ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL

NOVEMBER 1944
FROM: OPCNAV
TO: ALBANIA, LONDON

NUMBER 641, PERSONAL AND
NOST, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Referring to my 635, I have received a reply from U.J. which is
not very helpful in the selection of a place for our next meeting. He
states that if our meeting on the Soviet Black Sea Coast is acceptable he
considers it an extremely desirable plan.

His doctors to whose opinion he must give consideration do not
wish him to make any "big trips."

He gave me no information as to location of the meeting, accessi-
ability, living conditions, etc., except to express a hope that it will
be possible to provide a safe entrance for my ship into the Black Sea.

He will be glad to see me as soon as I find it possible to make
the trip.

I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided, first
because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it
imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with
Washington by Air Mail, and, second because of sanitary conditions.

Dr. McIntire tells me that health conditions in Black Sea ports
such as Odessa are very bad, and we must think of the health of our staff
and our ship's crews as well as ourselves.

What do you think of the possibility of our inducing U.J. to meet
with us in Piraeus, Salonica, or Constantinople. Any of these would not
be a "big trip" for him.
Please give me your advice as to the best date for the meeting from your point of view, together with any information you may have in regard to a suitable place for the meeting, danger from enemy action, living conditions, etc. I will take a ship to wherever we may go.

I fear that Uncle Joe will insist on the Black Sea. I do think it important that we three should meet in the near future.

All advice and assistance that you can contribute to the solution of this problem will be appreciated.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 022032, 2 November 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM, Captain, A. C.
November 2, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Referring to my 635, I have received a reply from U.J. which is not very helpful in the selection of a place for our next meeting. He states that if our meeting on the Soviet Black Sea Coast is acceptable he considers it an extremely desirable plan.

His doctors to whose opinion he must give consideration do not wish him to make any "big trips."

He gave me no information as to location of the meeting, accessibility, living conditions, etc., except to express a hope that it will be possible to provide a safe entrance for my ship into the Black Sea.

He will be glad to see me as soon as I find it possible to make the trip.

I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided first because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with Washington by Air Mail, and, second because of sanitary conditions.

Dr. McIntire tells me that health conditions in Black Sea ports such as Odessa are very bad, and we must think of the health of our staff and our ships crews as well as ourselves.
What do you think of the possibility of our inducing
U.J. to meet with us in Piraeus, Salonica, or Constantinople.
Any of these would not be a "big trip" for him.

Please give me your advice as to the best date for
the meeting from your point of view, together with any informa-
tion you may have in regard to a suitable place for the meeting,
danger from enemy action, living conditions, etc. I will take
a ship to wherever we may go.

I fear that Uncle Joe will insist on the Black Sea.
I do think it important that we three should meet in the
near future.

All advice and assistance that you can contribute
to the solution of this problem will be appreciated.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

Serial or file no.: 641, 2 Nov 44.

Date: 2 Nov 44.

Subject: Tripartite meeting.

ACTION:

1. See PRES-PW #635, 24 Oct 44, and PM-PRES #808, 25 Oct 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change, 2 Nov 44, and dispatched.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #814, 5 Nov 44.

Copies to: 210 Plamond

Date: 

By direction of:

210(2)
6 November 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

NUMBER 642. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

I should like to express to you my personal sorrow and regret at the loss of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who as Great Britain’s senior representative on your Combined Staff Mission in America contributed his high soldierly talents and his wide experience with conspicuous success to the solution of our many common war problems.

America joins with Great Britain in sorrow at the loss of your distinguished soldier whose personal admirers here are legion.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1400, EWT, 6 November 1944

ROBERT W. BOGUE, Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. G. Stewart
Date 4/1971

06/821 TAR 3506
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

Serial or FILE No. 642, 6 November 1944

DATE

TOR MAF ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Message of sympathy on death of Sir John Dill.

ACTION:

1. Written by the President at Hyde Park; sent to Map Room for transmission to PM as 48-IN-181, 061720Z. Dispatched 061821Z.
2. Answered by PM-PRAO #820, 10 Nov 44.
3. See also PM-PRAO #619, 9 Nov 44, which asks permission to publish President’s condolence message; and the President’s reply, PM-PRAO #643, 9 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

_____________ ___________ ______________________
_____________ ___________ ______________________
_____________ ___________ ______________________

SIR JOHN DILL

0227
6 November 1944

From: Opnav

To: Aluana, London

NUMBER 643. PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Following is our suggested text of Anti-U-boat statement for October:

QUOTE. The scope of the German U-boats' activities in October 1944 was materially below that of any other month of the war; in consequence of which the number of United Nations' merchant vessels sunk by German submarines during the month was also the lowest of any month of the entire war.

Although the number of German U-boats destroyed was less than what has come to be considered a good monthly "bag", it represented a one-sided ratio as compared to the number of Allied merchant vessels sent to the bottom by the U-boats.

The Allies continue to supply on schedule their ever-growing Armies in Europe. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1915, EWT, 6 November 1944.

F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

DATE: 6 November 1944

SUBJECT: October Sub Statement

ACTION:

1. Statement drafted by Navy Department; approved by OWI; transmitted to Admiral Brown by Elmer Davis by memo dated 6 Nov 44.

2. Statement transmitted to President at Hyde Park as ARR-OUT-514 (061515 Z Nov 44) with following introduction: "Request your approval of the following proposed sub statement for month of October, submitted by the Navy Dept and approved by Elmer Davis..."

3. ARR-OUT-182 (062245 Z Nov 44) stated: "FROM Admiral Leahy to Admiral Brown. The President approves. Send to Prime Minister."

4. Dispatched to PM 6 Nov 44.

5. Answered by PM-FOSS S12: 9 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: ____________________________ DATE: ____________________________ BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________________

ARR 0007 (3)
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 644, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your 818. I agree.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1945Z, 8 Nov 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By \_\_P. Stewart
Date J NOV 7 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

Social or FILE No. 644, 8 November 1944.

TO WHOM VIA

SUBJECT: October Sub Statement.

ACTION:

1. See STATUS SLIP attached to PM-PRES #618, 8 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7 (3)
9 November 1944

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. PERSONAL AND
NUMBER 645.

Your 819. Publication of paraphrase of my 642 approved.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1105, EWT, 9 November 1944

John A. Tyree, Jr.
Commander, USN

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
President to Prime
from 8/19 publication of
paraphrase of my 6/42
approved

Roosevelt

#645
The President

The Prime Minister

DATE: 645, 9 Nov 44.

SUBJECT: Release to press of statement re Sir John Bill.

ACTION:
1. Answers FM-PRES #819, 10 Nov 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-532. (See also FM #620).
2. FM #819 read by Admiral Leahy, who prepared reply approving release of PRES #642; this message (PRES #645, 9 Nov 44) released to Navy Department at 091505Z.
3. At 091658 the following message was received from President as MR-IN-186: "Yr MR-OUT-532 approved. Please prepare and transmit reply accordingly." Admiral Leahy's office notified; no further action since message had already been sent.

COPIES TO: [Blank]

DATE: [Blank]

BY DIRECTION OF: [Blank]

[Signature] Sir John
10 NOVEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON 101615Z NCR

NUMBER 646, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your 816 and 817. Thank you for your friendly message and for
your repetition of the 1940 message which I certainly had not forgotten.
We should now be permitted to continue our work together until this
world-wide agony is ended and a better future insured.

F. D. R.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 101615Z, Nov 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stoudt
Date NOV 1 1971
10 November 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Your 816 and 817, thank you for your friendly message and for your repetition of the 1940 message which I certainly had not forgotten. We should now be permitted to continue our work together until this world-wide agony is ended and a better future insured.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Strohart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

DEPTAL or FILE NO. #646, 10 November 1944

DATE

FOR MAP ROOM Via

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of election congratulations.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #816 and #817, which were sent to the President at Hyde Park as #23-OUT-$25 and $26 respectively.
2. Reply by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 10 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: 

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

000.1

0237
ULTRA

FROM: OPRAV
TO: ALICIA, LONDON

13 NOVEMBER 1944

NUMBER 647, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
THE PRIME MINISTER.

The death of the TIRPITZ is great news. We must help the
Germans by never letting them build anything like it again, thus
putting the German Treasury on its feet.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

Released from the White House Map Room
at 131703E, 13 Nov 44.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

The death of the TIRPITZ is great news. We must help the Germans by never letting them build anything like it again, thus putting the German Treasury on its feet.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 647, 13 Nov 44.

DATE: 647, 13 Nov 44.

TO: Map Room

VIA: 

SUBJECT: Sinking of German BB TIRPITZ.

ACTION:

1. Written by the President.
2. Answered by Para 1, PM-PRES #822, 16 Nov 44.

SIGNED: [Signature]

DATE: [Date]

BY DIRECTION OF: [Signature]
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

14 November 1944

The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. The location of a meeting now is very difficult. All my people advise strongly against the Black Sea. I do not think there is a chance that UJ would agree to Jerusalem, Egypt or Malta.

But there is a real chance that by the end of January or early February he could get rail transportation to head of the Adriatic. He might be willing to come to Rome or the Riviera. I would of course stop in England going or returning. I do not think he wants to fly or take a very difficult and long rail journey to Haifa.

Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third.

Ever so many thanks for your wire. I finally got angry toward the end of the campaign and replied to the worst type of opposition I have ever met. However it worked well and people are now setting back trying to catch their breath.
What do you think of postponement? It appeals to me greatly. My best to you on your Parisian trip. Don't turn up in French clothes.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1416222 November 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Nov 1 1971
November 14, 1944.

The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. The location of a meeting now is very difficult. All my people advise strongly against the Black Sea. I do not think there is a chance that UJ would agree to Jerusalem, Egypt or Malta.

But there is a real chance that by the end of January or early February he could get rail transportation to head of the Adriatic. He might be willing to come to Rome or the Riviera. I would of course stop in England going or returning. I do not think he wants to fly or take a very difficult and long rail journey to Haifa.

Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third.

Ever so many thanks for your wire. I finally got angry toward the end of the campaign and replied to the worst type of opposition I have ever met. However it worked and people are now sitting back trying to catch their breath.

What do you think of the postponement? It appeals to me greatly. My best to you on your Parisian trip. Don't turn up in French clothes.

F.D.R.

[Signature]

0243
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

MEMORIAL or FILE NO.: 648, 14 November 1944

FOR: Map Room
 Via:

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting; election; French

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #s 814 and 815, 5 Nov 44, which were sent to the President at Hyde Park as M-OUT-510 & 512 respectively.
2. Dispatch written by the President after his return from Hyde Park and dispatched on 14 Nov 44.
3. Answered by Para 2, PM-PRES. #822, 16 Nov 44.
4. See PRES-PM #649 and #650 for further correspondence.

COPIES TO:

210 Argonne

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (x): 0001
18 November 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

NUMBER 649, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 822. I am sending you in a message to follow a copy of a message I have just sent to Uncle Joe on the subject of our next meeting. It does not seem to me that the French Provisional Government should take part in our next conference as such a debating society would confuse our essential issues. The three of us can discuss the questions you raise in regard to turning over parts of Germany to France after the collapse of Nazism and the further problems of helping to build up a strong France.

Regardless of available shipping and availability of material in the United States, I have no authority at present to equip an eight division post war French army. I, of course, sympathize with the French point of view and hope that we may all be able to help her meet post war responsibilities. You know, of course, that after Germany's collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit. I shall be glad to have your views about the time and place of our next meeting.

Roosevelt

Released, 1818032 Nov 44.

R. W. Doane, Lt., USNR.
18 November 1944.

From: The President.
To: The Prime Minister.

Your 822. I am sending you in a message to follow a copy of a message I have just sent to Uncle Joe on the subject of our next meeting. It does not seem to me that the French Provisional Government should take part in our next conference as such a debating society would confuse our essential issues. The three of us can discuss the questions you raise in regard to turning over parts of Germany to France after the collapse of Nazism and the further problems of helping to build up a strong France. Regardless of available shipping and availability of material in the United States, I have no authority at present to equip an eight division post war French army. I, of course, sympathize with the French point of view and hope that we may all be able to help her meet post war responsibilities. You know, of course, that after Germany's collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit. I shall be glad to have your views about the time and place of our next meeting.

Roosevelt

ROOSEVELT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: S. Stone
Date: Nov 1 1971
16 November 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 822 received.

Regardless of available shipping and availability of material in the U.S., there does not appear to be at the present time any authority for the United States to equip an eight division post-war French Army.

I also sympathize with the French point of view and hope that France will be able to build up a sufficient military force to meet the needs of a post-war period.

I am not prepared now to agree that the provisional French Government should be a fourth member of our next staff meeting. Such a debating society probably would not expedite the essential business of the conference.

In regard to turning over parts of Germany to France after the collapse of Nazism, this will it seems to me require agreement by the Soviet, the U.K., and the U.S.

Participation by the French Provisional Government in discussions leading to such an agreement does not appear to me to be necessary or helpful.

In this connection I will desire and expect to bring the American troops home as quickly after Germany's collapse as is permitted by all the transportation that can be made available.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

649, 18 November 1944

S H I F T:

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting; French; equipping French divisions.

ACTION:

1. Answered PM #822, 16 Nov 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; given to Admiral Brown by the President to be reworded so that it would read more personal.
3. Admiral Brown's draft approved by the President 18 Nov 44, and dispatched.
4. See also PRES-PW #550, which is continuation of this message.
5. Answered by PM-PRES. #823, 19 Nov 44.

210, 011 France, 371 Germany.
18 NOVEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSKA, LONDON

181807Z NOV 44

NUMBER 650, PERSONAL AND
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

I have today sent the following message to Stalin:

QUOTE. All three of us are of one mind — that we should meet
very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this
moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to
get back here by Christmas but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient
if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January
twentieth.

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do
not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as
it would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere. Churchill has
suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens,
though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here
while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not
adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under
the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets
here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth
or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will have rail
travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which should provide a fairly good climate at that time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on Legislation — a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January or early February.

Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disintegrate quickly, we should have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer the meeting at the end of January.

A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out the problem between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you. UNQUOTE.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

DATE: 650, 18 Nov 44

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting.

ACTION:
1. Further reply to PM #822, 16 Nov 44. Also see PRES-PW #649.
2. Quotes to Churchill a message sent by the President to Marshal Stalin, 18 Nov 44. (PRES-STALIN #121, 18 Nov 44.)
3. Answered by PM-PRES, #823, 19 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: 210 Argus

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (r)
From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

PRIORITY
By

18 November 1944

Date

1971

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Early in October you were good enough to agree to defer for a while
the signature of a meat contract with the Farrell regime in Argentina.
Your refusal to sign a contract has helped us tremendously. It has in­
creased the uncertainty which has driven the Colonels to a desperate
condition.

We believe that if our tactics can be continued, we have a very good
chance of putting an end within a reasonable time to a Fascist regime that
otherwise would be a threat to the peace and security of this continent for
many years to come.

I have been concerned to hear recent reports that you may shortly take
up the matter of the Argentine meat contract with us again.

It is my strong personal conviction that if you sign a meat contract
with the Farrell regime the consequences will be disastrous and much more
far reaching than we have been able to make some of your people understand.
Such action would be propagated by the Argentine regime to demonstrate
a division between us; it would strengthen both their domestic and their
international position; and because our own people feel so strongly about
the Nazi threat on this continent while their sons are fighting all over
the world, such action would have repercussions in the press, in public
discussions, and in Congress at a most unfortunate time.
I would not, of course, urge this so strongly if it meant less meat for your people. As you know, you are getting all the meat you can carry from Argentina right now even though you have no contract, and you will recall that this was also the case for ten months prior to the signing of the last contract.

I know that we can continue to count on your help to liquidate this dangerous Nazi threat.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 123152, November 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt., AGD.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request there is enclosed herewith a draft message to Prime Minister Churchill respecting further delay in the meat contract negotiations with Argentina.

ERSY

Enclosure:
Draft telegram for Prime Minister Churchill
Early in October you were good enough to agree to defer for a while the signature of a meat contract with the Farrell regime in Argentina. Your refusal to sign a contract has helped us tremendously. It has increased the uncertainty which has driven the Colonels to a desperate condition.

We believe that if our tactics can be continued, we have a very good chance of putting an end within a reasonable time to a Fascist regime that otherwise would be a threat to the peace and security of this continent for many years to come.

I have been concerned to hear recent reports that you may shortly take up the matter of the Argentine meat contract with us again.

It is my strong personal conviction that if you sign a meat contract with the Farrell regime the consequences will be disastrous and much more far reaching than we have been able to make some of your people understand. Such action would be propagandized by the Argentine regime to demonstrate
a division between us; it would strengthen both their domestic
and their international position; and because our own people
feel so strongly about the Nazi threat on this continent
while their sons are fighting all over the world, such action
would have repercussions in the press, in public discussions,
and in Congress at a most unfortunate time.

I would not, of course, urge this so strongly if it meant
less meat for your people. As you know, you are getting all
the meat you can carry from Argentina right now even though
you have no contract, and you will recall that this was also
the case for ten months prior to the signing of the last
contract.

I know that we can continue to count on your help to
liquidate this dangerous Nazi threat.

I am glad to say that our people tell me the phase two
land-lease discussions are going well.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By PHCEBS Date FEB 14/1972

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

NOT SENT NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON
HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

0256
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

Serial or File No.: 651, 18 Nov 44.

Date: 18 Nov 44.

Subject: Argentine Beef.

ACTION:

1. Dispatch drafted by the State Department, sent to the President by memo, 17 Nov 44, signed "ERS jr."
2. President approved message without change; dispatched 182315Z.
3. Answered by PW-PRES #826, 19 Nov 44.
4. Further answered by PW-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44.
5. (Also see WINANT-PRES #1063, 20 Nov 44, on this subject.)
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 652, PERSONAL AND

201703Z NOV 44

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your Number 823.

General Wainland Wilson is entirely acceptable to us as a successor for Sir John Dill. We would welcome him to Washington.

As to the command arrangements in the Mediterranean resulting from General Wilson's transfer to Washington, I feel that General Alexander is logically General Wilson's successor and his appointment as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Theater is agreeable to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and to me.

I appreciate the compliment you pay General Clark in suggesting that he take over the Army Group in Italy as General Alexander's successor. I think that is also a logical arrangement. Generals Alexander and Clark have worked together successfully now for some time and I see no reason to change that combination.

General McArney's status as Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander should remain the same under the new arrangements.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 201703Z November 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
War Department
Office of the Chief of Staff

19 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Attached is a proposed answer to the Prime Minister's message to the President.

G. C. M.
Proposed Message to the Prime Minister

Your Number V33

General Maitland Wilson is entirely acceptable to us as a successor for Sir John Dill. We would welcome him to Washington. Have you considered General Janey, she would also be very acceptable to us?

As to the command arrangements in the Mediterranean resulting from General Wilson's transfer to Washington, I feel that General Alexander is logically General Wilson's successor and his appointment as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Theater is agreeable to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and to me.

I appreciate the compliment you pay General Clark in suggesting that he take over the Army Group in Italy as General Alexander's successor. I think that is also a logical arrangement. Generals Alexander and Clark have worked together successfully now for some time and I see no reason to change that combination.

General McNarney's status as Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander should remain the same under the new arrangements.

Roosevelt
FROM  The President  TO  The Prime Minister

Serial or File No.  652, 20 November 1944

Date

To: The Prime Minister

Subject: Appointment of Gen Wilson to CCS; Mediterranean Command.

Action:
1. Answers PM-PRES #823, 17 Nov 44, which was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for draft reply.
2. Draft reply prepared in Chief of Staff's office; approved by Adm King; approved by the President 20 Nov 44; and dispatched to London.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #829, 26 Nov 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

211617Z WCH 5 44

NUMBER 653, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your S21. In regard to the Italian grain ration it is true that I have "jumped some fences" and because of the great number of Italians in this country I must continue in the future to follow the same practice. I know you will understand.

I have not been at all satisfied with the administration of the relief problem to date, especially with the distribution of food in Italy.

In September, 1944, General Wilson reported that from a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean area might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

The provision of relief to the distressed peoples in liberated areas presents very difficult problems of shipping. My own view is that until after German collapse the import of such supplies must be limited to those supplies for which the Combined Chiefs of Staff can obtain shipping in the light of shipping requirements to carry out current and projected operations. In view of these heavy operational shipping demands, I think that, until German collapse, they can provide shipping in operational areas only for those basic essentials necessary to avoid disease and unrest which would interfere with operations or lines of communication and supply. I agree with your suggestions that we should not discriminate in favor of Italy over...
other liberated areas, although, in view of shipping limitations, it will only be possible to furnish a minimum relief program necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations.

It is my belief that to continue military personnel in the Allied Commission any longer than is absolutely necessary is inconsistent with the principles you and I announced in our joint statement. I therefore feel that whenever a position in the Commission need no longer be filled by an officer, he should be replaced by a civilian as soon as a suitable replacement can be found. I will, of course, be glad to consider any views which you may have on these matters and other problems of economic assistance to Italy, after your consultation with MacMillan.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2116172 November 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
November 21, 1944

PRESIDENT TO FRANK:

Your 321. In regard to the Italian grain ration it is true that I have "jumped some fences" and because of the great number of Italians in this country I must continue in the future to follow the same practice. thus you will understand.

I have not been at all satisfied with the administration of the relief problem to date, especially with the distribution of food in Italy.

In September, 1944, General Wilson reported that from a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Area might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

The provision of relief to the distressed peoples in liberated areas presents very difficult problems of shipping. My own view is that until after German collapse the import of such supplies must be limited to those supplies for which the Combined Chiefs of Staff can obtain shipping in the light of shipping requirements to carry out current and projected operations. In view of these heavy operational shipping demands, I think that, until German Collapse, they can provide shipping in operational areas, only for those basic essentials necessary to avoid disease and unrest which would interfere with operations.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971
or lines of communication and supply. I agree with your suggestions that we should not discriminate in favor of Italy over other liberated areas, although, in view of shipping limitations, it will only be possible to furnish a minimum relief program necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations.

It is my belief that to continue military personnel in the Allied Commission any longer than is absolutely necessary is inconsistent with the principles you and I announced in our joint statement. I therefore feel that whenever a position in the Commission need no longer be filled by an officer, he should be replaced by a civilian as soon as a suitable replacement can be found. I will, of course, be glad to consider any views which you may have on these matters and other problems of economic assistance to Italy, after your consultation with MacMillan.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Handwritten Date]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 653, 21 Nov 44.

DATE 21 Nov 44.

FOR MAP NO. VI

SUBJECT: Italian grain ration.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #821, 12 Nov 44, which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of reply.

2. Reply drafted by Joint Chiefs; first two paragraphs added by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 21 Nov 44 and dispatched.

COPIES TO: Date: By direction of:

on Italy: Allied Control Council, Italy.
21 November 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alcena, London

NUMBER 654. SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

The aviation conference is at an impasse because of a square issue between our people and yours. We have met you on a number of points, notably an arrangement for regulation of rates and an arrangement by which the number of planes in the air shall be adjusted to the amount of traffic. This is as far as I can go. In addition, your people are now asking limitations on the number of planes between points regardless of the traffic offering. This seems to me a form of strangulation. It has been a cardinal point in American policy throughout that the ultimate judge should be the passenger and the shipper. The limitations now proposed would, I fear, place a dead hand on the use of the great air trade routes. You don't want that any more than I do.

The issue will be debated tomorrow. I hope you can get into this yourself and give instructions, preferably by telephone, to your people in Chicago so that we can arrange, if possible, to agree. It would be unfortunate indeed if the conference broke down on this issue.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 212162 November 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR

0267
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Subject: Aviation Conference

Mr. Berle telephoned Mr. Hopkins from Chicago this morning and requested that a message be sent by the President to the Prime Minister. Mr. Hopkins asked me to clear the matter with the President.

Would you please be good enough to show the attached wire to the President, and if he has any question I am sure Mr. Hopkins will clear it up with him. I understand that Mr. Hopkins will return to his office from the Combined Chiefs of Staff at three o'clock.
U.S. URGENT

AMBASSADOR

LONDON

NIACT.

Please transmit the following message to the Prime Minister immediately (repeat immediately):

QUOTE The aviation conference is at an impasse because of a square issue between our people and yours. We have met you on a number of points, notably an arrangement for regulation of rates and an arrangement by which the number of planes in the air shall be adjusted to the amount of traffic. This is as far as I can go. In addition, your people are now asking limitations on the number of planes between points regardless of the traffic offering. This seems to me a form of strangulation. It has been a cardinal point in American policy throughout that the ultimate judge should be the passenger and the shipper. The limitations now proposed would, I fear, place a dead hand on the use of the great air trade routes. You don't want that any more than I do.

The issue will be debated tomorrow. I hope you can get into this yourself and give instructions, preferably by

Enciphered by ..............................................

Sent by operator ........................................ 19 ..............................................
Department of State

Washington,

-2-

telephone, to your people in Chicago so that we can arrange, if possible, to agree. It would be unfortunate indeed if the conference broke down on this issue. Franklin D. Roosevelt. END QUOTE
THE AVIATION CONFERENCE IS AT AN IMPASSE BECAUSE OF A SQUARE ISSUE BETWEEN OUR PEOPLE AND YOURS. OUR PEOPLE HAVE MET YOUR PEOPLE ON A NUMBER OF POINTS, ESPECIALLY AN ARRANGEMENT FOR REGULATION OF RATES AND AN ARRANGEMENT BY WHICH THE NUMBER OF PLANES IN THE AIR SHALL BE ADJUSTED TO THE TRAFFIC OFFERING. BUT THE BRITISH POSITION NOW IS THAT, IN ADDITION TO THOSE POINTS, THEY WISH TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF PLANES BETWEEN POINTS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TRAFFIC OFFERING, AND THIS IS, FOR US, AND, INDEED, FOR EVERYBODY, A FORM OF CONTINUING STRANGLATION. IT HAS BEEN A CARDINAL POINT IN AMERICAN POLICY THROUGHOUT THAT THE ULTIMATE JUDGE OUGHT TO BE THE PASSENGER AND THE SHIPPER. WITH THE LIMITATIONS NOW INSISTED ON, THE GREAT AIR TRADE ROUTES WOULD BE DEAD THINGS INSTEAD OF LIVE THINGS.

( I THINK WE HAVE WALKED OUT OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY CONCEPTION OF AIR TRADE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CONCEPTION OF AIR TRADE AND STAND ON THE THRESHOLD AND THAT WE OUGHT TO GO RIGHT ON THROUGH. )

SINCE THE DEBATE ON THE ISSUE WILL BE TOMORROW, I HOPE YOU CAN GET INTO THE MATTER YOURSELF AND GIVE INSTRUCTIONS, PREFERABLY BY TELEPHONE, TO YOUR PEOPLE IN CHICAGO SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE, IF POSSIBLE, TO AGREE.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: Aviation Conference in Chicago.

ACTION:
1. See memo, Stettinius to Tully, 21 Nov 44, filed herein, which gives background for this message.
2. Msg first drafted by Mr. Hopkins; altered by State Department; approved by President 21 Nov and dispatched.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #227, 22 Nov 44.

COPY: "210 AIR CONFERENCE"

COPY TO: BY DIRECTION OF:
22 November 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 655. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

1. Apparently the Chiefs of SHAPE would like something done by top
evel to help break down German morale.

2. I can think of nothing except a joint statement from you and me and
therefore suggest something along the line of the following:

QUOTE. We have viewed the overall iron discipline of the Wehrmacht
and strangle-hold of the Nazi party over the individuals of the German nation
and we have considered the problem of getting the truth to the people of Germany,
for they have been flooded with Nazi propaganda that the Allies seek the destruc-
tion of the German people and the devastation of Germany.

Once more we wish to make it clear to the German people that this war
does not seek to devastate Germany or eliminate the German people.

Once more we want to make it clear to the people of Germany that we
seek the elimination of Nazi control and the return of the German people to the
civilization of the rest of the world.

We are winning. There is no question of that.

But we want to save lives and to save humanity.

We hope that this slaughter of Germans can be brought to an end but
we are going to bring this war to a conclusion which will satisfy civilization
and seek to prevent future wars. The answer lies in the hands of the German

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Johnston
Date July 1971

- 1 -
people. They are being pressed the whole length of their boundaries on the Rhine. They are being pressed by overwhelming numbers and inexhaustable resources in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary. German towns are daily being destroyed and your enemies draw closer in the closing of an inexorable ring. The simple fact remains that the Allies are united in demanding a complete military victory.

The choice lies with the German people and the German army. Do not prolong the days of death and suffering and destruction. Join all the other people in Europe and Africa and America and Asia in this great effort for decency and peace among human beings. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2218.42Z, November 1944.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C.E.


DECLASIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By JG. Stearns
Date Nov 1 1971
To: Former Naval Person  
From: The President

November 22, 1944

1. Apparently the Chiefs of SHAPE would like something done by top level to help break down German morale.

2. I can think of nothing except a joint statement from you and me and therefore suggest something along the line of the following:

"We have viewed the overall iron discipline of the Wehrmacht and strength-hold of the Nazi party over the individuals of the German nation and we have considered the problem of getting the truth to the people of Germany, for they have been flooded with Nazi propaganda that the Allies seek the destruction of the German people and the devastation of Germany.

"Once more we wish to make it clear to the German people that this war does not seek to devastate Germany or eliminate the German people.

"Once more we want to make it clear to the people of Germany that we seek the elimination of Nazi control and the return of the German people to the civilization of the rest of the world.

"We are winning. There is no question of that.

"But we want to save lives and to save humanity.

"We hope that this slaughter of Germans can be brought to an end but we are going to bring this war to a conclusion which will satisfy civilization and seek to prevent future wars. The answer lies in the hands of the German people. They are being pressed the whole length of their boundaries on the Rhine. They are being pressed by overwhelming numbers and inexhaustible resources in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary. German towns are daily being destroyed and your enemies drew closer in the closing of an inexorable ring. The simple fact remains that the Allies are united in demanding a complete military victory.

"The choice lies with the German people and the German army. Do not prolong the days of death and suffering and destruction. Join all the other people in Europe and Africa and America and Asia in this great effort for decency and peace among human beings."
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France.

To: War Department
CO, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

Nr: S 67648 20 November 1944

This is SCAF number 134. S 67648 to for action AGHAK for Combined Chiefs of Staff for info Central District UK Base for British CO & from SHAEF signed Eisenhower cite SGST

1. German morale on this front shows no sign of cracking at present. I am of the opinion that enemy's continued stolid resistance is a main factor postponing final victory which, in present circumstances can only be achieved by prolonged and bitter fighting.

2. Factors which are compelling the enemy to continue strong resistance appear to be:
   a. Overall iron discipline of the Wehrmacht and stranglehold by the Nazi party.
   b. Successful Nazi propaganda which is convincing every German that unconditional surrender means the complete devastation of Germany and her elimination as a nation.

3. Consider it is of vital importance that we should redouble our efforts to find a solution to the problem of reducing the Germans will to resist and then to bring every appropriate weapon to bear to achieve this end. I have in mind particularly the employment of deception methods in addition to propaganda and other possible means.

4. Since any plan which aims at reducing the enemy's will to resist must affect the German Army in all theatres, this is not a subject which can be dealt with by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, which is not in possession of the relevant information and does not control all the weapons to put such plan into effect.

5. This matter has been discussed with the controlling officer, who has had the subject under review. I now request that it be taken up in London as a matter of urgency.

ACTION: CC/S

CM-IN-20084 (21 Nov 44) 0005Z

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
The President

TO

The Prime Minister

DATE

#655, 22 Nov 44.

SUBJECT: Proposed statement to German people to break German morale.

ACTION:

1. See War Dept msg, #67648, 20 Nov 44, from EISENHOWER to CCS. President read this message, and discussed it in length with Admiral Brown at evening news presentation, 21 Nov 44. President took dispatch with him to prepare draft statement and msg to Prime Minister.

2. President's draft given to Admiral Leahy to be taken up with Gen Marshall. President left for Hyde Park on evening of 21 Nov 44.

3. Leahy to President, WR-OUT-538, 22 Nov 44, stated: "Marshall and I agree as to the advisability of sending to PM, for his approval, your proposed joint statement designed to break German morale. Upon receipt of your permission, I will send the message to Prime and will also inform Eisenhower of your action in the matter."


5. Dispatched to PM, 22 Nov 44.

6. To Gen Marshall by memo signed Admiral Leahy, for dispatch to Gen Eisenhower, 22 Nov 44.

7. Answered by Gen Marshall, 24 Nov 44.

COPY TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

300 Germany: 000.7

0277
24 NOVEMBER 1944

FROM: OPIAV
TO: ALJUHA, LONDON

2416072 NoR 6355

NUMBER 126, PERSONAL AND 🗝️, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR
WINANT.

Please take the following message personally to Winston and convince
him that he has got to come through. You will understand how important it
is that he does.

"I have read carefully the message in your 827 and on replying
to it in my next telegram. I am afraid you do not yet fully ap-
preciate the importance of reaching a satisfactory agreement. Our
people have gone as far as to meet yours as I can let them go. If
the conference should end either in no agreement or in an agree-
ment which the American people would regard as preventing the
development and use of the great air routes the repercussions
would seriously affect many other things.

"We are doing our best to meet your lend-lease needs.
We will face Congress on that subject in a few weeks and it
will not be in a generous mood if it and the people feel that
the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial
air agreement. They will wonder about the chances of our two
countries, let alone any others, working together to keep the
peace if we cannot even get together on an aviation agreement.

"I hope you will review the situation once more and see
if we cannot get together."

ROOSEVELT

Released, 2416072 Nov 44.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. STEVENS
Date 1 Nov 1971

1. Deleted by direction Mr. Hopkins. See Para 5 of STATUS REPORT.

ORIGINAL filed "MR PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE"
FROM: The President  
TO: Winant (for Prime Minister)  

DATE: 126, 24 Nov 44  

SUBJECT: Aviation conference.  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PM-PRES #827, 22 Nov 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-341, 22 Nov 44.  
2. By direction Mr. Hopkins, paraphrased copy of PM #827 sent to State Dept for preparation of reply.  
3. Draft reply submitted by State Department to Mr. Hopkins. Several changes made by Mr. Hopkins. Sent to the President at Hyde Park for his approval as MR-OUT-545, 241400Z.  
4. President telephoned Mr. Hopkins giving his approval to the message as written. Message sent to the Navy Code Room for transmission to London.  
5. By direction of Mr. Hopkins, exact copy of #126 sent to Mr. Achilles in the State Department. Mr. Achilles called Mr. Hopkins' office, suggesting that the clause "and as replying to it in my next telegram" be deleted from the message since no further message from the President would be sent. Mr. Hopkins agreed. Navy Code Room notified and directed to make change.  
6. Answered by WINANT-PRES #1069, 27 Nov 44; PM-PRES #835, 27 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #832, 28 Nov 44.  

COPIES TO:  
COPY: "MR 210 AIR CONFERENCE"  
COPY: "MR PRES-PW FILE"  

210 Air Conference.

26 November 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London 261609Z, NCR 6717

NUMBER 656. PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

The announcement proposed in your Number 830 for 23.30 GMT, Sunday, November 26, is approved.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room 261609Z November 1944.

[Signature]
Richard Park, Jr.
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1971
26 November 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #656

The announcement proposed in your Number 830 for 23.30 GMT, Sunday, November 26, is approved.

[Signature]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

Serial or File No. 656, 26 Nov 44.

Date 26 Nov 44.

FOR MAP BOOK

Via

SUBJECT: Announcement of Gen Wilson's, Gen Alexander's and Gen Clark's appointments.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #830, 26 Nov 44. (Also see PM-PRES #829, 26 Nov 44).
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched 2616092.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO: ____________________________   DATE: ____________________________   BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

2616092 130 000 7
26 November 1944

From: OPNAV
To: Aluena, London 26161671, NCR 47/5

NUMBER 657. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 828. Your attitude toward the proposed joint statement, my 655, is accepted and I have informed General Eisenhower in regard thereto.

I share with your earnest hope that both the British and American Armies can throw extra weight into the effort and succeed in destroying the German West Wall Armies by the end of this year.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2616142, November 1944.

RICHARD HELLO, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971

0283
November 25, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #657

Your S28. Your attitude toward the proposed joint statement, my 655, is accepted and I have informed General Eisenhower in regard thereto.

I share your earnest hope that both the British and American Armies can throw extra weight into the effort and succeed in destroying the German West Wall Armies by the end of this year.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

Serial or File No.: 657, 26 Nov 44.

For Rep No. VIA

Subject: Proposed statement to German people to break German morale.

Action:

1. Answered PM-PRES #823, 24 Nov 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as JR-OUT-548, 242235.
2. The President, in JR-IN-188, 242323, directed msg be referred to Admiral Leahy and that it be paraphrased and sent to Gen Eisenhower.
3. Msg was referred to Adm Leahy; paraphrased and sent as GEN-EISENHOWER #127, 25 Nov 44.
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President; dispatched 2616142.
5. Gen Eisenhower informed by Gen Marshall of PRES #657 (See 1st Para.)
6. Answered by PM-PRES #834, 27 Nov 44.

Copies to: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________

By Direction Of: ________________________________
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London 261637Z, NCR 676

NUMBER 698. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 825. Uncle Joe has now replied to my message in regard to the tripartite meeting forwarded to you in my 650.

He expresses regret that my Naval advisors doubt the expediency of meeting on the shore of the Black Sea. He does not object to a meeting at the end of January or the beginning of February, but he has in mind that we shall choose as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. He must consider the opinion of his doctors that a long trip would be a danger to him.

He hopes that we will now or soon finally agree upon a meeting place that will be acceptable to all of us.

I have a feeling that we will not succeed in getting U.S. to travel beyond the Black Sea unless the Germans should have surrendered by that time.

In regard to paragraph six of your 825, there should be no difficulty for us in equipping so much of a French occupation force as they may need in a disarmed Germany from the military equipment that we will take from the German Army when it surrenders or is destroyed.

DECLASSIFIED By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By Date Nov 1 1971
In any event, I have at the present time no authority under which it would be possible for me to equip any post-war foreign army, and the prospect of getting such authority from the Congress is more than doubtful.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2616372, November, 1944.

RICHARD PAHX, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
November 26, 1944

President to Prime: 

Your 325. Uncle Joe has now replied to my message in regard to the tripartite meeting forwarded to you in my 650.

He expresses regret that my Naval advisors doubt the expediency of meeting on the shore of the Black Sea. He does not object to a meeting at the end of January or the beginning of February, but he has in mind that we shall choose as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. He must consider the opinion of his doctors that a long trip would be a danger to him.

He hopes that we will now or soon finally agree upon a meeting place that will be acceptable to all of us.

I have a feeling that we will not succeed in getting U.J. to travel beyond the Black Sea unless the Germans should have surrendered by that time.

In regard to paragraph six of your 325, there should be no difficulty for us in equipping so much of a French occupation force as they may need in a disarmed Germany from the military equipment that we will take from the German Army when it surrenders or is destroyed.

In any event, I have at the present time no authority under which it would be possible for me to equip any
post-war foreign army, and the prospect of getting such authority from the Congress is more than doubtful.

Russell
The President

TO

The Prime Minister

Date

658, 26 November 1944

For Map Room

VIA

SUBJECT: Tri-partite meeting; equipping of French occupation force.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PRES #235, 19 Nov 44.
2. (See STALL-PRES 23 Nov 44, which this message quotes in part to the Prime Minister.)
3. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched 2616372.
4. Answered by PS-PRES #34, 27 November 1944.

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

210 E, 311 France
27 November 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 659. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

In mid October Air Vice Marshal Willock informed our Navy Department of his intention to survey Clipperton Island in compliance with instructions from British Air Ministry and we understand that a survey party is now at Acapulco, Mexico. Having in mind the Monroe Doctrine, air agreements now under discussion and American public opinion, I suggest that any plan of development of military bases on Clipperton or any other territory in or near American waters be discussed by the Governments concerned rather than by the Armed Forces. I request that you cancel any instructions by your people about a further survey of Clipperton until you and I can discuss it. King is sure he can work out a schedule of your planes through Hawaii to meet military requirements. I have personally visited Clipperton twice.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 271722Z, November 1944.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date Nov 7 1971
PROPOSED MESSAGE

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

In mid October Air Vice Marshal Willock informed our Navy Department of his intention to survey Clipperton Island in compliance with instructions from British Air Ministry and we understand that a survey party is now at Acapulco, Mexico. Having in mind the Monroe Doctrine, air agreements now under discussion and American public opinion, I suggest that any plan of development of military bases on Clipperton or any other territory in or near American waters be discussed by the Governments concerned rather than by the Armed forces. I request that you cancel any instructions by your people about a further survey of Clipperton until you and I can discuss it. King is sure he can work out a schedule of your planes through Hawaii to meet military requirements.

Copy to: State Navy War Joint Staff

NOTE:—Consult State before sending. Direct Navy to investigate Clipperton and install a weather and radio station.
November 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary for War:

The following message, sent by the President on 27 November to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, is quoted for information and guidance of the State, War and Navy Departments:

"In mid October Air Vice Marshal Willock informed our Navy Department of his intention to survey Clipperton Island in compliance with instructions from British Air Ministry and we understand that a survey party is now at Acapulco, Mexico. Having in mind the Monroe Doctrine, air agreements now under discussion and American public opinion, I suggest that any plan of development of military bases on Clipperton or any other territory in or near American waters be discussed by the Governments concerned rather than by the Armed forces. I request that you cancel any instructions by your people about a further survey of Clipperton until you and I can discuss it. King is sure he can work out a schedule of your planes through Hawaii to meet military requirements. I have personally visited Clipperton twice."

/3/ H. S. Gath

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1 1971]

To: Secretary for War
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Navy

Go to Joint Chiefs of Staff
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SPECIAL or FILE NO.: 659, 27 Nov 44.

DATE: 659, 27 Nov 44.

TO MAP ROOM Via

SUBJECT: British air base on Clipperton Island.

ACTION:

1. Dispatch written by Admiral Brown. Taken to the President by Admiral Leahy. President added last sentence. Dispatched to PM at 2717222 NCR 6791.

2. Copies to Sec State, Sec War, Sec Navy, and Joint Chiefs of Staff by Admiral Leahy for information and guidance.

3. Answered by P4-PRES #838, 28 Nov 44.

C.P.F. CLIPPERTON

C.O.P.I.E.S. TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

550 CLIPPERTON

0294
27 November 1944

Priority

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London 271728Z, NCR 672

NUMBER 660. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER.

Referring to your S29, Truscott has been ordered to report
in Italy December 5 for duty.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 271728Z, November 1944.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date Nov 7 1971
November 27, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Referring to your 329, Truscott has been ordered to report in Italy December 5 for duty.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Number: WARX 67839

Book Message from Marshall to Eisenhower for action and McNarney for information

Issue necessary orders transferring Lt General L K Truscott to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Instruct him to report not later than December 5, 1944 to Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, Italy for instructions and assignment. You are authorized to issue orders transferring to Mediterranean Theater of Operations such personnel as is agreed mutually upon between you and Truscott.

End

ORIGINATOR: GEN HULL
INFORMATION: GEN HENRY
ADM LEAHY
C of S

CM-OUT-67839 (24 Nov 44) 1807Z mcs/ekk

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720514

BY CAM Date MAY 5 1972

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 660, 27 Nov 44.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Assignment of Truscott to 5th Army.

ACTION:

1. Answered PM-PRES #829, 26 Nov 44.
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; and dispatched 2717282 NR 6792.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #837, 28 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

__________________________  __________________________  __________________________

130
30 November 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

NUMBER 661. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

I have given careful thought to your 836 and to the problems which you cite. You know that I have no desire for any arrangement by which our people would profit from the sacrifices which yours have made in this war. Your confidence in the justice and fair play of the American people is, I am sure, justified. I have equal confidence that your people have the same qualities in the same measure. I know that they want an equal opportunity in the air and unquestionably they should have it. I cannot believe that they would want aviation, in which you as well as we have a great future, stifled and suffocated because they were for a moment in a less favorable competitive position.

You say that the British Empire is being asked to put bases all over the world at the disposal of other Nations. Of course it is. Would you like to see a world in which all ports were closed to all ships but their own or open to one foreign ship, perhaps two if they carried only passengers and cargo bound all the way from Liverpool to Shanghai? Where would England be if shipping were subjected to such limitations? Where will it be if
aviation is? I am unable to believe that you do not want an agreement at this time.

I can not agree that the answer is to hold everyone back. It must be rather to go forward together. I know the handicaps under which your aviation industry has laboured during the war. We have found ways to help you before and I am confident that we can find ways to help you in overcoming this. We are prepared to make transport aircraft freely available to you on the same terms as our own people can get them. Our only stipulation is that aviation must be permitted to develop, subject only to reasonable safeguards, as far as and as fast as human ingenuity and enterprise can take it.

We have no desire to monopolize air traffic anywhere. I do not see how increased frequencies on long routes would dominate traffic on short ones, when all lines would have the same right to increase their frequencies on the same basis. Nor do I see how in the long term such an arrangement would favor us over others, despite our head start.

You asked that I give further consideration to the fundamentals of your position and that I state the issues as I see them. I have done both and I am more convinced than ever that the answer is not to hold back but to go forward together.

I feel that the Conference can still reach an agreement vastly helpful both in the air and in wider fields. Swinton and Berle on November 27 publicly stated our respective positions. The smaller States have spoken and, if I may say so, our position seemed to have by far the greater support. If it is not possible to reach complete
agreement when our delegations have so closely approached it, the reasons, despite our best will, would be all too clear.

You speak of impartial arbitration within the general framework. The Canadians undoubtedly see both points of view, have laboured tirelessly to bring us together and on November 27 brought out a new formula which might provide a reasonable line of compromise if the small nations would indeed accept so limited a formula. I will give Berle latitude for one more try on the lines of that formula if you will give Swinton the same.

Given, on both sides, that spirit of justice and fair play of which you speak, I know that an agreement can be reached which will be equally beneficial to both our interests and to the world.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map
Room at 3001.00Z November 1944.

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

In accordance with your request of this morning, there is enclosed a draft of a further message to the Prime Minister concerning the Aviation Conference.

Enclosure:
Draft Message to the Prime Minister
I have given careful thought to your 836 and to the
problems which you cite. You know that I have no desire for
any arrangement by which our people would profit from the
sacrifices which yours have made in this war. Your confidence
in the justice and fair play of the American people is, I am
sure, justified. I have equal confidence that your people have
the same qualities and the same measure. I know that they want
equal opportunity in the air and unquestionably they should have
it. I can not believe that they would want aviation, in which
you as well as we have a great future, stifled and suffocated
because they were for a moment in a less favorable competitive
position.

You say that the British Empire is being asked to put
bases all over the world at the disposal of other Nations. Of
course it is. Would you like to see a world in which all ports
were closed to all ships but their own or open to one foreign
ship, perhaps two if there were 100 passengers and cargo bound all the way from Liverpool to Shanghai? Where would England
be if shipping were subjected to such limitations? Where
will it be if aviation is? I am unable to believe that you do
not want an agreement at this time.

I can not agree that the answer is to hold everyone back.
It must rather be to go forward together. I know the handicaps

While your aviation industry has laboured during the war. We have

found ways to help you before and I am confident that we can

find ways to help you in overcoming this. We are prepared to

make transport aircraft freely available to you and to our other

Allies on the same terms as our own people can get them. Our

only stipulation is that aviation must be permitted to develop,

subject only to reasonable safeguards. As far and as fast as

human ingenuity and enterprise can take it.

We have no desire to monopolize air traffic anywhere.

I do not see how increased frequencies on long routes would

dominate traffic on short ones, when all lines would have the

same right to increase their frequencies on the same basis. Nor

in the long term do I see how such an arrangement would favor us over others,

despite our head start. In the long term.

You asked that I give further consideration to the funda-

mentals of your position and that I state the issues as I see

them. I have done both and I am more convinced than ever that

the answer is not to hold back but to go forward together.

I feel that the Conference could not at this point

adjourned without serious consequences both by a future air

agreement and in wider fields, of which I have spoken before.

Swinton and Berle on November 27 publicly stated our respective
positions. The smaller states have spoken and, if I may say so, our position seemed to have by far the greater support.

If it is not possible to reach complete agreement when our delegations have so closely approached it, the reasons, despite our best will, will be all too clear.

You speak of impartial arbitration within the general framework. The Canadians undoubtedly see both points of view, have laboured tirelessly to bring us together and on November 27 brought out a new formula which might provide a reasonable line of compromise. I will give Berle latitude for one more try on the lines of that formula if you will give Swinton the same.

Given, on both sides, that spirit of justice and fair play of which you speak, I know that an agreement can be reached which will be equally beneficial to both our interests and to the world.
The President

TO

The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 661, 30 November 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Air Conference at Chicago.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #846, 28 Nov 44, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-559, and also referred by Admiral Brown to the State Dept for information, 28 Nov 44.

2. MR-1IN-190, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "Please take up MR-OUT-559 with Sec State and have him call Berle on the subject. The three of you work out an answer and send me a draft of it."

3. (Also see MR-OUT-563, from Berle to the President, re Air Conference.)

4. Reply prepared by State Dept, approved by Adm Leahy and forwarded to the President as MR-OUT-569, 29233552.

5. MR-1IN-191, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "MR-OUT-569 approved. Please send."

6. Dispatched 30 Nov 44.

7. Answered by PM-PRES #847, 1 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

COPY: "MR 210 AIR CONFERENCE"

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 Air Conference
30 November 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

NUMBER 662. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Ever so many happy returns of the day. I shall never forget the party with you and UJ a year ago and we must have more of them that are even better.

Affectionate regards.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 7 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 300310Z November 1944.

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM The President   TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE No. - 662, 30 November 1944.

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Churchill's birthday.

ACTION:

1. Received in Map Room from the President at Warm Springs as #5-IN-194, 3002452.
2. To Pa at 3001102.
3. Acknowledged in PM-PHRS #842, 3 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:   DATE:   BY DIRECTION OF:

---

0308