MAP ROOM PAPERS
Box 8
Stalin to Roosevelt
July - December, 1942
INCOMING
DISPATCHES

PREMIER STALIN

TO

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

1942
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 July 1942</td>
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TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

Paraphrase of telegram No 227
July 2, 5pm from Ambassador Standley
at Moscow.

Ambassador Standley refers to his telegram No 214
of June 26 and states that he has received the follow-
ning note dated July 1st., from Molotov:

"I have been instructed by the President of the Soviet
of Peoples Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Mr. I.V. Stalin,
forward the following message to the President in
reply to the note handed to me on the 28th., of June.

"With reference to your recent communications I deem
it advisable to inform you that I concur with you in
full regarding the expediency of the air route of Alaska
and Siberia for delivering aircraft to the Western
front from the United States. The Soviet government,
taking this into consideration, already has issued
the required orders in connection with finishing
in the immediate future the work already begun in
Siberia for receiving aircraft, namely, the equipping
of the appropriate installations and the existing
air fields. It seems to me that the delivery of the
planes from Alaska may be entrusted to Soviet aviators,
as was once proposed by the Department of State, who,
at any agreed time would be sent to Nome or any other
feasible spot. I believe that an appropriate group of
these aviators may also be entrusted with the survey
flight which you suggested. We would like you to let
us know now how many planes the United States plans
to deliver to the Western front via this route in order
to insure completely their reception.

"The Soviet government agrees the organization of a
meeting of United States army and navy representatives
and Soviet Union representatives in order to exchange
such information as is necessary, which was proposed
by you, and proposes that Moscow be the meeting place."
The White House
Washington

July 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Forster

Please send following plain except for last paragraphs.

Hull
The White House
Washington

TELEGRAM No. 231,
July 2, 1942

FROM: AMBASSADOR STANDLEY IN MOSCOW:

Accompanied by my Military Attaché, I talked with Stalin today, and in confirmation of the President's statement regarding Japan's aggressive attitude in the northern Pacific, I repeated the information furnished by telegram No. 176 from the Department. I then brought up the differences between the terms contained in the President's messages and those in Stalin's reply. The following were discussed specifically:

First. To my mention of the lack of any reference to heavy freight movement via northern rivers, Stalin replied that this route could not be used as during this season only one more navigation month remained. I was assured, however, that the Siberian area air fields were completely equipped and prepared to receive American planes.

Second. With regard to the suggestion of the President that representatives of the Soviet Union might participate in the proposed American planes survey flight, Stalin stated that it would be "entirely agreeable" for American representatives to accompany the Soviet planes on its test flight.

Third. With reference to the proposal by Mr. Stalin that American and Soviet representatives organize a meeting in Moscow for the exchange of information regarding the proposed route, and to the President's thought that meetings take place both in Moscow and Washington, I stated that it would be necessary to bring an American air expert to Moscow from Washington as there were none here, and suggested that a Soviet expert who is already in Washington might be named by the Soviet Government to confer with the appropriate American officials, adding that the American and Soviet experts could then return here to act as the President proposed and Stalin seconded. The latter replied that he saw no need of any additional discussions in Washington as it was obviously only a question of the monthly number of planes that could
The White House
Washington

(2)

be delivered.

Fourth. None or other feasible point in
Alaska than Semohun, then Yakutak, than Kirenak
and then Krasnoyarsk is the course that Stalin
stated the route would follow.
REL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (80)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY
237, July 4, 2 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

My 227, July 2, 3 p.m., and 231, July 2, 11 p.m.

The plan accepted by Stalin is similar to the one proposed by General Arnold which was presented by me to Stalin at my first interview (see Arnold's letter to me dated March 10, 1942, and my telegram 128, April 22, 2 p.m.). With reference to representatives in Moscow, previous experience and the tenor of my recent conversation with Stalin indicate that a large military mission would be unwelcome at this time. I therefore recommend that an Air Officer of as high rank as possible who is familiar with all plans and details be sent here from Washington immediately and that my Military Attaché Colonel Michela and Naval Attaché Captain Duncan be named as the Army and Navy representatives respectively.

As an indication of good faith I wish to emphasize
2, #237, July 4, 2 p.m., from (Moscow), Kuibyshev.

Emphasize the importance of furnishing the Soviet Government as soon as possible of the exact number of plants that can be supplied by this route.

STANDLEY

JRL
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STALIN. AGBASSADOR INFORMED,

"YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJ. GEN. F. E.
BRADLEY, CAPT. DUNCAN AND COL. MICHELA AS AMERICAN REPRESENT-
ATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY ME. AS AMERICAN
REPRESENTATIVES THEY WILL RECEIVE ALL THE COOPERATION NECESSARY
FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED THEM. REPRESENT-
ING THE USSR AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE MAJ. GEN. STERLING, COL.
KABANOV AND COL. LEVANDOVICH.

AS TO THE SURVEY FLIGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND
WITHIN A FEW DAYS FROM KRASNOYARSK TO NOUE ONE PLANE (HAVING
IN MIND AN AMERICAN TWO MOTORED PLANE) WHICH COULD BRING BACK
THE AMERICAN OFFICERS ON THE RETURN TRIP.

USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY APPRECIAT-
ION FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADDITIONAL 115 TANKS BEING
SENT TO THE USSR*. (PART TWO FOLLOWS)

"I CONSIDER IT A DUTY TO ADVISE YOU THAT, WHICH OUR
SPECIALISTS AT THE FRONT CONFIRM, THE AMERICAN TANKS CATCH ON
FIRE VERY EASILY FROM THE PROJECTILES OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

SEALED

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
STRIKING THE REAR OR SIDES. THIS RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT THE HIGH GRADE GASOLINE USED IN AMERICAN TANKS FORMS A HEAVY LAYER OF GAS VAPORS CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR CATCHING FIRE.

GERMAN TANKS ALSO OPERATE ON GASOLINE BUT THEIR GASOLINE IS OF LOW GRADE WHICH GIVES OFF LITTLE VAPOR IN VIEW OF WHICH THEY ARE LESS VULNERABLE TO FIRE.

OUR SPECIALISTS CONSIDER THAT THE DIESEL MOTOR IS MOST SUITABLE FOR TANKS.
FROM: ALUSHA MOSCOW (DUNCAN)
FOR: OPMAY
DATE: JULY 19, 1942

PART ONE 162023 MCR 5359
PART TWO 162040 MCR 5356

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STALIN. AMBASSADOR INFORMED.
*YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJ. GEN. F.
BRADLEY, CAPT. DUNCAN AND COL. MICHELA AS AMERICAN REPRESENT-A-TIVES TO THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY ME. AS AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES THEY WILL RECEIVE ALL THE COOPERATION NECESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED THEM. REPRESENT-ING THE USSR AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE MAJ. GEN. STERLING, COL.
KABANOV AND COL. LEVANDOVICH.

AS TO THE SURVEY FLIGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND
WITHIN A FEW DAYS FROM KRAKOVSKO TO NOVOK PARK (HAVING IN MIND AN AMERICAN TWO MOTORED PLANE) WHICH COULD BEING BACK
THE AMERICAN OFFICERS ON THE RETURN TRIP.

USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY APPRECIATION FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADDITIONAL 115 TANKS BEING
SENT TO THE USSR."

(PART TWO FOLLOWS)

*I CONSIDER IT A DUTY TO ADVISE YOU THAT, WHICH OUR
SPECIALISTS AT THE FRONT CONFIRM, THE AMERICAN TANKS CATCH ON
FIRE VERY EASILY FROM THE PROJECTILES OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
STRIKING THE REAR OR SIDES. THIS RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT
THE HIGH GRADE GASOLINE USED IN AMERICAN TANKS FORMS A HEAVY
LAYER OF GAS VAPORS CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR CATCHING FIRE.

GERMAN TANKS ALSO OPERATE ON GASOLINE BUT THEIR GASOLINE IS OF LOW GRADE WHICH GIVES OFF LITTLE VAPOR IN VIEW OF WHICH THEY ARE LESS VULNERABLE TO FIRE.

OUR SPECIALISTS CONSIDER THAT THE DIESEL MOTOR IS MOST SUITABLE FOR TANKS."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM: ALUSHA MOSCOW (DUNCAN)</th>
<th>DATE: 24 JULY 1942.</th>
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<td>FOR CODE: 2217/24.</td>
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<td>DECODER: BOLTON</td>
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<td>PARAPHRASED BY: GERMANY</td>
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**TEXT**

(INFO AMBASSADOR KUIBYSHEV)

GENERAL FEODROV, HEAD OF SOVIET WEATHER SERVICE, HAS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING EXCHANGE ADDITIONAL WEATHER DATA AND FORECASTS SIBERIAN ALASKAN AREA WITH PARTICULAR VIEW PROVIDING FORECASTS ALONG AIR ROUTE DISCUSSED PRESIDENTS RECENT MESSAGES TO STALIN. I WILL FORWARD ABOVE BY DESPATCH.

FEODROV AGREES IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE GENERAL BRADLEY BE ACCOMPANIED BY AEROLOGIST PREPARED DISCUSS DETAILS. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FEODROV AND ONE OF OUR AEROLOGISTS WOULD RESULT IN EXCHANGE OF METHODS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVEMENT WEATHER SERVICE WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF TIME INVOLVED BY DESPATCH NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBJECT.

REQUEST GENERAL BRADLEY BE INFORMED AND I BE NOTIFIED WHAT OFFICERS WILL ACCOMPANY BRADLEY AND DATE HE EXPECTS ARRIVE MOSCOW.
PARAPHRASE STALIN'S ANSWER TO PRESIDENT MESSAGE OPNAV 239192.

YOUR PLANE B-25 WILL ARRIVE HOME BETWEEN 8 AND 10 AUGUST
AND WILL CARRY 3 AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS ON SURVEY FLIGHT.

ACTION: PIA......

FILE.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
275, August 6, 10 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

I called upon Molotov upon my arrival today and delivered the President's recent messages to Stalin. Molotov stated that of course he would deliver the messages but added that he failed to understand the message to the effect the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Union until the spring of 1943 for the reason that Litvinov had reported to the Foreign Office that the President had advised him late in July that his information at the time was to the effect that the Japanese would definitely attack the Soviet Union during the first ten days of August 1942. I agreed to report this to the President for possible reconciliation.

STANDLEY

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
APR ' 1972
By [Signature] Date
<table>
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<td>FROM: USSNA MOSCOW</td>
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<td>RELEASED BY:</td>
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<td>DATE: 6 AUGUST 1942</td>
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**TEXT**

(STALIN TO PRESIDENT DATED 7TH)

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF AUGUST 5TH.
I EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE ADVICE CONCERNING THE
FOBTHCOMING ARRIVAL OF MR. HARRIMAN IN MOSCOW.
AS TO YOUR INFORMATION REGARDING JAPAN I HAVE LEARNED
OR IT WITH INTEREST AND OF COURSE I TOO SHALL NOT FAIL TO
TRANSMIT IT TO THE VISITOR.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

P1A......ACTION.
FILE.

**REGRADED**
UNCLASSIFIED

** SEALED **
SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 18 (4) NAV REGS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: DUNCAN (MOSCOW) | OPNAV
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 23-AUGUST-1942 | PRIORITY
FOR CODE: 1043/23 | ROUTINE
DECODED BY: PENNE | DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY: LEAND

ROUTE BY: LT. ALLEN 221836 NCR 1521
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE
TIME
OCT

TEXT

(PRES ROOSEVELT FROM STALIN)

I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE OF AUGUST 18. I ALSO REGRET YOU COULD NOT HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATIONS I RECENTLY HAD WITH MR CHURCHILL.

IN CONNECTION YOUR REMARKS REGARDING SHIPMENT FROM UNITED STATES DURING AUGUST OF TANKS AND WAR MATERIALS, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE OUR SPECIAL INTEREST AT PRESENT TIME IN RECEIVING FROM U.S. AIRCRAFT AND OTHER TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AND ALSO TRUCKS, IN GREATEST POSSIBLE QUANTITY. FURTHERMORE I HOPE ALL MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO GUARANTEE MOST EXPEDITIOUS DELIVERY OF GOODS TO SOVIET UNION ESPECIALLY BY NORTHERN SEA ROUTE.

ACTIONS: P1A
FILE: SEALED

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 70 (d) NAVVREG.)

7/1/36 221830
COPY OF MESSAGE SENT BY MR. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT WITH AMBASSADOR ADMIRAL STANLEY ON OCTOBER 7.

Availing myself of the opportunity to send you a personal message afforded by Mr. Standley proceeding to Washington, I would like to express a few considerations on the military supplies from the United States to the U.S.S.R.

It is reported that the difficulties with supplies are caused primarily by the shortage of shipping. In order to ease the shipping situation, the Soviet Government would agree to certain cuts in the American supplies of armaments to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily to have discontinued the supplies of tanks, artillery, ammunition, revolvers and such like. At the same time we are in extreme need of an increase in the supply of fighter planes of modern types (such as for instance Miracbras) and in getting under all circumstances certain kinds of other supplies. It should be born in mind that Kittyhawk planes are not up to the mark in the fight against modern German fighter planes.

It would be good, if the U.S.A. could in any case insure our getting every month the following supplies:

- 500 fighter planes
- 8 to 10 thousand trucks
- 5000 tons of aluminium
- 4 to 5 thousand tons of explosives.

In addition to this it is important to get the supply during 12 months of two million tons of grain (wheat), and also as much as pos-
sible of fats, food concentrates and canned meat. A considerable amount of these foodstuffs could be shipped via Vladivostok on Soviet ships, if the U.S. consented to concede to the U.S.S.R. at least 20 to 30 ships. I have already spoken to Mr. Willkie about all this and am sure that he will communicate it to you.

As regards the situation at the front, you are of course aware that during the last few months the situation grew worse in the south, especially in the Stalingrad sector, due to the shortage of planes, particularly fighter planes. The Germans turned out to have a large reserve of planes. In the South the Germans have at least a double supremacy in the air, which prevents us from giving our troops cover. The practice of the war has shown that the most gallant troops become powerless if they are not shielded from the air.

October 7, 1942.

Given to Map Room to file by Mr. Hopkins 1640/11 October.
Москва, 7 октября 1942 года.

Уважаемый господин Посол,

С настоящим посылай Вам личное Послание И.В. Сталина на имя г-на Президента. Просьшу не отказывать в любезности передать это Послание по назначению.

С искренним уважением

[Подпись]

Господину У. Стоуну,
Чрезвычайному и Полномочному Послу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

Москва.
Пользуясь возможностью послать Вам личное Письмение, бла-
годаря любезному соедействию г. Стэнли, уезжающему в Вашинг-
тон, я хотел бы высказать некоторые соображения о военных по-
ставках из США в СССР.

Как сообщает, затруднения в поставках создадутся, прежде всего, из-за недостатка и тоннажа. Чтобы облегчить дело с
тоннажем, Советское Правительство было бы готово пойти на
некоторое уменьшение поставок американских предметов воору-
жения Советскому Союзу. Мы готовы временно полностью отка-
заться от поставки танков, артиллерии, боеприпасов, пистоле-
тов и т. п. Но вместе с тем мы крайне нуждаемся в увеличении
поставок самолетов-истребителей современного типа (например,
"Аэрокобра") и в обеспечении при всех условиях некоторых
других поставок. Следует иметь в виду, что самолеты "Китихаук"
не выдерживают борьбы с японскими немецкими истребителями.

Было бы очень хорошо, если бы США во всём случае обес-
печили нам следующие поставки (еженедельно): истребители -
500 штук, грузовики - 8 или 10 тысяч штук, авиамодель - 5 тысяч
тонн, варёные вещества - 4-5 тысяч тонн. Кроме того, важно
обеспечить поставку в течение 12 месяцев 2 миллионов тонн
зерна (пшеницы), а также возможное количество жиров, концент-
ратов, мясных консервов. Мы смогли бы значительную часть про-
должения завезти через Владивосток советским флотом, если
бы США согласились уступить СССР для пополнения нашего флота
хотя бы 2-3 десятка судов. Обо всем этом я уже говорил с
с г. Улли, уверенный в том, что он сообщит Вам об этом.

Что касается положения на фронте, то Вы, конечно, знаете, что за последние месяцы наше положение на юге, особенно в районе Сталинграда, ухудшилось из-за недостатка у нас самолетов, главным образом, истребителей. У немцев оказался большой резерв самолетов. Немец имеет на юге минимальное превосходство в воздухе, что лишает нас возможности прикрыть свои войска. Практика войны показала, что самые храбрые войска становятся беспомощными, если они не защищены от ударов с воздуха.

7 октября 1942 г.
TRANSLATION.

FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Taking advantage of the opportunity to send you a personal message through the good offices of Ambassador Standley leaving for Washington, I should like to express certain considerations about the war deliveries from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R.

As it is reported the difficulties in the deliveries arise in the first place from the shortage of tonnage. In order to relieve the tonnage situation, the Soviet Government would be willing to agree to a certain curtailment of the deliveries of American war materials to the Soviet Union. We are willing to discard for the time being all of the deliveries of tanks, artillery, munitions, pistols etc. But at the same time we are extremely in need of an increase in the deliveries of pursuit planes of modern type (such as the "Aircobra") and of securing to us under all conditions of certain other supplies. It should be born in mind that the "Kittyhawk" planes do not stand the fight against present German pursuits.

It would be well if the United States would in any case secure the following monthly supplies to us: 500 pursuit planes, from 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminum, from 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. In addition, it is essential to secure the delivery within 12 months of 2 million tons of grain (wheat) as well as such quantity as possible of fats, concentrated food and canned meat.

We could import a considerable amount of food via Vladivostok by Soviet ships, provided the United States agree to cede to the USSR at least 20 to 30 ships to reinforce our merchant marine. All of this I already talked over with Mr. Willkie, confident that he will report it to you.

/
As to the situation at the front you certainly know that during the recent months our situation in the South and especially in the region of Stalingrad has worsened due to the fact that we are short of planes, first of all pursuit planes. The Germans proved to have a great reserve of planes. The Germans have in the South at least a two to one superiority in the air which deprives us of the possibility to cover our troops. The experience of the war has shown that the bravest armies become helpless if they are not protected from the blows from the air.

October 7-th, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Litvinov has transmitted the following message to you from Stalin:

"I am in receipt of your message of October 12 and thank you for your communication.

J. Stalin."

H.L.H.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTS

Ambassador Litvinov has transmitted the following message to you from Stalin:

"I am in receipt of your message of October 12 and thank you for your communications."

J. Stalin.

R.L.H.
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED A NOTE FROM MOLOTOV DATED OCT. 19 ADVISING HE HAD TELEGRAPHED THE FOLLOWING TO LITVINOV:

"FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
"I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCT. 16. MY ANSWER HAS BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE FRONT HAVE DIVERTED MY ATTENTION. THE WHOLE BUSINESS NOW ENTIRELY A MATTER OF YOUR CARGOES REACHING THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE TIME STATED."

DISTRIBUTION: REGRADED
ACTION...P1A.
FILE. UNCLASSIFIED
SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (6) NAVREC.)
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED NOTE DATED OCT 28 FROM MOLOTOV STATING HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TRANSMIT STALIN'S ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 24 AS FOLLOWS. QUOTE YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 24 RECEIVED.

I THANK YOU FOR THE INFORMATION UNQUOTE.
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM PREMIER STALIN

Dear Mr. President:

I am very grateful to you for your letter which General Hurley has handed in today. General Hurley and I had a long talk on strategy. It seems to me that he has understood me and is satisfied that the strategy which is now being followed by the Allies is correct. He asked to be allowed to see one of our fronts and, in particular, to go to the Caucasus. He will be afforded an opportunity to do so.

There were no major changes on the Soviet-German front during the last week. We expect to begin our winter campaign in the nearest future. Preparations for it are now going on. I shall keep you informed as to the progress of this campaign.

We here are all highly gratified by the brilliant successes of American and British armed forces in North Africa. Allow me to congratulate you upon this victory. With all my heart I wish you further successes.

With sincere respect,

STALIN

November 14, 1942.
PRIVATE AND SECRET MESSAGE

OF PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Offensive operations in the Stalingrad district have begun in the South and Northwest sectors. The first stage of these offensive operations aims at seizing the Stalingrad-Likhaya railroad line and at destroying the communications of the Stalingrad group of the German troops. In the northeast sector a breach 22 kilometers long has been made in the German front, in the South sector – 12 kilometers long. The progress of the operation is not bad.

November 20, 1942.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE
FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I thank you for your message received by me on November 21. I fully understand your desire to make the present military situation clear to the people of Australia and New Zealand, and the need for your attention to operations in the south-west Pacific.

As regards operations in the Mediterranean, which are developing so favorably, and may influence the whole military situation in Europe, I share your view that appropriate consultations between the Staffs of the United States of America, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. have become desirable.

Greetings and my best wishes for new successes in further offensives.

November 27, 1942.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE
FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

Thank you for your message which I received on November 27. I rejoice at your successes around the Solomon Islands and at the rapid growth of your forces in the south-west part of the Pacific.

Being sure that the Germans will soon be driven out of North Africa, I hope that this will serve the purpose of developing offensive operations of the Allies in Europe. The intensive bombings of Italy planned by you will, of course, be of importance.

In the course of the Stalingrad operations certain successes have been achieved by us, facilitated considerably by snowfall and fogs which prevented the German aviation from fully using its forces.

We have decided to undertake an operation at the central front.

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front as well, in order to prevent the enemy from moving his forces
southward.

Please accept my cordial greetings to yourself and my best
wishes to the American armed forces.

November 28, 1942.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE
FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I received your message on December 5. I welcome the idea of a meeting of the leaders of the Governments of the three countries to determine a common line of military strategy. However, to my great regret, I shall not be able to leave the Soviet Union. I must say that we are having now such a strenuous time that I cannot go away even for a day. Just at this time serious operations of our winter campaign are in the process of developing and in January they will not weaken. It is more likely that the contrary will be the case.

Round Stalingrad, as well as at the central front, the battles are developing. Round Stalingrad we are keeping encircled a group of German troops and hope to finish them off.

December 6 1942.

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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE
OF PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I too must express my deep regret that it is impossible for me to leave the Soviet Union either in the near future or even at the beginning of March. Front business absolutely prevents it, demanding my constant presence near our troops.

So far I do not know what exactly are the problems which you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill intended to discuss at our joint conference. I wonder whether it would not be possible to discuss these problems by way of correspondence between us, as long as there is no chance of arranging our meeting? I admit that there will be no disagreement between us.

Allow me also to express my confidence that the time is not being lost and that the promises about the opening of a second front in Europe given by you, Mr. President, and by Mr. Churchill in regard of 1942 and in any case in regard of the spring of 1943, will be fulfilled, and that a second front in Europe will be actually opened by the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States of America in the spring of the next year.

In view of all sorts of rumors about the attitude of the Union of Soviet

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of Soviet Socialist Republics toward the use made of Darlan and of other men like him, it may not be unnecessary for me to tell you that, in my opinion, as well as in that of my colleagues, Eisenhower's policy with regard to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and others is perfectly correct. I think it a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the waterway of the Allies fighting Hitler. Some time ago I made this known also to Mr. Churchill.

December 14, 1942.
From: Stalin
For: The President
Date: 20 December 1945

I am grateful to you for your readiness to help us. As to Anglo-American air squadrons with personnel, at the moment the necessity of having them sent to Transcaucasia has passed. Now the major battles are and will be developing at the central front and in the Voronesh area. I shall be grateful to you if you expedite the delivery of planes—especially fighter planes—without the personnel which is now extremely necessary to you, to be used in the above mentioned areas.

The peculiar state of Soviet aviation is that we have more than enough fliers but not enough planes.

The President, in his BLACK 4 from Hyde Park, 201554, December, requested that the above message be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of draft reply. See mag POTUS-STALIN, 8 January 1945.
PRIVATE AND MESSAGE OF PREMIER STALIN
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I am very grateful to you for your readiness to help us. As to Anglo-American air-squadrons with personnel, at the present moment the necessity of having them sent to the Transcaucasia has passed. Now the major battles are and will be developing at the central front and in the Voronezh area. I shall be very grateful to you, if you expedite the delivery of planes, especially fighter planes — without the personnel which is now extremely necessary to yourself — to be used in the above-mentioned areas.

The peculiar state of Soviet aviation is that we have more than enough fliers, but not enough planes.

December 18, 1942.

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