To: The President of the United States
Nr: 840  Filed 011532Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

Personal and

1. We consulted together at once on the issues discussed in your 661. We decided to examine the prospect of an agreement based on the Canadian plan as suggested in the seventh paragraph of your 661, coupled with a further exploration of the differentiation of faires for Fifth Freedom Traffic, of which I spoke in paragraph five of my 836 as a valuable line.

2. By the time we had communicated with Swinton, however, the conference had already decided to approve all the technical decisions and to refer unfinished business to the Council of the International Organization.

3. I must confess to you that we have found it difficult at this distance to form a clear judgment of the rapidly changing phases of a negotiation so complex in character and far-reaching in scope. Swinton's return will give me an opportunity to conduct with him a comprehensive survey of the problem such as cannot

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72.
be achieved in an exchange of telegrams.

4. Having reached an understanding, I would propose to give you an account of the plan which we can lay before the council in order to meet your wishes and, as far as may be possible, fulfil your expectations. You may be sure that your own desire to lay a sound foundation for the future civil air transport system of the world is paralleled by our own.

Prime.
1 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The following message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain is by direction of the President forwarded for the preparation of a draft reply for the President's consideration.

"We consulted together at once on the issues discussed in your 661. We decided to examine the prospect of an agreement based on the Canadian plan as suggested in the seventh paragraph of your 661, coupled with a further exploration of the differentiation of fares for Fifth Freedom Traffic, of which I spoke in paragraph five of my 856 as a valuable line.

"By the time we had communicated with Swinton, however, the conference had already decided to approve all the technical decisions and to refer unfinished business to the Council of the International Organization.

"I must confess to you that we have found it difficult at this distance to form a clear judgment of the rapidly changing phases of a negotiation so complex in character and far-reaching in scope. Swinton's return will give me an opportunity to conduct with him a comprehensive survey of the problem such as cannot be achieved in an exchange of telegrams.

"Having reached an understanding, I would propose to give you an account of the plan which we can lay before the council in order to meet your wishes and, as far as may be possible, fulfil your expectations. You may be sure that your own desire to lay a sound foundation for the future civil air-transport system of the world is paralleled by our own."

"Signed: Prime."

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander-in-Chief.
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 840, 92 December 1944.
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 01/1740Z
VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT: Chicago Air Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM 6641. 30 November 1944.

2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as NR-OUT-575.

3. NR-IN-196 from the Pres to Admiral Leahy stated, "The President has asked that NR-OUT-575 be referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply."

4. Referred to Sec State by Admiral Leahy, 1 Dec 44, for preparation of draft reply for the President's consideration.

5. Draft reply prepared by State; to Admiral Leahy on 2 Dec 44; to the President by Admiral Leahy as NR-OUT-578.

6. NR-IN-198, 021455 Dec 44, stated, "FROM PRES TO ADM LEAHY, Your NR-OUT-578. Approved. Please send."

7. Message as drafted by State Dept sent to PM as PRES-PM 6641, 2 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

COPY: 210 AIR CONFERENCE

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 AIR CONFERENCE

To: The President of the United States

Mr: 841

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 841 Personal

1. I agree fully with your number 663. Events have superseded the views expressed two days ago in my number 839. We must, then, review the new situation created in Burma by these misfortunes at a time when operation Capital has opened well.

The one request I make at the moment is that, as the two Chinese divisions are to be carried by air, we should be consulted about what air forces are left for the necessary support of Mountbatten's advancing forces. I have the greatest confidence in Wedemeyer but he cannot know the situation in the South at any moment.

2. I also concur with the United States Chiefs of Staff that, our officers in Moscow having received no answer from the Russians, the Russians should be notified that we shall bomb from December 3 up to the bomb line proposed to the Red Staff on November 28.
3rd December 1944

From: The U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 842

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Number 842.

I am deeply grateful to you for your most kind message on my birthday, which gave me the greatest pleasure, and also for the framed quotation from Abraham Lincoln with your own charming note upon it. This reached me, by sure hands, when I awoke.

I cannot tell you how much I value your friendship or how much I hope upon it for the future of the world, should we both be spared.

Prime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SIBEL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>842, 3 Dec 44.</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Churchill's birthday.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Acknowledges PERS-PM #662, 30 November 44.
2. Transmitted to the President at Warm Springs as SB-OUT-584, 03/25/44.
3. No reply
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 843

Personal and Personal. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 843.

Your number 665:

1. We agree, but we are sure you would not wish to leave SEAC forces in a dangerous plight, especially since operation CAPITAL is the one you favoured. It is most unlikely that there will be any difference between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer, but if this should arise we feel it should be settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. New subject: We endorse your action.

Prime.

Reed 05/1335Z
To President at Hot Springs as MR-OUT 595

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 843, 5 December 1944.  

TO: Map Room  
VIA:  

SUBJECT: China situation; Bombline in Balkans.  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PRES-PM #665, 4 Dec 44.  
2. To the President at Warm Springs as MB-OUT-595.  
3. No distribution: no reply.  

COPY TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

300 (BL); 530  

0499
To: The President of The United States
 Nr: 844 Filed 06/01302
 Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Private Number 844.

As we are unable to meet, I feel that the time has come for me to place before you the serious and disappointing war situation which faces us at the close of this year. Although many fine tactical victories have been gained on the western front and Metz and Strasbourg are trophies, the fact remains that we have definitely failed to achieve the strategic object which we gave to our armies five weeks ago. We have not yet reached the Rhine in the northern part and most important sector of the front and we shall have to continue the great battle for many weeks before we can hope to reach the Rhine and establish our bridgeheads. After that again, we have to advance through to Germany.

2. In Italy, the Germans are still keeping 26 divisions, equivalent to perhaps 16 full strength or more, on our front. They could however at any time retreat through the Brenner and Ljubljana and greatly shorten their line by holding from Lake Garda to (say) South of the Adige. By this they might save half their
Italian forces for home defence. Even after that there are the Alps to which they could fall back, thus saving more men. It seems to me that their reason for standing so long in Italy may have been to extricate the twelve divisions in the Balkans, etc, which are now fighting their way back to Hungary and Austria. Apart from the air and partisan and small commando forces, there are no means of preventing this, and my opinion is that the greater part will escape. About half of these might be available for adding to what may be saved from Italy. This would be a powerful reinforcement to the German homeland available, according to events, either in the east or in the west.

3. We have secured weighty advantages from DRAGON for the battle on the main front, but the reason why the Fifteenth Group of Armies has not been able to inflict a decisive defeat on Kesselring is that, owing to the delay caused by the weakening of our forces for the sake of DRAGON, we did not get through the Apennines till the valley of the Po had become waterlogged. Thus neither in the mountains nor on the plains have we been able to use our superiority in armour.

4. On account of the obstinacy of the German resistance on all fronts we did not withdraw the five British and British-Indian Divisions from Europe in order to enable Mountbatten to attack Rangoon in March, and for other reasons also this operation became
impracticable. Mountbatten therefore began, as we agreed at Quebec, the general advance to Burma downstream from the north and the west, and this has made satisfactory progress. Now, owing to the advance of the Japanese in China, with its deadly threat to Kunming and perhaps Chungking to the Generalissimo and his regime, two and possibly more Chinese divisions have to be withdrawn for the defence of China. I have little doubt that this was inevitable and right. The consequences however are serious so far as Mountbatten's affairs are concerned, and no decision has yet been taken on how to meet this new misfortune, which at one stroke endangers China and your air terminal as well as the campaign in northern Burma. All my ideas about a really weighty blow across the Adriatic or across the Bay of Bengal have equally been set back.

5. The vast scale operations which you have conducted in the Pacific are at present the only part of the war where we are not in a temporary state of frustration.

6. We have however happily to consider what the Russians will do. We have Stalin's promise for a winter campaign starting I presume in January. On most of his immense front he seems to have been resting and preparing though only about three or four German divisions have come over to face Eisenhower. I am not in a position to measure the latest attacks he has launched to the southwest of Budapest. We may however I think look forward to more assistance

RESGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Gst. 308.5B, 59-72
By R. H. Parks
MAY 6 1972

0502
from this and other Russian actions than we have had lately, and 
the German position is so strained that any heavy penetration 
might bring about a partial if not a total collapse.

7. I have tried to survey the whole scene in its scope and 
proportion and it is clear that we have to face in varying degrees 
of probability—

(a) a considerable delay in reaching and still more in forcing 
the Rhine on the shortest road to Berlin,

(b) a marked degree of frustration in Italy,

(c) the escape home of a large part of the German forces 
from the Balkan Peninsula,

(d) frustration in Burma,

(e) elimination of China as a combatant.

When we contrast these realities with the rosy expectations 
of our peoples in spite of our joint efforts to damp them down the 
question very definitely arises:—

"What are we going to do about it?"

My anxiety is increased by the destruction of all hopes of 
an early meeting between the three of us and the indefinite post-
ponement of another meeting of you and me with our Staffs. Our 
British plans are dependent on yours, our Anglo-American problems 
at least must be surveyed as a whole, and the telegraph and the 
telephone more often than not only darken counsel. Therefore I
feel that if you are unable to come yourself before February, I am bound to ask you whether you could not send your Chiefs of Staff over here as soon as possible, where they would be close to your main armies and to General Eisenhower and where the whole stormy scene can be calmly and patiently studied with a view to action as closely concerted as that which signalised our campaigns of 1944.

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR

Admiral King  
General Marshall

The enclosed copy of a message from Prime is forwarded for information and preparation of a draft reply for the President's consideration.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Re: Prime to President No. 844
TO

The Prime Minister

FROM

The President

DATE

844, 6 December 1944

SUBJECT:

General war situation; proposed meeting with Joint Chiefs in London.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MH-OUT-601, O61245Z.

2. Copies forwarded by Admiral Leahy to Gen Marshall and Adm King, 6 Dec 44, for preparation of draft reply for the President's consideration.

3. Draft message prepared by Marshall and King; sent to the President by Admiral Leahy as MH-OUT-617, 071858Z.

4. Message rewritten by the President, sent via pouch to Admiral Leahy on 8 Dec 44 with following notation, "I propose the following telegram to former Naval Person instead of the draft you sent me. Please clear with Marshall and King and send unless you have objections."

5. General Marshall made several changes in message. Msg sent back to President for approval of these changes, MH-OUT-621, 9 Dec 44, with following note by Admiral Leahy: "Marshall suggests changing your draft msg to Prime to the following. Marshall's proposed changes bear on a persistent British staff effort to support Mountbatten at the expense of China, and also on anticipated efforts by Prime to move into the Balkans at Eisenhower's expense. I recommend Marshall's changes."

6. MH-4H-219, 091854Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, directed that message be sent to the Prime Minister.

7. Sent to PM as PRES-PM #672, 9 Dec 44 (091947Z).
To: The President of the United States

Mr. 845
Filed: 0601307

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 845.

1. In view of the State Department's communique in Italy issued
yesterday, there will no doubt be a debate in Parliament. I shall
be called upon to reply to its strictures by implication, upon his
Majesty's Government's policy and action not only in Italy but in
Greece and possibly in Belgium. This I am quite prepared to do and
I hope you will realise that I must have all liberty in this matter.

2. I should be very much obliged to you if you would authorise
me to read the terms of Count Sforza's letter to Mr Berle of September
23, 1943. It was on the faith of this letter that the British Govern-
ment withdrew their opposition which they had a right to have considered
to the sending of Count Sforza into Italy. When Count Sforza passed
through London I went through this letter with his almost line by line,
before witnesses who are available, and he made the strongest declara-
tion amounting to a gentleman's word of honour that this represented
his position. However no sooner had he got to Italy than he worked
busily at the intrigues which destroyed the Badoglio Government. On

(Omitted due to top secret classification)

And 10006
To: Box 1402 - 06/1052
R_BAL
Copy to Allan Lasky

0507
account of this behavior I have regarded him as a man in whom no trust could be placed. It has never been our policy and we have no power, to veto the appointment of particular Italian ministers to particular positions. But it is certain that were Count Sforza to obtain the Premier ship or the Foreign Secretarship, the relations between the British Government and the Italian Government would suffer very much from our complete want of confidence in him. If you do not feel able to allow me to quote the letter, I shall name the less feel entitled to mention the substances of the undertakings given by Count Sforza to me,

3. I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communique to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it. I feel however entitled to remind you that on every single occasion in the course of this war I have loyally tried to support any statements to which you were personally committed for instance, in the Darlan affair I made the greatest possible exertions as you may remember to sustain the action of the United States Government and Commander, which was and still is much criticized in quarters ever ready to be critical. Also, in the matter of the division of the Italian Fleet I not only did all in my power to avoid the slightest appearance of difference between us, though the difference was considerable, but His Majesty's Government have actually supplied fourteen out of the fifteen warships lent to the Russians to make up for their one
third share of the Italian Fleet to which you had referred. Finally, it was I who proposed to you the bulk of the mitigations which were introduced into our relationship with Italy as the result of our talks at Quebec and Hyde Park.

4. In all these circumstances I was much hurt that a difference about Count Sforza should have been made the occasion for an attempt on the part of the State Department to administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government. In the very dangerous situation in which the war is now it will be most unfortunate if we have to reveal in public controversy the natural differences which arise inevitably in the movement of so great an alliance. I do not remember anything that the State Department has ever said about Russia or about any other allied state comparable to this document with which Mr. Stettinius has inaugurated his assumption of office. I am sure such things have never been said by the State Department about Russia even when very harsh communications have been received and harsher deeds done.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
5 December 1944

TEXT OF STATEMENT

The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of Government along democratic lines without influence from outside.

This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to Governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SPECIAL or FILE NO.: 845, 6 December 1944.

DATE: 0608002 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: State Department release on Italy and reaction in England.

ACTION:

1. See Statement released by State Department on 5 Dec 44. (See Oll ITALY for complete file.)
2. PM #845 to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-602, 0613052.
3. MR-IN-206, 0615402, from the President to Adm Leahy stated, "Re MR-OUT-602...for preparation of reply with the consultation of the Secretary of State."
5. See message from Stettinius to the President, MR-OUT-610, giving Stettinius' views.
6. Reply drafted by State; to Leahy on 6 Dec 44; sent to the President by Leahy on 6 Dec 44 as MR-OUT-614.
7. MR-IN-212, 0621552, from the President to Adm Leahy: "Re MR-OUT-614. Approved."
8. Reply sent to the PM as PRESS #669, 6 Dec 44.
9. (Also see MR-OUT-618, 7 Dec 44, from Stettinius to the President.)

COPIES TO: DSR: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature: AII. Italy]
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 846  Filed 0610082
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
Number 846.

I have replied as follows to Stalin's enquiry for my advice on the two questions raised with him by De Gaulle:

1. Your telegram about De Gaulle's visit and the two questions he will raise. We have no objection whatever to a Franco Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo Soviet pact. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed, it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo Soviet treaty with any improvements. In this way the obligations of each one of us would be identical and linked together. Please let me know if this idea appeals to you as I hope it may. We should both of course tell the United States.

2. The question of changing the eastern frontier of
France to the left bank of the Rhine or alternatively of forming a Rhenish-Westphalian province under international control, together with other alternatives ought to await settlement at the peace table. There is, however, no reason why, when the three heads of government meet, we should not come much closer to conclusions about all this than we have done so far. As you have seen, the President does not expect De Gaulle to come to the meeting of the three. I would hope that this could be modified to his coming in later on when decisions, especially affecting France, were under discussion.

3. Meanwhile, would it not be a good thing to let the European Advisory Commission sitting in London, of which France is a member, explore the topic for us all without omitting in any way the heads of governments?

4. I am keeping the President informed.*

2. There seems much to be said for a tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. In that way we can be sure that our mutual obligations to each other are harmonised from the beginning. Public opinion too would think such a joint agreement more satisfactory than an arrangement whereby relations between the French and ourselves were governed
by agreements which each of us had entered into separately with Russia.

3. I should welcome your views.

Prime.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 846, 6 December 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 061345Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Stalin's conference with De Gaulle; French frontier; Franco-Soviet pact.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #667, 5 Dec 44. (See STATUS SLIP on PRES #667 for details on this message.)
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MB-OUT-603, 061400Z.
3. MB-IN-206, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated "Re MB-OUT-603... For preparation of reply with the consultation of the Sec of State. 061510Z.
4. Given to Bohlen, State Dept-White House liaison, to work up reply.
5. (See also PRES-PM #568, 6 Dec 44, which quotes to the PM a message sent by the President to Stalin.)
6. Reply prepared by State Department; sent to the President by Admiral Leahy as MB-OUT-611.
7. President approved in MB-IN-210, 062153Z.
8. Sent to the PM as PRES #670, 6 Dec 44, 062225Z.

[Signature]

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

[Signature] 05X

0515
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 847 Filed 061020Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
Personal and TOP SECRET Number 847.

I attach our suggestion for the November U-Boat report.

Canada is being informed at the same time.

"Shipping losses from U-Boat action have again been very small and the number of U-Boats sunk in proportion has again been satisfactory.

The enemy has by no means abandoned the struggle and has introduced new devices, such as the extensible air intake and exhaust which enable U-Boats to remain submerged for long periods and so penetrate into areas denied to them for the past three years.

Reports that U-Boat construction has been abandoned are probably German inspired and are untrue. On the contrary, improved types of U-Boats may at any time be thrown into the battle and retention of our present command of the sea will undoubtedly call for unremitting vigilance and hard fighting."

Prime.
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

DATE  847, 6 Dec 44.

SUBJECT: November Anti-submarine statement.

ACTION:
1. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-604, 061410Z.
2. By direction Admiral Brown, copies to Navy Public Relations and
   OWI for comment.
3. MR-IN-207, 061510Z, stated, "To Admiral Leahy for approval and sub-
   mission of final form to the President." Admiral Leahy's office notified.
   Statement however was to be handled by Admiral Brown in usual manner.
4. By memo, 6 Dec 44, Adm Brown notified that Navy and OWI approved
   statement as drafted by the British.
5. MR-IN-615, 062055Z, from Adm Brown to the President, stated, "RE
   MR-OUT-604. Navy Dept and OWI approve anti-submarine statement
   submitted by the Prime Minister. Your authority to release is requested."
6. MR-IN-213 from President to Adm Brown, 062153Z, stated, "Your
   MR-OUT-615 approved."
7. Dispatch written by Adm Brown, sent to the PM as PRES #671,
   0623042 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:
MR 000.7 (3)  

000.7 (3)
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 848  Filed 0617522

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Number 848 personal and

Thank you for your telegram Number 664.

Although I have always felt that these discussions were premature and throw too heavy a burden on our minds at a time when so many anxieties of war weigh down upon us, yet I can assure you that I sympathise completely with your desire to take advantage of these pregnant negotiations at Chicago. It is our considered view, however, that further and, in the end, swifter progress will be made if we have an opportunity here to review the position in every one of its aspects and in its general setting in the world economy.

It is our desire, as it is yours, to reconcile the greatest possible freedom of air commerce with a broad justice to all nations, large and small.

It is your desire, as it is ours, that the free play of enterprise should not degenerate into an exploitation of national
advantages which would in the end be found generally intolerable.

We are not satisfied, however, that the projects which have succeeded one another in such profusion during the intricate discussions at Chicago represent the final contribution of human ingenuity towards a solution.

Apart from our own views, we have to take account of Parliament and public opinion.

Criticisms of the Chicago proposals are already appearing in quarters of the press which are in no sense reactionary or narrowly nationalistic. These are symptoms which in the interest of ultimate agreement we cannot ignore. They serve to fortify us in our conviction that we should at this stage consult with our people. From such a consultation we shall expect to reach a clearer comprehension of issues which now seem to us extremely confused and to propound fresh constructive approaches.

Prime.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SUBJECT: Chicago Air Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PW #66, 6 Dec 44.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WR-OUT-613.
3. WR-IN-211, 06/21532, from the President to Sec State: "WR-OUT-613 to prepare reply if necessary."
4. To State by memo, 6 Dec 44.

210 Air Conference.
8 December 1944


For: The President of the United States

Number: 849  Filed 0617282

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Mr. 849. Your telegram Nr. 683.

1. MacMillan is leaving almost at once for Washington and
will be able to discuss Italian questions with your people.

2. I have arranged for our views on the general question
raised in your telegram to be taken up by the Foreign Office with
the State Department. I fully endorse the line taken in the Foreign
Secretary's telegram.

End

683 concerns Italian gram matter

[Handwritten note]

To ADM Leahy to take up
with Secretary of State
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal
and
Number 850,

My telegram Number 849 of December 8th.

I am sorry that circumstances which I know you
will understand now compel me to send MacMillan ac-
companying Field Marshal Alexander to Athens and he will,
therefore, be unable, to his great regret and mine, to
make his visit to Washington for some time. I want to
send another minister to Washington in his place and
will let you know about this as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, as regards Italy, Halifax will tell
you what we have in mind. We are briefing him fully
and he will have the assistance of the officers who are
already waiting to meet MacMillan in Washington.

Halifax will tell you how much we all regret this
change of plan.

End
From: U.S. Military Attaché, London
To: President of the United States

I will send you a considered answer to your telegram, for the kindly tone of which I thank you, over the weekend. I hope that the British reinforcements now coming steadily into Attica may make a more healthy situation in Athens. You will realize how very serious it would be if we withdrew, as we easily could, and the result was a frightful massacre, and an extreme left wing regime under Communist inspiration installed itself, as it would, in Athens. My cabinet colleagues here of all parties are not prepared to act in a manner so dishonourable to our record and name. Ernest Bevin's speech to the labour Conference won universal respect. Stern fighting lies ahead, and even danger to our troops in the centre of Athens. The fact that you are supposed to be against us, in accordance with the last sentence of Stettinius press release, as I feared has added to our difficulties and burdens. I think it probable that
I shall broadcast to the world on Sunday night and make manifest the purity and disinterestedness of our motives throughout and also of our resolves.

Meanwhile I send you a letter I have received from the King of Greece, to whom we have suggested the policy of making the Archbishop of Athens Regent. The King refuses to allow this. Therefore an act of constitutional violence will be entailed if we finally decide upon this course. I know nothing to the credit of the Archbishop, except that the people on the spot think it might stop a gap or bridge a gully.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Changes made per attached correction received at 12:35 2/16 72. Ref# 45/242 075 007 012 0575.
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered

Here is a note received from originator regarding the following message:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and

We received the following:

"I regret there was a mistake in the message sent you last night Number 851. Para two last sentence should read, 'I know nothing to the credit of the Archbishop except that our people on the spot think he might stop a gap or bridge a gully'. You will have 'the people on the spot'."

Please forward.

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 2-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 851, 15 December 1944

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 150305L VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Greece

ACTION: (Complete file—"WR 051 GREECE:"")

1. Answers PRES-PM #673, 13 Dec 44.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as WR-OUT-654, 15 Dec 44.
3. In WR-In-231, 1516252, the President directed that PM #851 be sent to Secretary of State for preparation of reply if such were advisable.
4. PM #851 sent to Sec State, 15 Dec 44, by Adm Leahy, and also included a copy of PM #852 for information.
5. On 19 Dec 44, Mr. Bohlen (State Dept—White House Liaison) stated that no reply would be made to PM #851 and 852; that any forthcoming reply would be made to PM #855, received on 17 Dec 44.

COPIES TO: "WR 051 GREECE"

DATE: ___________ BY DIRECTION OF: ___________

051 Greece
From: U.S. Military Attache, London
To: President of the United States
No.: 852

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt person and number 852.

Following is text of letter, dated December 14th, mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins My Dear Prime Minister,

I feel I must convey to you the deep sorrow produced in my by yesterdays discussions. After a common effort of so many years, during which I did not spare myself or my people, I never expected that the time would ever come when I should hear what I heard yesterday.

I have pondered with all possible detachment on the arguments you advanced in support of the immediate establishment of a Regency, and I have studied anew Mr MacMillan's views, to which you seemed to subscribe.

What you demand of me really amounts to this: that I should entrust the regency to the Archbishop, with all the consequences implicit in such an action, without my being told what precisely are the obligations the Rebels would undertake against this concession.

Read 156/402

Top Secret 15 December 1944
You have not assured me that the disarming of the Guerrillas would necessarily follow or that General Scooby's terms would be accepted, not even do you inform me of the terms of the agreement now being sought with Rebels. What would be the position if, after the announce-
ment of the Regency, the Guerrillas were to persist in their refusal to disarm or were to put forward new terms? And what would be my own responsibility if I were now to surrender my authority to a Regent who would be able to take decisions in my name, without my being sure that the large but unarmed majority of my people would not be handed over tomorrow to the tender mercies of an armed minority?

I do not know whose views Mr MacMillan is referring to when he says that the demand for the Archbishops appointment as Regent constitutes "a general hope and wish of the people". What I can tell you, from my own information and on the strength of 10 years experience at the head of my people, is that such a course of action would be regarded as an abandonment of the struggle, would bring confusion to the front of resistance to the extreme left, would disgust the Royalists and the Conservatives, and would immediately give birth to innumerable intrigues around the person of the Archbishop, who does not by any means enjoy the general confidence of the political world. We have had many similar disappointments in the past over the choice of persons.
Yet you expect me to take such a momentous decision simply on
the strength of Mr Macmillan's recommendation, without even my govern-
ment being consulted—indeed, against the views of my own Prime Min-
ister and many other political leaders. In considering such a grave
matter concerning the future of the crown and bound also with a vital
political problem on the settlement of which will depend the future
of my country, I think it would constitute no excessive caution on my
part if I wished to ascertain the views of all the representatives of
the political parties, who should first be made cognizant of all the
advantages that would accrue to the people from such a sacrifice on
the part of their King.

From my attitude so far you have no reason to believe that I
have ever thought of my own self when it came to a question of serv-
ing my country. You will no doubt have in mind all the declarations
by which I specifically and irrevocably undertook to submit myself
to the will of my people. I left the government entirely in the
hands of persons known for their anti-dynastic sentiments, without
once pressing for the appointment of any minister faithful to the
crown. I agreed not to proceed to Greece without the previous con-
sent of my government, and I accepted without demur your own counsel
not to raise this issue at a time when the liberation was being joy-
fully celebrated throughout Greece. Surely you are in a position to
know whether there was ever in my heart the disposition to insist on anything that concerned my person. I am ready for any sacrifice; but this sacrifice must be for my peoples benefit and at my peoples demand. I have never solicited anyone's help to safeguard my throne, and you know-you more than anybody else, my dear Prime Minister-how wronged I am by those who think I would wish to rely on anything other than the will of my people. But is it a "self-defense policy" that I should wish to retain intact all my rights and duties towards my people until such time as they can freely express their will?

What hurt me most of all during these discussions was your remarks about the sacrifices the British troops are undergoing in Greece today to impose order. I can assure you that a feeling of horror goes through me when I think of this unbelievable tragedy.

What purpose would it serve now to examine how this has come about, and how so many arms are found in the hands of people who, after using them to seize power, have no compulsion now in turning them against Greece's best friend? What I would like to say to you once again, after mature reflection during the night, is that in my desire to help the position of your government and yourself, to whose assistance Greece owes so much, I would not ask your troops to remain in Greece one minute longer than is absolutely necessary for the liberation of the capital and its environs and for the arming of the population so that it can defend itself. Beyond this, it is
purely a matter for the occupation authorities, and will depend
exclusively on the general policy which your government intends to
follow with regard to countries liberated by British arms. But until
the arming of the government forces is effected and the safety of
the people is ensured, I cannot believe that there is any man in this
country who would be willing to abandon the Greek government and that
part of the population loyal to it to the mercy of armed bands equipped
by the British authorities. Because quite apart from all considerations
of fair play in a situation where British initiative is so deeply com-
mitted, quite apart also from the most elementary sense of humanity
towards an unarmed mass of human beings, the government which you recog-
nize today is your ally: it was formed at your recommendation; and it
derives its legal status from me, who did not grudge you any sacrifice
when my contribution to the allied cause was still of some weight. I
did not stop to consider the Greek soldiers would die by the side of
your own men in Macedonia and Crete in a military enterprise doomed
in advance, nor that Greece would have to suffer the tragedy of occup-
ation. And when, after the German attack, the political leaders fal-
tered and none came forward to assume responsibility, I took that re-
sponsibility on my shoulders, acting as my own prime minister for some
time.

This country, where you have so hospitably given me shelter

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks 

DATE MAY 6 1972
and which I have come to love as my own native land, cannot forget these things quickly, and I feel sure that if it were to see my government being abandoned to this fate, a shock would go through it much stronger than that produced by the present anxiety over the fact that British troops are implicated in Greece. More than that: the whole of Europe would soon appreciate that full significance of such a failure.

With most cordial feelings,

Yours very sincerely,

George II
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

Serial or File No. 852, 15 December 1944

TOR Map Room 15/0700Z VIA Army Code Room

Subject: Greece

Action: (Complete file—"MR 051 GREECE")

1. Further to PM-Prio #851, 15 Dec 44.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-657, 15 Dec 44.
3. In WH-IN-231, 1516254, the President directed that PM #851 be sent to Secretary of State for preparation of reply if such were advisable.
4. PM #851 sent to Sec State, 15 Dec 44, by Adm Leahy, and also included a copy of this message (#852) for the Secretary's information.
5. On 19 Dec 44, Mr. Bohlen (State Dept-White House Liaison) stated that no reply would be made to PM #'s 851 and 852; that any forthcoming reply would be made to PM #855, received on 17 Dec 44.

Copies To: OMR 051 GREECE

Date: ____________________________

By Direction Of: ____________________________

051 Greece
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 853, 16 DECEMBER 1944

I thank you cordially for your telegram Number 674 about Poland. I trust you will carry out your proposal to send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together. This suggestion is most valuable and also I feel extremely urgent. Would it be possible for you to do this today, as I apprehend Stalin may make some move recognizing the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland.

We will send you a fuller account of our views on the other questions you raise as soon as possible, probably tomorrow. I can however tell you at once that the War Cabinet feel that the four points mentioned in your letter to Nikolajczyk are very much in line with our ideas, and that the publication of them could do nothing but good. I also hope to send you a statement about Greece in answer to your Number 673.

I do hope you have benefited by your brief rest at Hot Springs after so strenuous and successful a campaign.

PRIME

Sent to Pres at Warm Springs as WR-CUT-666, 161510Z Dec 44.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 853, 16 December 1944  Filed 1611092
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Number 853.

I thank you cordially for your telegram number 674
about Poland. I trust you will carry out your proposal to
send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any
positive action on the Polish question until the 3 of us can
get together. This suggestion is most valuable and also I
feel extremely urgent. Would it be possible for you to do
this today, as I apprehend Stalin may make some move recog-
nizing the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland.

We will send you a fuller account of our views on the
other questions you raise as soon as possible, probably
tomorrow. I also hope to send you a statement about Greece
in answer to your number 673.

I do hope you have benefited by your brief rest at
Hot Springs after so strenuous and successful a campaign.
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 853, 16 December 1944

Correction from source to Prime Minister's message to President TOPSEC No 853.

Please insert in para 2 after "Tomorrow":-

I can however tell you at once that the War Cabinet feel that the four points mentioned in your letter to Mikolajczyk are very much in line with our ideas, and that the publication of them could do nothing but good.

Ric'd 16/1720z. Me-out 667 16/1730z

No Sig.
FROM  The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE  16 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES-PW 667, 16 December 1944.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as 41-OUT-666, 161502.
3. (Correction to original message was received at 1617202 and sent to Warm Springs as 41-OUT-667, 1617302.)
4. By direction of Adm Brown, copy was sent to the Sec of State for preparation of draft reply. President was informed by footnote to 41-OUT-666.
5. In 41-IN-236, 162044, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Secretary of State for approval. At the same time, the Secretary of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given the President's 41-IN-236. He requested that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen his 41-IN-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as 41-OUT-670 (1621182).
6. At 162232Z, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as 41-OUT-672: "My suggested meg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (41-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (41-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of 0-V-E-R

COPIES TO: 52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 000.9 President
meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."
7. In 8R-LA-236, 1623552, the President approved Stettinius' draft
messages—"Your Jn-274-372. Approved. Please notify the PA in my name."
8. Message as drafted by Stettinius sent to Marshal Stalin as Post-
uluido #136, 1701162; repeated to Churchill as Pape-PA #675, 1701192,
thereby answering PA-PRES #851.
9. The fuller account promised in Para 2 of 853 was sent as
PA #854.
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 854, 16 December 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret
Number 854.

In your telegram Number 674 you asked for my estimate of the possibility of Nikolajczyk returning to power with enough authority to carry out his plans.

When he resigned it looked to us for the time as though efforts by other Poles to form a government might fail and Nikolajczyk be called back soon. Now that Arciszewski's government has established itself, we no longer see any immediate prospect of this. The majority of the Poles here appear to have accepted Arciszewski faute de mieux, and to be in a fatalistic mood of waiting for something to turn up. But with the Poles these moods do not last. In London Nikolajczyk has the support of all his own Peasant party and of important elements of the Socialist and Christian Labour parties. We have indications that the people in Poland are unhappy about Nikolajczyk's absence from the government. I am hopeful therefore that Nikolajczyk's return to power will still be possible in the new year.

MR-00-875

R/W-17010 R

1944-0541
You also asked about the Lublin Committee. We do not regard it as in any way representative of Polish opinion and whatever developments there may be in the Soviet Government's attitude we do not, at present, intend to recognize it. We shall maintain our recognition of the London Government, which is the legal government of Poland and the authority to which the large Polish forces fighting under British command owe allegiance. We hope that we can keep in step and consult beforehand on all this.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 854, 16 December 1944

TO MAP ROOM 171210Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Poland

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WK-OUT-675, 171210Z.
2. By direction of Admiral Brown, sent to Secretary of State for information, 17 Dec 44.
3. This is "fuller account of views" promised by the Prime Minister in his #853.
4. No reply

COPIES TO: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

BY DIRECTION OF: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
17 December 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 855, 17 December 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and private and confidential number 855.

About Greece. The present position is that our representatives on the spot, MacMillan and Leeper, have strongly recommended the appointment of the Archbishop as regent. This is obnoxious to the Papandreou Government though they might be persuaded to advocate a regency of three, namely the Archbishop, General Plastiras and Dragoumis. There is suspicion that the Archbishop is ambitious of obtaining chief political power and that, supported by EAM, he will use it ruthlessly against existing ministers. Whether this be true or not I cannot say. The facts are changing from hour to hour. I do not feel at all sure that in setting up a one-man regency we might not be imposing a dictatorship in Greece.

There is also to be considered the fact that the King refuses, I think inflexibly, to appoint a regency, certainly not a one-man regency of the Archbishop, whom he distrusts and fears. According to the Greek constitution the Crown Prince is Regent in the absence of the King. The King also states that all his ministers under Papandreou advise him against such a step and that, as a constitutional monarch, he cannot be...
responsible for it.

The War Cabinet decided to await for three or four days the course of military operations. Our reinforcements are arriving rapidly and the British General Staff Intelligence says that there are not more than 12,000 ELAS in Athens and the Piraeus. The Greek King's estimate is 15 to 22,000. Anyhow we shall, by the middle of next week, be far superior in numbers. I am not prepared, as at present informed, to give way to un-constitutional violence in such circumstances.

Our immediate task is to secure control of Athens and the Piraeus. According to the latest reports ELAS may agree to depart. This will give us a firm basis from which to negotiate the best settlement possible between the warring Greek factions. It will certainly have to provide for the disarming of the Guerrilla forces. The disarmament of the Greek Mountain Brigade, who took Rimini, and the Sacred Squadron, who fought so well at the side of British and American troops, would seriously weaken our forces, and in any case we could not abandon them to massacre. They may however be removed elsewhere as part of a general settlement.

I am sure you would not wish us to cast down our painful and thankless task at this time. We embarked upon it with your full consent (see my number 755 and your reply). We desire nothing from Greece but to do our duty by the common cause. In the midst of our task of bringing food and relief and maintaining the rudiments of order for a government which has no armed forces, we have become involved in a furious, though not as yet very bloody, struggle. I have felt it snug that you were unable to give a word of explanation for our action but I understand your
difficulties.

Meanwhile the cabinet is united and the Socialist ministers approve
Mr. Bevin's declarations at the labour conference which, on this matter,
endorse the official platform by a majority of 2,435,000 to 137,000 votes.
I could at any time obtain, I believe, a ten to one majority in the House
of Commons. I am sure you will do whatever you can. I will keep you
constantly informed.
17 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

At the direction of Admiral Brown, the attached two messages are forwarded for the information of the Secretary of State.

ROBERT W. BOONE,
Lieutenant, USNR.

2 Incls -
Incl 1 - PM-FRES #854,
16 December 1944.
Incl 2 - PM-FRES #855,
17 December 1944.
FROM  The Prime Minister  
TO  The President  

SECRET or FILE NO.  855, 17 December 1946  

TOR MAP ROOM  171210Z  VIA  Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Greece  

ACTION: (Complete file—"MR O51 GREECE").  

1. See PM #851, 15 Dec 44, in which Churchill states, "I will send you a considered telegram..."  
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as 4W-OUT-676, 171430Z.  
3. By direction Adm Brown, copy to Sec State for information, 17 Dec 44. See attached memo.  
4. WR-IN-240, from Capt Graham to Map Room, 171626Z, stated, "Be your 4W-OUT-676. In this message PM refers to 'My No. 755 and your reply.' President asks that these two messages be broken out and ready for him sometime after he reaches Washington."

5. President was shown these messages upon his return from Warm Springs. He gave no further instructions.

FROM:  
TO:  

DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:

051 GREECE.
To: The President of The United States
No: 856

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Number 856.

Your number 675. I am most grateful to you for sending
this telegram to U.J. It can do nothing but good.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-39-73
By R. H. Parks Date

nr-our-677

MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET

0549
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

Date  856, 17 December 1944

TOR MAP ROOM  T714302  VIA  Army Code Room

SUBJECT: State Department release to press re Polish situation.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PW #675, which quotes to the PM a message sent by the President to Marshal Stalin.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as 48-OUT-677, 17 Dec 44.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

COPY: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
23 December 1944

To: The President of the United States.
Number: 857  Filed 2311022
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

I and my military advisers entirely agree with Eisen-
howe r (see his SACF-155) that it is essential for us to obtain
from the Russians, at the earliest possible moment, some in-
dication of their strategical and tactical intentions. We
think it hopeless to try to get this information through our
military mission, or indeed to ask the Russians to commit it
to writing. The best, if not the only hope of getting what
we want, is for you and me to send a joint telegram to U.J.
suggesting that he should allow us to send a high ranking offi-
cer, nominated by General Eisenhower, to Moscow at once, in
order that he may explain our present dispositions and future
intentions on the Western front to the Soviet Government and
obtain reciprocal information from them.

If you agree with this, I propose that we should send
the following telegram to U.J.:-

"General Eisenhower reports that there has been a tend-
ency for German divisions formed or reforming in East Germany
to move to the Western front. The arrival of these divisions
clearly influences Eisenhower’s dispositions and, if this trend
continues, it will affect the decisions which he has to make
regarding future strategy in the west. General Eisenhower there-
fore considers it essential that he should have, at the earliest
possible moment, some indication of your strategical and tac-
tical intentions.

"We propose, therefore, that we should send a high rank-
ing officer to Moscow to give you the latest information about
the Western front and to receive from your high officers all
the information that you feel able to give him about Russian
dispositions and future intentions." Roosevelt-Churchill

End
FROM: EISENHOWER
TO: THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
NO: SGAF 155  21 DECEMBER 1944

1. There has been a tendency recently for German Divisions formed
   or reforming in the East of Germany to move to the Western Front. The ar-
   rival of these divisions obviously influences the events in my area and if
   this trend continues it will affect the decisions which I have to make
   regarding future strategy in the west. I therefore consider it essential
   that we should obtain from the Russians at the earliest possible moment
   some indication of their strategical and tactical intentions. If, for
   instance, it is the Russian intention to launch a major offensive in the
   course of this or next month, knowledge of the fact would be of the utmost
   importance to me and I would condition my plans accordingly. Can anything
   be done to effect this coordination.

2. I am aware that a request of this nature would inevitably entail
   my giving reciprocal information to the Russians, which I am quite ready
   to do.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

CM-IN-20644 (21 DEC 44)
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 857, 23 December 1944

TO MAP ROOM 231120Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Eisenhower's sending representative to Moscow.

ACTION: (See AR 340 (2) for complete file)
1. To the President via usher.
2. To Admiral Leahy and JCS for action.
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; to Churchill as PRES-PW #577, 23 Dec 44. (Note that PRES #677 quotes to Churchill a message sent by the President to Stalin on the same day.)

COPIES TO:

340 (2)  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:

S/40

0554
24th December 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: Unnumbered Filed 24/1955Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Unnumbered.

Clemmie and I send you and Elinor our warmest wishes for a happy Christmas and a triumphant New Year.

Winston

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 9-99-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

RWB
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 858, 26 December 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal, eyes only. Number 858.

Anthony and I are going out to see what we can do to square this Greek entanglement. Basis of action:

The King does not go back until a plebiscite in his favour has been taken. For the rest, we cannot abandon those who have taken up arms in our cause and must if necessary fight it out with them. It must always be understood that we seek nothing from Greece in territory or advantages. We have given much and will give more if it is in our power. I count on you to help us in this time of unusual difficulty. In particular I should like you to tell your Ambassador in Athens to make contact with us and to help all he can in accordance with the above principles.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE or FILE NO. 858, 26 December 1944

TO MAP ROOM 2612092 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Greece

ACTION: (Complete file—"WR 051 GREECE.")

1. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-694.
2. Sent to the Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy for preparation of draft reply for the President's signature.
3. At 261632Z (after Pa #858 had been referred to State by Adm Leahy) the following message, WR-IN-244, was received: "FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE MAP ROOM. Re your WR-OUT-694. Refer to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply." Sent to Adm Leahy's office for information only since action had already been taken.
4. Draft reply prepared by State Department, to Adm Leahy by Mr. Bohlen. State Dept's draft sent to the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-698, 2621222, with covering memo by Adm Leahy.
5. President approved WR-OUT-698, with changes, in his WR-IN-245, 2623972. Reply to PM as PHS-Pa #680, 26 Dec 44, which was sent to Ambassador MacVeagh, Athens, for delivery to the PM.

COPY TO:
"WR 051 GREECE."
To: The President of the United States

Many thanks for your Number 680 which encouraged me amidst many difficulties. Ambassador Macveagh called yesterday and we had a talk. Like everyone else here he is convinced that a Regency under the Archbishop is the only course open at the moment. I have seen the Archbishop several times and he made a very good impression on me by the sense of power and decision which he conveyed as well as by his shrewd political judgments. You will not expect me to speak here on his spiritual qualities for I really have not had sufficient opportunity to measure these.

Greek conference of which you will have had from other sources full account, was unanimous in recommending a Regency. This was strongly supported by EAM however I do not consider Archbishop is at all Left Wing in Communist sense. On the contrary he seems to be an extremely determined man bent on establishing a small strong executive in Greece to prevent the continuance of Civil War.

I am therefore returning with Anthony to England to press
upon the King of Greece to appoint the Archbishop Regent.

Effect of this, if King agrees, will of course mean that Archbishop will form a government of ten or less of the best will. I gathered that he would make Plastiras Prime Minister and that Papandreou would not be included. Naturally I could not probe too far while all these matters are hypothetical.

On our return we shall advise our colleagues who are already inclined to this course, that we should put the strongest pressure on Greek King to accept advice of his Prime Minister, Monsieur Papandreou, who changes his mind about three times a day but has now promised to send a telegram in his own words but in sense of my immediately following.

If Ambassador Macveagh’s report should on these matters correspond with mine I should greatly hope that you would feel yourself able to send a personal telegram to the King of Greece during the next few days supporting the representation we shall make to him, of which we shall keep you informed. My idea is that the Regency should be only for one year or till a Plebiscite can be held under conditions what is called "normal tranquility”.

The Archbishop has left this matter entirely in my hands so that I can put the case in most favorable manner to the King. Of course if after these difficulties have been surmounted and Archbishop is Regent you felt able send him a telegram of support, that would make our task easier. Mr. President, we have lost over 1,000 men and though the greater part of Athens is now
clear, it is a painful sight to see this city with street fighting raging now here now there and the poor people all pinched and only kept alive in many cases by rations we are carrying, often at loss of life, to them at the various depots. Anything that you can say to strengthen this new lay out as the time comes will be most valuable and may bring about acceptance by ELAS of the terms of truce set forth by General Scobie. For the rest we are reinforcing as is necessary and military conflict will go on. The vast majority of the people long for a settlement that will free them from the Communist terror.

We have to think of an interim arrangement which can be reviewed when our long hopes for meeting takes place. This date should not now be far distant. It will then be possible to correlate our opinions and actions. In the meanwhile we have no choice but to recommend creation of a new and more competent executive government under Regency of Archbishop, and to press on with our heavy and unsought task of clearing Athens from very dangerous, powerful, well organised and well directed elements which are now pressing the area advance. I should value a telegram when I return on Friday morning.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-73
By R. N. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
28 December 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: 860 Filed 281725Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 860.

Reference Paragraph 4 of my immediately preceding telegram, following is message referred to.

"As Prime Minister of Greece it is my duty to report to
Your Majesty that at the conference today all present were unani-
mously in favour of establishing a Regency. All except members of
the Popular Party expressed themselves in favour of Regency being
created at once. I myself agreed that an immediate Regency was
necessary. The members of the Popular Party thought, however, that
establishment of a Regency should be deferred until KLAS had accepted
General Scobie's terms for a truce. In view of what happened today
and in the interests of Greece as well as outlook for the Royal House,
I as Prime Minister formally tend to Your Majesty advice that you
should appoint a Regency forthwith. It is further my advice that
there should be a single Regent and that he should be the Archbishop
of Athens."

End
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. B-89-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 861

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 861.

Your 676. I send you in my immediately following the Admiralty report on Yalta. If this place is chosen, it would be well to have a few destroyers on which we can live if necessary. There would be no difficulty in flying from the great air base and weather center at Caserta. I, myself, landed in a York at Simferopol. I dare say, however, Stalin will make good arrangements ashore. Our party will be kept to the smallest dimensions. I think we should aim at the end of January. I shall have to bring Anthony and Leathers.

Prime.

REREGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
TOP-SECRET

Read 2920292
Sent as MK-001-718

0565
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 861, 29 Dec 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 2920282 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PW #676, 23 Dec 44.
2. (Continued in PA-PW#682, 29 Dec 44.)
3. To the President at Hyde Park as AR-CUT-718, 2920372.
4. Answered by PA-PW #682, 30 Dec 44, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy. Further answered by PRES-PW #685, 31 Dec 44.

COPIES TO: 210 AMBASSADOR

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

210 (2)
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 862 Filed 29/17382
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and
Nr. 862.

Following is report mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram.

HARBOUR: The harbour at Yalta is small and is unsuitable for ships larger than destroyers. Its quays are believed to be intact. Ships of any size can anchor outside the harbour.

ANCHORAGE: The anchorage is exposed to the prevailing northeast wind which blows along the coast. The strongest winds are those from the northeast which blows in violent squalls from the mountains.

BOAT WORK: Under conditions of strong wind, boat work would become very difficult, if not impossible.

WEATHER: On the whole, however, strong wind conditions are not very frequent. The following figures are typical of the weather in January:

REGRADEN UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Temperature Range</td>
<td>30°F - 42°F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Gales per month</td>
<td>1 - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Days of Rain per month</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount per month</td>
<td>1 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Fine Days per month</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Bad Days (Rain and Wind) per month</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACCOMMODATION FACILITIES ABOARD:** There were a number of palaces and large country houses afloat which were converted into sanatoria and could have been used to provide ample accommodation; but we have no information about the conditions in which the Germans left them - it is believed that at least some of them have been destroyed.

**ACCOMMODATION ABOARD:** The question of availability of suitable ships is being looked into.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 862, 29 Dec 41.

TOR MAP ROOM 2920282 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: ARISTOTLE

ACTION:

1. Further to PM-PRES #860, 29 Dec 41, which answered PRES-PM #678, 23 Dec 41.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as AR-OUT-719, 2920572.
3. Answered by PRES-Pm #582, 30 Dec 41, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:

AR 210 ARISTOTLE

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2)
29 December 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Nr.: 863

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and

Nr. 863.

1. Ambassador Winant has sent me a copy of your message
to the Greek King. We are all very much obliged to you for acting
so promptly. Anthony and I have just returned. The War Cabinet
have endorsed all our actions and have authorised us to urge the
King of Greece tonight to appoint the Archbishop as Regent. The
Archbishop left it to me to discuss the period of the Regency with
the King, so that this gives a little latitude.

2. Failing agreement His Majesty's Government will advise
the Archbishop to assume the Office of Regent and assure him that
we will recognise him and the Government he forms as the government
of Greece.

Prime
To:  The President of The United States  
Nr:  864  
Filed 301455Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 864.

1. Anthony and I sat up with the King of Greece till 4:30 this morning at the end of which time His Majesty agreed to the announcement in my immediately following telegram. I have sent this to Ambassador Leeper in Athens in order that the Archbishop may go to work at once. The Greek translation is now being made and I will furnish you with a copy of it at the earliest moment.

This has been a very painful task to me. I had to tell the King that if he did not agree the matter would be settled without him and that we should recognize the new government instead of him. I hope you will be able to give every support and encouragement to the Archbishop and his government.

2. Your Number 681 enclosing Stalin's reply about Poland shows how serious will be the difficulties we shall have to face. I have consulted the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet about it and their clear view is that
we shall continue to press Stalin not to recognise the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland and tell him plainly that we shall not do so. The matter should be reserved for the coming conference.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 864, 30 December 1944

DATE: 3017272

TOR MAP ROOM: 3017272

VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland; Greece

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES-PM #681, 29 Dec 44.
2. Answered by PRES-PM #684, 30 Dec 44, which quotes to Churchill a message from the President to Stalin.

COPIES TO:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

051 GREECE

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 051 GREECE.
30 December 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 865

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and

My immediately preceding telegram. The following is the text of
the announcement referred to in Paragraph One.

"We, George Second, King of the Hellenes, having deeply considered
the terrible situation into which our well-loved people have fallen
through circumstances alike unprecedented and uncontrollable, and being
ourselves resolved not to return to Greece unless summoned by a free and
fair expression of the national will, and having full confidence in your
loyalty and devotion, do now by this declaration appoint you, Archbishop
Damasinos, to be our Regent during this period of emergency; and we
accordingly authorise and require you to take all steps necessary to
restore order and tranquillity throughout our Kingdom. We further de-
clare our desire that there should be ascertained by processes of demo-
cratic government, the freely-expressed wishes of the Greek people as
soon as these storms have passed, and thus abridge the miseries of our
beloved country by which our heart is rent."
31st December 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 866

I have not till now had an opportunity of telling you with what pleasure I received from Ambassador Winant your message of December 11th about Argentine meat. The very kind terms of this message gave the greatest satisfaction to the Cabinet. It is always our desire to be of assistance to you in your policies to the utmost of our power.

Prime
31st December 1944

To: The President of The United States

Mr: 867
Filed 31/20452

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 867.

1. In the instructions which the Combined Chiefs of Staff have sent to General Eisenhower for the guidance of the representative whom he is sending to Moscow for an exchange of information with U.J., it is contemplated that the Russians may wish to discuss the coordination of the action of their forces with those under Alexander’s command. In that event, Eisenhower’s representative is to say that he is not competent to discuss those questions, but that Alexander himself would probably be ready either to go to Moscow himself or to send a representative.

2. This seems to be a roundabout arrangement, and I feel it would be better for Alexander and Tedder to be in
Moscow together. Moreover it is desirable that Alexander's
meeting with Stalin should precede his agreed and urgently needed
conference at Belgrade with Tolbukhin and Tito. I therefore
propose we should instruct the Combined Chiefs of Staff to send
instructions to Alexander to proceed to Moscow as soon as he
can. As soon as I have your approval I will telegraph to

Stalin.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-30-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972

2
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

Serial or File No.: #657, 31 Dec 45.

Date: 01/0030Z

For Map Room: Army Code Room

Subject: Suggests Alexander also be sent to Moscow with Tedder.

Action:
1. See PRES-FO #679, 26 Dec 44.
2. To the President via ushers. Copy to Admiral Leahy.
3. Reply, written by Admiral Leahy, sent to Churchill as PRES #689.
   2 January 1945.

Copies To: #340 (2)

Date: ____________________

By Direction Of: ____________________

#340
31st December 1944

From: The U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 868 Filed 31/20552
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 868.
Your 682:-
I will certainly meet you at Yalta. We are preparing to
send a small signal ship to Sebastopol, also a civil liner for
accommodation if later information indicates that this is nec-
essary to supplement quarters on shore. It will be necessary
for me to take with me about the same numbers as attended the
last Quebec conference. This includes the provision for a round-
the-clock signal service, but any excess over those who can be
conveniently put up on shore will live aboard. Pending further
news from you I am taking January 28th (January 28th) as target
date for arrival of ships. I shall fly direct via Caserta in
the C-54 which General Arnold gave me and which is a wonder.
Have you a name for this operation? If not I suggest "ARGONAUT"
which has a local but not deducible association.
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

Serial or File No.: 868, 31 December 1944  

To: Map Room 0100302  
Via: Army Code Room  

Subject: ARGONAUT  

ACTION:  
1. Answers PRES-PA #682, 30 Dec 44.  
2. To the President via usher.  
3. To Admiral Leahy for reply; draft reply approved by the President; sent to Churchill as PASS-PA #690, 3 Jan 45.  

Copies To:  
210 (2)  

Date:  
By Direction Of:  

0582
From: The U.S. Military Attaché, London, England  
To: The President of The United States  
Nr: 869  
Filed 31/2100s  
Personal and Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 869.

1. I have had careful inquiries made into Air Vice-Marshall Eddison’s statement about U-boats which you mentioned in your letter of November 10. The script was carefully examined and approved both by the Admiralty and the Air Ministry before it was delivered, and they contend that these statements were within the limits of previous official announcements and disclosed no information which had not already appeared in the press and upon the German broadcast.

I have drawn the attention of both departments to the fact that future statements about the U-boat war are to be confined to achievements and should not speak about the forecast of the future, and that newspaper or German-broadcast disclosures are not to be taken as widening the scope of official statements, even though we know from other sources that they are true.

2. I hope you will let me know if you see any further cause for complaint.

File Copy
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

DATE: 31 December 1944

FILE NO. 869

TOR MAP ROOM 0100302 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: U-boat statement by Air Vice-Marshall Ellwood

ACTION:

1. Answers a personal letter from the President to Churchill, 10 Nov 44, delivered by courier. (See copy in MR 000.7 (3) Sec 2).
2. To the President via usher.
3. Reply prepared by Admiral Brown; approved without change by the President; sent to Churchill as PS594-364, 2 Jan 44.

COPIES TO: 000.7 (3) Sec 2.

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7
31st December 1944

From: The U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 870

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 870.

1. Many thanks for your 683. The Greek King behaved like a gentleman and with the utmost dignity, and I am sure a private message from you would give him comfort. I shall send only a civil acknowledgment to ELAS for the published message they have sent me, and hand the matter over to the Archbishop. It is clearly his job now.

2. I have read your 684 to Anthony, and he and I are in entire agreement with it. It will be most valuable to see what Stalin's reaction to it is. We shall of course send a supporting message at any moment you tell us it would be useful. The reason for delay is that you do not state in your 684 whether you have told Stalin that you have shown your message to me.

TOP SECRET

Read 01/0032 - TPVU


0585
3. It is very satisfactory that we seem to be getting into step on both these tangled questions.

4. The great battle in the west seems to be turning steadily in our favour and I remain of the opinion that Rommel's sortie is more likely to shorten than to lengthen the war.

Prime
TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.  870, 31 December 1944

TO WHOM 01/00302 VIA War Department

SUBJECT: Poland, Greece

ACTION:

1. Answer Press-P16 #1's 623 and 624.

2. To Secretary of State for preparation of reply, 1 Jan '44, by direction of the President.

EXTRACT: MR 051 GREECE

EXTRACT: MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

051 GREECE: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

0587