CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
JULY - AUGUST 1944
Map Room Papers
Messages: Roosevelt-Churchill
July-August 1944
May 6, 1972

ARMY

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

have been removed from this file:

Col. Carter W. Clarke to Col. McCarthy, 7-27-44, with enclosure

Col. Frank McCarthy to Col. Park, 7-19-44, with enclosure

Permission to examine classified documents must be obtained from the department or agency of origin. The reference archivist will advise you which department or agency has jurisdiction of classified documents in this file.
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 720
Filed 0109002

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 720. Reference telegram 572.

I was glad to have your telegram. I see good hopes of
reaching a solution on the lines you suggest and entirely agree
that we must coordinate closely.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL 720

DATE/TIME 01/0900Z

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM 010950 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT French Currency

ACTION

1. Answers Pres #572, 26 June 1944
2. To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 100, 1 July 1944.
3. No reply necessary.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

002 FRANCE
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 721 Filed: 011310 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 721. Your number 574.

1. We are deeply grieved by your telegram. There are no differences whatever between my War Cabinet colleagues and the British Chiefs of Staff. The splitting up of the campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can do anything decisive, is, in my humble and respectful opinion, the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible.

2. At Teheran you emphasized to me the possibilities of a move eastward when Italy was conquered and mentioned particularly Istria. No one involved in these discussions has ever thought of moving armies into the Balkans; But Istria and Trieste in Italy are strategic and political positions, which as you saw yourself very clearly might exercise profound and widespread reactions, especially now after the Russian advances.

3. After Teheran I was made doubtful about ANVIL by

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Govt., S.IW Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1025
General Eisenhower disliked for it. You will remember his words at Cairo when "General Eisenhower stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theatre since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base".

4. Furthermore, I was impressed by General Montgomery's arguments when at Marrakesh, after he had been nominated to the OVERLORD Command, he explained that it would take 90 days for a force landed at ANVIL to influence the OVERLORD operation.

5. Both these opinions are in contrast to SCAF. It is no reflection on these officers that they should now express a different view. But their opinions expressed so decidedly, make me less confident about an ANVIL operation. Moreover in those days the date was to be early in June. There is no doubt that an advance up the Rhone Valley begun at the end of August could easily be blocked and stemmed by a smaller number of German troops, who could come either through the tunnels from Italy or from Southern Germany. I doubt whether you will find that three American divisions, supported by seven French 80 per cent native divisions from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, will have any important strategic effect on the tremendous battle which Eisenhower and Montgomery are fighting 500 miles away to the north. It seems more likely to prove a cul-de-sac into which increasing numbers of United
States troops will be drawn, and I fear that further demands will be made even upon that is left to us in Italy. It would no doubt make sure of de Gaulle having his talons pretty deeply dug into France.

6. I should not be frank if I did not assure you that I fear a costly stalemate for you unless far more American divisions, at the expense of Eisenhower, are thrust into ANVIL to make it good at all costs by the great power of the United States. Little account is to be taken of Alexander's operations. The last decision given by the British and American Chiefs of Staff here a fortnight ago was: "The destruction of the German armed forces in Italy south of the Fisa-Rimini line must be completed. There should be no withdrawal from the battle of any Allied forces that are necessary for this purpose" (telegram number 3116 dated June 14th from OSS to Generals Wilson and Eisenhower). However, I received from Alexander on June 28th a long distressing telegram in which the following passage occurs:

"The ghost of ANVIL hangs heavily over the battlefront. For example, the Americans have been ordered to send 517 RCT and 117 Cav Recco Squadrons which are actually in contact with the enemy. They are also required to release now an engineer regiment and other service units required for the conduct of battle. The French do not appear to be putting their hearts into the present operations and reason is undoubtedly because they have their eyes turned in another direction.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. Sec. Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972
The air effort will shortly be curtailed owing to moves of fighting units to Corsica. Eighth Army are not directly concerned with ANVIL, but as long as there is doubt and uncertainty about the future so long will there be a moral weakening. Armies have a very delicate sense and they are beginning to look over their shoulders. You will no doubt remember the Biblical quotation "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle". If the momentum of my offensive is to be kept to its maximum, I must receive confirmation that Italian campaign is to be backed. If on the other hand it is decided to go all out for ANVIL, then I must know so that I can recast my present plans. In the event of the latter decision I have proposed to General Wilson that I should fly home and table certain proposals aimed at producing best results my emasculated forces will be able to achieve in support of the war effort.

7. I have considered your suggestion that we should lay our respective cases before Stalin. The passage in the very nice telegram I have received from him yesterday (which follows this immediately) seems to suggest that he does not underrate the Italian front. I do not know what he would say if the issue was put to him to decide. On military grounds he might be greatly interested in the eastward movement of Alexanders Army which, without entering the Balkans, would profoundly affect all the forces there and which, in conjunction
with any attacks he may make upon Roumania or with Roumania against Hungarian Transylvania, might produce the most far-reaching results. On a long-term political view, he might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in the very hard fighting that is to come, and that east, middle and southern Europe should fall naturally into his control. However it is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves.

3. What can I do, Mr. President, when your Chiefs of Staff insist on casting aside our Italian offensive campaign, with all its dazzling possibilities, relieving Hitler of all his anxieties in the Po Basin (vide Boniface), and when we are to see the integral life of this campaign drained off into the Rhone Valley in the belief that it will in several months carry effective help to Eisenhower so far away in the north?

9. If you still press upon us the directive of your Chiefs of Staff to withdraw so many of your forces from the Italian campaign and leave all our hopes there dashed to the ground, his Majesty's Government, on the advice of their Chiefs of Staff, must enter a solemn protest. I need scarcely say that we shall do our best to make a success of anything that is undertaken. We shall therefore forward your directive to General Wilson as soon as you let us know that there is no hope of reconsideration by your Chiefs of Staff or by yourself. Our Chiefs of Staff are letting yours know the corrections
on points of detail which they think necessary in the previous draft.

10. It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this sense. But I am sure that if we could have met, as I so frequently proposed, we should have reached a happy agreement. I send you every personal good wish. However we may differ on the conduct of the war, my personal gratitude to you for your kindness to me and for all you have done for the cause of freedom will never be diminished.

No Sig
July 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland

The attached message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the President, dated 1 July 1944, relative to ANVIL decisions, is forwarded to you for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that this message be returned when copies have been made.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6 1972
By V. J. Stewart Date
FROM  The Prime Minister     TO  The President

SERIAL  721          DATE  1 July 44

DATE/TIME  01/1302
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM    VIA

SUBJECT  ANVIL operation.

ACTION
1. Answers PRES #574, 29 Jun 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 102, 1 July 44, 011730.
3. BLACK 23, 011935, stated, "Furnish copy Admiral Leahy to take up at once with JCS for preparation of reply."
4. Draft reply prepared by JCS; sent to President as WHITE 108, 0123382; approved by the President in BLACK 25, 0202002, 1 July 44, with addition at end of message. Reply sent to PM As #577, 1 July 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:
310 ANVIL

1032
Rece 01/1755 Z
Sent to HP as White 104 01/1800 Z

From: U.S. MILITARY ATTACHÉ LONDON ENGLAND
To: The President of the United States
No. 722  Filed: 01/142

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential.

To: The President of the United States.

July 7, 1944

To: The President of the United States.

I have received your message of the 25th June.

In the meantime the Allied forces have liberated Cherbourg, thus crowning their efforts in Normandy with another great victory. I greet the increasing successes of the brave British and American forces who have developed their operations both in northern France and Italy.

If the scale of military operations in northern France is becoming increasingly powerful and dangerous for Hitler, the successful development of the Allies offensive in Italy is also worthy of every attention and applause. We wish you new successes.

Concerning our offensive it can be said that we shall not give the Germans a breathing space but shall continue

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By R. H. Parks
Date: MAY 8-47

1033
to widen the front of our offensive operations by increasing the strength of our onslaught against the German armies. You will, of course, agree with me that this is indispensable for our common cause.

As regards the Hitlerite flying bombs, this expedient, it is clear, can have no serious importance either for operations in Normandy or for the population of London whose bravery is known to all:

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister

TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 722, 1 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 01/17552 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Message from Stalin re OVERLORD; Italian campaign; and robot bombs.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 104/018002.
2. To Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; sent to PM as PRES #576.

310 OVERLORD; 900 Italy; 300 Russia; 070 Flying Bombs.
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: War Department
No. 723 Filed: 011340 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 723 your number 575.

1. I have discussed matter with Eden and we have decided to act as you wish. Eden has telegraphed to Buenos Aires recalling our Ambassador for consultation.

2. This decision has been taken in response to your appeal for a "common stand". There is a good deal of anxiety in the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet. I do not myself see where this policy is leading to nor what we expect to get out of the Argentines by this method. I only hope it will not adversely affect our vital interests and our war effort.

3. I hope you will not mind my saying, as is my duty, that we ourselves were placed in an invidious position by this American decision, to which we are now asked to conform, being taken without consultation with us. We were faced with a fait accompli.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 723 DATE 1 July 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 0113402
TOR MAP ROOM 0116452 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Relations with Argentinian; recall of British Ambassador

ACTION

1. Answers PRES #575, 30 Jun 44.
2. Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 103, 1 July 44.
3. BLACK 21, 0119352, President directed copy be given Sec State for preparation of reply.
4. Draft reply submitted by Sec State, 4 July 44. Approved by the President without change; sent to PM as #5179.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
052 ARGENTINA 1037
To: The President of the United States
Number 724

Prime Minister to President Personal and Non 724.

Many thanks for your 576 with Draft Anti U-Boat statement for June. The Admiralty have suggested two amendments which I submit for your approval.

(A) In view of the failure of the great efforts made by the U-Boats to interrupt supplies to France, the last part of paragraph 1 after "the continent" be amended to read "but their efforts to prevent the necessary supplying of our constantly growing Allied Army in Europe were made completely ineffective by our counter-measures".

(B) Latest information shows that another ship has been sunk in June and this will bring the total for the month slightly above that for May. Proposed therefore to insert the word "almost" before "the lowest figure" in the second sentence of paragraph 2.
Para 2. I am telegraphing to you separately about a proposed communiqué on a special point connected with the U-Boats efforts to interrupt supplies to France.

No Sig.
**FROM** THE PRIME MINISTER | **TO** THE PRESIDENT
--- | ---
**SERIAL** #724 | **DATE** 7 July 1944
**DATE/TIME** | **OR FILE NUMBER** 070050Z
**TOR MAP ROOM** | **VIA**
**SUBJECT** June anti-sub statement.

**ACTION**
1. Answers PM #578.
2. To President via usher.
3. See also PM #725, proposing additional statement.
4. Both PM 724 and 725 sent to Navy for comment. Navy approved with minor change; President approved 7 July 44; reply drafted by Captain Wood; sent to PM as #581, 7 July 44.
7 July 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 725

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Non 725.
Reference paragraph 2 of my 724.

I see no reason why this attached statement should not be issued without prejudice to our monthly statements. It deals with a special topic and will please the men. Do you mind?

Statement begins.

1. Thousands of Allied ships have been moved across the Channel to Normandy and coastwise to build up the Military Forces engaged in the liberation of Europe. No merchant vessel of this vast concourse has been sunk by U-Boat with the possible exception of one ship. In this case doubt exists as to her destruction by U-Boat or Mine.

2. This is despite attempts by a substantial force of U-Boats to pass up-channel from their bases in...
Norway and France. Such attempts were of course expected and squadrons of coastal command, working in cooperation with the surface forces of the Allied Navies, were ready.

3. From the moment that the U-Boats sailed from their bases they were attacked by aircraft of coastal command. Both aircraft and surface forces followed up sighting reports, hunting and attacking the U-Boats with relentless determination.

4. The enemy were thus frustrated by the brilliant and unceasing work of coastal command and the tireless patrols of the surface forces, and have suffered heavy casualties.

5. Operations continue.

Statement ends.

No Sig.
FROM  THE PRIME MINISTER  TO  THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL  725  DATE  7 July 44

DATE/TIME  070103Z

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT  Additional sub statement to be issued with June statement.

ACTION

1. Further to PM 724, which answered PRES #578.
2. To President via usher.
3. Both PM 724 and 725 sent to Navy for comment. Navy approved with minor change; President approved 7 July 44; reply drafted by Captain Wood; sent to PM as #581, 7 July 44.
To: The President of the United States
Number 726 Filed: 13/13052
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Confidential Number 726.

Your number 582.

I am glad to hear that the De Gaulle visit went off well and that you agree that the British drafts will do as a basis for agreement with the French Committee.

2. We agree with the procedure you suggest, and we are instructing our people in Washington accordingly.

3. In regard to your two points. I entirely agree that Eisenhower must have all the authority which he wants for his military operations. This was the paramount aim of our officials in the discussions and the necessity was fully recognized by the French. It was not easy to find a form of words which reconciled Eisenhower's supremacy with French susceptibilities but we were satisfied that we had fully safeguarded the position by the agreed wording of articles one to five of the draft main agreement (see my immediately following message). If your people can improve the wording and persuade the French to accept it, we shall, of course,
To: The President of the United States
Number 726 Filed: 13/13052

be content. I am sure though that it would be a mistake to delay unduly. Now, after your successful meeting, is the moment to clear the whole business up.

4. Your second point is very important but we did not feel that it was an appropriate provision to insert in an agreement confined to practical administrative and other questions arising out of Allied operations for the liberation of France. Moreover, the French Committee, as you know, have provided in their decree of April 21st for the holding of elections and the appointment of a provisional government by the resultant representative assembly as soon as two-thirds of France, including Paris, have been liberated. I think we can be sure that the very democratically-minded civilian members of the Committee and of the Assembly and the French people inside France will see that these elections are held. We ourselves are satisfied on this point and I hope that you will not press for it to be covered in the actual agreement. Indeed, I do not see how it could be.

5. When the texts have been finally cleared through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I take it that you will wish to proceed as in the case of the agreements about other
To: The President of the United States  
Number 726  
Filed: 13/13052

Allied liberated territory, and that you will wish Eisenhower to sign for you on the military level. On our side the Foreign Secretary will sign with a representative of the French Committee. As we, for our part, are already prepared to accept the London texts and it appears from your telegram that there is not much difference between us, I hope that the talks which your people are having with the French in Washington will shortly be concluded and that we can get the various memoranda finally settled within a very few days.

6. I entirely agree that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared.

End
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 726

I am glad you agree that the British drafts will do as a basis for agreement with the French Committee and that the De Gaulle visit went off well.

2. We agree and we are instructing our people in Washington in accordance with the procedure you suggest.

3. With reference to your two points. That Eisenhower must have all the authority which he wants for his military operations, I entirely agree. The necessity was fully recognized by the French and this was the paramount aim of our officials in the discussions. It was not easy to find a form of words which reconciled Eisenhower's supremacy with French susceptibilities but we were satisfied that we had fully safeguarded the position by the agreed wording of articles one to five of the draft main agreement (see my immediately following message,) If your people can improve the wording and persuade the French to accept it, we shall, of course, be content. To delay unduly though, I am sure, would be a mistake. The moment to clear the whole business up is now, after your successful meeting.

4. Very important is your second point but we did not feel that it was an appropriate provision to insert in an agreement confined to practical administrative and other questions arising out of Allied operations for the liberation of France. Moreover, as you know, the French Committee have provided in their decree of 21st of April for the holding of elections and the appointment of a provisional government by the resultant representatives assembly as soon as two-thirds of France, including Paris, have been liberated. We can be sure,
I think, that the very democratically-minded civilian members of the Committee and of the Assembly and the French people inside France will see that these elections are held. On this point, we ourselves are satisfied, and I hope that you will not press for it to be covered in the actual agreement. Indeed, I do not see how it could be done.

5. I take it that you will wish to proceed as in the case of the agreements about other Allied liberated territory. When the texts have been finally cleared through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that you will wish Eisenhower to sign for you on the military level. The Foreign Secretary, on our side, will sign with a representative of the French Committee. As we, for our part, are already prepared to accept the London texts and it appears from your telegram that there is not much difference between us, I hope that the talks which your people are having with the French in Washington will shortly be concluded and that so can get the various memoranda finally settled within a very few days.

6. That no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared, I am entirely in agreement.
FROM: The Prime Minister - TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 726, 13 July hh

DATE: 13/1600 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Agreement with French Committee

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #582. (See further PM #727).
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Answer prepared by President; sent to PM as #583, which also answers PM #727.
4. By direction of Admiral Leahy, paraphrased copy furnished Secretary of State, 13 July hh.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State 13 July hh Admiral Leahy

ALL FRANCE

1049
13 July 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 727

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 727.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding message. Begins:

1. In areas affected by active military operations the necessity is recognized for the Allied Commander-In-Chief to possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which, in his judgment, are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. The necessary arrangements for this purpose are set out in Articles two to six below.

2. (1) Liberated French metropolitan territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.

   (2) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations referred to in Article 1; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph subpara 4 below.

   (3) The interior zone will include all other...
To: The President of the United States
Number 727 Filed: 13/13052

regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 subpara 2 below.

(4) The delegate referred to in Article 3 below will, in agreement with the Allied Commander-In-Chief, effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law. It is understood that this delimitation shall meet the requirements of the Allied Commander-In-Chief, as dictated by military necessity, in regard to the extent of the forward zone.

3. (1) In accordance with Article 1 of the ordonnance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on the 14th March, 1944, a delegate will be appointed for the present theater of operations. Other delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

(2) The delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a military delegate and liaison officers for administrative duties. The delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between
To: The President of the United States
Number 727 Filed: 13/1305Z

the Allied military command and the French authorities.

(3) When the powers conferred on the delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:

(1) It will be for the delegate to take, in accordance with French law, the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of Article 1 and, in particular, to issue regulations and to make appointments in the public services.

(2) In exceptional cases, where no French author-

ity is in a position to ensure the operation of the admin-
istrative services, the Commander-In-Chief may, as a temporary measure and pending the designation of a French authority by the delegate, take such urgent measures as are required by military necessity.

(3) The powers under the state of siege will be exercised by the Allied Commander-In-Chief through the French military delegate in accordance with French law.

5. (1) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility thereof,
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 727 Filed: 13/1305Z

including the powers under the state of siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities. Special arrangements will be made between the Allied Commander-In-Chief and the competent French authorities in order that all measures necessary for the conduct of military operations may be taken.

(2) Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 sub-para 3 and by agreement between the Allied Commander-In-Chief and the delegate, certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance, for example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration areas. In the military zones, the Allied Commander-In-Chief may request the French authorities to take all measures resulting from the state of siege which he considers necessary. The conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 80-99-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

End
13 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

Forwarded herewith, by direction of the President, for your information are paraphrased copies of the Prime Minister's messages Number 726 and 727 together with the President's reply thereto, Number 583.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Chief of Staff to the Commander-In-Chief.

Enc. (HW)
1. PM to PRES, #726, 13 Jul 44.
2. PM to PRES, #727, 13 Jul 44.
3. PRES to PM, #583, 13 Jul 44.
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 727

13 July 1944

The following is text referred to in my preceding telegram:

1. The necessity is recognized, in areas affected by active military operations, for the Allied Commander-In-Chief to possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which, in his judgment, are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. Set out in Articles two to six below are the necessary arrangements for this purpose.

2. (1) Into two zones will liberate French metropolitan territory be divided: An interior zone and a forward zone.

   (2) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations referred to in Article 1; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph subpara 4 below.

   (3) All other regions in the liberated territory will be included in the interior zone, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 subpara 2 below.

   (4) The delegate referred to in Article 3 below will, in agreement with the Allied Commander-In-Chief, effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law. This delimitation, it is understood, shall meet the requirements of the Allied Commander-In-Chief.
as dictated by military necessity, in regard to the extent of the forward zone.

3. (1) A delegate will be appointed for the present theater of operations, in accordance with Article 1 of the ordonnance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on the 14th March, 1944. In accordance with the development of operations, other delegates may be appointed.

(2) At his disposal, the delegate will have, an administrative organization, a military delegate and liaison officers for administrative duties. In particular the delegate's task will be to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied military command and the French authorities.

(3) It will be for those authorities, when the powers conferred on the delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, to execute the obligations of the delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:

(1) In accordance with French law it will be for the delegate to take the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of Article 1 and, in particular, to issue regulations and to make appointments in the public services.

(2) In exceptional cases, where no French authority is in a position to ensure the operation of the administrative services, the Commander-In-Chief may, as a temporary measure and pending the designation of a French authority by the delegate, take such urgent measures as are required by military necessity.

(3) Through the French military delegate in accordance with
French law, the powers under the state of siege will be exercised by
the Allied Commander-In-Chief.

5. (1) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of
the territory and responsibility therefor, including the powers under
the state of siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities.
Special arrangements will be made between the Allied Commander-In-Chief
and the competent French authorities in order that all measures necessary
for the conduct of military operations may be taken.

(2) Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 subpara. 3 and by
agreement between the Allied Commander-In-Chief and the delegate, certain
portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected
to a special regime on account of their vital military importance, for
example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration
areas. The allied Commander-In-Chief may request the French authorities
to take all measures resulting from the state of siege which he considers
necessary, in the military zones. Solely a matter for the French
authorities, nevertheless, will be the conduct of the territorial
administration and responsibility therefor.

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

- 3 -
The Prime Minister - The President

727, 13 July hh.

13/1600Z Army Code Room

Draft of proposed agreement with French Committee.

1. Further answers PRES #582. (See also PM #726).
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Answer prepared by President; sent to PM as #583, which also
   answers PM #727.
4. By direction of Admiral Leahy, paraphrased copy furnished
   Secretary of State, 13 July hh.

See State 13 July hh Admiral Leahy

OIL FRANCE
14 July 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States

Number 726

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential.

Number 726. Your number 563.

We agree. Eden and I send you all good wishes for your trip. We wish it was in the other direction.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 2-2272
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 728, 14 July 44

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Agreement with French Committee; President's trip.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #583, 13 July 44.
2. To President as RESU 127 (Pacific Trip).
3. No reply.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


ALL FRANCE: O00.9 PRESIDENT
14 July 1944


To: The President of the United States

Number 729

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 729. Your number 584.

We are both of us in full agreement, but the Australians hold the prisoners and have made very strongly the point about the divers and pilots. We have forwarded you telegram to Mr. Curtin with the strongest request that they fall in with your views, which I am sure they will do; then in a few days I hope to be able to report all clear on the British Empire front. Meanwhile we hope you will repeat your telegram so far as is necessary to General MacArthur, telling him you have my agreement.

No Sig.
CM-OUT-65465 (15 Jul 44)

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Commander-in-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WAR 65465

What follows is an exchange of messages between the President and the Prime Minister submitted to General MacArthur for his information.

First Message, from President to Prime Minister, dated July 13th is as follows:

"Negotiations are being conducted by both our governments to exchange Japanese civilian prisoners held by each of us for British and American civilians held by Japan. It is likely that such an exchange may be the only way of saving the lives of hundreds of your nationals and ours.

"On both sides there is a snag. The Japanese want us to release 300 odd divers and pilots held in Australia; their release is not agreed to by my military people and your exchange negotiations have bogged down as a result.

"The snag in our exchange is that the Japanese Government insists that Japanese officials coming out shall not be searched, while a search is insisted on by your people. The case in point concerns officials leaving Argentina. As a result, when we inform the Japanese of this requirement, our negotiations will fail."
"In my opinion, the military considerations in either case are now very small. Effective quantities even of valuable contraband cannot be carried by Japanese officials. On the other hand, our naval affairs in the Pacific are proceeding well, and the Japanese pilots and divers held in Australia cannot help the Japanese greatly, even with respect to far eastern installations, in view of our present superiority in the sea and air.

"I suggest that you give directions to your people to waive the search of Japanese officials; I will be prepared to recommend to our people that they permit the exchange of divers and pilots. This at least will give a reasonable chance that both exchanges might succeed, saving many hundreds of both British and Americans from slow death. Please let me have your views; I think the importance of considerations quite proper in themselves, but which should be overridden by the higher humanitarian interest, is being over-emphasized by the technical people." End of first message.

Second message, from Prime Minister to President dated July 14th, follows:

"Both of us are in full agreement, but the prisoners are held by the Australians and the point about the divers and pilots has been made very strongly by them. Your telegram has been forwarded to Mr. Curtin with the strongest request that they adopt your views, which I feel sure they will do. I hope then in a few days to be able to report all clear from the British Empire. We hope meanwhile that you will tell General MacArthur that you have my agreement and repeat to him your telegram so far as is necessary."

End.

ORIGINATOR: SG5
INFORMATION: Gen McFarland, Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy, Adm. King, Col. Park, Mr. McCloy, C of S

CM-OUT-65465 (15 Jul 44) 1519Z e+jv

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 729, 14 July 1944

DATE

TO JAP ROOM 141625Z VIA

SUBJECT:
Exchange of Allied and Jap Prisoners of War.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #584. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 127.
2. By direction of the President, PRES #584 and WM #729 sent to General MacArthur for his information.
3. No further reply.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

330
To: The President of the United States
Number 730  Filed 141627Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 730.
I ought to send you the immediately following minute I have received from Mr. Llewellin, the British Food Minister. We wish to do everything we can to help you and Mr. Hull with the South American countries; but we think you ought to have the formidable arguments of this minute before you. Please remember that this community of 46,000,000 imported 66,000,000 tons a year before the war and is now managing on less than 25,000,000. The stamina of the workman cannot be maintained on a lesser diet in meat. You would not send your soldiers into battle on the British service meat ration, which is far above what is given to workmen. Your people are eating per head more meat and more poultry than before the war while ours are most sharply cut. I believe that if this were put before Mr. Hull he would do all he could
to help us to obtain a new contract and nothing which would jeopardize its chances. I therefore hope that you will do so.

No Sig.

Redd 1418302

To Pres as Red 128
27 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signatures WINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.

Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.G.

7 Incls.
Incl 1. WINANT-PRES #1069,
   26 Nov 44.
Incl 2. PM-PRES #832,
   26 Nov 44.
Incl 3. PM-PRES #833,
   26 Nov 44.
\sqrt{Incl 4. PM-PRES #730},
   14 July 44.
Incl 5. PM-PRES #731,
   14 July 44.
Incl 6. PRESS-PM #588,
   22 July 44.
Incl 7. PRESS-PM #528,
   10 Oct 44.
15 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

In accordance with the telephonic request received from Mr. Gray, there are attached hereto paraphrased copies of the Prime Minister's messages No. 730 and 731.

Subsequent to this telephone conversation, a message was received from the President directing that the subject messages be sent to the Secretary of State in connection with the message delivered to you previously.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6 1972
By N. J. Stewart Date
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 730, 14 July 1944

The immediately following minute has just been received by me from Mr. Llewellyn, the British Food Minister, which I ought to send to you. We wish to do everything we can to help you and Mr. Hull with the South American countries, but we think you ought to have the formidable arguments of this minute before you. Please remember that this community of 46,000,000 imported 66,000,000 tons per year before the war and is now managing on less than 25,000,000. The workman's stamina cannot be maintained on a lesser diet in meat. You would not send your soldiers into battle on the British Service meat ration, which is far above what is given to workmen. The people in your country are eating more meat and more poultry per head than before the war, while ours are most sharply cut. If this were put before Mr. Hull I believe that he would do all he could to help us obtain a new contract and do nothing which would jeopardize its chances. Therefore, I hope you will do this.
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 731, 14 July 1944

The minute referred to in my immediately preceding telegram reads as follows:

The position into which we are getting ourselves with the Argentine worries me greatly.

For over 40% of my imported meat, I depend upon that country. The first/second meat ration will have to be reduced by about £D if I fail to get it. The ration will have to be reduced with even a temporary loss of supplies.

We are very grateful to the Americans for the meat they are sending us. I do not believe that they can send us such an increase as to make up for the loss of supplies from the Argentine.

Such additional meat, in any event, would be largely pork and we have too great a proportion of that now. The meat we get from the Argentine is beef and mutton.

My present contract with the Argentine runs out in October. In order to make sure that the people of this country will get the meat they want and need, not only for the rest of the war, but for the period of shortage afterwards, I am anxious to renew the contract for three or four years.

For me to persuade the Argentines to let me have all their exportable surplus of meat for this period is going to be most difficult,
unless we can surmount the present political difficulties. It will go
the common pool for allocation by the Combined Food Board if we get it.
Both the Americans and ourselves are running the risk of those liberated
countries which have foreign balances competing independently for the
meat, running up the prices and benefitting only the Argentines if we
fail to get the contract.

You ought to be warned now of the position which is likely to arise,
I think.

This is being sent to you with the knowledge of Mr. Eden who has
seen this minute.
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 730, 14 July hh.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: British contract for Argentine Meat.

ACTION:

1. See PM #731, which is continuation of this message. PM #730 to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 128.
2. Draft reply prepared by the President, sent to Sec State as BLUE 30, 14 July hh, for the Secretary to correct and approve, and to send through Map Room.
3. In BLUE 31, 14 July hh, President directed copies of PM #730 & #731 be sent to Sec State in connection with BLUE 30.
4. RED 166, 23 July hh, Sec State informed President message had been sent intact with two additional paragraphs. Sent to PM as #588, 23 July hh.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

OS2 ARGENTINA; 603
To: The President of the United States
Number 731

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 731.

Following is minute referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:

I am very worried at the position into which we are getting with the Argentine.

I depend upon that country for over 40 per cent of my imported meat. If I fail to get it, the first/second meat ration will have to be reduced by about five D. Even a temporary loss of supplies will reduce the ration.

We are very grateful to the Americans for the meat they are sending us. I do not believe that they can send us such an increase as to make up for the loss of our supplies from the Argentine.

In any event such additional meat would be largely pork and we have too great a proportion of that now. The meat we get from the Argentine is beef and mutton.

My present contract with the Argentine runs out in October, I am anxious to renew it for three to four years, in order to make sure that the people of this country will get the meat they want and need, not only for the rest of the war, but for the period of shortage afterwards.

It is going to be most difficult for me to persuade the Argentine to sell us all their expected surplus of meat for
this period, unless we can surmount the present political difficulties. If we get it it will go the common pool for allocation by the Combined Food Board. If we fail to get it both the Americans and ourselves are running the risk of those liberated countries which have foreign balances competing independently for the meat, running up the prices and thus benefitting only the Argentines.

I think therefore you ought to be warned now of the position which is likely to arise.

The Foreign Secretary has seen this minute and knows that I am sending it to you.

Rec'd 14/3/62 PLE
To Pres & Secy Red 129

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72 By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972
27 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signatures WINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.

Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

7 Incls.
Incl 1. WINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 2. PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 3. PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 4. PM-PRES #730, 14 July 44.
Incl 5. PM-PRES #731, 14 July 44.
Incl 6. PRES-PM #586, 22 July 44.
Incl 7. PRES-PM #628, 10 Oct 44.
**The Prime Minister**  
**TO**  
**The President**

**SERIAL or FILE NO.** 731, 14 July 44

**DATE**

**TOR MAP ROOM**  
**VIA**

**SUBJECT:** British contract for Argentine meat.

**ACTION:**

1. See PM #730, which is first part of this message. PM #731 sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 129.

2. Draft reply prepared by the President, sent to Sec State as BLUE 30, 14 July hh, for the Secretary to correct and approve, and to send through Map Room.

3. In BLUE 31, 14 July hh, President directed copies of PM #730 & #731 be sent to Sec State in connection with BLUE 30.

4. RED 166, 23 July, Sec State informed President message had been sent intact with two additional paragraphs. Sent to PM as #588, 23 July hh.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

052 ARGENTINA; 603
To: The President of the United States
Number 732

16 July 1944

Prime Minister to President Personal and 732.

When are we going to meet and where? That we must meet soon is certain. It would be better that U. J. came too. I am entirely in your hands. I would brave the reporters at Washington or the mosquitoes of Alaska! Surely we ought now to fix a date and then begin negotiating with U. J. His Majesty's Government would wish to propose "Eureka II" for the last ten days of August. For details see my immediately following telegram. Failing this, Casablanca, Rome or even Teheran present themselves and many other places too. But we two must meet and if possible three. Please let me have your ideas on all this.

End
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 732, 16 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Center

SUBJECT: Conference

ACTION:

1. Sent to President while on train enroute to Pacific Coast as RED 134.
2. President sent his reply to Map Room as BLUE 33 with direction that it be sent to Prime Minister. Sent as #585 to the Prime Minister, 17 July 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 p.m.
To: The President of the United States
Number 733

Prime Minister to President Personal and

We suggest that the first attempt should be to arrange a meeting between us three at Invergordon, where each could have his battleship as headquarters besides a suitable house on land. The King would entertain us before, after or during the meeting either at Langwell, which he could borrow from the Duke of Portland, or at Balmoral if a night journey is acceptable. The weather might well be agreeable in Scotland at that time. Secrecy, if desired, and security in any case, can be provided. U. J. might be able to fly or could certainly come by sea in the Royal Sovereign which has now become a part of his fleet. Anyhow please let me know what you think. Remember you have my standing offer and Mackenzie King's for Quebec if that is easiest for you.

End
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 733, 16 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Center

SUBJECT: Suggested places for conference.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President while enroute to Pacific Coast as RED 135.
2. President sent reply in BLUE 33 and directed the Map Room to release it. Sent as #585 to the Prime Minister.
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 734

I send you a minute to me from the Admiralty, with which I hope you will agree. It really is quite an achievement to have held 150 U boats close at hand and unable to harm our vital convoys. This would not interfere with our monthly statement. If you agree will you please inform your people, and I will do the needful here and with the Canadians. The Admiralty will get all that is put out.

Although the enemy's attempts to interfere with our OVERLORD convoys have failed, it would save us much effort if he could be induced to abandon them altogether, particularly as we shall shortly have to withdraw escort vessels for the winter Atlantic convoys.

File Copy
The only way to bring him to abandon them is to make him realize that they have failed and to bring home to him the extent of his losses. If we can succeed in this, we may undermine the morale of his U boat crews altogether.

We should therefore like to put out communiques and stories about the anti U boat operations of OVERLORD, as background for a thorough-going onslaught on U boat morale, without waiting for the usual monthly statements. The stories would of course be strictly censored and not issued without Admiralty permission.

End
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 734, 20 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Publicity on anti-submarine activities during OVERLORD.

ACTION:

1. Received by President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 153.
2. By direction of the President in BLUE 41, 20 July 1944, sent to COMINCH with request for recommendation.
3. Reply, prepared by Admiral Edwards in absence of Admiral King, sent to President as RED 156. Draft reply approved by the President; sent to Map Room as BLUE 42.
4. Reply sent to the PM as PRES #587, 21 July 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

MR 000.7 (3)

1083
25 July 1944

To: War Department
Number 735 Filed 25/2235Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and Number 735.

Para 1. Please see U.J.'s telegram to me of July 23rd and the answer I have sent off after discussion with Anthony, the text of which immediately follows this.

Para 2. We have pressed Mikolajczyk strongly to go with his Ministers and to make contact with Stalin. It may well be they will receive a friendly welcome, but of course their outburst last night about "Usurpers" etcetera may have worsened the situation. However we still have hope, and aim at fusion of some kind.

Para 3. Meanwhile it is of the utmost importance that we do not desert the orthodox Polish Government, and Anthony will give answers in the House tomorrow making it clear that our relations remain unchanged. Anything you say to U.J. that will induce him to give Mikolajczyk a good welcome and realise the importance of founding a
united Polish Government, will be invaluable. The great hope is fusion of some kind between the Poles relying on Russia and Poles relying on USA and G.B. We are sure that U.J. will be much influenced by your view of these things.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 735, 25 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION:

1. Continued in PM #736. PM #735 sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 180.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room for transmission as BLUE h9. Sent to PM as PR 31's #590, 26 July 1944.
3. Also see PRES-STALIN, 26 July 1944; PM #737, PRES #592; and PM #740.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
25th July 1944

To: War Department

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Official. Number 736.

Following are telegrams referred to in paragraph 1 of my immediately preceding telegram.

Premier Stalin to Prime Minister. Dated July 23d.

I have received your message of July 20th. I am writing to you now only on the Polish question.

Events in our front are proceeding at an extremely rapid tempo. Lubin, one of the large towns of Poland, was occupied today by our troops, who are continuing to advance.

In these circumstances the question of administration on Polish territory has arisen for us in a practical form. We do not wish to have and shall not set up our administration on the territory of Poland, for we do not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. The Poles themselves must do this. We therefore
considered it necessary to establish contact with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which was recently set up by the National Council of Poland, which was itself constituted in Warsaw at the end of last year out of representatives of the democratic parties and groups, as you must already have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to undertake the setting up of administration on Polish territory, and this, I hope, will be accomplished. In Poland we have not found any other forces which could have set up a Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, directed by the Polish Government in London, proved ephemeral and devoid of influence. I cannot consider the Polish Committee as the government of Poland, but it is possible that, in due course, it will serve as a nucleus for the formation of a provisional Polish government out of democratic forces.

As regards Mikolajczyk, I shall of course not refuse to receive him. It would however be better if he were to address himself to the Polish National
Committee, whose attitude would be friendly towards
Mikolajczyk. (Ends)

Prime Minister to Premier Stalin. Dated July 25th.

Monsieur Mikolajczyk is starting tomorrow night in
response to the suggestion in the last paragraph of your
message of July 23d. He is bringing with him Monsieur
Romer and Monsieur Grabski. His Majesty’s Government
are making arrangements for his transport to Teheran or
Moscow as may be required. He desires a full and friendly
conversation with you personally. He commands the full
support of all his colleagues in the Polish government
which of course we continue to recognise.

Para. 2. Our heartfelt wish is that all Poles may
be united in clearing the Germans from their country and
in establishing that free, strong and independent Poland
working in friendship with Russia which you have proclaimed
is your aim.

Para. 3. I have told the President of the United
States of your telegram to me and have sent him also a
copy of this. He will no doubt communicate with you.

No Sig
The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 736, 25 July 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION:
1. See also PM #735. PM #736 sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 181.
2. Reply written by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room for transmission as BLUE 19. Sent to PM as PRES's #590, 26 July 1944.
3. Also see PRES-STALIN, 26 July 1944; PM #737; PRES #592; and PM #740.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-ROMEAN RELATIONS.
26 July 1944.

To: The President of the United States
Number 737 Filed 26/21292
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and TOP SECRET number 737.
Para 1. My No. 735. I should like to add:
Begins. I should also be grateful for anything you could do to encourage Mikolajczyk. Perhaps you could send him a telegram to say how glad you are that he is undertaking this journey, that he has your support and that you much hope he may be able to come to an arrangement which will result in the fusion of all Polish forces.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. #737, 26 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations

ACTION:

1. Further to PM #725.
2. Sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 187, 26 July 1944.
3. President's reply sent to Map Room as BLUE #592, 28 July 1944, for transmission to the PM. Sent to the PM as PRES #592, 28 July 1944.
4. See further PM #740.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian relations.
27 July 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 738  Filed: 27/1149Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 738.

Your message of July 14.

I entirely agree on the desirability of cutting off Swedish exports to the enemy. We must, however, avoid jeopardizing:

(A) The substantial economic warfare advantages we have already obtained in Sweden:

(B) Our military requirements, especially in relation to deception plans:

(C) Our sources of intelligence in Sweden:

(D) Our bases in Sweden for underground work in Denmark and Central Europe.

The Foreign Office is communicating with Winant regarding the form and timing of our approach to the Swedish Government.

As soon as this is agreed, it will be necessary to approach the Russian Government and seek their support.

End

File Copy
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 738, 27 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Cutting off Swedish exports to Germany.

ACTION:

1. To the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 138. Reference is State Department message. (Blue 55)
2. By direction of the President, copy to Sec State for information.
3. Acknowledged in PRES-PM #591, sent to the Map Room for transmission as BLUE 57.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

051 Sweden
28 July 1944

From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 739 Filed 2810372
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
Number 739.
Your number 589.
Thank you so much. Ten died and nine survived.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Red 195

File Copy
<table>
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Randolph Churchill's escape</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers PRES #589, 27 July 44.
2. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 195.
3. No reply by President.

100 Churchill, Randolph
To: War Department
Number 740

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and T Number 740.

This seems to me the best ever received from WJ.

"I have received your messages of the 25th and 27th July one on the subject of the departure of M. Nikolajczyk. M. Nikolajczyk and his party will be given the necessary assistance on arrival in Moscow.

"You know our point of view on the question of Poland who is our neighbour and relations with whom have an especial importance for the Soviet Union. We welcome the national committee which has been created on the territory of Poland from democratic forces and I think that by the creation of this committee a good start has been made for the unification of poles friendly disposed towards Great Britain, the USSR and the United States and for the surmounting of opposition on the part of those Polish elements who are not capable of unification with democratic forces.

File Copy
"I understand the importance of the Polish question for the common cause of the allies and for this very reason I am prepared to give assistance to all Poles and to mediate in the attainment of an agreement between them. The Soviet forces have done and are doing everything possible to hasten the liberation of Poland from the German usurpers and to help the Polish people in the restoration of their freedom and in the matter of the welfare of their country."

Message of 25th July is contained in my 736 to you. Following is text of my message to UJ of 27th July.

1. Nikolajczyk and his colleagues have started. I am sure Nikolajczyk is most anxious to help a general fusion of all Poles on the lines on which you and I and the President are, I believe, agreed. I believe that Poles who are friendly to Russia should join with Poles who are friendly to Great Britain and the United States in order to establish the strong, free, independent Poland, the good neighbour of Russia and an important barrier between you and another
German outrage. We will all three take good care there are other carriers also.

"2. It would be a great pity and even disaster if the western democracies found themselves recognizing one body of Poles and you recognizing another. It could lead to constant friction and might even hamper the great business which we have to do the wide world over. Please therefore receive these few sentences in the spirit in which they are sent which is one of sincere friendship and our 20 years alliance."

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 740, 29 July 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION:

1. See PM #735; PM #736; PRES #590; PRES-STALIN 26 July 44; PM #737; PRES #592; PRES-HARRIMAN 28 July 44.
2. PM #740 sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska as RED 206.
3. President's reply sent to Map Room as BLUE 69, 2 Aug 44, for transmission to the PM; Sent to PM as #593, 2 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian relations.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: #741, 4 August 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

Personal and Number 471.

As U.J. cannot come to OCTAGON, would it not be well to invite Molotov?

Many congratulations on the magnificent fighting of your troops and the splendid advances. We have now placed the 52nd British Division at the disposal of General Montgomery, who has already prepared plans for its use. There may easily be a wide-open break and a general retreat of Rommel's Army. The 52nd will give us the equivalent of 20 divisions in Normandy. I wish we had more, but it is better to use what men we have left to fill the ranks.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 741, 4 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Inviting Molotov to OCTAGON Conference; congratulations on fighting of troops.

ACTION:

1. Sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 234.
2. President did not make a reply to this message.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PM 34, June
4 August 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 742 Filed 04/21/42

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 742.

1. The course of events in Normandy and Brittany
and especially the brilliant operations of the United States
left wing give good prospects that the whole Brittany Penin-
sula will be in our hands within a reasonable time. I beg
you will consider the possibility of switching DRAGOON into
the main and vital theatre where it can immediately play its
part at close quarters in the great and victorious battle in
which we are now engaged.

2. I cannot pretend to have worked out the details
but the opinion here is that they are capable of solution.
Instead of having to force a landing against strong enemy
defences we might easily find welcoming American troops at
some point or other from St. Nazaire north-westward along
the Brittany Peninsula. I feel that we are fully entitled
to use the extraordinary flexibility of sea and air power
to move with the moving scene. The arrival of the ten divisions
assigned to DRAGOON with their LST's might be achieved rapidly,
and if this came off it would be decisive for Eisenhower's
victorious advance by the shortest route right across France.

3. I most earnestly ask you to instruct your Chiefs of
Staff to study this proposal on which our people here are al-
ready at work.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 712, 29 July 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: DRAGOON operation.

ACTION:

1. Sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 2h2.
2. In RED 253, 5 Aug 44, Gen McFarland sent to Adm Leahy CCS 603-15 and 603-16, together with msg from Gen Eisenhower.
3. President approved JCS disapproval of Prime Minister's proposal, informing JCS in BLUE 87.
4. Reply to PM as PRESS #596, 6 Aug 44, which was forwarded to Map ROOM as BLUE 88 for transmission.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

310 ANVIL (DRAGOON)
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 743, 5 August 1944 File 0507182

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 743.

Here is our suggestion for the monthly report on U-Boats.

We are informing Canada in case you have difficulties in communication.

The number of German U-Boats sunk during the war now exceeds 500. It is therefore understandable that the U-Boats still operating are extremely cautious. Their efforts have been ineffective during July, a month which has been so important for the success of continental operations.

The number of U-Boats destroyed has been substantially greater than the number of merchant ships sunk. Seventeen U-Boats have been sunk while attempting to interfere with our cross-channel traffic since the first landing of the Army of Liberation.
The U-Boat fleet is still of impressive size, nevertheless the U-Boat remain the hunted rather than the hunters. They have been attacked from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, aircraft playing a great part with the surface forces. This pressure will be maintained until all chances of revival of the U-Boat campaign are killed, whatever may be the new devices and methods developed by the enemy.

The Nazi claims of sinkings continue to be grossly exaggerated. For instance, their claim for June, the latest month for which complete figures are available, was an exaggeration of a 1,000%.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

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<th>743, 5 August 1944</th>
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TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: July monthly sub statement.

ACTION:

1. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 244, 5 Aug 44. Also sent to OWI and Navy Dept by Map Room.
2. President approved statement; message sent to Map Room as BLUE 84; sent to PM as PRES #594, 7 Aug 44.
3. Map Room instructed to notify OWI and Navy Dept of approval.

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000.7 (3)
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 744, 5 August 1944 Filed 051006Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal

Thank you so much for your 593. Things are everywhere approaching a climax, and almost always a climax in our favour.

Please try to give me a firm date for OCTAGON as I have a lot to arrange.

I am sure your journey to the Pacific must have strengthened the already buoyant situation there. One of the most important things we have to settle when we meet is what you want us to do in the Japanese finale and how we can do it, and also, please, what we would like to do ourselves.

Am off to Normandy tomorrow morning, returning evening, and on Wednesday night I leave for 10 days or a fortnight for Wilson, Devers, and Alexander. I shall be in full touch all the time and will communicate as
usual, which is saying a lot. Every good wish.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister  
TO  
The President  

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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>OCTAGON meeting; President's Hawaii-Alaska trip; PM's trip to Normandy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Sent to the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 245.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Reply written by the President; sent to Map Room as BLIE 85; transmitted to PM as PRES #595</td>
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<td>210 PRES; 000.9 PRES; 000.9 PM</td>
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8 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 745 Filed: 08/15072

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 745.

Your number 596:
I pray God that you may be right.
We shall, of course, do everything in our
power to help you achieve success.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 745, 8 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: DRAGOON operation.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #596 (BLUE 88) 7 Aug 44.
2. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 265.
3. No reply necessary.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

310 ANVIL (DRAGOON)
8 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 746 Filed: 08/1510Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 746.

1. I will certainly come to Bermuda at any time. We could make you very comfortable at Government House. I had preparations made some months ago for your personal convenience in every way. Whatever you wish in these matters will be agreeable to us.

2. By "climax" I did not mean "end".

3. Thank you for your very kind personal thoughts.

End

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 746, 8 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 081615Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT: OCTAGON meeting.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #595, 8 August 1944
2. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RPD 265.
3. See PM #748 (RPD 274) which cancelled above telegram in view of later information.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PM
To: The President of the United States
Number 747

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and No. 747.

In view of your telegram, No. 587, stories regarding anti-submarine activities during OVERLORD were withheld from publication. It is, however, now proposed to release them in the ordinary way on expiry of the one month interval. These combat stories will, of course, as usual, be subject to careful security censorship, intended to avoid release of information likely to be of value to the enemy including especially Japan.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., S-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 744, 8 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: OVE-LORD anti-submarine statements.

ACTION:

1. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 269, 8 Aug 44.
2. By direction of Admiral Leahy, BLUE 11h to Map Room, message referred to Navy Department for comment and advice.
3. Reply proposed by Navy Department received as RED 321, 1h Aug 44; approved by the President; to Map Room as BLUE 123; to PM as PRES #600, 1h Aug 44.

COPYES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


000.7 (3)
8 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 748
Filed: 08/2322Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 748

My telegram number 746.

I am sending you an amended version of my reply about OCTAGON on account of later information. Please therefore regard my telegram as cancelled.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 748, 8 August 1944

DATE 09/0115Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: OCTAGON meeting.

ACTION:

1. Cancels PM #746 in view of later information received by PM.
2. Amended version of PM #746 received as PM #750 (RED 290).

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PM.
To: The President of the United States
Number 749

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and No. 749

I send you the following telegram from Premier Stalin. The mood is more agreeable than we have sometimes met, and I think that we should persevere.

"Aug. 8, Premier Stalin to Prime Minister.

I wish to inform you about my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has unsatisfactory information about affairs in Poland. At the same time, I was left with the impression that Mikolajczyk is not opposed to the finding of ways to unite the Poles.

Para two. As I did not consider it possible to press any decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and colleagues should meet and themselves discuss their questions with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and, above all,
the question of the speediest possible union of all the democratic forces of Poland on liberated Polish territory. These meetings have taken place. I have been informed about them by both sides. The delegation of the National Committee proposed that the 1921 constitution should be taken as the basis of the activity of the Polish Government, and, in the event of agreement, offered Nikolajczyk's group four portfolios, among them the post of Prime Minister for Nikolajczyk. Nikolajczyk, however, could not bring himself (literally: did not decide) to give his agreement to this. Unfortunately, these meetings have not yet led to the desired results, but they have all the same had a positive significance, inasmuch as they have permitted both Nikolajczyk and also Morawski and Bernt, who had only just arrived from Warsaw, to inform each other in a broad way about their points of view and especially of the fact that both the Polish National Committee and Nikolajczyk expressed the wish to work together and to seek the practical possibilities to that end. One may consider this as the first stage in relations between the Polish Committee and Nikolajczyk and his colleagues. We shall hope that the business will
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 749, 10 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations. Forwards message from Stalin.

ACTION:

1. See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file on this subject.
2. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as MR 749.
3. Same message sent to President by Stalin; see Stalin folder and
   stalin 293, 10 Aug 44.
4. No reply, by direction of Adm Leahy.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


052 Polish-Russian Relations.
10 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 750 Filed: 10/13/42

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
Personal and number 750.
See my numbers 746 and 748.

1. I have a very bad report on the climatic conditions in Bermuda in the first or second week of September. It is said to be extremely hot and steamy whether ashore or afloat. There is also a persistent southerly wind reported very sticky and unpleasant. I most deeply regret your inability to visit Scotland. The King seemed very much disappointed when I told him. However, I quite see that, with Stalin not coming, you may wish to defer this promised visit. I, therefore, recommend the QUADRANT area. MacKenzie King assured me he would be enchanted. I have no doubt all could be arranged to your comfort and convenience.

2. I agree about reduced staff on the Teheran scale, but I hope that the meeting will not be delayed beyond the early part of September.
To: The President of the United States
Number 750        Filed: 10/13/42

There are several serious matters in the military sphere which must be adjusted between our staffs. I, too, would greatly welcome a few frank talks with you on matters it is difficult to put on paper. We have to settle the part the British Empire should take in the war against Japan after Germany's unconditional surrender. The situation in Burma causes me much anxiety. We have suffered very heavy losses through disease and the prospect of the whole forces of the British Indian Army being tied down indefinitely in the worst part of the country is unattractive. Other tangled questions arise about the position of Alexander's army in Italy including whether it is to be bled white for DRAGOON and thus stripped of all initiative. It is impossible to resolve these thorny matters by correspondence and I am sure that, if we and the staffs were together, good working agreements could be reached.

3. It will be a very great pleasure for me to see you again. I do hope your tour has
To: The President of the United States
Number 750 Filed: 10/13/42

done you good. Let me know your wishes as soon as possible.

End

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 750, August 10, 1944

DATE 10/1623 VIA Army Code Room

TO MAP ROOM 10/1623 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: OCTAGON meeting.

ACTION:

1. See PM's #746 and #748. PM #750 is amended version of PM #748.
2. Sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 290.
3. Reply written by Admiral Leahy; sent to Map Room for transmission as BLUE 106; sent to PM as PRES #597, 11 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PM 000 4

1127
For: The President of the United States
Number 751

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and top-secret. No. 751.

The following telegram received from Ambassador Clark Kerr dated 10 Aug '44 contains our latest news of Polish affairs.

"M. Nikolajczyk left this morning. I did not see him again after his visit to Stalin last night, but he sent me a message to say that the atmosphere at the Kremlin had been much more cordial than last time. Both Stalin and Molotov had shown marked friendliness. Stalin had answered the question I had suggested with a categorical assurance that he had no intention of communiqueing Poland. He had emphasised the need for an alliance between Poland and the USSR but had said that the Poles must have ties with the West also 'alliances with Great Britain, the United States and France'.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
"Stalin had agreed to send help to the Poles in Warsaw, and had said that arrangements must at once be made for Marshal Sokossovski to send a Soviet officer to Polish Headquarters here with ciphers and wireless.

"The talk had then turned on Germany. Stalin had said he would do 'everything possible and impossible' to ensure that Germany could never again reap revenge. Mikolajczyk had told Stalin that a German officer captured in Normandy had said that Germany would go communist after the war, and would find in the communist part of the world an outlet for the German capacity for organization. To this, Stalin had replied that communism was 'no more fit for Germany than a saddle for a cow'. This had surprised and pleased the Poles, who had recalled the German origins of the communist theory.

"Mikolajczyk now felt that speed was the first essential.

"It is clear that this talk has put cheerfulness where there had been gloom in the hearts of the Poles."

End
**FROM** The Prime Minister
**TO** The President

**SERIAL or FILE NO.** 751, 11 August 1944

**DATE** 11 August 1944

**TOR MAP ROOM** VIA

**SUBJECT:** Forwards msg from Amb Clark Kerr re Russian-Polish relations.

**ACTION:**
1. To President on Alaska-Hawaii trip as RED 298.
2. Reply written by Admiral Leahy; sent to the Map Room as BLUE 110; to PM as PRES #598, 11 Aug 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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052 Polish-Russian Relations.
12 August 1944

From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: 752 Filed 120902Z 
Prime Minister to President Personal and
752. Your number 597.
We accept with greatest pleasure. Urgently looking to our meeting. War situation by then may have cleared up many difficulties. I am arranging with MacKenzie King and others.
How magnificently your troops are fighting and how their logistics have carried them forward.

End

Red 310 12/1053 Z.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 752, 12 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 121053Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT: OCTAGON meeting.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #597, 11 August 1944.
2. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 310.
3. No reply to be made by President.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


210 PRES-PM.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 753, 14 August 1944

I have had meetings during the last 2 days with Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Prime Minister. I told both the Yugoslav leaders that we had no thought but that they should combine their resources so as to weld the Yugoslav People into one instrument in the struggle against the Germans. Our aim was to promote the establishment of a stable and independent Yugoslavia and the creation of a United Yugoslav Government was a step towards this end.

The two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions. They agreed that all the Yugoslav Naval Forces will now be united in the struggle under a common flag. This agreement between the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito will enable us with more confidence to increase our supplies of war material to the Yugoslav Forces.
They agreed between themselves to issue simultaneously in a few days time, which I hope will strengthen and intensify the Yugoslav war effort. They are going off together today to Vis to continue their discussions.

I am informing Marshal Stalin of the result of these meetings.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 753, 14 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Relations between Marshal Tito and Yugoslav Prime Minister.

ACTION:

1. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as #322.
2. Answer written by the President; to Map Room for transmission as BLUE 121; to PM as PRES #399, 14 August 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature]

Yugoslavia
To: The President of the United States

Number 754  Filed: 08/1621

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

Personal and ___________ Number 754.

\ Have just returned from watching the assault from considerable distance. Everything seems to be working like clockwork here and there have been few casualties so far and none that I know of amongst the mass of shipping deployed.

2 All arrangements proceeding for OCTAGON on dates you mention.

3 I had the pleasure of taking Patterson and General Somervell out on my destroyer.

End

Rec'd 16/22402.

Red 332

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 754, 16 August 1944

DATE: 16 August 1944

SUBJECT: DRAGOON operation; OCTAGON meeting; Talk with Patterson and General Somervell.

ACTION:

1. To President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 332.
2. No reply to PM.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

310 Dragoon; 210 Gen. Off.; 100 Patterson; 100 Somervell.

1137
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 755

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 755.

Instructions to General Wilson.

1. We have always marched together in complete agreement about Greek policy, and I refer to you on every important point. The War Cabinet and Foreign Secretary are much concerned about what will happen in Athens, and indeed in Greece, when the Germans crack or when their divisions try to evacuate the country. If there is a long hiatus after German authorities have gone from city before organized government can be set up, it seems very likely that EAM and the Communist Extremists will attempt to seize the city and crush all other form of Greek expression but their own.

2. You and I have always agreed that the destinies of Greece are in the hands of the Greek people, and they will have the fullest opportunity of deciding between a Monarchy or Republic as soon as tranquility has been restored, but I do not expect you will relish
more than I do the prospect either of chaos and street fighting or of a tyrannical Communist government being set up. This could only serve to delay and hamper all the plans which are being made by UNRRA for the distribution of relief to the sorely tried Greek people. I therefore think that we should make preparations through the Allied Staff in the Mediterranean to have in readiness a British force, not exceeding 10,000 men, which could be sent by the most expeditious means into the capital when the time is ripe. The force would include parachute troops, for which the help of your air force would be needed. I do not myself expect that anything will happen for a month, and it may be longer but it is always well to be prepared. As far as I can see there will be no insuperable difficulty. I hope, therefore, you will agree that we may make these preparations by the staffs out here in the usual way. If so, the British Chiefs of Staff will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff draft.

End

REGRAD ED U NCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
26 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. HOPKINS
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Attached are messages #755 and #770 from the Prime Minister to the President. Upon the receipt of the tracer message (#770), the President directed that #755 be referred to Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy jointly for preparation of reply.

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR.

2 Incls.
TO: The President

SUBJECT: Restoration of Greek Government.

ACTION:

1. To the President via Colonel Park.
2. In #770, the PM asked for an answer to his #755.
3. Referred to Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins jointly by the President for preparation of reply. Memo of 26 Aug 44.
4. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins, approved by the President without change; sent to the PM as PRES #608, 26 Aug 44.
For: The President of the United States
Number 756

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and No. 756.

Thank you for your letter dated 15th July. I had
an agreeable conversation with Mr. Morgenthau before I
left.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 756, 17 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Thanks for letter of 15th July; talk with Mr. Morgenthau.

ACTION:

1. Shown to the President by Colonel Park.
2. No reply necessary.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

---

Mr. Morgenthau
To: The President of the United States

Number 757 Filed: 17/17562

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt PERSONAL and No. 757.

I am so glad you are cheered by what I told you of my interview with Tito and the BAN. They certainly seemed to understand each other very well, but I cannot be sure that BAN gives sufficient expression to Serbians point of view. How to supply this will be difficult.

Every good wish.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 757, 17 August 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Reconciliation of Tito and Subasic.

ACTION:
1. Answer PRES #599, 14 August 1944.
2. Shown to the President by Colonel Park.
3. No reply.

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature: Yugoslavia]
18 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 758

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 758. Your number 600.

I have repeated your telegram to Admiralty who will take
every precaution in the matter.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>OVERLORD anti-submarine statement</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers PRES #600, 15 August 1944.
2. To the President via usher.
3. No reply.

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000.7 (3)
18 August 1944

From: Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of The United States

No.: 759 Filed 1015152

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 759.

The Prime Minister has asked that this telegram which he has received from Marshal Stalin should be repeated to the President.

Para. 1. After the conversation with W. Mikolajczyk I gave orders that the Command of the Red Army should drop arms intensively in the Warsaw sector. A parachutist liaison officer was also dropped who, according to the report of the Command, did not reach his objective as he was killed by the Germans.

Further, having familiarized myself more closely with the Warsaw affair, I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet Command had been informed before the beginning of the
Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it.

In the situation which has arisen the Soviet Command
has come to the conclusion that it must dissociate itself from
the Warsaw adventure as it cannot take either direct or indirect
responsibility for the Warsaw action.

Para. 2. I have received your communication regarding
the meeting with Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Subasic. I
thank you for the communication.

Para. 3. I am very pleased at the successful landing of
Allied Forces in the south of France. I wish success from my
heart.

No Sig
FROM         The Prime Minister  TO       The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.  759, 18 Aug 44.
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher. See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file of correspondence.
2. See further PM #760, and PRES 601.
3. Answered by PRES #602, which was written by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:   DATE:   BY DIRECTION OF:


052 Polish-Russian Relations; 051 Yugoslavia; 310 Dragon
16 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 760 Filed 182220Z

1. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No 760 personal and confidential.

The refusal of the Soviet to allow the U.S. aircraft to bring succour to the heroic insurgents in Warsaw, added to their own complete neglect to fly in supplies when only a few score of miles away, constitutes an episode of profound and far reaching gravity. If, as is almost certain, the German triumph in Warsaw is followed by a wholesale massacre no measure can be put upon the full consequences that will arise. I am willing to send a personal message to Stalin if you think this wise and if you will yourself send a separate similar message.

2. Better far than two separate messages would be a joint message signed by us both. I have no doubt we could agree on the wording.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972
3. The situation in Europe is being vastly changed by the glorious and gigantic victories being achieved in France by the U.S. and British forces and it may well be that our armies will gain a victory in Normandy which far exceeds in scale anything that the Russians have done on any particular occasion. I am inclined to think therefore, that they will have some respect for what we say so long as it is plain and simple. It is quite possible Stalin would not resent it but even if he did we are nations serving high causes and must give true counsels towards world peace.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 760, 18 August 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations.

ACTION:

1. See "WR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file of correspondence. Taken to President via Usher.

2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; to PM as PPRS #760, 19 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

1153
For: The President of the United States
Number 761  Filed 191347Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Further to my 760.

You should see the following telegram which I have just received from Foreign Secretary.

"The Polish Government have reminded me that Soviet broadcasting stations have for a considerable time past repeated appeals to the Polish population to drop all caution and start a general rising against the Germans. As late as July 29th, i.e., three days before the Warsaw rising began, the Moscow radio station broadcast an appeal from the Union of Polish Patriots to the population of Warsaw which, after referring to the fact that the guns of liberation were now within hearing, called upon them as in 1939 to join battle with the Germans, this time for decisive action. 'For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.' After reference to the German plan to set up defence points which would result in the gradual destruction of the city, the broadcast terminated by reminding the inhabitants..."
that 'All is lost that is not saved by active effort' and that
'By direct active struggle in the streets, houses, etc., of
Warsaw the moment of final liberation will be hastened and the
lives of our brethren saved.'

End
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  
SERIAL or FILE NO: 761, 19 Aug 44.  
DATE:  
TOR MAP ROOM: VIA  
SUBJECT: Polish-Soviet relations; supplies to Warsaw.  
ACTION:  
1. To President via Usher.  
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President, 23 Aug 44; sent to the PM as PRES #603, 23 Aug 44.  
3. (See MR U52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file of correspondence on this subject.)  

COPiES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

052 Polish-Russian Relations
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 762 Filed 2008082

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and No. 762.

The message in your Number 601 has been sent on to U.S. over our two signatures. Our thoughts are one.

Following telegram received from our Ambassador in Moscow, dated 17 August:

"United States Ambassador and I are asking urgently for interview with M. Stalin. If his instructions do not arrive in time he will support me on his own responsibility.

"You should, however, know that last night Vyshinski asked the United States Ambassador to call, and, explaining that he wished to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding about what he had said to us the previous afternoon, read out the following statement. Begins:

"The Soviet Government cannot, of course, object to English or American aircraft dropping arms in the region of
"Warsaw since this is American and British affair. But they
decidedly object to American or British aircraft, after dropping
arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since
the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either
directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw." (ends)

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 762, 20 August 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations. Supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 333.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President, 23 Aug 44; sent to the PM as RED #603, 23 Aug 44.
3. (See MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file of correspondence on this subject.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian Relations
To: The President Of The United States
Nr: 763, 20 August 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 763.

Today I had the honour of inspecting your magnificent troops in the liberated soil of Italy. May I be permitted to express my admiration of the character, quality and bearing of these soldiers. We are most grateful for your help.

No Sig.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tele., 3-59-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 763, 20 August 1944

DATE VIA

SUBJECT: Congratulations on troops in Italy.

ACTION:
1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 335.
2. (See also PM #764, also containing congratulations.)
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy for PM #763 and #764; approved by the President 23 Aug 44; sent to PM as PRES #604.
4. In PM #768, the Prime Minister explained that PM #763 was sent to the President by mistake.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


21 August 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 764 21 August 1944 Filed 210750Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and

Number 764, dated 20 August.

Today I spent with your grand Fifth Army and Mark Clark.
I also saw the Brazilians, whose bearing was excellent. The
spirit of this Army and of the British Eighth Army, standing
on its right, is high but of course there is a sense of bewilder-
ment at the repeated and ceaseless withdrawals of important and
key elements.

Everything is in train for OCTAGON on the 10th. I am
looking forward greatly to meeting you.

End

Reed: 2109002.
T.P. as red 341 at 212003.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 764, 21 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: Congratulations on performance of troops in Italy.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 341.
2. See also PM #763 and PM #768.
3. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; to PM as this #764.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature]

[Signature]
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 765 23 August 1944 Filed 2308452

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and
Number 765.

After much pressure from Weizmann I have arranged that
the War Office shall raise a Jewish brigade group in what you
would call a regimental combat team. This will give great
satisfaction to the Jews when it is published and surely they
of all other races have the right to strike at the Germans as
a recognizable body. They wish to have their own flag, which
is the Star of David on a white background with two light blue
bars. I cannot see why this should not be done. Indeed I think
that the flying of this flag at the head of a combat unit would
be a message to go all over the world. If the usual silly ob-
jections are raised I can overcome them, but before going ahead
I should like to know whether you have any views upon it.

End

Regarded Unclassified by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.  765, 23 August 1944.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT: Organization of Jewish Brigade.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President; to PM as PRES #609, 28 August 1944.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:
23 August 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 766 Filed 231806Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 766.

Personal and

I am thankful that you see our point about getting a new Argentine meat contract. We are going ahead accordingly with these difficult negotiations and hope that nothing will happen to hazard them. We have no wish or intention to present the Colonels with anything they can represent as a diplomatic triumph.

2. I hope that you liked my reference to Argentina on August 2nd: from all accounts Argentines do not seem to have liked it. We seem to be agreed as to objectives and I hope that we can also agree as to tactics. We will not send our ambassador back or recognise the Argentine Government until we have discussed with you what we think the situation requires. Our Embassy have now received our views and passed them to your State Department. Now that we have said in
public just what we think of the present Argentine Government, I do most earnestly hope that you will ignore the Colonels for a good many weeks, thus giving both of us an opportunity to examine a common policy and the Argentines a chance to mend their ways, which they can never do under the glare of public indictment.

Prime
23 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

By direction of the President, the attached copy of message No. 766 from the Prime Minister to the President is forwarded to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

By direction of the President, a copy has also been furnished the Secretary of State for his information.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 6 1972

SECRET

- 1 -
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 766 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 23 August 1944, is forwarded for the information of the Secretary of State.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 6 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
FROM:  THE PRIME MINISTER

TO:    THE PRESIDENT

NO:    766, 23 August 1944

As you see our point about getting a new meat contract with Argentina, for which I am thankful, we are moving ahead with these difficult negotiations and I hope that they won't be upset. To present the Colonels with anything they can construe as a triumph of diplomacy is neither desired nor intended by us.

In my speech on August 2nd I made reference to Argentina, which I hope you liked. From all accounts the Argentines did not. I hope we can agree on tactics, since we seem to be in accord on objectives. Until we discuss with you what we think the situation requires, we will neither recognize the Argentine Government nor permit our Ambassador to return.

Our views have been passed to our Embassy, which has given them to your State Department. An opportunity for both of us to examine a common policy and the Argentines a chance to mend their ways, which under the glare of public indictment they can never do, seems to be in order. For that reason, now that we have said in public just what we think of the present Argentina Government, I do most earnestly hope that you will ignore the Colonels for a good many weeks.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 766, 23 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: British contract for Argentine Beef.

ACTION: (See PM #730, PM #731, PRES #588.)

1. To President by Comdr. Tyree.
2. By direction of the President, to Sec State for information; to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President with minor changes; sent to the PM as PRES #607.

052 Argentina; 603
From: U.S. Military Attache London England

To: The President of the United States

No. 767

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No. 767. Personal and

The following is an eye witness account of the Warsaw rising. A copy has already been given to the Soviet Ambassador in London.

1. 11th August the Germans are continuing despite all efforts of AK, their ruthless terror methods. In many cases they have burnt whole streets of houses and shot all the men belonging to them and turned the women and children out on to the street where battles are taking place, to find their way to safety. On Krolewska Street many private houses have been bombed out. One house was hit by 4 separate bombs. In one house, where lived old retired professors of Polish Universities, the SS troops forced an entrance and killed many of them. Some succeeded in escaping through the cellars to the other houses. The morale of AK and the civilian population is of the highest standard. The watchword is "Death to the Germans".

2. 11th August.

The German Tank Forces during last night made determined efforts
to relieve some of their strong points in the city. This is no light task however, as on the corner of every street are built huge barricades mostly constructed of concrete pavement slabs torn up from the streets especially for this purpose. In most cases the attempts failed, so the tank crews vented their disappointment by setting fire to several houses and shelling others from a distance. In many cases they also set fire to the dead which litter the streets in many places and have begun to smell rather badly. The German Tank Corps have begun to have a great respect for the Polish barricade, for they know that behind each one waits determined troops of AK with petrol bottles. These petrol bottles have caused great destruction to many of their comrades.

3. 13th August.

The German Forces have brutally murdered wounded and sick people, both men and women who were lying in the hospitals of SS Lazarus on Nmska Str., N. 18, and Karol and Marsa hospitals on Przejazd Str., N. 5.

On Aleje Jerozolimskie, when the Germans were bringing supplies by tank to one of their outposts they drove before them 500 women and children to prevent the troops of AK from taking action against them. Many of them were killed and wounded. The same kind of action has been reported from many other parts of the city.

Despite lack of weapons, the Polish forces continue to hold the initiative in the battle for Warsaw. In some places they have broken into German strongholds and captured much needed arms and ammunition. On August 12th, 11,600 rounds of rifle ammunition, 5 machine guns, 8,500 small arms ammunition, 20 pistols, 30 anti tank mines and transport were captured.

The German forces are fighting desperately...
AK set fire to a building which the Germans were holding as a fortress.

2 German soldiers tried to escape to the Polish lines with a white flag, but an SS Officer saw them and shot them dead. During the night of the 12th/13th August AK received some weapons from Allied aircraft.

4. August 15th.

The dead are buried in backyards and squares. The food situation is continually deteriorating, but as yet there is no starvation. Today there is no water at all in the pipes. It is being drawn from the infrequent wells and house supplies. All quarters of the town are under shell fire and there are many fires. The dropping of supplies has intensified the morale. Everyone wants to fight and will fight but the uncertainty of a speedy conclusion is depressing.

5. August 16th.

Fighting continues to be very bitter in Warsaw. The Germans fight for every inch of ground. It is reported that in some places whole districts have been burnt and the inhabitants either shot or taken to Germany. The inhabitants continue to repeat "When we get weapons we will pay them back".

Fighting for the electric power station began on August 1st at 5.10 PM. 23 soldiers of the Polish Home Army were stationed in the works before that hour because they were employed in the normal course of things, expecting the outbreak of the rising. The Germans had on the day before raised the strength of the garrison to 150 militarized police stationed in concrete pill boxes and block houses, also in all the works buildings. The signal of action was the explosion of a mine under one of the buildings. After 16 hours of fighting the electric power station was
fully in Polish hands. The Polish losses were 17 killed and 27 wounded.
The German losses were 30 killed and 22 wounded with 56 taken as Prisoners
of War. The detachment which captured the station consisted solely of
manual and metal workers of the works. In spite of the fact that the
buildings of the station are daily bombarded with 75 MM shells by the
Germans, the personnel has succeeded in maintaining the supply of current
to the civil population without the slightest interruption.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 767, 23 August 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations; supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:
1. To President via usher. (See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS").
2. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President without change; to PM as PRES #605, 24 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian relations.
August 24, 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 768 Filed 21/2150Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 768.

My cipher number 763 was sent to you by mistake. The cipher people had apparently not realized there was any other president in the world.

Prime
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered

Originator requests change msg 768 addressed POTUS to begin: "My number 763 etc instead of 'My chain number 131'."

End

Rec'd 24/2230 2

TOP SECRET

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister

The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 768, 21, August 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: he PM #763—congratulations on performance of troops in Italy.

ACTION:

1. To President via Colonel Park.
2. See PM #763, PM #764, PM #764.
3. Prime Minister explains that his #763 was sent to the President by mistake. Apparently, PM #763 should have been sent to the President of Brazil.
4. No reply.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature]

[Date]

[Signature]
For: The President of the United States
Number: 769
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and top secret. Number 769.

Uncle Joe's reply adds nothing to our knowledge and he avoids the definite questions asked. I suggest following reply:

"We are most anxious to send American planes from England. Why should they not land on the refueling ground which has been assigned to us behind the Russian lines without enquiry as to what they have done on the way. This should preserve the principle of your government's dissociation from this particular episode. We feel sure that if wounded British or American planes arrive behind the lines of your armies, they will be succoured with your usual consideration. We do not try to form an opinion about the persons who instigated this rising which was certainly called for repeatedly by radio Moscow. Our sympathies are, however, for the..."
unarmed people whose special faith has led them to attack German guns, tanks and aircraft. We cannot think that Hitler's cruelties will end with their resistance. On the contrary, it seems probable that that is the time when they will begin with full ferocity. The massacre in Warsaw will undoubtedly be a very great annoyance to us when we all meet at the end of the war. Unless you directly forbid it, therefore, we propose to send the planes."

If he will not give any reply to this I feel we ought to go and see what happens. I cannot conceive that he would maltreat or detain them. Since signing this, I have seen that they are even trying to take away your airfields at Poltava and elsewhere.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 769, 25 August 1944.
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: Dropping supplies to Warsaw; proposed message to Stalin

ACTION:

1. For complete file of correspondence on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
2. PM #769 to President via usher.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes; to PM as PRES #606, 26 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish: Russian Relations; 580 Shuttle Bombing
To: The President of the United States

Number 770

Prime minister to President Roosevelt Personal and

Could you very kindly give me an answer to my
telegram of August 16th (number 755). We are getting
on with the preparations and the crisis may come soon.
Should you feel you do not wish to express an opinion
on the subject I am quite willing to go ahead on my own.

End
26 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. HOPKINS
ADMiral LEAHY

Attached are messages #755 and #770 from the Prime Minister to the President. Upon the receipt of the tracer message (#770), the President directed that #755 be referred to Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy jointly for preparation of reply.

ROBERT W. ROGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR.

2 Incls,
The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 770, 25 August 1944.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Restoration of Greek Government.

ACTION:

1. To President via Commander Tyree. (Further to PM #755.)

2. This message, together with PM #770, to Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy jointly for preparation of reply by direction of the President.

3. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins, approved by the President without change; sent to the PM as PRES #608, 26 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

Personal and Confidential

To take part in the conference I shall only bring 14 or 15 persons but I must explain to you that as I and the Chiefs of Staff have to conduct a very great number of important affairs from day to day it will be necessary to have considerable numbers of persons for that purpose. For instance. My own party and private secretaries 7. Secretariat and Administration 6. Clerical 42. Cipher staff 30. Royal Marine Guard 36. There will also be a small contingent from our element in Washington. These however are only the machinery with which I carry on my work and without which I could not leave the country. You have all your great departments immediately under your hand a few hours away by air.

Para 2. The glorious events in France and in the Balkans have completely altered the whole outlook of the war and with people like the Germans anything might happen. Last time Bulgaria proved the lynch pin which when pulled brought everything crashing down.

Para 3. I must express my admiration to you not only for
the valour but for the astonishing mobility and manoeuvring power of the great armies trained in the United States. I am looking forward immensely to seeing you again and trying to clear up with you in the light of our friendship some of the difficulties which beset even the path of dazzling victory. Thank you very much for your telegram about Greece.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 771, 29 August 1944

DATE

TOR A P ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON Conference; events in France and Balkans; congratulations on US Army; Greece message.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President; sent to the PM as PRES #610, 30 August 1944.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nbr: 772, 29 August 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Secret, number 772.

General Alexander received a telegram from SHAPE asking for efforts to be made to prevent the withdrawal of more divisions from the Italian Front. This of course was the consequence of the great weakening of our armies in Italy and has taken place entirely since the attack on the Riviera. In all, four divisions have left including a very strong Panzer on route for Chalons. However, in spite of the weakening process Alexander began about three weeks ago to plan with Clark to turn or pierce the Apennines. For this purpose the British 13 Corps of four divisions has been placed under General Clark's orders and we have been able to supply him with the necessary artillery of which his army had been deprived. This army of eight divisions - four American and four British - is now grouped around Florence in a northerly axis.

By skimming the whole front and holding long stretches with nothing but anti-aircraft gunners converted to a kind of artillery -
infantry and supported by a few armoured brigades, Alexander has also been able to concentrate ten British or British controlled divisions representative of the whole British Empire on the Adriatic flank. The leading elements of these attacked before midnight on the 25th and a general barrage opened and an advance began at dawn on the 26th. An advance of about nine miles was made over a large area but the main position, the Gothic Line, has still to be encountered. I had the good fortune to go forward with this advance and was consequently able to form a much clearer impression of the modern battlefield than is possible from the kinds of pinnales and perchas to which I have hitherto been confined.

The plan is that the Eighth Army of ten divisions very heavily weighted in depth will endeavour to pierce the Gothic Line and turn the whole enemy's position entering the Po Valley on the level of Rimini but at the right moment depending on the reactions of the enemy Mark Clark will strike with his eight divisions and the elements of both armies will converge to Bologna. If all goes well I hope that the advance will be much more rapid after that and that the continued heavy fighting will prevent further harm being done to Eisenhower by the withdrawal of divisions from Italy.

I have never forgotten your talks to me at Teheran about Istria and I am sure that the arrival of a powerful army in Trieste
and Istria in four or five weeks would have an effect far outside purely military values. Tito's people will be awaiting us in Istria. What the condition of Hungary will be then I cannot imagine but we shall at any rate be in a position to take full advantage of any great new situation.

No Sig.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 772, 29 August 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Italian campaign.

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor changes by the President; to PM as PRES #613.
3. Answered by PM #774.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

|--|--|--|

300 Italy; 2/19 Pres Off.
To: The President Of The United States
Nr: 773, 31 August 1944 Filed 310847Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Confidential No 773.

I had a sudden attack of my former malady with a temperature of between 103 and 104 degrees two hours before my plane reached home. However with vigilance, care and W and B, I am now normal again and have every hope and intention of coming in the Queen Mary on the fifth instant, thus reaching OCTAGON on the 10th. The voyage at sea will be better for me than a journey by air.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Top Secret

File Copy

Read 31/12002

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>773, 21 Aug 44.</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>PM's illness; OCTAGON meeting.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. To President via usher.
2. Answer drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with addition of 1 paragraph; to PM As PRES #612, 31 August 1944.
31 August 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 774 Filed 311532Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 774.
Your No. 611 80F.

Now all operations in Italy are conceived and executed
by General Alexander in accordance with his general directives
from the Supreme Commander. You will see that he is now in contact
for twenty miles on the Adriatic flank with the Gothic line, and a
severe battle will be fought by the Eighth Army. Also General
Clark with the Fifth Army has made an advance from the direction
of Florence. I have impressed most strongly upon General Alexander
the importance of pressing with his utmost strength to destroy
the enemy's armed forces as well as turn his line. It will not
be easy for the Germans to effect a general retreat from the Gothic
line over the Alps especially if we can arrive in the neighbourhood
of Bologna. The western passes and tunnels into France are already
blocked by your advance into the Rhone Valley. Only the direct
route to Germany is open. We shall do our utmost to engage, harry
and destroy the enemy. The decisive battle has yet, however, to
be fought.
2. In view of the fact that the enemy on the Italian front has been weakened by four of his best divisions, we no longer ask for further American reinforcements beyond the 92nd Division, which I understand will shortly reach us. On the other hand, I take it for granted that no more will be withdrawn from Italy, i.e., that the four divisions of Clark's army and the elements remaining with them will continue there: and that General Alexander should make his plans on that basis. So much for the present.

3. As to the future: continuous employment against the enemy will have to be found for the Eighth and Fifth Armies once the German armies in Italy have been destroyed or unluckily made their escape. This employment can only take the form of a movement first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna. Should the war come to an end in a few months, as may well be possible, none of these questions will arise. Anyhow, we can talk this over fully at OCTAGON.

4. I congratulate you upon the brilliant success of the landings in Southern France. I earnestly hope the retreating Germans may be nipped at Valence or Lyons and rounded up. Another mob of about 90,000 is apparently streaming back from the south via Poitiers.

End
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 774, 31 Aug 44
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 311900Z VIA "Ray Code Room"
SUBJECT: Operations in Italy

ACTION:

1. To President via Col Park.
2. To Admiral Leahy for action.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by Gen Marshall; sent to President at Hyde Park as RED 357, 0314402.
4. BLUE 133, 0317302, President approved RED 357 with minor change.
5. Reply to PM as PRES #616, 031822 Sept.

COPIES TO: Date: By Direction Of:

[Signature]
300 L. St. "Nancy, 301 "Italy"