252

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT April monthly sub statement.

ACTION

1. Answer PRESS #534, 5 May 44.
2. Shown to President with evening news, 8 May 44.
3. By memo to Directors of Office of War Information and Bureau of Public Relations, Navy Department, 8 May 44, for release on 10 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

0568
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 673
11 May 1944

Prime Minister to President personal and

Your No. 563. The Chiefs of Staff suggest the amendments contained in the following text. They seem to strengthen our statement.

"From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin.

In order to give maximum strength to the attack across the sea against northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France simultaneously with the OVERLORD assault. We are planning to make such an attack later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from northern France..."
and the eastern front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France. Signed Roosevelt Churchill.
FROM: The Prime Minister 
TO: The President 
SERIAL: 673 
DATE/TIME: 11 May 1944 
OR FILE NUMBER: 11/NFT 
TOR MAP ROOM: VIA 
SUBJECT: Informing Stalin of cancellation of ANVIL 

ACTION: 
1. Answer PHS #536, 10 May 44. 
2. To President at SHANGRI-LA as White 1, 120200Z. 
3. White 5, Admiral Leahy sent message to President suggesting PM #673 be approved. 
4. Miss Tully returned White 5 with President's approval. Sent to PM as #538, 12 May 44. 

COPY TO: 
DATE: 
BY DIRECTION OF: 

ACTION COMPLETED: 310 ANVIL 
FILED: 0571
From: U.S. Military Attaché London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 674

To President Roosevelt from Prime Minister personal and number 674.

As the hour approaches we feel it indispensable to have some kind of understanding with the French National Committee. Owing to the restrictions we have found it necessary to put on cypher communications and on comings and goings from this island, which gained your approval, we find it impossible to allow any French who have come or may be permitted to come to this island in order to join in the Eisenhower-Koenig conversations, to leave it again before the event. De Gaulle and his committee refuse to accept these conditions and state that no reasonable discussion is possible.

Para 2. In these circumstances we must presently be faced with a public complaint that no kind of arrangement has been made with the French National Committee for the employment of French forces outside or inside France. We could quite well dispense with French aid from outside in
the operation, because the LeClerc Division does not reach the scene until D plus 90, and as the FNCL will have no troops till then the military aspect would not be involved. However General Eisenhower says that he attaches great importance to the action to be taken by the French resistance groups on and after D Day, and undoubtedly we must take care that our joint troops do not suffer heavier losses owing to the fact that no agreement has been made for the employment of the French resistance groups. The French Committee state that the resistance army numbers 175,000 men and they intend to incorporate them officially in the French Army under the name of French Forces of the Interior.

Para 3. I therefore propose to you that General De Gaulle, together with one or two of his committee, should be invited to come here on say May 18th in the utmost secrecy: That you should either entrust your case to General Eisenhower or send over someone specially to meet them: That we should discuss outstanding matters affecting military and political collaborations together face to face, showing all our substantial reasons against any extreme demands but endeavouring to reach a working arrangement. The Foreign Secretary or I would conduct the discussion with De Gaulle and any of your
representatives you may choose. We will make the best proposals we can to you without agreeing to anything until we have heard from you. It may be that no agreement will be reached because they are unreasonable, in which case we have done our best, and he will have put himself hopelessly in the wrong. In any case we shall have done our duty by the soldiers and you will have the fullest opportunity of seeing the best lay-out we can get for you to consider.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tél., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL 674

DATE 11 May 1944

DATE/TIME 12/1116Z

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Pre-OVERLORD meeting with French National Committee in London.

ACTION

1. Sent to the President at Shangir-La as WHITE 2, 12 May 44.
2. Admiral Leahy sent proposed reply to President as WHITE 4, 12 May 44.
4. Miss Tully returned Adm Leahy's draft with President's approval. Also directed that message be quoted to Gen Eisenhower with further notations by the President.
5. Msg sent to PM as #538, 13 May 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 11 France

FILED:
To: The President of the United States
Number 675

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 675.

Your 538. Joint message to Uncle Joe has been despatched.

No Sig

Sent to President at Shangri-La as
While 9, 13/17002.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 675 DATE 13 May 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 13/1534Z

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Mag to Stalin re cancellation of ANVIL.

ACTION

1. Answers PASS #538, 12 May 44.
2. Sent to President at Shangri-La as WHITE 9, 131700Z.

ACTION COMPLETED: 310 ANVIL
To: The President of the United States
Number 676
Prime Minister to President personal and
Number 676.
Ban duly lifted and safely received.

11th May 1944

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL: 676  
DATE: 14 May 1944  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 14/14/42Z.  

TOR MAP ROOM 14/16/5Z  VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Ban of Croatia  

ACTION  
1. Answers PRES # 539, 13 May 1944.  
2. To President at Shangri-La as WHITE 12, 131710Z.  
3. No reply. (See Pa-Pass 677 for further correspondence on Ban.)  

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ACTION COMPLETED: 051 Yugoslavia  
FILED:  

0579
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 677 Filed: 181450 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 677.

I send you herewith a message which I have sent to Marshal Tito, which I hope you will like. The King hopes to announce his new government on Monday. He has just left me, and seems in very good form. Telegram runs as follows:

This morning, as the result of British advice, King Peter II dismissed Monsieur Puric's administration, which included General Mihailovic as Minister of War. He is now about to form a small government under the Ban of Croatia. This course has the strong approval of his Britannic Majesty's Government.

We do not know what will happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic certainly holds a powerful position locally as Commander in Chief, and it does not follow that his ceasing to be Minister of War will rob his of his influence. We cannot predict what he will do. There is also a very large body, amounting perhaps to 300,000, of Serbian peasant proprietary who are anti-German but strongly Serbian and who naturally hold the views of a peasant owner.
ship community. My object is that these forces may be made to work with you for a united, independent Yugoslavia which will expel from the soil of Yugoslavia the filthy Hitlerite murderers and invaders till not one remains.

It is of importance to the common cause and to our relations with you that these changes should be given a fair chance to develop in a favourable way to the main object. I should greatly regret it if you were at all in a hurry to denounce them in public. Crucial events impend in Europe. The battle in Italy goes in our favour. General Wilson assures me of his resolve to aid you to the very utmost. I feel therefore that I have a right to ask you to forbear any utterance adverse to this new event, at least for a few weeks til we can have exchanged telegrams upon it.

Brigadier MacLean, who is with me now, will be with you in less than 3 weeks with all the views he has gathered here, and I hope that at the very least you will await his return.

Meanwhile, I congratulate you once more upon the number of enemy divisions which you are holding griped on your various fronts. You will realize, Marshal Tito, that the war will soon come to a very high pitch of intensity and that British, American and Russian forces will all hurl themselves on the common foe. You must be at your strongest during this climax. While I cannot guarantee a speedy breakdown of the enemy's power, there is certainly a chance of it.

No Sig
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 27, 1944

There is attached a copy of a message sent by Marshal Tito to Prime Minister Churchill in reply to the latter's message to Marshal Tito. Mr. Churchill informed you of his message in his telegram No. 677 of May eighteenth.

This copy is transmitted to you at the request of Sir Ronald Campbell in the absence of Lord Halifax, under instructions of the British Foreign Office.
Text of Marshal Tito's reply to a message from the Prime Minister

Your Excellency I have received your message referring to dismissal of Monsieur Puric's Government and intended formation of new Government of Monsieur Subasic. I can inform you that you will meet with no difficulties from our side on the subject. The more so as the dismissal of the Puric Government has a positive echo with us. I have undertaken necessary measures that our press and broadcast station should not make any comment on that matter until we get a clearer picture of the newly created situation. I am sure that Brigadier Maclean will be able to inform me in greater detail. I think it would be very useful if General Velebit chief of our military mission could inform you on things you wish to know.
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<th>FROM</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
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<td>TO MAP ROOM</td>
<td>1615/18Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Ltr to Tito re King Peter's new government.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

1. To the President via General Watson.
2. President's reply brought to the Map Room by Mrs. Brady evening 18 May 44. Sent to PM as #5/49, 18 May 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

051 Yugoslavia

**FILED:**

0584
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 678     Filed: 191285 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 678.

In your No. 538 you assented to my idea of asking De Gaulle over here. On further reflection I think the following course would be better: Namely, once D-day has started, I will send him a cordial invitation to come and talk things over. There will then be no chance of his making difficulties about going back with any entourage he has brought with him, or sending back individual members, or demanding, as head of a considerable Empire, Free French cypher communication with them. Our ban will be off and anybody can cable or come and go as they please.

In the meantime, I recommend that we allow Koenig or Vienot to send a few messages in their own cypher, subject to their giving us the substance of these messages and giving their word that they do not refer to military affairs other than those specifically affecting French troops. Neither will be informed of D-day or anything military.

There will be plenty of time after De Gaulle arrives here (if he
deigns to come) when the show has started, to settle up the French collaboration in their own country. It seems probable to me that for a week, or perhaps a fortnight, it will be a shot-torn, bomb-crumbled battlefield, and I cannot see any question of a civil government arising there. If you agree with me I will hold to this decision. At the same time if you agree, I will telegraph to General Wilson to take the French more into their confidence about the battle in Italy. Considering the fine performance of the two French Corps they deserve to be consulted. There would, I think, be feeling here that we were treating them roughly if we do not act in comradeship with them in this Italian battle.

I do not think we are called upon to notice at all the Algiers declaration that they are the provisional Government of France unless or until the Committee informs us officially. We will of course consult you then. Meanwhile, our action remains regulated by the terms of recognition we, in unison, have already given them. It may be that the Russians will recognize them as what they now call themselves. In this case it is important that we should be together. Personally I do not think the Russians will dare to draw such dangerous lines of demarcation, but I may well be wrong.

Further about the Russians. I have found it practically impossible to continue correspondence with them, but I note that after each very rude message they send to me, they have done pretty well...
what was asked. For instance, I do not think they have done any
great harm to the Poles, and the tide seems to have turned in favor
of the Polish Government here making themselves less disagreeable
to the Soviets. Again, although Molotov was most insulting about
Rumania, they have today told us they accept the broad principle that
they take the lead in the Rumanian business and give us the lead in
Greece. I am quite content with this. A portion of the Soviet policy
is to be found in the gushing message which I have received from the
Representatives of ZAM gathered, with all other Greek parties, in the
Lebanon. I do not think it at all impossible that we may get a united
Greece which we can support in accordance with what I know are your
heart-felt wishes. Your message, backing up my message, and a little
firmness in putting down the mutiny, may prove to have had a salutary
effect.

The battle in Italy has been very good and may be still better.
We are most grateful to your Chief's of Staff for sending the LST's as
desired. This battle is being fought, not so much to join with the
bridgehead army or even to take Rome—valuable though that may be—but
rather to destroy the German Armies which have been sent by Hitler
away from "OVERLORD".

The moment the Italian battle is over and we can see clear on the
chess board, every effort will be made to mount the largest and strongest
amphibian we can conceive and to direct it upon the point which will
best help "OVERLORD".

TOP SECRET

0587
All goes well here, and everything will be hurled in at the appointed hour. Kindest regards.

No Sig
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 678

Filed: 191800 Z

Amendment to telegram number 678 follows:

In Paragraph 4, Line 5 change the word "delay" to read action.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

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<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>678</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>19 May 1944</th>
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<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>19/1235Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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**SUBJECT** OVEILOORD discussion with FNC; correspondence to Russians; Italian battle.

**ACTION**

1. Answers Press #538, which had been sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 16, 19 May 44.
2. Draft reply which had been prepared by Admiral Leahy sent simultaneously as RED 17.
3. President approved with minor changes, BLUE 3. Sent to PM as #542, 19 May 1944.
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: 679, 22nd May 1944
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and 

Your number 541. I will bring this matter before the Cabinet today Monday. Personally I think it would be best you should speak for all three of us. I can easily do a follow-up on some of the points later on. But the main principle of the note we should strike towards Germany seems to require considerable thought. Also the time of any such statement should have relation to the success or otherwise of our operation.

No Sig

original sent as Red 28/22 1692 (read 22/16352)

"Today" was omitted - correct as indicated above
was sent - unnumbered 22/1845? (read 22/18403)
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 679 DATE 22 May 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 22/NFT

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Statement by President to German people on D-day.

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #541, 18 May 1944.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 28, 22/1642Z.
3. BLUE 6, 222140Z, President directed copy be given to Admiral Leahy.
4. BLUE 7, 222255Z, President directed statement be sent to Stalin with notation "Churchill has agreed to follow up with similar message along same lines."
5. Continued in PM #680, 25 May 44, disapproving proposed statement by President.
6. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; sent to the PM as PRES #543, 27 May 44.
7. Msg also sent to Stalin, 27 May 44, informing him that President would not make statement.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 0V HLORD

FILED:
To: The President of the United States
No: 680

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

I brought your No. 541 before the Cabinet yesterday, Curtin and Smuts also being present. Considerable concern was expressed at the tone of friendship shown to the Germans at this moment when the troops are about to engage. There was a feeling that the message, if sent before the battle is won, might be distorted by the enemy into a sort of peace appeal. If there were nothing between us except that the Germans have an evil philosophy, there would be little ground for the war going on. I think myself that the message might conceivably be taken as a peace feeler, and that the Germans might reply that they accepted your note as a basis for further discussion.

In truth there is much more between them and us than a philosophy. Nearly all Europe cries for vengeance against brutal tyranny. At Teheran my
suggestion for the isolation of Prussia was considered far too modest by you and U.J. Everybody expects complete forcible disarmament of Germany, possibly extending to civil aviation, to be made and maintained. There are other very grave questions open. For instance, how are the Poles going to be compensated if they do not get East Prussia and certain territories up to the line of the Oder in return for the Curzon Line which the Russians will certainly demand?

I do not know what U.J. will say about your declaration, but we here earnestly hope you will not make it in its present form and, above all, at this present time. There was also a feeling that a document so grave addressed to the enemy, should emanate from the three principal Allies. I may add that nothing of this document would get down to the German pillboxes and front line in time to affect the fighting troops.

The battle is going well in Italy and Alexander has high hopes. Up to the present, so far from trying to bolt to the northwards, Hitler has been bringing down at least three more divisions, one from Istria and two from the north of Rome. Even the Hermann Goering Division which is in Hitler's Special General Reserve may be drawn in. All our Allied troops are fighting magnificently and everywhere the enemy has been pressed
back. I think myself tomorrow and the day after may be very important days.

I go every weekend to see the armies preparing here and I have visited some of your finest divisions. Even more striking are all the extraordinary structures and mass of craft already prepared. The weather is a great gamble but otherwise I am full of hope.

All this brings me to my great hope, which is that you will yourself be able to come over. It could not now I suppose be till after D Day as your movement would be taken as heralding it. But if you could start as soon as the signal has been given, the very greatest advantages might be derived from our close talks about all matters including any address to the Commons by you. This is also becoming a practical necessity in respect of the Chiefs of Staff. We have the whole Far Eastern Campaign to discuss and our execution of our promise to help in it to the very utmost of our strength. We need you here so much as the great battle will be of a profound and heart-shaking character, not by any means only in its opening phase. The King will of course send you a formal invitation at any moment that you let me know.
There is a very good place in London which would give you perfect safety and comfort. I greatly desire to see you again. It is six months since we met.

No Sig.
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement by President to German people on D-day; Italian battle; joint conference.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PRES #541. (Continuation to PM #679, 22 May 44.)
2. To President via usher, 25/2440Z.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral; approved by the President with minor changes; sent to PM as PRES #543.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

000.7 OVERLORD; 300 Italy;

To: The President of the United States

No. 681, Filed 260930Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal
and Number 681.

I am letting you know that we have decided to
appoint Robert Brand, who has been head of our Food
Mission in Washington and the British Representative on
the Combined Food Board, to the post of Treasury Repre-
sentative in succession to the late Sir Frederick
Phillips.

Halifax has explained to Morgenthau our reasons
for choosing Brand for this very important appointment,
even at the cost of losing him from his work on the
Food Board and Food Mission.

Brand is known to you personally and I think
you will agree that we have chosen the right man for
a difficult post. Brand got on very well with the
Administration on his work for our Ministry of Food
and I have no doubt that he will soon be on equally good terms in his new work. I vouch for him.

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<td>TO</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>260930Z</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>26/11572</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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**SUBJECT**: Appointment of Robert Brand to post of Treasury representative to succeed Sir Frederick Phillips.

**ACTION**

1. To President via usher.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy 1 June 44; approved by the President; sent to PM as PRES #547, 1 June 44.
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: 682, Filed 26/1615Z
Prime Minister to President. Personal and

1. You will have seen what has passed about De Gaulle coming here and what I said in Parliament on the subject. There is a very strong feeling here after their recent fighting in Italy in favour of the French. We are going to liberate France at the cost of much British and American blood. The feeling is that she should be with us in this. But who is "She"? When this works out in the person of De Gaulle, all those difficulties which you and I know so well, emerge.

2. I feel, however, that we should be in a difficulty if it were thought that more British and American blood was being spilt because we had not got the French national spirit working with us. There is a strong French movement here and of course they do not know, nor can we tell them, all the faults and follies
of De Gaulle. This is only another reason why you and I should consult together in the near future. Of course I shall keep you informed every day about any talks that may occur with De Gaulle. He has lately shown some signs of wishing to work with us and after all it is very difficult to cut the French out of the liberation of France. I should be grateful for a full expression of your views and any other points.

No Sig

Red: 26/7257 BPP
TPVU
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Discussions with De Gaulle and FNC</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PRES #542, 19 May 1944.
2. To President via usher, 261725Z.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with minor changes; sent to PM as PRES #544, 27 May 1944.
4. Further answered in PRES #546, 31 May 1944.
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: 683, Filed 27/1315Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. and personal.

I have noticed a bad mistake in paragraph 6 of my telegram number 680. For "address to the commons by you" read "address to the Germans by you". Also insert "meeting" before "is also becoming" in the next sentence.

I am so sorry about this mistake.

No Sig
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>27/1445Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Correction of PM #680, re joint conference.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Correction to PM #680.
2. To President via Captain Wood. No further action.
For: The President of the United States
Number 684 Filed 272043Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

1. I do not propose to invite De Gaulle who is bringing three members of his Cabinet with him till D day at dawn. I would earnestly ask you to send over someone of the rank of Stettinius to express your point of view. I see the growth of opinion very powerful here and the feeling that France should be with us when we liberate France. Naturally, there is a great wave of sentiment for France on account of the bravery and success of French troops mainly African but well led by French officers, in our Italian battle. There is also the sense that they should share in the work we have in hand. No one will understand their being cold-shouldered. I feel I ought to let you know how things are moving. The word "leadership" in Hull's speech has been very helpful here.

To the President at Shanghai on Red 31.

By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972

File Copy
2. The Anzio bridgehead looks like paying a dividend six months later than I hoped, but none the less welcome. Besides we have enticed about ten divisions down into the south of Italy and not all of them will see their homes in Germany again unmauled.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL 684
DATE 27 May 1944

DATE/TIME 27/20432
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Conversations with De Gaulle; Italian campaign.

ACTION
1. To President at Shangri-La as RED 37, 27/2230.
   2. Answered by PRES #546, 31 May 44, which was written by the
      President from a draft message prepared by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: OIL FRANCE: FILED:
300 ITALY.
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: 685, Filed 28/1723Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

1. Cabinet and I are most grateful to you for your number 543 about my 680.

2. I still think that a short visit is, above all things, desirable for the Staffs and above all for you, but any time after D+4 might be convenient to you, and would be received with rejoicing by us. I am delighted at what you say and that you are keeping this in view. Doctor Churchill informs you that a sea voyage in one of your great new battleships would do you no end of good.

3. Your number 544 and the fact that you will not be here at the time, make it all the more necessary that you should send someone who will express your views. I do not think it is impossible that De Gaulle will subscribe to the last two sentences of 544, but of course there
ought to be a responsible United States representative at all the discussions. I will help all I can to act in harmony with our long association on this subject, but the situation and my sentiment are somewhat changed by the substantial fighting of the French troops in these Italian battles.

4. Finally I am hoping that Alexander will turn his battle into left-handed hook so as to get as many as possible.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

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<td>28 May 1944</td>
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</table>

OR FILE NUMBER 28/17232

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Visit to UK; De Gaulle conference; statement to Germans on D-day; Italian campaign.

ACTION

1. Answers PRES 543 and 544.
2. Sent to the President at Shangri La as RED 40, 281945Z.
3. Answered by PRES #546, 31 May 44, which was written by the President from a draft message prepared by Admiral Leahy.

ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 OVERLORD; FILED: 210 PRES-PH; 011 FRANCE; 300 ITALY.
To: The President of the United States
Number 686

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and top secret. Number 686.

Reference your number 545. As you had not reverted to the question of the zones of occupation by our respective forces since I sent you my number 589 of 23rd February, I had the impression that all this was settled.

It has however occurred to me that in sending your number 545 you might possibly have overlooked the arguments in my number 589 which, in our view, are just as cogent now as they were in February last.

I hope that if there has been a misunderstanding we can clear it up, as a change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>31 May 1944</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>31/07082</td>
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<td>TO MAP ROOM</td>
<td>31/08502</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Zones of occupation</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PRES #686.
2. To President via usher.
3. Answer prepared by the President; sent to PM as #549, 2 June 44.
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 687 Filed: 31/1050 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 687.

There have recently been disquietening signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the lead in Roumanian affairs, while we would take the lead in Greek affairs, each government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation since Roumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Ambassador here told Eden on May 18th
that the Soviet Government agreed with this suggestion but before giving any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether we had consulted the United States Government and whether the latter had also agreed to this arrangement.

I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing. We do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it applied only to war conditions and did not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. The arrangement would of course involve no change in the present collaboration between you and us in the formulation and execution of Allied policy towards these countries. We feel, however, that the arrangement now proposed would be a useful device for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkans.

Meanwhile Halifax has been asked to raise this matter with the State Department on the above lines.

No Sig
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:
1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
Disquietening signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and Russia in regard to the Balkan countries and particularly toward Greece recently have appeared. Therefore we suggested to the Russian Ambassador here in London that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Russian Government would take the lead in the affairs of Roumania, while we would take the lead in the affairs of Greece, each government giving the other assistance in the respective countries. Since the Roumanian territory falls within the area of the Red Armies and the Greeks within the sphere of the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General Wilson, an arrangement such as this would be a natural development of the existing military situation.

On May 18th, the Russian Ambassador informed Mr. Anthony Eden that the Soviets were in agreement with this suggestion, but before any final assurances in the matter were given, they would like to know whether we had consulted the Government of the United States and whether the latter was also in agreement with this arrangement. I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing.

Of course we do not wish to cut up the Balkans into areas of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it did not affect the rights and responsibilities which the United States, Great Britain and the Soviets will have to exercise at the peace settlement and later on in regard to Europe as a whole, but that it applied only to war conditions. There would of course be no change involved by this arrangement in the present collaboration between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain in the formulation and execution of the policy of the Allies toward these countries. However we feel that the new proposed arrangement would be a device useful for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkan countries.

In the meantime I have requested Lord Halifax to take up this matter with the Department of State along the lines indicated above.

PRIME

REGRASED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The President requests that the State Department prepare a reply, for his signature, to the enclosed paraphrased message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President,
By direction.

Attachment:
Paraphrased copy FM 687.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972.
D. Deming

Please make necessary changes in the elevation of the post car as desired by D. Long.

Send the whole non-attend to Washington for weekend.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 687 DATE 31 May 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 21/1050Z

TOR MAP ROOM 31/1310Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Policy of Russia and Britain in regard to Balkan countries—Roumania and Greece.

ACTION

1. To President via usher;
2. To State Department by direction of the President 31 May 44.
3. Answered in Pres # 557, 10 June 44.

ACTION COMPLETED: 052 RUSSIA-ET BRITAIN
051 GREECE; 051 ROUMANIA; 051 BALKANS.