ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
JUNE 1944
1 June 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 547. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 681. I am delighted to know of your appointment of Robert Brand to the post of Treasury Representative. As you know he is an old friend of mine.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 1 June 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. L. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971
June 1, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 631. I am delighted to know of your appointment of Robert Brand to the post of Treasury Representative. As you know he is an old friend of mine.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM  The President
TO   The Prime Minister

SERIAL  547
DATE  1 June 44

DATE/TIME
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM
VIA

SUBJECT Appointment of Robert Brand to post of Treasury representative to succeed Sir Frederick Phillips.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #681.
2. Draft of this message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 1 June 44.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #689, 1 June 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

100 Brand, Robert; 130
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 548. PERSONAL AND

1 June 1944

From the President for the
Former Naval Person.

I refer to your telegram number 665 of April 29, 1944 in which
you set forth the urgent need for additional shipping in order that
greater quantities of wheat than now contemplated may be imported within
the year into India from Australia.

Upon receipt of your telegram I immediately directed that the
matter be taken under urgent consideration by the appropriate authorities
of this Government. The appeal has my utmost sympathy and you may be
sure that there is full realization of the military, political and human-
itarian factors involved. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff have
reported, however, that they are unable on military grounds to consent to
the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the request because of the
adverse effect such a diversion would have upon military operations al-
ready undertaken or in prospect.

Needless to say, I regret exceedingly the necessity of giving you
this unfavorable reply.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1845, EWT, 1 June 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.
SUGGESTED REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE NO. 665 OF APRIL 29, 1944

I refer to your telegram no. 665 of April 29, 1944 in which you set forth the urgent need for additional shipping in order that greater quantities of wheat than now contemplated may be imported within the year into India from Australia.

Upon receipt of your telegram I immediately directed that the matter be taken under urgent consideration by the appropriate authorities of this Government. The appeal has my utmost sympathy and you may be sure that there is full realization of the military, political and humanitarian factors involved. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported, however, that they are unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the request because of the adverse effect such a diversion would have upon military operations already undertaken or in prospect.

Needless to say, I regret exceedingly the necessity of giving to you this unfavorable reply.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1971]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 31, 1944

Request of British Prime Minister for additional shipping to avert the probable recurrence of famine in India.

I refer to the memorandum of April 30, 1944 from the White House transmitting a paraphrased copy of message no. 665 from the British Prime Minister, in which there is set forth the urgent need for additional shipping if the probability of a recurrence of famine conditions in India is to be averted.

This matter was immediately referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the statement that in the Department’s opinion the appeal of the Prime Minister should be granted if it should be found to be at all feasible to do so in keeping with the over-all demands of the war situation.

A reply dated May 29, 1944 has now been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which it is stated that they are unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the Prime Minister’s request, because of the adverse effect such diversion would have upon military operations already undertaken or in prospect. A copy of this reply is enclosed.

In accordance with the directive contained in the memorandum of April 30, 1944, there is also enclosed for your consideration a draft of a reply to the Prime Minister.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 1944.

2. Suggested reply to the British Prime Minister.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Prime Minister Churchill's Appeal to the President for Food for India.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received the copy of the message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the President which you enclosed with your memorandum of 2 May 1944 on the above subject. Both papers have received thorough and sympathetic consideration.

While fully aware of the impelling humanitarian and political considerations involved in the present grave situation in India, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the Prime Minister's request, because of the adverse effect such a diversion would have upon military operations already undertaken or in prospect.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/495-1 28 Feb. 1972
By R. M. F. APR 10 1972
FROM  The President  
TO  The Prime Minister  
SERIAL  548  
DATE  1 June 1944  
ACTION  

1. Answer PM #665, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 145, 291525Z.
2. BLACK 86, directed PM #665 be sent to Sec State for preparation of reply after consultation with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Draft reply, prepared by State Dept after consultation with JCS, submitted to President 31 May 44; approved without change by the President.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:  
412; 005; 622; 603
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 549. PRIORITY AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring back to your message of February twenty-third, No. 589, and in reply to your 686, my telegram No. 457 of February seventh on this subject contained the following statements: QUOTE I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well UNQUOTE.

I am worried lest you also did not receive my letter to you of February twenty-ninth and I was really waiting to hear from you in response to that letter of mine.

I am worried because I fear you did not get it and that that was the reason for your silence until the other day.

A good part of the letter does not refer to the subject but I am now quoting it to you in full lest it did not reach you:

QUOTE I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility

By W. S. Stought
Date Nov 1 1977

Declassified

021258 NER 0470

0629
in one document. But, as so often happens when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document — with every known kind of terms — to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.

My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the location of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument — facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things — and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!
I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. 'Do please don't' ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now! UNQUOTE.

As a result of this exchange back in February and March, I believed until recently that at least tentative plans would be made for occupation of northwestern Germany by American forces.

I am just as strongly for this point of view as I was before, and your special problems can be perfectly easily handled on the naval side even if American forces are in northwest Germany.

In view of my clearly stated inability to police the south and southwestern areas now occupied by the Germans, I really think it is necessary that General Eisenhower shall even now make such plans as are practicable to use American forces of occupation in northwestern Europe during the occupation period. Such plans as it is practicable for Eisenhower to prepare in advance would help to meet the contingency of your not being able to provide forces of occupation in all of the surrendered and liberated areas not occupied by the Soviets and of my inability to police the southern areas -- France, Italy, etc.

There is ample time for this unless Germany suddenly collapses because, as you and I know, the present timetable proves the point.

Under my plan all of your needs can and will be taken care of in the northwest area, but I hope you will realize that I am in such a position that I cannot go along with the British General Staff plan. The reasons are political, as you well know, though, as a result, they enter necessarily into
the military.

Over here new political situations crop up every day but so far, by constant attention, I am keeping my head above water.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1820, EWT, 2 June 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
June 2, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Referring back to your message of February twenty-third, No. 589, and in reply to your 686, my telegram No. 457 of February seventh on this subject contained the following statements: QUOTE I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well UNQUOTE.

I am worried lest you also did not receive my letter to you of February twenty-ninth and I was really waiting to hear from you in response to that letter of mine.

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Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

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ROOSEVELT
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Policing France and occupied countries; political situation.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answer to PM #686, 31 May 44.
2. Answer prepared by the President.
3. Memorandum by PM taken at Octagon Conference.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:** 371 Germany and Occupied Countries 000.1

**FILED:** 0639
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

NUMBER 550. AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 691. I am in full agreement with you as to the high desir-
ability of reopening the northern convoys to Russia at the earliest
practicable date after the results of OVERLORD are known to us.

We should give to the Soviet attack on Germany all the support
and assistance that we can provide.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1115, EWT, 6 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Your 691. I am in full agreement with you as to the high desirability of reopening the northern convoys to Russia at the earliest practicable date after the results of OVERLORD are known to us.

We should give to the Soviet attack on Germany all the support and assistance that we can provide.

Drafted by Admiral Leahy, 3 June 44, for the President’s approval.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Russian convoys</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #691, 2 June 44.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy, 3 June 44; approved by the President 6 June 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 442

**FILED:** 0642
From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London.

6 June 1944

NUMBER 451 AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Thank you very much for your 688, 690, and 692.

In view of today's stupendous events the subjects already seem like ancient history. I have sent word to De Gaulle that in view of his expression of hope that I will see him here, I shall be very glad to do so if he will come to Washington between June 22 and 30 or else between July 6 and 14. Fenhald has gone to London this morning with the above.

I agree that you and I should send a joint message to Stalin in the near future - preferably when his plans and ours are in full swing. How I wish I could be with you to see our war machine in operation!

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room, 1600, EWT, 6 June 1944.

Wilton Brown, 
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By I.D. Stuart
Date 3 Nov 1971
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you very much for your 698, 690, and 692.

The magnificent success of our combined armies in Italy has been jubilantly received by us all. From now on may our blows on the enemy be delivered with stunning regularity.

I have seen Eisenhower's report on his conference with de Gaulle which apparently went off in a manner satisfactory to us. His broadcast should prove helpful. I shall have further word for you on this subject in the near future.

With reference paragraph 7 of your 692 I think it best to postpone such a message until his offensive as well as ours are satisfactorily rolling.

Our joint success against the U-boat last month was truly gratifying.

I feel it unnecessary for you to come to this side now, but that is a decision which can be quickly and readily made if circumstances require.

This draft was used.

Rippon
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you very much for your 688, 690, and 692.

In view of today's stupendous events the subjects already seem like ancient history. I am sending Admiral F pamphlet to London with a message for De Gaulle which I hope may help you to keep him in line.

I agree that you should send a joint message to Stalin in the near future — preferably when his plans and ours are in full swing. How I wish I could be with you to see our war machine in operation.

I have written to Dr. Sarnoff that in view of the expression of hope that I will see him here, I shall do my best to do so. If he will come to Washington between June 22 and 26 or else between July 6 and 14, Sarnoff has gone to London this morning with the above.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>De Gaulle’s visit to U.S.; joint message to Stalin.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #688, #690, and #692.
2. Reply written by the President from a draft prepared by Captain Wood. See also PRES #532, predated to 4 July 44.

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**DATE:** 6 June 1944
From: Opnav
To: Admiral, London

NUMBER 552, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. DATED JUNE 4, SENDING DELAYED TO JUNE 6.

1. I have your No. 692 at Charlottesville where I am spending the weekend with General Watson. We have just heard of the fall of Rome and I am about to drink a mint julep to your very good health. I have sent telegrams to Alex and Clark and Leese and Jumbo. The whole operation was a magnificent example of perfect teamwork.

2. Marshall and the others will be able to talk with you in regard to next moves. I will see them on Tuesday.

3. All good luck in your talks with prima donna. Admiral Fenard is just back in Washington from De Gaulle with a very important message to me. I will see the Admiral on my return to Washington Monday afternoon. I will let you know at once.

4. In your paragraph 4, please for the love of Heaven do not tell De Gaulle that I am sending him a "friendly message to come over to see me." The whole point of it is that I decline absolutely as head of the state to invite him to come over here. My message via Admiral Fenard was that if he asked me if I would see him if he came over I told Fenard that I would reply in the affirmative most cordially. The distinction is a very important one.

5. Don't worry about chit-chat over here in regard to Franco. It is an old controversy and soon I hope that he will not be able to worry us much one way or the other.
6. Harry is really better and I think will be back in Washington within the next two weeks and he will be able to resume a part of his work.

7. It is great news that Randolph got out of the cave safely. I note that he is now a major and that makes me very happy.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1710, EWT, 6 June 1944.

CHANCEY DOUGLAS
Captain, U.S. Navy.
To: Former Naval Person

From: The President

1. I have your No. 692 at Charlottesville where I am spending the weekend with General Watson. We have just heard of the fall of Rome and I am about to drink a mint julep to your very good health. I have sent telegrams to Alex and Clark and Leese and Jumbo. The whole operation was a magnificent example of perfect teamwork.

2. Marshall and the others will be able to talk with you in regard to next moves. I will see them on Tuesday.

3. All good luck in your talks with prima donna. Admiral from DeGaulle with Fennard is just back in Washington very important message to me. I will see the Admiral on my return to Washington Monday afternoon. I will let you know at once.

4. In your paragraph 4 please for the love of heaven do not tell DeGaulle that I am sending him a "friendly message to come over to see me". The whole point of it is that I decline absolutely as head of the state to invite him to come over here. My message via Admiral Fennard was that if he asked me if I would see him if he came over I told Fennard that I would reply in the affirmative most cordially. The distinction is a very important one.

5. Don't worry about chit chat over here in regard to Franco. It is an old controversy and soon I hope that he will not be able to worry us much one way or the other.

(more)
6. Harry is really better and I think will be back in Washington within the next two weeks and he will be able to resume a part of his work.

7. It is great news that Randolph got out of the cave safely. I note that he is now a major and that makes me very happy.
The President

TO
The Prime Minister

SERIAL 552

DATE 4 June 44 (Predated)

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Fall of Rome; De Gaulle's visit; Franco; Hopkin's health; Randolph Churchill.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #692.
2. Written by the President at Charlottesville.
3. This dispatch was actually released on 6 June 44, but by direction of the President was predated to 4 June 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 100 Stabl; 310 Audit; 900 9732; 100 8127; 100 Churchill, Randolph; 011 State

FILED:
FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

6 JUNE 1944

NUMBER 553, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

We think your submarine statement excellent and plan to release it exactly as received.

It was indeed a grand month.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1835, EWT, 6 June 1944.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
Captain, A.G.D.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date 1 Nov 1971
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.  #553

6 June 44.

We think your submarine statement excellent and plan to release it exactly as received.

It was indeed a grand month.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Soucek
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM The President

TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 553

DATE 6 June 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT May submarine warfare statement.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #693, British suggestion for May sub statement.

2. This message written by Captain Wood after obtaining OWI's and Navy Department's approval of sub statement; approved by the President 6 June 44; sent to CR 1835.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 354, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am sorry to learn that Sir William Brown and staff departure
has been delayed. I personally hope much that they can come as
quickly as possible, as the situation is becoming embarrassing.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1640, EWT, 7 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date Nov 1 1971

072124  MCR 7385

0655
I am sorry to learn that Sir William Brown and staff departure has been delayed. I personally hope much that they can come as quickly as possible, as the situation is becoming embarrassing.

ROOSEVELT
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Sir William Brown and staff</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Brought to the Map Room by Mrs. Brady. Written by the President.
2. Answered by File #704.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

100 Brown, Sir Wm.: 21st Oil Conference
9 June 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 555. AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 695 received. The plans of U.J. promise well even if the beginning is a little later than we hoped for, but it may be for the best in the long run.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 9 June 1944

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D.L. Stuart
Date Nov 1971
June 9, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 625 received. The plans of U.J. promise well even if the beginning is a little later than we hoped for. But it may be for the best ... the long run.

[Handwritten note: President]
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<td>The President</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<td>9 June 44</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Comments on letter from U.J. and Soviet offensive.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #695, 9 June 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 9 June 44.
9 June 1944

From: Opmav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 556. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 694 received. It appears that de Gaulle is performing in accordance with his previous record of lack of cooperation in our effort to liberate France.

He may visit Washington at the end of this month or about mid July but there is no indication yet that he will be helpful in our efforts in the interest of his country. I will do my best to attract his interest to the Allied war effort.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 9 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD, Captain, U. S. Navy.
June 9, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 694 received. It appears that de Gaulle is performing in accordance with his previous record of lack of cooperation in our effort to liberate France.

He may visit Washington at the end of this month or about mid July but there is no indication yet that he will be helpful in our efforts in the interest of his country. I will do my best to attract his interest to the Allied war effort.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By 0662
Date NOV 1 1971
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM 694, 7 June 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President, 9 June 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

OIL FRANCE; 000.9 (De Gaulle).
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 557.

The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Rumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram no. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2330, EMT, 10 June, 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, CE
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/\ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:

1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570
The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Roumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram No. 667 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Rumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram no. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.
My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith Mr. Churchill's telegram no. 687 of May 31 concerning the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, together with a draft reply.

This same matter was discussed with the Secretary by the British Ambassador on May 30, and the Department had prepared a memorandum to be handed to Lord Halifax setting forth our position.

In view of Mr. Churchill's telegram to you, the memorandum, a copy of which is also enclosed, has not yet been delivered, and I shall be grateful if you will inform me whether it is in accordance with your views.

You will of course note at once the serious political implications of the British proposal, and its pertinence to the whole question of joint participation and joint responsibility of all the Allied Governments in the conduct of the war. However adroitly the proposed arrangement is presented, it seems really to amount to the establishment of spheres of influence, and an attempt to obtain American approval of such a policy.

Enclosures:

1. Original paraphrased message from Mr. Churchill;
2. Draft reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram; and
3. Copy of memorandum to the British Embassy.

Faithfully yours,

Acting Secretary

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's note of conversation of May 30 expresses the view that the best means of preventing any divergence of policy in the Balkans between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would be in a solution whereby, as a practical matter, Rumanian affairs should be in the main the concern of the Soviet Government, and similarly Greek affairs should, vis-a-vis the Soviet Government, be in the main the concern of the United Kingdom Government. The Embassy then inquires whether the Government of the United States sees any objection to an agreement to this end between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and if not, whether the Government of the United Kingdom may so inform the Soviet Government.

The Department has duly noted the Embassy's observations regarding the practical considerations favoring such an agreement such as the fact that Rumania is within the sphere of operations of the Soviet armies and that Greece is within the Allied Command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean. It has likewise taken note of the intention that the contemplated understanding would apply only to war conditions, without affecting the rights and responsibilities of the principal Allied Governments at the peace settlement, and, afterwards, in regard to Europe generally.

The Department acknowledges that the Government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will in the ordinary course of events take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting that territory, due to the circumstances of the military operations therein. The Department believes that the natural tendency for such initiatives to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type suggested. Thus in the Department's view the proposed arrangements would inevitably result in the persistence rather than the elimination of any divergence in the views of the British and Soviet Governments with regard to the Balkan region and would lead to the division of that region into spheres of influence, despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to war conditions.

The Department firmly believes that the practical and military advantages sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system. It is consequently unwilling to give
the approval of this Government to the proposed arrangement.

In the Department's opinion it would be preferable to give attention to the proposals to establish adequate machinery for frank consultation regarding the Balkan region, and thus direct the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action. The importance which this Government attaches to this policy is especially evident at the present time, when special efforts are being made for concerted action in laying the foundations of a broader system of general security in which all countries great and small will have their part.

Any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of such a broader system.

The President has received a communication on this subject from the Prime Minister, to which he has replied on the foregoing lines.

Department of State,

Washington.
FROM       THE PRESIDENT       TO       THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO.  557, 10 June 44.

DATE  10 June 44

TO MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT: Russian and British spheres of influence in Rumania and Greece.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #637, 31 May 44, which was sent to the State Department by direction of the President, 31 May 44, for preparation of reply.
2. See attached memorandum from State Dept to the President, forwarding draft reply and also memorandum sent by State to British Embassy, 10 June 44.
3. President approved State Dept draft without change, 10 June 44; dispatched 110409.
4. Answered by PM #700, 11 June 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State, 30 June 44—See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 June 44 (attached).
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 558, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 699. Before forming an opinion on this question I should like to have a recommendation from the Italian Advisory Committee and General Wilson.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1155, EWT, 11 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. STUART
Date NOV 1 1971
Pres to Prime #552

Your 699 Before forming an opinion on this question I should like to have a recommendation from the Italian Advisory Committee and General Wilson.

Roosevelt

ML
14 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The attached is a paraphrase of a message sent to the Prime Minister by the President and is being forwarded to the Secretary of State for information by direction of Admiral Leahy. The paraphrased message answers the message received from the Prime Minister to the President forwarded to the Secretary of State on 11 June.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc (HB)
1. Msg. Pres to PM #558,
11 Jun 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date

0674
11 June 1944

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No. 1 558

Re your 699, I should like to have a recommendation from General Wilson and the Italian Advisory Committee on this question before forming an opinion.
FROM: The President  
TO: The Prime Minister  
SERIAL: 558  
DATE: 11 Jun 44.  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER:  
TOR MAP ROOM: VIA  
SUBJECT: Italian political situation.

ACTION:
1. This msg is an "interim" message answering PM #699, which was at the same time referred to the Sec State for preparation of reply.
2. PM answered this #558 in his #703, 14 Jun 44. Further answered #558 in his #703, 14 Jun 44, which in turn was answered by PRES #562.

COPIES TO:  
Sec State  

DATE:  
11 Jun 44  

BY DIRECTION OF:  
The President  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
011 ITALY  

FILED:
I share your view that this currency issue is being exploited to stampede us into according full recognition to the Comité. Personally I do not think the currency situation referred to in your cable is as critical as it might first appear, nor do I feel that it is essential from the point of view of the acceptability of the supplemental currency that De Gaulle make any statement of support with respect to such currency. I propose that De Gaulle should be informed as follows:

1. We intend to continue to use the supplementary franc currency in exactly the same manner as we have planned and as we have agreed with the British Treasury and as has been fully understood by Messrs. Monnet and Mendes-France of the French Comité.

2. If for any reason the supplemental currency is not acceptable to the French public, General Eisenhower has full authority to use yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes. Accordingly, if De Gaulle incites the French people into refusing to accept supplementary francs then the Comité will have to bear the full responsibility for any bad effects resulting from the use of yellow seal notes and BMA notes in France. One of the certain consequences will be the depreciation of the French franc in terms of dollars and sterling in a black market which will accentuate and reveal the weaknesses of the French monetary system. This is one of the important reasons why we accepted the request of the French Comité that we not use...
yellow seal dollars and HMA notes as a spearhead currency. There would be other adverse effects which would be apparent to De Gaulle and his advisers.

I would certainly not importune De Gaulle to make any supporting statement whatever regarding the currency. Provided it is clear that he acts entirely on his own responsibility and without our concurrence he can sign any statement on currency in whatever capacity he likes, even that of the King of Siam.

As far as the appearance of the notes is concerned, I have seen them before but I have looked at them again and think them adequate. I am informed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing counterfeiting experts that they will be extremely difficult to counterfeit by virtue of the intricate color combination. I am also informed that the British Treasury officials approved the note and that the French representatives here not only approved the note but were satisfied with the designs and the color.

It seems clear that prima donnas do not change their spots.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1720, EWT, 12 June 1944

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971

0678
Proposed Cable from the President to the Prime Minister

I share your view that this currency issue is being exploited to stampede us into according full recognition to the Comité. Personally I do not think the currency situation referred to in your cable is as critical as it might first appear, nor do I feel that it is essential from the point of view of the acceptability of the supplemental currency that De Gaulle make any statement of support with respect to such currency. I propose that De Gaulle should be informed as follows:

1. We intend to continue to use the supplementary franc currency in exactly the same manner as we have planned and as we have agreed with the British Treasury and as has been fully understood by Messrs. Monnet and Mendes-France of the French Comité.

2. If for any reason the supplementary currency is not acceptable to the French public, General Eisenhower has full authority to use yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes. Accordingly, if De Gaulle incites the French people into refusing to accept supplementary francs then the Comité will have to bear the full responsibility for any bad effects resulting from the use of yellow seal notes and BMA notes in France. One of the certain consequences will be the depreciation of the French franc in terms of dollars and sterling in a black market which will
accentuate and reveal the weaknesses of the French monetary system. This is one of the important reasons why we accepted the request of the French Comite that we not use yellow seal dollars and BNA notes as a spearhead currency. There would be other adverse effects which would be apparent to De Gaulle and his advisers.

I would certainly not importune De Gaulle to make any supporting statement whatever regarding the currency. Provided it is clear that he acts entirely on his own responsibility and without our concurrence he can sign any statement on currency in whatever capacity he likes, even that of the King of Siam.

As far as the appearance of the notes is concerned, I have seen them before but I have looked at them again and think them adequate. I am informed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing counterfeiting experts that they will be extremely difficult to counterfeit by virtue of the intricate color combination. I am also informed that the British Treasury officials approved the note and that the French representatives here not only approved the note but were satisfied with the designs and the color.

It seems clear that foreign diplomats do not change their spots.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

As requested in a telephone conversation between Miss McCue of your office and Mrs. Brady of the White House Secretariat, there is enclosed herewith a paraphrased copy of the President's message no. 559 to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date Nov 1 1974
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No.: 559

Your view that this currency issue is being exploited to stampede us into according full recognition to the Committee is shared by me. I do not think, personally, the currency situation referred to in your cable is as critical as it might first appear, nor, from the point of view of the acceptability of the supplementary currency, do I feel that it is essential that De Gaulle make any statement of support with respect to such currency. My suggestion is that De Gaulle should be informed as follows:

1. It is our intention to continue to use the supplementary franc currency in exactly the same manner as we have planned and as we have agreed with the British Treasury and as has been fully understood by Messrs. Monnet and Mendes-France of the French Committee.

2. General Eisenhower has full authority to use yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes if for any reason the supplementary currency is not acceptable to the French public. Therefore, the Committee will have to bear the full responsibility for any bad effects resulting from the use of yellow seal notes and BMA notes in France if De Gaulle incites the French people into refusing to accept supplementary francs. The depreciation of the French franc in terms of dollars and sterling in a black market will be one of the certain consequences. This will accentuate and reveal the weaknesses of the French monetary system. The above is one of the important reasons why
we accepted the request of the French Committee that we do not use BMA notes and yellow seal dollars as a spearhead currency. Also, there would be other adverse effects which would be apparent to the Committee and to De Gaulle.

Certainly I would not importune De Gaulle to make any supporting statement whatever regarding the currency. He can sign any statement on currency in whatever capacity he likes, provided that it is clear that he acts entirely on his own responsibility and without our concurrence.

On the subject of the appearance of the notes, I have seen them before but have looked at them again and think them adequate. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing counterfeit experts informed me that the notes would be extremely difficult to counterfeit by virtue of the intricate color combination. Also, I am informed that officials of the British Treasury approved the note and that French representatives in Washington not only approved the note but were satisfied with the color and the design.

Apparently, it seems that prima donnas do not change their spots.

Signed: ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 559 DATE 12 June 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT French currency notes.

ACTION (See "MR 002 FRANCE (1)"

1. Answers PM #696 & #697, 9 June 44, which were sent to the SecTreasury for preparation of reply.

2. Draft reply prepared by Treasury; approved by the President with minor changes 12 Jun 44.

3. See further Para 4, PM #703, 14 June 44.

4. Answered by PM #709.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 002 FRANCE FILED:
From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

NUMBER 560. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 700. I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph seven of subject message.

We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post war spheres of influence.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1840, EWT, 12 June 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
June 12, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #560

Your 700. I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph seven of subject message. We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post war spheres of influence.

Roosevelt
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:

1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stilwell
Date NOV 1 1971

0687
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO.: 560, 12 JUNE 1944.

I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph seven of your number 700.

Care must be exercised by us to make it clear that no post-war spheres of influence are being established.
FROM The President

TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 560

DATE 12 June 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Russian and British spheres of influence in Roumania and Greece.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #700, 11 June 44.
2. Written by the President; sent to PM 12 June 44.
3. Answered by PM #703

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 052 RUSSIA OR BRITAIN; 051 ROUMANIA; 051 GREECE.

051 Balkans
14 JUNE 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER 561, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 703. I can see no objection to your action in permitting de Gaulle to visit France and feel that his visit may have the good effect of stimulating that part of the French underground over which he has authority or which he can influence to work against the common enemy.

In my opinion we should make full use of any organization or influence he may have in so far as is practicable without imposing him by force of our arms upon the French people as their government or giving recognition to his outfit as the Provisional Government of France. After all, the Germans control over 99% of the area of France.

His unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary French currency does not disturb me. My reaction to his action in the matter of currency is fully covered in my number 559 of 12 June.

I join with you in a hope that the Italian situation will clear up to the advantage of our military effort in Italy and elsewhere, and I regret exceedingly that it was not possible for me to be with you on your visit with our splendid soldiers who have made the first breach in Hitler's "citadel of Europe." But don't do it again without my going with you.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1135, EWT, 14 June 44.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
June 14, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 703. I can see no objection to your action in permitting de Gaulle to visit France and feel that his visit may have the good effect of stimulating that part of the French underground over which he has authority or which he can influence to work against the common enemy.

In my opinion we should make full use of any organization or influence he may have in so far as is practicable without imposing him by force of our arms upon the French people as their government, giving recognition to his authority of France over the underground.

His unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary French currency does not disturb me. My reaction to his action in the matter of currency is fully covered in my number 559 of 12 June.

I join with you in a hope that the Italian situation will clear up to the advantage of our military effort in Italy and elsewhere, and I regret exceedingly that it was not possible for me to be with you on your visit with our splendid soldiers who have made the first breach in Hitler's "citadel of Europe." But don't do it again without my joining with you.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971
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**SUBJECT**

De Gaulle's attitude and visit to France; currency; Italian situation.

**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #708, 14 Jun 44.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; slightly modified by the President.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

002 FRANCE; 011 FRANCE; 011 ITALY; 310 OVERDORD
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 562. PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

With further reference to your telegram No. 699 and my reply No. 558, I have consulted with my advisers here and in the field and, despite some surprise here that the Deputy President of the Control Commission apparently acted without consulting the other Allied Governments, I have reached the conclusion that it would be a grave mistake for us not to permit the Bonomi cabinet to be promptly installed.

Though regretting Badoglio's withdrawal, I nevertheless feel that this may be of distinct advantage to us. Aside from allaying criticism at home and abroad of our Italian policy and pointing to the implementation of our proclaimed policy, it would seem well that the surrender terms — hitherto in the public mind associated with Badoglio's person — should become the obligation of the most representative men today available in Italy, forming a cabinet regarded as one hundred percent anti-fascist. I understand that the new cabinet have pledged themselves to assume all the commitments the Badoglio government contracted with the Allies, including both the long terms of surrender and the postponement of the institutional question until the hostilities are ended.

The broadening of the Government when Rome was reached had long been foreseen. Negotiations following Rome's fall were held with the approval of the Allied Control Commission and in constant consultation with its Deputy President and his British and American political advisers. While the parties were divided in willingness to serve under Badoglio, Bonomi was the unanimous
choice of all the parties represented in that Rome Committee of National Liberation which seems to be the best available channel existing in Italy today for the expression of popular will.

Interference on our part at this late moment in the establishment of what appears to be a representative government would have, I fear, serious repercussions both at home and in Italy, to the detriment of the military situation and the profit of mischievous elements there, and would not this be in direct violation of our announced policy to let the people choose their own government?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1645, EWT, 15 June 1944

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Inauguration of the new Italian Government.

With reference to my memorandum of June 13 concerning the composition of the new Italian Government and to Captain Wood's memorandum of June 14 enclosing a paraphrase of your reply no. 558 to the Prime Minister, I am enclosing a draft telegram to Mr. Churchill for dispatch, if you approve, with further reference to this urgent matter. I have now received the comments of both Ambassadors Murphy and Kirk, and I find them in substantial agreement that any attempt at this time to insist on the return of Badoglio as head of the Italian Government and the consequent repudiation of the Bonomi Government would be seriously damaging to Anglo-American prestige and would be generally misunderstood throughout the world.

Mr. Murphy suggests that the only possible course is to give the Bonomi Government a trial after it has assumed all of the obligations to the Allies undertaken by Badoglio and the former government.

Mr. Kirk points out that the Bonomi Government has given assurances that it is bound by the undertakings given by the Badoglio Government to the Allies; that it represents to all appearances the expression of the Italian party leaders and that any obvious interference from foreign sources in this internal political situation would undoubtedly raise a question in the minds of many within and without Italy as to the real intent of Allied policy.

Enclosure:
Telegram to Mr. Churchill

CH
DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

With further reference to your telegram no. 699 and my reply no. 558, I have consulted with my advisers here and in the field and, despite some surprise here that the Deputy President of the Control Commission apparently acted without consulting the other Allied Governments, I have reached the conclusion that it would be a grave mistake for us not to permit the Bonomi cabinet to be promptly installed.

Though regretting Badoglio's withdrawal, I nevertheless feel that this may be of distinct advantage to us. Aside from allaying criticism at home and abroad of our Italian policy and pointing to the implementation of our proclaimed policy, it would seem well that the surrender terms - hitherto in the public mind associated with Badoglio's person - should become the obligation of the most representative men today available in Italy, forming a cabinet regarded as one hundred percent anti-fascist. I understand that the new cabinet have pledged themselves to assume all the commitments the Badoglio government contracted with the Allies, including both the long terms of surrender and the postponement of the institutional question until the hostilities are ended.

The broadening of the Government when Rome was reached had long been foreseen. Negotiations following Rome's fall were held with the approval of the Allied Control Commission
and in constant consultation with its Deputy President and his British and American political advisers. While the parties were divided in willingness to serve under Badoglio, Bonomi was the unanimous choice of all the parties represented in that Rome Committee of National Liberation which seems to be the best available channel existing in Italy today for the expression of popular will.

Interference on our part at this late moment in the establishment of what appears to be a representative government would have, I fear, serious repercussions both at home and in Italy, to the detriment of the military situation and the profit of mischievous elements there.

I hope, therefore, that you will agree that we should permit the new cabinet to take oath without delay and I have instructed the United States member of the Advisory Council to support this view in the Council.
16 June 1944

MEMO FOR MR. GRAY, STATE DEPARTMENT:

The President made the following change in the dispatch which was dispatched yesterday to the Prime Minister: The last paragraph was deleted and the following sentence was added to the penultimate paragraph: "And would not this be in direct violation of our announced policy to let the people choose their own government?"

Respectfully,

Robert H. Myers
Lieutenant U.S.N.R.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 562 DATE 15 June 1944

DATE/TIME 152112 NCR 8928

OR FILE NUMBER

TO/ROUTE VIA

SUBJECT Italian political situation

ACTION (SEE FILE "MR OIL ITALY.")

1. Further reply to PM #699. See also interim messages, PRES #558 and PM #701.
2. Draft reply prepared by State Dept; approved with minor changes by the President. State Dept informed of changes by memo, 16 June 44, from Lt. Myers to Mr. Gray.
3. Answered by PM #705.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

OIL ITALY
17 JUNE 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, NUMBER 563, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

I am in agreement with your 705, but believe we should obtain
advice General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff before pub-
lishing the long terms of surrender.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1245, EWT, 17 June 44.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W. STUART
Date: NOV 1 1971
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Italian political situation</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #705, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 62, 171515Z.
2. Admiral Leahy prepared draft reply, which was sent to the President as RED 63, 171547Z.
3. President approved RED 63 without change in his BLUE 11, 171630Z.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

0/1 Italy

**FILED:**

0701
1. I am glad the visit of De Gaulle to France passed off peacefully and without any apparent harm.

2. I have a third person message, via French Mission here, saying the General hopes to come here during one of the two specified times I said I could see him. It was polite but vague.

3. I am thinking of a trip to the Pacific Coast about the middle of July and this seems important from a good many angles.

4. Our operations at Saipan are progressing slowly, for there are between twenty and thirty thousand Japanese troops on that Island. If it goes through it will be of the highest importance to future offensives against Japan.

   I do wish I could have seen all you did. The efficiency must have delighted your soul. I hope that when I get over I will be able to land along side the Quai at Cherbourg.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EST, 19 June 1944

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 564 DATE 19 June 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT De Gaulle; operations at Saipan; OVERLORD operation.

ACTION

1. Written by the President at Hyde Park; sent to the Map Room as BLUE 14, 1916072.
2. Answered by PM #707, 20 June 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 081 Frano; 000 President; 200 Pacific.

At Batllano. 310 Airtof
22 JUNE 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 565, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

With reference to your 687 and my 560 regarding matters in the
Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I
should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that your people took
this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians
and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office
apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose
out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government
into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can
be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1400, EWT, 22 June 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:
1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570
June 22, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON #565
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your #67 and my #560 regarding matters in the Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

ROOSEVELT
My dear Mr. President:

Just as the Department was despatching to you the Acting Secretary's letter of June 10, 1944, relating to the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, Lord Halifax handed to Mr. Stettinius a further telegram from the Prime Minister and one from the Foreign Office on this subject, copies of which are attached for your information.

Mr. Churchill's further exposition of the British case did not overcome our objections or seem to us to warrant any change in our views toward this dangerous proposal. You will be interested to note, however, that the Prime Minister refers to the British sacrifice for the Greeks in 1941 (but not the Greek sacrifice for British); that he openly applies the proposition to the entire Balkan region by mentioning Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in addition to Rumania and Greece; and that he advances our position in South America as an analogy.

The Foreign Office telegram touches upon another and extremely disturbing aspect of this matter which the Department planned to take up with you as soon as the immediate issue was disposed of. This is the fact that the British did not discuss a proposal of this nature with us until after it had been put up to the Russians and the latter inquired whether we had been consulted.

The Foreign Office, apparently realizing belatedly that Mr. Churchill's frank telegram to you had exposed Lord Halifax's failure to mention this aspect of the question to me, now describes the whole thing as the "Soviet Government's proposal" and explains unconvincingly that it "arose out of a chance remark" of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador at London. The Prime Minister's telegram clearly stated, however, that the British "suggested to the Russian Ambassador that we should agree between ourselves" and indicated that this Government would have been faced with a concluded spheres-of-influence agreement between the British and Russians if the latter had simply agreed without raising the question of our position.
You may want to call this to the Prime Minister's attention. A suggested draft is attached for possible use in this connection.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1) Draft telegram to Mr. Churchill;

2) Telegram from the Prime Minister to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944; and

3) Telegram from Foreign Office to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 6/12/44

ADDRESS TO

The President
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

With reference to your 697 and my _____, I believe I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that you consulted us on this matter only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. The Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.
Telegram from London dated June 8, 1944

Following from Prime Minister.

Greece and Roumania

There is no question of spheres of influence. We all have to act together but someone must be playing the hand. It seems reasonable that the Russians should deal with Roumanians and Bulgarians upon whom their armies are infringing and that we should deal with the Greeks who are in our assigned theatre, who are our old Allies and for whom we sacrificed 40,000 men in 1941. I have reason to believe that the President is in entire agreement with the line that I am taking about Greece. The same is true of Yugoslavia. I keep him constantly informed but on the whole we, His Majesty's Government are playing the hand and have to be very careful to play it agreeably with the Russians. Events move very rapidly in these countries.

2. On the other hand we follow the lead of United States in South America as far as possible as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton. On this we naturally develop strong views on account of the little folk.

3. By all means show this to Mr. Hull or anyone else you think wise if you think worth while.
Soviet Government's proposal arose out of chance remark by the Secretary of State in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. There was thus no opportunity of discussing proposal at its inception with the Americans. But as soon as the Soviet Government took up this chance remark and converted it into a formal proposal we consulted the United States Government as indeed the Soviet Government suggested we should do.
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Drafted by State Department. (Refers to PM 687 and PRES 560.)
   See "MR 051 BALKANS" for complete file.
2. Answered by PM #712, 23 June 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 566, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Replying to your Number 710, Admiral King advises as follows: In their meeting in London on June 13 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved a telegraph to be addressed to General Wilson and General Eisenhower concerning future amphibious operations using forces in the Mediterranean. This despatch was to be sent after the receipt of your approval, which was reported by your secretariat to have been obtained.

The approved despatch expressed the view that an amphibious operation involving a three-divisional lift should be undertaken, the operation to be launched by July 25.

Admiral King's memorandum to Admiral Stark provided for the prospective movement of combat forces and certain amphibious forces to the Mediterranean in time to provide for these operations that had met with the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The combat forces involved were essentially those originally set up for the support of a two-divisional ANVIL and were later moved, after the postponement of ANVIL, to OVERLORD for the specific purpose of augmenting the support forces to be used in the firm establishment of the beachhead. The amphibious forces to be moved southward were derived after consultation with Eisenhower's staff and were discussed in the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting. Emphasis on the need for an early date for amphibious operations in the Mediterranean in support of OVERLORD (an...
earlier date than the August 15 proposed by General Wilson) was particularly stressed by Eisenhower. However, Admiral King's memorandum to Admiral Stark stated that the directive to execute the planned movement could be expected to follow immediately upon final Combined Chiefs of Staff decision (which has not yet been made.)

Obviously it is not King's intention to take any steps that would jeopardize OVERLORD. Further the planned steps for the prospective movement of forces were taken after consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff and with General Eisenhower.

It appears that there is a misunderstanding in regard to the directions given by King to Stark.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1150, EWT, June 23, 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
June 23, 1944

FROM: The President
To: The Prime Minister

Relying to your Number 710, Admiral King advises as follows: In their meeting in London on June 13 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved a telegram to be addressed to General Wilson and General Eisenhower concerning future amphibious operations using forces in the Mediterranean. This despatch was to be sent after the receipt of your approval, which was reported by your secretariat to have been obtained.

The approved despatch expressed the view that an amphibious operation involving a three-divisional lift should be undertaken, the operation to be launched by July 25.

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the Mediterranean in support of OVERLORD (an earlier date than the August 15 proposed by General Wilson) was particularly stressed by Eisenhower. However, Admiral King's memorandum to Admiral Stark stated that the directive to execute the planned movement could be expected to follow immediately upon final Combined Chiefs of Staff decision (which has not yet been made).

Obviously it is not King's intention to take any steps that would jeopardize OVERLORD. Further the planned steps for the prospective movement of forces were taken after consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff and with General Eisenhower.

It appears that you have been misinformed in regard to the directions given by King to Stark.

P.S.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 566 DATE 23 June 44

DATE/TIME 231622 NCR 312 OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Transfer of American ships from OVERLORD operation to Mediterranean.

ACTION

1. Answered PM #710, 21 Jun 44, which by direction of the President was sent to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change.
3. Amended by PM #715, 26 June 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 4/2
23 June 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 567. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 707. I join with you in a hope that a visit by De Gaulle in Washington will have a corrective effect on what is now a very unsatisfactory situation.

We are informed by your Embassy that your Government plans discussions with the Committee prior to De Gaulle's visit with the thought of "being helpful to the Washington conversations."

I hope you will not make any agreements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon.

I should not like to be faced with a fait accompli when De Gaulle arrives in Washington.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, ENT, 23 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
22 June 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Your 707. I join with you in a hope that a visit by De Gaulle in Washington will have a corrective effect on what is now a very unsatisfactory situation.

We are informed by your Embassy that your Government plans discussions with the Committee prior to De Gaulle's visit with the thought of "being helpful to the Washington conversations".

I hope you will not make any agreements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon.

I should not like to be faced with a fait accompli when De Gaulle arrives in Washington.

[Signature]
President to Truman

Your 707 I join with you in a hope that a visit by de Gaulle in Washington will have a correcting effect on what is now a very unsatisfactory situation. We are informed by your Embassy that your government plans discussions with the Committee prior to de Gaulle's visit with the thought of being "kept up to date" in conversations.

I hope you will not make any agreements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon. I should not like to be tied with a fait accompli when de Gaulle arrives in Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have been informed by the British Embassy that the British Government on June 19 was to have begun discussions with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation in London, looking toward the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement for Metropolitan France. According to a telegram from Mr. Eden to the British Embassy, General de Gaulle informed Mr. Eden that it might be desirable to advance the Franco-British discussions prior to General de Gaulle's visit to the United States. Mr. Eden remarked that if progress were made in the next few days the United States Government would be informed of the results and that "this in its turn would be helpful to the Washington conversations."

It is apparent from the above information that the British Government contemplates discussions beyond the scope envisaged in your directive of March 15 to General Eisenhower and that any agreement which may be reached with the French will, in accordance with the British practice in negotiations with the other governments-in-exile, be on a governmental rather than a military basis. Furthermore, should an agreement be reached between the British Government and the French Committee of National Liberation prior to consultation and agreement with this Government, we will be faced with a fait accompli and will be compelled to go along with it, or be placed in the position alone of having to object to the terms of the agreement.

I understand that the matter is the cause of concern to our military authorities and since in the past we have always felt that the British and ourselves should act along parallel lines in our relationship with the French Committee, I shall assume in the absence of anything to the contrary that you will give to the Prime Minister such comment on the matter as you desire. - See Br. 567.
FROM  The President
TO    The Prime Minister

SERIAL  567
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM   VIA
SUBJECT  De Gaulle.

ACTION
1. Answers PM #707, 20 Jun 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy in Map Room; approved by the President without change.
3. Amended by PM # 713.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

All Signed
PRIORITY

24 JUNE 1944

FROM: CPHNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 568, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

Your 708. Beaverbrook is as you know an old friend of mine and I shall be very happy to see him.

May the good fortune of you and yours in the bombing continue until the Hun is crushed and we hope your counter measures already producing good results will rapidly increase in their effectiveness.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1130, EWT, 24 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
June 23, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 708. Beaverbrook is as you know an old friend of mine and I shall be very happy to see him.

May the good fortune of you and yours in the bombing continue until the Hun is crushed and we hope your counter measures already producing good results will rapidly increase in their effectiveness.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 568 DATE 24 June 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 241616 NCR 490

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Beaverbrook and Oil Conference; German bombing.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #708, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 79, 210139Z.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy on President's return, 23 Jun 44; approved by the President without change.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
210 OIL CONFERENCE; 070 ROBOT PLANES.
PRIORITY

24 JUNE 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 569, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Thank you for the message from U.J. contained in your 711.

The immediately prospective new offensive should be of real
assistance to our Italian and French efforts which are already
moving forward at a rate of progress that is exceeding my ex-
pectations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1135, EWT, 24 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1 1971]
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

June 23, 1944

President to Prime:

Thank you for the message from U.J. contained in your 711.

The immediately prospective new offensive should be of real assistance to our Italian and French efforts which are already moving forward at a rate of progress that exceeds my expectations.

Roosevelt
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 569 DATE 24 June 1944

DATE/TIME 241614 NCR 491

OR FILE NUMBER VIA

TOR MAP ROOM

SUBJECT Acknowledgement of Prime message quoting msg from Stalin.

ACTION

1. Answers PM 711, 21 Jun 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 88, 210105Z.

2. Admiral Leahy prepared draft answer on President's return; approved by the President without change; sent to PM 1135, EWT.

ACTION COMPLETED: 442; 011 ITALY; 320 OVERLORD; 300 RUSSIA.
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, NUMBER 570, FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your Number 712.

It appears that both of us have inadvertently taken unilateral
action in a direction that we both now agree to have been expedient for
the time being.

It is essential that we should always be in agreement in matters
bearing on our Allied war effort.

My next following message quotes the one I sent to U.J. about the
Polish Prime Minister's visit.

Oliver Lyttleton's remark reminds me of the well known old prayer
that we be spared from our friends — I think that is now a dead issue
that should not be resurrected.

Local problems are no doubt occupying much of the time of both of
us, but I am sure we do not admit preoccupation with anything but the
war.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1310, EWT, 26 June 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date

OCEAN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant, USNR.
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:

1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Scott
Date NOV 1 1977

0731
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO. 570, 26 JUNE 1944

With respect to your number 712, it would seem that each of
us has inadvertently taken independent steps in a direction which we
both now agree was for the time being expedient.

That we should always be in accord over questions bearing on
our Allied war effort is essential. My next following message
quotes the one I sent to U.J. about the visit of the Polish Prime
Minister.
June 26, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #570.

Your Number 712.

It appears that both of us have inadvertently taken unilateral action in a direction that we both now agree to have been expedient for the time being.

It is essential that we should always be in agreement in matters bearing on our Allied war effort.

My next following message quotes the one I sent to U.J. about the Polish Prime Minister's visit.

Oliver Lyttleton's remark reminds me of the well known old prayer that we be spared from our friends — I think that is now a dead issue that should not be resurrected.

Local problems are no doubt occupying much of the time of both of us, but I am sure we do not admit preoccupation with anything but the war.

P.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President
TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 570
DATE 26 June 1944

ACTION

1. Answers PM #712, 23 Jun 44, which was sent by the President on 21 Jun 44, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President 26 June 44, sent to PM as PReS #570 and also #571.
3. Answered by PM #716, 27 Jun 44.

SUBJECT Balkans; msg to U/J re Polish PM's visit; Oliver Lyttleton.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 571. AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

The following is an accurate paraphrase of the message sent to Stalin on 17 June 1944.

QUOTE. The Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Mikolajczyk, as you know, has just completed a short visit here. I deemed his visit at this time as desirable and necessary for reasons which Ambassador Harriman has already explained to you.

Therefore, you know that his visit was not connected with any attempt on my part to insert myself into the merits of the differences which exist between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government-in-exile. I can assure you that no specific plan or proposal in any way affecting Polish-Soviet relations was drawn up, although we had a frank and beneficial exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects affecting Poland. However, I think you would be interested in his attitude towards the problems confronting his country and in my personal impression of him.

He impressed me as a very reasonable and sincere person whose only aim is to do what is best for his country. Being fully aware that the entire future of Poland depends upon the establishment of really good relations with the Soviet Union, he will, in my opinion, exert every effort to achieve that goal.

His first immediate concern is the vital necessity for setting up the fullest kind of collaboration between the forces of the Polish Underground
and the Red Army in the common struggle against our enemy. It is his belief that cooperation between the organized Polish Underground and your Armies is a military factor of the greatest importance not only to your Armies in the East but also to the main task of finishing off by our combined efforts the Nazi beast in his lair.

The Prime Minister gave me the impression that he will not let any minor considerations stand in the way of his attempts to reach a solution with you and that he is thinking only of Poland and the Polish people. If he felt that you would welcome such a step on his part, it is my firm belief that he would not hesitate to go to Moscow in order to discuss with you frankly and personally the problems involving your two countries, in particular the urgency of immediate military collaboration. You will understand, I know, that I am in no way trying to press my personal views upon you in a matter which is of special concern to you and your country, when I make this observation. However, I felt that a frank account of the impressions I received in talking with the Polish Prime Minister were due you. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EWT, 26 June 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
June 26, 1944

The following is an accurate paraphrase of the message sent to Stalin on 17 June 1944:

QUOTE. The Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Nikolajczyk, as you know, has just completed a short visit here. I deemed his visit at this time as desirable and necessary for reasons which Ambassador Harriman has already explained to you.

Therefore, you know that his visit was not connected with any attempt on my part to insert myself into the merits of the differences which exist between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government-in-exile. I can assure you that no specific plan or proposal in any way affecting Polish-Soviet relations was drawn up, although we had a frank and beneficial exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects affecting Poland. However, I think you would be interested in his attitude towards the problems confronting his country and in my personal impression of him.

He impressed me as a very reasonable and sincere person whose only aim is to do what is best for his country. Being fully aware that the entire future of Poland depends upon the establishment of really good relations with the Soviet Union, he will, in my opinion, exert every effort to achieve that goal.

His first immediate concern is the vital necessity for setting up the fullest kind of collaboration between the
forces of the Polish Underground and the Red Army in the common struggle against our enemy. It is his belief that cooperation between the organized Polish Underground and your Armies is a military factor of the greatest importance not only to your Armies in the East but also to the main task of finishing off by our combined efforts the Nazi beast in his lair.

The Prime Minister gave me the impression that he will not let any minor considerations stand in the way of his attempts to reach a solution with you and that he is thinking only of Poland and the Polish people. If he felt that you would welcome such a step on his part, it is my firm belief that he would not hesitate to go to Moscow in order to discuss with you frankly and personally the problems involving your two countries, in particular the urgency of immediate military collaboration. You will understand, I know, that I am in no way trying to press my personal views upon you in a matter which is of special concern to you and your country, when I make this observation. However, I felt that a frank account of the impressions I received in talking with the Polish Prime Minister were due you. UNQUOTE.

PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. E. Stewart
Date
- 2 -
ACTION

1. Answers PM #712, 23 June 44, which was sent by the President on 24 Jun to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President 26 Jun 44. (Also see PM #570, which also answers PM #712 in conjunction with this message #571.)

3. Answered by PM #716, 27 Jun 44.
From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

NUMBER 572. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Refer your 709 of June 21.

I do not feel that we should proceed upon the assumption that our
governments are responsible for the redemption of the supplemental franc
currency merely because no understanding has been reached with the French
Committee.

The supplemental franc currency has been issued by the Supreme Allied
Commander because at present he is the only authority with the power to issue
currency for France. The Supreme Commander has the responsibility during the
military period to see that the Frenchmen who accept and hold this currency
will not be cheated and that full value will be given for it in France.
Ultimately the supplemental currency will be redeemed like any other good
currency by the government of the country in which it is issued. In due
course, when a government is established in France the United States and
British Governments can reach a full settlement with the French Government
for Allied expenditures in France. In such a settlement, even in the absence
of prior agreement with the French Committee, allowance could be made for
assumption by the French of all costs of civil government and of those local
expenditures of our armed forces which in the case of other Western European
countries will be regarded as mutual aid.

Despite these considerations I have recently proposed financial agree-
ments with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway under which this Government

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Steuart
Date Nov 1 1971
will pay currently in dollars for the amounts of their currencies used for our troop pay. On the other hand, we expect these governments to pay us in dollars for supplies for the civil population. If dollars accruing to them from troop pay are insufficient to cover their purchases of civilian supplies, we shall expect them to draw on their dollar or gold resources. I understand you have similar arrangements with these countries.

I am willing that we should study the possibility of reaching an understanding with the French Committee consistent with existing political considerations embodying the payment principles of the financial arrangements with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. I am giving instructions to the appropriate departments of this government to proceed with the study of this problem in consultation with the French Committee, and I feel it advisable that your studies and consultations be coordinated with ours.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1655, EWT, 26 June 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM
Captain, A.C.
27 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

The proposed cable from the President to Prime Minister Churchill re French currency notes, which was submitted for the President's approval on 23 June 1944, was sent out over the President's signature as message #572, 26 June 1944.

The message was sent as submitted with the exception of the last sentence of paragraph 2, starting "If we wanted" and ending "other liberated areas," which was deleted.

Very respectfully,

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.
My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your request, I am sending you, through the courtesy of Admiral Leahy, draft of a proposed cable to Mr. Churchill in answer to his cable No. 709 of June 21st.

Mr. James Dunn and General Hilldring have participated in the drafting of this cable, and both of these gentlemen have cleared it with their respective departments.

If you have any question about any part of the cable, I would appreciate your sending for me so that I can go over it with you in person.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
Refer your 709 of June 21.

I do not feel that we should proceed upon the assumption that our governments are responsible for the redemption of the supplemental franc currency merely because no understanding has been reached with the French Committee.

The supplemental franc currency has been issued by the Supreme Allied Commander because at present he is the only authority with the power to issue currency for France. The Supreme Commander has the responsibility during the military period to see that the Frenchmen who accept and hold this currency will not be cheated and that full value will be given for it in France. Ultimately the supplemental currency will be redeemed like any other good currency by the government of the country in which it is issued. In due course, when a government is established in France the United States and British Governments can reach a full settlement with the French Government for Allied expenditures in France. In such a settlement, even in the absence of prior agreement with the French Committee, allowance could be made for assumption by the French of all costs of civil government and of those local expenditures of our armed forces which in the case of other Western European countries will be regarded as mutual aid. If we wanted to drive a hard bargain, a strong case could be made that neither of our governments has any obligation to bear the burden for any of our local currency expenditures in France or in other liberated areas.

Despite these considerations I have recently proposed financial agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway under which this government will pay currently in dollars for the amounts of their currencies used for
our troop pay. On the other hand, we expect these governments to pay us in dollars for supplies for the civil population. If dollars accruing to them from troop pay are insufficient to cover their purchases of civilian supplies, we shall expect them to draw on their dollar or gold resources. I understand you have similar arrangements with these countries.

I am willing that we should study the possibility of reaching an understanding with the French Committee consistent with existing political considerations embodying the payment principles of the financial arrangements with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. I am giving instructions to the appropriate departments of this government to proceed with the study of this problem in consultation with the French Committee, and I feel it advisable that your studies and consultations be coordinated with ours.
FROM  The President

TO   The Prime Minister

SERIAL  572

DATE/TIME  262133 NCR 821

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT  Currency for France.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #709, 21 Jun 44, which by direction of the President was forwarded to the Treasury Department for preparation of reply.

2. Draft reply, prepared by Treasury Department in collaboration with State and War, sent to the President by memo 23 June 44. Approved by the President with minor change and sent to the PM 26 Jun 44.

3. Treasury Department notified of change by memo, signed by Capt. Putnam, 26 Jun 44.

ACTION COMPLETED: 002 FRANCE

FILeD:
26 JUNE 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 573, PERSONAL AND PRIVATE, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 711.

I have examined the problem of assistance for OVERLORD by operations in the Mediterranean which our Chiefs of Staff have been discussing. On balance I find I must completely concur in the stand of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson’s proposal for continued use of practically all the Mediterranean resources to advance into northern Italy and from there to the northeast is not acceptable to me, and I really believe we should consolidate our operations and not scatter them.

It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a dead-lock in the Combined Staffs’ as to future course of action. You and I must prevent this and I think we should support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for ANVIL and wants action in the field by August 30th preferably earlier.

It is vital that we decide at once to go ahead with our long agreed policy to make OVERLORD the decisive action. ANVIL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate support from Wilson’s forces.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1:205, EWT, 26 June 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. G.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971

0747
DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I have examined the problem of assistance for OVERLORD by operations in the Mediterranean which our Chiefs of Staff have been discussing. I find I must completely concur in the stand of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson's proposal for continued use of practically all the Mediterranean resources to advance into northern Italy and from there to the northeast is not acceptable. I really believe we should continue our operations and not re-orient them. (Inset A)

It is vital that we decide at once to go ahead with our long agreed policy to make OVERLORD the decisive action.

ANVIL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate support from Wilson's forces.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date: May 1, 1944
It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a deadlock in the combined staffs as to future course of action.

You and I must prevent this and I think we should support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for hard and wants action in the field by August 30 preferably earlier.

[Signature]

[Date] Nov 1971
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1. Answers PM #714, upon which Admiral Leahy took action.
2. Draft reply prepared in General Marshall's office; Commander Smith brought it to Map Room to be shown to the President by Admiral Brown since Admiral Leahy was ill.
3. Draft reply altered by The President and Admiral Brown, sent to the PM as PRES #573. Copy to Commander Smith to be given to Colonel McCarthy for JCS.
4. See PM #717, which crossed this in transmission.
5. Answered by PM #719 20 June 44.
From: Opnav
To: Algana, London

NUMBER 374. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

1. I have given careful personal consideration to your Number 718 and I have had our Joint Staffs give the whole subject further consideration.

2. I agree with you that our over-all strategic concept should be to engage the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity, but I am convinced that it must be based on a main effort together with closely coordinated supporting efforts directed at the heart of Germany.

3. The exploitation of OVERLORD, our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the West—all as envisaged at Teheran—will most surely serve to realize our object,—the unconditional surrender of Germany. In this connection also I am mindful of our agreement with Stalin as to an operation against the south of France and his frequently expressed views favoring such an operation and classifying all others in the Mediterranean as of lesser importance to the principal objective of the European campaign.

4. I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany.

5. I agree that the OVERLORD build-up must receive continuing attention, but consider this to be definitely Eisenhower's responsibility. The forces we are sending him from the United States are what he has asked for. If he wants divisions ahead of service troops he has but to ask—the divisions will be.
6. Until we have exhausted the forces in the United States, or it is proved we cannot get them to Eisenhower when he wants them, I am opposed to the wasteful procedure of transferring forces from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. If we use shipping and port capacity to shift forces from one combat area—the Mediterranean—to another—OVERLORD, it will certainly detract from the build-up of OVERLORD direct from the United States and the net result is just what we don’t want—fewer forces in combat areas.

7. My interest and hopes center on defeating the Germans in front of Eisenhower and driving on into Germany, rather than on limiting this action for the purpose of staging a full major effort in Italy. I am convinced we will have sufficient forces in Italy with ANVIL forces withdrawn, to chase Kesselring north of Pisa-Rimini and maintain heavy pressure against his army at the very least to the extent necessary to contain his present force. I cannot conceive of the Germans paying the price of 10 additional divisions, estimated by General Wilson, in order to keep us out of northern Italy.

8. We can—and Wilson confirms this—immediately withdraw 5 divisions (3 U.S. and 2 French) from Italy for ANVIL. The remaining 21 divisions plus numerous separate brigades will certainly provide Alexander with adequate ground superiority. With our air superiority there is obviously sufficient air in the Mediterranean to furnish support both for operations in Italy and for ANVIL, and to provide overwhelming air support during the critical moments of either operation. We also have virtual mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean.

9. I agree that operations against Bordeaux or Cette with Mediterranean forces are out of the picture. As to Istria, I feel that Alexander and Smuts

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. Date NS4P 1971
for several natural and very human reasons are inclined to disregard two vital considerations: the grand strategy firmly believed by us to be necessary to the early conclusion of the war and the time factor as involved in the probable duration of a campaign to debouch from Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. The difficulties in this advance would seem far to exceed those pictured by you in the Rhone Valley, ignoring the effect of organized resistance groups in France and the proximity to OVERLORD forces. I am informed that for purely logistical reasons it is doubtful if, within a decisive period, it would be possible to put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap more than six divisions. Meanwhile we will be struggling to deploy in France thirty-five U. S. divisions that are now in continental United States plus an equivalent of corps and army combat troops not to mention the necessary complement of service troops. I cannot agree to the employment of U.S. troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops.

10. The beaches, exits, communications and cover in the Toulon area are most suitable. The Rhone corridor has its limitations, but is better than Ljubljana and is certainly far better than the terrain over which we have been fighting in Italy.

11. I am impressed by Eisenhower's statement that ANVIL is of transcendent importance and that he can and will furnish the required additional means to Wilson without undue detriment to OVERLORD, and by Wilson's statement that he can conduct the operation if given an immediate directive.

12. Wilson's plans for ANVIL are well developed and hence the operation can be launched with no delay.

13. Since the agreement was made at Teheran to mount an ANVIL, I cannot accept, without consultation with Stalin, any course of action which abandons
this operation. In the event that you and I are unable to agree to issue a directive to General Wilson by 1 July to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date, we must communicate with Stalin immediately. Furthermore, I feel that if we are to abandon ANVIL we must at once discuss with the French the use of their forces, which might by this decision be kept out of the battle in France, while taking losses in a secondary effort in Italy or the Balkans.

14. I again urge that the directive proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff be issued to General Wilson immediately. It is evident that the drawing out of this discussion if continued will effectively kill the prospects of ANVIL in time to be of major benefit to OVERLORD.

15. At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow, history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My dear friend, I beg you let us go ahead with our plan.

16. Finally for purely political considerations over here I would never survive even a slight setback in OVERLORD if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1440, EWT, 29 June 1944.

ROBERT W. BOGUE, Lieut. (jg), USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. Archivist

Date NOV 1 1974
June 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from the President to the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated 29 June 1944, relative to ANVIL, and sent this afternoon, is forwarded to you for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that distribution be held to the minimum necessary as this is an exact copy.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from the President to the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated 29 June 1944, relative to ANVIL, and sent this afternoon, is forwarded to you for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that distribution be held to the minimum necessary as this is an exact copy.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

Admiral Leahy has studied the proposed message as presented by the Joint Staffs and asks me to say that he questions the necessity of paragraph three and thinks perhaps it is better not to make any admissions. Also, in paragraph twelve he suggests that we change the lines "We must discuss with the French the use of their forces" to "It will be necessary to ascertain the possibility of using the French Army from Africa."

He also suggests that the first paragraph should state that you have given careful personal consideration to Prime Minister No. 718 and have had our Joint Staffs give the whole subject further consideration.

He also agrees with me that a final paragraph somewhat as given below might through its appeal to history, cause the Prime Minister to give up his effort to get away from ANVIL:

"At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow, history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My dear friend, I beg you let us go ahead with our plan."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

Copy to:

Admiral Leahy

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In response to the request transmitted in a memorandum from Admiral Brown, dated 28 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the enclosed draft of a reply to the Prime Minister’s telegram number 718 and recommend that it be dispatched.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Enclosure.
29 June 1944

REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

2. I agree with you that our over-all strategic concept should be to engage the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity, but I am convinced that it must be based on a main effort together with closely coordinated supporting efforts directed at the heart of Germany.

3. The exploitation of OVERLORD, our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the West—all as envisaged at Teheran—will most surely serve to realize our object,—the unconditional surrender of Germany. In this connection also I am mindful of our agreement with Stalin as to an operation against the south of France and his frequently expressed views favoring such an operation and classifying all others in the Mediterranean as to the principal objective of the European campaign.

4. I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany.

5. I agree that the OVERLORD build-up must receive continuing attention, but consider this to be definitely
Eisenhower’s responsibility. The forces we are sending him from the United States are what he has asked for. If he wants divisions ahead of service troops he has but to ask—the divisions will be ready.

Until we have exhausted the forces in the United States, or it is proved we cannot get them to Eisenhower when he wants them, I am opposed to the wasteful procedure of transferring forces from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. If we use shipping and port capacity to shift forces from one combat area—the Mediterranean—to another—OVERLORD, it will certainly detract from the build-up of OVERLORD direct from the United States and the net result is just what we don’t want—fewer forces in combat areas.

My interest and hopes center on defeating the Germans in front of Eisenhower and driving on into Germany, rather than on limiting this action for the purpose of staging a full major effort in Italy. I am convinced we will have sufficient forces in Italy with ANVIL forces withdrawn, to chase Kesselring north of Pisa-Rimini and maintain heavy pressure against his army at the very least to the extent necessary to contain his present force. I cannot conceive of the Germans paying the price of 10 additional divisions, estimated by General Wilson, in order to keep us out of northern Italy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS

927/495-1 22Feb 1972

By R. E. Date APR 1 0 1972

0760
We can—and Wilson confirms this—immediately withdraw 5 divisions (3 U.S. and 2 French) from Italy for ANVIL. The remaining 21 divisions plus numerous separate brigades will certainly provide Alexander with adequate ground superiority. With our air superiority there is obviously sufficient air in the Mediterranean to furnish support both for operations in Italy and for ANVIL, and to provide overwhelming air support during the critical moments of either operation. We also have virtual mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean.

I agree that operations against Bordeaux or Cette with Mediterranean forces are out of the picture. As to Istria, I feel that Alexander and Smuts for several natural and very human reasons are inclined to disregard two vital considerations: the grand strategy firmly believed by us to be necessary to the early conclusion of the war and the time factor as involved in the probable duration of a campaign to debouch from Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. The difficulties in this advance would seem far to exceed those pictured by you in the Rhone Valley, ignoring the effect of organized resistance groups in France and the proximity to OVERLORD forces. I am informed that for purely logistical reasons it is doubtful if, within a
decisive period, it would be possible to put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap more than six divisions. Meanwhile we will be struggling to deploy in France thirty-five U. S. divisions that are now in continental United States plus an equivalent of corps and army combat troops not to mention the necessary complement of service troops. I cannot agree to the employment of U. S. troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops.

The beaches, exits, communications and cover in the Toulon area are most suitable. The Rhone corridor has its limitations, but is better than Ljubljana and is certainly far better than the terrain over which we have been fighting in Italy.

I am impressed by Eisenhower's statement that ANVIL is of transcendent importance and that he can and will furnish the required additional means to Wilson without undue detriment to OVERLORD, and by Wilson's statement that he can conduct the operation if given an immediate directive.

Wilson's plans for ANVIL are well developed and hence the operation can be launched with no delay.

Since the agreement was made at Teheran to mount an ANVIL, I cannot accept, without consultation with Stalin, any course of action which abandons this operation. In the event
that you and I are unable to agree to issue a directive to General Wilson by 1 July to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date, we must communicate with Stalin immediately. Furthermore, I feel that if we are to abandon ANVIL we must at once discuss with the French the use of their forces, which might by this decision be kept out of the battle in France, while taking losses in a secondary effort in Italy or the Balkans.

I again urge that the directive proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff be issued to General Wilson immediately. It is evident that the drawing out of this discussion if continued will effectively kill the prospects of ANVIL in time to be of major benefit to OVERLORD.

Finally for purely political considerations ever here I would never have written down a night set back in Overlord if it were known that fairly large forces had been directed to the Balkans.
29 June 1944

REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. I agree with you that our over-all strategic concept should be to engage the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity, but I am convinced that it must be based on a main effort together with closely coordinated supporting efforts directed at the heart of Germany.

2. The exploitation of OVERLORD, our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the West--all as envisaged at Teheran--will most surely serve to realize our object,--the unconditional surrender of Germany. In this connection also I am mindful of our agreement with Stalin as to an operation against the south of France and his frequently expressed views favoring such an operation and classifying all others in the Mediterranean as unimportant to the principal objective of the European campaign.

3. I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany.

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Eisenhower's responsibility. The forces we are sending him from the United States are what he has asked for. If he wants divisions ahead of service troops he has but to ask--the divisions will be ready.

5. Until we have exhausted the forces in the United States, or it is proved we cannot get them to Eisenhower when he wants them, I am opposed to the wasteful procedure of transferring forces from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. If we use shipping and port capacity to shift forces from one combat area--the Mediterranean--to another--OVERLORD, it will certainly detract from the build-up of OVERLORD direct from the United States and the net result is just what we don't want--fewer forces in combat areas.

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7. We can—and Wilson confirms this—immediately withdraw 5 divisions (3 U.S. and 2 French) from Italy for ANVIL. The remaining 21 divisions plus numerous separate brigades will certainly provide Alexander with adequate ground superiority. With our air superiority there is obviously sufficient air in the Mediterranean to furnish support both for operations in Italy and for ANVIL, and to provide overwhelming air support during the critical moments of either operation. We also have virtual mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean.

8. I agree that operations against Bordeaux or Cetse with Mediterranean forces are out of the picture. As to Istria, I feel that Alexander and Smuts for several natural and very human reasons are inclined to disregard two vital considerations: the grand strategy firmly believed by us to be necessary to the early conclusion of the war and the time factor as involved in the probable duration of a campaign to debouch from Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. The difficulties in this advance would seem far to exceed those pictured by you in the Rhone Valley, ignoring the effect of organized resistance groups in France and the proximity to OVERLORD forces. I am informed that for purely logistical reasons it is doubtful if, within a
decisive period, it would be possible to put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap more than six divisions. Meanwhile we will be struggling to deploy in France thirty-five U.S. divisions that are now in continental United States plus an equivalent of corps and army combat troops not to mention the necessary complement of service troops. I cannot agree to the employment of U.S. troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops.

9. The beaches, exits, communications and cover in the Toulon area are most suitable. The Rhone corridor has its limitations, but is better than Ljubljana and is certainly far better than the terrain over which we have been fighting in Italy.

10. I am impressed by Eisenhower's statement that ANVIL is of transcendent importance and that he can and will furnish the required additional means to Wilson without undue detriment to OVERLORD, and by Wilson's statement that he can conduct the operation if given an immediate directive.

11. Wilson's plans for ANVIL are well developed and hence the operation can be launched with no delay.

12. Since the agreement was made at Teheran to mount an ANVIL, I cannot accept, without consultation with Stalin, any course of action which abandons this operation. In the event
that you and I are unable to agree to issue a directive to
General Wilson by 1 July to launch ANVIL at the earliest
possible date, we must communicate with Stalin immediately.
Furthermore, I feel that if we are to abandon ANVIL we must
at once discuss with the French the use of their forces, which
might by this decision be kept out of the battle in France,
while taking losses in a secondary effort in Italy or the
Balkans.

15. I again urge that the directive proposed by the U. S.
Chiefs of Staff be issued to General Wilson immediately. It is
evident that the drawing out of this discussion if continued
will effectively kill the prospects of ANVIL in time to be of
major benefit to OVERLORD.

It will be necessary to ascertain
the possibility of using the French
army from Africa

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
927/4951 22.6.1972
RHES
APR 10 1972
FROM | The President
---|---
TO | The Prime Minister

| SERIAL | 574 | DATE | 29 June 1944 |
| DATE/TIME | 291904 | NCR 1260 |
| OR FILE NUMBER | |
| TOR MAP ROOM | VIA |

**SUBJECT**
ANVIL operation.

**ACTION**

1. Sequence of messages on this subject: PM #714, PRES #573, PM #717, PM #718, PM #719, PRES #574, PRES #721, PRES #577. (For complete file of dispatches, see "MR 310 ANVIL.")

2. Answers PM #717, #718, & #719, which were forwarded immediately upon receipt to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of reply.

3. Draft reply prepared by Joint Chiefs; several changes suggested by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown; approved by President as amended, and with additional changes made by the President.

4. Answered by PM #721, 1 July 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

| 310 ANVIL | 0769 |
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 575. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I understand that the Foreign Office is fully informed with regard to the importance which we attach to the proposal that Ambassador Kelly in Buenos Aires be recalled for consultation.

We have announced Armour's recall. Almost all of the other Republics are taking parallel action. However, it is clear beyond any question that the collective effect of this action will be seriously prejudiced if Kelly stays on in Buenos Aires.

In view of the importance of a common stand at this time, I earnestly hope that your decision will be a favorable one.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1310, EWT, 30 June 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Archivist of the U.S.
By Date NOV 1 1971

0770
BLACK 19  
30 JUNE 1944

(HYDE PARK to MAP ROOM)

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Re WHITE 97. I wholly approve proposed message from me to the Prime Minister. Please sign my name and send it.

RECD 30/1655. 2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 30, 1944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In connection with our recall of Ambassador Armour, we have suggested to the British and to the other Republics that the attitude of the non-recognizing governments would be most forcefully brought home to the Farrell regime if all of the remaining Chiefs of Mission were recalled for consultation during the next two weeks.

We are now certain that practically all of the Republics approached by us, eighteen in all, will follow our lead. However, several of the Republics, including two which have not yet given us a final reply, Uruguay and Chile, have inquired with regard to the British action. Aranha of Brazil has inquired several times whether the British Ambassador is being recalled.

We have sent two urgent messages to Winant and I have discussed the matter with Halifax on two occasions. However, the British show a definite reluctance to take parallel action.

Immediate withdrawal of the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires is of the first importance. The opinion is widely held throughout the continent that the British have been pursuing an independent course in Argentina. If the British act independently on the withdrawal of Ambassadors, the consequences in terms of public reaction may be very serious.

In order to indicate the importance which we attach to this matter, I recommend that you send the attached message to Mr. Churchill.
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

Winston Churchill, C.H., M.P.,

Prime Minister,

London.

I understand that the Foreign Office is fully informed with regard to the importance which we attach to the proposal that Ambassador Kelly in Buenos Aires be recalled for consultation.

We have announced Armour's recall. Almost all of the other Republics are taking parallel action. However, it is clear beyond any question that the collective effect of this action will be seriously prejudiced if Kelly stays on in Buenos Aires.

In view of the importance of a common stand at this time, I earnestly hope that your decision will be a favorable one.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

RPA: CBS: OMH 6/30/44 ARA S

Sent to PM as #1574.
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Recall of Ambassadors from Argentina.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Message originated by State Department. Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 97, 201600Z, for approval of the President.
2. President approved suggested message without change in BLACK 19, 30 June 44.
3. Answered by PM #723, 1 July 44.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

052 ARGENTINA