CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT

NOVEMBER 1944
To: The President of The United States
Sr: SL4

Personal and SECRET from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number SL4.

1. Your number 641. I send you in my immediately following the report which I called for from the First Sea Lord. The whole matter has been carefully studied by the Admiralty and, as you will see, every port is reported on separately. Our sailors have pretty good knowledge of these ports. On all this I consider the Black Sea out of the question and the Piraeus very little better.

2. I am somewhat attracted by the suggestion of Jerusalem. Here there are first-class hotels, government houses, etc., and every means can be taken to ensure security. The warships could probably lie at Haifa unless the weather turned very rough, in which case they could go to Port Said or Alexandria.

3. Alexandria would probably be a feasible proposition.

4. U.J., could come by special train, with every form of protection, from Moscow to Jerusalem, I am having

Read 05/09/202

W.B.

5th November 44
the timetables of the journeys studied and will telegraph to you about them.

5. I think we ought to put the proposition to U.J., and throw on him the onus of refusing. After all, we are respectable people too.

6. In the event of his not coming, I earnestly hope you will pay your long-promised and deferred visit to Great Britain and then visit your armies in France. The right thing would be to have the conference between us in Britain. I have trodden so often on your hospitality. We could no doubt get Molotov to deputize for Stalin. He counts for a lot.

7. Perhaps you would send me a draft of the telegram we should send to Stalin, after considering the information I am now sending you.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SkrllNo. or FILE NO. 814, 5 Nov 44.

DATE

TO SUBJ. 05/1312Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PMS #641, 2 Nov 44. (Continued in PM-PRES #815.)
2. Sent to President at Hyde Park as 48-OUT-510, 05/1312Z.
3. Answer written by the President after he had returned to Washington; sent to PM as PRES #564B, 14 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: 210 Argumant

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

210 (2)
5 November 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 815, 5 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and number 815.

The report of the First Sea Lord referred to in my number 814 follows:

I have examined the various alternatives for the forthcoming meeting. The considerations are as follows.

During November and December weather conditions are such that it is most desirable for ships to be berthed in a protected anchorage.

Weather conditions in the Aegean and Black Sea are usually bad in the winter, but good in the southern part of the eastern Mediterranean.

The northern part of the Black Sea and the approaches to the Crimea have been heavily mined. Russian minesweeping is an unknown quantity.

There may well be great difficulty in obtaining Turkish consent to the passage of warships through the Dardanelles, which is contrary to the Montreux Convention.
It is possible that the only solution would be for Turkey to become a belligerent. This question is, however, one for the Foreign Office.

A British cruiser could be sent to pick up passengers at any port in the Aegean or eastern Mediterranean, and, with some risk, at any Black Sea port.

My conclusions in general terms are as follows:

(A) Black Sea and Crimean ports should be ruled out on account of the minefields in the Black Sea and at the entrance to the Dardanelles. I would certainly not advise the safety of valuable units being dependent on Russian minesweeping. In addition, there is the almost certain lack of amenities, and bad weather conditions. The Montreux Convention is also relevant.

(B) In the Bosphorus the weather conditions are slightly better, and there are reasonably good anchorages. There is, however, the mining danger and the Montreux difficulty as in subpara (A) above.

(C) Aegean - battleships cannot enter the Piraeus. Phalerum Bay is a possible alternative but an open anchorage, and here again there is some danger from mines. Salonika, though good anchorage, has no amenities and malaria is rife. Mineable waters which have not yet been swept extend a long
way from the port.

(D) Cyprus Famagusta and Limassol are possible. But both are open anchorages. Malaria is prevalent and they are not recommended.

(E) Levant - Beirut and Haifa are open anchorages, but the weather should be moderate. There is reasonably good accommodation ashore. Haifa has rail and first class road communication with Jerusalem.

(F) Egypt - Alexandria is a first class port with a good climate and excellent accommodation ashore. There is some doubt, however, whether the largest battleships can traverse the approaches to the harbour. This is being confirmed. An alternative is Port Said, where battleships can berth within the harbour.

(G) Malta - An excellent harbour and some accommodation ashore.

Conclusions:

I find great difficulty in making any recommendation to suit all the conditions. The Aegean and Black Sea in my opinion are no places to hold conferences in the winter, let alone the mining danger. Of the ports considered above, I would recommend Alexandria first, with Port Said as its alternative if battleships cannot enter, and secondly Haifa, but this presupposes that Marshal Stalin is prepared
to make the long journey by train across Turkey or by sea from a Black Sea port. Failing these, Malta of course provides the necessary battleship anchorage and some accommodation.

Detailed notes on the various ports follow:

Black Sea ports—two considerations apply to all Black Sea ports:

1. The Montreux Convention:
2. Widespread mining is known to have been carried out, and the extent of sweeping by the Russians is unknown. The whole of the north-west section of the Black Sea (including Sevastopol, Nikolaev, Odessa and Constanza) is believed to be heavily mined. Nikolaev insufficient depth of water. Odessa open anchorage only. Constanza open anchorage only. Novorossisk open anchorage only. Crimea Sevastopol open anchorage only. Climate very cold. It is presumed that amenities in these ports have been largely wrecked.

Bosphorus—two considerations apply:
1. The Montreux Convention;
2. The approaches to the Dardanelles are known to have been heavily mined, and exact details are not known.

Possible anchorages are:
(A) Off Istanbul. There is a very strong current.

(B) One ship in Bay, and the other in Beikos Bay
(on the other side of the Bosphorus, about two and one quarter
miles away). There is not room for two ships in either of
these bays. Therapia is within easy distance (about one
mile) by boat from both these bays. Climate cold.

Phalerum Bay the nearest anchorage to Athens which
ships could use (within easy reach by road). The anchorage
is an open one, but ships could shift to Salamis Bay (also
within easy reach) in the event of Phalerum becoming untenable.
The approaches were all heavily mined but considerable
sweeping has been done (operation V) and cruisers now come
and go freely. Suggest route from Russia would be by rail
from Tiflis to Beirut, and thence by sea - or it may be
possible to go direct by rail through Roumania and Bulgaria.
Climate temperate.

Salonika a good protected anchorage, but involving
a long approach through waters which may be heavily mined.
Malaria is rife. Route from Russia as for Phalerum Bay.

Cyprus only open anchorages are available - off
Famagusta and Limassol. Ships could shift from one to
the other in the event of bad weather. These places are
connected by an asphalt all - weather road, but are 60 miles
apart. Suggested route from Russia would be by rail from
Tiflis to Beirut, and thence by sea. Accommodation Ashore—
is limited to government buildings and a few small hotels.
Climate temperate. There is a danger of Malaria.

Beirut open anchorage. Climate temperate with little
risk of gales, but fairly heavy rainfall. Some hotels.
Direct rail communication with Tiflis.

Haifa open anchorage. Climate temperate with little
risk of gales, but fairly heavy rainfall. Rail and first
class road communication with Jerusalem direct rail communica-
tion with Tiflis.

Alexandria a good protected anchorage with ample
berthing space for both battleships. It is possible to
reach Alexandria by rail from Tiflis. Hotel accommodation
plentiful. Climate good.

* Being serviced.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 816, 5 November 1944 Filed 050920Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret number 816.

First sentence showing garble should read:
(B) One ship in Buyukdere Bay, and other in Beikos Bay (on the other side of the Bosphorus, about two and one quarter miles away).

Second sentence showing garble should read:
The approaches were all heavily mined but considerable sweeping has been done (operation MANNA) and cruisers now come and go freely.

No Sig.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 815, 5 Nov 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 05/1720Z VI. Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting.

ACTION:
1. Continuation of PM-PRES #814, which answered BRES-PM #643, 2 Nov 44.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-512, 05/1720Z.
3. Answer written by the President after he had returned to Washington; sent to PM as PRES #648, 14 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: 210 Argus

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

218 (2)
8 November 1944

TOP SECRET

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 816, 8 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 816 personal

I always said that a great people could be trusted to stand by the pilot who weathered the storm. It is an indescribable relief to me that our comradeship will continue and will help to bring the world out of misery.

I send you, as you have forgotten it, a copy of the telegram I sent you in 1940, much of which is true today. Signed Winston.

Prime

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Red 08/12102

TOP SECRET

File Copy

0320
To the President at Hyde Park as AR-OUT-525, 0816252. (See further PM #817, 8 Nov 44.)
2. Reply by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 10 Nov 44; sent to the PM as PRES #646, 10 Nov 44.

To: The President of The United States

Nr: 817, 6 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 817 personal

and

My immediately preceding telegram. Here is the text of what I sent you on November 6, 1940.

I did not think it right for me as a foreigner to express any opinion upon American Politics while the election was on but now I feel that you will not mind my saying that I prayed for your success and that I am truly thankful for it. This does not mean that I seek or wish for anything more than the full, fair and free play of your mind upon the world issues now at stake in which our two nations have to discharge their respective duties.

We are entering upon a sombre phase of what must evidently be a protracted and broadening war, and I look forward to being able to interchange my thoughts with you in all that confidence and goodwill which has grown up between us since I went to the Admiralty at the outbreak.
Things are afoot which will be remembered as long as the English language is spoken in any quarter of the globe, and in expressing the comfort I feel that the people of the United States have once again cast these great burdens upon you.

I must avow my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bring us all safely to anchor.

No Sig.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

INTELLIGENCE FILE No. #817, 8 Nov 44.

TO MAP ROOM 0816002 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Election congratulations

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park as 48-OUT-256, 0816252. (See also PM #816, 8 Nov 44.)
2. Reply by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 10 Nov 44; sent to the PM as PRES #646, 10 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: Date: BY DIRECTION OF:

000.1
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 818, 8 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 818 personal and

Your number 643 anti-U-boat statement for October. Proposed
text is admirable but would you accept following rewording of para-
graph 2 in order to make it a bit clearer for our paper?

"Although the number of German U-boats destroyed was less than
what has come to be considered a good monthly "bag", it compares very
favourably with the number of Allied merchant vessels sunk by U-boats."

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Gort., State Dept. tel., S-22-76
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

Subject or File No. 818, 8 November 1944

To Map Room 0816002 VI Army Code Room

Date

Subject: October Sub Statement

ACTION:

1. Answered PRESS-FM #642, 6 Nov 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as AR-OUT-528 (0816252)
3. Navy Dept and OMI notified by memorandum that FM had suggested change, but that President had not yet cleared the change due to his absence from the White House.
4. AR-IN-184, from the President to Admiral Leahy, stated "Yr AR-OUT-528. Approved."
5. AR-IN-184, to Admiral Leahy’s office. Admiral Leahy was not available. With approval of Colonel Park, message drafted and sent by Commander Smith. Sent to FM as PRESS #642, 8 Nov 44.
6. Navy Department notified by phone; corrected copy sent to Bur of Public Relations on morning of 9 Nov 44; Navy Department stated they would inform OMI.

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

000.7 (3)
To: The President of The United States
No. 819   8 November 1944   Filed: 0823322

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 819 personal and

Your 642. This was not sent in a cypher corresponding to our one time pad and consequently cannot be published as it stands. Will you trust me to paraphrase it and publish it, together with a suitable acknowledgment of thanks from me.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks   Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 819, 9 Nov 44.
DATE: 9/0110
TOR MAP hXXX: VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Release to press of statement re Sir John Dill.

ACTION:
1. See PRES-PM #642, 6 Nov 44; PM-PRES #620, 10 Nov 44.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-532.
3. Message read by Admiral Leahy, who prepared reply approving release of PRES #642; sent to PM as PRES #645, 9 Nov 44, 091509Z.
4. At 091658 the following message was received from President as MR-IN-186: "Tr MR-OUT-532 approved. Please prepare and transmit reply accordingly." Admiral Leahy's office notified; no further action since message had already been sent.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Sir John Dill: 000.7

0328
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 820, 10 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 820.
I was deeply moved by your message on the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

The kindness and goodwill with which he was throughout his mission treated by all the high officers of the United States and the consideration which you always showed him made his task fruitful in the highest degree.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister  TO The President  

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 820, 10 Nov 44.

DATE 10 Nov 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 1016252 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of President's condolences on death of Sir John Dill.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #642, 6 Nov 44. (Also see PM-PRES #819, 9 Nov 44, and PRES-PM #645, 9 Nov 44.)
2. Sent to the President gis usher.
3. No further reply.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature]

Sir John
12 November 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 821, 12 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and No 821.

I have seen your directive of 1st November to the U. S. Secretary of War about the Italian grain ration, and I hope you will not mind my saying that you have jumped a good many fences. It will be difficult to give our ex enemies in Italy more than our Allies in Greece and Yougoslavia, and I hope your people will bear this in mind.

You will understand why I am rather anxious about commitments of this sort, which are bound to tie up so much shipping. I trust that the U.S. War Department will take steps to provide the additional tonnage, which we cannot ourselves provide, to carry the increased supplies.

As regards economic assistance to Italy generally, dealt with in NAP 910, MacMillan is coming here soon and has asked that this question should be kept open until he has taken over as Acting President of the Allied Commission.
I also hope that United States military personnel will not - as was suggested by the War Department - be withdrawn from commission in the meantime.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
General McFarland:

The attached paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 12 November 1944, on the subject of increased supplies of grain to Italy, is forwarded for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military aspects of the problem and for preparation of a draft reply to be made to the Prime Minister.

(W. D. Leahy)
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 821, 12 NOVEMBER 1944

I hope that you won't mind my saying that you have jumped a
good many fences in your directive of 1 November to your Secretary of
War about the Italian ration of grain, which I have just read. I hope
your people will consider that it will be difficult to give more to
our ex-enemies in Italy than to our Greek and Yugoslavian Allies.

Commitments of this sort are bound to tie up a great deal of
shipping, and because of this you will understand why I am rather
anxious. We cannot provide the additional required tonnage, and I
trust that your War Department will adopt measures to carry the in-
creased supplies.

MacMillan, who is coming here soon, has asked that the question
of general economic assistance to Italy be kept open until he has taken
over as the Allied Commission's acting President. This subject of eco-
nomic assistance to Italy generally was dealt with in NAP 810.

The War Department's suggestion that military personnel be with-
drawn from the Commission in the meantime will, I hope, not be followed.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 821, 12 NOVEMBER 1944

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Commitments of this sort are bound to tie up a great deal of shipping, and because of this you will understand why I am rather anxious. We can not provide the additional required tonnage, and I trust that your War Department will adopt measures to carry the increased supplies.

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The War Department's suggestion that military personnel be withdrawn from the Commission in the meantime will, I hope, not be followed.

Paraphrase for Adams Daily

To give to J. P. S.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 821, 12 Nov 44.
DATE: 12/18352

FOR MAP ROOM: Via Army Code Room.

SUBJECT: Italian grain ration.

ACTION:
1. To President via usher.
2. To J.C.S. for preparation of draft reply.
3. Reply by Joint Chiefs; first two paragraphs added by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 21 Nov 44; sent to PM as PRESS #693, 21 Nov 44.

COPIES TO:
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DATE: 13 Nov 44

BY DIRECTION OF: The President (for reply)

All Italy; 210 Allied Control Commission, Italy.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 822

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 822.

1. Your number 647.
Thank you so much. It is a great relief to us to get this
brute where we have long wanted her.

2. Your number 648.
I am very sorry that you are inclined to make no further
effort to procure a triple meeting in December, and I will send
you a separate telegram making some further suggestions about
this.

3. Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-De
Gaulle trip. I certainly had a wonderful reception from about
half a million French in the Champs Elysees and also from the
party opposition centre at the Hotel de Ville. I reestablished
friendly private relations with DeGaulle, who is better since he
has lost a large part of his inferiority complex.

4. I see statements being put out in the French press
and other quarters that all sorts of things were decided by us in Paris. You may be sure that our discussions on important things took place solely on an ad referendum basis to the three great powers, and of course especially to you who have by far the largest forces in France. Eden and I had a two-hours talk with De Gaulle and two or three of his people after luncheon on the 11th. De Gaulle asked a number of questions which made me feel how very little they were informed about anything that had been decided or was taking place. He is of course anxious to obtain full modern equipment for eight more divisions which can only be supplied by you. SHAEF reasonably contends that these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the field and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep of the actual forces that will win the battles of the winter and spring. I reinforced this argument.

5. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take over more line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what is left of it, and there may be plenty, and not to have to go into Germany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that this was a sentimental point which ought never the less to receive consideration. The important thing for
France was to have an army prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge, namely their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly France behind the front of our armies, and secondly to assist in the holding down of parts of Germany later on.

6. On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany not merely as sub-participation under British or American command but as a French command. I expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that there will be a time not many years distant when the American armies will go home and when the British will have great difficulty in maintaining large forces overseas, so contrary to our mode of life and disproportionate to our resources, and I urged them to study the type of army fitted for that purpose, which is totally different in form from the organization by divisions required to break the resistance of a modern war-hardened enemy army. They were impressed by this argument but nevertheless pressed their view.

7. I see a Reuter message, emanating no doubt unofficially from Paris, that it was agreed France should be assigned certain areas, the Ruhr, the Rhineland, etc, for their troops to garrison.
There is no truth in this and it is obvious that nothing of this kind can be settled on such a subject except in agreement with you. All I said to De Gaulle on this was that we had made a division of Germany into Russian, British and United States spheres: roughly, the Russians had the east, the British the north and the Americans the south. I further said that, speaking for His Majesty's Government, the less we had of it the better we should be pleased and that we would certainly favour the French taking over as large a part as their capacity allowed, but that all this must be settled at an inter-Allied table. I could of course issue something which would be a disclaimer of any loose statements made by Reuter, but you may not think this necessary in view of the obvious facts. I am telegraphing to U. J. in the same sense. We did not attempt to settle anything finally or make definite agreements.

8. It is evident however that there are a number of questions which press for decision at a level higher than that of the high commands, without which decisions no clear guidance can be given to the high commands. Here is another reason why we should have a triple meeting if U. J. will not come, or a quadruple meeting if he will. In the latter case the French would be in on some
subjects and out on others. One must always realize that before five years are out there must be made a French army to take on the main task of holding down Germany. The main question of discussion between Eden and Bidault was Syria, which was troublesome, lengthy and inconclusive but primarily our worry.

9. I thought I would give you this account at once in case of further tendentious statements being put out in the press. (Foreign Minister (Command 292))

10. I thought very well of Bidault. He looks like a younger and better looking Reynaud, especially in speech and smiling. He made a very favourable impression on all of us and there is no doubt that he has a strong share in the power. Giraud was at the banquet apparently quite content. What a change in fortunes since Casablanca. Generally I felt in the presence of an organised government, broadly based and of rapidly-growing strength, and I am certain that we should be most unwise to do anything to weaken it in the eyes of France at this difficult, critical time. I had a considerable feeling of stability in spite of communist threats, and that we could safely take them more into our confidence. I hope you will not consider that I am putting on French clothes when I say this. Let me know your thoughts. I will cable you later about
the meeting and the meat.

Prime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>822, 16 Nov 44.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOP MAP ROOM</td>
<td>160308Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Tirpitz; tripartite meeting; Prime's trip to France.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. To the President via usher. Answers PRES #647, #648.
2. To Admiral Leahy for action.
3. Admiral Leahy prepared draft reply. Given to Admiral Brown by the President to be reworded so that it would read more personally.
4. Admiral Brown's draft approved by the President 18 Nov 44; sent to the PM as PRES #649, 18 Nov 44.

**COPIES TO:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Extract:</th>
<th>210 Argonaut</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

"210°; 400 Lift; 000.9 Churchill; 011 France; 160."
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 823
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Top Secret. No. 823.

1. I feel it of great importance to have Field Marshall Dill's position filled by someone who would have access to you from time to time and would have a status which would enable him to be in very close touch with Marshall. I can find only one officer with these credentials. General Maitland Wilson as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean has worked very well with all your people and is in full possession of the general outlook upon the war as a whole. I propose, with your agreement, to appoint him to the vacant post as head of the British Military Mission and as my official representative in military matters at Washington. I consider he has all the qualities necessary for this task.

2. I propose to you that General Alexander should become Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean in
succession to General Wilson, with General McNarney as his deputy, and that General Mark Clark should command the 16th Group of Armies in Italy. In Alexander we have a man whom you know and respect and who is in the most friendly relations with Clark. The course of our general strategy has since the capture of Rome not been favourable to Alexander's activities. But he has the entire confidence of his troops and of His Majesty's government. As Supreme Allied Commander, General Alexander would exercise full authority and responsibility for the operations in the field.

3. I have been disturbed by the immense staffs which have grown up in the Mediterranean Theatre, one for the armies at the front and the other for the Allied Supreme Commander at Caserta. These commands should be combed and where possible amalgamated and reduced to the minimum necessary.

4. I hope therefore that I may have your agreement to the following:

(A) General Maitland Wilson to succeed Dill.

(B) General Alexander to be Supreme Allied
Commander in the Mediterranean.
(C) General Mark Clark to command the group of armies on the Italian front.

5. I should be grateful to have your concurrence as soon as possible in these appointments which I am sure are in our common and closely linked interests.

Prime.
FROM: The Prime Minister  TO: The President

SPECIAL or FILE NO.: 823, 17 Nov 44.

DATE: 17/22502

VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Assignment of Gen Wilson to CCS; commands in Mediterranean.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. To Admiral Leahy to take up with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Draft reply prepared in Chief of Staff's office; approved by the President 20 Nov 44; sent as PRES-PW #652, 20 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DATE: 18 Nov 44

BY DIRECTION OF: The President (for reply)

[Signature]

[Postage stamp: 30c, 10c Gen Wilson; 10c Gen Alexander; 10c Gen Clark]

0347
18 November 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 824 Filed: 1815592

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.
No. 824. Your 638.

In deference to your view, we have decided to omit from our publication shipping losses which occurred since the 1st January 1944. We propose to publish about noon on 28 November. We are sending over to you by air via the Embassy copies of the figures of shipping losses which will be included in our publication.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

[Redacted]

Red: 18/1820Z
TRUN - PUB
Navy + DNI informed W.
18 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
VICE ADMIRAL EDWARDS,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

We have received word that the British will publish,
on 28 November 1944, merchant shipping losses—British, Allied,
and neutral—up to 1 January 1944; and that they are sending us,
by air mail, a copy of the figures which they intend to include
in the publication.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to: Director of OWI.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPRIETARY

The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 824, 18 November 1944.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM 181830Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Publication of shipping losses.

ACTION:

1. Answer press-pm #638, 26 Oct 44.
2. To the President via usher.
4. No reply.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7 (8)
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 825 Filed 1922202
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and number 825.

1. Naturally I am very sorry to receive your numbers 649 and 650.

2. Your message to U. J. will, of course, make it certain that he will not come anywhere before the end of January. Also you yourself give independently the important reasons which make it difficult for you to come earlier.

3. These reasons, I fear, destroy the hope which we had cherished that you would now pay your long-promised visit to Great Britain, and that we two could meet here in December and ask U. J. to send Molotov, who would be an adequate deputy. It is a great disappointment to me that this prospect should be indefinitely postponed.

4. There is, in my opinion, much doubt whether U. J. would be willing or able to come to an Adriatic port by January 30th, or that he would be willing to come on a non-Russian vessel through

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
this extremely heavily-mined sea. However, if he accepts we shall, of course, be there. I note you do not wish the French to be present. I had thought they might come in towards the end in view of their vital interests in the arrangements made for policing Germany, as well as in all questions affecting the Rhine frontiers.

5. Even if a meeting can be arranged by the end of January, the two and a half intervening months will be a serious hiatus. There are many important matters awaiting settlement, for example. The treatment of Germany and the future world organisation, relations with France, the position in the Balkans, as well as the Polish question, which ought not to be left to moulder.

6. Para two of your 649 causes me alarm. If after Germany's collapse you "must bring the American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit" and if the French are to have no equipped post-war army or time to make one, or to give it battle experience, how will it be possible to hold down western Germany beyond the present Russian occupation line? We certainly could not undertake the task without your aid and that of the French. All would therefore rapidly disintegrate as it did last time. I hope, however, that my fears are groundless. I put my faith in you.

Prime.

[Signature]

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0352
FROM  The Prime Minister TO  The President

TO  or FILE NO.

DATE  825, 19 Nov 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting; American occupation of Germany.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-FM #649 and #650, 18 Nov 44.
2. To President via usher. Reply to Churchill held up pending receipt of answer to PRES-STALIN #124, 18 Nov 44.
3. Answered by Cen. FM #659, 21 Nov 44, which was prepared
   by Eden Leary.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 321 Lance: 321 Germany
19 November 1944

To: President of the United States
Nr: 826 Filed 1922202

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and

Your 651. I should be very grateful if you would read again the correspondence which has passed between us on this subject. I have had all the telegrams printed in a convenient form and am sending you two copies by air. It is on this basis that I shall venture to put our case before you.

End

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-2972
By R. H. Farkas Date May 6 1972

Rec'd 20/00072 &
Tobias Winick

File Copy
Frm: The Prime Minister  To: The President

To: The President Via: Army Code Room

Subj: Argentine Beef.

Action:

1. Answers PRESS-PW #651, 19 Nov 44.
2. To the President via usher.
3. No action taken on this message. Awaiting "printed form" which the Prime Minister states he is sending to the President.
4. Further answered by PW-PRES #632, 26 Nov 44.

Copies To: Date: By Direction Of:

603-052 Argentina
To: The President of the United States

Date: 22 February 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Person and No. 827.

We have sat all day on your message No. 654 which only reached me at 2:15 A.M. this morning.

The cabinet after prolonged discussion desire me to send to you the following expression of their views which I endorse.

If there is anything in this message on which you would like further explanation I earnestly request that you should send for Lord Swinton.

Message from Cabinet begins:

1. We would like to draw your attention to the course of the negotiations at Chicago which have been marked by a large measure of concessions on both sides.

2. Whereas, in order to reach a common agreement your Delegation has agreed to a method of regulating the share of the various countries on the different routes and of regulating the fares, we have agreed to the throwing open of our airfields all...
over the world to aircraft of other nationalities and to such planes being able to carry not only through traffic but local traffic between two neighbouring countries on the route.

3. We had very much hoped that the agreement thus arrived at between your Delegation and ours, which was embodied in the form of the draft of November 17, would be a satisfactory document to submit for the approval of the whole body of the conference.

4. We feel that we have gone to the limit of concession in this draft especially with relation to the so-called Esca
   lator Clause which enabled the share of operators to be increased if they in fact carry more traffic between terminals than they are allotted under the frequency arrangements.

5. In our understanding it was only because of the new proposals brought forward by your Delegation on the evening of November 18 after the agreement had been arrived at, that the present difficulties have arisen. These proposals we could not accept, since they demand a share of the local traffic between two neighbouring countries by the aircraft of a third country far beyond that which the granting of the right to take up traffic on

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
through service would warrant.

6. We were prepared to agree to the so-called Fifth Freedom subject to adequate protection of the local operators by a price differential, to which your Delegates agreed in the draft accepted.

7. We are, of course, prepared to stand by what Swinton had already agreed with Berlin, but we cannot see our way to accept these new suggestions put forward, which would gravely jeopardize our own position.

8. We suggest, therefore, that if you are unable to confirm the agreement arrived at on November 17 by our Delegations at Chicago, the Conference should finalize the valuable technical agreements which have been arrived at, and that the rest of the matters should be adjourned for a time during which we can consider the matter more fully and see whether there is some solution of the problem at which we can arrive.

9. We share with you the most earnest desire to come to a fair and satisfactory agreement by which both our countries can play their full part in the development of world wide civil aviation as soon as possible.
10. We hope that you will be able to examine this and we feel sure you will agree that it is a wise and workable compromise between two points of view which originally diverged widely.

Prime.
23 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. J. E. BROWN

Hereewith is cable mentioned in our telephone conversation this morning.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
PA-FRES, #827,
22 Nov 44.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
From: The Prime Minister  
To: The President  
Number 827  

Your message No. 694 reached me in the early hours of the morning and we have worked on it all day.

After prolonged discussion the Cabinet wish me to forward to you the following expression of their views which is endorsed by me. I earnestly request that you should send for Lord Swinton if there is anything in this message on which you would like further explanation.

Cabinet message follows:

"We wish to draw your attention to the course of the negotiations at Chicago which have witnessed a great number of concessions by both of us.  

"That we might reach a common agreement, we have agreed to throwing open our airfields all over the world to aircraft of other nationalities and to such planes being able to carry not only through traffic but local traffic between two neighbouring countries on the route and your delegation has agreed to a method of regulating the share of the various countries on the different routes and of regulating the fares.

"It had been our hope that the agreement thus reached by our two delegations, which was made a part of the form of the draft of November 17, would be a satisfactory document to submit to the whole body of the conference for approval.

"Especially in respect to the so-called Escalator Clause which enabled the share of operators to be increased if they in fact carry more traffic between terminals than they are allotted under the frequency arrangements, we feel that we have gone to the limit of concession in this draft."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 6-20-72  
By R. H. Parks  Date  MAY 6 1972  

0361
"The present difficulties have arisen as we understand it because of the new proposals brought forward by your delegation on the evening of November 13 after the agreement had been reached. Since these proposals demand a share of the local traffic between two neighbouring countries by aircraft of a third country far beyond that which the granting of the right to take up traffic on through service would warrant, we could not accept them.

"Subject to adequate protection of the local operators by a price differential, to which your delegates agreed in the accepted draft, we were prepared to agree to the so-called Fifth Freedom.

"We cannot see our way to accept these new suggestions, which would gravely jeopardize our own position, but, of course, we are prepared to stand by what Swinton had already agreed with Britain.

"Therefore, we suggest that if you cannot confirm the agreement reached on November 17, the Conference should finalize the valuable technical agreements which have been arrived at, and that the rest of the matters should be adjourned for a period during which we can consider the matter at greater length and see whether we can arrive at some solution of the problem.

"We partake with you the most sincere wish to reach a fair and satisfactory arrangement by which our two countries can play their full part in the development of world-wide civil aviation at the earliest time.

"We hope you will have an opportunity to examine this and we feel sure you will agree that two points of view which originally diverged widely are joined in a wise and workable compromise."
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 827, 22 Nov 44.

TO Map Room 222240Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Aviation conference in Chicago.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM, #827, 22 Nov 44.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-54.1, 22 Nov 44.
3. By direction Mr. Hopkins, paraphrased copy sent to State Dept for preparation of reply.
4. Draft reply submitted by State Department to Mr. Hopkins. Several changes made by Mr. Hopkins. Sent to the President at Hyde Park for his approval as MR-OUT-54.5, 241400Z.
5. President telephoned Mr. Hopkins giving his approval to the message as written. Message sent as PRES-WINANT #126, 24 Nov 44. Note that message was sent to Winant to be given personally to the Prime Minister.

(Copy filed in PM folder.)

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(Copy filed in PM folder.)

To: The President of the United States

Nr: 828

Personal and Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Number 828.

Your Number 655°. I have consulted the Cabinet and separately the Chiefs of Staff and we all gravely doubt whether any such statement should be made. I do not think that the Germans are very much afraid of the treatment they will get from the British and American armies or governments. What they are afraid of is a Russian occupation, and a large proportion of their people being taken off to toil to death in Russia, or as they say, Siberia. Nothing that we can say will eradicate this deep seated fear.

2. Moreover, U. J. certainly contemplates demobilizing two or three million Nazi youth, Gestapo men, etc., doing prolonged reparations work, and it is hard to say that he is wrong. We could not therefore give the Germans any assurances on this subject without consultations with U. J.

3. It seems to me that if I were a German soldier or general, I should regard any such statement at this juncture, when the battle
for Cologne is at its height, as a confession of weakness on our part and as proof positive of the advantages of further desperate resistance. The Chiefs of the Staff and Ministry of Information both independently agree with me that this might well be the consequence of any such announcement now. I do not see any alternative to the General Grant attitude "To fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer". We, therefore, are opposed to any reassurance being volunteered by us at this juncture.

4. The brilliant French success in the south, your capture of Metz and the break-through of the Seventh American Army upon Strasbourg now taken are substantial facts which must be added to the intense pressure of the American First and Ninth Armies and our own British efforts towards Venlo. Even if we do not conquer at the strongest point towards Cologne, enough has been already gained to make the battle a notable step towards our goal. Words, I am sure, would play no part now and we can, it seems to me, speak no words of which the Russians, who are still holding on their front double the number of divisions opposite us, are not parties.

5. I, therefore, earnestly hope that we shall fight the battle out till winter comes about the middle of December and throw

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By R. B. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
extra weight into the points of penetration. I am sure it would be hurtful to our prestige and even to our initiative if we seemed to try high-level appeals to the Germans now. All kinds of propaganda can be thrown across the battle-fronts locally as they do to us, and the staffs are working at a plan on which a separate telegram will be sent, which is designed to meet Eisenhower’s desire to get at German morale by underground methods. But to make the great governments responsible for anything which would look like appeasement now would worsen our chances, confess our errors and stiffen the enemy resistance. Please, however, do not hesitate to correct me if you think I am wrong. Meanwhile, I remain set where you put me on unconditional surrender.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 24, 24 November 1944

TO MAP ROOM 242107 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Proposed statement to German people to break German morale.

ACTION:

1. Anwera PRES-WA #655, 22 Nov 44.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-548, 2422362.
3. The President, in WR-IN-188, 2423232, directed as be referred to Admiral Leahy and that it be paraphrased and sent to Gen Eisenhower.
4. Paraphrased and sent to Gen Eisenhower as PRES-EISENHOWER #127, 25 Nov 44.
5. Draft reply prepared by adm Leahy; approved by the President; sent to PM as PRES #637, 26 Nov 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

See Germany; 000.7
To: The President of the United States
Nr.: 829  Filed 25/22452
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Nr. 829. Your 652.

1. General Wilson has gratefully accepted appointment.

My immediately following telegram contains the announcements
which I suggest should be made in London and Washington simultaneously at 23.30 GMT on Sunday, November 26.

2. Alexander has, off the record and very privately expressed a keen desire to have Truscott for the Fifth Army.

Thus, we should get the Anzio crowd together. I ventured to
mention this to Ike when I saw him last week, and he told me
that he had been planning to have Truscott as one of his army
commanders, but that this would not mature before next May. In
the circumstances, he would not stand in his way for this im-
mediate appointment: indeed, he thought it far the best. I
await your decision on this point.

Prime.

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By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 6 1972

Recd. 24/01/46
Filed for delivery in Adm. TPV May 7/5004
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 829, 26 November 1944

TOR MAP ROOM 26/01/62 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Announcement of General Wilson's appointment to CCS; Assigning Truscott to 5th Army.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #552, 20 Nov 44.
2. To President via tray 26/1200.
3. (See further PM-PRES #630, 26 Nov 44.)
4. To Admiral Leahy and Joint Chiefs for action. Leahy prepared answer, approved by the President, sent to PM as PRES #650, 27 Nov 44.
5. (For answer to Para 1 of PM #829, see PRES-PM #656, 26 Nov 44, which also answers PM #830, 26 Nov 44.)
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England  
To: The President of the United States  
Nr: 830  
Filed 25/12452  
Prime Minister to President, Roosevelt, Personal and Confidential  
No. 830.

My immediately preceding telegram.

1. I suggest the following for the British Press.

"The Prime Minister and Minister of Defence has appointed General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GCB, GBE, DSO, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and his personal representative on military matters with the President of the United States in succession to the late Field Marshal Sir John Dill, GCB, GCMG, DSO".

"Consequent on the above, the following appointments, which are the result of agreement between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, are announced:—

"General Sir Harold Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, to be Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre".

"Lieut. General Mark Clark, United States Army, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Fifteenth Group of Armies in Italy".

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-26-72
By R. H. Fain  
Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy  
Filed 24/2552  
Held for delivery in M. TPW May 26/3002.

0370
"The War Office announce that the King has been graciously pleased to approve the promotion of General Sir Harold Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, (late Irish Guards) to be Field Marshal, supernumerary to establishment, with effect from June 6th, 1944, the date of the capture of Rome".

Prime.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, Office of War Information

London will release the following announcement at 2330 GMT, Sunday, 26 November. The President directs that OWI release simultaneously.

"The Prime Minister and Minister of Defence has appointed General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GCB, GBE, DSO, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and his personal representative on military matters with the President of the United States in succession to the late Field Marshal Sir John Dill, GCB, GCMG, DSO.

"Consequent on the above, the following appointments, which are the result of agreement between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States are announced:

"General Sir Harold Alexander, GCB, CH, DSO, MC, to be Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

"Lieut. General Mark Clark, United States Army, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Fifteenth Group of Armies in Italy."

"The War Office announce that the King has been graciously pleased to approve the promotion of General Sir Harold Alexander, GCB, CH, DSO, MC (late Irish Guards) to be Field Marshal, supernumerary to establishment, with effect from June 4th, 1944, the date of the capture of Rome."

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President.

cc: Secretary Early
Admiral King
General Marshall
Navy Dept., OSS

26 November 1944
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 830, 26 Nov 44.

TOR: Map Room 26/0245E

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Announcement of Wilson's assignment to CCS; Alexander and Clark

ACTION:

1. Further to PM-PRES #829, 26 Nov 44, which see.
2. To President on breakfast tray.
3. Reply written by Admiral Leahy in the Map Room; approved by the President; dispatched to the Prime Minister as PRES-PW #656, 26 Nov.

[Blank space for copies, date, and direction]

To: The President of the United States

Mr.: 831. Filed 26/10372

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and No. 831.

Cherwell has told me how very kind the U. S. Army and Navy were in showing him their latest developments in many fields and in entertaining him at their various establishments. Perhaps if you thought it well, you would transmit my thanks to them and especially to General Groves who went to so much trouble to show Cherwell the latest developments in his particular field.

Perhaps you might also think fit to express my gratitude to the TUVE establishment at Silver Springs whose work on the proximity fuses has proved so valuable in defending London against the robot bombs.

MAP ROOM NOTE: TUVE establishment named for Dr. Merrill A. Tuve, a professor from Carnegie Institute of Technology. His work is in the laboratory of Terrestrial Magnetism Department of OSRD. (Organization of Scientific Research and Development) - He is in Section T which comes under the Navy and to which he is attached for this purpose. In Section T he is engaged in Applied Physics, apparently working on the type of fuse mentioned above. - He evidently took Lord Cherwell under his wing when he was on his visit here.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 831, 26 Nov 44.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM 261330Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Expression of thanks.

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.
2. No reply made to the PA by the President.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

070
26th November 1944


To: The President of The United States

No: 832

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret.

1. You will by now have received the print I sent you about the Argentines and British meat contracts. May I ask you to read again my telegram of 11th July 1944, with its enclosure of the minute by the Food Minister in which you will see that the contract mentioned was one of three-four years. It was in reply to this telegram that you sent your 730 of July 23d, which began "I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat to England. Heaven knows that it is quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract". See also the last sentence of my reply to Stettinius of August 5th.

2. It is perfectly clear there that we had your full agreement in making a three-four years contract in July. However on October 11th you sent me a strongish telegram to Moscow asking that we would continue on "a month to month basis for some time to come". In order to meet your wishes at a critical time
I agreed "that no long term contract is to be negotiated for the next couple of months or so and that we are to proceed meanwhile on a month to month basis during which time we can discuss matters further".

3. The "couple of months or so" is now nearly up and of course the Food Minister wishes to make his contract. I have however already received your number 651 in which you express a wish for further prolongation of the month to month basis. From the beginning I have told my colleagues that owing to our financial relationship and the scale on which you are helping us to play our part in the common war effort and for many other kindly and friendly acts I would not allow money to count in the matter. I have absolved the Minister of Food from his duty of making the most thrifty contracts in his power and have said that only if our food supply in beef and mutton is endangered should we have to resist your desires.

4. I have put this matter strongly to the Cabinet and they agreed about the money aspect and also felt the risk of our losing our meat supply might be accepted in the near future. In consequence we shall be prepared to continue on a month to month basis for six months from 1st December 1944. We do this on the understanding, to which I am sure you will agree, that...
all your influence and weight will be used to keep other buyers out of the Argentine market and make sure they do not get refrigerated cargo space. We hope this will be satisfactory to you. It is always my earnest desire to assist you in any way we can, having regard to all the many things you do for us.

5. Since however I brought this matter before the Cabinet I received the document contained in my immediately following telegram. I was of course very much hurt that this form of pressure should be applied to us, and I hope it will not be thought that the Cabinet was aware of it or influenced by it at the time they agreed to my request. It seems almost to amount to a threat of indirect blockade arising out of a matter on which I have your promise of July 28th. I feel sure that you yourself were not aware that this document was being sent to us and certainly Ambassador Hinant knew nothing of its delivery.

I am therefore withholding it from circulation to the Cabinet.

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signature: WINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.

Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.G.

7 Incls.

Incl 1. WINANT-PRES #1069,
26 Nov 44.

Incl 2. PM-PRES #832,
26 Nov 44.

Incl 3. PM-PRES #833,
26 Nov 44.

Incl 4. PM-PRES #730,
14 July 44.

Incl 5. PM-PRES #731,
14 July 44.

Incl 6. PRES-PM #588,
22 July 44.

Incl 7. PRES-PM #628,
10 Oct 44.

- 1 -
1. You will by now have received the print I sent you about the Argentine and British meat contracts. May I ask you to read again my telegram of 11th July 1944, with its enclosure of the minute by the Food Minister in which you will see that the contract mentioned was one of three-four years. It was in reply to this telegram that you sent your 730 of July 23rd, which began "I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat to England. Heaven knows that it is quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract." See also the last sentence of my reply to Stettinius of August 5th.

2. It is perfectly clear there that we had your full agreement in making a three-four years contract in July. However on October 11th you sent me a strongish telegram to Moscow asking that we would continue on "a month to month basis for some time to come." In order to meet your wishes at a critical time I agreed "that no long term contract is to be negotiated for the next couple of months or so and that we are to proceed meanwhile on a month to month basis during which time we can discuss matters further."

3. The "couple of months or so" is now nearly up and of course the Food Minister wishes to make his contract. I have however already received your number 651 in which you express a wish for further prolongation of the month to month basis. From the beginning I have told my colleagues that owing to our financial relationship and the scale on which you are helping us to play our part in the common war effort and for many other kindly and friendly acts I would not allow money to count in the matter. I have absolved the Minister of Food from his duty of making the most thrifty contracts in his power and have said that only if our food supply in beef and mutton is endangered should we have to resist your desires.

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of indirect blockade arising out of a matter on which I have your promise of July 23d. I feel sure that you yourself were not aware that this document was being sent to us and certainly Ambassador Winant knew nothing of its delivery.

I am therefore withholding it from circulation to the Cabinet.

PRIME

1. PM-FRCES #4's 730 and 731, 14 July 44 (Incl's 4 and 5).
2. Incorrect reference. refers to PRES-FM #588 (Incl 6).
3. PRES-FM #628, 10 Oct 44 (Incl 7).
4. Verbatim copy of message drafted by the State Department and sent to the President by memorandum of 17 November 1944 signed "R S, Jr." Sent to PM as PRES #651, 18 Nov 44.
26th November 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 833 Filed 26/18152

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 833.

My immediately preceding telegram.
The following is document dated 20th November 1944, mentioned in paragraph 5.

"Dear Perowne:"

"I wish to refer to previous correspondence with the Foreign Office concerning exports to Argentina and the purchase of Argentine products. These questions were dealt with in detail in Mr. Winant's letters of August 14th and September 9th to Mr. Eden. As you know we are still awaiting the Foreign Office's reply to these questions."

"We have now received a telegram from the State Department calling our attention to a specific problem which has arisen, which has a bearing on this general question of Argentine exports and imports. The facts in the case are as follows: an export licence for thirteen tons of synthetic rubber, which
is needed in a sealing compound for the Argentine meat pack that is intended for the United Kingdom is at this time under consideration by the State Department. The granting of such a licence is made difficult by a number of factors, among them being our rubber agreement with Brasil. The agencies of the Government of the United States charged with passing on this export licence would therefore hesitate to approve a licence in view of the failure of the Foreign Office to inform us regarding the steps your Government is prepared to take to reduce exports to and imports from the Argentine."

"The State Department tells us moreover that until this information regarding the steps that your Government is prepared to take with reference to Argentine exports and imports is received, it is reluctant to authorize the export of any products from the United States which would be used in connection with Argentine exports to the United Kingdom. There are many cases besides this particular one involving synthetic rubber which are constantly being presented. This case involving synthetic rubber is however particularly troublesome. Should a request for the concurrence of Brasil be laid in this case and a shipment from the United States be made, it might make it
very difficult for the authorities of Brazil to continue to
resist pressure for meeting the general rubber needs of Argen-
tina."

"We have been asked by the State Department to bring this
case to the attention of the Foreign Office stressing at the
same time the urgency of getting a definite and clear indication
of your Government's position on the general question of exports
to Argentina and purchases of Argentine products."

Sincerely,

William J. Gallman

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
27 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signatures WIMANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44. Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

7 Incls.
   Incl 1. WIMANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44.
   Incl 2. PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44.
   √Incl 3. PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.
   Incl 4. PM-PRES #730, 14 July 44.
   Incl 5. PM-PRES #731, 14 July 44.
   Incl 6. PRES-PM #588, 22 July 44.
   Incl 7. PRES-PM #628, 10 Oct 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By N. J. Stewart Date
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 834 Filed 27/10022

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Number 834.

1. Your 657. Thank you very much. Please tell us if there is anything you think we ought to do.

2. Your 658. I agree with your conclusion that U. J. will not travel beyond the Black Sea but I am sure the ports there will be unfit for us until the winter has passed.

3. Your last paragraph. We have not got to this point yet and I agree with you we should collect a good many arms from the Germans. Still, I think when American divisions begin to return home there would be a strong case for their leaving some of their heavy weapons and equipment behind for the French to take over the job.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. C. Franks Date MAY 6 1972
The Prime Minister  TO  The President

DATE: 834, 27 November 1944

SUBJECT: Joint statement to German people; Tri-partite meeting; equipping of French occupation forces.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-FM #657 and #658, 26 Nov 44.
2. To the President via usher.
3. No reply necessary, per Adm Leahy.

COPIES TO:

Extract: 214 Pagenant

Date:  

By Direction Of:

2/16/1945 0388
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 835  Filed 27/17512

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Number 835.

We have spent all the weekend and this morning on the issues raised by the air conference and by your message to me of the 25th, and we have arrived at definite conclusions. I hope you will forgive me for not sending them to you till tomorrow as we have to give reasonable prior notice of our United Kingdom decisions to the Dominions and India. We can, of course, act for ourselves apart from them, but such discordance would represent a failure on our part in managing our own commonwealth affairs. I will make sure that our message placing our full position before you is in your hands during your morning of the 28th.

Prime.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

FILE No. 835, 27 November 1944

DATE

TO RAP ROOM 27/2007Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Air Conference in Chicago.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. No reply. See further FM-PRES #836, 28 Nov 44.

210 Air Conference
28 November 1944

To: The President of the United States
Nr: 836

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Number 836

Personal and

1. Winant has brought me your message about the
air in reply to my number 827, and naturally it has caus-
ed me much anxiety. I agree with you that this is a grave
matter in which not only governments but parliaments and
peoples may become deeply agitated, with consequences which
cannot fail to be disastrous both to the prosecution of
the war and to the prevention of future wars. I feel it
my duty, therefore, to place before you in simple terms
the issue as it presents itself to me after hearing all
the advice of the special committee under Beaverbrook,
of which Stafford Cripps is an important member, as well
as the unanimous views of the War Cabinet.

2. The foundations of our position at this confer-
ence, which is being held at the time and place which you
proposed, are:

(A) The British Empire is asked to put invaluable
and irreplaceable bases for air transport all over the world at the disposal of such nations as are capable of using them. This means of course primarily and in bulk placing them at the disposal of the United States.

(B) It was agreed between us as a war measure that you should make the transport aircraft and specialize upon them on account of the character of the war, the need to supply China over the Hump, the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, etc., and that we should concentrate our efforts upon fighting types. In consequence the United States are in an incomparably better position than we are to fill any needs of air transport that may arise after the war is over, and to build up their civil aircraft industry. We would venture most earnestly to suggest that these two points are not receiving adequate consideration.

3. However, in partial recognition of the above two points, Lord Swinton believed that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Berle at Chicago on November
17th about the amount of aircraft capacity that should be put into service by our respective countries (frequencies) on a basis of "embarked traffic". Agreement was also reached about fares to prevent undercutting, unfair subventions, etc.

4. All the above was satisfactory to us and, I think, to the world. On November 18, however, your side of the table put forward an entirely new set of ideas and arguments which, in our judgment, took away with one hand what had been given with the other in consideration of our fundamental position set forth above in paragraphs 2 (A) and (B).

5. For instance, the escalator clause was sought, not only for traffic to and from your country but also for traffic between any two foreign countries. This meant that the number of services on any route could be increased when an airline achieved a load equal to 65% of its full capacity. We had already agreed, reluctantly, that this escalator clause should apply to traffic to and from an aircraft's own country. We had also agreed to a so-called fifth freedom which would grant to an aircraft one through services the right to
pick up and set down traffic between foreign countries at intermediate stops. It is true that provision was made for a differentiation of fares to safeguard the local traffic. That seemed to me a valuable line to explore.

6. Mr. Berle then asked for a combination of the escalator clause and the fifth freedom which would enable American aircraft to carry most of the traffic between the United Kingdom and the Dominions and India and all foreign countries, as well as between all nations of the Commonwealth. It would, in fact, give to United States airlines the right to everything save sabotage.

7. We must accept the fact that the arrangements about frequencies will very soon be completely different from those agreed upon before the escalator clause was proposed. There is very little doubt that our position relatively to yours is markedly injured thereby. This applies not only to Great Britain but to many other durable powers who are now in a weak condition to design and build suitable transport aircraft and to embark traffic.

8. On top of this escalator clause, which we have
conceded for traffic to and from your country, Mr. Berle now demands the right of duplication over any section of any through route and also provision for increasing frequencies so that any airline could carry all the intermediate traffic it could get. This might well mean that aircraft embarking traffic in the United States would not only excel, as they are welcome to do on merits, but dominate and virtually monopolise traffic not only between our country and yours, but between all other foreign countries and British Dominions besides.

9. I have the opinion that both this point of linking the escalator clause and the fifth freedom together, and the claim for duplication on foreign air routes, require further patient study with a view to reaching agreement between our two countries. Thus, we could make sure that Great Britain and the Dominions and many other countries as well are not in fact run out of the air altogether as a result of your flying start with no regard to the fact that we are willing to throw all our bases all over the world into the common pool. I am sure I could not obtain the agreement of the Cabinet or of
either House of Parliament to anything which wore that aspect. Nor would I try.

10. It may be that you will say I have not right-
ly posed the issues. If this be so, I should be most
grateful if you would state them in your own words. It
is suggested, for instance, that we are going to chal-
lenge the right of all nations of innocent passage in
Freedom I, or the consequential right of refuelling and
repair in Freedom II, except in so far as these are mixed
up in the much more refined issues arising out of your
doctrines of escalator and duplication? There may well
be other simplifications which could be made.

11. Should it not be possible for us to reach an
agreement at this stage on Freedoms III, IV and V, when
great battles in which our troops are fighting side by
side are at their height and when we are preparing for
immense new further efforts against Japan. I cannot see
that a temporary adjournment to allow of the aforesaid
patient discussions would do any serious harm. On the
contrary, I believe that it would be as readily understood
as was the postponement of final decision at Dumbarton.
Oaks. There is always the great body of technical matter upon which agreement has been secured. Therefore, unless complete agreement is reached, I plead that there shall be an adjournment. Such adjournment for a short time, if asked for by an intimately-allied power like us, ought not to be denied, nor ought we to be confronted with such very serious contingencies as are set out in your message received on Saturday. As open dispute carried out by Parliament and Congress, both of which would have to be informed and in our voluble free press on both sides, would do far more harm to the war effort and to our hopes of the future than an adjournment of a few weeks or even months, while both parties persevered behind the scenes for a settlement.

12. It is my earnest hope that you will not bring on this air discussion the prospect of our suffering less generous treatment on Lend-Lease than we had expected from the Quebec discussions. But even if I thought that we were to be so penalized, I would not feel myself able to agree to a decision contrary to the merits, as we see them, on this matter.
13. I should be ready, of course, to accept impartial arbitration on the points outstanding at the Chicago conference, provided that they were discussed in relation to the general framework. We have not yet got our World Court again, but there are friendly states and neutral states from whom competent judges might be found.

14. Let me say also, that I have never advocated competitive "bigness" in any sphere between our two countries in their present state of development. You will have the greatest navy in the world. You will have, I hope, the greatest air force. You will have the greatest trade. You have all the gold. But these things do not oppress my mind with fear because I am sure the American people under your re-acclaimed leadership will not give themselves over to vainglorious ambitions, and that justice and fair-play will be the lights that guide them.

Prime.
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL or FILE No. 836, 28 Nov 44.  

DATE 28/11/44  

TOR MAP Room 28/17312  

VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Air Conference in Chicago.  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PRESS-WINANT/PM #126, 26 Nov 44.  
2. To President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-559.  
3. By direction of Admiral Brown, copy sent to State Dept for information, 28 Nov 44.  
4. MR-IN-190, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "Please take up MR-OUT-559 with Sec State and have him call Berle on the subject. The three of you work out an answer and send me a draft of it."  
5. (See MR-OUT-563, from Berle to the President, re Air Conference.)  
6. Draft reply to FM #836 prepared by State Dept, approved by Adm Leahy and forwarded to the President as MR-OUT-569, 2923552.  
7. MR-IN-191, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "MR-OUT-569 approved. Please send."  
8. Msg sent to PM as PRESS #661, 30 November 1944.  

COPIES TO:  
COPY: MR 310 AIR CONFERENCE  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

210 Air Conference
28 November 1944

To: The President of The United States
No: 837 Filed: 28/1010Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 837.
Your Number 660. Thank you so much.

Prime
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SPECIAL or FILE NO. #837, 28 Nov 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 2812302 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Assignment of Truscott to 5th Army.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRESS-FW #660, 27 Nov 44.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-554, 28 Nov 44, 2813252.
3. No reply.

COPY TO: DaTh: BY DIRECTION OF:

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/30
28 November 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 838 Filed: 28/1010Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and for Baker. Number 838.

Your 659. I had not heard of this, but of course all action will now be suspended till you and I have discussed the matter.

Prime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<td>SERIAL/FILE</td>
<td>838, 28 Nov 44.</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>281230Z</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>British air base on Clipperton Island</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers PRES-PM #659, 27 Nov 44.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as UK-OUT-555, 281325Z.
3. No reply.

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**COPY TO:**

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**DATE:**

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**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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950 Clipperton
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 839, 29 November 1944 Filed 291945Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 839
Personal and

In a telegram received today (SEACOS 265) Admiral Mountbatten reports that he has received a warning from General Carton De Wiart that Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek contemplates withdrawing the divisions which he requires in China from the Chinese Army in India, which is now engaged in carrying out its share of operation "CAPITAL".

The Chiefs of Staff endorse what Admiral Mountbatten says about the deplorable effect of these withdrawals on our operations in Burma. I suggest that you and I send the Generalissimo the following message of protest. If you agree with this suggestion, and with the terms of the message to the Generalissimo, pray send it off as a joint message from us both, with such minor alterations or additions as you think fit.

"Message from President and Prime Minister to Generalissimo."
"Admiral Mountbatten reports that he has received a message from General Carton De Wiart saying that you contemplate the withdrawal of two of your best divisions from the north Burma front as soon as Bhamo has fallen."

"The withdrawal of these forces from north Burma will inevitably bring the southward thrust through Bhamo to a standstill thus jeopardising the success of the whole campaign, and the security of the Mogaung Kyitkyina air base."

"Your two divisions are now in contact with the enemy. If they are withdrawn from the battle in Burma by land route they will spend these critical months in weary marches over the rough track northwards. If they are withdrawn by air, they will use up aircraft which might otherwise be carrying to China the supplies you badly need. In neither case could their heavy transport and equipment be moved with them."

"We earnestly request you therefore to reconsider any idea of weakening your gallant forces which are cooperating so successfully with ours with the intention of reestablishing firm communications between China and her Allies."
November 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 29 November 1944, proposing a joint message to Chiang Kai-Shek, is forwarded to you for the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after consultation with General Wedemeyer.

Lm. V. D. Slaby

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date May 6, 1972
November 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 29 November 1944, proposing a joint message to Chiang Kai-Shek, is forwarded to you for the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs Staff after consultation with General Wedemeyer.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972