To: The President of the United States  
Nr: 775  

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 775 Personal and

My temperature is normal and I am much better though still eating masses of M and B. The doctors seem quite confident that I can get away on night of fifth. The ship goes to Halifax direct and I will arrive Citadel on the tenth.

I look forward so much to seeing you again and to making good plans with you for the future in these days of glory.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 775, 1 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: PM's illness; OCTAGON Conference.

ACTION:

1. Previous messages: PM #773; PRES #612.
2. To President as RED 346, 0112332.
3. President's reply received in Map Room as BLUE 129; to PM as PRES #614, 1 Sept.

COPY TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

203.7 PM; 2100100 PM.
Red 347 - Hyde Park
1 September 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 776

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Nr. 776.

Personal and confidential.

I see that General Donovan has sent an American mission to General Mihailovic. I thought from your telegram, No. 515 in response to my No. 638, that such a step would not be taken. We are endeavouring to give Tito the support and, of course, if the United States back Mihailovic, complete chaos will ensue. I was rather hoping things were going to get a bit smoother in these parts, but if we each back different sides, we lay the scene for a fine civil war. General Donovan is running a strong Mihailovic lobby, just when we have persuaded King Peter to break decisively with him and when many of the Cetniks are being rallied under Tito's National Army of Liberation. The only chance of saving the King is the unity between his Prime Minister, the Ban of Croatia, and Tito. I have been able to arrange for the fusion of the Yugoslav air and naval forces under the title and with the emblem of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force and the Royal Yugoslav Navy.

End

File Copy
TO: The President

FROM: The Prime Minister

DATE: 776, 1 Sept 44.

SUBJECT: Donovan's sending mission to Mihailovic.

ACTION:

1. See PM #638, PRES #515.
2. To President at Hyde Park as RED 347, 1 Sept 44.
3. BLUE 131, President directed that message be referred to Admiral Leahy and Joint Staff for preparation of reply.
4. Admiral Leahy's reply sent up via pouch—did not come through Map Room.
5. BLUE 135, 3 Sept 44, President sent to Map Room reply to the Prime Minister; sent to PM as PRES #617.
6. BLUE 136, 3 Sept 44, President sent message to Gen Donovan, directing him to call-off OSS mission to Mihailovic. Sent by memo to Mr. Charles Cheston for transmission to Gen Donovan.

COPIES TO: 210 OSS; 051 YUGOSLAVIA
1 September 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 777  Filed 011330Z

Personal and

I hope you will pardon a further transgression of
the Teheran scale. I am going to bring Mrs. Churchill with
me.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0106
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 777, 1 Sept 1944

DATE VIA

TOR MAP ROOM

SUBJECT: Bringing Mrs. Churchill to OCTAGON.

ACTION:
1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 348.
2. President's reply received as BLUE 132, 1 Sept; to PM as PRES #615.
3. Answered by PM #778.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PM CONFERENCES.

0107
For: The President of the United States
Number 778  Filed 021440Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 778.
I am delighted that Eleanor will come.
The doctors are resolute that I can go bar a setback.
I cannot reach OCTAGON till noon 11th.
End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date  MAY 6 1972
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.  778, 2 Sept 44.

DATE  778, 2 Sept 44.

TO: MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON CONFERENCE.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES #615, 1 Sept 44.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 355, 2 Sept 44.
3. No reply by President.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PW CONFERENCES.
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 779 Filed 04/21152

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

1. The War Cabinet are deeply disturbed at the position
in Warsaw and at the far reaching effect on future relations
with Russia of Stalin's refusal of airfield facilities.

2. Moreover as you know Mikolajczyk has sent his pro-
posals to the Polish Committee of Liberation for a political
settlement. I am afraid that the fall of Warsaw will not
only destroy any hope of progress but will fatally undermine
the position of Mikolajczyk himself.

3. My immediately following telegram contain the
text of a telegram which the War Cabinet in their collec-
tive capacity have sent to our Ambassador in Moscow and

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date may 6 1972

To Russ as Red 369-
050482. RUS
also of a message which the women of Warsaw have communicated to
the Pope and which has been handed by the Vatican to our
Minister.

4. The only way of bringing material help quickly to
the Poles fighting in Warsaw would be for United States air-
craft to drop supplies using Russian airfields for the purpose.
Seeing how much is in jeopardy we beg that you will again con-
sider the big stakes involved. Could you not authorize your
Air Forces to carry out this operation, landing if necessary
on Russian airfields without their formal consent? In view
of our great successes in the west, I cannot think that the
Russians could reject this fait accompli. They might even
welcome it as getting them out of an awkward situation. We
would of course share full responsibility with you for any
action taken by your air force.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 779, 4 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 0500402 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw

ACTION:

1. See PM 780, PM 781, and Winant's OA2325Z. Also see MR O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file on this subject.

2. To Hyde Park as RED 369, 0500402.

3. BLUE 139, 050215Z, President directed Admiral Leahy "Take up with Joint Staff and Secretary of State for preparation of reply for me to send if possible by noon tomorrow, 5 Sept."

4. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department; to President as RED 374, 051355Z.

5. Approved by President without change in BLUE 140, 051730Z; to PM as PRES #619, 051826Z.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 780 Filed 04/21/1942
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
TOP SECRET. Number 780.

Following is text of telegram sent to Moscow this
evening mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:

"1. The War Cabinet at their meeting today consid-
ered the latest reports of the situation in Warsaw which
show that the Poles fighting against the Germans there are
in desperate straits.

2. The War Cabinet wish the Soviet Government to
know that public opinion in this country is deeply moved by
the events in Warsaw and by the terrible sufferings of the
poles there. Whatever the rights and wrongs about the begin-
ings of the Warsaw rising, the people of Warsaw themselves
cannot be held responsible for the decision taken. Our people
cannot understand why no material help has been sent from outside to the Poles in Warsaw. The fact that such help could not be sent on account of your Government's refusal to allow United States aircraft to land on aerodromes in Russian hands is now becoming publicly known. If on top of all this the Poles in Warsaw should now be overwhelmed by the Germans, as we are told they must be within two or three days, the shock to public opinion here will be incalculable. The War Cabinet themselves find it hard to understand your Government's refusal to take account of the obligations of the British and American Governments to help the Poles in Warsaw. Your Government's action in preventing this help being sent seems to us at variance with the spirit of Allied cooperation to which you and we attach so much importance both for the present and the future."

Prime
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 780, 4 Sept 44.
DATE: 4 Sept 44

TOR MAP ROOM: 0500AOZ VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. See PM 779, PM 781, and Winant's 042325Z. Also see MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file on this subject.
2. To Hyde Park as RED 370, 0500AOZ.
3. BLUE 139, 050215Z, President directed Admiral Leahy "Take up PM #779 with Joint Staff and Secretary of State for preparation of reply for me to send if possible by noon tomorrow, 5 Sept." PM #780 sent to Admiral Leahy with PM #779 for information.
4. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department; to President as RED 374, 051555Z.
5. Approved by President without change in BLUE 140, 051730Z; to PM as PRES #619, 0518262 (Answers PM's 779, 780 & 781).

COPIES TO: [Blank]
DATE: [Blank]
BY DIRECTION OF: [Blank]

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 781
Filed 04/21/52
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 781.

Following is text of message from women of Warsaw referred to in my number 7791-

"Most Holy Father, we Polish women in Warsaw are inspired with sentiments of profound patriotism and devotion for our country. For three weeks while defending our fortress we have lacked food and medicine. Warsaw is in ruins. The Germans are killing the wounded in hospitals. They are making women and children march in front of them in order to protect their tanks. There is no exaggeration in reports of children who are fighting and destroying tanks with bottles of petrol. We mothers see our sons dying for freedom and the fatherland.

Our husbands, our sons and our brothers are not considered by the enemy to be combatants. Holy Father, no one is helping us.
The Russian armies which have been for three weeks at the gates of Warsaw have not advanced a step. The aid coming to us from Great Britian is insufficient. The world is ignorant of our fight. God alone is with us. Holy Father, Vicar of Christ, if you can hear us, bless us Polish women who are fighting for the Church and for freedom."

Prime
ACTION:

1. See PM 779, PM 780, and Winant's 042325. Also see WR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS for complete file on this subject.
2. To Hyde Park as RED 371, 0500042.
3. BLUE 139, 050215, President directed Admiral Leahy "Take up PM #799 with Joint Staff and Secretary of State for preparation of reply for me to send if possible by noon tomorrow, 5 Sept." PM #781 sent to Admiral Leahy with PM #799 for information.
4. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department; to President as RED 374, 051555.
5. Approved by President without change in BLUE 140, 051730; to PM as PBH 619, 051826 (Answers PM's 779, 780 & 781).

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 781, 4 Sept 44.
DATE: 781, 4 Sept 44.
VIA: Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 781, 4 Sept 44.
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VIA: Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 781, 4 Sept 44.
DATE: 781, 4 Sept 44.
VIA: Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.
From: Military Attache London, England
To: President of the United States
No. 782 060730Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and top secret number 782.

We are just off. I cannot make Quebec before evening 11th. It might be convenient for you to put off your arrival till 12th as I should wish to have the pleasure of welcoming you and Eleanor at the Citadel but everything will be in readiness anyhow.

Every good wish.

End
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 782, 6 Sept 44.

DATE: 6 Sept 44.

SUBJECT: OCTAGON Conference.

ACTION:
1. To President via Admiral Leahy.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with several additions; sent to the PM as PRES #620, 6 Sept 44.

COPIES TO: DA'I' 

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

210 PRES-PM Conferences.
7 September 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 783

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 783.

There are a number of Uncle Sam service personnel returning home in this ship for leave, I am told, beginning from their date of embarkation. The sailing of ship was delayed on account of OCTAGON and they may, therefore, lose in some cases as many as seven days leave.

May I indicate through your good offices this will be made up to them? It would be pleasure to me if this could be announced before end of voyage and their anxiety relieved.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM     The Prime Minister  TO     The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.                                      783, 7 Sept 44.
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM:                                             VIA
SUBJECT: Extension of leave for service men held up by delayed departure
of QUEEN MARY.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Hully.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Brown; approved by the President
   in Map Room; to PM as PRES 5621, 7 Sept 44.
3. Copy to General Marshall and Admiral King; for compliance.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

122.1; 210 PRES-PM.
From: U.S. Military Attache, London England
To: The President Of The United States
Nr: 784, 22 September 1944 Filed 222215Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No 784 personal and

About our Italian manifesto, Anthony has made some valid comments which you no doubt have now seen. The argument against publication of long armistice terms at this stage is I feel conclusive. I do not think the omission of words "On basis of exchange of goods" would detract from the value of concessions.

I hear that a very bad impression has been produced in England by the Rome lynching. It might therefore be wise to delay a week or so before making the announcement. This will also give time for a review of French situation which I am anxious to go into on my return and about which I will presently cable you.

Thank you so much for our delightful visit to your home. Every good wish. May we soon meet again.

[Signature]

Red 230015 2. 7R4 - O No. Sig.
About our Italian Manifesto. Anthony has made some valid comments which you no doubt have now seen. The argument against publication of long armistice terms at this stage is I feel conclusive. I do not think the omission of words "On basis of exchange of goods" would detract from the value of concessions.

I hear that a very bad impression has been produced in England by the Rome lynching. It might therefore be wise to delay a week or so before making the announcement. This will also give time for a review of French situation which I am anxious to go into on my return and about which I will presently cable you. Thank you so much for our delightful visit to your home. Every good wish. May we soon meet again.

Eden to Halifax
"I have seen & cordially endorse the Prime Minister's statement to the President."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., S-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

DATE: 784, 22 Sept 44.

TOP MAP ROOM: 2300152 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Italian Manifesto; French situation.

ACTION: (Complete file of correspondence, see "MR OIL ITALY")

1. To President via usher.
2. To Admiral Leahy for action; reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President without change 23 Sept 44; sent to the Prime Minister as PRES #622, 23 Sept 44.
3. Answered by PM #785, 25 Sept 44.

OIL ITALY; OIL FRANCE; 210 Yalta Conference.
For: The President of the United States
Number: 785     Filed 2516492
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 785.

You will wish to read the following telegram I have
received from Smuts. Begins:

"I feel deeply perturbed over deadlock with Russia in
world organisation talks. This crisis, in any case, comes at
most unfortunate moment before final end of war. I fear we are
being rushed at breakneck pace into momentous decisions, and not
in this case only. International aviation, tele-communications,
etc., all tell the same tale. Here, however, the consequences
may be particularly disastrous, I may therefore be pardoned for
sending a warning note about this impasse.

"At first, I thought the Russian attitude absurd and
their contention one not to be conceded by other great powers,
and unlikely to be turned down by smaller powers also. But
second thoughts have tended the other way. I assume that Russian
attitude is sincerely stated by Molotov and correctly interpreted
by Clark-Kerr and Cadogan as one involving honour and standing of

TOP SECRET

25 September 1944
Russia among her allies. She asks whether she is trusted and treated as an equal or is still the outlaw and pariah. A misunderstanding here is more than a mere difference. It touches Russian amour propre and produces an inferiority complex and may poison European relations with far-reaching results. Russia, conscious of her power, may become more grasping than ever. Her making no attempt to find a solution shows her reaction and sense of power. What will be her future relations with Germany and Japan, even France, not to mention lesser countries? If a world organization is formed with Russia out of it, she will become the power centre of another group and we shall be heading for World War III. If no such organization is formed by the United Nations, they will stand stultified before history. The dilemma is a very grave one, and the position into which we may be drifting should be avoided at all costs.

"In view of these dangers, the smaller powers should be prepared to make a concession to Russia's amour propre and should not on this matter insist on theoretical equality of status. Such insistence may have most devastating results for smaller powers themselves. Where questions of power and security are concerned, it would be most unwise to raise theoretical issues of sovereign equality, and United Kingdom and United States of America should
use their influence in favour of common sense and safety first rather than status for the smaller countries.

"On the merits there is much to be said for unanimity among the great powers, at least for the years immediately following on this war. If in practice the principle proves unworkable, the situation could be reviewed later when mutual confidence has been established and a more workable basis laid down. At the present stage, a clash should be avoided at all costs. If unanimity for the powers is adopted, even including their voting on questions directly concerning their interests, the result would be that the United Kingdom and the United States of America will have to exert all their influence on Russia to be moderate and sensible and not to flout world opinion. And in this they are likely to be largely successful. If Russia proves impossible, the world organisation may have to act; but the blame will be here. At worst the principle of unanimity will only have the effect of a veto, if preventing action where it may be wise or even necessary. It will be negative and slow down action. But it will also make it impossible for Russia to embark on crises disapproved of by United Kingdom and United States of America.

"Where people are drunk with new-won power, it may not be so bad a thing to have a brakes-like unanimity. I do not defend it, I dislike it, but I do not think it at present so bad that the
future of world peace and security should be sacrificed on this issue.

"The talks have so far been on an official advisory level although, no doubt, there may have been intervention on a higher level. I think, before definite decisions are reached on the highest level, the whole situation should be most carefully reconsidered in all its far-reaching implications and some modus vivendi, even if only of a temporary character, should be explored among the great powers, which would prevent a catastrophe of the first magnitude. We simply must agree and cannot afford to differ where so much is at stake for the future."

End
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.  785, 25 September 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:  Russia's role in World Peace Organization—msg from Smuts.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-440, 251918.
2. WR-IN-161 (2523102) from President to Map Room states, "Yr 440... Refer to Admiral Leahy and ask him to take up with me upon my return to Washington Wednesday morning, 27 Sept 44."
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with addition, 28 Sept 44; sent to the PM as PRESS #524, 28 Sept 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

210 WORLD PEACE ORGANIZATION; 100 SMUTS, FIELD MARSHAL
To: War Department
Number: 786

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and.
Number 786. Your number 622.

I have not been able to signal you before as we were among
U-Boats (German) and condemned to wireless silence. I shall be
making my statement to the House on Thursday, September 28th and
should like to refer to our Italian statement. Could we not syn-
chronize publication on that date? This would enable me to add some
words of condemnation of lynching in Rome which would, I think,
reconcile public opinion and put that episode in its proper propor-
tion, which is not large. If, however, the earlier date is important
to you, I will, of course, meet your wishes. I do not know at the
moment of signalling what has actually been settled.

2. We all saw Wilson's film with great interest and pleasure.
It made a strong impression upon American officers and troops, but some
comments were made about it being effective Democratic Party propaganda.
My feeling is that it can do nothing but good to common cause. Kindest
regards to all.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 786, 25 Sept 44.

DATE:

FOR MAP ROOM VIA:

SUBJECT:

Italian Manifesto; Wilson film

ACTION: (For complete file of correspondence, see "MR OIl ITALY")

1. Answers PRES #622, 23 Sept 44.
2. Sent to President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-443.
3. MR-OUT-444, 2522372, Mr. Blake sent to the President the following message, "At suggestion of Adm. Leahy and for your information, Wright of the British Embassy telephoned me relating that he had wire from Eden giving War Cabinet OK to Italian statement and suggesting release be made for Wednesday morning papers, Sept 27."
4. MR-IN-161, 25/23102 Sept, from President to Map Room, said, "Yr...443 and 444. Refer to Admiral Leahy and ask him to take up with me upon my return to Washington Wednesday morning, 27 Sept." Admiral Leahy advised 2523252. (Note: Statement was to be given to papers on evening of 26th Sept.)
5. PM-PRES #787; (MR-OUT-445 25/23082) stated, "I am now safely back. Please cancel Para 1 of my telegram #786 as I now feel that publication should be on the 27th as originally planned."
6. Statement was released to papers on evening of 26th for publication in morning papers, (Decision reached by telephone; no account of telephone conversations, or participating parties, in Map Room.)

COPIES TO:       DATE:       BY DIRECTION OF:

OIl ITALY; 000.81
To: President Of The United States.
Mr: 787

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 787 personal and ______. Most immediate.

I am now safely back. Please cancel paragraph one of my telegram number 786 as I now feel that publication should be on the 27th as originally planned.

All best wishes.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 787, 25 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 2523582 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Italian Manifesto

ACTION: (Complete file of correspondence, see "MR OIL ITALY.")

1. Further to PM #786, 25 Sept 44. Sent to HP as MR-OUT-445.
2. See "Status Report" for PM #786 for complete action on this message.

OIL ITALY, 21st Jan 1944 Conference
27 September 1944

For: The President of the United States.
Number: 788 Filed 2710572

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 788.

I find on arrival here a very strong feeling that we ought to go a bit further than we have done towards recognizing the French Provisional Government. Our Italian announcement has gone well but of course people ask "What about the French?". I hope you will not mind my saying tomorrow that we are carefully studying the question from week to week in the light of changing events. I shall not of course commit you in any way.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-82-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
28 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Further Recognition of Provisional French Government.

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the attached exchange of correspondence between the President and the Prime Minister is forwarded for the information of the Secretary of State.

HENRY M. PUTMAN,
Captain, A.G.

2 Incls.
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
NO: 788, 27 SEPTEMBER 1944

On my arrival here I find a very strong feeling that we should go somewhat further than we have towards recognition of the Provisional Government of France.

The announcement we made on Italy has gone well but naturally it makes people ask "What about France?" I trust you will not mind if I say in my talk tomorrow, without of course committing you in any way, that the question is being studied carefully by us from week to week in the light of changing events.

PRIME
FROM

The Prime Minister

TO

The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.

788, 27 September 1944

DATE

2713552

VIA

Army Code Room

SUBJECT:

Further recognition of French Provisional Government.

ACTION:

1. To President with morning news.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President 28 Sept 44; sent to PM as PRES #623, 28 Sept 1944.

COPIES TO:

State Department

DATE:

28 Sept 44

BY DIRECTION OF:

Admiral Leahy

01 FRANCE ; 01 ITALY
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 789 Filed 29/17262
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential. Number 789.

1. Your number 624. I am repeating this to Field Marshal Smuts who will be much gratified.

2. U.J. was most expansive and friendly in a conversation with Averell and Clark Kerr the other night. He however "grumbled about his own health." He said he was never well except at Moscow and his doctors did not like him flying. Even his visits to the front did him harm and it took him a fortnight to get over Teheran, etc.

3. In these circumstances Anthony and I are seriously considering flying there very soon. The route is shorter now. We have not yet heard from U.J. in reply to our suggestion. Our two great objects

REGRAD ED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
To President via Miss Kelly
would be, first, to clinch his coming in against Japan and, secondly, to try to effect a friendly settlement with Poland. There are other points too about Greece and Yugoslavia which we would also discuss. We should keep you informed of every point. We would of course welcome Averell's assistance, or perhaps you could send Stettinius or Marshall. I feel sure that personal contact is most necessary.

4. Your number 623. You may be sure that we shall not take any action with the French except after full consultation with you. I hope nothing I said yesterday embarrassed you. I see you use the expression "French Provisional Government" in your 623. It seems to me there would not be much harm in this phrase coming into use without any formal instrument being agreed between the Governments. After all they are the French Provisional Government and it is fully admitted even in the Boniface series that they represent all France.

5. It seems to me pretty clear that Germany is not going to be conquered this year. Omar Bradley in
a telegram I have seen is already talking about an operation across the Rhine in the Middle of November and I see many other signs of the German resistance stiffening.

6. Off the record - I have read your speech with much gusto and was delighted to see you in such vigorous form.

Every good wish.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 789, 29 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Meeting with Stalin; Recognition of French; German campaign.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. To Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved without change by President; sent to PM as PRES #625, 30 Sept 44.

COPiES TO:

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Extract: "MR 310 JAPAN"

Extract: "MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"

210 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION: 210 PRESRM MEETINGS: 310 JAPAN:
300 GERMANY; 000.1; 011 FRANCE; 057 BULGARIA; 057 YUGOSLAVIA.
To: The President of the United States.
Mr: 790

Prime Minister to President. Personal and
Number 790.

1. Anthony and I start Saturday and hope
in two or three days to reach U.S. We should like
you to send a message to him saying that you
approve of our mission and that Averell will be
available to take part in discussions.

2. Will you tell Averell or General Deane
what can be said about your far eastern plans and
let us know what you have told them, so that we
all keep within the limits prescribed. We want
to elicit the time it will take after the German
downfall for a superior Russian army to be gath-
ered opposite the Japanese on the frontiers of
Manchukuo and to hear from them the problems of
this campaign, which are peculiar owing to the
lines of communication being vulnerable in the later stages.

3. Of course the bulk of our business will be about the Poles, but you and I think so much alike about this that I do not need any special guidance as to your views.

4. The point of Dumbarton Oaks will certainly come up and I must tell you that we are pretty clear that the only hope is that the three great powers are agreed. It is with regret that I have come to this conclusion contrary to my first thought. Please let me know if you have any wishes about this matter, and also instruct Averell accordingly.

Prime
ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President. Mr. Hopkins, after phoning President, directed message not be sent; draft prepared by Mr. Hopkins; approved by the President; sent to PM as PRES #626, 4 October 1944.
3. See also message sent to Stalin (PRES-HARRIMAN/STALIN #76, 4 Oct 44) as requested by PM.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:
Extract: "MR 310 JAPAN (1)"

Extract: "MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE."

210 (2); 310 JAPAN; 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATION; 210 SECURITY COUNCIL.
For: The President of the United States  
Number 791  
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and  
Number 791. Your number 626.

1. Thank you very much for what you say and for your good wishes. I am very glad that Averell should sit in at all principal conferences; but you would not, I am sure, wish this to preclude private tete-a-tetes between me and U. J. or Anthony and Molotov, as it is often under such conditions that the best progress is made. You can rely on me to keep you constantly informed of everything that affects our joint interests apart from the reports which Averell will send.

2. I gather from your last sentence but one that you have sent some general account of your Pacific plans to your people in Moscow which will be imparted to U. J. and which I shall see on arrival. This will be most convenient.

3. Should U. J. raise the question of voting as he very likely will do, I will tell him that there is no hurry about this.
and that I am sure we can get it settled when we are all three together.

End
FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 791

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 051945Z VIA Army Courier

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's forthcoming talks with Stalin

ACTION:

1. To the President via Miss Tully.
2. Replies to President's #626 of 4 Oct 44.
3. No further action taken by the President.

COPIES TO:

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

"Winston Churchill Stalin Conference."

Estimated: 'At 310 Japa.'

210 (2); 310 Japa; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.
6 October 1944


For: The President of the United States

Number 792 Filed 061056Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 792.

I attach our suggestion for the September U-Boat report.

Canada is being informed at the same time.

Begins:

During September there has been a lull in U-Boat activity, which is possibly seasonal. This year, as last, the enemy may hope to renew his offensive in the autumn and may rely on new types of U-Boats to counter our present ascendancy. Shipping losses have been almost as low as in May 1944, the best month of the war. The rate of destruction of U-Boats in proportion to shipping losses remains satisfactory.

The U-Boat war, however, demands unceasing attention. Only the zeal and vigour of the Allied air and surface forces have procured the comparative safety of our shipping and the enemy's scant success.

End REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0149
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL or FILE NO. 732
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 061200Z VIA Army Courier
SUBJECT: U-boat statement

ACTION:
1. To the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-450, 061224Z.
2. Forwarded to OWI and OOR, Navy Dept. for comment. Departments had no comments and approved statement as written.
3. Reply to Prime Minister as No. 627, 7 October 1944.
4. Released to Press for publication 10 October 1944.

000.7 (3)

0150
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States

Number 793               Filed 1023302

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and number 793.

We reached Moscow from London in 36 hours, 23 hours spent in flight and on the whole I feel better for the voyage.

Para 2. On the way we had four hours at Naples with Generals Wilson and Alexander. I was much distressed by their tale. The fighting has been very hard. Our losses since the battle opened are about 30,000 of which at least four fifths have been British or British controlled. The enemy are estimated to have lost 42,000 including 10,000 prisoners in our hands. Our men are tired and there are no fresh divisions to put in. It seems so much was taken away from our Italian front against Germany as just to deny a complete victory in this theatre. Alexander and also Clark tried their best with what was left to them but as I told you I could not guarantee results. Thus Kesselring may bring us to a standstill in the Appenines until they are wrapped in snow. He could then withdraw five or six divisions to resist Eisenhower on the Rhine. The German fighting here has been of the utmost tenacity and the troops he could withdraw would be high class.
Para 3. Pressure in Dutch salient seems to me to be growing very severe and our advances are slow and costly. In these circumstances we have with much sorrow had to recommend that we should put (canceling Operation to Capture Rome) off DRACULA from March to November and leave British 3rd Division in France as well as sending the 52nd Division, one of our best, about 22,000 strong in fighting troops and the 6th Airborne Division to the Netherlands. Eisenhower is counting on these for the impending operation on the Rhine and of course this was much the quickest way to bring additional troops into France.

Para 4. Could you not deflect 2 or better still 3 American divisions to Italian ports which would enable them to join Mark Clark's Fifth Army and add the necessary strength to Alexander? They would have to be there in 4 or 5 weeks. I consider the fact that we shall be sending Eisenhower these extra 2 divisions gives me a case for your generous consideration.

Para 5. With regard to Istria, Trieste, etc, General Wilson is forwarding his plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan will be in accordance with our all strategic objective, namely the expulsion from or destruction in Italy of Kesselring's army.

Para 6. I was overjoyed to hear that General Marshall was in France at Eisenhower's Headquarters. To save time I have ventured to send a copy of the relevant portion of this telegram to him through Eisenhower. I hope you will send him to Italy so that the situation
can at least be fairly talked over between high commanders involved.

Para 7. I hope and trust all is going well with you.

End
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Reference: Memo 801.

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 11 October 1944, is forwarded for the preparation of a draft reply.

/s/ William D. Leahy

No. 793 from Prime to President attached.
October 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Reference: Medcom 201.

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 11 October 1944, is forwarded for the preparation of a draft reply.

/s/ William D. Leahy

(No. 793 from Prime to President attached)
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER             TO THE PRESIDENT  
SERIAL or FILE NO.                   793  
DATE                                  
TOR MAP ROOM 110415Z VIA Army Courier 
SUBJECT: Situation of the Battle in Italy 

ACTION:                                
1. Delivered to the President by Captain Putnam as President was passing through hall returning from Hyde Park. 
2. President directed Admiral Leahy send to Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of draft reply. 
3. Draft reply presented to President 10/16/44. Approved by President without change. 
4. Sent to the Prime Minister as #629, 10/16/44. 

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF: 
300 ITALY; 210 (2)
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 794

11 October 1944

To President Roosevelt from Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill personal and number 794 10th Oct 44.

In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our agreement, social and otherwise. We have invited Messrs. Koliakoyz, Romer and Orabki to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish National Committee. We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two foreign secretaries together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make.
Para 2. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on prowess of United States Forces and upon the conduct of the war in the west by General Eisenhower.

Signed Churchill and Stalin

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER & STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 794

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 1104 152 VIA Army Courier

SUBJECT: Progress of Churchill-Stalin conference.

ACTION:

1. Delivered to the President by Captain Putnam as the
President was passing through hall returning from Hyde
Park.

2. President directed Admiral Leahy to prepare draft reply
for his approval. Miss Ringquist, Admiral Leahy's Office
made three copies of message in their office. Admiral
Leahy desired copies in order to prepare draft reply as
directed by the President.

3. Reply to Prime Minister and Stalin as #629, 11 October 44.

COPIES TO: DATE:

"210 Churchill-Stalin Conference" BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2); 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

052 Balkans
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number 795

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
Private and Confidential. Number 795.

We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made for Averell are I think satisfactory to him and do not preclude necessary intimate contacts which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report.

It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and

[Handwritten note: Preparation highly careless. Political aspects of this matter are not considered.]
Russia, subject to further discussion and melting-down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.

I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this because otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks except to say it is barred, at your desire. However Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you to do.
MEMORANDUM FOR

MAP ROOM:

A paraphrase-brief of message No. 785, Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, dated October 11, 1944, was sent by Admiral Leahy to the Secretary of State for preparation of a draft reply covering the political aspects of this message.

[W. Smith]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 795, 11 Oct 44.

DATE 112412 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Churchill-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.
2. To Admiral Leahy for action; paraphrase brief sent to Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy for "preparation of a draft reply covering the political aspects of this message."
3. Acknowledged in PRES-PM #632, 22 Oct 44; no draft reply received from the State Department covering political aspects; removed from STATUS REPORT on 23 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2); 051 Balkans; 310 JAPAN; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.
October 13 1944

For: The President of the United States

Nbr: 796
Filed 131625Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
number 796.
Your number 628.

I have given instructions to Food Minister that
no long-term contract is to be negotiated and that
we are to proceed on a month to month basis next
couple of months or so during which time we can
discuss matters further.

We are worried for fear that French, Belgian
and presently the Dutch will come into the market
with plenty of gold. Nevertheless we shall make no
arrangement at present time but later on I must
address you again on the subject.

End

Rec'd 13/7/40 2
To: Browne

Top Secret

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0164
13 October 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NUMBER 796.

Your 628.

We will not negotiate a long term contract but will instead go along on a month to month bases for the next couple of months or so. We can discuss matters further during this time, I have given the necessary instructions to the Food Minister.

The possibility that the French, Belgians and soon the Dutch will come into the market is giving us some worry. However we shall make no arrangement now, but I must bring up the subject again at a later time.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-59-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

P.s. has both copies of original.
This paragraph deleted to State, 1322063. 76
13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State

At the direction of the President, there is enclosed herewith a paraphrased copy of a message to the President from the Prime Minister dated 13 October. The President's message, No. 628, referred to by the Prime Minister was transmitted 10 October.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR

Enc. (SH)
1. Msg. Prime Minister to President, #796, 13 Oct 44.
15 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State:

With reference to your letter of October 14, 1944, requesting Cable #798 from the Prime Minister to the President, I am advised that the paraphrase of this message was delivered by the Map Room to Secretary Hull's office on October 13. In this connection, I am enclosing a close paraphrase of a message on the same subject received last night.

/5/ William D. Leahy
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER, NUMBER 797
TO: THE PRESIDENT

In order to eliminate any possible ambiguity
please amend the first paragraph of my 796 so it will
read as follows:

"I have given instructions to the food minister that
no long term contract is to be negotiated for the next couple
of months or so and that we are to proceed meanwhile on a
month to month basis during which time we can discuss the matter
further."

14 October 1944

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

DATE: 796, 13 Oct 44.  

SUBJECT: Meat contract with Argentina  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PRES-PW #628, 10 Oct 44.  
2. To President via Miss Fally.  
3. Paraphrased copy to Sec State for information.  
4. Acknowledged in PRES-PW, #632, 22 Oct 44; not answered.  
5. See PW-PRES #997, 14 Oct 44, which amends PW-PRES #796.  

COPIES TO:  
Sec State  

DATE: 13 Oct 44.  

BY DIRECTION OF:  
The President  

052 ARGENTINA; 603
To: The President of the United States
Number 797    Filed 1A22352

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and number 797.

Reference my number 796 about Argentine meat contract. In order to make my meaning clear perhaps you will kindly amend the first sentence of this telegram to read as follows:

"I have given instructions to the food minister that no long term contract is to be negotiated for the next couple of months or so and that we are to proceed meanwhile on a month to month basis during which time we can discuss the matter further".

End
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN

Will you see that the State Department gets this?

F. D. R.

[Addendum sent to State Department on October 22, 1944]

Hope from War... If this has not already been sent to State, please forward.

The President desires that the above paragraph...
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.  797, 14 Oct 44.

DATE  15Oct44.

FCC MPR BUM  1501472  VIA  Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Meat contract with Argentina

ACTION:
1. This message is correction to PM-PRES #796, 13 Oct 44.
2. Copy of SecState by memorandum signed "William D. Leahy." Copy of memo filed with PM-PRES #796.
3. Acknowledged in PRES-PW, #632, 22 Oct 44.

COPIES TO:
SecState  DATE:

15 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral Leahy

052 Argentina; 603
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 798  Filed 14/2235Z

Number 798 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
confidential

I have been reflecting about the question of recognition of
the French Provisional Government. I think events have now moved to
a point where we could take a decision on the matter consistently
with your own policy and my latest statement in the House of Commons.

In your telegram number 623 you said that you thought that we
should wait until France was cleared of the enemy and you implied that
in any case De Gaulle must first show himself ready to take over from
Eisenhower full responsibility for the administration of part of
France as an interior zone. I for my part took the line in Parlia-
ment that the reorganization of the consultative assembly on a more
representative basis ought to precede recognition.

I understand that Eisenhower is anxious to comply with the re-
quest he has already had from the French to constitute a large part
of France into an interior zone. Negotiations between Supreme Head-
quarters and the French are making good progress and it appears that
we may expect about three quarters of France to become an interior zone
very shortly.

The enlargement of the consultative assembly is also making good progress. Duff Cooper reports that owing to very real difficulties of communications in France, French have found it impracticable to proceed with the original Algiers plan of getting members of an enlarged assembly confirmed in their mandates by elections in liberated departments. They propose instead to add selected delegates from the resistance movement and parliamentary groups I understand it is hoped to settle matter shortly and publish a new decree defining attributions of the reformed assembly and giving it increased powers over the executive. It is thought that the enlarged assembly should be able to meet at the end of this month.

There is no doubt that the French have been cooperating with Supreme Headquarters and that their Provisional Government has the support of the majority of French people. I suggest therefore that we can now safely recognize General De Gaulle's administration as the Provisional Government of France.

One procedure might be to tell the French now that we will recognize as soon as the enlarged assembly has met and has given De Gaulle's administration a vote of confidence.

An alternative procedure would be to recognize as soon as the interior zone has been formally established. I am inclined to think
that this alternative is preferable as it would connect recogni-
tion with what will be a mark of satisfactory cooperation between
the French authorities and A.E.F. in the common cause against Ger-
many.

Please tell me what you think. If you agree that we should
settle the matter by one or other of the procedures suggested above,
the Foreign Office and State Dept might at once compare their ideas
upon the actual terms in which we should give recognition. It is im-
portant that we should take the same line although we need not neces-
sarily adopt exactly the same wording. We should have of course also
to inform the Soviet Government of what we intend.

Recognition would not of course commit us on the separate ques-
tion of French membership of the European Advisory Commission or simi-
lar bodies.

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972.
FROM: The Prime Minister 
TO: The President 

798, 14 Oct 44. 

SUBJECT: Recognition of French Committee.

1. To President via usher. 
2. By direction of the President, a paraphrased copy sent to State Department for preparation of reply, 16 Oct 44. 
3. Draft reply, approving recognition of French Committee, to President dated 16 Oct 44. This, however, was forwarded to the President by memo from Mr. Hopkins, 18 Oct 44, who also attached his draft reply disapproving recognition of Committee. 
4. The President forwarded Mr. Hopkins' draft message to State with memo, "...I think it would be mistake to go ahead at this moment with recognition of Prov Govt of France...What do you think of this draft?" 
5. SecState replied in memo, 19 Oct 44, suggesting change of one paragraph of the message. Change approved by President. Message as drafted by Mr. Hopkins and changed by SecState sent to PM as PRES-PM, #631, 19 Oct 44.
18 October 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 799

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

I send you in my immediately following text of document to
which Nikolajczyk's delegation agreed together with two amendments
on which Stalin insisted. Nikolajczyk said that if he accepted the
first of these amendments he would be repudiated by his own people.
Stalin's position is that in this case it is not worthwhile proceeding
to the difficult discussions arising out of the second
amendment. These could probably have been surmounted had the first
been accepted.

2. Both the London and the Lublin Poles will now return
home to consult their colleagues on outstanding points and our
communique from here will explain that progress has been made and
differences narrowed. Meanwhile, only the London Poles and Russians
know of this document and every endeavour will be made to prevent it
leaking out, though London Poles will have to consult some of their
people.

TOP SECRET

0177
3. You will see I have not gone at all beyond the position adopted by His Majesty's Government in your presence at Tehran, though possibly the regions to be ceded by Germany have been more precisely stated. I have made it clear throughout that you are not committed in any way by what I have said and done. It only amounts to a promise on the part of His Majesty's Government to support the Curzon Line and its compensations at the armistice or peace conference, which alone can give a final and legal validity to all territorial changes. I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east, and our twenty year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasized his earnest desire for your return at
the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

5. Meanwhile, in other directions, considerable advantages have been gained. You have already been informed about the obvious resolve of the Soviet Government to attack Japan on the overthrow of Hitler, of their detailed study of the problem and of their readiness to begin inter-allied preparations on a large scale. When we are vexed with other matters, we must remember the supreme value of this in shortening the whole struggle.

6. Arrangements made about the Balkans are, I am sure, the best that are possible. Coupled with our successful military action recently we should now be able to save Greece and, I have no doubt that agreement to pursue a fifty-fifty joint policy in Yugoslavia will be the best solution for our difficulties in view of Tito's behaviour and changes in the local situation, resulting from the arrival of Russian and Bulgarian forces under Russian command to help Tito's eastern flank. The Russians are insistent on their ascendency in Romania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea countries.

7. Although I hear most encouraging accounts from various quarters about United States politics, I feel the suspense probably far more than you do or more than I should if my own affairs were concerned in this zone. My kindest regards and warmest good wishes.
The Prime Minister

TO The President

DATE 18/15112, 18 Oct 44.

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Conference between Churchill and Stalin; Poles, Russia's part in war against Japan; Balkans.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.

2. Answered by PRES-PM, #632, 22 Oct 44, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-632; approved with minor changes by President in MR-IN-173.

COPIES TO:

Extract: "MR-310 JAPAN"

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 310 JAPAN; 051 BALKANS; 000.1; 210 (2)
18 October 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 800

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and
Number 800.

This is text referred to in Paragraph One of my immediately
preceding telegram. Text begins:

"British and Soviet Governments, upon conclusions of dis-
cussions at Moscow in October 1944 between themselves and with Polish
Government, have reached the following agreement.

"2. Upon unconditional surrender of Germany, territory of
Poland in west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of
East Prussia, West and South Konigsberg, the administrative district
of Oppeln in Silesia and lands desired by Poland to east of line of
the Oder. It is further agreed that possession of these territories
shall be guaranteed to Poland by Soviet and British Governments. It
is understood that Germans in said regions shall be repatriated to
Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repat-
riated to Poland.

"3. In consideration of foregoing agreement, the Polish
Government accept Curzon Line as basis for frontier between Poland
and USSR."
"4. Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and repatriation of population of both countries and release of persons detained. It is agreed that necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

"5. It is agreed that a Polish Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Nikolajzyk will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian arms.

"6. The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting establishment within the territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with Polish Government, which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

"7. The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally." End of text.

Herewith amendments to text:

Paragraph Five should read as follows:

It is agreed that Polish Government of National Unity in accordance with agreement (or understanding) reached between the
Polish Government in London and Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian armies. (Amendment to Para Five ends).

(Further amendment). Note reference to second amendment Stalin said he agreed that M. Mikolajczyk should be Prime Minister. End of amendment.

End

[Signature]

TOP SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. S-29-73
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

FILE No. or FILM No.  
800, 18 Oct 44.  

TO WHOM: 18/15122  
VIA: Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Agreement between British and Soviet Governments on Poland.  

ACTION:  
1. Further to PM-PRES #799, 18 Oct 44.  
2. To President via ushers.  
3. Answered by Pres-FM, #532, 22 Oct 44, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-632; approved with minor changes by President in WH-IN-173.  

COPIES TO:  
[Blank]  

DATE:  
[Blank]  

BY DIRECTION OF:  
[Blank]  

[Blank]  

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.  

0184
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 801 Filed 221014Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Number 801.

Many thanks for your number 631.

Para 1. On our last day at Moscow Mik saw Berut who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his men had been shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. Approaching winter conditions behind the front could be very hard as the Russian army moved forward using all transport. He insisted however that if Mik were premier he must have 75% of the cabinet. Mik proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he naming four out of the five of their best men whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

Para 2. Later at my request Stalin saw Mik and had one and one-quarter hours very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him and Mik promised to form and conduct a government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

Para 3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mik had 50/50 plus himself the western world would not be
convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with 50/50 but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mik had previously explained to me that there might be an announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin government and a different arrangement among the Poles behind the scenes.

Para 4. Apart from the above Mik is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon line including Lwow for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed.

Para 5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in International law but he replied if there were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. In face of this view from this quarter I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department.
Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn.

Para 6. We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland Czechoslovakia and Hungary to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of south-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.

Para 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.

Para 8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a triple meeting towards the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

Para 9. U. J. also raised formally the Montreux Convention,
wishing for modification for the free passage of Russian warships.

We did not contest this in principle. Revision is clearly necessary

as Japan is a signatory and Inoue missed his market last December.

We left it that detailed proposals should be made from the Russian side.

He said they would be moderate.

Para 10. About recognizing the present French administration

as the provisional government of France, I will consult the cabinet

on my return. Opinion of UK is very strongly for immediate recognition.

De Gaulle is no longer sole master, but is better harnessed than ever

before. I am sure he will make all the mischief he can, but I still

think that when Eisenhower proclaims a large zone of the interior for

France it would not be possible to delay this limited form of recogni-

tion. Undoubtedly De Gaulle has the majority of the French nation

behind him and the French government hold support against potential

anarchy in large areas. I will however cable you again from London. I

am now in the air above Alamein of blessed memory. Kindest regards.

End
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 801, 22 Oct 44.

DATE 801, 22 Oct 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 2214372 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Further report on Moscow conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-FM #631, 19 Oct 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-486 (2215152).
3. WH-OUT-486, 221645 Oct 44, "General Leahy transmitted to President suggested reply.
4. WH-IN-173, 22 Oct 44 (2219092), President stated, "WH-OUT-486 approved with following modifications...."
5. To FM as PRES-FM #632, 22 Oct 44, which also acknowledged FM-PRES's #795, #796, #797, and #800.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

"210 Churchill-Stalin Conference"

O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 (2); 000.5; 371; O52; O11 FRANCE.
To: The President of the United States

Number 802  Filed 221125Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Number 802.

We agreed at Quebec that MacMillan should be appointed acting
president of the Allied Control Commission in Italy. In order to put
this decision into effect I suggest the following announcement should
be issued simultaneously in Washington and London by our two Govern-
ments. "As already announced the President of the United States and
Prime Minister of Great Britain recently reviewed the situation in Italy
and agreed on a general policy to meet the many economic and other
difficulties of that country. In order to facilitate the task they
have agreed that the Right Honourable Harold MacMillan, M. P., British
Resident Minister at AFHQ, Mediterranee, should, in addition to his
present post, become responsible head of the Allied Commission. In
order to effect this, General Wilson will delegate to Mr. MacMillan
his functions as president of the Commission. Captain Stone of the
United States Navy at present acting chief commissioner, will be ap-
pointed chief commissioner. Mr. MacMillan as acting president will be

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specially charged with duty of supervising development of new measures
together with any change in structure of commission necessary to carry
them out."

Para 2. Please let me know if you approve.

End
22 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the attached message from Prime Minister Churchill to the President is forwarded to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply to be transmitted through the Map Room to the President.

RICHARD PAIX, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
PM-PRES, #802,
22 October 44.
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
NO: 802, 22 OCTOBER 1944

1. At Quebec you and I agreed to appoint MacMillan as acting President of the Allied Control Commission in Italy. I suggest that the US and UK Governments issue simultaneously in London and Washington the following announcement so that this decision can be put into effect:

"As already announced the President of the United States and Prime Minister of Great Britain recently reviewed the situation in Italy and agreed on a general policy to meet the many economic and other difficulties of that country. In order to facilitate the task they have agreed that the Right Honourable Harold MacMillan, M.P., British Resident Minister at AFRQ, Mediterranean, should, in addition to his present post, become responsible head of the Allied Commission. In order to effect this, General Wilson will delegate to Mr. MacMillan his functions as President of the Commission. Captain Stone of the United States Navy, at present acting chief commissioner, will be appointed chief commissioner. Mr. MacMillan, as acting President, will be specially charged with duty of supervising development of new measures together with any change in structure of commission necessary to carry them out."

2. Kindly advise me if this meets with your concurrence.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 802, 22 Oct 44.

TOP MAP ROOM 2214372 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Announcement of MacMillan's appointment as President, Allied Control Commission in Italy.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as 4R-OUT-484, 22 Oct 44 (2215152).
2. By direction of Admiral Leahy, forwarded to SecState for preparation of reply.
3. Subsequent to Admiral Leahy's sending 802 to State, message received from President stating, "Please refer to 4R-OUT-484 today. I think it is all right. Please prepare reply." (4R-IN-171, 2216242)
4. By memo, 23 Oct 44, SecState submitted draft reply approving announcement of appointment. This was changed slightly by the President and Admiral Leahy; sent to the FM as PRES-PM #636, 24 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: SecState DATE: 22 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF: Admiral Leahy

OIL ITALY.
23 October 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 803	Filed 22/18152

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 803.

In view of your number 631 in reply to my number 798 I was naturally surprised at the very sharp turn taken by the State Department and on arrival here I find the announcement is to be made tomorrow. We shall, of course, take similar and simultaneous action. I think it likely that the Russians will be offended. Molotov in conversation said that he expected they would be made to appear the ones who were obstructing, whereas they would have recognized long ago but had deferred to American and British wishes. I hope therefore it has been possible to bring them in.

End

Note: Delay due to correction made by originator.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
22 October 1944

To: President of the United States
Nr: Svc 86 Filed 2219452

From originator comes following: "Telegram number 803 from Prime Minister to President Roosevelt should not be shown to the President. Revised text will follow."

Please adhere.

End
22d October 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 803

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
File: 22/1815Z

In view of your number 631 in reply to my number 798 I
was naturally surprised at the very sharp turn taken by the State
Department and on arrival here I find the announcement is to be
made tomorrow. We shall of course take similar and simultaneous
action. I am sure the Russians will be very much offended.

Molotov in conversation said that he expected they would be made
to appear the ones who were obstructing whereas they would have
recognized long ago but had deferred to American and British
wishes. I hope therefore it has been possible to bring them in.

Prime

[Signature]

[Redacted]
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

DATE: 803, 23 Oct 44.

Fork Map Room: 231955Z

VI: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: "Recognition of Provisional Government of France."

ACTION:

1. Original message 803 received in Map Room at 221955Z. This message was being transmitted to the President at Hyde Park when a phone call was received from Army Code Room informing that a message from MilAttache, London, requested it be held and not shown to the President until corrected text was received. Message to Hyde Park was cancelled.

2. A corrected text of #803 was received in the Map Room at 230317Z. One sentence only was changed. Hyde Park notified of change in message.

3. This message caused considerable confusion in the Map Room. No previous information had been received in the Map Room that the US and UK would make announcement recognizing the Provisional French Govt at 1200 noon, 23 Oct 44. Mr. Hopkins phoned James Dunn in State Dept. at 231503Z. Informed that Mr. Stettinius had met with President in New York on Saturday evening, 21 Oct 44, and that President had given his approval to recognition of Provisional Govt. The text of announcement, together with release time, had been sent to State to London and Moscow. (Mr. Dunn said 231500Z that statement had been in Moscow for 36 hours.)

4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown in Map Room. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as AR-OUT-495 (231547). President’s approval received as AR-IN-176 (231655Z). Reply sent to PM as PRESS #632, 231715Z.

5. Also see PM #804 which crossed PRESS #633 in transmission.

COPIES TO:

OIL FRANCE (S) Sec 2.

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

OIL FRANCE.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 804
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Confidential

No 804.

Para 1. I am bewildered by the reference in your No 632 to recognizing the provisional government in France. Matters have already moved far beyond the stage mentioned in your third sentence from the end. However I am in full agreement with the result which is to be announced tonight at five thirty GMT.

Para 2. U. J.'s doctors do not like him flying and I suppose there would be the same difficulties in Russian warships coming out of the Black Sea as of American and British warships coming in. One way would be for Turkey to declare war, which I expect she would be very willing to do. But I am not at all sure that the Russians would welcome this at the present juncture in view of what I told you about their wish for revision of the Treaty of Montreux. Alternatively we could ask Turkey to waive the Montreux Treaty for the passage either way of the said ships. This I expect the Russians

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
would like. But I am not so sure about the Turks. From what I saw of the Crimea it seems much shattered and I expect all other Black Sea ports are in a similar state. We should therefore in all probability have to live on board our ships. I am inquiring about Athens from Eden who will be there in a day or two. Personally I should think it a splendid setting and here again we should have our ships handy.

Cyprus is of course available where absolute secrecy, silence and security can be guaranteed together with plain comfortable accommodation for all principals. Will you telegraph to U. J. on the subject, or shall I? Or, better still, shall we send a joint message?

Para 3. I was delighted to see the proofs of your robust vigour in New York. Nevertheless I cannot believe that four hours in an open car and pouring rain with a temperature of 40 and clothes wet through conform to those limits of prudence which you would be so ready to prescribe if it were my case. I earnestly hope you are none the worse and should be grateful for reassurance. I cannot think about anything except this (group undecipherable) election.

End
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: French Provisional Committee; three-power meeting; President's health; politics.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES-PW #622, 22 Oct 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as "N-OUT-496, 23 Oct 44 (2318324)."
3. N-177, 23 Oct 44 (2319504) stated "FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ADMIRAL LEAHY. Re N-OUT-496. "Take up with me tomorrow morning, Tuesday."
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor changes by the President; to PW as PRES-PW #631, 24 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

OIL RANGE: 210 (2); 000.1
MR-OUT-500 (2322152)

23 October 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number: 805

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Reference Paragraph 3 of my number 804.

For "group undecipherable", read "six groups unde-
cipherable."

End

Read 2822002.

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-89-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

Subject: PM's pun on 1944 election. "Group undecipherable" election.

ACTION:

1. Further to PM-PRES #804, 23 Oct. 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as NR-OUT-500, 23 Oct 44 (232213%).
3. No reply. (See P28-PHM #635, which answers PM-PRES #804.)
24 October 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number: 806 Filed 2416282

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 806. Personal

There are two minor matters connected with the change of policy towards Italy which were mentioned in our talks but not covered by our public joint declaration at Hyde Park.

1. There is at present a partial ban on intercourse between British and Italian diplomats throughout the world. We propose that this should be raised.

2. We suggest the British and American governments should declare that they consider the six hundred thousand or so Italian soldiers at present interned in Germany, who are not regarded by the German government as prisoners of war, should be entitled to prisoner of war treatment, and that appropriate measures will be taken against those responsible for maltreating Italian prisoners as soon as they fall into our hands.

Please let me know if you concur.

MAY 6 1972

End
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

FILE NO.: 806, 24 Oct 44.

SUBJECT: Policy towards Italians; ban on intercourse between British and Italian diplomats; interned Italian soldiers in Germany.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Fuly.
2. Copies of PM #806 and #807 to Admiral Leahy at his request.
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President, 24 Oct 44; sent to PM to PM #637.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

01. Italy; 052; 330
24 October 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 807 Filed 2417102

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 807. Personal and

Please see my number 802.

I am anxious to get this settled. When I passed through
Naples three days ago, I had long talks with General Wilson,
MacMillan and other authorities there. The situation in Italy is
not good and might sharply deteriorate. There was a serious riot
in Sicily and there has been trouble at Pisa. General Wilson spoke
to me with anxiety about the whole position, particularly that the
Allied Control Commission had been without a head now for nearly
ten weeks. I certainly take my full share of the blame for this,
but I should like to get it settled now; otherwise, there may be
trouble for all of us.

End

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 807, 24 Oct 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 24/19132 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Announcement of MacMillan's appointment as President, Allied Control Commission.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. Admiral Leahy prepared draft reply; approved by the President on 24 Oct 44; to PM as PRESS-PM #537, 24 Oct 44. (This message apparently crossed the President's #536 to the Prime Minister.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

OIL ITALY
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 808, 25 October 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

Personal and secret number 808.

Your 635.
I like it all.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tele., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

File Copy
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

DATE  808, 25 October 1944

TOR MAP ROOM  251200Z  VIA  Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of Pres #635 re French Provisional Government; message to Stalin re three-power meeting; politics.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES-P4 #635, 24 Oct 44.
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. No reply.
4. See Further Cen. P4 # 641, 2 Nov 44.

OII Finance; 210 (2); 000.1
From: U.S. Military Attache, London England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 809 Filed 25/11/44

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 809.

We want to include in a forthcoming publication of statistics of the British war effort yearly figures of merchant shipping losses—British, Allied and neutral—since the outbreak of the war. We are satisfied no security questions are involved, but in view of our agreement of July 1943, about statements on submarine warfare, I ask your assent to this publication.

Prime

RECLASSIFIED by British
Go.t., State Dept. tel., 3-29-79
By R.H. Parks Date May 6, 1972

[Signature]

File Copy
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 809, 25 Oct 44
DATE: 2516352
TO MAP ROOM: 2516352
VIA: Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Publication of statistics of merchant shipping losses.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. To Admiral Leahy for action. President and Navy Department approved release of information with simultaneous release in U.S.
3. Reply, written by Admiral Leahy, sent to FM as FDR #632, 26 Oct 44.

000.7 (3)
27th October 1944

From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 810 . Filed 27/14,502

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 810.

Personal and

Acceptable to us is November 10th as the date reference
your 636 of the announcement about Italy and I will arrange
for publication here to be simultaneous with the announcement
in Washington. Meanwhile we are telling them to get on with
the job in anticipation of the formal announcement.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET

Recd 27/1644 E-
- orig. to Adm. Navy office for current instructions and
sent to POTUS.

By direction Adm. Navy, no answer required.

File Copy
28 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Admiral Leahy directs that the State Department be advised that, in accordance with an agreement between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the announcement of Macmillan's appointment as President of the Allied Control Commission, which was forwarded to the Secretary of State by memorandum of 22 October 1944, will be released at 12:00 noon, Eastern War Time, Friday, 10 November 1944.

RICHARD PASK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 27 Oct 44.

TOR MAIL ROOM 27/16442 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Announcement of Macmillan’s appointment as President of Allied Control Commission.

ACTION:

1. Answers PERS-PM #526, 28 Oct 44.

2. Before President departed on his Pittsburg-Chicago political campaign tour, instructions were left to refer all messages to Admiral Leahy before sending to President. Original of #810 to Admiral Leahy. Admiral Leahy directed message be filed and no answer sent.

3. State Department notified of date and time of announcement by direction of Admiral Leahy. See memo attached.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

OHL ITALY
27 October 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 611 Filed 2717302
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Number 611.

I agree with the suggested announcement of changes in the
American command contained in your number 634. For the sake of clarity
I suggest that the last sentence should read: "General Wedemeyer is
now Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten. The United States
Forces in the India/Burma theater will be commanded by Lieutenant
General Daniel I. Sultan, now Deputy Commander of the China/Burma/India
theater."

Para 2. I had intended to submit General Stilwell's name to
the King for KCB. Is there any objection to this?

Prime

SECRET

FILED COPY

Classified by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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| 300 CHINA, BURMA, INDIA; 000.7; 10A; 100 STILWELL. |
27 October 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States

Number 612 Filed 2717252
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Number 612.

Is there any objection to my publishing my immediately follow-
ing?

Prime

UNHADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Cov. State Dept. tel: 3-29723
By R. E. Parks. Brits MAY 6 1972

File Copy

Conduit Smith took to Mrs. Lea's home 27/19402
FROM: Prime Minister
TO: The President

Serial or FILE NO.: 812, 27 Oct 44.

DATE:

FOR MAP ROOM VIA:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

300 JAPAN; 000.7
October 27, 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States

No. 813 Filed 2717422

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 813.

Pray accept my most sincere congratulations which I tender on behalf of His Majesty's Government on the brilliant and massive victory gained by the sea and air forces of the United States over the Japanese in the recent heavy battles.

We are very glad to know that one of His Majesty's Australian cruiser squadrons had the honour of sharing in this memorable event.

Prime

RERGRADK UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy

Answered by Allen Leake at 8 a.m. 6/21/43
Cosby Smith took to Allen Leake at his home 27/20412