ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
DECEMBER 1944
1 December 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. NUMBER: 663.

Since the receipt of your message number 839 of November 29th reference mountbatten's SEACOS 265 a message has been received from General Wedemeyer outlining the gravity of the situation in China and stating that he concurs in the decision of the Generalissimo to transfer the two best trained divisions of Chinese troops from Burma to the Kunming area. You have undoubtedly seen this message which went to Mountbatten and has been furnished to your Mission here in Washington so I shall not repeat it.

We have General Wedemeyer's views on the ground as to the gravity of the situation along with his knowledge of the situation and the plans for operations in Burma. I feel that he is better informed as to the general situation and requirements than any other individual at this moment. Furthermore we are faced by the fact that the Generalissimo in a grave crisis which threatens the existence of China, has decided that he must recall these two divisions in order to check the Japanese drive on Kunming. It would avail us nothing to open a land line to China if the Japanese seized the
Kunming terminal for air and ground. Under the circumstances I therefore am of the opinion that we are not in a position to bring pressure on the Generalissimo to alter his decision.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to send to General Wedemeyer a message which approves his recommendation in support of the Generalissimo's decision but requests him to endeavor to develop a scheme for using other units which might make possible the retention in India of one or even both of the two crack Chinese divisions. The U.S. Chiefs have explained their intention to the British Chiefs of Staff and have requested that they concur with this action and inform Mountbatten accordingly.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 010223Z December 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant, USNR

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971

0410
OP PRIORITY

From: OSS

To: Foreign Office, London, O215192, NCR 7617

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Thank you for your 860. I am advised that Swinton's motion, which Berle seconded, to refer unfinished business to the Council has now been deferred on a motion from the floor. The Conference apparently still feels, as do I, that agreement should be reached if possible. I would accordingly appreciate your further urgent consideration of the matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at O215192, December 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR., Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By________
Date NOV 1 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

In accordance with your request of this morning I enclose for the President's consideration a draft reply to the Prime Minister's most recent message concerning the Aviation Conference. Mr. Berle states that an urgent reply of this character would be helpful in view of the day's developments at the Conference.

Enclosure:
Draft message to the Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By 8th Ed. Date FEB 14 1972
Thank you for your 840. I am advised that Swinton's motion, which Berle seconded, to refer unfinished business to the Council has now been tabled on a motion from the floor. The Conference apparently still feels, as do I, that agreement should be reached if possible. I would accordingly appreciate your further urgent consideration of the matter.
FROM  The President  TO  The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: Chicago Air Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #3140, 1 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-575.
2. MR-IN-196 from the Pres to Adm Leahy stated, "The President has asked that MR-OUT-575 be referred to Adm Leahy for preparation of reply."
3. Referred to Sec State by Adm Leahy, 1 Dec 44, for preparation of draft reply for the President's consideration.
4. Draft reply prepared by State; to Admiral Leahy on 2 Dec 44; to the President by Adm Leahy as MR-OUT-578.
5. MR-IN-198, 021455 Dec 44, stated, "FROM PRES TO ADM LEAHY. Your MR-OUT-578. Approved. Please send."
6. Dispatched 2 Dec 44.
7. Answered by PM-PRES #348, 6 Dec 44.

210 Air Conference.
4 December 1944

From: Oppav

To: Alsina, London

NUMBER 665. SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 841. Generals Wedemeyer and Sultan have been directed to transfer two Chinese divisions to China to meet the emergency.

Wedemeyer has been directed to limit his demands for transport aircraft to those not urgently required for supply of SEAC forces engaged with the enemy unless no other means of meeting the emergency can be found.

New subject — Regarding the bomb line in Balkans, Russians have been notified that we shall attack enemy with bombs up to the line proposed to the Soviet Staff on November 28.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 041802Z, December 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM

TO

FILE or FILE NO.

DATE

FOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

300 Anna, Indiana, Ohio

530
5 December 1944

FROM: OPWUY
TO : Alcuna, London

NUMBER 666, PERSONAL AND

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
PRIME MINISTER. COPY TO AMBASSADOR WINANT FOR BACKGROUND ONLY.

In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between you, Marshal Stalin and myself are unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am taking this means of placing before you my present views on the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Marshal Stalin.

I am certain that the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:

PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTEF ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party
to a dispute should abstain from voting.

You will note that the proposal provides for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace or to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I am prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by the Soviet Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character the permanent members would always have a vote.

At the same time I am sure that the maintenance of the moral prestige of the great powers is an essential element in any successful system of international cooperation. I am certain therefore that those powers should not insist on exercising a veto in such judicial or quasi-judicial procedures as the international organization may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. I am certain that willingness of the permanent members to abstain from the exercise of their voting rights on questions of this sort would immensely strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace and would make the whole plan far more acceptable to all nations.

If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Marshal Stalin to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt
convening of a general United Nations conference?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 051647Z Dec 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff.
TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

November 22, 1944

In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between you, Marshal Stalin and myself are unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am taking this means of placing before you my present views on the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Marshal Stalin.

I am certain that the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:

PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTER ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
You will note that the proposal provides for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace or to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I am prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by the Soviet Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character the permanent members would always have a vote.

At the same time I am sure that the maintenance of the moral prestige of the great powers is an essential element in any successful system of international cooperation. I am certain therefore that those powers should not insist on exercising a veto in such judicial or quasi-judicial procedures as the international organization may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. I am certain that willingness of the permanent members to abstain from the exercise of their voting rights on questions of this sort would immensely strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace and would make the whole plan far more acceptable to all nations.

If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Marshal Stalin to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAP ROOM

Subject: Messages for Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill

Please send forward promptly the attached messages to Prime Minister Churchill and to Marshal Stalin, the latter being incorporated, you will note, in a telegram to Ambassador Harriman. The President approved these messages on November 22 and authorized the time of their dispatch to coincide with Ambassador Harriman's arrival in Moscow. As Ambassador Harriman is expected to reach Moscow in the very near future, it is important that the messages now go forward.

The Moscow telegram should, of course, be sent to Harriman, secret for him alone, but the one to London should be sent directly to the Prime Minister.

/s/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

By Data FEB 14 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
WINSTON CHURCHILL, M. P.
PRIME MINISTER, LONDON.

I am deeply grateful for your message (No. 832
November 26, 1944) informing me of your decision to
continue purchases on a month to month basis for a
further six months' period. We will do everything in
our power to satisfy your understanding with respect
to other buyers as well as with respect to refrigerated
cargo space to which you refer in paragraph four.

I am sorry about the apparent misunderstanding men-
tioned in the last paragraph of your message, and con-
cerning which I, of course, had no prior information. I
believe, however, that you will discover, as I did on fur-
ther investigation, that the document quoted in your 833
did not refer to the matter of the meat contract, on
which we exchanged messages in October, but to the general

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1974
programming of your other imports from and exports to
Argentina about which the Department of State submitted
inquiries to the Foreign Office in August and September.
This message was intended to be an inquiry on a matter of
common interest and, of course, in no sense a threat.

I am confident, however, that this matter can readily
be adjusted and I want again to thank you for your helpful
message.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

December 4, 1944

MR. LATTA:

This should go to the State Department to send but a copy should also go to the Map Room at the White House.

djhb

(Handwritten note: Original sent 5/12/44. File for file.)

For file.

0426
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 28, 1944

Subject: Reply to the Prime Minister on Argentine Meat.

I hand you herewith a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's message informing us of the British decision to continue purchases of Argentine meat on a spot basis for another six months.

We believe that there is nothing to be gained by pointing out to the Prime Minister that the gradual stiffening of our requests in this matter was prompted by our growing concern with the military-Fascist character of the Farrell regime, and by evidence that the regime would make propaganda and political capital out of the signing of a contract.

As pointed out in the second paragraph of the proposed reply, we find that the Prime Minister mistakenly interpreted the Embassy's communication of November 20 as referring to the negotiations on the meat contract. The Embassy, on instructions from the Department, was in fact trying to stimulate an answer to our inquiries of August and September on the general subject of British trade with Argentina--inquiries, incidentally, to which we have yet to receive a reply.

I am entirely confident, however, that we can straighten these matters out without troubling you further. The net result of the British action on the meat contract is all to the good.

/s/ E. R. STETTINUS, JR.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-44
By FEB 4 1944
5 December 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

NUMBER 667.
SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

I have received from U.J. messages dated second and third December regarding his talks with de Gaulle and am informed he sent you identical messages. I would like to have your views before I reply to Stalin.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 052017Z, December 1944.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C.E.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 667, 5 December 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: De Gaulle's conference with Stalin.

ACTION:

1. See 2 msgs from Stalin to the President, dated 2 and 3 Dec 1944, which were also sent by Stalin to the Prime Minister. These were sent to President at Warm Springs as MB-OUT-594 and 593 respectively.
2. MB-IB-203, 4 Dec 44, from President to Adm Leahy, stated, "Re MB-OUT-593. For preparation of reply with the approval of the Sec of State."
3. MB-IN-204, 4 Dec 44, from President to Adm Leahy, stated, "Re your MB-OUT-594. For preparation of reply and approval of Sec of State."
4. Taken up with State Dept by Admiral Leahy, and following message sent to the President by Adm Leahy at 051525Z: "FR MB-IN-203 and 204. In view of British interest in proposed Franco-Soviet pact, State Dept believes we should await probable message from Prime before replying to Stalin.
   "Unless otherwise directed I will wait for something from Prime before preparing draft message in reply to Uncle Joe."
5. Discussed verbally with Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1300 5 Oct by Admiral Leahy.
6. After further consideration, Sec State suggested that a message be sent to the President, including draft message to Prime Minister requesting his views. Sent to the President as MB-OUT-599, 051937Z.
7. President approved in MB-IN-205, 052003Z. Message dispatched as this #667, 052017Z.
8. Answered by NA-PRESS #816, 6 Dec 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

206; 052; 01 France
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 668. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

I have this date sent the following message to U.J.:

QUOTE. Thank you for your two informative messages of December two and December three.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General De Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General De Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable. UNQUOTE.

I will reply to your 846 in a subsequent message.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 061829Z, December 1944.

OOGEN KNIFIN, Major, C. E.
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: Stalin's conference with De Gaulle; French frontier; Franco-Soviet Pact.

ACTION:

1. Sequence of messages on this subject: STALIN-PRES 2 Dec 44; STALIN-PRES 3 Dec 44; PRES-PREM #667, 5 Dec 44; PM-PRES #816, 6 Dec 44; PRES-STALIN #133, 6 Dec 44 (which this message quotes); PRES-PREM #668, 6 Dec 44; and PRES-PREM #670, 6 Dec 44.

2. This message quotes to the Prime Minister a message sent by the President to Stalin in reply to two messages from Stalin, dated 2 and 3 Dec 44. Stalin's two messages sent to the President at War Springs are #54-OUT-594 and 593 respectively. By direction of the President in #54-IN-203 and 204, the two Stalin msgs were referred to Adm Leahy for preparation of reply with approval of the Sec of State.

Reply was drafted by Adm Leahy on 5 Oct. Copies of Stalin's two msgs, with Adm Leahy's draft reply, were given to Mr. Bohlen of the State Dept on 5 Oct. Adm Leahy's draft reply was revised by State Dept and returned to Adm Leahy by Mr. Bohlen at 1500Z, 6 Nov 44. Sent to the President as #54-IN-606, 061500Z, with request that it be sent to Churchill for his information. Approved by the President in #54-IN-208, 061600Z. Msg sent to Stalin as #133, 6 Dec 44; sent to the PM for his information as this #668, 6 Dec 44.

3. See also PM-PRES #816, 6 Dec 44, received in White House at 061300Z; and its reply, PRES-PREM #670, 6 Dec 44. (Note that although similar in content, Adm Leahy's draft of proposed message to Stalin was drafted on 5 Dec; PM #816, quoting PM's reply to Stalin, was received on 6 Dec 44.)
December 1944

PRIORITY

From: OPNAV

To: ALUENA, LONDON

MEMORANDUM 669, AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 845.

As you know, the letter to Berle merely transmitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way involved this Government. I see no reason why you should not use the message itself in any way you see fit. I believe the message has already been made public, having been given to the press by Badoglio at the time of its receipt.

I deplore any offense which the press release on Italy may have given you personally or any implication of my lack of understanding of your responsibility before your country. You must recognize, however, the untenable position in which we were put by Mr. Eden's prior statement in the House regarding the British Government's representations to the Italian Government on the position of Sforza in any new government. While military operations continue, Italy is an area of combined Anglo-American responsibility and our silence on this step made it appear that we agreed with the action taken. Actually this move was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter and it is quite contrary to the policy which we have tried to follow in Italy, since the Moscow Conference last year, in accepting democratic solutions in government worked out by the Italian people themselves. In the circumstances we had no other choice than to make our own position clear.

You will remember my feeling on this score expressed to you at the time Bonomi succeeded Badoglio in forming a Government last June.

6 December 1944

OQueEN KNIFFIN, Major, C.E.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: State Dept release on Italy and reaction in England.

ACTION:

1. (See WR O11 ITALY for complete file).
2. Answers PM-PRES #555, 6 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WR-OUT-602, 0613052.
3. WR-IN-206, 0615002, from the President to Adm Leahy stated, "Re WR-OUT-602...For preparation of reply with the consultation of the Secretary of State."
5. See message from Stettinius to the President, WR-OUT-610, giving Stettinius' views.
6. Reply drafted by State; to Leahy on 6 Dec 44; sent to the President by Leahy on 6 Dec 44, as WR-OUT-614.

FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: State Dept release on Italy and reaction in England.

ACTION:

1. (See WR O11 ITALY for complete file).
2. Answers PM-PRES #555, 6 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WR-OUT-602, 0613052.
3. WR-IN-206, 0615002, from the President to Adm Leahy stated, "Re WR-OUT-602...For preparation of reply with the consultation of the Secretary of State."
5. See message from Stettinius to the President, WR-OUT-610, giving Stettinius' views.
6. Reply drafted by State; to Leahy on 6 Dec 44; sent to the President by Leahy on 6 Dec 44, as WR-OUT-614.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 670, PRIORITY AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 846.

You will have seen from my reply to Stalin on his talks with De Gaulle that our views are identical on the two questions which he raised.

I still adhere to my position that any attempt to include De Gaulle in the meeting of the three of us would merely introduce a complicating and undesirable factor.

In regard to your suggestion to Uncle Joe that the question of France's postwar frontiers be referred to the European Advisory Commission I feel that since the Commission is fully occupied with questions relating to the surrender of Germany, it would be a mistake to attempt to bring up at this stage before it any questions of postwar frontiers. It seems to me preferable to leave this specific topic for further exploration between us.

I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the affect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future world organization, whereas a bilateral arrangement between France and the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-British Pact would be more understandable. I realize, however, that this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

DATE 670, 6 December 1944.

FOR MAP BOOK VIA

SUBJECT: Stalin's conference with De Gaulle; French frontier; Franco-Soviet pact.

ACTION:

1. Sequence of messages on this subject: STALIN-PRES 2 Dec 44; STALIN-PRES 3 Dec 44; PRES-PW #657, 5 Dec 44; FM-PRES #846, 6 Dec 44; PRES-STALIN #133, 6 Dec 44; PRES-PW #668, 6 Dec 44; PRES-FM #670, 6 Dec 44.

2. Answer FM-PRES #846, 6 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WR-OUT-603, 061402.

3. WR-IN-206, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated, "Re WR-OUT-603.

4. For preparation of reply with the consultation of the Sec of State, 0615002.

5. Given to Bohlen, State Dept-White House Liaison, to work up reply.

6. See PRES-PW #668, 6 Dec 44, which quotes to the PM a message sent by the President to Stalin, 6 Dec 44.

7. This reply prepared by State Department; sent to the President by Admiral Leahy as WR-OUT-611.

8. President approved in WR-IN-210, 0621532. Dispatched at 062252Z.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

212 (A); 032; 011 France

0435
SECRET

6 December 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London 0623042, NCR

MEMORANDUM, PERSONAL AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 847. We agree with your proposed statement.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0623042, December 1944.

OGDEN KNIFPPIN,
Major, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: G. Stuart
Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM The President. TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE No. 671, 6 Dec 44.

DATE VIA

TOR MAP ROOM

SUBJECT: November Anti-submarine statement.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #847, 6 Dec 44.
2. See STATUS SLIP attached to PM #847 for complete details.

COPY TO:

"AR 000.7 (3)"
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

9 December 1944

MINISTER.

Your 844. I am at Warm Springs in Georgia taking ten days off after the campaign and everything in the personal line is going well.

Perhaps I am not close enough to the picture to feel as disappointed about the war situation as you are and perhaps also because six months ago I was not as optimistic as you were on the time element.

On the European front I always felt that the occupation of Germany up to the left bank of the Rhine would be a very stiff job. Because in the old days I bicycled over most of the Rhine terrain, I have never been as optimistic as to the ease of getting across the Rhine with our joint armies as many of the Commanding Officers have been.

However, our agreed broad strategy is developing according to plan. You and I are now in the position of Commanders-in-Chief who have prepared their plans, issued their orders, and committed our resources to battle according to those plans and orders. For the time being, even if a little behind schedule, it seems to me the prosecution and outcome of the battles lie with our Field Commanders in whom I have every confidence. We must remember that the winter season is bringing great difficulties but our ground and air forces are day by day chewing up the enemy’s dwindling manpower and resources, and our supply flow is much improved with the opening of Antwerp.

General Eisenhower estimates that on the Western Front line he is inflict-
ing losses in excess of the enemy's capability to form new units. I still cannot see clearly just when, but soon a decisive break in our favor is bound to come.

As to the Italian Front, Alexander's forces are doing their bit in keeping those German divisions in Italy, and we must remember that the Germans are really free to withdraw to the line of the Alps if they so decide.

The same thing applies to their troops in the Balkans. I have never believed that we had the power to capture any large German forces in the Balkans without assistance by the Russians.

On the Russian Front we must also give full allowance to the vile weather and the Russians seem to be doing their bit at the present time. This, of course, you know more about than I do.

The Far Eastern situation is, of course, on a somewhat different footing and I am not at all happy about it.

From the long range point of view other than the measures Wedemeyer is now taking, we can do very little to prepare China to conduct a worthwhile defense, but Japan is suffering losses in men and ships and materials in the Pacific area that are many times greater than ours and they, too, cannot keep this up. Even the Almighty is helping. This magnificent earthquake and tidal wave is a proof.

The time between now and spring when the freeze is over will develop many things. We will know a lot more than we know now.

My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their abilities and energies in directing their organizations toward carrying out the plans we have made and in supporting our forces throughout the world. Practically all of these forces are, for the time being, committed. That is why I do not feel that my Chiefs should leave their posts at this time since no requirement exists for broad

DECLASSIFIED  By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By  
Date  NOV 1 1971
strategic decisions to guide our Field Commanders.

I think I can leave after Inauguration Day. I hoped that Uncle Joe could come to Rome or Malta or Taormina or Egypt but if he will not — and insists on the Black Sea — I could do it even at great difficulty on account of Congress. Harriman suggested Batum which has an excellent climate. You and I could fly there from Malta or Athens, sending ahead one of my transport Flagships on which to live. Yalta is also intact, though the roadstead is open and we should probably have to live ashore.

Congratulations on the vote.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 091947Z, December, 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The following quoted draft reply to Prime's BfA is forwarded for your consideration. It has Marshall's and King's approval.

"Your BfA.

"We are winning on every front of our global battlefield except in China. I agree with you that some of our optimism at Quebec concerning speedy victory has not been justified by the subsequent course of events. However, our agreed broad strategy is developing according to plan. You and I are now in the position of Commanders in Chief who have prepared their plans, issued their orders, and committed all of their resources to battle according to those plans and orders. For the time being, it seems to me the prosecution of the war and the outcome of the battles lie with our field commanders, in whom I have every confidence.

"It is true that our progress in Europe, both in the battle of Germany and in the Mediterranean, has been beset by exasperating delays. The winter brings with it further difficulties. However, with the opening of Antwerp and the assured flow of divisions and supplies to General Eisenhower, I feel the situation is now brighter than it has been for some time. In the battle of Germany our ground and air forces are day by day chewing up the enemy's dwindling manpower and resources. General Eisenhower estimates that on the Western Front alone he is inflicting losses in excess of the enemy's capability to form new units. I cannot see clearly just when, but soon a decisive break in our favor will come. If the German chooses to continue this battle of attrition to the bitter end, there can be no result but complete destruction of the enemy. Our air and ground force efforts in the Mediterranean all help in this whittling down of Germany. I think our people understand the situation as it has developed. I feel hopeful that Eisenhower's increasing strength and a Russian offensive after the freeze will decisively crush German military resistance by spring.

"I share your concern about the situation in Asia but believe it is now too early to attempt to evaluate it. Admiral Mountbatten's operations are ahead of schedule, and I think there is a good chance that he may achieve his objectives in spite of immediate transfer of U.S. and Chinese resources to China. As to the grave Chinese situation, I do not see how more aid can be given to the Generalissimo than is now being provided by making available to Wedemeyer the resources for which he has asked.

My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their abilities and energies in directing their organizations towards carrying out the plans we have made and in supporting our forces throughout the world. Practically all of these forces are, for the time being, committed. I do not feel
that my Chiefs should leave their posts at this time since no requirement exists for broad strategic decisions to guide our field commanders in directing the decisive battles. If you, however, have any ideas or plans, even though not completely formulated, we should give thought to them at once. This would make it even more important that my Chiefs should be here during the period of preliminary consideration where their advice is immediately available to me."
The following quoted message was sent via pouch to Admiral Leahy by the President on 8 December 1944. The message was changed by Admiral Leahy and General Marshall (deletions = portion of President's original message crossed out by Gen Marshall; additions = underlined words added by General Marshall) and returned to the President for his approval as #R-OUT-624, with the following introduction:

"Marshall suggests changing your draft message to Prime to the following. Marshall's proposed changes bear on a persistent British Staff effort to support Mountbatten at the expense of China, and also on anticipated efforts by Prime to move into the Balkans at Eisenhower's expense.

"I recommend Marshall's changes."

The President approved changes in his #R-IN-219 (0918542) and message was transmitted to Churchill as PRS #672, 0919472.

Message as drafted by President and changed by General Marshall follows:

"TO: ADMIRAL LEAHY.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT.

I propose the following telegram to former Naval Person instead of the draft you sent me. Please clear with Marshall and King and send unless you have objections:

"QUOTE. Your #64. I am at Warm Springs in Georgia taking ten days' off after the campaign and everything in the personal line is going well.

Perhaps I am not close enough to the picture to feel as disappointed about the war situation as you are and perhaps also because six months ago I was not as optimistic as you were on the time element.

On the European front I always felt that the occupation of Germany up to the left back of the Rhine would be a very stiff job. Because in the old days I bicycled over most of the Rhine terrain, I have never been as optimistic as to the ease of getting across the Rhine with our joint armies as many of the Commanding Officers have been.

However, our agreed broad strategy is developing according to plan. You and I are now in the position of Commanders-in-Chief who have prepared their plans, issued their orders, and committed our resources to battle according to those plans and orders. For the time being, even if a little behind schedule, it seems to me the prosecution and outcome of the battles lie with our Field Commanders, in whom I have every confidence. We must remember that the winter season is bringing great difficulties but our ground and air forces are day by day chewing up the enemy's dwindling manpower and resources, and our supply flow is much improved with the opening of Antwerp.

General Eisenhower estimates that on the Western Front line he is inflicting losses in excess of the enemy's capability to form new units."
I still cannot see clearly just when, but soon a decisive break in our favor is bound to come.

"As to the Italian Front, Alexander's forces are doing their bit in keeping those German divisions in Italy, and we must remember that they have always had the probable chance of moving their troops north of the Alps whenever they wanted to do so. The Germans are really free to withdraw to the line of the Alps if they so decide.

"The same thing applies to their troops in the Balkans. I have never believed that we had the power to capture any large German forces in the Balkans without assistance by the Russians.

"On the Russian Front we must also give full allowance to the vile weather and the Russians seem to be doing their bit at the present time. This, of course, you know more about than I do.

"The Far Eastern situation is, of course, on a somewhat different footing and I am not at all happy about it.

"From the long range point of view, other than the measures Bedemeyer is now taking we can do very little at this time to keep prepare China together to conduct a worthwhile defense, but Japan is suffering losses in men and ships and materials in the Pacific area that are many times greater than ours and they, too, cannot keep this up. Even the Almighty is helping. This magnificent earthquake and tidal wave is a proof.

"The time between now and spring when the freeze is over will develop many things. We will know a lot more than we know now.

"My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their abilities and energies in directing their organizations toward carrying out the plans we have made and in supporting our forces throughout the world. Practically all of these forces are, for the time being, committed. That is why I do not feel that my Chiefs should leave their posts at this time since no requirement exists for broad strategic decisions to guide our Field Commanders.

"I think I can leave after Inauguration Day. I hoped that Uncle Joe could come to Rome or Malta or Taormina or Egypt but if he will not — and insists on the Black Sea — I could do it even at great difficulty on account of Congress. Harriman suggested Batum which has an excellent climate. You and I could fly there from Malta or Athens, sending ahead one of my transport Flagships on which to live. Malta is also intact, though the roadstead is open and we should probably have to live ashore.

"Good luck Congratulations on the vote.

"ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE"

by A. C. Leahy

1. Changed from "Good luck" to "Congratulations" since vote had been taken before message was released.

- 2 -
**FROM**  The President  **TO**  The Prime Minister  

**SERIAL or FILE NO.**  

**DATE**  9 Dec 44  

**TOR MAP ROOM**  VIa  

**SUBJECT:** General war situation; proposed meeting with Joint Chief's in London.  

**ACTION:**  

1. *Answers PM-FRMS #844, 6 Dec 44*, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as IR-OUT-601, 0612452.

2. Copies of PM #844 forwarded by Admiral Leahy to Gen Marshall and Adm King, 6 Dec 44, for preparation of draft reply for the President's consideration.

3. Draft message prepared by Marshall and King; sent to the President by Admiral Leahy as IR-OUT-617, 071858 (See Incl 1).

4. Message rewritten by the President, sent via pouch to Admiral Leahy on 8 Dec 44, with following notation, "I propose the following telegram to former Naval Person instead of the draft you sent me. Please clear with Marshall and King and send unless you have objections."

5. General Marshall made several changes in message. Msg sent back to President for approval of these changes, IR-OUT-624, 9 Dec 44, with following note by Admiral Leahy: "Marshall suggests changing your draft msg to Prime to the following. Marshall's proposed changes bear on a persistent British Staff effort to support Mountbatten at the expense of China, and also on anticipated efforts by Prime to move into the Balkans at Eisenhower's expense. I recommend Marshall's changes." (See Incl 2 for msg as written by the President and changed by Gen Marshall.)

6. IR-OUT-219, 0918542, from the President to Admiral Leahy, directed that message be sent to the PM. Dispatched 0919472 Dec 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

21B: 2002 President; 320 Germany; 900 Italy; 320 Belgium; 310 Russia; 310 China, Burma, India; 310 Pacific; 21D (3); 0001.
I have been as deeply concerned as you have yourself in regard to the tragic difficulties you have encountered in Greece. I appreciate to the full the anxious and difficult alternatives with which you have been faced. I regard my role in this matter as that of a loyal friend and ally whose one desire is to be of any help possible in the circumstances. You may be sure that in putting my thoughts before you I am constantly guided by the fact that nothing can in any way shake the unity and association between our two countries in the great tasks to which we have set our hands.

As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help to you in this trying situation, there are limitations imposed in part by the traditional policies of the United States and in part by the mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in this country. No one will understand better than yourself that I, both personally and as head of State, am necessarily responsive to the state of public feeling. It is for these reasons that it has not been possible for this Government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece. Even to attempt to do so would bring only temporary value to you and would in the long run do injury to our basic relationships. I don't need to tell you how much I dislike this state of affairs as between you and me. My one hope is to see it rectified
so we can go along in this as in everything, shoulder to shoulder. I know
that you, as the one on whom the responsibility rests, desire with all
your heart a satisfactory solution of the Greek problem and particularly
one that will bring peace to that ravished country. I will be with you
wholeheartedly in any solution which takes into consideration the factors
I have mentioned above. With this in mind I am giving you at random some
thoughts that have come to me in my anxious desire to be of help.

I know that you have sent MacMillan there with broad powers to find
such a solution and it may be that he will have been successful before you
got this. I of course lack full details and am at a great distance from
the scene, but it has seemed to me that a basic reason—or excuse,
perhaps—for the EAM attitude has been distrust regarding the intentions
of King George. I wonder if MacMillan's efforts might not be greatly facilita-
ted if the King himself would approve the establishment of a regency in
Greece and would make a public declaration of his intention not to return
unless called for by popular plebiscite. This might be particularly ef-
fective if accompanied by an assurance that elections will be held at some
fixed date, no matter how far in the future, when the people would have full
opportunity to express themselves.

Meanwhile, might it not be possible to secure general agreement on
the disarmament and dissolution of all the armed groups now in the
country, including the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion, leaving
your troops to preserve law and order alone until the Greek national
forces can be reconstituted on a non-partisan basis and adequately equipped.
I shall be turning over in my mind this whole question and hope you will share your thoughts and worries with me.

ROOSEVELT

Released 132217Z Dec 44.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. R.
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 673, 13 December 1944

DATE: 673, 13 December 1944

TO: MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Greece

ACTION: (Complete file—"MR 051 GREECE.")

1. In MR-OUT-643, 13 Dec 44, the Secretary of State sent to the President at Warm Springs a suggested message to Churchill on the Greek situation, together with reasons for sending the message.

2. MR-IN-226, 1321312, from the President to the Secretary of State directed, "I think your proposed message to Churchill (MR-OUT-643) is all right at this time. Please send it." Sent through White House channels as PRES #673.


COPIES TO: MR 051 GREECE

DATE: __________

BY DIRECTION OF: __________

051 Greece.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

15 December 1944

152347Z

NUMBER 674, PERSONAL AND

SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE

FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have seen the newspaper reports of your statement in the House
on the Polish question. In order that we may cooperate fully in this
matter I would appreciate receiving the benefit of your ideas as to what
steps we can now take in regard to this question. Particularly I would
like to have your evaluation of the possibility of Mikolajczyk's coming
back into power with sufficient authority to carry out his plans and what
action you feel we should take in the event the Lublin Committee should
declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and Stalin
should recognize it as such. In view of this possibility I wonder if
it would be helpful if I should send a message to Stalin suggesting
that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the
three of us can get together.

You will recall the contents of the letter I sent to Mikolajczyk
by Mr. Harrimar which he showed to you and which outlines our policy in
regard to Poland. I anticipate strong pressure here for the position of

this Government to be made clear, and I may therefore have to make public

in some form the four points outlining our position contained in my letter
to Mikolajczyk referred to above.

Knowing that we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to
Poland I want to be sure to coordinate with you any steps which I may
contemplate in this matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released, 1523472 Dec 44.

OUDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C. E.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister


ACTION:

1. Dispatch written by the Secretary of State, dispatched to the President with covering memorandum as WH-OUT-661 (152125 Dec 44).

2. WH-IN-232 (15232202) approved suggested message to the Prime Minister and directed it be sent. Dispatched at 1523372 WHR 982.

3. Answered by PM-PR-3 #853, 16 December 1944.

COPY TO:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

0452
16 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALISNA, LONDON

1701192 NCR 84

NUMBER 675, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your Number 853. I have today sent the following message to U.J.:

In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

QUOTE. 1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general postwar settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.

3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have no objection if the Government and the people of
Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.

UNQUOTE.

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and as I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present...
form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

Released 17011944 Dec 1944.

ODDEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #853, 16 December 1944, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as 44-OUT-666, 1615102; also sent by A. Brown to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

2. In WH-IN-236, 1620444, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given WH-IN-236. He requested, however, that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen WH-IN-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-IN-236 (1622182).

3. At 1622322, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-IN-672: "My suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-IN-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get stalin's reply."

4. In WH-IN-238, 1623545, the President approved Stettinius' draft messages—"Your WH-IN-672 approved. Please notify the PM in my name."

O-V-8-R

COPIED TO:

O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: ________________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ________________________

____________________________

____________________________

____________________________

O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

0456
5. Message sent to Marshal Stalin as PM-STALIN #36, 16 Dec 44; repeated to the Prime Minister in this message, PM-STALIN #675, 16 Dec 44.
6. Answered by PM-PRESS #856, 17 Dec 44.
23 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUNA, LONDON

NUMBER 676, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

I am today sending to Harriman the following message in regard to
our projected three party meeting with U.J.

Please let me have your opinion as to the possibilities of this
plan from your point of view.

QUOTE. If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean
I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta which
appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea having the best
accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions.

We would arrive by plane from some Mediterranean port and would
send in advance a naval vessel to Sevastopol to provide necessary service
and living accommodations if it should be necessary for me to live on board
ship.

I would plan to leave America very soon after the inauguration on a
naval vessel. You will be informed later of a date of arrival that will be
satisfactory to Churchill and to me. My party will be numerically equal to
that which was present at Teheran, about 35 total.

I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet
us half way. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 2315472 Dec 1944.

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.
December 25, 1941

PRESIDENT TO CHURCHILL:

I am today sending to Harriman the following message in regard to our projected three-party meeting with U.S.

Please let me have your opinion as to the possibilities of this plan from your point of view.

QUOTE: If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta which appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea having the best accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions.

We shall arrive by plane from some Mediterranean port and would send in advance a naval vessel to Sevastopol to provide necessary service and living accommodations if it should be necessary for me to live on board ship. I am planning to leave America on January on a naval vessel. You will be informed later of a date of arrival that will be satisfactory to Churchill and to me. My party will be numerically equal to that which was present at Teheran, about 35 total.

I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet us half way. UNQUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: 
Date: Nov 1, 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting.

ACTION:

1. See STATUS SLIP attached to PRES-HARRIMAN #143, 23 Dec 44. This dispatch quotes PRES-HARRIMAN #143 to the Prime Minister for his information and views.

2. Dispatch written by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor changes by the President; dispatched 231547Z.

3. Answered by PAL-PRES #861 and #862, 29 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

MR 210 ARGONAUT

DATE: __________________

BY DIRECTION OF: __________________

210 (2)
PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London 2317232, NCR 11117

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 857. I have today sent the following message to Stalin:

QUOTE. I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send to Moscow
a fully qualified officer of his staff to discuss with you Eisenhower’s
situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front,
in order that all of us may have information essential to our coordin-
ation of effort. We will maintain complete secrecy.

I hope you will see this officer of Eisenhower’s Staff and
arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual ben-
fit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of
the next phase.

In view of the emergency an early reply to this proposal is
requested. UNQUOTE.

Perhaps you can assist in getting a favorable reply.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2317232, December 1944.

H. W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.C. STUART
Date NOV 1 1971
December 23, 1944

#677

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 057. I have today sent the following message to Stalin:

QUOTE: I am informed by President Roosevelt I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send to Moscow a fully qualified officer of his staff to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front, in order that all of us may have information essential to our coordination of effort. We will maintain complete secrecy.

I hope you will see this officer of Eisenhower's Staff and arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of the next phase.

In view of the emergency an early reply to this proposal is requested. UNQUOTE.

Perhaps you can assist in getting a favorable reply.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Mr. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Ministe

Sekelal or FILE NO. 677, 23 December 1944

DATE VIA

TO R MAP ROOM 23/72/3 VIA

SUBJECT: Eisenhower's sending representatives to Moscow.

ACTION:

1. Answers Pa-Pres #357, 23 Dec 44.
2. Quotes to Churchill a message sent by the President to Stalin on same day.
4. See further FPre-Pa #679, 26 Dec 44; and Pa-Pres #967, 31 Dec 44.

COPIES TO: 340 (2) DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

0463
25 December 1944

From: OPNAV

To: AJISNA, LONDON

NUMBER 673, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Eleanor joins with me in a happy Christmas to you and Clemmie and the children and an old fashioned good luck for all of you in the new year.

Bless you all.

ROOSEVELT

Released 2500052 December 1944.

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W. Stewart
Date: Nov 1, 1971
FROM

TO

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

FILE NO. 671

DATE

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

006

0465
26 December 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, London 261519Z, NCR___
NUMBEB 679 PERSONAL AND ___ FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.
Referring to my 677, Stalin has agreed to receive an
officer of Eisenhower's Staff and discuss the situation with
him.
Eisenhower has been informed.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 261519Z, December 1944.

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
December 26, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Referring to my 677, Stalin has agreed to receive an officer of Eisenhower's Staff and discuss the situation with him.

Eisenhower has been informed.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date NOV 1 1971
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO AMBASSADOR MacVEAGH, FOR DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL.

QUOTE. Number 680, personal and confident, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill.

Replying to your 858, I have asked our Ambassador to call upon you as soon as possible and I am ready to be of all assistance I can in this difficult situation.

I hope that your presence there on the spot will result in achieving an entirely satisfactory solution. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 2623172 Dec 1944.

OCEAN S. COLLINS, JR., Lieutenant, U.S.N.
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<td>FROM:</td>
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**Original NCR Distribution:**

NAVAGDE(#1 #2) ACTION FILE.

**Note:** White House Map Room notified by phone 3002572.

**Ref:** Your operational priority service radio Washington 262317Z received radio Athens 270740Z. Translation delivered to ambassador 270830Z.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 680, 26 December 1944.

DATE: VIA

SUBJECT: Greece

ACTION: (Complete file—"051 GREECE")

1. Answers PM-PRES #858, 26 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-694. Admiral Leahy sent copy of PM #858 to Sec of State for preparation of reply.

2. At 261632Z (after PM #858 had been referred to State by Adm Leahy) the following message, WH-IN-241, was received: "FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE WAR ROOM. Be your WH-OUT-694. Refer to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply." Sent to Adm Leahy's office for information only since action had already been taken.

3. Draft reply prepared by State; to Adm Leahy by Mr. Bohlen; sent to President by Adm Leahy as WH-OUT-698, 262122Z; President approved with changes in WH-IN-245, 262327Z; dispatched to Ambassador MacVeagh in Athens for delivery to the Prime Minister, 262317Z.

051 Greece.
29 December 1944

FROM: OPINAV
TO: ALJUSMA, LONDON

NUMBER 681, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

I have today received the following message from Marshal Stalin, dated 27 December, in reply to the message quoted to you in my 675. I should like your comments before making a reply.

QUOTE: I have received your message on Polish matters on December 20.

As regards Mr. Stettinius' statement of December 18, I would prefer to express myself about this during our personal meeting. In any case the events in Poland have considerably moved ahead; it is reflected in the said statement.

A number of facts which took place during the time after the last visit of Nikolajczyk to Moscow and, in particular the radio-communications with Nikolajczyk's government intercepted by us from arrested in Poland terrorists—underground agents of the Polish emigre government—with all palpability proves that the negotiations of Mr. Nikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Nikolajczyk's back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland. We cannot reconcile with such a situation when terrorists instigated by Polish emigrants kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead a criminal fight against Soviet troops which are liberating Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they in fact are. The substitution of Nikolajczyk by Armyshevsky and,
in general, transpositions of ministers in the Polish exilic government have made the situation even worse and have created a precipice between Poland and the exilic government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made serious achievements in the strengthening of the Polish state and the apparatus of governmental power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion and strengthening of the Polish army, in carrying into practice of a number of important governmental measures and, in the first place, of the agrarian reform in favor of the peasants. All this has lead to consolidation of democratic powers of Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Committee among the wide masses in Poland and among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want and are capable to work together with it and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany.

For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government will not have any serious ground for postponement of the question of its recognition. It is necessary...
to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of Poland but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security of the Soviet Union. To this we have to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependent on the presence of peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance while the emigre government and its underground agents by their terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of the latter. On the other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy of support of the emigre government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable for our common cause if the governments of the Allied countries as the first step have agreed on an immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a certain time it would be recognized as the lawful government of Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into a provisional government of Poland. Otherwise I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish People in the Allied powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests
of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 2920174 Dec 1944.

ODEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. 681, 29 December 1944

DATE: 681, 29 December 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Quotes to Churchill message received by the President from Stalin, dated 27 Dec 44. (See STATUS SLIP on STALIN-PRES 27 Dec 44.)

2. Answered by PM-PRES 56 A, 30 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: ____________

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

0476
30 December 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

PRIME MINISTER,

Your 861 and 862. I am preparing to leave the U.S. as soon as possible after the Inauguration by warship to the Mediterranean and from there by airplane for Yalta, but have not yet so informed Stalin.

I will give you accurate dates as soon as details are worked out.

My thought now is to send a Naval ex-passenger ship to the Black Sea to provide services and living accommodations if necessary. This ship could berth in Sevastopol if necessary because of weather.

Information from Harriman indicates that suitable quarters and staff meeting place can be made available at Yalta where the city was not damaged during the German occupation.

It is my intention to take with me about 35 persons, including Joint Staff, personal staff, Secret Service, servants, etc.

I will give you more detailed information in the near future.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 3016142, December 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.
December 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #612

Your 361 and 362. I am preparing to leave the U.S. as soon as possible after the Inauguration by warship to the Mediterranean and from there by airplane for Yalta, but have not yet so informed Stalin.

I will give you accurate dates as soon as details are worked out.

My thought now is to send a Naval ex-passenger ship to the Black Sea to provide services and living accommodations if necessary. This ship could berth in Sevastopol if necessary because of weather.

Information from Harriman indicates that suitable quarters and staff meeting place can be made available at Yalta where the city was not damaged during the German occupation.

It is my intention to take with me about 35 persons, including Joint Staff, personal staff, Secret Service, servants, etc.

I will give you more detailed information in the near future.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 682, 30 Dec 44.

DATE 682, 30 Dec 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 301614Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

1. Answered FY-PRESS #661 on Dec 29, Dec 44, which were both forwarded to the President at Hyde Park.
2. Upon President’s return on 30th, this draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched 301614Z.
3. Answered by FY-PRESS #668, 31 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

210 ARGONAUT

DATE: ____________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________

210 (2)
30 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: OPHAV

TO: ALISNA, LONDON

NUMBER 683, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 683 received. I am happy to know of your safe arrival and wish you every success in the solution of the Greek problem which seems very promising as a result of your journey.

ROOSEVELT

Released 3016222 December 1944.

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.
December 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 863 received. I am happy to know of your safe arrival and wish you every success in the solution of the Greek problem which seems very promising as a result of your journey.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: NOV 1 1911

301622
30 December 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 684. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 864. I have today sent the following to Stalin. You will see that we are in step.

QUOTE. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the...
Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem and I therefore...
still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of
the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military
angle see any great objection to a delay of a month. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 301957Z, December 1944.

ROYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Serial or File No. 684, 30 December 1944

TO Map Room VIA

SUBJECT: Poland, Recognition of Lublin Government

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #96A.
2. Quotes to the Prime Minister a message sent by the President to Marshal Stalin (PREZ-STALIN 153, 30 Dec 44.) See STATUS SLIP on this message.
3. Answered by PM-PRES #370, 31 Dec 44.
4. Also see WINANT-PRES 2027, 31 Dec 44, for Winant's comments on this message.

COPIES TO: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

DATE: ___________________ BY DIRECTION OF:

_______________________ ___________________

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_______________________ ___________________

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0486
FROM: OPAV
TO: LONDON

NUMBER 683, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Referring to your Memo in regard to taking off by plane from Caserta, my advisors, medical and otherwise, consider it advisable to fly in high altitudes over the mountains between Italy and destination.

Admiral Hewitt has recommended going by Naval vessel from here to Malta and flying from Malta to destination, which can be done without reaching any high altitude. The same applies to Alexandria or Suez, but would necessitate my spending more time on the ship.

Is there any reason why I should not transfer from ship to plane at Malta which might involve remaining overnight?

We are working on the details and hope to give you full information in the early future.

ROOSEVELT

31 December 1944

Released 31626Z December 1944.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Reclassified By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: Nov 1 1971

File Copy
December 30, 1944

PRÉSIDENT TO PRIME:

Referring to your in regard to taking off by plane from Caserta, my advisors, medical and otherwise, consider it inadvisable to fly in high altitudes over the mountains between Italy and destination.

Admiral Hewitt has recommended going by Naval vessel from here to Malta and flying from Malta to destination, which can be done without reaching any high altitude. The same applies to Alexandria or Suez, but would necessitate my spending more time on the ship.

Is there any reason why I should not transfer from ship to plane at Malta which might involve remaining overnight?

We are working on the details and hope to give you full information in the early future.

P.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1978
FROM  The President  TO  The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO.  685, 31 Dec 44.

DATE  31 Dec 44.

TOR MAP NOON  VIA

SUBJECT: ARGENTINA

ACTION:

1. Partner reply to PM-Fish #36, 30 Dec 44. (See FIS-Pa #682, 30 Dec 44.)
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President; dispatched 31 Dec 44.
3. Answered by PM-Fish #371, 4 Jan 45.

COPIES TO:  AR 210 ARGENTINA

DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2)