
To: The President of The United States

Nr: 900 Filed 17124/2Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and private No 900.

1. Harold MacMillan will gladly come to Algiers any time February 17th in case you wish to see him. He is very well informed about Italy as head of the Allied Control Commission. You have only to send him a message via Kirk. All good wishes. ENDS.

2. We are also communicating this message through United States Embassy here but you should also pass through usual channel.

Prime.

FXR: MAVB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-2972

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Sent to Prime by SMR-OUT-202, 171530 B.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

Serial or FILE NO. #902, 17 February 1945

DATE

TO: MAP ROOM 171530Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: MacDonald meeting President at Algiers.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President on ARGONAUT as M-OUT-202, 171530Z.
2. President’s reply received as M-11-117; sent to Churchill as PRES-P4 #708, 18 Feb 43.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2)
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 901    Filed 261240Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 901.

1. Accept my deep sympathy in your personal loss through
the death of General Watson. I know how much this will grieve
you.

2. You will probably see the accounts of our three days' debate which began yesterday. Today 21 Conservatives are moving a hostile amendment in favour of Poland, and Greendoow, who speaks for the Labour Party, made a foolish and hostile speech. We shall no doubt defeat the amendment by an over-whelming majority. Nevertheless there is a good deal of uneasiness in both parties that we are letting the Poles down, etc.

3. In these circumstances it is of the utmost importance that as many representative Poles as possible should be invited as soon as possible to the consultations in Moscow and, above all, that Mikolajczyk who is the leading test case should be invited. The London Polish Government is of course trying to prevent any Poles leaving here for Moscow or Poland, and is playing for a breakdown.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-22-72
By P. W. B.

File Copy
4. Clark Kerr telegraphs that Molotov spontaneously offers to allow British and American observers to go into Poland and see what is going on for themselves. I think this is of the highest importance. Nor can I feel that the acceptance of the offer would imply any recognition of the Lublin Government. There are many stories put about of wholesale deportations by the Russians and of liquidations by the Lublin Poles of elements they do not like, and I have no means of verifying or contradicting these assertions.

5. I do hope you have benefited by the voyage and will return refreshed. The battle seems to be going well and I propose to visit the front at the weekend, seeing both Eisenhower and Montgomery. I cannot help feeling there might easily be a good break through in the west. Every good wish to you and all. I hope Harry is recovering.

END
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #901, 28 February 1945

DATE

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. To the President via usher.
2. No answer.
3. See PM-PRES #905, 8 Mar 45, for next message on this subject.
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 902

Personal and Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Number 902.
Reference your telegram Number 710.

1. The total deficiency amounts to 109,000 tons. 51,000 tons for March arrival and 58,000 tons for April arrival. We have already made arrangements to meet the 51,000 tons for March arrival by diverting 30,000 tons of wheat in transit to U.K. and 21,000 tons ex SHAEP'S general reserve held by us for them in this country. The April deficiency will have to be met from U.K. stocks as there is no time to meet the demand from any other source.

2. We cannot meet certain items at all because we have no stocks available. These details are being arranged with the agencies concerned.

3. I want to impress upon you that we shall require immediate replacement of a large part of these food stuffs, and the provision of ships to carry them.
4. I am sure that the problem will turn out to be bigger than these figures. British Officers are now discussing the matter with SHAEF and will be returning tomorrow. I will send you a further telegram on editing their report.

Prime.
2 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Marshall:

The attached message from the Prime Minister was received today by the President, and is forwarded for your information.

/s/ William D. Leahy

COPY FOR MAP ROOM FILE

(Enclosure: Prime to President, No. 902.)
From: U.S.A. London
To: The President of the United States
Mr: 903, 5 March 1945
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
No. 903.

The First Lord of the Admiralty will be making his
customary annual statement to Parliament on Wednesday, March
7, in which it will be necessary for him to make a reference
in general terms to the history of our submarine warfare in
the past year.

This will not conflict in any way with our monthly
statement. I have read it myself and it will not touch
upon any technical secrets which would be useful to the
Japanese.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-89-72
By R. H. Parks Date

EH/01  ended 05/13/52.

To President at HP as MR-007-277 (05/15/65)
Copy to Adm. Edwards, Navy Department.

End. MAY 6 1972

0895
MEMORANDUM FOR

VICE ADMIRAL H. S. EDWARDS, U.S.N.,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

By direction of the President, the attached

copy of message No. 903 from Prime Minister Churchill
to the President, dated 5 March 1943, is forwarded
for your information.

Very respectfully,

J. A. TIRRE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

1 Encl.
5 March 1945

FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
NO: 903

The First Lord of the Admiralty will be making his customary annual statement to Parliament on Wednesday, March 7, in which it will be necessary for him to make a reference in general terms to the history of our submarine warfare in the past year.

This will not conflict in any way with our monthly statement, I have read it myself and it will not touch upon any technical secrets which would be useful to the Japanese.
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
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<td>903, 5 March 1945</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>051345Z</td>
<td>VIA:</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>Annual report by First Lord of the Admiralty.</td>
<td>ACTION:</td>
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<td>1. To the President at Hyde Park as 4H-OUT-277 (0515402).</td>
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<td>2. Copy to Admiral Edwards, Navy Department, for their information.</td>
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<td>3. No action taken. Report was made on 7 March to Parliament; this message removed from STATUS REPORT.</td>
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6 March 1945

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 904  Filed 0614282.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
Number 904.

1. On January 27 I sent you my telegram 897 about
the aviation agreement with the Government of Southern Ire-
land. You could not at the time reply because of wireless
silence. At Yalta, and also later at Alexandria, I under-
stood from you that you did not approve this step and that
it had been taken without your agreement. Mr Stettinius
also made this clear so far as he was concerned. At the
same time as we sent out 897 to you Lord Halifax was in-
structed to let the State Department have a copy of the
telegram at once so that they should hold their hand un-
til you had had an opportunity to comment on it.

2. On January 31 the State Department confirmed
that negotiations had been in progress but said that they
had not reached readiness for signature. On February 3
however, without further warning, Lord Halifax was in-
formed that the agreement had been signed and shortly afterwards it was published.

3. Our special concern with Eire is obvious on political and geographical grounds, and it is indeed much closer than that of the United States with the Argentine. We and the United States have, moreover, throughout kept in close touch in our general policy towards Eire, e.g., over the recent United States approach to De Valera for the removal of the Axis representatives. For this reason the political effect of the United States action in concluding an agreement with Southern Ireland on an important issue without consulting us seemed to us bound to injure our relations with De Valera politically, and may be embarrassing to the United States also, as it can only encourage him to try to play off one against the other. It has, in fact, been hailed in Southern Ireland as a diplomatic success for them.

4. I trust therefore that you will be able to take the necessary steps to have the agreement annulled. So far no response has been made to our telegrams or representations whether addressed personally to you or handed formally to the State Department.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 2-39-72
By R. H. Farkas Date MAY 6 1972

End.
6 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Air Agreement with Southern Ireland.

By direction of the President, the attached copy of message #904 from the Prime Minister to the President is forwarded for preparation of reply.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.G.

1 Enc.
PM-PRES #904,
6 March 43.

RECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By J. J. Stewart Date MAY 8 1972

-1-
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE 904, 6 March 1945.

TO OR MAP ROOM 06/1650Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Air Agreement with Ireland.

ACTION:

1. See PM #897, 27 Jan 45; #889, 4 Jan 45; and #888, 31 Jan 45, all filed PM 210 AIR CONFERENCE.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as #882, 061/7052.
3. President's #894, 6 Mar 45, stated: "Re #882. Please send copy to Secretary of State for preparation of reply."
4. Sent by memo to State, 6 Mar 45.
5. State's draft reply received by memo, 8 Mar 45 (Bohlen-Adams-Leahy). Approved without change by the President, dispatched to Churchill as PM #717, 15 March 1945.

COPY TO:

PM 210 AIR CONFERENCE.

DATE

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 AIR CONFERENCE.

0902
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 905

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 905.

1. I feel sure that you will be as distressed as I
am by recent events in Roumania. The Russians have succeeded
in establishing the rule of a Communist minority by force and
misrepresentation. We have been hampered in our protests
against these developments by the fact that, in order to have
the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October
recognised that Russia should have a largely preponderant
voice in Roumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece.
Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the
thirty days fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the
city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most
disagreeable to him and those around him.

Peace has now been restored in Greece and, though
many difficulties lie before us, I hope that we shall be able
to bring about in the next few months free, unfettered elec-
tions, preferably under British, American and Russian super-
vision, and that thereafter a constitution and government will
be erected on the indisputable will of the Greek people, which
remains our supreme ultimate objective in all cases, and with which I know you are in sympathy.

2. Stalin is now pursuing the opposite course in the two Black Sea Balkan countries, and one which is absolutely contrary to all democratic ideas. Since the October Anglo-Russian conversations in Moscow Stalin has subscribed on paper to the principles of Yalta which are certainly being trampled down in Roumania. Nevertheless I am most anxious not to press this view to such an extent that Stalin will say "I did not interfere with your action in Greece, why do you not give me the same latitude in Roumania?"

This again would lead to comparisons between the aims of his action and those of ours. On this neither side would convince the other. Having regard to my personal relations with Stalin, I am sure it would be a mistake for me at this stage to embark on the argument.

3. Again I am very conscious of the fact that we have on our hands the much more important issue of Poland, and I do not therefore want to do anything as regards Roumania which might prejudice our prospects of reaching a Polish settlement. Nevertheless, I feel that he should be informed of our distress at the developments which led to the setting up by force of a government in Roumania of a Communist minority, since this conflicts with the conclusions of the declaration on liberated Europe upon which we were agreed at the Crimea conference.

More especially I am afraid that the advent of this
Communist Government may lead to an indiscriminate purge of Anti-Communist Roumanians, who will be accused of Fascism much on the lines of what has been happening in Bulgaria. This is as good as foretold in the Moscow broadcast of yesterday, the text of which I have telegraphed to our Embassy.

I would suggest, therefore, that Stalin should be asked to see to it that the new government does not immediately start a purge of all political elements which are in opposition to their views on the ground that they have been encouraged to do so by the Yalta declaration.

We will, of course, give you every support, and if you will show me the text of any message you feel inclined to send Stalin, I will also send one to him supporting it. There is, of course, complete agreement between our representatives on the spot and yours.

4. The news from Moscow about Poland is also most disappointing. I must let you know that the government majorities here bear no relation to the strong under current of opinion among all parties and classes and in our own hearts against a Soviet domination of Poland.

Labour men are as keen as conservatives, and Socialists as keen as Catholics. I have based myself in Parliament on the assumption that the words of the Yalta declaration will be carried out in the letter and the spirit. Once it is seen that we have been deceived and that the well-
known communist technique is being applied behind closed doors in Poland, either directly by the Russians or through their Lublin puppets, a very grave situation in British public opinion will be reached.

How would the matter go in the United States? I cannot think that you personally or they would be indifferent. Thus just at the time when everything military is going so well in Europe and when the Japanese policy is also satisfactorily arranged, there would come an open rift between us and Russia not at all confined, in this country at any rate, to government opinion, but running deep down through the masses of the people.

5. After a fairly promising start Molotov is now refusing to accept any interpretation of the Crimea proposals except his own extremely rigid and narrow one. He is attempting to bar practically all our candidates for the consultations, is taking the line that he must base himself on the views of Berut and his gang and has withdrawn his offer that we should send observers to Poland.

In other words, he clearly wants to make a farce of consultations with the "Non-Lublin" Poles—which means that the new government in Poland would be merely the present one dressed up to look more respectable to the ignorant and also wants to prevent us from seeing the liquidations and deportations that are going on and all the rest of the game of setting up a totalitarian regime before elections are held and even before a
new government is set up. As to the upshot of all this, if we do not get things right now, it will soon be seen by the world that you and I by putting our signatures to the Crimea settlement have under-written a fraudulent prospectus.

6. I am in any case pledged to Parliament to tell them if the business of setting up a new Polish government etc., cannot be carried out in the spirit of the Yalta declaration. I am sure the only way to stop Molotov's tactics is to send a personal message to Stalin and in that message I must make clear what are the essential things we must have in this business if I am to avoid telling parliament that we have failed.

I think you will agree with me that far more than the case of Poland is involved. I feel that this is the test case between us and the Russians of the meaning which is to be attached to such terms as Democracy, Sovereignty, Independence, Representative Government and free and unfettered elections.

I therefore propose to send to Stalin a message on the lines set out below. It is as you will see based on the ideas in Eden's telegram to Halifax number 2078 which has been communicated to State Department. I hope you will be ready to send Stalin a similar message containing the same minimum requirements. I shall not send my message till I hear from you. Message begins.

7. "I am sorry to say that the discussions in the Moscow commission on Poland show that M. Molotov has quite a
different view from us as to how the Crimea decision on Poland should be put into effect. As you know, nobody here believes that the present Warsaw administration is really representative and criticism of the decision in Parliament to the line that the discussion in Moscow would not result in a really representative government being set up and that, if this was so, all hope of free elections disappeared: All parties were also exercised about the reports that deportations, liquidations and other oppressive measures were being put into practice on a wide scale by the Warsaw administration against those likely to disagree with them.

Feeling confident of your cooperation in this matter, Eden and I pledged ourselves to Parliament that we would inform them if the fears of our critics were fulfilled. I am bound to tell you that I should have to make a statement of our failure to Parliament if the commission in Moscow were not in the end able to agree on the following basis:

(A) M. Molotov appears to be contending that the terms of the Crimea Communique established for the present Warsaw administration an absolute right of prior consultation on all points. In the English text the passage of the communique in question, of which was in American draft, cannot bear this interpretation. M. Molotov's contention therefore cannot be accepted.

(B) All Poles nominated by any of the three governments shall be accepted for the consultations unless ruled out
by unanimous decision of the commission, and every effort made to produce them before the commission at the earliest possible moment. The commission should ensure to the Poles invited facilities for communicating with other Poles whom they wish to consult whether in Poland or outside and the right to suggest to the commission the names of other Poles who should be invited to its proceedings. All Poles appearing before the commission would naturally enjoy complete freedom of movement and of communication among themselves while in Moscow and would be at liberty to depart whither they chose upon the conclusion of the consultations. M. Molotov has raised objections to inviting M. Nikolajczyk but his presence would certainly be vital.

(C) The Poles invited for consultations should discuss among themselves with a view to reaching agreement upon the composition of a government truly representative of the various sections of Polish opinion present before the commission. The discussions should also cover the question of the exercise of the presidential functions. The commission should preside over these discussions in an impartial arbitral capacity.

(D) Pending the conclusion of the commissions discussions the Soviet Government should use its utmost influence to prevent the "Warsaw" administration from taking any further legal or administrative action of a fundamental character affecting social, constitutional, economic, or political conditions in Poland.
(E) The Soviet Government should make arrangements to enable British and American observers to visit Poland and report upon condition there in accordance with the offer spontaneously made by M. Molotov at an earlier stage in the commissions discussions.

8. We must not let Poland become a source of disagreement and misunderstanding between our two peoples. For this reason I am sure you will understand how important it is for us to reach an early settlement on the basis of the Yalta decision, and it is because I am confident that you will do your utmost to bring this about that I am now telegraphing you". Ends.

9. I should be grateful to know your views. Pray let this telegram be between you and me.

10. Many congratulations on your statement to Congress.

Every good wish.

EH/cl

END

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER TO: THE PRESIDENT

DATE or FILE NO. #905, 8 March 1945

TO: MP ROOM 0818202 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: POLAND; ROMANIA; GREECE

ACTION:
1. To the President via ushers.
2. Referred informally by the President to Admiral Leahy to take up with State Department.
3. Before State had drafted reply, PA #907 was received, which was also referred by the President to the State Department.
4. Replies to both PA #905 and #907 prepared by State, to President by memorandum 10 Mar 45; approved by the President without change.
5. Reply to PA #905 to Churchill as PA 205 #715, 11 Mar 45; reply to PA #907 as PA 205 #713, 11 Mar 45. (Note: Map room numbering resulted in answer to PA #907 being sent before reply to #905.)

COPY TO:

DATE: AR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

BY DIRECTION OF:

053 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 051 ROMANIA; 051 GREECE.
To: The President of the United States.
No: 906, 8 March 1945
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 906.
Your number 711. Text of February anti U boat state-
ment. I agree.

RH/c1
End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 2320-72
By R.H. Farke Date MAY 6 1972

Copies prepared
and sent to Navy

Rec'd 081820Z
T.P.V.M.T.

TOP SECRET

0912
PREP: The Prime Minister

TO: The President

SUBJECT: February sub statement

ACTION:

1. Answers PREP-PW #711, 7 March 1945.
2. To the President via Miss Tully.
3. Navy and OWI notified; statement released at usual time.
4. No reply.

COPIES TO:

000.7 (3)

DATE: ________________________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ________________________________

000.7 (3)
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 907, 10 March 1945

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 907.

1. I have now read the instructions to Mr. Harriman
which were shown to our Ambassador today. I need not say
how cordially I agree with all the first part of these in-
structions, but I am distressed at the conclusion which I
fear may lead us into great difficulties.

I do not know what the answer of the London-Polish
Government would be to a request for a political truce. They
continue to assert, with a wealth of detail, that their friends
in Poland are being arrested, deported and liquidated on a
large scale. At the best they would make conditions of an
impossible character.

2. As to the Lublin Poles, they may well answer that
their government can alone ensure "The maximum amount of
political tranquility inside", that they already represent
the great mass of the "Democratic Forces in Poland" and that
they cannot join hands with emigre traitors to Poland or
fascist collaborationists and landlords, and so on according
to the usual technique. 

3. Meanwhile we shall not be allowed inside the
country or have any means of informing ourselves upon the
position. It suits the Soviet very well to have a long
period of delay so that the process of liquidation of ele-
ments unfavourable to them or their puppets may run its full
course.

This would be furthered by our opening out now
into proposals of a very undefined character for a political
truce between these Polish parties, (whose hatreds would eat
into live steel) in the spirit and intent of the Crimea
decision and might well imply the abandonment of all clear-
cut requests such as those suggested in my last telegram to
you. Therefore I should find it very difficult to join in
this project of a political truce.

4. I have already mentioned to you that the feeling
here is very strong. Four ministers have abstained from the
divisions and two have already resigned.

I beg therefore that you will give full considera-
tion to my previous telegram number 905 and will suspend the
delivery of the latest Harriman instructions till I have re-
ceived your reply and can reply to it.

RH/cl

END
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

FILE NO. 907, 10 March 1945

TO MAJ. ROOM 1003582 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: POLAND

ACTION:
1. To the President via ushers.
2. For "Instructions to Mr. Harriman" mentioned by the Prime Minister in first paragraph, see telegram from State to An Embassy, Moscow, dated 8 March 45 (copy filed #052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS) which was given to the British Embassy in Washington for transmission to London.
3. See also Pa's #905, 8 March 45, which was sent to the State Department for preparation of reply. Attached message (Pa #907) also sent to State for preparation of reply.
4. Replies to both Pa #905 and #907 drafted by State; sent to the President via memo dated 10 Mar 45; approved by the President without change. Reply to Pa #905 sent as Pa No #914; reply to Pa #907 sent as Pa No #915. (Note: Map Room numbering resulted in answer to Pa #907's being sent before reply to Pa #905.)

COPIES TO: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 908 Filed 101645Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 908 repeated to General Marshall.

About my proposal, to which you and General Marshall agreed at Malta, for appointing Field Marshal Alexander as deputy to Eisenhower in place of Air Chief Marshal Tedder. I have had long talks with Eisenhower, who was in every way ready to accept the change and "make it work" on account of his high regard for Alexander. Nevertheless I consider the situation has been changed by the progress of the war, and I therefore withdraw my proposal while thanking you and General Marshall for your ready acceptance of it.

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADmiral leahy:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

密级 or FILE NO. 908, 10 March 1945

FOR MAP ROOM 10/1842A VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Appointing Alexander as deputy to Eisenhower in place of Tedder.

ACTION:

1. See WR-OUT-68, 30 Jan 45, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, who was on board the USS Quincy en route to Salta for AMEND- SANT CONFERENCE, in which the Chiefs request that "prior to seeing the President refrain from making any commitments on possible suggestion by the Prime Minister concerning an exchange of Alexander for Tedder in the jobs of Deputy SHAPE and SACRED or related proposals."

2. P4 #908 to the President via ushers.

3. To Admiral Leahy on 12 March 1945 by chit: "For the necessary action. F.D.R."

4. Acknowledgment prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to Churchill as P418-P4 #716, 12 March 1945.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

130; 100 ALEXANDER, Field Marshal; 100 TEDDER, Air Chief Marshal.
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 909, 10 March 1945
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No. 909. Personal

Following is summary of "information received from Poland" transmitted to me by Polish Prime Minister here. It will show you how situation is viewed by Poles in this country, and seems to me to be stated with restraint.

Of course we cannot guarantee any of this information which comes from the Polish Governments Agents in Poland who are not likely to minimise these things nor do we know what opportunities they have of checking their information, as they must be living underground. All this emphasises the need for sending our observers into the country.

(Summary begins) Summary of the more important information sent from Poland in the period 17th January to 1st March.

17 January 45. Kielce Province: The Lublin Committee has assumed civil authority. Arrests of members of the Home Army and the underground administration have begun. Enforced
registration of all males in the age groups (question) 19-59.

22 January 45. Cracow Province: On 18th January, groups of the Home Army were fighting the Germans in the western suburbs. Public utility buildings were preserved, thanks to the action of Home Army units. The population greets the Red Army and units of Berlings Army now marching in coldly. The command of Berlings Army is strictly controlled by the NKVD. According to a statement made by one of Berlings officers about 70 percent of the soldiers are in favour of the Government in London.

24 January 45. Cracow Province: Two orders of Marshal Koniev have been posted up on the walls: One regarding right of mobilization, which empowers the Lublin Committee or the Red Army, when so authorized by the committee, to effect mobilization, and a second regarding the surrender of weapons and radio sets, and the registration of typewriters, printing presses and duplicators. Registration of males in the age groups (question) 16-65.

The NKVD has been functioning in Cracow since 21st January. At present they are reading denunciations and observing. Delegates from Lublin speak against the London Government at meetings, and make sharp attacks on the Home
Army. The same is evident in the Lublin press, which is already being issued in Cracow and in the soldiers papers.

24 January 45. Miechow District: A number of members of the Home Army have been shot in Miechow and Słomniki. Radziwill was arrested in Balice, and 40 landowners and farmers in Miechow district for belonging to the Home Army or approving it. The Polish Workers party is undertaking the work of denunciation.

27 January 45. Piotrków District: On the river Pilica in Opoczno District, strong units of the Home Army took part in fighting the Germans. They captured weapons, and destroyed and captured cars. After completing their tasks, these units of the Home Army had to disperse. The Soviet authorities only managed to catch one of the company leaders, and he succeeded in escaping.

The population is treating the new authorities with great reserve. Soviet paratroops are hunting for leaders of the Home Army. Two have already been shot. Soviet officers have announced that the Home Army is to be exterminated as Fascist. Orders have been issued for the surrender of arms, radio sets, typewriters and duplicators.

30 January 45. Piotrków, Miechow, Częstochowa Districts: In Miechow District, 16 officers of the Home Army have been
arrested: In Plotrkow, a number of agents of the underground
movement. The food and fuel situation is desperate. The with­
drawal of Cracow zloties has produced a complete lack of
currency.

Soviet and Lublin agitation against Great Britain is
noted. At Czestochowa during a manifestation on 25 January,
a banner was carried with the slogan "Down With England".

1 February 45. Cracow Province: The Soviet military
authorities take no account of the Lublin Committee and act
independently. The Lublin Committee slavishly comply with
all their demands. A visa from the Soviet Ambassador and the
permission of the peoples commissariat of foreign affairs is
necessary in order to travel to Lwow.

The Soviet armies rely on the food stocks of the Polish
population for their food supplies. The shops are shut, and
there is no bread, water, gas or electricity.

As President of Cracow, an agent of the Committee with
the pseudonym of Michalski has been sent from Lublin. So­
called Socialists, members of the Peasant Party and Democrats,
unknown to anyone have appeared on the town and province
councils.

In towns, judges and advocates are the first to be
arrested, in the country landowners.
6 February 45. Lodz Province: The situation is similar to that prevailing in other parts: Chaos in administration and the villages have to give up their last remaining food supplies. The NKVD has already begun arresting former members of the Home Army. In Lodz, two officers have been arrested. Zymierski's Army is coldly received by the population.

7 February 45. Warsaw Province: Meetings at which demands for the transformation of the Lublin Committee into a temporary government were adopted here have been organized in villages and small towns by the Soviet Military Commandants on a pattern laid down in advance.

People were compelled by force to attend. Members of the NKVD were mingled with the audience in uniform and in civilian clothes, and they took careful note of the audiences' behaviour. Members of the Polish Workers Party, also mixed with the audience, cheered and clapped at the appropriate moments, so as to give an appearance of unanimity and enthusiasm.

9 February 45. Warsaw Province: Dearth everywhere in this area. Shoes cost 2500 zloties, a suit 50,000 zloties, butter 500 zloties a pound. Private people are not allowed to use the postal services. It is not allowed to travel even in
your own district without a permit.

Steps are being taken to effect the complete extermination of the Home Army.

14 February 45. Warsaw Province: Public security is under the direction Radkiewicz who is dependent on the NKVD and not on the Lublin Committee. The militia in the villages is similarly situated. The Polish Workers Party is controlled by the NKVD and used for political investigations. The population is required to give personal data on every possible occasion.

16 February 45. Warsaw Province: The Sovietisation of Poland is proceeding apace. Agrarian reform is being carried out in great haste in the territories taken by the Soviet Armies. The land allotted is usually much less than four hectares and may not be built on.

The nationalization of industry and trade is being prepared by the annulling of the stocks of ready cash which may only be changed for Lublin złoties by individuals in person. The Lublin Committee is granting short term credits and in case of non-payment the businesses are taken over by the committee.

A totalitarian organization of society is gradually being introduced and is based on enforced one party orga-
tions. Such an organization for the villages is the Peasants Mutual Aid Association and for workers the appropriate trade union. The Supreme Councils of the trade unions and Mutual Aid are dominated by the Polish Workers Party.

The cooperative movement is in the hands of the one party central cooperative "Spolem". Cinemas and films are in the hands of a cooperative for the exploitation of films taken over by the Lublin Committee from the Germans. The publication and sale of papers, journals and books is concentrated in the hands of one institution, organized to have the appearance of a readers cooperative.

20 February 45. Radom District: The NKVD is taking systematic steps to discover the whole organization of the Home Army and to arrest its members. In Kielce Province, about 20 percent of the former members of the Home Army have been arrested. In Sandomierz, more Poles have been arrested during the few months of Soviet occupation than during the whole five years of German occupation.

The local and state authorities are constantly changing, as they cannot cope with the situation: In Kielce, the Wojewoda is the fourth and the Mayor the sixth in succession. The attitude of the population to the new authorities is indifferent or hostile. Even the enthusiasts change their views
in a short time.

Members of the Home Army are grieved that, after so many years of fighting and difficulties, they still have to hide like criminals.

22 February 45. Lwow Province: In January, mass arrests took place, in which 60 percent of those arrested were Poles, among them 21 university professors, priests and all classes of society. The prisons are full to overflowing. In August, 1944, and January, 1945, two trainloads of arrested persons, each containing about 2,000 people, were sent to forced labour camps in Russia.

In connection with these arrests the possession of an old envelope bearing a postage stamp with Hitler's image, or of an old German newspaper is considered sufficient proof of collaboration with the Germans. From 5th February Poles in important positions (professors, doctors and so on) have been forced to sign a memorandum condemning the Polish Government in London and Home Army and praising the Lublin Committee.

22 February 45. Bialystok-Lomza Province: Between 8th and 15th November, 1944, 143 cattle trucks packed full of arrested Poles left Bialystok and Grodno in an easterly director towards Russia.

Up to first January 1945 the total number of Poles
arrested and deported to Russia was about 5,000 in Grodno and about 10,000 in H Alystok.

Levies for Berlings Army, carried out by means of manhunts, continue. Up to first February, there were arrested 6 District Chiefs of Staff, 5 inspectors, 3 local commandants, about 1,000 officers 400 non-commissioned officers and some hundreds of soldiers of the Home Army together with their families. The people are unwaveringly behind the Government in London.

East of the Curzon Line, the NKVD are organizing hunts for Poles, and are deporting them to forced labour in Russia. Sometimes they are forcibly expelled on the Lublin side. The Byelorussian population expresses sympathy for the Polish Government in London and wishes these territories to be Polish.

The situation is similar in Vilno and Novogrodek Provinces.

24 February 45. Radom Province: A former inspector has been arrested. The NKVD demanded that he should reveal the whole organization of the Home Army and underground administration.

25 February 45. Lublin Province: In Lubartow, there is a camp for officers of the Home Army and for those officers of Zymierski's Army who have been convicted of belonging to the
Home Army or of other "political" crimes. This camp is under the control of the NKVD and contains about 6,000 officers and soldiers. Every few days groups are deported to Russia to an unknown destination.

During the first days of February, the Vice-Wojewoda of Kielce and some officials of the government delegation were arrested.

There is great anxiety at the Crimea decisions. The hostile attitude towards the Lublin Committee is increasing. Nevertheless belief in another more favourable solution of Polish affairs has not been shaken.

26 February 45. Warsaw Province: The wife of Premier Arciszewski was arrested on 20th February. She was working in the Polish Red Cross. Further arrests of members of the Polish Red Cross are taking place. Please inform the British. Allied intervention necessary.

1 March 45. Bialystok Province: The population in Bialystok strongly supports the Legal Polish Government in London. Byelorussians also support the Polish Government in London and wish to be Polish citizens. The minority question simply does not exist in these areas, as there is complete agreement. The population faithfully believes that a better solution of Polish affairs will be found.
They have now become hardened, changed from what they were before the war, they are suffering, but they are fighting on and show no weakness.

In the province of Białystok, the NKVD are carrying out arrests of former soldiers of the Home Army and of loyal-minded Poles without pause.

In February 1945, 125 cattle trucks from Grodno Province and 242 from Białystok Province, containing arrested Poles, were sent off to Russia.

The NKVD are keeping those arrested in cellars, air raid shelters and in every possible place. Those arrested sit in darkness, without any bedding or warm clothes. In the course of interrogations, the NKVD beat prisoners, torture them morally, keep them in the cold without clothes. They accuse those arrested of espionage on behalf of the British and of the Polish Government in London, and of collaboration with the Germans. There is a high rate of mortality among the prisoners.

Leaders of the Home Army are carried off into the heart of Russia or perish without any trace.

The NKVD often "work" in the uniforms of Polish officers. Spies and collaborators with the Gestapo were at first arrested by the NKVD--later, however, they were set free and the NKVD employed them as their own spies.
In towns and bigger villages, special posts have been set up to help in the hunt for former soldiers of the Home Army.

1 March 45. Lodz Province: During the last days of February, the NKVD arrested 23 officers of the Home Army, who formerly worked on the District Staff.

The attitude of the population towards the Lublin authorities is unfavourable. Most people in Poland consider the present state of affairs as Soviet occupation.

Note: The dates given are approximately those of the despatch of messages from Poland. (Ends)
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

RE: File No. 909, 10 March 1945

Via: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. See File #905, #907, #713, #714.
2. To President via Miss Tally.
3. To Adams Leahy for reply in collaboration with State Department.
4. Reply prepared by Adams Leahy and Mr. Bohlen; approved by President with minor change; sent to the Prime Minister as File #715, 12 March 1945.

COPIES TO:

052 Polish-Russian Relations

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian Relations.
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 910, 13 March 1945
Plt: 1319322
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 910.
1. Your numbers 713, 714 and 715.
I thank you for your full and considerate replies to
my various messages on Poland. We can, of course, make no
progress at Moscow without your aid, and if we get out of
step the doom of Poland is sealed.
A month has passed since Yalta and no progress of any
kind has been made. Soon I shall be questioned in Parliament
on this point and I shall be forced to tell them the truth.
Time is, of course, all on the side of Lublin, who are no
doubt at work to establish their authority in such a way as
to make it impregnable.
2. I am willing to defer addressing Stalin directly
for the time being on this subject. But, in that case, I
must beg you to agree that the instructions to our Ambassa-
dors should deal with the points which I have proposed to put
to Stalin in (A) to (E) of paragraph 7 of my number 905.

You say that some of these might have the opposite effect to what we intend. I wonder which you have in mind. We might be able to improve the working. But I am convinced that unless we can induce the Russians to agree to these fundamental points of procedure, all our work at Yalta will be in vain.

3. When the discussions following Yalta began at Moscow, we had a perfectly simple objective, namely, to bring together for consultation representative Poles from inside Poland and elsewhere and to promote the formation of a new re-organized Polish Government sufficiently representative of all Poland for us to recognize it.

A test case of progress in this direction would be the inviting of Nikolajczyk and 2 or 3 of his friends who have resigned from the London Polish Government because they realize that a good understanding must be reached with Russia.

4. I fear that your present instructions to Averell will lead to little if any progress on all this, as the only definite suggestion is that there should be a truce between Polish parties. Here we should enter ground of great disadvantage to us both. The Russians would almost at once claim that the truce was being broken by the Anti-Lublin Poles and
that Lublin therefore could not be held to it.

I have little doubt that some of the supporters of the Polish Government in London and more particularly the extreme right wing underground force, the so-called N.S.Z., are giving and would give the Russians and Lublin ground for this contention.

As we are not allowed to enter the country to see what the truth is, we shall be at the mercy of assertions. After a fortnight or so of negotiations about the truce, we shall be farther back than in the days before Yalta when you and I were agreed together that anyhow Nikolajezzyk should be invited.

5. At Yalta also we agreed to take the Russian view of the frontier line. Poland has lost her frontier. Is she now to lose her freedom? That is the question which will undoubtedly have to be fought out in Parliament and in public here.

I do not wish to reveal a divergence between the British and the United States Governments, but it would certainly be necessary for me to make it clear that we are in presence of a great failure and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta, but that we British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further and that the limits of our capacity to act have been reached.

The moment that Molotov sees that he has beaten us
away from the whole process of consultations among Poles to form a new government, he will know that we will put up with anything. On the other hand, I believe that combined dogged pressure and persistence along the lines on which we have been working and of my proposed draft message to Stalin, would very likely succeed.

6. We are also in presence of the Soviet memorandum of March 9 about inviting representatives of the Lublin Poles to San Francisco. This would amount to a de facto recognition of Lublin. Are we not both pledged not to recognize the Lublin Government until it has been re-organized in accordance with the declaration and spirit of Yalta, and consequently to continue to recognize the London Polish Government as the only one in existence.

The only possible course if no agreement is reached is to invite neither of the present Governments. This is in fact the line agreed upon between us. On the other hand, this very invitation question is well-suited to bring matters to a head at the Moscow conference and make the Soviets see that they must reach a fair and honourable conclusion in accordance with the decisions of Yalta.

7. I trust Harry is progressing. It is very disappointing that he should have had so serious a setback. When
he first arrived in London he was better than I had seen him for years.

Kind regards.

EH/cl

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0937
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
DATE: 13 March 1945

TO: Map Room 140240X VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers Files PM #713, #714, and #715.
2. To the President via ushers.
3. By direction of the President, copy to Secretary of State (via Bohlen) for preparation of reply.
4. State's draft reply forwarded to the President by memo, dated 15 Mar 45, via Mr. Bohlen. Approved by the President without change; sent to the PM as File #718, 15 March 1945.

COPIES TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

DATE: ______

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 100 Hopkins, Mary.
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 911
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Number 911.

1. Your 712 reached me when I was troubled not only about future requirements for North West Europe but about future requirements for the approaching crisis in world food supplies as a whole. I am advised that there will be enough wheat. But supplies of meat, sugar, fats, dairy produce, etc., will not go anywhere near meeting demands. I agreed at Yalta to a further investigation of our stock levels and we had been led to expect that you would send some one to London for the preliminary part of such survey. But such stock level enquiry is only a small part of the picture and I agree with you that the overall problem must be fully explored and determined in the immediate future.

2. I would, therefore, propose, if agreeable to you, to send over Lyttelton and Llewelin to join with any representatives you may name in determining what steps can and should be taken to cut consumption down to the level of supplies.
This enquiry should embrace all major foods in short supply and should cover the whole field including the civil requirements of SHAEF and other military theatres and of the governments of liberated areas, possible further reductions in U.K. stocks, possible reductions in service demands in all theatres and in civilian consumption levels. I realize the difficulties which face producing countries in reducing their standards of consumption. But we shall not get through 1945 without disaster unless reductions are made.

3. Meanwhile situation in North West Europe is so serious that I must ask you at any rate provisionally pending forthcoming discussions, to arrange for the outstanding balance of Eisenhower's stated requirements to be found by U.S.A. I know you realize how important it is that all agreed requirements should arrive to schedule.

4. It would be very helpful if we were able, jointly or severally, to make a statement soon as to how the Allies intend to deal with this emergency.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

DATE: #911, 16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Food problem.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PW #718, 10 Mar 45.
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Referred by President to Admiral Leahy to take up with Justice Byrnes.
4. Referred by Byrnes to Department of State. Draft reply prepared by State (minus answer to Para 3 about Eisenhower's requirements); sent to Justice Byrnes on 17 Mar 45; Justice Byrnes referred to the President with note, "Reply is satisfactory to me."
5. Draft reply returned to the Map Room by Miss Tully on evening of 17 March 45, who stated that President had directed that reply re Eisenhower's requirements be prepared by Admiral Leahy and Colonel Park. Admiral Leahy took up with Joint Chiefs of Staff. Referred by JCS to Civil Affairs Division of War Department for preparation of appropriate reply.
6. The two draft replies (State's and War's) were coordinated into one message by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 21 Mar 45; dispatched to Churchill as PRES-PW #722, 21 Mar 45.
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 912, 16 March 1945
Fld: 161820Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and
No. 912.

1. Thank you for your No. 718 of 16 March. I am
most relieved that you do not feel that there is any funda-
mental divergence between us and I agree that our differences
are only about tactics.

You know, I am sure, that our great desire is to keep
in step with you and we realise how hopeless the position
would become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were
not in full accord.

2. Just before getting your telegram, I received
from Clark Kerr the draft of the communication he thinks we
should make to Molotov. This was drawn up after long talks
with Averell but, of course, does not commit him.

We are instructing Halifax to show Clark Kerr's pro-
posed communication immediately to Stettinius and if possible
to you. I like Clark Kerr's draft and must earnestly beg you
to consider whether you cannot accept our proposals in this modified form. I hope that when Stettinius has been through it with Halifax you will see your way to instruct Averell to put in the same, or at least a very similar, communication.

3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views upon the various points the inclusion of which I still consider essential. I welcome your agreement on point (A).

With regard to point (B), what happens if Molotov vetoes every one of our suggestions? And secondly, what is the use of anyone being invited who has no freedom of movement and communications? We had in fact not understood that Molotov had disputed this latter point when it was raised with him earlier but Mikołajczyk has made it a condition of going to Moscow and I gravely doubt whether we could persuade him to leave unless we had some definite assurance to convey to him.

Equally it is in order to reassure the anti-Lublin Poles whom we want to see invited that I should like to come to an agreement with Molotov in regard to the character of the discussions and the commission's arbitral capacity (my point (C)).

If you feel strongly against mentioning the matter of the presidential function at this stage I will give way al-
though it is a matter of great practical importance which the Poles must not be debarred from discussing.

In regards point (D) I fear I cannot agree that your truce plan would achieve the desired result. How can we guarantee that nothing will be said or done in Poland or by the Polish Government's supporters here, which the Russians could not parade as a breach of the truce?

I fear that the truce plan will lead us into interminable delays and a dead end in which some at least of the blame may well be earned by the London Polish Government. I fear therefore that it is impossible for us to endorse your truce proposal, for we think it actively dangerous.

I beg you once more most earnestly to consider whether you cannot accept the revised version of (D) included in Clark Kerr's draft. This would give us something on which to base the work of our observers (point (E), on which I am very glad to see that we are in agreement).

4. At present all entry into Poland is barred to our representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn across the scene. This extends even to the liaison officers, British and American, who were to help in bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to our information the American officers as well as the British who had already reached Lublin
have been requested to clear out.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is going on in Poland. It may be that apart from the Poles they are being very rough with the Germans. Whatever the reason, we are not to be allowed to see. This is not a position that could be defended by us.
March 17, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State:

By direction of the President, there is forwarded herewith attached, for preparation of a
draft reply, Prime Minister's message No. 918 in reply to President's message No. 718 of 16 March
which was drafted by the Secretary of State.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

COPY FOR MAP ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 6 MAY 1972
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>THE PRIME MINISTER</th>
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<th>THE PRESIDENT</th>
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<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
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**ACTION:**

2. To the President in Doctor's office.
3. To Secretary of State, 17 Mar 45, by memo signed by Adm Leahy, for preparation of reply.
4. Draft reply by State; to President via Adm Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched to Churchill as PRes-P4 #719, 18 Mar 45.

**COPY TO:**

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<td>MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS</td>
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**052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.**
From:  U. S. Military Attache, London  
To:  President of the United States  
Nr:  913 Filed 1721052  

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and Top Secret, Number 913.

1. I hear that there are certain difficulties between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer about activities in Indo-China. As Wedemeyer is now in Washington it seems a good moment to try to clear them up.

2. Under existing decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Indo-China is still within the China Theatre. But Mountbatten has a vital interest in Indo-China as well as in Siam, since it is through them that runs the Japanese land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya; and as you know he has an oral understanding with Chiang Kai Shek that both he and the Generalissimo shall be free to attack Siam and Indo-
China and that the boundaries between the two theatres shall be decided when the time comes in accordance with the progress made by their respective forces. The Generalissimo agreed after SEXTANT that this understanding extended to pre-occupational activities.

3. I am told that Medemeyer feels difficulty in recognizing this oral understanding in the absence of instructions to that effect from his superior authorities.

4. This is a situation from which much harmful friction may spring. Could not you and I clear it up by jointly endorsing the oral understanding which seems a sensible and workable arrangement?

5. I well understand Medemeyer's interest in Indo-China and it is clear that there ought to be the closest liaison about it between him and Mountbatten. If you agree, we might, when endorsing the understanding, direct that appropriate arrangements be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for full and frank exchange of intentions, plans and intelligence between Medemeyer and Mountbatten as regards Indo-China and indeed as regards all matters of mutual concern.

End.

To: The President of The United States.

Nr: 914

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and private, Number 914.

1. I hope that the rather numerous telegrams I have to send you on so many of our difficult and intertwined affairs are not becoming a bore to you. Our friendship is the rock on which I build for the future of the world so long as I am one of the builders. I always think of those tremendous days when you devised Lend-Lease, when we met at Argentina, when you decided with my heartfelt agreement to launch the invasion of Africa, and when you comforted me for the loss of Tobruk by giving me the 300 Shermans of subsequent Alamein fame. I remember the part our personal relations have played in the advance of the world cause now nearing its first military goal.

2. I am sending to Washington and San Francisco most of my ministerial colleagues on one mission or another, and I shall on this occasion stay at home to mind the shop. All
the time I shall be looking forward to your long-promised visit. Clemmie is off to Russia next week for a Red Cross tour as far as the Urals to which she has been invited by Uncle Joe (if we may venture to describe him thus), but she will be back in time to welcome you and Eleanor. My thoughts are always with you all.

3. Peace with Germany and Japan on our terms will not bring much rest to you and me (if I am still responsible). As I observed last time, when the war of the giants is over, the wars of the pygmies will begin. There will be a torn, ragged and hungry world to help to its feet: and what will Uncle Joe or his successor say to the way we should both like to do it? It was quite a relief to talk party politics the other day. It was like working in wood after working in steel. The advantage of this telegram is that it has nothing to do with shop except that I had a good talk with Rosenman about our daily bread. All good wishes.

Winston.

RRH/11a

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept., tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks
Date MAY 6 1972
18 March 1945

To: The President of the United States.
Nr: 915

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and Number 915.

Will you kindly consider the following kind of proclamation to the German Army by the three of us or by we two: (Begins)

German soldiers, who are fighting bravely to defend your native land, do you realize what will be the consequences of the war being carried on throughout the whole of Germany during the present spring and summer? You are told you are defending your homes and families and the German people. But though you may delay, you cannot stop our overrunning your whole country both from the east and west in the next few months. We feel it our duty to give you this warning, that if by your tenacity you destroy the means of production in your country and prevent or neglect the spring sowings, you will condemn Germany to a winter famine the like of which has never been seen in Europe.

Read 18/VIV482

TOP SECRET

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0952
It will be quite impossible for us, with our duties to our own peoples and to the liberated countries, to accept any responsibility for feeding Germany in the winter of 1945/46. We may do what we can, but the available transport, and the available food which we could supply would be utterly insufficient to handle or bear so heavy a burden. If therefore you force us to carry the war on through the homelands of Germany, so that these are devastated by war, you will not protect your wives and families from war suffering, but on the contrary you will condemn a very large proportion of the German people to death by starvation when winter comes. Your leaders at the top will not run short as long as you continue fighting; but the population of Germany will assuredly undergo a frightful reduction by famine unless the crops of this year are sown in time and gathered fully in peace.

The decision is yours, and we can only tell you that if you continue to fight, as we can well understand good soldiers would wish to do, you will not save your nation but doom it to horrors far beyond any you have endured so far and far beyond our power to give you help. Ends.

2. I am inclined to think we should send the above
or something like it. On the other hand there is this danger to be weighed. The Germans may react by starving all foreigners, including prisoners of war, in Germany on the ground that if they themselves are to starve next winter they must begin to save up now as much food as they can. I should like very much to know what you think.

End.
TO THE PRESDENT

DATE 18 MARCH 1945

TO THE PRESDENT

CODE ROOM 18/22482 VIA ARMY CODE ROOM

SUBJECT: Statement to German soldiers re surrendering and planting spring crops to avert famine.

ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action.
3. Draft dispatch by Admiral Leahy approved by the President without change; sent to Churchill as PR/22/FW #721, 21 March 1945.

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE 18 MARCH 1945

TO THE PRESDENT

CODE ROOM 18/22482 VIA ARMY CODE ROOM

SUBJECT: Statement to German soldiers re surrendering and planting spring crops to avert famine.

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3. Draft dispatch by Admiral Leahy approved by the President without change; sent to Churchill as PR/22/FW #721, 21 March 1945.

COPY TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7; 370 Germany
19th March 1945

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 916 Filed 19/15322

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and number 916.

Your number 719.

I have now read the text proposed. I am delighted we are in full agreement. We will send an identical message to Clark Kerr forthwith.

Prime.

P.S.: U.J.: OKAY: (UK)*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., S-28-72
By R.H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Constitution (addition of UK) added by
Army Code Room.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

Serial No: #916, 19 Mar 45.
Date:

For Map Room: Via

Subject: Poland

Action:
1. Answers PRES-PM #719, 18 Mar 45.
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Copy to Admiral Leahy for State Department.
4. No answer. See further PM-PRES #925, 27 Mar 45.

Copied To:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Copy by Direction of:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 917, 21 March 1945
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and private.

I am greatly looking forward to seeing Bernie, who is one of my older friends. I am telegraphing him to say how glad I am that he is coming. I should like to know when he will see me.

ECD/cvl

End.

REGRADED UNGCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-39-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
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<tr>
<th>FROM THE PRIME MINISTER</th>
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<td>#917, 21 March 1945</td>
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<td><strong>SUBJECT:</strong></td>
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<td>Churchill's seeing Bernie Baruch</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers PMto-PW #722, 29 Mar 45.
2. To the President via ushers.
3. Answer prepared by the President; sent to Churchill as PRES #726, 21 Mar 45.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

100 Baruch, Bernie.
21st March 1945

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 918

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 918.
Your telegram number 712 of 11th March and my reply number 911 of 16th March.

Lyttelton and Llewelin will leave here for Washington next Friday morning, 23d March.

Prime

FIR/FIR

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Red 21/1740 Z.
T.P. in office via Miss Trust.

0960
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 919

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your 721, I agree with your view about my suggestion.
Pray consider it dead.

ECH/cvl

End.

Reed
22/1220Z

T. P. V. U.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

DATE 919, 22 March 1945

TO MAP ROOM 22/12202 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Statement to German soldiers.

ACTION:

1. Answered PRES-Pul #701, 21 March 1945.
2. To the President via ushers.
3. After seeing the President on morning of 22 March, admiral Leary returned to Map Room, direction that it be filed as no answer was to be made.

COPY TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

000.7
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 920

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 920.

I have seen your recent exchange of messages with Marshall Stalin on prisoners of war matters. As regards the general question of Allied prisoners in German hands, I entirely agree with you that we ought to arrange matters now so that we are in a position to do something quickly at the right time.

We have long foreseen danger to these prisoners arising either in consequence of chaotic conditions resulting from a German collapse or alternatively out of a deliberate threat by Hitler and his associates to murder some or all of the prisoners. The object of this manoeuvre might be either to avoid unconditional surrender or to save the lives of the more important Nazi gangsters and war criminals, using this threat as a bargaining counter, or
to cause dissention among the Allies in the final stages of the war. With this in mind we put to the United States and Soviet Governments last October through our diplomatic representatives at Washington and Moscow a proposal for an Anglo-American-Russian warning to the Germans (for text please see my immediately following telegram), but have so far received no reply.

On the 2d March last, the British Minister in Berne was informed by the Head of the Swiss Political Department that he had received reports from Berlin, which he could not confirm, that the Germans intended to liquidate, i.e. massacre, such prisoners of war as were held in camps in danger of being overrun by the advancing Allied forces rather than try to remove the prisoners or allow them to fall into Allied hands. In addition we have, in recent months, received various indications that the Nazis might in the last resort either murder Allied prisoners in their hands or hold them as hostages.

Various proposals of a practical nature for bringing immediate military aid and protection to prisoners of war camps in Germany have been under consideration by the British and United States military authorities. I believe that the
issue at the appropriate moment of a joint warning on the lines we have proposed would be a powerful aid to such practical measures as it may be possible to take. An S/S General is now in charge of prisoners of war matters in the German Ministry of Defence and the S/S and Gestapo are believed to be taking over controls of camps. On such people a warning will have only limited effect, though at the worst it can do no harm. On the other hand it is by no means certain that the S/S have completed taking over from the Regular Army Officers and on the latter the warning might have real effect. We should surely miss no opportunity of exploiting any duality of control.

I would therefore earnestly invite you and Marshall Stalin, to whom I am repeating this message, to give this proposal your personal attention, and I very much hope you will agree to go forward with us in issuing it at the appropriate moment.

Prime

FXR/fixr

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parke Date

MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DEPARTMENTAL or FILE NO. #920, 22 Mar 45.

TOR MAP ROOM 221455Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Statement to Germans on treatment of Allied prisoners.

ACTION:

1. "Recent exchange of messages with Marshal Stalin" mentioned in first paragraph, see WR 330 (2).
2. To President by Admiral Brown.
3. To Admiral Leahy for action. See also FM #921, which supplements this message.
4. Answered by FM #925, 22 Mar 45, which was written by Admiral Leahy.

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<th>COPY TO: WR 330 (2)</th>
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330: 000.7
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.:

DATE: #921, 22 Mar 45.

FOR MAP ROOM 2214352 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Statement to Germans re treatment of Allied prisoners.

ACTION:

1. Supplements PM-PRES #920, 22 Mar 45.
2. To the President by Admiral Brown.
3. To Adm Leahy for action.
4. Draft reply to PM #920 and #921 written by Adm Leahy; approved by the President without change; sent to PM as PRES #725, 22 Mar 45.

COPIES TO:

DATE: DIRECTIONS OF:

WR 370 (2)
URGENT

TOP SECRET

TOPSECRET - TOT

23 March 1945

From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 922 Fld: 230932Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Your 725. I thank you.

ECH/cvl End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

I agree to substance of warning statement
re Briand, finer if Stalin addresses.

TOP SECRET

Received 23/2347.
File Copy

0970
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: #922, 23 March 1945

TO: MAP ROOM 231238Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Statement to Germans on American prisoners of war.

ACTION:

1. Acknowledges PRES-PW #725, 22 Mar 45.
2. To President via Admiral Brown.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO:

MR 330 (2) DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

330

To: The President of The United States.

Nr: 923

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 923.

1. In reply to your 722 Lyttelton and Llewelin have left for Washington today and have power to discuss the whole supply problem and concert plans with you but the War Cabinet must be consulted before any final decisions are taken.

2. As regards your paragraph 3. I realize your difficulties in meeting General Eisenhower's urgent requirements in full and in time. But assuming these difficulties cannot be entirely overcome I urge most strongly that General Eisenhower should be informed immediately of the amount which can reasonably be expected to be made available by the due date so that he can plan accordingly. Moreover it is to me most important without waiting for the general review, that every effort should be made to procure and ship whatever supplies are available. I hope you will agree to this being done and I regret that there is nothing more that can be shipped from
the U. K. towards meeting these requirements at present. This small island dependent for its life upon imported food must be judged by its sacrifices in rations and not by its contributions.

3. Your paragraph 4. This is being covered in a separate telegram.

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-80-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FXR/11s

Red 24/02502
T.P.V.U.

0973
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 924 Filed 251520Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your 726. Delighted. Am telegraphing to Bernie to say times proposed will be perfectly convenient and to invite him to be guest of the British Government during his visit.

END

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-39-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
DATE: 25 March 1945

FILE NO.: #924

TO: MAP ROOM 25/18000E VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Bernard Baruch's going to London.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PA #726, 24 Mar 45.
2. To the President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-291.
4. Lt. Collins phoned information to Mr. Baruch at 2523452.
5. No reply to Prime Minister.

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

100 BARUCH, BERNARD
27 March 1945

From: Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 925
Fld: 2713372
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and number 925.

1. I am extremely concerned at the deterioration of the Russian attitude since Yalta.

2. About Poland, you will have seen that Molotov in his reply to the agreed communication made to him by our Ambassadors on the 19th March, and in their discussion on the 23rd March, returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with and ignored others.

He persists in his view that the Yalta Communique merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first. He maintains his right to veto Mikołajczyk and other Poles we may suggest and pretends that he has insufficient information about the names we have put forward long ago.

Nothing is said about our proposal that the commission...
should preside in an arbitral capacity over discussions among the Poles. Nothing on our point that measures in Poland affecting the future of the Polish State and action against individuals and groups likely to disturb the atmosphere should be avoided.

He ignores his offer about observers and tells us to talk to the Warsaw puppets about this. It is as plain as a pike staff that his tactics are to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power.

3. Clark Kerr's proposal for dealing with this was to try by redrafting to build something on the four point formula included in Molotov's reply. We cannot see that any real progress towards getting an honest Polish settlement can possibly be made in this way.

It would merely mean that we allowed our communication to be side tracked, negotiated on the basis of Molotov's wholly unsatisfactory reply and wasted time finding formulae which do not decide vital points. We therefore instructed Clark Kerr that he should not proceed on this basis, and that we are discussing matters with you.

4. As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia, both Eden and I are pledged to report the fact openly to the
House of Commons. There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House, the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong. All the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a set up there on the new Romanian model.

In other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the declaration of liberated Europe and you and we shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area.

5. Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of democracy? (You no doubt saw Vyshinsky’s public explanations in Roumania of this doctrine). There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing our total failure. That alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta declaration.

But I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin? I will send you our rough idea on this in my immediately following. I hope you can agree.

6. I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If we are rebuffed, it will be a very sinister sign, taken with
the other Russian actions at variants with the spirit of Yalta; such as Molotov's rude questioning of our word in the case of CROSSWORD, the unsatisfactory proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the coup de'etat in Roumania, the Russian refusal to allow the declaration on liberated Europe to operate, and the blocking of all progress in the EAC by the Russians.

7. What also do you make of Molotov's withdrawal from San Francisco? It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out or are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based on the conception of great power unity.

If no such unit exists on Poland, which is after all a major problem of the post war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new world organization? And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

8. I believe, therefore, that if the success of San Francisco is not to be gravely imperilled, we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin about Poland and if necessary about any other derogations from the harmony
of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the world organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions.

Indeed, I am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now the deplorable impression Molotov’s absence from San Francisco will cause.

ECH/cvl

END
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 27 March 1945

SUBJECT: Poland; Russian attitude.

ACTION:
1. To the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-297, 2719302.
2. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request, 27139452.
3. (See also PM #926, which supplements this message.)
4. MR-IN-151, 2721112, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated,
   "Refer to MR-OUT-297 and 298. Confer with JCS and Mr. Grew and prepare
   reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning."
5. Draft reply prepared by State Dept and Adm Leahy. To the President
   by Admiral Leahy on his return from Hyde Park on 29 Mar; approved by
   the President; sent to Churchill as PM-PM #729. 29 March 1945. Also
   see PM-PM #729.

COPY TO:
MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

EXTRACT: MR 210 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 210 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION;
370 GERMANY; 330; 051 ROMANIA; 210 EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.
From: Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 926

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 926.

1. My immediately preceding telegram.

Could we not both tell him that: We are distressed that the work of the Polish Commission is held up because misunderstandings have arisen about the interpretation of the Yalta decisions. The agreed purpose of those decisions was that a new Government of National Unity was to be established after consultations with representatives of Lublin and other Democratic Poles which both our governments could recognize.

We have not got any reply on the various Polish names we have suggested, pleading lack of information. We have given him plenty of information. There ought not to be a veto by one power on all nominations. We consider that our nominations for the discussions have been made in the spirit of confidence which benefits allies; and of course there could be
no question of allowing Lublin to bar them. We will accept any nominations he puts forward, being equally confident that the Soviet Government will not suggest Pro-Nazi or Anti-Democratic Poles.

The assembled Poles should then discuss the formation of a new government among themselves. The Commission should preside as arbitrators to see fair play. Monsieur Molotov wants the Lublinites to be consulted first. The Communiqué does not provide for this. But we have no objection to his seeing them first.

We cannot authorize our representatives to do so since we think it contrary to the spirit of the Communiqué. Also, to our surprise and regret Molotov, who suggested at an earlier stage that we might like to send observers, has now withdrawn the offer.

Indeed, he appeared to suggest that it had never been made; and has suggested that we should apply to the present Warsaw Administration. Stalin will understand that the whole point of the Yalta decision was to produce a Polish Government we could recognize and that we obviously cannot therefore deal with the present administration.

We feel sure he will honour the offer to send observers
and his influence with his Warsaw friends is so great that
he will overcome with ease any reluctance they may show in
agreeing.

2. Also, Stalin will surely see that while the three
great allies are arranging for the establishment of the new
Government of National Unity, those in power in Poland should
not prejudice the future. We have asked that the Soviet
Government should use their influence with their friends in
temporary power there. Stalin will, we feel confident, take
steps to this end.

3. Stalin will find all this set out in most reasonable
terms in our communication of the 19th March. Will he cast his
eye over it and judge whether our suggestions are not all in
line with the spirit of the Yalta decision, and should they
not all be met by our ally in order that the aim of the Yalta
settlement of Poland, viz the setting up of a representative
government which Britain and the U.S.A. can recognize, may be
carried out without further delay.

ECH/cvl

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-38-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

TOP SECRET
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE

FILE NO.

TO THE PRESIDENT

#926, 27 March 1945

ARMY CODE ROOM

SUBJECT:

Poland

ACTION:

1. (Continuation of PM #925, 27 Mar 45.) To the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-298, 271930Z.

2. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request, 271945Z.

3. MR-IN-161, 2721111Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated "Refer to MR-OUT-297 and 298. Confer with JCS and Mr. Crew and prepare reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning."

4. Draft reply prepared by State Dept and Adm Leahy. To the President by Admiral Leahy on his return from Hyde Park on 29 Mar] approved by the President; sent to Churchill as PRES-FM #720, 29 Mar 1945. Also see PRES-FM #729.

COPIES TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 927 Filed: 301851Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

I am delighted to see from the abundance of messages I have received from you this morning that you are back in Washington and in such vigour. I saw Bernie yesterday and he is coming tonight for the weekend. He seems in great form. As you know, I think he is a very wise man. Winant is coming tomorrow. Clemmie is in flight for Moscow and will be flying about there for at least a month, all of which hangs on my mind. By the way, did you ever receive a telegram from me of a purely private character, No. 914? It required no answer. But I should like to know that you received it. I will now address myself to our joint business.

END

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0301/02

TO PRESIDENT AT WARM SPRINGS AS
M-001-307, 00070208.
30 March 1945

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 928. Filed 301851Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 928.

1. Thank you for your 729 and 730. I am glad you agree that the time has come for us both to address Stalin directly. We consider the draft in your 730 is a grave and weighty document and, although there are a few points in which it does not give full expression to our own views, we will whole-heartedly accept it and I will also endorse it in my parallel message to Stalin, the text of which I will send you before it goes.

2. Perhaps however before deciding on your final text you would consider the importance of making it clear that we shall not enter into any arrangements with the Lublinites before the arrival of our own Poles. There is no harm in discussing with the Lublinites, but I am sure that Mikołajczyk for instance will stipulate that the field shall be open when he arrives. We should be glad if you would provide for this in your draft.

3. More important still is to get rid of Molotov's veto on our candidates. You indicate this in a most polite
manner, but would it not be well to emphasize the point by adding a sentence at the appropriate place to the effect that none of the three of us should veto each other's candidates? Otherwise he will simply veto every one that the Lublin Poles wish him to.

4. Finally, could you not mention in the last paragraph of your draft that it was Molotov himself who originally made the suggestion of observers?

5. I do not ask you to delay the dispatch of your draft on account of these desired additions by us. We leave it in your hands. Meanwhile I agree that our two Ambassadors should give Molotov the redraft of the latter's basic principles, making it clear in doing so that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 19th and will revert to them at a later stage.

END

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-89-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #928, 30 Mar 45.

DATE

FOR MAP ROOM 302139Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #729 and #730, 29 Mar 45. (Also see PM #929, which is continuation of this message.)
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-308, 3020082.
3. President replied in his MR-IN-165, 3023382, referring PM #928 to Admiral Leahy for whatever action he deemed necessary.
4. Admiral Leahy took up with State Department; suggested changes proposed by Churchill were incorporated in President's draft message to Stalin (See PRES-PM #730). A message was drafted to be sent to Churchill, informing him of the changes. This message sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-315, 3120102. President approved in MR-IN-169, 0100102 Apr.
5. Answer sent to Churchill as PRES #732, 31 Mar 45. Message to Stalin (as drafted in PRES #730, and amended in accordance with PM #928) dispatched to Moscow as PRES-STALIN #218, 31 Mar 45. PRES #732 also approved PM #929, 31 Mar 45.

COPIES TO: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

BY DIRECTION OF:
31 March 1945


To: The President of The United States.

File: 31010402

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret.

Following is text of message I propose to send to Stalin. Please let me know what you think. I will not send it off till I hear from you. Text begins:

Prime Minister to Marshall Stalin. Personal and Top Secret:

1. You will by now I hope have received the message from the President of the United States which he was good enough to show to me before he sent it.

It is now my duty on behalf of His Majesty's Government to assure you that the War Cabinet desire me to express to you our wholehearted endorsement of this message of the President's, and that we associate ourselves with it in its entirety.

2. There are two or three points which I desire specially to emphasize. First, that we do not consider we
have retained in the Moscow discussions the spirit of Yalta nor indeed, at points, the letter. It was never imagined by us that the commission we all three appointed with so much good will would not have been able to carry out their part swiftly and easily in a mood of give and take.

We certainly thought that a Polish Government "new" and "reorganized" would by now have been in existence, recognized by all the United Nations. This would have afforded a proof to the world of our capacity and resolve to work together for its future. It is still not too late to achieve this.

3. However, even before forming such a new and reorganized Polish Government, it was agreed by the commission that representative Poles should be summoned from inside Poland and from Poles abroad, not necessarily to take part in the government but merely for free and frank consultation.

Even this preliminary step cannot be taken because of the claim put forward to veto any invitation, even to the consultation, of which the Soviet or the Lublin Government do not approve. We can never agree to such a veto by any one of us three. This veto reaches its supreme example in the case of Monsieur Nikolajczyk who is regarded throughout the British and American world as the outstanding Polish figure outside
Poland.

4. We also have learned with surprise and regret that Monsieur Molotov's spontaneous offer to allow observers or missions to enter Poland has now been withdrawn. We are therefore deprived of all means of checking for ourselves the information, often of a most painful character, which is sent us almost daily by the Polish Government in London.

We do not understand why a veil of secrecy should thus be drawn over the Polish scene. We offer the fullest facilities to the Soviet Government to send missions or individuals to visit any of the territories in our military occupation.

In several cases this offer has been accepted by the Soviets and visits have taken place to mutual satisfaction. We ask that the principle of reciprocity shall be observed in these matters, which would help to make so good a foundation for our enduring partnership.

5. The President has also shown me messages which have passed between him and you about Monsieur Molotov's inability to be present at the conference at San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of the three Foreign Ministers might have led to a clearance of many of the difficulties which have descended upon us in a storm since our happy and hopeful union at Yalta. We do not however question in any way the
weight of the public reasons which make it necessary for him to remain in Russia.

6. Like the President, I too was struck with the concluding sentence of your message to him. What he says about the American people also applies to the British people and to the nations of the British Commonwealth with the addition that His Majesty's present advisers only hold office at the will of the Universal Suffrage Parliament.

If our efforts to reach an agreement about Poland are to be doomed to failure, I shall be bound to confess the fact to Parliament when they return from the Easter recess. No one has pleaded the cause of Russia with more fervour and conviction than I have tried to do. I was the first to raise my voice on June 22, 1941.

It is more than a year since I proclaimed to a startled world the justice of the Curzon Line for Russia's western frontier, and this frontier has now been accepted by both the British Parliament and the President of the United States.

It is as a sincere friend of Russia that I make my personal appeal to you and to your colleagues to come to a good understanding about Poland with the western democracies and not to smite down the hands of comradeship in the future guidance of the world which we now extend.

ECH/cv1

End.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #929, 31 Mar 45.

TO Map Room 311403Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Continuation of PM #928, 31 Mar 45. Sent to the President at War Springs as MR-OUT-311, 311403Z.

2. President replied in MR-IN-166, to Admiral Leahy (311904Z), stating "I think this is all right."

3. Draft reply to both PM #928 and #929 prepared by Admiral Leahy and State Department; sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-315, 3120010Z. President approved in MR-IN-169, 0100010Z.

4. Answer sent to Churchill as PRES #732, 31 Mar 45.

COPIES TO: MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

EXTRACT: MR 210 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.
From: Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 930

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your 732. I am delighted with our being in such perfect step. I have bunged off my 929 to the Bear.

ECH/cvl

End.

Read 011555Z
MR-051-320

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-09-70
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #930, 1 April 1945.

TO THE PRESIDENT 011555Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PREP-PM #732, 31 Mar 45.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-320, 011642Z.

COPY TO:
MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
To: The President of The United States
No: 931. Filed 0118002

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

1. You will have read the telegrams between the British Chiefs of the Staff and their United States colleagues, number COS (W) 723 from us and the U.S. COS reply CCS 605-2. I think there is some misunderstanding on both sides which I am anxious to disperse without more ado.

2. We are very much obliged to the U.S. COS for their Para. 9 which gives time for a reasonable interchange of views between our two Chiefs of Staff Committees.

3. I am however distressed to read in Para. 3 of CCS 805-2 that it should be thought that we wish in the slightest degree to discredit or lower the prestige of General Eisenhower in his increasingly important relations with the Russian Commanders in the field.

All we sought was a little time to consider the far-reaching changes desired by General Eisenhower in the plans.
that had been concerted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Malta and had received your and my joint approval. The British Chiefs of the Staff were naturally concerned by a procedure which apparently left the fortunes of the British Army, which though only a third of yours still amounts to over a million men, to be settled without the slightest reference to any British authority. They also did not fully understand from General Eisenhower’s 252 what actually was intended. In this we may be excused because General Deane was similarly puzzled and delayed delivery of General Eisenhower’s message to Stalin for 24 hours in order to ask for background. I am in full agreement in this instance with the procedure proposed by your Chiefs of Staff in the last sentence of Para. 3 of 805-2 and I am sorry we did not think of it ourselves.

At this point I wish to place on record the complete confidence felt by His Majesty’s Government in General Eisenhower, our pleasure that our armies are serving under his command and our admiration of the great and shining qualities of character and personality which he has proved himself to possess in all the difficulties of handling an allied command. Moreover, I should like to express to you, Mr. President, as I have already done orally in the field to General Eisenhower, my heart-felt congratulations on the glorious victories and
advances by all the armies of the United States centre in the recent battles on the Rhine and over it.

5. Having thus, I trust, removed to your satisfaction any misunderstanding of our action that may have given any cause of offence on our part, I should like to say that I thought that the implications of the references to the work of the British and Imperial forces in the northern advance in Para. 4 and in the second sentence of Para. 6 did not quite do justice to our efforts or contributions. Both at Caen in the Normandy battle and lately on the front north of Wesel, we have had the task of forming the hinge to the main American swing. Therefore it could not be expected that in discharging this duty very spectacular results could attend our indispensable action. In the Rhine battle we had to fight onwards alone in the northern hinge for 13 days longer than was arranged on account of the opening of the dams by the Germans which inevitably delayed the coming into action of the Ninth U. S. Army. During this period it was natural that the enemy should transfer as many paratroops and other corps d'elite as possible to confront us, and this conjoined with the state of the ground and the weather made our effort a very hard one. From February 9th, when we began, down to March 30th (the latest date of which I have figures) the 12 or 13 divisions of His Majesty's forces which were engaged
suffered a loss of over 20,000 casualties. I do not think any
of the American armies to the southward suffered more, and some
of them, thank God, suffered very much less. Therefore I feel
sure that you will not feel discontented with our efforts and
that the actual speed of our advance to date will not be con-
trasted invidiously with the splendid advances made by the United
States Armies in the centre. We even think we may have aided
them by our work, and we hope that now we are in the open
plains of northern Germany we may be able to move more rapidly.

6. Having dealt with and I trust disposed of these mis-
understandings between the truest friends and comrades that
ever fought side by side as allies, I venture to put to you a
few considerations upon the merits of the changes in our ori-
ginal plans now desired by General Eisenhower. It seems to
me the differences are small and as usual not of principle but
of emphasis. Obviously, laying aside every impediment and shun-
ning every diversion, the allied armies of the north and centre
should now march at the highest speed towards the Elbe. Hither-
to the axis has been upon Berlin. General Eisenhower on his
estimate of the enemy’s resistance, to which I attach the great-
est importance, now wishes to shift the axis somewhat to the
southward and strike through Leipzig, even perhaps as far south
as Dresden. He withdraws the Ninth U. S. Army from the northern
group of armies and in consequence stretches its front southwards.
I should be sorry if the resistance of the enemy was such as to destroy the weight and momentum of the advance of the British Twenty First Army Group and to leave them in an almost static condition along the Elbe when and if they reach it. I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of high strategic importance. Nothing will exert a psychological effect of despair upon all German forces of resistance equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be the supreme signal of defeat to the German people. On the other hand, if left to itself to maintain a siege by the Russians among its ruins and as long as the German flag flies there, it will animate the resistance of all Germans under arms.

7. There is moreover another aspect which it is proper for you and me to consider. The Russian armies will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna. If they also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it. This also appears sound on military grounds.
8. To sum up, the difference that might exist between General Eisenhower’s new plans and those we advocated, and which were agreed upon beforehand, would seem to be the following, viz, whether the emphasis should be put on an axis directed on Berlin or on one directed upon Leipzig and Dresden. This is surely a matter upon which a reasonable latitude of discussion should be allowed to our two Chiefs of Staff Committees before any final commitment involving the Russians is entered into.

9. I need hardly say that I am quite willing that this message, which is my own personal message to you and not a Staff communication, should be shown to General Marshall.

END
3 April 1945

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 932 Filed 0310452.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and
F. No 932.

I am attracted by the suggestion in your No 723 that a
high-powered economic mission should visit Greece, but I am
rather doubtful whether this is an appropriate moment to
bring the Russians in. We cannot expect any help from the
Russians in the economic sphere, and to include them in the
mission would be a purely political gesture. As such, it
might be valuable if we could be sure that the Russian re-
presentative would behave correctly and make a public de-
monstration of his solidarity with our policy, but this as-
sumption seems very doubtful. There is the further disad-
vantage that at a time when the Russians are firmly exclud-
ing both you and us from any say in the affairs of Roumania,
it would be rather odd to invite them unsolicited to assume
some degree of responsibility in Greek affairs.
2. We have ourselves been giving some thought to the future Allied organisation in Greece. I am, of course, most anxious to reduce the number of British troops in the country at the earliest possible moment, but it is clear that this will not be the end of our responsibility there. In fact the Greek Government must for some time be given advice and guidance in many spheres of the administration if they are to govern the country effectively. Without this help, they will be unable to resume control throughout the country, and the withdrawal of our forces may be seriously delayed.

3. Advice for the Greek Government has hitherto been provided mainly under the authority of General Scobie as general officer commanding British troops in Greece. We hope, however, that the "operational phase" is now over and it therefore seems appropriate that Scobie should be relieved of many of the responsibilities which he has so far borne, and that these should be transferred to our two Embassies where they more properly belong. As you will know, it is proposed that UNRRA should take over relief work from the military on April 1, and this seemed to be a convenient date on which the other changes could be made. The War
Cabinet have therefore agreed that on the British side the Embassy will be responsible as from April 1 for tendering advice to the Greek Government. This advice will be particularly important on economic and financial questions, and I much hope that we can count on the continued collaboration of the United States Embassy in Athens. If you agree, I suggest that a joint Anglo-American committee should be established, comprising the appropriate British and American experts and responsible to our two Embassies. Although members of this committee have not been invited by the Greek Government to advise, I have no doubt that they will in fact exercise great influence over the economic and financial policies of the Greek Government.

4. I feel that this committee should be set in motion before we consider sending a mission on the lines you suggest. A further reason for postponement would be in order to see how the transference of relief from the military authorities to UNRRA works out. Once all this new machinery has begun to work, a high-powered mission on the lines you suggest might do great good by smoothing out difficulties and getting things moving. By that time we might also have resolved the troubles in Romania and be in a position to
invite the Russians to join the mission.

5. We should, of course, welcome the assistance of Donald Nelson at any time, and if it convenient for him to visit Greece now, I would certainly not suggest that he should delay his journey until a full Allied mission can be sent. The problems to be overcome in Greece are so formidable and urgent that his presence there even for a short visit would be of the greatest value.

End.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 933
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
T. Your No. 733.

I still think it was a pity that Eisenhower's tele-
gram was sent to Stalin without anything being said to our
chiefs of staff or to our deputy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder,
to our Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Montgomery.
The changes in the main plan have now turned out to be very
much less than we at first supposed. My personal relations
with General Eisenhower are of the most friendly character.
I regard the matter as closed and to prove my sincerity I
will use one of my very few Latin quotations, "Amantium
irae amoris integratio est".

END

"Lover's quarrels always go with true love."

REORGANGED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

MR-07-35/1

TOP SECRET
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 934

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Your No. 734.

1. I am astounded that Stalin should have addressed
to you a message so insulting to the honour of the United
States and also of Great Britain. His Majesty's Government
cordially associate themselves with your reply and the War
Cabinet have instructed me to send to Stalin the message in
my immediately following.

2. There is very little doubt in my mind that the Soviet
leaders, whoever they may be, are surprised and disconcerted
at the rapid advance of the Allied armies in the west and
the almost total defeat of the enemy on our front especially
as they say they are themselves in no position to deliver a
decisive attack before the middle of May. All this makes it
the more important that we should join hands with the Russian
armies as far to the east as possible and if circumstances
allow, enter Berlin.

Recd 0600452
MR 074-352
3. I may remind you that we proposed and thought we had arranged six weeks ago provisional zones of occupation in Austria, but since Yalta the Russians have sent no confirmation of these zones. Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will occupy the whole of Austria, it may well be prudent for us to hold as much as possible in the north.

4. We must always be anxious lest the brutality of the Russian messages does not foreshadow some deep change of policy for which they are preparing. On the whole I incline to think it is no more than their natural expression when vexed or jealous. For that very reason I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries in order that the air may be cleared and they realize that there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult. I believe this is the best chance of saving the future. If they are ever convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of our future relations with them and much else.

END

GAMX/dg

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SPECIAL or FILE NO. #934, 5 April 1945.

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations; zones of occupation in Austria.

ACTION:
1. Answered PRES-PM #734, 6 Apr 45, which quoted to the Prime Minister an exchange of messages between the President and Stalin.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-352, 060202Z.
3. See also PM-PRES #935, which is continuation of PM #934.
4. President referred #934 to Admiral Leahy in MR-IN-181, 060250Z, for preparation of draft reply.
5. Draft reply for PM #934 and #935 prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-359, 061540Z. Approved by the President in MR-IN-182, 061708Z.
6. Answer sent to Churchill as PRES-PM #736, 6 April 1945.

COPY TO: MR 370 GERMANY DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

370 GERMANY
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 935 Filed 0521252

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

following is text of my telegram to Stalin referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and Top

Secret.

1. The President has sent me his correspondence with you about the contacts made in Switzerland between a British and an American officer on Field Marshal Alexander's staff and a German General named Wolff relating to possible surrender of Kesselring's army in northern Italy. I therefore deem it right to send you a precise summary of the action of His Majesty's Government. As soon as we learned of these contacts we immediately informed the Soviet Government on March 12th and we and the United States Government have faithfully reported to you everything that has taken place. The sole and only business mentioned or referred to in any way in Switzerland was to test the credentials of the German
emissary and try to arrange a meeting between a nominee of Kesselring's, with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters or some convenient point in northern Italy. There were no negotiations in Switzerland even for a military surrender of Kesselring's army. Still less did any political-military plot, as alleged in your telegram to the President, enter into our thoughts, which are not as suggested of so dishonourable a character.

2. Your representatives were immediately invited to the meeting we attempted to arrange in Italy. Had it taken place and had your representatives come, they would have heard every word that passed.

3. We consider that Field Marshal Alexander has full right to accept the surrender of the German army of 25 divisions on his front in Italy and to discuss such matters with German envoys who have the power to settle the terms of capitulation. Nevertheless we took especial care to invite your representatives to this purely military discussion at his headquarters should it take place. In fact however nothing resulted from any contacts in Switzerland. Our officers returned from Switzerland without having succeeded in fixing a rendezvous in Italy for Kesselring's emissaries to come to. Of all this the Soviet Government have been
fully informed step by step by Field Marshal Alexander or by Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, as well as through United States channels. I repeat that no negotiations of any kind were entered into or even touched upon, formally or informally, in Switzerland.

4. There is however a possibility that the whole of this request to parley by German General Wolff was one of those attempts which are made by the enemy with the object of sowing distrust between allies. Field Marshal Alexander made this point in a telegram sent on March 11th in which he remarks, "Please note that two of the leading figures are S.S. and Himmler men which makes me very suspicious". This telegram was repeated to the British Ambassador in Moscow on the 12th of March for communication to the Soviet Government. If to sow distrust between us was the German intention, it has certainly for the moment been successful.

5. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was instructed by Mr. Eden to explain the whole position to M. Molotov in his letter of March 21st. The reply of March 22nd handed to him from M. Molotov contained the following expression: "In this instance the Soviet Government sees not a misunderstanding but something worse". It also complains that, "In Berne for two weeks behind the backs of the Soviet Union, which is
bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, negotiations have been going on between representatives of the German military command on the one hand and representatives of English and American commands on the other. In the interests of Anglo-Russian relations, His Majesty's Government decided not to make any reply to this most wounding and unfounded charge but to ignore it. This is the reason for what you call in your message to the President, "The silence of the British". He thought it better to keep silent than to respond to such a message as was sent by M. Molotov, but you may be sure that we were astonished by it and affronted that M. Molotov should impute such conduct to us. This however in no way affected our instruction to Field Marshal Alexander to keep you fully informed.

6. Neither is it true that the initiative in this matter came as you state to the President wholly from the British. In fact the information given to Field Marshal Alexander that the German General Wolff wished to make a contact in Switzerland was brought to him by an American agency.

7. There is no connection whatever between any contacts at Berne or elsewhere with the total defeat of the German armies on the western front. They have in fact fought
with great obstinacy and inflicted upon us and the American armies since the opening of our February offensive up to March 26th upwards of 67,000 casualties. However being outnumbered on the ground and literally overwhelmed in the air by the vastly superior Anglo-American air forces, which in the month of March alone dropped over 200,000 tons of bombs on Germany, the German armies in the west have been decisively broken. The fact that they were outnumbered on the ground in the west is due to the magnificent attacks and weight of the Soviet armies.

8. With regard to the charges which you have made in your message to the President of April 3rd, which also asperse His Majesty's Government, I associate myself and my colleagues with the last sentence of the President's reply."

END
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #935, 5 April 1945

DATE 5 April 1945

TO MAP ROOM 060045Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. See "immediately preceding telegram", PM-PRES #934, 5 Apr 45.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-353, 5 Apr 45.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President as MR-OUT-359, 061540Z.
4. Approved by the President in MR-IN-182, 061708Z.
5. Reply to Churchill sent as PRES-PM #736, 6 April 1945.

COPIES TO:

MR 370 GERMANY (2)

370 GERMANY
TOP SECRET

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 936 Filed 061009Z.
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 936.
My number 935.

In Paragraph eight of message to Stalin for
"Charges which you have made" read "Charges which are
made".

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 2-2272
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 8 1972

FXR: JV
Rec 006/12182 Send to MR-001756

TOP SECRET
TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: #936, 6 April 1945

FOR MAP ROOM: 06/12152 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations

ACTION:

1. Correction to PM #935, 5 April 1945.
2. To President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-356, 06/1225Z. PM #935 previously sent as MR-OUT-353, 06/0202Z.
3. No answer.

COPIES TO:

MR 370 GERMANY (2)

DATE: ____________________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________________

370 GERMANY
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 937
Filed 070329Z.
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Important. Number 937.

There follows for your concurrence the draft of the anti-U-boat warfare statement for March. I am also consulting Mr. MacKenzie King.

"During March the U-boat effort continued to increase but fewer successes were obtained against our shipping than in February. Casualties inflicted on U-boats were again severe and the prolonged and extensive bombing and minelaying policy of the Allies had undoubtedly delayed the introduction of the new type U-boats. In a similar manner the capture of Danzig by the Soviet arms helps to cut off the evil at its source."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1019
9 April 1945

To: The President of the United States.
Nr: Filed 091045Z.

Private Secretary to Prime Minister to White House.

With reference to President's Number 738-M U-boat statement for March: word "had" in second sentence should read "has". Error regretted.

End.

RHH/11s
7 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Office of War Information.
Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.

The following suggestion for the March, 1945, Submarine Warfare Statement has been received from the Prime Minister this date. The President desires any comments you may have to make on this statement.

"During March the U-boat effort continued to increase but fewer successes were obtained against our shipping than in February. Casualties inflicted on U-boats were again severe and the prolonged and extensive bombing and mine laying policy of the Allies had undoubtedly delayed the introduction of the new type U-boats. In a similar manner the capture of Danaig by the Soviet arms helps to cut off the evil at its source."

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
7 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director of Public Relations, Navy Department.
Director, Office of War Information.

The following suggestion for the March, 1943, Submarine Warfare Statement has been received from the Prime Minister this date. The President desires any comments you may have to make on this statement.

"During March the U-boat effort continued to increase but fewer successes were obtained against our shipping than in February. Casualties inflicted on U-boats were again severe and the prolonged and extensive bombing and minelaying policy of the Allies had undoubtedly delayed the introduction of the new type U-boats. In a similar manner the capture of Danzig by the Soviet arms helps to cut off the evil at its source."

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE #37, 7 April 1945

TO 07/12002 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: March Antisubmarine Statement.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-354, 0713302.
2. Copies to Navy Department and OWI for comment.
3. MR-IN-184, from the President to Admiral Brown (0716182), stated: "MR-OUT-354 approved subject to any changes by OWI and Navy."
4. Admiral Cooke informed Admiral Brown by telephone Sunday morning, 8 Apr 1945, that both Navy and OWI had approved statement.
5. President informed Churchill of agreement in PRES-PK #715, 8 Apr 45, (0816112).
6. President informed in MR-OUT-373, 0817172, which stated: "OWI and Navy have concurred in your approval of the U-boat statement and the Prime has been notified that we agree."
7. A message from the private secretary to the Prime Minister to the White House, filed 0910452, corrected one word in the substatement. OWI and Navy informed by memo.

COPIES TO: MR 000.7 (3) DATE: 000.7 (3) BY DIRECTION OF:
From: Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 938
Fid: 092240Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

1. The plight of the civil population of occupied Holland is desperate. Between two and three million people are facing starvation. We believe that large numbers are dying daily, and the situation must deteriorate rapidly now that communications between Germany and Holland are virtually cut. I fear we may soon be in the presence of a tragedy.

2. Eisenhower has plans prepared for bringing relief to the civil population when Western Holland is liberated and we have accumulated the stocks for this purpose in suitable proximity. But if we wait until Holland has been liberated, this help may come too late. There is need for action to bring immediate help, on a far larger scale than is afforded by the Swedish relief scheme.

3. I therefore ask you to join me in giving notice to the German Government, through the Swiss Government as the
protecting power, to the following effect.

It is the responsibility of the German Government to sustain the civil population in those parts of Holland which remain in German occupation. As they have failed to discharge that responsibility, we are prepared to send food and medical supplies for distribution to the civil population through the agency of the International Red Cross.

We are ready in increase the limited supplies that are already being sent from Sweden and also to send in further supplies, by sea or direct from areas under military control of the allies, subject to the necessary safe conducts being arranged. We invite the German Government to accord the facilities to enable this to be done.

4. In present circumstances I think that the German Government might well accede to this request. If, however, they should refuse, I propose that we should, at this stage, warn the German Commander in Holland and all the troops under his command that by resisting our attempt to bring relief to the civil population in this area they brand themselves as murderers before the world, and we shall hold them responsible with their lives for the fate which overtakes the people of Holland.

Full publicity would be given to this warning so as to
bring it home to all German troops stationed in Holland.

5. We must avert this tragedy if we can. But, if we cannot, we must at least make it clear to the world on whose shoulders the responsibility lies.

6. The terms of the communication to be made to the German Government through the protecting power are being drafted and will be sent to you tomorrow.

In the meantime, I hope that you will feel able to agree in principle.

ECH/cvl

End.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-99-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd 10/0/72
Sent 12/OUT 387 TOWS

TOP SECRET
TO: The President of The United States

From: Military Attache, London

Primes Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

In paragraph six of my telegram No. 938 of April 10 about relief for occupied Holland I promised to send you our suggested terms for the communication to be made by both our governments to the German Government through the protecting power. Following is text:

1. According to reliable information received by His Majesty's/U. S. Government between two or three million people in those parts of Holland which remain in German occupation are facing starvation and large numbers dying.

2. The situation is such that no improvement can be anticipated. As the German Government are aware, they are directly and wholly responsible for sustaining the civil population in areas under their military occupation.

Since the German Government have failed to discharge their responsibility in this matter, H. M. G./U. S. G. are prepared in addition to the limited supplies which can be
sent in Swedish vessels to send food and medical supplies for
distribution to the civil population in this area through the
agency of the International Red Cross direct by sea and land
from areas under the military control of the Allies, subject
to the necessary safe conducts being arranged.

H. M. G./the U. S. G. accordingly invite the
German Government as a matter of urgency to declare their
readiness in principle to accord whatever facilities may be
required for this purpose."

ECH/cvl

End.
11 April 1945

From: Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 940
Fld: 110015Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your No. 734 about CROSSWORDS. I send you a private
message I have received from Stalin covering the official
telegram which he has sent to you with copy to me. I have a
feeling that this is about the best we are going to get out
of them, and certainly it is as near as they can get to an
apology.

However, before considering any answer at all from
His Majesty's Government, please tell me how you think the
matter should be handled so that we may keep in line
together.

ECH/cvl

End.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

MAIL or FILE NO. #940, 11 April 1945

TO: MAP ROOM 110032 Via Army Code Room

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Further reply to PRES-PM #734, 2 April 1945. (Also see PM #934, PM #935, PM #936, PRES #736, STALIN-PRES 7 Apr 45).
2. Also see PM #941, which is continuation of this message.
3. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-396, 110032.
4. In MR-OUT-402 (116102) from Admiral Leahy to the President, Leahy submitted for approval a draft reply to Stalin's message of 7 Apr to the President. He also requested permission to send this reply, if approved by the President, to Churchill as an answer to #940.
5. President approved MR-OUT-402 in his message MR-IN-196 (1200122).
6. The President's message was sent to Stalin as PRES-STALIN #229, 11 Apr 45; the message was quoted to Churchill in PRES-PM #741, 11 Apr 45, for Churchill's information and as answer to PM-PRES #940.

COPY TO:
MR 370 GERMANY (2)

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

370 GERMANY
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 941 Fld: 1100152
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Following

is Marshal Stalin's message dated 7 April.

Your message of 5th April received. In my message of
7th April to the President, which I am sending to you also, I
have already replied to all the fundamental points raised in
your message regarding the negotiations in Switzerland. On
the other questions raised in your message I consider it neces-
sary to make the following remarks.

1. Neither I nor Molotow had any intention of "blacken-
ing" anyone. It is not a matter of wanting to "blacken"
(anyone) but of our having developed differing points of view
as regards the rights and obligations of any ally. You will
see from my message to the President that the Russian point of
view on this question is the correct one, as it guarantees each
ally's rights and deprives the enemy of any possibility of

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. M 97-72
By R. H. Parks Date 11-12-72

File Copy
sowing discord between us.

2. My messages are personal and strictly confidential. This makes it possible to speak one's mind clearly and frankly. This is the advantage of confidential communications.

If, however, you are going to regard every frank statement of mine as offensive, it will make this kind of communication very difficult. I can assure you that I had and have no intention of offending anyone.

ECH/cvl

End.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 942
Fld: 1100442
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Roumania: You will have seen our various telegrams to
the British officers on the Control Commission in Roumania.
In Roumanian affairs we have been following your lead because
of what I told you in my No. 905, and we shall continue to do
so.

We should be grateful if you would take some of the
burden of giving refuge to Roumanian personalities whom you
and we have supported, should their lives be in danger.

Rădescu is already on our hands. Now there is this
question of the King and queen Mother. We have unhesitatingly
said that if they have no other sanctuary they may come to us.
But I hope you will take some of this weight off us, as you
are taking the lead in Roumania.

ECH/cvl

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 6 1945
399
11 April 1945

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 943
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 943.

Your 724.

1. Acting on the instructions of the British Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mountbatten has discussed the whole question of clandestine operations with General Wedemeyer when the latter was in Kandy recently. You will probably have heard from your Chiefs of Staff that they have come to a very satisfactory agreement and have settled all difficulties outstanding between them.

2. Nevertheless I still think that we should issue directives to Admiral Mountbatten and General Wedemeyer respectively. I, for my part, will telegraph to Mountbatten as follows. Do you agree?

"Directive from Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten in accordance with the agreement which you reached after SEXTANT with the Generalissimo, you may conduct from whatsoever base appears most suitable the minimum pre-occupational
activities in Indo-China which local emergency and the advance of your forces require. It is essential, however, that you should keep General Wedemeyer, as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, continually informed of all your operations, since forces of China Command will also be operating in the same theatre.

You should foster full, free and frank exchange of plans, intentions and intelligence with General Wedemeyer as regards Indo-China in order to ensure the closest correlation of Allied military interests in that area.

General Wedemeyer is receiving similar instructions from the President that he is likewise to keep you informed of all his activities into Indo-China.

If, as is unlikely, there should be any point of disagreement between you and General Wedemeyer, it should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

3. Now that the Japanese have taken over Indo-China and that substantial resistance is being offered by French patriots, it is essential not only that we should support the
French by all the means in our power, but also that we should associate them with our operations into their country. It would look very bad in history if we failed to support isolated French forces in their resistance to the Japanese to the best of our ability, or, if we excluded the French from participation in our councils as regards Indo-China.

END
OUT
404
To: The President of The United States.
 Nr: 944 Filed 1116302.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and Number 944.

Your 739.

1. Stalin sent me a copy of his reply to your message on Poland. He also sent me an additional private message, of which the last sentence in Para 1, if seriously intended, would be important. I send this message in my immediately following. Please let these personal introductions to his official messages be guarded absolutely as between you and me.

2. I have to make a statement in the House of Commons next Thursday and of course I should like to know your views about how we should answer Stalin as soon as possible. I have a feeling that they do not want to quarrel with us, and your telegram about CROSSWORD may have seriously and deserved-

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11 April 1945
ly perturbed them. Our angle of approach and momentum remain exactly what they have been in both the matters under dispute as set forth in our telegrams.

End.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.: #944
DATE: 11 April 1945
SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #720, 10 April 1945.
2. (See also PM-PRES #944, which is a continuation of this message.)
3. To the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-404, 112017Z.
4. Copy to Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy.
5. Answered by PRES-PM #945, 11 Apr 45, which was written by the President at Warm Springs and transmitted to the Map Room as MR-IN-197, 120012Z.
6. Further answered by President Truman on 13 April 1945, in his #2 to the Prime Minister.

COPIES TO:

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

MR-052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

INDEED:

O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 945

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 945.

The private message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram follows:

Personal and Secret. Premier J. V. Stalin to The Prime Minister Mr. Winston Churchill.

I have received your message of April 1st on the Polish question. In my message on this subject to The President, which I am also sending to you, I answer all the main questions connected with the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland. As regards the other questions which you raise in your message, I have the following remarks to make:

(1) The British and American Ambassadors who are members of The Moscow Commission are unwilling to take account of The Provisional Polish Government and insist on inviting Polish personalities for consultation,
without regard to their attitude to the decisions of
the Crimea Conference on Poland and to The Soviet Union.
They absolutely insist on summoning to Moscow for con-
sultation, for instance, Nikolajczyk, and this they do
in the form of an ultimatum: in this they take no
account of the fact that Nikolajczyk has come out
openly against the decisions of the Crimea Conference
on Poland. However, if you think it necessary, I should
be ready to use my influence with The Provisional Polish
Government to make them withdraw their objections to
inviting Nikolajczyk if the latter would make a public
statement accepting the decisions of the Crimea Conference
on the Polish question and declaring that he stands for
the establishment of friendly relations between Poland
and The Soviet Union.

(2) You wonder why the Polish theatre of military
operations must be wrapped in mystery. In fact there
is no mystery here. You ignore the fact that if British
observers or other foreign observers were sent into
Poland, the Poles would regard this as an insult to
their national dignity, bearing in mind the fact, more-
over, that the present attitude of The British Government
to The Provisional Polish Government is regarded as unfriendly by the latter. So far as The Soviet Government is concerned, it cannot but take account of the negative attitude of The Provisional Government to the question of sending foreign observers into Poland. Further, you are aware that The Provisional Polish Government puts no obstacles in the way of entrance into Poland by representatives of other states which take up a different attitude towards it, and does not in any way obstruct them; this is the case, for instance, in regard to the representatives of The Czechoslovak Government, The Yugoslav Government and others.

Prime.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SPECIAL or FILE NO.: #925, 11 April 1945

DATE: 11 April 1945

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Quotes to the President a message received by Churchill from Stalin. This same message was previously quoted to the President by Stalin in STALIN-PRES 7 Apr 45.
2. For "immediately preceding telegram" see FM-PRES #944, 11 Apr 45.
3. Not answered by the President. FM #944 was answered by PRES #742, 11 April 1945.

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ORIGINAL: PRES-FM FILE

INDEXED:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.