OUTGOING
DISPATCHES

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

TO

PREMIER STALIN

JANUARY thru JUNE

1943
8 Jan 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (022325, 082359) Reply to Stalin's 20 Dec 43. Further explanation of POTUS message of 30 Dec 42 concerning planes to Russia, and proposal to send General Marshall and General Bradley to Moscow for visit. (Answered by STALIN-POTUS 15 Jan 43).

9 Jan 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (022228) 200 C-47 transport planes to be assigned to Russia in 1943.


22 Feb 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (222230, 222240) Allied war effort in North Africa and operations against European continent. (Answered STALIN-POTUS 16 Feb 45).


5 May 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (012035) Informs Stalin of Churchill's coming to Washington.

15 May 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (151951) Acknowledgment of Stalin's congratulatory message on liberation of Tunisia. (STALIN-POTUS of 8 May 45, sent in CLEAR).


2 June 1945. ADMIRAL BROWN-ALUSNA, MOSCOW. Instructions for delivery of TRIDENT conference decisions (030600 June, POTUS-STALIN).

2 June 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (030600) Summary of TRIDENT conference decisions.

Also filed under above messages:

26 May 1945. FM-POTUS. (Pencil No. 400) (COPT) PM forwards General Marshall's draft of proposed message to Stalin on decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at TRIDENT conference.

31 May 1945. FM-HOPKINS. (COPT) Request for status of message to Stalin on TRIDENT decisions.

51 May 1945. HOPKINS-FM. (COPT) Advising that modified message to Stalin was sent to General Marshall to be sent via courier to Stalin.
Also filed under POTUS-STALIN 2 June 43 (Continued).

31 May 1943. POTUS-GENERAL MARSHALL. (AGWAR 9238) Amendment and method of delivery to Stalin of message on TRIDENT conference decisions (POTUS-STALIN 030600 June).

2 June 1943. GENERAL MARSHALL-GENERAL McARNET. (W-1802) Churchill's approval of amendment to and delivery of TRIDENT decisions. (Answers AGWAR 9238).

2 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. Informs Stalin that Ambassador Standley will deliver message on TRIDENT decisions.

2 June 1943. POTUS-GENERAL MARSHALL. (Re W-1802, 2 June 1943, MARSHALL-McARNET). POTUS informs Marshall that TRIDENT decisions are being transmitted in code to American Ambassador in Moscow for delivery to Stalin.

4 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (041558) POTUS extends his gratitude for cordial reception of Ambassador Davies.

16 June 1943. POTUS-AMBASSADOR STANLEY. (161652) Ambassador Kerr not to be given dispatch on TRIDENT decisions.

16 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (162258) 5,000 long tons of primary aluminum and 1,000 long tons of secondary aluminum a month to be made available to Russia.

18 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (182230) POTUS informs Stalin that everything possible is being done at this time, and that the shipping situation is tight.

Also filed under above message:

20 June 1943. PM-POTUS. (6582) Copy of PM's message to Stalin, 19 June 43.

26 June 1943. POTUS-STANLEY. (250045) Permission to give British Ambassador copy of TRIDENT decisions. (Answers STANLEY-POTUS 26 June 43).
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

January 8, 1943

From: Cognaw
To: Aliusna, Moscow

From the President to Premier Stalin.

After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East
I am afraid I did not make myself clear.

As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not
practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in
existing organized units.

Our proposal regarding the 100 planes referred to a situation which
would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and
Russia. Under such conditions we calculated that by regrouping our air
units in the Pacific Theater 100 planes in organized units could be
concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their action as well as your
battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in
the Pacific theater.

My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory pro-
tective planning against a possibility only. The immediate action
recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General
Bradley with Soviet officials. Only by such preliminary survey and
advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assis-
tance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia.

I should like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in
the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will
be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able
to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about
planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By P. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
President-Stalin. Page two.
January 8, 1945.

I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.
Meanwhile, I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of
December 30 that General Bradley and his party proceed without delay
to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies.
The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is
beginning to work.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 10:40, EST, January 8, 1945.

CARL STERN
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
Proposed Radio to Premier Stalin

After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East
I am afraid I did not make myself clear.

As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not
practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in
existing organized units.

Our proposal regarding the 100 planes referred to a situation
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[conditions]

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in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will
be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able
to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned
operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I think this
will be very helpful and he will have the latest news. Meanwhile, I would
appreciate an early reply to my proposal of December 27 that General
Bradley and his party proceed without delay to the Far East for survey
and staff discussions.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies.
The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning
to work.

Ravenel
MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

January 8, 1943.

The President requests the attached despatch to Premier Stalin, dated January 8, 1943, be forwarded to you for your information.

Very respectfully,

/s/ W C MOTT

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

1 Inc.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U...

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

This was actually dispatched.
January 8, 1945.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: CPDNY
To: Aluena, Moscow

From the President to Premier Stalin.

In a recent message to you I proposed sending 100 bombardment airplanes to the Far East in the event of war between the Soviet and Japan and at the same time suggested that General Bradley proceed to the Far East Theater in order to make a survey as to the advance preparations which would be necessary in order to insure effective participation of our units promptly on the initiation of hostilities.

After reading your reply I am afraid that I did not make my proposal clear. It was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only. The only immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey to be made by General Bradley in conjunction with Soviet air officials.

I would like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies.

The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EST, January 8, 1945.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. APR 10 1972

BECLASSIFIED
From: The President
To: Premier Stalin.

In a recent message to you I proposed sending 100 bombardment airplanes to the Far East in the event of war between the Soviet and Japan and at the same time suggested that General Bradley proceed to the Far East Theater in order to make a survey as to the advance preparations which would be necessary in order to insure effective participation of our units promptly on the initiation of hostilities.

After reading your reply I am afraid that I did not make my proposal clear. It was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory planning. The only immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey to be made by General Bradley in conjunction with Soviet air officials.

I would like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theatres. I think there will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.

My deep appreciation for the continuing aid of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
January 9, 1943

From: Oppen
To: Alcena, Moscow

TO PREMIER STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE ARRANGED THAT TWO HUNDRED C-47 TRANSPORT PLANES
BE ASSIGNED TO YOU IN 1943 BEGINNING IN JANUARY. YOUR MISSION
HERE IS BEING ADVISED OF THE DATES OF DELIVERY BY MONTHS. I
AM GOING TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GIVE YOU ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED
BUT YOU CAN DEFINITELY COUNT ON THE TWO HUNDRED.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1745, ENT, January 9, 1943.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
January 9, 1943

TELEGRAM

TO: STALIN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE ARRANGED THAT TWO HUNDRED C-47 TRANSPORT PLANES BE ASSIGNED TO YOU IN 1943 BEGINNING IN JANUARY. YOUR MISSION HERE IS BEING ADVISED OF THE DATES OF DELIVERY BY MONTHS. I AM GOING TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GIVE YOU ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED BUT YOU CAN DEFINITELY COUNT ON THE TWO HUNDRED.

ROOSEVELT
January 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

Subject: Operations to be undertaken by American and British Forces in the first nine months of 1943.

Enclosure: Copy of draft telegram.

Attached hereto is a draft telegram from the President and Prime Minister to Premier Stalin as it was revised on the Saturday night prior to departure from Casablanca. I have been told informally that this revision was to be sent to Mr. Stalin over British channels of communications.

DEANE

maf

Distribution: OSS Records
Capt. Royal
Stayback

DECLASSIFIED
JOE letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
JAN 7 1974
DRAFT TELEGRAM

From the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open—

   (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and

   (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. We shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as possible.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. You are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operation which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian Front.
8. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.
From: Coney
To: Aliuna, Moscow.

Personal to Mr. Stalin from the President.

On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history.

For many months, in spite of tremendous losses in men, supplies, transportation and territory, the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus, and finally, at the immortal battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory, and especially in morale.

Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training, and above all, the determination to defeat the enemy, no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice.

At the same time, I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs, and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice.

The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler Forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the

lasting admiration of the people of the United States.

ROOSEVELT

The 70th anniversary date of the Red Army in February 1945. However, thieves in certain high places in Washington will never rationalize the time of transition in arms consideration, it seems to be necessary that the services go forward today on a much broader. Attached is a proposed draft.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1740, WHT, February 22, 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

February 22, 1943

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

For many months, no sign of transmittal of supplies, transportation and equipment to the Red Army had been received.

The real anniversary date of the Red Army is February 23rd. However, Moscow is seven hours ahead of Washington. Therefore, when the time of transmittal is also considered, it seems to be necessary that the message go forward today on a rush basis. Attached is a proposed draft.

Your achievement can only be accomplished by an army that has excellent training, and furthermore, an army that has an esprit de corps... At the same time, I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people and their great army, and upon whom it is dependent.

Attachment I

The Red Army and the Russian people were already started on the road to victory a year and have earned the respect of the world, and the world, in the coming years, will be able to go forward with the greatest of the world. 

J. H. BURNS
Major General, U. S. Army
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN.

On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history.

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The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler Forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of the people of the United States.

Released on 17 April 1943.
From: The Prime Minister  
To: The President  

No: 263, 10 February 1943

I send you the message I have sent to Joe as amended in accordance with your wishes.

"Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin most secret and personal. Your message of 30 January. I have now consulted the President and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on both sides of the ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both as follows:

"(a) There are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier.

"(b) When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia, and wearing down the German Air Force; this is to be closely followed by an operation in the eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese.

"(c) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of 3 or 400,000 men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established.

"(d) We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross channel operation in August, in which both British and United States units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the channel at that time.

"(e) Both the operations will be supported by very large United States and British Air Forces, and that across the channel by the whole Metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Britain and the United States.

"(f) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined Chiefs of Staff the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible."

I send you also a telegram I have had from him about Turkey, and the consequential message I have sent to Inoue after a long talk with Maisky who urged it. Perhaps you can emphasize it through your channels.

R. H. Parks

[Image of building]
I hope we may be more successful in making this marriage than the other.

"Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill personal and secret.

"I received your messages concerning the Turkish question on the 2nd and 3rd February. Many thanks for information on your talks with the leading Turkish personalities in Adana.

"In connection with your suggestion that the Turks would reciprocate any friendly gesture from the Soviet Union I would like to mention that we have already made a number of statements, the friendly character of which is well known to the British Government, some months before the Soviet German war as well as after its beginning. However the Turks did not react to our steps. Apparently they were afraid to incur the wrath of the Germans. I am afraid that a similar reception will be accorded to the gesture suggested by you.

"The international position of Turkey remains very delicate. On the one hand Turkey has the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with the USSR and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against Aggression with Great Britain, on the other hand she has the Treaty of Friendship with Germany signed 3 days before the German attack against the USSR. It is not clear to me how in the present circumstances Turkey thinks to combine her obligations vis-a-vis the USSR and Great Britain with her obligations vis-a-vis Germany. Still if Turkey wishes to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate let her say so. In this case the Soviet Union would be willing to meet Turkey half way.

"Of course I have no objection against you making a statement that I was kept informed on the Anglo-Turkish meeting although I cannot say that the information was very full.

"I wish the First and the Eighth Armies as well as the American troops in North Africa every success in the coming offensive and a speedy expulsion of the German-Italian forces from the African soil.

"Let me thank you for your friendly congratulations on the surrender of the Field Marshal Paulus and on the successful annihilation of the encircled enemy troops near Stalingrad."

"Prime Minister to Monsieur Saracoğlu.

"For President Inonu, personal and secret.

"I told Premier Stalin about our talks, and have described to him the Turkish desire for closer understanding with the Soviet Union.

In reply Premier Stalin has recalled a number of statements of a friendly character towards Turkey which have been made by the Soviet Government in recent years. None the less Monsieur Stalin tells me [REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972]
that if it is the wish of Turkey to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate, then the Soviet Government is willing to meet the Turkish Government half way and would welcome any suggestions that the Turkish Government could make to improve relations between the 2 countries.

"In these conditions it seems to me of first importance that you should carefully consider the nature of the arrangements which would best contribute to the growth of confidence between Turkey and the Soviet Union. If you feel able to formulate these I feel sure that Premier Stalin would be ready to give them close and sympathetic examination. You will know that my good offices are always available to promote the successful outcome of any negotiations between our Turkish and Soviet Allies.

"I feel most strongly that this is a very fine opportunity. I cannot conceal my desire for a warm renewal of friendship between Russia and Turkey similar to that achieved by Mustapha Kemal. Thus Turkey while increasing her own defences would stand between two victorious friends. In all this I am thinking not only of the war, but of the post war period. Tell me if there is anything I can do."

Your number 257 . . . . .
February 22, 1943.

From: [Redacted]
To: Alusza, Moscow

Personal and [Redacted] from the President to Mr. Stalin.

I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th. (Copy attached)

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines and made the fields and mountains impassable.

I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible moment successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output of ships to improve our transportation.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities permit.

[Redacted]

...can be provided by our maximum effort.

We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1730, EWT, February 22, 1943.

CHESTER HAMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10, 1972
FROM: The President

TO: Mr. Stalin

I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th.

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies en route from our landing ports to the front lines and made the fields and mountains impassable. I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible moment successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

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I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.

Roosevelt
PRESIDENT TO STALIN

February 19, 1943.

In reply to your message of February 16, I wish to extend on behalf of the government and people of the United States, our heartiest congratulations on the splendid success your troops are attaining in the present offensive. We follow the day to day accounts with the keenest interest and highest hopes for the continued success of the Russian armies.

In answer to the questions you raise with respect to Mr. Churchill's message of February 12, I want to state that the only thing that prevents our pushing the offensive in Tunisia to a successful conclusion are matters over which we have no control. The most important of these are unexpected weather conditions. The conditions, especially in northern Tunisia where we had planned to make our drive, have been such as to preclude any movements except on roads. This is reported to be the rainiest winter in that area for many years.

We are fully aware of the importance of exerting the maximum pressure upon the Axis at this particular time, but we would have you remember that all the Anglo-American forces with which to exert pressure have to be transported and maintained over long and exposed sea lanes. Moreover at this season of the year the condition of the ground in the Tunis-Bizerte Area preclude large scale operations.

As to the opening of the second front in Europe, it is true that we will be unable to accomplish much until late summer. This is due solely to shipping and escort vessel limitations. We are using a considerable portion of our shipping and escort vessels, both British and American, to send supplies to you. This we have done with
the full knowledge that it would affect the transportation overseas of our own forces.

In Tunisia our ground operations are as I have already stated - restricted in scope at present. In the air, a different condition exists. Our planes are seeking out the German air force at every opportunity and their losses since the 1st of January have been more than double ours. The air force is being built up as rapidly as possible in North Africa in order to provide for a constant increase in the intensity of these operations. From England, British and American bombers are striking at the Axis on every occasion the weather permits. The highest possible scale of attack is maintained. That these attacks are bringing results is indicated by the fact that a considerable portion of the German air force is now maintained in Western Europe to combat our attacks.

The most reliable information we have indicates that the Germans have poured troops into North Africa to the limit of their capabilities, and that the air battle now going on there as well as in Western Europe has resulted in the use of at least 50 percent of his air forces against Anglo-American operations.

We will push the Tunisian campaign and follow it up with the Sicilian operation at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile to the limit of available ocean shipping we will prepare for a landing on the continent.
SECRET

February 18, 1945.

Signature -

I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th.

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the expected schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines.

I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible date successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output of ships to improve our transportation.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that as I am convinced the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We are making every possible effort in North Africa. You of course are informed of our present difficulties in Africa which I believe will be rapidly cleared up as soon as improved weather conditions make the roads passable for troops and supply trains.

We hope that the astonishing success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.
From: [Name]  
To: [Name], Moscow.

Personal and [redacted] from the President for Mr. Stalin.

Your telegram was received by me while on my inspection trip out West. Your problem is well understood by me but I do hope that in this present situation you can find means to label your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government-in-exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.

In my opinion Sikorski has in no way acted with the Hitler gang but instead he has made a mistake in taking up this particular matter with the International Red Cross. Also, Churchill will find ways and means, I am inclined to think, of getting the Polish Government in London to act in the future with more common sense.

If I can help in any way, please let me know, particularly with reference to looking after any Poles which you may desire to send out of the Soviet Union.

In the United States, incidentally, I have several million Poles, a great many of them being in the Navy and Army. All of them are bitter against the Nazis, and the situation would not be helped by the knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between yourself and Sikorski.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]

Released from the White House Map Room at 3:30, 1943.

[Signature]

Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.

[Signature]

RECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Stalin's message of 21 April 1943 was sent by the Map Room to the President on 24 April 1943 as GREEN 47 when he was on his trip to Monterrey, Mexico. The President prepared a draft reply, which he sent through the Map Room on 26 April 1943 to Secretary Hull for his opinion:

"RED 16, 26 April 1943.

"Ask Map Room please to show you long telegram from Churchill to me dated 25th (PM-POTUS #264).

"I suggest I send the following to Stalin together with a copy thereof to Churchill:

"Mr. Stalin, Moscow.

"I have received your telegram while on my Western inspection trip. I can well understand your problem but I hope in present situation you can find means to label your action as a suspension of conversation with the Polish Government in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.

"It is my view that Sikorski has not acted in any way with Hitler gang, but rather that he made a stupid mistake in taking the matter up with the International Red Cross. Also I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the future.

"Let me know if I can help in any way, especially in regard to looking after any Poles you may desire to send out of Russia.

"Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, very many of them in the Army and Navy. They are all bitter against the Nazis and knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski would not help the situation. Signed Roosevelt.""

"If you approve the above, have my Map Room send it, together with a copy to Churchill."

The Secretary of State approved the draft in the following memorandum to Lt. Colonel Hammond (original filed with RED #16):
"April 26, 1943
1:15 p.m.

"MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHESTER HAMMOND:

"Complying with your request, this is to confirm that the President's suggested message (April 26) to Mr. Stalin meets with Secretary Hull's approval after the elimination of the word 'stupid' appearing in the second paragraph.

"It is understood that a copy of the President's message to Mr. Stalin is being transmitted to Prime Minister Churchill.

"George Ranchard"

The message was sent to Stalin on 26 April 1943, and to the Prime Minister as POTUS #274, 26 April 1943."
May 5, 1943,

PRIORITY

From: Ovnav

To: Alusyn, Moscow.

Personal and secret for Mr. Stalin from the President.

I want you to know that Mr. Churchill is coming to Washington next week to discuss our immediate next steps. We will of course keep General Belyayev currently informed.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EWT, May 5, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aides.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 197
Mr. State,

I want you to know that Mr. Churchill is coming to Washington next week to discuss our immediate affairs. We will of course keep General 13 currently informed.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
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<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
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<tr>
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<td>FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT. CDR. GARTh) 070730 - NCR 1376
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME OCT TEXT

OPNAV 06234.

DISTRIBUTION:
NAVY ACTION
FILE

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOCS
0322/68 (6/22/68)

DATE 8-19-71

RNP

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (c) NAVREG.)

070730
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

May 13, 1943.

From: Oppen
To: Alsina, Moscow.

Personal and secret from the President to Mr. Stalin.

Thank you for your message of congratulation on the performance of our forces in liberating Tunisia.

Now that we have the initiative it is reasonable to expect further successes on both the eastern and the western fronts, and also further supplies including air.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1040, EWT, May 13, 1943.

George W. Halsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.
May 13, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO STALIN:

Thank you for your message of congratulation on the performance of our forces in liberating Tunisia.

Now that we have the initiative it is reasonable to expect further successes on both the eastern and the western fronts, and also further supplies including air.

[Signature]

[Address]

[City]
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SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 of NAVPERS 141001.)

1/100y. Pres. att. l. l.
May 18, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alcena, Moscow

Personal and - from the President to Premier Stalin.

I know that you will be happy to learn that the following are the American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa from December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943:

Total personnel losses: 625,000.

Total tank losses: not less than 2,100.

Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,596 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, and 4,499 damaged.

Total merchant shipping losses: 625 ships totalling 2,200,000 tons sunk, and 371 ships totalling 1,600,000 tons damaged.

American estimate of Italian losses in East Africa:

Exclusive of natives, Italian losses in East Africa were approximately 150,000.

These figures agree substantially with British estimates except for personnel losses, in which their estimate is somewhat lower than ours.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1900, EST, May 18, 1943.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 1 1972

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.
Proposed to Premier Stalin:

To: Premier Stalin.
From: President Roosevelt.

I know that you will be happy to learn that the following are the American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa from December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943:

Total personnel losses: 626,000.

Total tank losses: not less than 2,100.

Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,696 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, and 4,499 damaged.

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Exclusive of natives, Italian losses in East Africa were approximately 150,000.

These figures agree substantially with British estimates except for personnel losses, in which their estimate is somewhat lower than ours.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
YOUR 182341
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alcina, Moscow

This dispatch from Adm. Brown, Naval Aide to President.

My immediately following messages are for Stalin from Roosevelt
and Churchill. They are most secret and should be decoded and seen
by no one except Duncan, a decoder appointed by him, and Ambassador
Standley. Delivery should be effected by Ambassador Standley direct
to Stalin. This is a specific exception to method outlined your
130900 of last October. Messages should be carefully but closely
paraphrased before delivery to Stalin and acknowledgment of delivery
made.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1310, EWT, June 2, 1943.

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 1 0 1 9 7 2
June 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, Moscow

Personal and [Redacted] from the President to Premier Stalin.

I am sending you through Ambassador Standley the recently approved decisions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff. These decisions have the joint approval of both Mr. Churchill and myself. In view of their extremely secret nature I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1110, EST, June 2, 1943.

[Redacted]

N. C. MOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1982
June 2, 1942.

From: Cvnay
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and confidential from the President to Premier Stalin.

1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

   (a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace, the security of our overseas lines of communication, and to employ every practicable means to support Russia.

   (b) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

   (c) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.

   (d) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

   (e) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long-range aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.
With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows:

(a) To intensify the present air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. This was for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past three weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States' heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,150 September 30, and 2,500 April 1. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing.

(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of MEDITAN, (viz the assault on Sicily,) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be
referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-west Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, June 2, 1943.

W. C. Mott
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.
Pencil No. 400

PRESENT ARRIVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Russia. C.I.O.S. and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.O.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Minister's) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me.

(Inset statement)

22, 5, 43

(REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972)

(Original filed with AEN Jan 294.)
1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of communication.

(b) Next in priority to employ every practicable means to support Russia.

(c) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

(d) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power.

(e) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(f) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long range aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore, increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.
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(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY, (via the assault on Sicily,) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be
referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

5. We have found that undertakings listed utilize our full resources.

We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

26. 5. 43 "G.C.M."
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

31 May 1943

For General Marshall from the President. Urgent and [redacted].

DESPATCH FOR STALIN APPROVED WITH FOLLOWING AMENDMENT: STRIKE OUT UNDER B FOLLOWING WORDS, QUOTE M.PRIORITY UNQUOTE, AND INCLUDE A AND B AS ONE PRIORITY STOP IN ORDER TO PROTECT SECURITY SUGGEST YOU WRITE STALIN TELLING HIM YOU ARE SENDING COURIER BY AIR TO DELIVER MESSAGE TO HIM IN MOSCOW OR HIS AGENT AT SOME CONVENIENT PLACE. YOU MAY STATE THAT YOUR MESSAGE WAS MY APPROVAL AS WELL AS CHURCHILL'S.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1418 EWT by

[Signature]

F. H. GRAHAM
2d Lt., AID
Watch Officer

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
Urgent for immediate delivery to Cabby for his eyes only from Bitty. Despatch for Stalin approved with following amendment: Strike out under B following words "H priority", and include A and B as all priority. In order to protect security suggest you are Stalin telling him you are sending courier by air to deliver message to him in Moscow or his agent at some convenient place. You may state that your message has my approval as well as agent's.

Prime Minister

ORIGINATOR: SGS
INFORMATION: OPD

EYES ONLY
Secretary, General Staff
May 31, 1943

FREEDOM, ALGIERS
Number 9238

President Marshall

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By E. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

CN-OUT-13094 (31 May 43) 1853Z med

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
31 May 1943

COPY
From: London
To: Mr. Harry Hopkins
No number. Filed 31/18092

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal and most secret. Reference pencil number 400. [See 26 May 43" filed herein.]

I should be glad to know as soon as possible position about message to Joe. Has it been sent?

I wish you were here with me to enjoy the sunshine and cool breeze.

Prime

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

Original filed “100 Hopkins.” SECRET
COPY 1
COPY

From: War Department
To: General Eisenhower, Algiers
No: FREEDOM #2255, 31 May 1943

Your message to me dated May 31 reference pencil number 400.
(From Mr. Hopkins for General Eisenhower to pass to Prime Minister
Churchill.) Modified message to Joe has been sent to General Marshall
for him to send to Stalin by courier in interest of security. Suggest
you get copy of message from Marshall.

Harry Hopkins
June 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached message refers to the delivery of the message containing the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Premier Stalin.

This message was received in reply to the message sent by the President to General Marshall on May 31, 1945, a copy of which is attached.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER MAHONED,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incis.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY
URGENT

TO SEXTON SECRETARY OF GENERAL STAFF FOR HIS EYES ONLY SIGNED EISENHOWER

From: AFBQ in North Africa
To: War
No. W1802 June 2, 1943
Declassified By Authority of JCS

LETTER 7-5-43
By RT Date DEC 30 1972

Take at once to Sexton Secretary General Staff for his eyes only this message from Richmond (signed Eisenhower's aide Palmer). ADC asks that MAGIC be given high priority in sending all copies of his message to Sexton. Reference MAGIC 9233 from CAMO to HUNGA querying if MAGIC agrees to amendment. He is concerned over delay in delivery and proposes that message should be sent through MAGIC and or DRINK in same way as other secret telegrams. He hopes covering note of transmittal will bear signatures of BIDDLE and him.

Underlined Staff Plenum

This all refers to message drafted on plane by me in lieu of SCRUB proposal and returned by AGMA direct to APPLE recommending acceptance and proposing note of transmittal. This matter is highly important and URGENT.

Cordially,

Dick Palmer

Saw CRIPS troops today and will visit AGMA SYLAW and others tomorrow. Another meeting Thursday and will probably depart MAGIC Friday arriving in LA Sunday or Monday. Details probably not available until Thursday but will send then.

Declassified

9233 is CH-OUT-11094 (51 N Y 43) 808
Action: SOG
Information: OPD
CH-IN-817 (2 June 43) 0537E mc

COPY 2

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War
No. W1802 June 2, 1943.

Sexton from Richmond for McNarney from Marshall.

Reference AGWAR 9238 from Roosevelt to Marshall regarding Stalin.

Churchill agrees to amendment. He is concerned over delay in delivery and proposes that message should be sent through United States and/or British Ambassador in same way as other secret telegrams. He hopes covering note of transmittal will bear signatures of Roosevelt and him.

This all refers to message drafted on plane by me in lieu of Combined Staff Planners proposal and returned by Churchill direct to Roosevelt recommending acceptance and proposing note of transmittal. This matter is highly important and urgent.

Saw Anderson's troops today and will visit Clark, Patton and others tomorrow. Another meeting Thursday and will probably depart Algiers Friday arriving Washington Sunday or Monday. Details probably not available until Thursday but will send them then.
June 2, 1943.

From: The President.
To: General Marshall. (Algiers)

Reference your W1802, June 2, 1943, to McNarney.

Please inform Prime Minister Churchill that the message containing decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff has been sent to Stalin together with suggested covering note of transmittal in code through the American Ambassador in Moscow but with reluctance because of the ever present danger of the code's being broken.

Roosevelt.

[Signature]

Released from the White House Map Room at 1500, EWT, June 2, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: H. J. Stewart Date: APR 10 1972

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 4, 1943.

From: Cptav
To: Aluena, Moscow.

Personal and from the President for Marshal Stalin.

I am very grateful to you for your courtesy extended to my
government and me in your cordial reception of Ambassador Davies.
He has returned safely, bearing your letter. I am very happy
that you and I are in complete agreement in principle on all the
matters contained in your letter and I will await your further
communication in accordance with your letter and your understanding
with Mr. Davies.

My warm personal regards, with my kind remembrances also to

Mr. Brown,
(l.c. Mr. Telester)

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 11:50, EWT, June 4, 1943.

McMort
W. C. NOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER: ALUSNA-MOSCOW

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSES: US NAVCOM

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

US NAVCOM

WASHINGTON D.C.

RELEASED BY: June 6, 1943

DATE: 1513

TOR CODE ROOM

DECODED BY: DELANNOY

INFORMATION

PARAPHRASED BY

LT COMOR KELLY

NCR 5660

US NAVCOM

WASHINGTON D.C.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORGANIZATION FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

OCT

TEXT

RDO WASHINGTON 41558

*NCR 2350

NOTE: CONTACTED MAP ROOM AT 1520/4TH

DECLARED

DUO

CWR 5000.0 8/24/48

NAV-AIDE...ACT

FILE.....

Date: 8-19-71

Signature: RNP

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVREC.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 June 1943

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna Moscow

Personal and from the President to Ambassador Standley. Your 140910.

In view of the extreme secrecy of my 030600 I do not consider it advisable to give or show a copy of this dispatch to Ambassador Kerr unless requested by his government.

Roosevelt

Released from Map Room
1215 June 16, 1943

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

151652 -
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow.

Personal and [redacted] from the President to Ambassador Standley. Your 140910.

In view of the extreme secrecy of the future military operations mentioned in my 030600 I do not consider it advisable to give or show a copy of this dispatch to Ambassador Kerr. [redacted] requested by

Roosevelt

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Lt. nr. Stewart Date APR 10 1972
From: Opanav
To: Alissma Moscow

Secret and Personal from the President to Marshal Stalin.

In addition to our new protocol agreement I have directed that six hundred additional fighters be sent to you during the balance of 1943. They are P-40-E type of fighter which we fought very successfully in Tunisia. This is the most maneuverable fighter we have. It provides our best protection against dive bombers and gives excellent protection to the ground strafing of the P-39's.

I have also directed the shipment of seventy eight additional B-25's during the same period. In November the airplane situation will be again reviewed and we will then inform you what the shipping schedule of the last half of the protocol year will be.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at the White House Map Room
1025, June 16, 1943.

By: E. M. House
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.A.
Assistant to Naval Aide to the President.
June 16, 1943.

From: The President
To: Marshal Stalin

I have directed, in addition to our new protocol agreement, that during the balance of 1943 600 additional fighters be sent to you. They are the type of fighter (P-40-K) which we fought in Tunisia very successfully. It is the most maneuverable fighter we have. It gives excellent protection to the P-39's ground strafing and provides our best protection against dive bombers.

In addition I have also directed that 78 additional B-25's be shipped during the same period. The airplane situation will be again reviewed in November and you will be informed at that time of the shipping schedule of the second half of the protocol year.

Roosevelt
JUNE 16, 1943

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN

IN ADDITION TO OUR NEW PROTOCOL AGREEMENT
I HAVE DIRECTED THAT SIX HUNDRED ADDITIONAL
FIGHTERS BE SENT TO YOU DURING THE BALANCE OF
1943. THEY ARE P-40-N TYPE OF FIGHTER WHICH
WE FOUGHT VERY SUCCESSFULLY IN TUNISIA. THIS
IS THE MOST MANEUVERABLE FIGHTER WE HAVE. IT
PROVIDES OUR BEST PROTECTION AGAINST DIVE BOMBERS
AND GIVES EXCELLENT PROTECTION TO THE GROUND
STRAFING OF THE P-39'S.

I HAVE ALSO DIRECTED THE SHIPMENT OF SEVENTY-
EIGHT ADDITIONAL B-25'S DURING THE SAME PERIOD.
IN NOVEMBER THE AIRPLANE SITUATION WILL BE AGAIN
REVIEWED AND WE WILL THEN INFORM YOU WHAT THE
SHIPPING SCHEDULE OF THE LAST HALF OF THE PROTOCOL
YEAR WILL BE.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I talked to General Arnold this morning about this. He told me these planes are not wanted by the navy.

General Arnold told me you could assume his memo has the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would not be opposed by the British.

I, therefore, suggest that the attached wire be sent.

H.L.E.

encl.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A review of our requirements, commitments, and production prospects for the last half of 1943 leads to the conclusion that we may undertake to obligate for U.S.S.R. 600 P-40N fighter airplanes in addition to P-39's currently scheduled and an additional 78 B-25G medium bombers for 1943 delivery.

We have a model change due in the Bell-Buffalo plant this fall (from P-39 to P-63). In view of the delay in production which always attends a model change, I feel that it would be unwise to increase the commitment of P-39's to the U.S.S.R. beyond the 250 per month for which we are already obligated.

Curtiss-Buffalo production of the P-40N promises to remain fairly stable during the last half of 1943. Our combat experience in Tunisia has demonstrated that the P-40N is the most maneuverable fighter we have. The P-40N will provide to the U.S.S.R. an excellent protection against dive bombers, and a very satisfactory fighter cover for the ground strafing P-39's.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL H.H. ARNOLD

I wish you would give careful consideration to giving some more P-39 planes to Russia, over and above the Protocol.

It seems to me that from the point of view of carrying out our strategic concept of the war we should do everything possible to strengthen Russia this summer. Airplanes is the quickest and best way.

I understand that we are giving something like 150 P-39s to the British each month. Would it not be possible to postpone the British allotment and give the Russians those 150 planes each month for a few months; or, if that is not possible, replace the P-39s for the British with another type of fighter?

It is possible the Russians would take P-40s if they are available.

I hope you can give them some more B-25s.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972
June 16, 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and [name redacted] from the President to Stalin.

In response to your special request it has been decided to make available to your country from the production of the United States and Canada during July, August, and September five thousand long tons per month of primary aluminum and one thousand long tons of high grade secondary aluminum of the type we ourselves are using in aircraft manufacture. Because of the possible shortage of primary aluminum, it is not possible at this time to agree to increase the offer contained in the Third Protocol and it may therefore be necessary to curtail shipments during succeeding months to the extent that shipments of primary aluminum only exceed the four thousand long tons per month scheduled in the Protocol, although I hope this will not be necessary. The secondary aluminum is in addition to the Protocol offering. We will review the situation again within the next two months and let you know the shipping schedule during the last quarter of the calendar year and, if possible, for the balance of the Protocol year.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1045 June 16, 1943.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Attached is another cable to
Stalin.

This is the best I can get
out of the EPB but I think it
means a substantial increase in
aluminum to Russia.

H.L.H.

encl.
JUNE 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SPECIAL REQUEST IT HAS BEEN
DECIDED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOUR COUNTRY FROM THE
PRODUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA DURING JULY
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER FIVE THOUSAND LONG TONS PER MONTH
OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM AND ONE THOUSAND LONG TONS OF HIGH
GRADE SECONDARY ALUMINUM OF THE TYPE WE OURSELVES ARE
USING IN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE. BECAUSE OF THE
SHORTAGE OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS
TIME TO AGREE TO INCREASE THE OFFER CONTAINED IN THE THIRD
PROTOCOL AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO CURTAIL SHIP-
MENTS DURING SUCCEEDING MONTHS TO THE EXTENT THAT SHIPMENTS
OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM ONLY EXCEED THE FOUR THOUSAND LONG TONS
PER MONTH SCHEDULED IN THE PROTOCOL, ALTHOUGH I HOPE THIS WILL
NOT BE NECESSARY. THE SECONDARY ALUMINUM IS IN ADDITION TO
THE PROTOCOL OFFERING. WE WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION AGAIN
WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND LET YOU KNOW THE SHIPPING
SCHEDULE DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF THE CALENDAR YEAR AND,
IF POSSIBLE, FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PROTOCOL YEAR.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 7, 1972
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

TEXT

YOUR 162258 AND 162259

NAVAL TO PRES.....ACT

FILE......

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.3 (9/27/69)

Date: APR 7 1972

Signature: [Signature]

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 322. I send you the telegram to Stalin in the final form in which it went:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, personal and secret.

1. I have received a copy of your telegram of about 11th June to the President. I quite understand your disappointment but I am sure we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is physically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia if we threw away 100,000 men in a disastrous cross-channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present conditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all my expert military advisers, we should, even if we got ashore, be driven into the sea, as the Germans have forces already in France superior to any we could put there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies. It might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross-channel attack which I believed would lead only to useless massacre.

2. The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not by losing them. This we have done in Tunisia, where the long arm of British and United States sea power has reached across the Atlantic and 10,000 miles around the Cape and helped us to annihilate great Axis land and air forces. The threat immediately resulting to the whole Axis defensive system in the Mediterranean has already forced the Germans to reinforce Italy, the Mediterranean Islands, the Balkans and Southern France with land and air forces. It is my earnest and sober hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, and by doing so we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means open. The great attack that is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Port Said inclusive. After Italy has been forced out of the war, the Germans will have to occupy the Riviera, make a new front either on the Alps or the Po, and above all provide for the replacement of the 32 Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish participation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bombing of the Romanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale.
already we are holding in the west and south of Europe the larger part of
the German air forces and our superiority will increase continually.
Out of a first line operational strength of between 4800 and 4900
aircraft, Germany, according to our information, has today on the Russian
front some 2,000 compared with some 2,600 this time last year. We are
also ruining a large part of the cities and munitions centers of Germany,
which may well have a decisive effect by sapping German resistance on all
fronts. By this coming autumn this great air offensive should have pro-
duced a massive return. If the favourable trend of the anti-U-boat
warfare of the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the
movement of the United States forces to Europe which is being pressed to
the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tribute
than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the
common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have
lately given to the exertions of your two western allies. It is my firm
belief that we shall present you before the end of the year with results
which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction.

"5. I have never asked you for detailed information about the
strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been,
and are still, bearing the brunt on land. I should however be glad to
have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the
Russian front and whether you think a German attack is imminent. We
are already again in the middle of June and no attack has been launched.
We have some reason to believe that the unexpectedly rapid defeat of the
Axis forces in North Africa has dislocated German strategy, and that the
consequent threat to southern Europe has been an important factor in
cauling Hitler to hesitate and to delay his plans for a large scale
offensive against Russia this summer. It is no doubt too soon to pro-
nounce decidedly on all this, but we should be very glad to hear what
you think about it.

"4. At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not
been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons
which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whither
we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to re-
linquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious
campaign. Nevertheless the need and advantages of a meeting are very
great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you
and the President may agree upon. I and my advisers believe that Soapa
Flows, our main naval harbour in the north of Scotland would be the most
convenient, the safest and if secrecy be desired probably the most secret.
I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there
by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement
would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome
from your British and American comrades.

PRIME
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 18, 1943.

From: OPNAV
To: ALUSNA, Moscow.

Personal and from the President to Marshal Stalin.

As I was away when your message came, I am a few days late in answering it. I am in full accord with what the Prime Minister telegraphed you. I assure you that we are really doing everything that is possible at this time.

I trust you will appreciate that our shipping situation is still tight, though we are cheered by the progress of our campaign against the submarines for the past two months, giving us a good net gain in shipping available.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1730, EDT, June 18, 1943.

CHESTER HAYGOOD,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972
June 18, 1943

TO: MARSHAL STALIN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I am a few days late in answering your message as I was away when it came. I fully subscribe to what Mr. Churchill telegraphed you and I want to assure you that at this time we are really doing everything that is possible. I hope you will understand that the shipping situation is still tight, though we have been greatly encouraged by the better progress of our anti-submarine campaign during the last two months which shows us a good net gain in available ships.

ROOSEVELT

March 1, 1943, from the President at Hyde Park to the War Rooms. Sent to Prime Minister on 20th June 1943.

Paraphrased and sent to Aliena, Moscow.
RADIO WASHINGTON 101745.*

* THIS IS REENGIPHERMENT RADIO WASHINGTON 182236 NCR 5159.*
FROM:  OPNAV
TO:  ALUSNA MOSCOW

Personal and [Redacted] from the President to Ambassador Standley.

Your 240908 affirmative.

Roosevelt

25 June 1943

Released from the White House Map Room
2020 ENT 24 June 1943

OGDEN NIXON
Captain GE

RECLASSIFIED:
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: APR 7 1972

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