From: Oona
To: Aluana, London

1 July 1944

NUMBER 576, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 722.

I am very much pleased with U.J.'s statement regarding his offensive on the Eastern Front and we all join with him in hoping you will succeed in neutralizing the flying bombs.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1930, EWT, 1 July 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant USNR
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 576, 1 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Thanks for statement from U.J.; flying bombs.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #722, 1 July 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 104/01100Z.
2. To Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; sent to PM as this #576.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

310 OVERLORD; 300 ITALY; 300 RUSSIA; 070 Flying Bombs.
I appreciate deeply your clear exposition of your feelings and views on this decision we are making. My Chiefs of Staff and I have given the deepest consideration to this problem and to the points you have raised. We are still convinced that the right course of action is to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date.

Perhaps I am more optimistic than you are, but I feel that our commanders in Italy will, with the forces left to them, continue to do great things and attain all the essential objectives there.

I do not believe we should delay further in giving General Wilson a directive. We have had indicated to us the changes which the British Chiefs of Staff think necessary in the directive and they are acceptable to us. Will you ask your Chiefs to despatch it to General Wilson at once.

As a matter of fact I personally cannot see in the short distance to go in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini Line we can destroy even a major part of the German Army. North of that Line if we clear the Po Valley we gain very little in the destruction of Germans as they can retreat even further north.

At Teheran what I was thinking of was a series of raids in force in Istria if the Germans started a general retirement from the Dodecanese and Greece. But it has not happened yet and Tito appears
to be in a less strong position than he was then.

On the same line the country in Istria has bad combat terrain in the winter time - worse than southern France.

Therefore I am compelled by the logic of not dispersing our main efforts to a new theater to agree with my Chiefs of Staff and I think we can jointly cut any idea of 90 days to 60 if you and I insist on it.

I honestly believe that God will be with us as he has in OVERLORD and in Italy and in North Africa. I always think of my early geometry "A straight line is the shortest distance between two points."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2300, EWT, 1 July 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
To President

The following draft reply to Prime's 721 is approved by all American Chiefs of Staff.

Time is important and if you inform Maj. Gen. B on your approval it will be sent at once.

quint

unsigned
The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose that the following draft message is reply to the Prime Minister of 26/4/45.

"I appreciate deeply your clear exposition of your feelings and views on this decision we are making. My Chiefs of Staff and I have given the deepest consideration to this problem and to the points you have raised. We are still convinced that the right course of action is to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date.

Perhaps I am more optimistic than you are, but I feel that our commanders in Italy will, with the forces left to them, continue to do great things and attain all the essential objectives there.

"I do not believe we should delay further in giving General Wilson a directive. We have had indicated to us the changes which the British Chiefs of Staff think necessary in the directive and they are acceptable to us. Will you ask your Chiefs to despatch it to General Wilson at once."
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>577</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>1 July 44</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>ANVIL operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers PM #721, 1 July 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 102, 1 July 44, 011730.
2. BLACK 23, 011935, stated, "Furnish copy Admiral Leahy to take up at once with JCS for preparation of reply."
3. Draft reply prepared by JCS; sent to President as WHITE 108, 012338Z; approved by the President in BLACK 25, 020200Z, 1 July 44, with additions at end of message by President.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

310 ANVIL

**FILED:**
From: Opnav
To: Alusne, London

NUMBER 578. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I propose the following statement for release on 10 July.

"Proposed anti-submarine statement covering June 1944, to be issued
by the Prime Minister and the President.

"Hitler's submarine fleet failed on all counts in June 1944. Not
only were the U-boats unable to halt the United Nations' invasion of the
continent, but they made little effort to prevent the necessary supplying
of our constantly-growing Allied Army in Europe.

"The U-boats apparently concentrated to the west of the invasion
during the month, relatively few of them being disposed over the Atlantic.
Their sinking of United Nations' merchant vessels reached the lowest figure
of the entire war. For every United Nations' merchant vessel sunk by Germ­
an submarines, several times as many U-boats were sent to the bottom."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2030 EWT 3 July 1944

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL 578 DATE 3 July 1944

OR FILE NUMBER

SUBJECT June anti-sub statement.

ACTION
1. Sub statement prepared by Navy Department; approved by ONI; sent to White House for approval of President.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE LIL, 3 July 44, 03/21/22.
3. President approved in BLACK 26, 3 July 44, 03/23/02.
4. Draft sent to PM as PRES #578, 3 July 44.
5. Answered by PM #724 & #725, 7 July 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: AIR 000.7 (3) FILRD:
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 579. PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 723 of July 1, 1944 was genuinely welcome. Your favorable decision on the recall of Kelly concurrently with us and others has already produced significant concrete results. The immediate reaction has been prompt, conciliatory and definitely in the right direction, with complete absence of irritation or threats toward any country. If we continue to stand firm, letting the Farrell regime understand, in a tone not necessarily unfriendly, that it cannot in violation of its pledge of hemispheric unity and solidarity support the Axis in opposition to its sister nations, there is a good chance that this entire matter can soon be cleared up. It is everywhere recognized that the issue at stake in Argentina is the same as that which is involved in the war against the Axis. I am confident, therefore, that there is not any risk in pursuing a firm and forthright policy toward the Farrell regime. Again my heartiest thanks.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0940, EWT, 6 July 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
July 4, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose herewith for your consideration a suggested reply to the Prime Minister regarding Argentina.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 723 of July 1, 1944 was genuinely welcome. Your favorable decision on the recall of Kelly concurrently with us and others has already produced significant concrete results. The immediate reaction has been prompt, conciliatory and definitely in the right direction, with complete absence of irritation or threats toward any country. If we continue to stand firm, letting the Farrell regime understand, in a tone not necessarily unfriendly, that it cannot in violation of its pledge of hemispheric unity and solidarity support the Axis in opposition to its sister nations, there is a good chance that this entire matter can soon be cleared up. It is everywhere recognized that the issue at stake in Argentina is the same as that which is involved in the war against the Axis. I am confident, therefore, that there is not any risk in pursuing a firm and forthright policy toward the Farrell regime. Again my heartiest thanks.
FROM | The President | TO | The Prime Minister
--- | --- | --- | ---
SERIAL | 579 | DATE | 6 June 44

TO MAP ROOM | VIA

SUBJECT | Relations with Argentina; recall of British Ambassador

ACTION
1. Answers PM #723, 1 July 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 103, 1 July 44.
2. HILL 21, 0119352, President directed copy be given Sec State for preparation of reply.
3. Draft reply submitted by Sec State, 4 July 44, Approved by the President without change 6 July 44.

COPIES TO: | DATE: | BY DIRECTION OF:
--- | --- | ---

ACTION COMPLETED: | FILLED:
| 052 ARGENTINA | 052 ARGENTINA
Referring to my 571 transmitting a message sent by me to U.J. the following quoted reply is received this date:

QUOTE. Thank you for the information regarding your meeting with Mr. Mikolajczyk.

If to bear in mind the establishment of military cooperation between the Red Army and the fighting against Hitlerite invaders forces of the Polish underground movement, then this, undoubtedly, is now an essential matter for the final rout of our common foe.

Great significance, of course, has in this respect the correct solution of the question of Soviet-Polish relations. You are familiar with the point of view of the Soviet Government and its endeavor to see Poland strong, independent and democratic, and the Soviet-Polish relations - good-neighbourly and based upon durable friendship. The Soviet Government sees the most important premises of this in the reorganization of the emigre Polish Government, which would provide the participation in it of Polish statesmen in England, as well as Polish statesmen in the United States and the U.S.S.R., and especially Polish democratic statesmen in Poland itself, and also in the recognition by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line as the new border between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

It is necessary to say, however, that from the statement of

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. Stewar

Date NOV 1 1977
Mr. Mikolajczyk in Washington it is not seen, that he makes in this matter any steps forward. That is why it is difficult for me at the present moment to express any opinion in respect to Mr. Mikolajczyk's trip to Moscow.

Your opinion on the question of Soviet-Polish relations and your efforts in this matter are highly valued by all of us. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EWT, 6 July 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
July 6, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #580

Referring to my 571 transmitting a message sent by me to U.J. the following quoted reply is received this date:

QUOTE: Thank you for the information regarding your meeting with Mr. Nikolajczyk.

If to bear in mind the establishment of military cooperation between the Red Army and the fighting against Hitlerite invaders forces of the Polish underground movement, then this, undoubtedly, is now an essential matter for the final rout of our common foe.

Great significance, of course, has in this respect the correct solution of the question of Soviet-Polish relations. You are familiar with the point of view of the Soviet Government and its endeavor to see Poland strong, independent and democratic, and the Soviet-Polish relations—good-neighbourly and based upon durable friendship. The Soviet Government sees the most important premises of this in the reorganization of the émigré Polish Government, which would provide the participation in it of Polish statesmen in England, as well as Polish statesmen in the United States and the U.S.S.R., and especially Polish democratic statesmen in Poland itself, and also in the recognition by the Polish Government of the Curson Line as the new border between the
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Your opinion on the question of Soviet-Polish relations and your efforts in this matter are highly valued by all of us. UNQUOTE.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<td>580, 6 July 1944</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Quoted message from Stalin to President re Polish Prime Minister’s visit to Washington.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1. Msg received from Stalin on 24 June 44. Message quoting this dispatch from Stalin prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the PM without change.</td>
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<td>2. (See MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file on this subject.)</td>
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052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUGNA, LONDON

NUMBER 581, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 724, and 725.

We think your proposed changes and the additional communiqué excellent with the single exception that before the word "squadrons" in the second paragraph of the special communiqué we insert "U. S. and British air" so that the sentence now reads, "Such attempts were of course expected and U. S. and British air squadrons of coastal command, working in cooperation with the surface forces of the Allied Navies, were ready."

Unless we hear to the contrary, we will release statements as amended at scheduled time.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1845, EWT, 7 July 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By
Date NOV 1 1971
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Your 724 and 725.

We think your proposed changes and the additional communiqué excellent with the single exception that before the word "squadrons" in the second paragraph of the special communiqué we insert "U. S. and British air" so that the sentence now reads, "Such attempts were of course expected and U. S. and British air squadrons of coastal command, working in cooperation with the surface forces of the Allied Navies, were ready."

Unless we hear to the contrary, we will release statements as amended at scheduled time.

ROOSEVELT

* Recommended by Navy Department.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM THE PRESIDENT | TO THE PRIME MINISTER
---|---
SERIAL 581 | DATE 7 July 1944
DATE/TIME: \(072330\) NCR 2634 | OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM | VIA
SUBJECT | June anti-sub statement.

**ACTION**

1. Answer PM #724 & #725, both of which were sent to the Navy Department for comment. Navy approved with minor change; President approved 7 July 44; reply drafted by Captain Wood; sent as this #581.

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ACTION COMPLETED: Wk 000.7 (3) | FILED: |
From: Opnav
To: Alasna, London

NUMBER 582. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Re your 713, I am prepared to accept Committee as temporary de facto authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear - first, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations, and, second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own Government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points, and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General De Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared.

The visit has gone off very well.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1315, EST, 10 July, 1944

ROBERT W. MYERS
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By I.G. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971

TOP SECRET
101846 NCR 2456

0924
July 8, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PM: 

Re your 713, I am prepared to accept Committee as temporary de facto authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear—first, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations, and, second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own Government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base to insure these points, and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General de Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared.

The visit has gone off very well.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We should like to suggest to you a fresh approach to the French situation.

This new approach would be to deal with the French Committee as the "Civil Authority", "Administrative Authority", "De Facto Authority", or "French Authority" and to reach agreements on civil affairs administration along the lines of those reached with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. Those agreements, reconciled in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, were signed on behalf of the United States by General Eisenhower as U. S. Theatre Commander and on behalf of Great Britain by the British Foreign Secretary.

The agreements with the French Authority would be based on the following principles:

(1) The agreements should be essentially practical and temporary pending the selection of a French Government by the free choice of the French people. The agreed arrangements would be based on the acceptance of the French Committee as the authority which should assume leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs during the period of liberation. However, the continuing status of the Committee must be based upon the support which it has of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. The agreements would be designed to avoid prejudicing the right of the French people to choose their own government and would be so drawn as to avoid any expression of preference or political support for the Committee.

(2) The agreements must be such as will give the Supreme Commander the full authority he needs for the unimpeded conduct of military operations.

(3) With respect to currency the French Committee would become the issuing authority for the supplemental franc currency, with appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations.

If this meets with your approval, the matter will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take the necessary action.
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<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>582, 8 July 1944.</td>
<td>DATE</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Prepared by State Department in conjunction with War Department and JCS.
2. Draft reply approved by the President 8 July 44.

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011 FRANCE.
13 July 1944

From: Cnpav

To: Aluena, London

NUMBER 583. AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

The receipt is acknowledged of your 726 and 727. I feel that the small differences between the British and American drafts of the agreement can be adjusted by your and my representatives here working with representatives of the French Committee.

It is essential that Eisenhower have all the authority that is necessary for the conduct of his military operations at the smallest cost in life to the American and British soldiers.

I am off on my trip and will be gone several weeks but can always be reached.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1715, EWT, 13 July 1944.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM
Captain, AOD

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Steed
Date NOV 1 1971

[Handwritten note on lower left corner] 

1/24

An erased copy to 20 State

for direction of Alan Landis.
July 13, 1944

President to Prime: # 583

The receipt is acknowledged of your 726 and 727. I feel that the small differences between the British and American drafts of the agreement can be adjusted by your and my representatives here working with representatives of the French Committee.

It is essential that Eisenhower have all the authority that is necessary for the conduct of his military operations at the smallest cost in life to the American and British soldiers.

I am off on my trip and will be gone several weeks but can always be reached.

Declassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date Nov 1 1971
13 July 1944

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No. 983

Your 726 and 727.

I believe that your representatives and my representatives here, working with representatives of the French Committee, can adjust the small differences between the British and American drafts of the agreement.

The first requisite is that General Eisenhower have all the authority required for the conduct of his military operations at the smallest cost in life to British and American troops.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971

See appendix memo
Attached to RM 747
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<td>MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>Agreement with French Committee; President's trip.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers FM #726 & #727, 13 July hh.
2. Written by the President.
3. Answered by FM #726, 1h July hh.

**COPIES TO:**

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**DATE:**

| 13 July hh |

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

| Admiral Leahy |

---

**COL FRANCE; 000.9 PRESIDENT**

---
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 584. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Both you and we are negotiating to exchange Japanese civilian prisoners held by each of us for British and American civilians held by Japan. The likelihood is that such an exchange may be the only way of saving the lives of hundreds of your and our nationals.

There is a snag on both sides. The Japanese want us to release 300 odd divers and pilots held in Australia; my military people do not agree to their release and as a result your exchange negotiations has bogged down.

In our exchange the snag is that the Japanese Government insists that Japanese officials coming out shall not be searched, while your people insist on search. The immediate case concerns officials coming out of Argentina. In result our negotiations will bog down when we inform the Japanese of this requirement.

It seems to me that the military considerations in either case are now very small. Japanese officials cannot carry any effective quantities even of valuable contraband. On the other hand, our naval affairs in the Pacific are proceeding well, and the Japanese divers and pilots held in Australia cannot be of great help to the Japanese, even in respect to Far Eastern installations, in view of our present sea and air superiority.
My suggestion is that you give directions to your people to waive the search of Japanese officials; I will be prepared to recommend to our people that they let the divers and pilots be exchanged. This at least will give a reasonable chance that both exchanges might go through, saving many hundreds of both Americans and British from slow death. Please cable me your views. I think the technical people are over-emphasizing the importance of considerations quite proper in themselves, but which should be overridden by the higher humanitarian interest.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1820, EWT, 13 July 1944

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM
Captain, A&O
Mr. Latta

This is the telegram I spoke with you about yesterday from the White House.

D. Hall
Both you and we are negotiating to exchange Japanese civilian prisoners held by each of us for British and American civilians held by Japan. The likelihood is that such an exchange may be the only way of saving the lives of hundreds of your and our nationals.

There is a snag on both sides. The Japanese want us to release 300 odd divers and pilots held in Australia; my military people do not agree to their release and as a result your exchange negotiation has bogged down.

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President

JUL 13 1944 P.M.

A-B: AAB: LJL: GES

SWP

FE

CAB

NOT SENT

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. #584, 14 July 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA Mr. Latte

SUBJECT: Exchange of Prisoners of War with Japan

ACTION:

1. Message prepared by Secretary of State.

2. Prime Minister acknowledged in his #729 which was sent to President while enroute to Pacific Coast as RED 126.

3. Adm. Leahy directed paraphrased copies of President's #584 and Prime Minister's #729 be sent to Gen. MacArthur for information. (Blue 29).

4. Sent to General MacArthur via OPD, War Department their # CM-OUT-65465.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

392
17 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

NUMBER 585, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 732 and 733.

I am half way across the continent and think this is the best opportunity to go through with this trip. This means I will not get back until between the fifteenth and twentieth of August. I ought to be a fortnight in Washington. I wholly agree that we three should meet but it would be a lot easier for me if we could make it the tenth or fifteenth of September. This is just before the Equinox. I am rather keen about the idea of Invergorden or a spot on the west coast of Scotland. I like the idea of the battleship. This would get me back in plenty of time for the election, although that is in the lap of the Gods. I am sending a telegram, as per my next, to Uncle Joe purely as a feeler. If he feels he cannot come you and I should meet anyway.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0900, EWT, 17 July 1944, by

F. H. GRAHAM, Capt, AGD.
CONFERENCE

1. Answers Prime Minister's #732 and 733.
2. Received from Presidential Party as BLUE 33, 17 July 1944.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

NUMBER 586, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Following is copy of my wire to Uncle Joe:

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the far west and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 10:15, EWT, 17 July 1944 by

RICHARD PEARL, Colonel, GSC.
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1. Received as BLUE 34 from Presidential Party.
2. Message is exact repeat of President’s message to Stalin # 27, 17 Jul 44.
21 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

In respect to proposal in your 734 that Admiralty publish commi­
uniques and stories regarding anti-submarine activities during OVER­
LORD, my opinion still is that relaxation of security as to anti­
submarine measures will result in improvement of Japanese technique
against our submarines which are now on the crest of a wave of success
that is having marked influence on the Pacific Campaign. I recall that
our surge of superiority over the U-boats was coincident with and possi­
ibly connected with adoption of the current policy of silence as to the
steps taken to counter them. I am dubious of the effect of newspaper
stories on the morale of U-boat crews. I cannot therefore concur in the
proposal for publicity in allied press. I suggest instead radio propa­
ganda direct to U-boat personnel stressing names of U-boats known by
us to have been sunk as well as total numbers they have lost without
any details.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date: Nov 1 1977
<table>
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>587, 21 July 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>Publicity on anti-submarine activities during OVERLORD.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers PM #734, 20 July 44, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 153. By direction of the President in BLUE #1, 20 July 44, PM #734 was sent to COMINCH with request for recommendation.

2. Reply, prepared by Admiral Edwards in absence of Admiral King, sent to President as RED 156. Draft reply approved by the President; sent to Map Room as BLUE #2; sent to the PM as this #587.

**COPIES TO:**

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MR 000.7 (3)
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 588, PERSONAL AND
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

Your 730.

I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat of England. Heavens knows that it is already quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract.

I hope, however, that you will, in very firm, clear, disgruntled tones of voice let Argentina know beyond a doubt that we are all fed up with her pro-axis sentiments and practices. She is the only nation of North, Central and South America acting thus. I think it would help if you could instill this into their stubborn heads and, at the same time, get the meat contract.

Argentina knows full well that if, on its own initiative, deliveries of meat to England were to be delayed or stopped at this time, its action would everywhere be considered a betrayal of the United Nations.

I suggest that you examine the full statement of our position on Argentina which was transmitted to Winant for delivery to Eden on Thursday of this week.

22 July 1944

DECLASSIFIED
ROOSEVELT
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1850 EWT 22 July 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant USNR
27 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signatures: WINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.

Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

7 Inc1s.
Incl 1. WINANT-PRES #1069,
   26 Nov 44.
Incl 2. PM-PRES #832,
   26 Nov 44.
Incl 3. PM-PRES #833,
   26 Nov 44.
Incl 4. PM-PRES #730,
   11 July 44.
Incl 5. PM-PRES #731,
   11 July 44.
Incl 6. PRES-PM #588,
   22 July 44.
Incl 7. PRES-PM #628,
   10 Oct 44.
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat of England. Heavens knows that it is already quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract.

I hope, however, that you will, in very firm, clear, disgruntled tones of voice let Argentina know beyond a doubt that we are all fed up with her pro-Axis sentiments and practices. She is the only Nation of North, Central and South America acting thus. I think it would help if you could instill this into their stubborn heads and, at the same time, get the meat contract.

Argentina knows full well that if, on its own initiative, deliveries of meat to England were to be delayed or stopped at this time, its action would everywhere be considered a betrayal of the United Nations.

I suggest that you examine the full statement of our position on Argentina which was transmitted to Winant for delivery to Eden on Thursday of this week.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA

The attached message is to be sent to Prime Minister Churchill from the President. We return herewith Colonel Park's memoranda of July 15 with respect to the same subject.

[Signature]

July 22, 1944
Memorandum for Mr. Latte

The attached message is to be sent to Prime Minister Churchill from the President.

We return herewith Colonel Park's memoranda of July 15 with respect to the same subject.
I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat of England. Heavens knows that it is already quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract.

I hope, however, that you will, in very firm, clear, disgruntled tones of voice let Argentina know beyond a doubt that we are all fed up with her pro-Axis sentiments and practices. She is the only Nation of North, Central and South America acting thus. I think it would help if you could instill this into their stubborn heads and, at the same time, get the meat contract.

Argentina knows full well that if, on its own initiative, deliveries of meat to England were to be delayed or stopped at this time, its action would everywhere be considered a betrayal of the United Nations.

I suggest that you examine the full statement of our position on Argentina which was transmitted to Winant for delivery to Eden on Thursday of this week.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 588, 23 July 44.

DATE 23 July 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA SUBJ:ct: British contract for Argentine meat.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #730 & #731, 1h July 44, which were sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED:128 & 129 respectively.

2. Draft reply prepared by the President, sent to Sec State as BLUE 30, 1h July 44, for the Secretary to correct and approve, and to send through Map Room.

3. In BLUE 31, 1h July 44, President directed copies of PM #730 & PM #731 be sent to Sec State in connection with BLUE 30.

4. RED 166, 23 July 44, Sec State informed President message had been sent intact, with two additional paragraphs by Sec State, as PRES #588.

052 ARGENTINA: 603
27 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alunna, London

NUMBER 589. [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

I am very happy that Randolph has come through all right.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0700, EWT, 27 July 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. C. STEWART
Date NOV 1 1971
The President

TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 589, 27 July 44.

DATE: 27 July 44

FOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Randolph Churchill's "coming through all right."

ACTION:

1. Written by the President. To Map Room for transmission to PM as BLUE 46, 27 July 44.
2. Answered by PM #759, 28 July.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

100 Churchill, Randolph
27 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

MEMORANDUM AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

I am sending you for your information the text of my message to Marshal Stalin.

"I have received your telegram about the Polish situation and I hear from the Prime Minister that Nikolajczyk is leaving to call on you. It goes without saying that I greatly hope you can work this whole matter out with him to the best advantage of our common effort".

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0700, EWT, 27 July 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt., AGD.
FROM: The President  
TO: The Prime Minister  
SERIAL or FILE NO: 590, 27 July 1944  
DATE: 
TOR MAP ROOM: 
VIA: 
SUBJECT: POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #735 & #736, which were sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as REDE 180 & 181 respectively.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room as BLUE h9 for transmission to the PM.
3. See also PRES-STALIN, 26 July h1; PM #737; PRES #592; and PM #740.

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

0954 Polish-Russian relations.
SECRET PRIORITY

28 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

NUMBER 591. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

SECOND PERSONAL.

Your Number 738 received. My inspection voyage to date has been
very interesting and profitable.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0245, EWT, 28 July 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, CE
FROM  | The President
TO    | The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. | 591, 26 July 1944 (BLUE 57).

DATE         | 591, 26 July 1944 (BLUE 57).

TOR MAP ROOM | VIA

SUBJECT:     | Acknowledgment of PM 738 re supplies to Germany from Sweden; Hawaii-Alaska trip.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #738, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 188.
2. Copy to Sec State for information by direction of President in BLUE 55.
3. No further reply.

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05/ Sweden: 222/9 09/6
28 July 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 592.

Your 737, I have sent the following to Molotov:

"I am pleased that you are discussing the Polish problem with the Soviet Government and I hope you can work out the whole matter to the best advantage of the combined Allied effort against our common Nazi enemy."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1930, EWT, 28 July 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, CE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971

282357 NCR 6337
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 592, 28 July 1944

DATE: 28 July 1944

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #737, 26 July 1944, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RSD 187.
2. President's reply sent to Map Room as BLUE #61, 28 July 1944, for transmission to the PM.
3. See further PM #740, 29 July 1944, also PRES-HARRIMAN, 28 July 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian relations.
3 August 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

NUMBER 593. PERSONAL AND TENTATIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 740 received at sea, indicated that we have reason to hope that the Stalin-Mikolajczyk conversation may bring about a settlement of the Polish controversy that can be accepted by all of us.

My inspection journey to the Pacific has already been fully justified by my conferences with the High Commands.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2025, EWT 3 August 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

DATE 593, 3 August 1944

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations; Pacific trip.

ACTION:
1. (See PM #735; PM #736; PRES #590; PRES-STALIN 26 July 44; PM #737; PRES #592; PRES-HARRIMAN 28 July 1944.)
2. Answers PM #740, sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 206.
3. President's reply sent to Map Room as BLUE 69, 2 Aug 44, for transmission to the PM.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

0960
8 August 1944

SECRET PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL NUMBER 394.

Your number 743. Monthly report on U-Boats is approved.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0030 EWT 8 August 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date \( \text{NOV 1 1971} \)
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 594, 7 August 1944
DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: July monthly sub statement.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #743, 5 Aug 44, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 244.
2. President approved of statement; message sent to Map Room as BLUE 81, to be sent to the PM as this No. 594.
3. Map Room instructed to notify OWI and Navy Dept of approval.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7 (3)
FROM:  OPNAV
TO:  ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM THE PRESIDENT. NUMBER 395.

Thanks for your number 744. I am still in the Aleutians but will be back in Washington in ten days.

I hope you are right about the climax but I can not feel quite as optimistic in view of the distances involved both in France and on the Russian front.

Can you give me one week more to consider all the implications of OCTAGON? My present thought is that, for many reasons you will understand, it would be a mistake for me to go to Scotland especially in view of Uncle Joe's failure to come. My present inclination is to give greater consideration to Bermuda especially if we can make it a small meeting of Staffs and not a full Staff meeting as it was in Quebec. We could both live on our ships. As you know, domestic problems are unfortunately difficult for three months to come.

I hope you will have a grand trip and wish I could be with you.

Tell Clemmie I am hereby ordering you not to take unnecessary risks.

Released from the White House Map Room at 0030 EWT 8 August 1944

Robert W. Rogers

DECLASSIFIED

ROOSEVELT

Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM: The President  
TO: The Prime Minister  

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 595, 7 August 1944  
DATE:  

TOR MAP ROOM  
VIA  

SUBJECT: President's Hawaii-Alaska trip; OCTAGON meeting; PM's visit to Normandy.  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PM #766, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 245.  
2. This reply written by the President; to Map Room for transmission to the PM as BLU 85.  
3. Answered by PM #766  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

OOO, 9 PRES; 210 PRES; 00:9 PM
8 August 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

NUMBER 596 PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to your 742, I have consulted by telegraph with my Chiefs of Staff and am unable to agree that the resources allocated to DRAGOON should be considered available for a move into France via ports on the coast of Brittany.

On the contrary it is my considered opinion that DRAGOON should be launched as planned at the earliest practicable date and I have full confidence that it will be successful and of great assistance to Eisenhower in driving the Huns from France.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0030 E.W.T. 8 August 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 596, 7 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: DRAGOON operation

ACTION:

1. Answers FM #742 which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 2h2.
2. In RED 253, 5 Aug 44, Gen McFarland sent to Adm Leahy OCS 603-15 and 603-16, together with msg from Gen Eisenhower.
3. President approved JCS disapproval of Prime Minister’s proposal, informing JCS in BLUE 87.
4. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room for transmission to the FM as BLUE 88.
5. Answered by FM #745, 8 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


310 ANVIL (DRAGOON)
11 August 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 597 personal and confidential from the President for the
Former Naval Person.

"Your 750 is received at sea. I also deeply regret my inability
to come to Scotland for this meeting.

"It appears now that I should be able to arrive in Quebec on the
10th or 11th of September for a meeting of the Combined Staff on the
Teheran scale.

"My consultations with the military and naval commanders in the
Pacific area have been most interesting and valuable".

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0155, EWT, 11 August 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
11 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland,
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There is forwarded herewith for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a paraphrased copy of the President’s message to the Prime Minister of 11 August 1944. This message is being furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by direction of the President.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, GSC

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. F. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
TOP SECRET
PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE: 11 AUGUST 1944

"I also am exceedingly sorry that I wont be able
to come to Scotland for a meeting.

"It appears now that I should be able to arrive in
Quebec on the 10th or 11th of September for a meeting of
the Combined Staff on the Teheran scale.

"My conferences with the commanders in the Pacific
area, both military and naval, have been most interesting
and valuable."
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 597, 11 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON meeting.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #750.
2. Reply written by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room for transmission as BLUE 106; sent to PM as PRES #597.
3. Copy to Joint Chiefs of Staff by direction of the President.
4. Answered by PM #752, 12 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES–PM/000.9 Rev.
11 August 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 598. TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

AND PERSONAL.

Your 751 received with its pleasing news of the Soviet-
Polish conversations.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2030 EWT, 11 August 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, CE
FROM     The President
TO       The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.  598, 11 Aug hh.

DATE      11 Aug hh.

TOR MAP ROOM

SUBJECT:   Russian-Polish Relations

VIA

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #751, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska
trip as RED 298.
2. This reply written by Admiral Leahy; to Map Room for transmission
to PM as BLUE 110, 11 Aug hh.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH- RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
PRIORIT

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 599. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 753. Congratulations on your prospects of success in bringing together the opposing factions in Jugoslavia which should bring to an end the civil war in that country and be of assistance to us in the rapidly approaching defeat of the Nazis.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2240 ERT 14 August 1944 by

[Signatures]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. Shaye
Date NOV 1 1977
FROM: The President TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 599, 14 August 1944

DATE: 14 August 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA:

SUBJECT: Reconciliation between Tito and Subasic.

ACTION:

1. Answers FI 77, 14 August 1944, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as R&D 322.
2. President's answer sent to Map Room as BLUE 121; to PM as this

Copied by PM 77, 17 August 1944.
15 August 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 600. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Proposals in your 747 are satisfactory, but I hope all concerned with security censorship of U-boat stories will be impressed with the fact that our submarine campaign in the Pacific is far from over, and that we can be done irreparable harm if Japan gains any knowledge of the reasons for successful anti-U-boat technique of British and American forces.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0145 EMT 15 August 1944 by

OGDEN KNAPPIN
Captain CE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 600, 14 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OVERLORD Anti-submarine statements.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #747, 8 Aug 44, which was sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 269.
   3. Proposed reply prepared by Navy received as RED 321, 14 Aug 44; approved by the President; to Map Room for transmission as BLUE 123.

4. Answered by PM #752, 18 August 1944.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND NUMBER 601, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

Your 760. The following is suggested as a joint message to U.J. which if you approve you may send over both our signatures.

QUOTE. We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or will agree that our planes should do it very quickly. We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1235, EWT, 19 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

- 1 -
August 19, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 760. The following is suggested as a joint message to U.J. which if you approve you may send over both our signatures.

QUOTE. We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or will agree that our planes should do it very quickly. We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance. UNQUOTE.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
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<td>Polish-Russian relations; dropping supplies to Warsaw.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. (See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file of correspondence. Answers PM #760, and suggests message to Stalin.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Aug 44.
3. Answered by PM #762, 20 Aug 44.

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052 Polish-Russian relations.
FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALISNA, LONDON

NUMBER 602, PERSONAL AND TO BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to our agreement that the OCTOGON Conference should be on the Teheran scale I find by consultation with my Chiefs of Staff with which I am in agreement that the Teheran scale on the American Staff included the four Chiefs of Staff with their eleven military assistants, a total of fifteen officers.

I am therefore limiting those officers who will go to Quebec with me to fifteen, not counting Leahy, Watson, Brown and McIntire.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, EWT, 23 August 1944:

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0980
August 23, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Referring to our agreement that the Octagon Conference should be on the Teheran scale I find by consultation with my Chiefs of Staff with which I am in agreement that the Teheran scale on the American Staff included the four Chiefs of Staff with their eleven military assistants, a total of fifteen officers.

Please let me know that this number is sufficient for your Staff in order that our detailed plans may be completed.

I am therefore requesting that you will go to Quebec with me to fifteen not counting lately Wakeham, Denson and H-1.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President

TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 602, 23 Aug 44.

DATE 602, 23 Aug 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON conference.

ACTION:

1. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with alterations;
2. See PM-HOPKINS, 26 August 1944, for reply.
PRIORITY

23 August 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 603, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 759, 761 and 762. We must continue to hope for agreement by the Soviet to our desire to assist the Poles in Warsaw.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1208, EWT, 23 August 1944:

Richard Park, Jr.
Richard Park, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

23175NSR1366
PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 759, 761 and 762. We must continue to hope for agreement by the Soviet to our desire to assist the Poles in Warsaw.
The President
TO
The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 603, 23 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations; dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:
1. See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file on this subject.
2. Answers PM #759, #761, and #762.
3. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President, 23 August 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian Relations
FROM:  OPNAV
TO:   ANUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 604, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 763 and 764 noted. I am happy to have your personal observation that our Fifth and Eighth Armies' spirit is fully up to our expectations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1220, EWT, 23 August 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

231712 NCR 1367
PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 763 and 764 noted. I am happy to have your personal observation that our Fifth and Eighth Armies' spirit is fully up to our expectations.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. 604, 23 August 1944

SUBJECT: Congratulations on performance of troops in Italy.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #763, and #764.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 23 August 44.
3. See PM #768, which explains that PM #763 was sent to the President by mistake. Apparently, it should have been sent to the President of Brazil.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

DATE 23 August 1944

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. 604

SUBJECT: Congratulations on performance of troops in Italy.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #763, and #764.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 23 August 44.
3. See PM #768, which explains that PM #763 was sent to the President by mistake. Apparently, it should have been sent to the President of Brazil.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

300 Italy; 000.6 P.M.
24 August 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALLIANCE, LONDON

NUMBER 605, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Thank you for the information in regard to the appalling situation of the Poles in Warsaw and the inhuman behavior of the Nazis described in your 767.

My information points to the practical impossibility of our providing supplies to the Warsaw Poles unless we are permitted to land on and take off from Soviet airfields, and the Soviet authorities are at the present time prohibiting their use for the relief of Warsaw.

I do not see that we can take any additional steps at the present time that promise results.

Stalin's reply of August 23 to our joint message about the Warsaw Poles is far from encouraging to our wishes to assist.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1155, EWT, 24 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1, 1971
PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Thank you for the information in regard to the appalling situation of the Poles in Warsaw and the inhuman behavior of the Nazis described in your 767.

My information points to the practical impossibility of our providing supplies to the Warsaw Poles unless we are permitted to land on and take off from Soviet airfields, and the Soviet authorities are at the present time prohibiting their use for the relief of Warsaw.

I do not see that we can take any additional steps at the present time that promise results.

Stalin's reply of August 23 to our joint message about the Warsaw Poles is far from encouraging to our wishes to assist.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
ACTION:

1. See MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file on this subject.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change, 24 August 1944.
26 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSA, LONDON

NUMBER 606, PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your 769. In consideration of Stalin's present attitude in regard to relief of the Polish Underground in Warsaw as expressed in his messages to you and to me, and his definite refusal to permit the use by us of Soviet air fields for that purpose, and in view of current American conversations in regard to the subsequent use of other Soviet bases, I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to U.J.

I have no objection to your sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1150, EWT, 26 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971

-1-
August 25, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: 606

Your 769. In consideration of Stalin's present attitude in regard to relief of the Polish Underground in Warsaw as expressed in his messages to you and to me, and his definite refusal to permit the use by us of Soviet air fields for that purpose, and in view of current American conversations in regard to the use of other Soviet bases, in our war effort against Germany I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to U. J.

I have no objection to your sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [NOV 1 1971]
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 606, 26 August 1944

DATE: 606

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Dropping supplies to Warsaw; proposed message to Stalin

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #606, 26 Aug 44. (For complete file of correspondence on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.")

2. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes.

3. No reply received from the Prime Minister as to whether or not he sent proposed message to Stalin.

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian Relations
26 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 607, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 766. We are watching with sympathetic interest your efforts to get Argentina in line with our appetites, and we hope your efforts will be crowned with success. I have no doubt that a satisfactory meat contract will be arranged. After all they must sell their beef and no other diner is in sight.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1155, EWT, 26 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By
By W.G. Stoudt
Date NOV 1 1971
August 25, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: 607

Your 766. We are watching with sympathetic interest your efforts to get Argentina in line with our policies, and we hope your efforts will be crowned with success. I have no doubt that a satisfactory meat contract will be arranged. After all they must sell their beef and no other diner is in sight.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the N.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1 1971]
PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 607, 26 August 1944.

In reply to your 766, your efforts to get Argentina in line with our appetites is being watched with sympathetic interest, and we hope that your efforts will be crowned with success. A satisfactory meat contract, I have no doubt, will be arranged. After all, no other diner is in sight, and they must sell their beef.
28 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached copy of the President's message #607 to the Prime Minister is forwarded for the information of the Secretary of State. The President's #607 answers a message from the Prime Minister, #766, forwarded to the Secretary by memorandum of 23 August 44.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.
PRES-PM #607,
26 August 44.
FROM  The President TO  The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.  607, 25 Aug 44.
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: British contract for Argentine Beef.

ACTION:

1. Answers FM #766, 23 August 1944.
2. By direction of the President, FM #766 sent to Sec State for information, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
3. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes 25 August 1944.
4. See PRES #613, 31 August 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Argentina: 603
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUNA, LONDON

NUMBER 608, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 755 and 770. I have no objection to your making preparations
to have in readiness a sufficient British Force to preserve order in
Greece when the German Forces evacuate that country. There is also
no objection to the use by General Wilson of American transport airplanes
that are available to him at that time and that can be spared from his
other operations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1215, EWT, 26 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
August 26, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #608

Your 755 and 770. I have no objection to your making preparations to have in readiness a sufficient British Force to preserve order in Greece when the German Forces evacuate that country. There is also no objection to the use by General Wilson of American transport airplanes that are available to him at that time and that can be spared from his other operations.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 608, 26 August 1944.

DATE

TOR #AP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Restoration of Greek Government.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM 770 and #755, which were referred jointly to Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

2. Reply drafted by Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy; approved unchanged by the President 26 Aug 44.

3. Acknowledged by last sentence of PM #771, 29 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

051
PRIORITY

28 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPHNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 609, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 769. I perceive no objection to your organizing a Jewish
Brigade as suggested.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1150, EWT, 28 Aug 44.

RICHARD PAXK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
609.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Your 763. I perceive no objection to your organising a Jewish
Brigade as suggested.

[Signature]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 609, 28 August 1944.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Organization of Jewish Brigade.

ACTION:

1. Answer PM #765, 23 Aug 44.
2. Drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President 28 August 1944.

COPY TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

____________________  ____________________  ____________________

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1005
FROM: GPHAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER 610, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your 771. I am pleased that our final arrangements for OCTAGON
will keep the number who will participate in the conference to the
Teheran level insofar as practicable.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 12:30, EWT, 30 August 1944.

ROBERT W. ROGERS,
Lieutenant, USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. STANLEY
Date NOV 1 1971
PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 771. I am pleased that our final arrangements for OCTAGON will keep the number who will participate in the conference to the Teheran level insofar as practicable.

ROOSEVELT.
The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 610, 30 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #771.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President.
30 August 1944

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 611, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 772. I was very glad to receive your account of the way in which General Wilson has concentrated his forces in Italy and has now renewed the offensive. My Chiefs of Staff feel that a vigorous attack, using all the forces available, should force the enemy into the Po Valley. The enemy may then choose to withdraw entirely from northern Italy. Since such action on his part might enable the enemy to release divisions for other fronts, we must do our best to destroy his forces while we have them in our grasp. I am confident that General Wilson has this as his objective.

With an offensive under way and being pressed full strength in Italy, I am sure that General Eisenhower will be satisfied that everything possible is being done in the Mediterranean to assist him by mauling German divisions which might otherwise be moved against his forces in the near future. I understand all available British resources in the Mediterranean are being put into Italy. We are pressing into France all reinforcements and resources we can in order to guarantee that General Eisenhower will be able to maintain the impetus of the joint victories our forces have already won. With the smashing success of our invasion of southern France and the Russians now crumbling the enemy flank in the Balkans, I have great hopes that complete and final victory will not be long delayed.

It is my thought that we should press the German Army in Italy vigorously with every facility we have available and suspend decision on the future use
of General Wilson's armies until the results of his campaign are better known and we have better information as to what the Germans may do.

We can renew our Teheran talk about Trieste and Istra at OCTAGON.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1235, EWT, 30 August 1944.

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.
August 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 772. I was very glad to receive your account of the way in which General Wilson has concentrated his forces in Italy and has now renewed the offensive. My Chiefs of Staff feel that a vigorous attack, using all the forces available, should force the enemy into the Po Valley. The enemy may then choose to withdraw entirely from northern Italy. Since such action on his part might enable the enemy to release divisions for other fronts, we must do our best to destroy his forces while we have them in our grasp. I am confident that General Wilson has this as his objective.

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DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971
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It is my thought that we should press the German Army in Italy vigorously with every facility we have available and suspend decision on the future use of General Wilson's armies until the results of this campaign are better known and we have better information as to what the Germans may do.

We can renew our Teheran talk about Trieste and Istria at OCTAGON.

[Signature]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 611, 30 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Italian campaign; Trieste and Istria talks.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #772, 29 August 1944.
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor changes by the President, 30 August 1944.
3. Answered by PM #774, 31 August 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

300 Italy: 21st Nov. PM.
31 August 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALISNA, LONDON

NUMBER 612, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 773. I am distressed at the news of your illness. Please guard your health first and above all other considerations.

We can postpone OCTAGON to some later date if it appears advisable to do so.

Where is landing spot? If New York you and I could go to OCTAGON together on my train.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1135, EWT, 31 August 1944.

RICHARD PEARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1, 1974]

[Handwritten note]
President to Prime Minister

August 31, 1944

I am distressed at the news of your illness. Please guard your health first and above all other considerations.

We can postpone Octagon to some later date if it appears advisable to do so.

[Handwritten note: where is landing spot? If New York, you and I could go Octagon, New York, Tuesday.]

Roosevelt

Declassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.:
By: O.J. Stewart
Date: Nov 1, 1971
President & Prime
Your 778. I am distressed at the news of your illness.
Please guard your health first and above all other considerations.
We can postpone October to some later date if it appears advisable to do so.
FRO!!

The President

TO

The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 622, 31 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT: PM’s illness.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #773.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with addition of 1 paragraph; to PM on Aug 31, 1944.
3. Answered by PM #775.

COPIES TO: 

DATE: 

BY-DIRECTION OF: 

700 PM: 210 (Geo. C.)
In connection with the Argentine meat negotiations you have no doubt seen the message to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Ambassador in London in which the Ambassador warned his government that its difficulties were "no longer centered on suspension of relations with the United States" and that Argentina was being placed "in a position of isolation vis-a-vis the Allied and friendly nations." He added that according to a "big meat packer the Allied Nations are now in a position to do without Argentine meat for six months with no trouble at all and for twelve months with some sacrifice." The Ambassador also said that his information tallies with that from the Argentine Commercial Counsellor in Washington and with the view expressed for some time past by the Ambassador himself that the United Nations may make fewer purchases from Argentina.

Since we know that the Colonels are falling all over themselves to get you to buy their meat, I am confident that you will agree that the Ambassador's message was an extremely bad piece of news for them.

All the evidence that has come to my attention reinforces our belief that you are in an excellent position to use the negotiations to support the whole Allied stand in this Hemisphere against this broad Fascist movement. You will certainly have no trouble on the beef and mutton matter in any event.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Argentina

I attach hereto a draft of telegram which I would suggest that you send to the Prime Minister, if you agree.
In connection with the Argentine meat negotiations you have no doubt seen the message to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Ambassador in London in which the Ambassador warned his government that its difficulties were "no longer centered on suspension of relations with the United States" and that Argentina was being placed "in a position of isolation vis-à-vis the Allied and friendly nations". He added that according to a "big meat packer the Allied Nations are now in a position to do without Argentine meat for six months with no trouble at all and for twelve months with some sacrifice." The Ambassador also said that his information tallies with that from the Argentine Commercial Counsellor in Washington and with the view expressed for some time past by the Ambassador himself that the United Nations may make fewer purchases from Argentina.

Since we know that the Colonels are falling all over themselves to get you to buy their meat, I am confident that you will agree that the Ambassador's message was an extremely bad piece of news for them.

All the evidence that has come to my attention reinforces our belief that you are in an excellent position to use the negotiations to support the whole Allied stand in this Hemisphere against this broad Fascist movement. You will certainly have no trouble on the beef and mutton matter in any event.

[Signature]
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 613, 31 August 1944.

DATE: 31 August 1944.

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: British contract for Argentine beef.

ACTION:

1. (See PM #1766 & PRES #607.) Message prepared by State Department, to President via memo from Hull, 30 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ARGENTINA: 603

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library