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MAP ROOM PAPERS

Box 8

Roosevelt to Stalin

January - June, 1943

OUTGOING
DISPATCHES

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
TO
PREMIER STALIN

JANUARY thru JUNE
1948

8 Jan 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (082350, 082359) Reply to Stalin's 20 Dec 42. Further explanation of POTUS message of 30 Dec 42 concerning planes to Russia, and proposal to send General Marshall and General Bradley to Moscow for visit. (Answered by STALIN-POTUS 13 Jan 45).

9 Jan 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (092232) 200 C-47 transport planes to be assigned to Russia in 1945.

5 Dec 1945. S

22 Feb 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (222230) Sent in CLEAR. Congratulations to Red Army on 25th Anniversary. (Answered by STALIN-POTUS 24 Feb 45).

22 Feb 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (222210, 222240) Allied war effort in North Africa and operations against European continent. (Answers STALIN-POTUS 16 Feb 45).

26 Apr 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (261738, 261751) Severance of diplomatic relations between Soviets and Polish Government-in-exile over Smolensk mass execution. (Answers STALIN-POTUS 21 Apr 45; answered by STALIN-POTUS 29 Apr 45).

5 May 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (052034) Informs Stalin of Churchill's coming to Washington.

15 May 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (151951) Acknowledgment of Stalin's congratulatory message on liberation of Tunisia. (STALIN-POTUS of 8 May 45, sent in CLEAR).

18 May 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (182341) American estimate of Axis losses in North Africa from 8 Dec 1940 to 12 May 1945.

2 June 1945. ADMIRAL BROWN-ALUSNA, MOSCOW. Instructions for delivery of TRIDENT conference decisions (030600 June, POTUS-STALIN).

2 June 1945. POTUS-STALIN. (030600) Summary of TRIDENT conference decisions.

Also filed under above message:

25 May 1945. PM-POTUS. (Penail No. 400) (COPY) PM forwards General Marshall's draft of proposed message to Stalin on decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at TRIDENT conference.

31 May 1945. PM-HOPKINS. (COPY) Request for status of message to Stalin on TRIDENT decisions.

31 May 1945. HOPKINS-PM. (COPY) Advising that modified message to Stalin was sent to General Marshall to be sent via courier to Stalin.

Also filed under POTUS-STALIN 2 June 43 (Continued).

31 May 1943. POTUS-GENERAL MARSHALL. (AGWAR 9238) Amendment and method of delivery to Stalin of message on TRIDENT conference decisions (POTUS-STALIN 030600 June).

2 June 1943. GENERAL MARSHALL-GENERAL McHARNEY. (W-1802) Churchill's approval of amendment to and delivery of TRIDENT decisions. (Answers AGWAR 9238).

2 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. Informs Stalin that Ambassador Standley will deliver message on TRIDENT decisions.

2 June 1943. POTUS-GENERAL MARSHALL. (Re W-1802, 2 June 1943, MARSHALL-McHARNEY). POTUS informs Marshall that TRIDENT decisions are being transmitted in code to American Ambassador in Moscow for delivery to Stalin.

4 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (041858) POTUS extends his gratitude for cordial reception of Ambassador Davies.

16 June 1943. POTUS-AMBASSADOR STANDLEY. (161652) Ambassador Kerr not to be given dispatch on TRIDENT decisions.

16 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (162258) 5,000 long tons of primary aluminum and 1,000 long tons of secondary aluminum a month to be made available to Russia.

18 June 1943. POTUS-STALIN. (182230) POTUS informs Stalin that everything possible is being done at this time, and that the shipping situation is tight.

Also filed under above message:

20 June 1943. FM-POTUS. (#522) Copy of FM's message to Stalin, 19 June 43.

25 June 1943. POTUS-STANDLEY. (250045) Permission to give British Ambassador copy of TRIDENT decisions. (Answers STANDLEY-POTUS 24 June 43).

00
January 8, 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: OpNAV
To : Alusna, Moscow

From the President to Premier Stalin.

After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East I am afraid I did not make myself clear.

As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in existing organized units.

Our proposal regarding the 100 planes referred to a situation which would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and Russia. Under such conditions we calculated that by regrouping our air units in the Pacific Theater 100 planes in organized units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific theater.

My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only. The immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General Bradley with Soviet officials. Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia.

I should like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I

COPY TO GEN. DEANE FOR JOHN CHASE OF STAFF,
COPY TO GEN. WHEATLEY

092350 NCR 2974
092359 NCR 2975

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

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~~SECRET~~
President-Stalin. Page two.
January 8, 1945.

think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.
Meanwhile, I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of
December 30 that General Bradley and his party proceed without delay
to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies.
The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is
beginning to work.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1640, ENT, January 8, 1945.


CHESTER HAMFORD
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~
1
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

00

Proposed Radio to Premier Stalin

After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East

I am afraid I did not make myself clear.

As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in existing organized units.

Our proposal regarding the 100 planes referred to a situation *which would occur if* ~~hostilities~~ *actually break out* between Japan and Russia. Under *these* *to break* ~~these~~ conditions we calculated that by regrouping our air units in the Pacific Theater 100 planes in organized units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific theater.

My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only. The immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General Bradley with Soviet officials. Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia.

I should like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I think this

will be very helpful and he will have the latest news. Meanwhile, I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of December ³⁰ that General Bradley and his party proceed without delay to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work.

Russett

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

001

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL:

The President requests the attached
despatch to Premier Stalin, dated January 8,
1943, be forwarded to you for your information.

Very respectfully,

/s/ W C MOTT
W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.A.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

*This was actually dispatched
Goye*

00
January 8, 1943.

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, Moscow

From the President to Premier Stalin.

In a recent message to you I proposed sending 100 bombardment airplanes to the Far East in the event of war between the Soviet and Japan and at the same time suggested that General Bradley proceed to the Far East Theater in order to make a survey as to the advance preparations which would be necessary in order to insure effective participation of our units promptly on the initiation of hostilities.

After reading your reply I am afraid that I did not make my proposal clear. It was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only. The only immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey to be made by General Bradley in conjunction with Soviet air officials.

I would like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theaters. I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.

My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1300, EST, January 8, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By E. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

W.C. Mott
W. C. MOTT

Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

~~SECRET~~

COPIES TO AIRMAIL, 4000,
AND AERIAL.

2350 Jan.

Not sent - scheduled by

00
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From: The President
To: Premier Stalin.

Not sent

In a recent message to you I proposed sending 100 bombardment airplanes to the Far East in the event of war between the Soviet and Japan and at the same time suggested that General Bradley proceed to the Far East Theater in order to make a survey as to the advance preparations which would be necessary in order to insure effective participation of our units promptly on the initiation of hostilities.

After reading your reply I am afraid that I did not make my proposal clear. It was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory ^{protective} ~~planning~~ ^{against a possibility only}. The only immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey to be made by General Bradley in conjunction with Soviet air officials.

I would like to send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near future and if this can be arranged I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time. *He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war theatres. I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.*

My deep appreciation for the continuing advance of your armies. ~~With~~ The principle of attrition of the Kibany forces on all fronts is beginning to work Russia

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

00

THE WHITE HOUSE

January 9, 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, Moscow

TO PREMIER STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE ARRANGED THAT TWO HUNDRED C-47 TRANSPORT PLANES
BE ASSIGNED TO YOU IN 1943 BEGINNING IN JANUARY. YOUR MISSION
HERE IS BEING ADVISED OF THE DATES OF DELIVERY BY MONTHS. I
AM GOING TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GIVE YOU ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED
BUT YOU CAN DEFINITELY COUNT ON THE TWO HUNDRED.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1745, EWT, January 9, 1943.

W. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

092282
VCR 341

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00
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1943.

TELEGRAM

TO: STALIN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE ARRANGED THAT TWO HUNDRED C-47
TRANSPORT PLANES BE ASSIGNED TO YOU IN 1943
BEGINNING IN JANUARY. YOUR MISSION HERE IS BEING
ADVISED OF THE DATES OF DELIVERY BY MONTHS. I AM
GOING TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GIVE YOU ANOTHER
ONE HUNDRED BUT YOU CAN DEFINITELY COUNT ON THE
TWO HUNDRED.


ROOSEVELT

COPY

JCS
JHD

January 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

Subject: Operations to be undertaken by American
and British Forces in the first nine months of 1943.

Enclosure: Copy of draft telegram.

Attached hereto is a draft telegram from the President and Prime Minister to Premier Stalin as it was revised on the Saturday night prior to departure from Casablanca. I have been told informally that this revision was to be sent to Mr. Stalin over British channels of communications.

DEANE

mf

Distribution:
CCS Records
Capt. Royal
Stayback

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

JAN 7 1974

DRAFT TELEGRAM

From the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:-

- (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
- (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. We shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as possible.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operation which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian Front.

DECLASSIFIED JAN 7 1974
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-8-72

8. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-8-72
JAN 7 1974

SEND IN CLEAR TEXT

February 22, 1943.

WJL

From: Onnav
To: Alusna, Moscow.

Personal to Mr. Stalin from the President.

On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history.

For many months, in spite of tremendous losses in men, supplies, transportation and territory, the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus, and finally, at the immortal battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory, and especially in morale.

Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training, and above all, the determination to defeat the enemy, no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice.

At the same time, I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs, and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice.

The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler Forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the

Sent in clear.
- 222230

CS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

President-Stalin, Feb. 22, 1945. Page two.

February 22, 1945

lasting admiration of the people of the United States.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROOSEVELT:

ROOSEVELT

The 70th Anniversary date of the Red Army in
February 1945. However, Moscow is celebrating
Washington. Therefore, over the time of transfer and also
celebrated, it seems to be necessary that the message go
forward today on a final basis. Attached is a proposed draft.

WAB

Major General, U. S. Army

Released from the White House Map
Room at 1740, EWT, February 22, 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

C3

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD

February 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS: It is noted that the anniversary of the founding of the Red Army is celebrated in the territories and districts of the Soviet Union on February 23rd. However, Moscow is seven hours ahead of Washington. Therefore, when the time of transmittal is also considered, it seems to be necessary that the message go forward today on a rush basis. Attached is a proposed draft.

JHB
J. H. BURNS
Major General, U. S. Army

Attachment 1 covers Red supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the greatest sacrifices.

The Red Army and the Russian people have already started the Battle of the Road to Gatchina and have earned the admiration of the people of the United States.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN.

On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history

For many months, in spite of tremendous losses in men, supplies, transportation and territory, the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus, and finally, at the immortal battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory, and especially in morale.

Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training, and above all, the determination to defeat the enemy, no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice.

At the same time, I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs, and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice.

The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler Forges on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting ^{admiration} ~~gratitude~~ of the people of the United States.

Released at 1740

Released by President
1725- WS

From: The Prime Minister
To : The President

No : 263, 10 February 1943

I send you the message I have sent to Joe as amended in accordance with your wishes.

"Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin most secret and personal. Your message of 30 January. I have now consulted the President and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on both sides of the ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both as follows:

"(a) There are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier.

"(b) When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Jugoslavia, and wearing down the German Air Force; this is to be closely followed by an operation in the eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese.

"(c) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of 3 or 400,000 men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established.

"(d) We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross channel operation in August, in which both British and United States units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the channel at that time.

"(e) Both the operations will be supported by very large United States and British Air Forces, and that across the channel by the whole Metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Britain and the United States.

"(f) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined Chiefs of Staff the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible."

I send you also a telegram I have had from him about Turkey, and the consequential message I have sent to Inonu after a long talk with Maisky who urged it. Perhaps you can emphasize it through your channels. I

COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

I hope we may be more successful in making this marriage than the other.

"Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill personal and secret.

"I received your messages concerning the Turkish question on the 2nd and 3rd February. Many thanks for information on your talks with the leading Turkish personalities in Adana.

"In connection with your suggestion that the Turks would reciprocate any friendly gesture from the Soviet Union I would like to mention that we have already made a number of statements, the friendly character of which is well known to the British Government, some months before the Soviet German war as well as after its beginning. However the Turks did not react to our steps. Apparently they were afraid to incur the wrath of the Germans. I am afraid that a similar reception will be accorded to the gesture suggested by you.

"The international position of Turkey remains very delicate. On the one hand Turkey has the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with the USSR and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against Agression with Great Britain, on the other hand she has the Treaty of Friendship with Germany signed 3 days before the German attack against the USSR. It is not clear to me how in the present circumstances Turkey thinks to combine her obligations vis-a-vis the USSR and Great Britain with her obligations vis-a-vis Germany. Still if Turkey wishes to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate let her say so. In this case the Soviet Union would be willing to meet Turkey half way.

"Of course I have no objection against you making a statement that I was kept informed on the Anglo-Turkish meeting although I cannot say that the information was very full.

"I wish the First and the Eighth Armies as well as the American troops in North Africa every success in the coming offensive and a speedy expulsion of the German-Italian forces from the African soil.

"Let me thank you for your friendly congratulations on the surrender of the Field Marshal Paulus and on the successful annihilation of the encircled enemy troops near Stalingrad."

"Prime Minister to Monsieur Sarahoglu.

"For President Inonu, personal and secret.

"I told Premier Stalin about our talks, and have described to him the Turkish desire for closer understanding with the Soviet Union.

In reply Premier Stalin has recalled a number of statements of a friendly character towards Turkey which have been made by the Soviet Government in recent years. None the less Monsieur Stalin tells me

~~SECRET~~
- 2 -
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 12 1972

that if it is the wish of Turkey to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate, then the Soviet Government is willing to meet the Turkish Government half way and would welcome any suggestions that the Turkish Government could make to improve relations between the 2 countries.

"In these conditions it seems to me of first importance that you should carefully consider the nature of the arrangements which would best contribute to the growth of confidence between Turkey and the Soviet Union. If you feel able to formulate these I feel sure that Premier Stalin would be ready to give them close and sympathetic examination. You will know that my good offices are always available to promote the successful outcome of any negotiations between our Turkish and Soviet Allies.

"I feel most strongly that this is a very fine opportunity. I cannot conceal my desire for a warm renewal of friendship between Russia and Turkey similar to that achieved by Mustapha Kemal. Thus Turkey while increasing her own defences would stand between two victorious friends. In all this I am thinking not only of the war, but of the post war period. Tell me if there is anything I can do."

Your number 257

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by B:
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-25-12
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

COPY

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~~SECRET~~

February 22, 1943. *WJ*

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and [redacted] from the President to Mr. Stalin.

I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th. *(Copy attached)*

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines and made the fields and mountains impassable.

I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible moment successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output of ships to improve our transportation.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

APR 10 1972

By W. J. Stewart Date _____

222210 NCR 8864
222240 NCR 8865

~~SECRET~~


President-Stalin, Feb. 22, 1945. Page two.

can be provided by our maximum effort.

We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.

ROOSEVELT. /

Released from the White House Map
Room at 1730, EWT, February 22, 1945.


CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

00
February 22, 1943.

FROM: The President

TO: Mr. Stalin

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I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.

Roosevelt

SECRET

February 19, 1943.

*Marshall
Kil*

PRESIDENT TO STALIN

In reply to your message of February 16, I wish to extend on behalf of the government and people of the United States, our heartiest congratulations on the splendid success your troops are attaining in the present offensive. We follow the day to day accounts with the keenest interest and highest hopes for the continued success of the Russian armies.

In answer to the questions you raise with respect to Mr. Churchill's message of February 12, I want to state that the only thing that prevents our pushing the offensive in Tunisia to a successful conclusion are matters over which we have no control. The most important of these are unexpected weather conditions. The conditions, especially in northern Tunisia where we had planned to make our drive, have been such as to preclude any movements except on roads. This is reported to be the rainiest winter in that area for many years.

We are fully aware of the importance of exerting the maximum pressure upon the Axis at this particular time, but we would have you remember that all the Anglo-American forces with which to exert pressure have to be transported and maintained over long and exposed sea lanes. Moreover at this season of the year the condition of the ground in the Tunis-Bizerte Area preclude large scale operations.

As to the opening of the second front in Europe, it is true that we will be unable to accomplish much until late summer. This is due solely to shipping and escort vessel limitations. We are using a considerable portion of our shipping and escort vessels, both British and American, to send supplies to you. This we have done with

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Doc ID: 8200-9 (8/27/88)

Date- 9-11-69

Signature: *JWS*

00

SECRET

the full knowledge that it would affect the transportation overseas of our own forces.

In Tunisia our ground operations are as I have already stated - restricted in scope at present. In the air, a different condition exists. Our planes are seeking out the German air force at every opportunity and their losses since the 1st of January have been more than double ours. The air force is being built up as rapidly as possible in North Africa in order to provide for a constant increase in the intensity of these operations. From England, British and American bombers are striking at the Axis on every occasion the weather permits. The highest possible scale of attack is maintained. That these attacks are bringing results is indicated by the fact that a considerable portion of the German air force is now maintained in Western Europe to combat our attacks.

The most reliable information we have indicates that the Germans have poured troops into North Africa to the limit of their capabilities, and that the air battle now going on there as well as in Western Europe has resulted in the use of at least 50 percent of his air forces against Anglo-American operations.

We will push the Tunisian campaign and follow it up with the Sicilian operation at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile to the limit of available ocean shipping we will prepare for a landing on the continent.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date-

9-11-64

Signature

JWR

DECLASSIFIED

000 DIR 5200 9 (9/27/58)

SECRET*Lesby*Date- *9-11-69*
February 18, 1943.Signature- *FR*PRESIDENT TO STALIN

I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th.

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the expected schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads ^{*extremely difficult*} ~~impassable~~ for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines.

I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible ^{*moment*} ~~date~~ successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output of ships to improve our transportation.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that ~~insofar as~~ I am concerned the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We are making every possible effort in North Africa. You of course are informed of our present difficulties in Africa which I believe will be rapidly cleared up as soon as improved weather conditions make the roads passable for troops and supply trains.

We hope that the ~~astounding~~ success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue.

Stalin's message of 21 April 1943 was sent by the Map Room to the President on 24 April 1943 as GREEN #47 when he was on his trip to Monterrey, Mexico. The President prepared a draft reply, which he sent through the Map Room on 26 April 1943 to Secretary Hull for his opinion:

"RED 16, 26 April 1943.

"Ask Map Room please to show you long telegram from Churchill to me dated 25th (PM-POTUS #284).

"I suggest I send the following to Stalin together with a copy thereof to Churchill:

"Mr. Stalin, Moscow.

"I have received your telegram while on my Western inspection trip. I can well understand your problem but I hope in present situation you can find means to label your action as a suspension of conversation with the Polish Government in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.

"It is my view that Sikorski has not acted in any way with Hitler gang, but rather that he made a stupid mistake in taking the matter up with the International Red Cross. Also I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the future.

"Let me know if I can help in any way, especially in regard to looking after any Poles you may desire to send out of Russia.

"Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, very many of them in the Army and Navy. They are all bitter against the Nazis and knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski would not help the situation. Signed Roosevelt."

"If you approve the above, have my Map Room send it, together with a copy to Churchill."

The Secretary of State approved the draft in the following memorandum to Lt. Colonel Hammond (original filed with RED #16):

00
1
2
"April 26, 1943

"1:15 p.m.

"MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHESTER HAMMOND:

"Complying with your request, this is to confirm that the President's suggested message (April 26) to Mr. Stalin meets with Secretary Hull's approval after the elimination of the word 'stupid' appearing in the second paragraph.

"It is understood that a copy of the President's message to Mr. Stalin is being transmitted to Prime Minister Churchill.

"George Renchard"

The message was sent to Stalin on 26 April 1943, and to the Prime Minister as POTUS #274, 26 April 1943.

CS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Stabin
Personel and ~~confidential~~
I want you to know
that Mr. Churchill is coming
to Washington next week
& discuss our immediate
next steps. We will of
course keep General
B *currently*
informed.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>7 MAY 1943.</u>	INFORMATION	-	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>2127/7.</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>PLAIN</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>GERMAN</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT.CDR.GARTH)

070730 - NCR 1376

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	QCT
TEXT			

OPNAV 052034.

DISTRIBUTION:

PLA.....ACTION.
FILE.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOU

1980.3 (0/27/88)

Date: 8-19-71

RHP

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVRECS.)

NCR 13

16-5282-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

070730

Pms-Itali

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

May 13, 1943.

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow.

Personal and ~~secret~~ from the President to Mr. Stalin.

Thank you for your message of congratulation on the performance of our forces in liberating Tunisia.

Now that we have the initiative it is reasonable to expect further successes on both the eastern and the western fronts, and also further supplies including air.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1540, EWT, May 13, 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSKY,
Lieutenant (j-g.), U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
BY W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~
131951
NR 3069

CS
WAT
May 13, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO STALIN:

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congratulation on the performance of our
forces in liberating Tunisia.

Now that we have the initiative
it is reasonable to expect further successes
on both the eastern and the western fronts, and
also further supplies including air.

Roosevelt

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE 15 MAY 1943.	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TON CODEROOM 1301/15.			PRIORITY
DECODED BY PLAIN LANGUAGE.			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT. GERMAN)

141001 NCR 6653

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	SEC
TEXT			

USNAVCOM 131951.

DISTRIBUTION:

**PIA.....ACTION.
FILE.**

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DDO E.O. 12958 (1/17/88)

Date- 8-19-

Signature: **RHA**

No 1 ADMIRAL No 2 FILE No 3 F-1 ON CHARTROOM No 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (C) NAVREGS.)

FORM 30

141001

Per - Stalin

May 18, 1943.

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and from the President to Premier Stalin.

I know that you will be happy to learn that the following are the American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa from December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943:

Total personnel losses: 625,000.

Total tank losses: not less than 2,100.

Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,596 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, and 4,499 damaged.

Total merchant shipping losses: 625 ships totalling 2,200,000 tons sunk, and 371 ships totalling 1,600,000 tons damaged.

American estimate of Italian losses in East Africa:

Exclusive of natives, Italian losses in East Africa were approximately 150,000.


These figures agree substantially with British estimates except for personnel losses, in which their estimate is somewhat lower than ours.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1900, ENT, May 18, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 1 1972


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

~~SECRET~~
182341

CO

~~SECRET~~

~~Proposed~~ to Premier Stalin:

To: Premier Stalin.
From: President Roosevelt.

I know that you will be happy to learn that the following are the American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa from December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943:

Total personnel losses: 625,000.

Total tank losses: not less than 2,100.

Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,596 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, and 4,499 damaged.

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American estimate of Italian Losses in East Africa:

Exclusive of natives, Italian losses in East Africa were approximately 150,000.

These figures agree substantially with British estimates except for personnel losses, in which their estimate is somewhat lower than ours.

Roosevelt
ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PPPP
RELEASED BY			
DATE 20 MAY 1943	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
TON CODEROOM 201716			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY HATCH			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

HATCH **200733** **NCR 354**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT
TEXT

YOUR 182341

WHITE HOUSE ACTION
FILE.....

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DECLASSIFIED
DDO 5000.0 (9/27/88)
Date- 8-19-71
Signature- RHP

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-4 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch office in person. (See Art. 78 (6) NAVREGS.)

FORM 28

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Aluzna, Moscow

This dispatch from Adm. Brown, Naval Aide to President.

(032609)
My immediately following messages are for Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill. They are most secret and should be decoded and seen by no one except Duncan, a decoder appointed by him, and Ambassador Standley. Delivery should be effected by Ambassador Standley direct to Stalin. This is a specific exception to method outlined your 130900 of last October. Messages should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery to Stalin and acknowledgment of delivery made.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1310, EWT, June 2, 1943.

W. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

JK
JWR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and **[REDACTED]** from the President to Premier Stalin.

I am sending you through Ambassador Standley the recently approved decisions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff. These decisions have the joint approval of both Mr. Churchill and myself. In view of their extremely secret nature I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally.

Roosevelt

FWR

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1310, EST, June 2, 1943.

W C Mott

W. C. MOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By N. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 2, 1945.

From: Cpnnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President to Premier Stalin.

1. In General, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

- (a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace, the security of our overseas lines of communication, and to employ every practicable means to support Russia.
- (b) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.
- (c) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.
- (d) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
- (e) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of longrange aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May. 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

BY H. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

President-Stalin, June 2, 1945. Page 2.

With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows:

- (a) To intensify the present air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. This for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past three weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States' heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,150 September 30, and 2,500 April 1. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing.
- (b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY, (viz the assault on Sicily,) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

BY RE J. Stewart DATE APR 10 1972

[REDACTED]
President-Stalin, June 2, 1945. Page 3.

referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-west Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1300, ENT, June 2, 1945.

H. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

021900	NCR	2006
022340		2007
030115		2008
030230		2009
030416		2010
030600		2011

*Naval Department copy returned
and destroyed. Same.*

[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~
1015
1015
Pencil No. 400

PRESENT AERIAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
~~SECRET~~

General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Russia. C.I.G.S. and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.G.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Minister's) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me.

(Insert statement)

26. 5. 43

(Original filed with PM-Less 4296.)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

~~SECRET~~

10 Downing Street,
Whitehall.

████████████████████

With reference to the support of Russia, Agreement with
WAZ

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PREMIER STALIN.

████████████████████

and to be in Europe. This for the purpose of securing

████████████████████

1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace, and the security of our overseas lines of communication, ^{and} next in priority, to employ every practicable means to support Russia.

(b) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

(c) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.

(d) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(e) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of longrange aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore, increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

████████████████████

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

O

[REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

[REDACTED]

referred to.

- (c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

26. 5. 43 "G.C.M."

[REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

31 May 1943

For General Marshall from the President. Urgent and [REDACTED]

DESPATCH FOR STALIN APPROVED WITH FOLLOWING AMENDMENT: STRIKE OUT
UNDER B FOLLOWING WORDS, QUOTE W. PRIORITY UNQUOTE, AND INCLUDE A
AND B AS ONE PRIORITY STOP IN ORDER TO PROTECT SECURITY SUGGEST YOU
WIRE STALIN TELLING HIM YOU ARE SENDING COURIER BY AIR TO DELIVER
MESSAGE TO HIM IN MOSCOW OR HIS AGENT AT SOME CONVENIENT PLACE.
YOU MAY STATE THAT YOUR MESSAGE HAS MY APPROVAL AS WELL AS CHURCHILL'S.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House
Map Room at 1415 EST by

F. H. Graham
F. H. GRAHAM
2d Lt, AGP
Watch Officer

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Secretary, General Staff

May 31, 1943

FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 9238

Urgent for immediate delivery to Cobby for his eyes only from Bitty. Despatch for Stalin approved with following amendment: Strike out under B following words "N priority", and include A and B as 1 priority. In order to protect security suggest you wire Stalin telling him you are sending courier by air to deliver message to him in Moscow or his agent at some convenient place. You may state that your message has my approval as well as agent's.

Copy of message sent from Map Room 5/31

President

Marshall

Prime Minister

ORIGINATOR: SGS

INFORMATION: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By K. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

CM-OUT-13094 (31 May 43) 1853Z med

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

31 May 1945

COPY

From: London

To: Mr. Harry Hopkins

No number. Filed 31/1809Z

Prime Minister to Mister Harry Hopkins personal and most secret. Reference pencil number 400. [See "26 May 45" filed herein.]

I should be glad to know as soon as possible position about message to Joe. Has it been sent?

I wish you were here with me to enjoy the sunshine and cool breeze.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 12 1972

Original filed "100 Hopkins."
COPY

SECRET

- 1 -

COPY

COPY

From: War Department
To: General Eisenhower, Algiers
No: FREEDOM #9258, 31 May 1948

Your message to me dated May 31 reference pencil number 400.
(From Mr. Hopkins for General Eisenhower to pass to Prime Minister
Churchill.) Modified message to Joe has been sent to General Marshall
for him to send to Stalin by courier in interest of security. Suggest
you get copy of message from Marshall.

Harry Hopkins

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

Original filed "100 Hopkins."

COPY

~~SECRET~~
- 1 -

COPY

June 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached message refers to the delivery of the message containing the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Premier Stalin.

This message was received in reply to the message sent by the President to General Marshall on May 31, 1945, a copy of which is attached.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

JDJDB11
0235B/2
W

CCWD
6-2-43
0147Z

URGENT

EYES ONLY

TO SEXTON SECRETARY OF GENERAL STAFF FOR
HIS EYES ONLY SIGNED EISENHOWER

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War
No. W1802 June 2, 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Letter 7-5-72
By RT Date DEC 30 1972

Washed
Stalin

~~Take at once to Sexton Secretary General Staff
for his eyes only this message from Richmond (signed
Eisenhower aka PHSCS) ADP asks that BITTY be given
following message at once: "Reference AGWAR 9238 from
CANDY to RUMBA regarding P-44: AGENT agrees to amendment.
He is concerned over delay in delivery and proposes that
message should be sent through INGOT and or DRINK PITCH
in same way as other secret telegrams. He hopes covering
note of transmittal will bear signatures of BITTY and him.~~

Combined Staff Plans
This all refers to message drafted on plane by me in
reply of SCRUB proposal and returned by AGENT direct to
APPLE recommending acceptance and proposing note of trans-
mittal. This matter is highly important and URGENT."

Chink
Pat
Saw CHINKS troops today and will visit AGREE BYLAN
and others tomorrow. Another meeting Thursday and will
probably depart NASTY Friday arriving INLET Sunday or
Monday. Details probably not available until Thursday but
will send them then.

Chink
Pat
Russell
Chink

Nowig DECLASSIFIED

9238 is CM-OUT-13094 (31 M.y 43) 805

Action: 805
Information: OPD

DEC 30 1972

CM-IN-817 (2 June 43) 0327Z mcs

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 2

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

From: AFHQ in North Africa

To: War

No. W1802 Jun 2, 1943.

Sexton from Richmond for McNarney from Marshall.

Reference AGWAR 9238 from Roosevelt to Marshall regarding Stalin.

Churchill agrees to amendment. He is concerned over delay in delivery and proposes that message should be sent through United States and/or British Ambassador in same way as other secret telegrams. He hopes covering note of transmittal will bear signatures of Roosevelt and him.

This all refers to message drafted on plane by me in lieu of Combined Staff Planners proposal and returned by Churchill direct to Roosevelt recommending acceptance and proposing note of transmittal. This matter is highly important and urgent.

Saw Anderson's troops today and will visit Clark, Patton and others tomorrow. Another meeting Thursday and will probably depart Algiers Friday arriving Washington Sunday or Monday. Details probably not available until Thursday but will send them then.

June 2, 1943.

~~SECRET~~

From: The President.

To: General Marshall. *(Alpin)*

Reference your W1802, June 2, 1943, to McNarney.

Please inform Prime Minister Churchill that the message containing decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff has been sent to Stalin together with suggested covering note of transmittal in code through the American Ambassador in Moscow but with reluctance because of the ever present danger of the code's being broken.

Roosevelt.

FOR

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1300, EWT, June 2, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 4, 1943.

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, Moscow.

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President for Marshal Stalin.

I am very grateful to you for your courtesy extended to my government and me in your cordial reception of Ambassador Davies. He has returned safely, bearing your letter. I am very happy that you and I are in complete agreement in principle on all the matters contained in your letter and I will await your further communication in accordance with your letter and your understanding with Mr. Davies.

My warm personal regards, with my kind remembrances also to Mr. Brown.

(i.e. Mr. Tindler)

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1130, EDT, June 4, 1943.

W. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~
24155P NCR 225P

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA MOSCOW			
FROM	FOR ACTION	US NAVCOM	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		WASHINGTON D C	ROUTINE
DATE	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT COMDR KELLY

Ø5Ø6ØØ

NCR Ø512

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	QCT
TEXT			

RDO WASHINGTON Ø41558*

*NCR 235Ø

NOTE: CONTACTED MAP ROOM AT 1520/5TH

NAVAIDE....ACT

FILE.....

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOB 1000.0 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-19-71

Signature: RHP

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 26

16-5222-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 June 1943

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna Moscow

Personal and [redacted] from the President to Ambassador
Standley. Your 140910.

In view of the extreme secrecy of my 030600 I do not
consider it advisable to give or show a copy of this dispatch
to Ambassador Kerr unless requested by his government.

Roosevelt

Released from Map Room
1215 June 15, 1943

Chester Hammond
CHESTER HAMMOND
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.

151652 -

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: Opnav
To : Aluana, Moscow.

Personal and from the President to Ambassador
Standley. *Your 140910.*

In view of the extreme secrecy of the ~~future military~~
~~operations mentioned in my 030600~~ I do not consider it
advisable to give or show a copy of this dispatch to
Ambassador Kerr. *unless requested by*
his Govt.

Roosevelt

Released
MR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

Published in Stalin's Correspondence with
Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman:
E. P. Durrant, New York, 1958.

Volume 2 Page(s) 72 #94

June 16, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna Moscow

~~Secret~~ and Personal from the President to Marshal Stalin.

In addition to our new protocol agreement I have directed that six hundred additional fighters be sent to you during the balance of 1943. They are P-40-E type of fighter which we fought very successfully in Tunisia. This is the most maneuverable fighter we have. It provides our best protection against dive bombers and gives excellent protection to the ground strafing of the P-59's.

I have also directed the shipment of seventy eight additional B-25's during the same period. In November the airplane situation will be again reviewed and we will then inform you what the shipping schedule of the last half of the protocol year will be.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at the White House Map Room
1825, June 16, 1943.

G. W. Elsey
G. W. Elsey,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.A.
Assistant to Naval Aide to the
President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the W.H.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1977

162258

~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASE

June 16, 1945.

From: The President
To : Marshal Stalin

I have directed, in addition to our new protocol agreement, that during the balance of 1945 600 additional fighters be sent to you. They are the type of fighter (P-40-E) which we fought in Tunisia very successfully. It is the most maneuverable fighter we have. It gives excellent protection to the P-39's ground strafing and provides our best protection against dive bombers.

In addition I have also directed that 78 additional B-25's be shipped during the same period. The airplane situation will be again reviewed in November and you will be informed at that time of the shipping schedule of the second half of the protocol year.

Roosevelt

JUNE 16, 1943

March 1
[REDACTED] AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN

IN ADDITION TO OUR NEW PROTOCOL AGREEMENT I HAVE DIRECTED THAT SIX HUNDRED ADDITIONAL FIGHTERS BE SENT TO YOU DURING THE BALANCE OF 1943. THEY ARE P-40-N TYPE OF FIGHTER WHICH WE FOUGHT VERY SUCCESSFULLY IN TUNISIA. THIS IS THE MOST MANEUVERABLE FIGHTER WE HAVE. IT PROVIDES OUR BEST PROTECTION AGAINST DIVE BOMBERS AND GIVES EXCELLENT PROTECTION TO THE GROUND STRAFING OF THE P-39'S.

I HAVE ALSO DIRECTED THE SHIPMENT OF SEVENTY-EIGHT ADDITIONAL B-25'S DURING THE SAME PERIOD. IN NOVEMBER THE AIRPLANE SITUATION WILL BE AGAIN REVIEWED AND WE WILL THEN INFORM YOU WHAT THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE OF THE LAST HALF OF THE PROTOCOL YEAR WILL BE.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

*written up +
rel. call
Pl*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I talked to General Arnold this morning about this. He told me these planes are not wanted by the navy.

General Arnold told me you could assume his memo has the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would not be opposed by the British.

I, therefore, suggest that the attached wire be sent.


H.L.H.

encl.

~~SECRET~~

Shaw H. H.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A review of our requirements, commitments, and production prospects for the last half of 1943 leads to the conclusion that we may undertake to obligate for U.S.S.R. 600 P-40N fighter airplanes in addition to P-39's currently scheduled and an additional 78 B-25G medium bombers for 1943 delivery.

We have a model change due in the Bell-Buffalo plant this fall (from P-39 to P-63). In view of the delay in production which always attends a model change, I feel that it would be unwise to increase the commitment of P-39's to the U.S.S.R. beyond the 250 per month for which we are already obligated.

Curtiss-Buffalo production of the P-40N promises to remain fairly stable during the last half of 1943. Our combat experience in Tunisia has demonstrated that the P-40N is the most maneuverable fighter we have. The P-40N will provide to the U.S.S.R. an excellent protection against dive bombers, and a very satisfactory fighter cover for the ground strafing P-39's.

Shaw



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
ORD Letter, 5-8-72

DEC 30 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

I wish you would give careful consideration to giving some more P-39 planes to Russia, over and above the Protocol.

It seems to me that from the point of view of carrying out our strategic concept of the war we should do everything possible to strengthen Russia this summer. Airplanes is the quickest and best way.

I understand that we are giving something like 150 P-39s to the British each month. Would it not be possible to postpone the British allotment and give the Russians those 150 planes each month for a few months; or, if that is not possible, replace the P-39s for the British with another type of fighter?

It is possible the Russians would take P-40s if they are available.

I hope you can give them some more B-25s.

F.D.R.

FDR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

Inc #1

00

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 16, 1945

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, Moscow

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President to Marshal Stalin.

In response to your special request it has been decided to make available to your country from the production of the United States and Canada during July August and September five thousand long tons per month of primary aluminum and one thousand long tons of high grade secondary aluminum of the type we ourselves are using in aircraft manufacture. Because of the ~~possible~~ shortage of primary aluminum, it is not possible at this time to agree to increase the offer contained in the Third Protocol and it may therefore be necessary to curtail shipments during succeeding months to the extent that shipments of primary aluminum only exceed the four thousand long tons per month scheduled in the Protocol, although I hope this will not be necessary. The secondary aluminum is in addition to the Protocol offering. We will review the situation again within the next two months and let you know the shipping schedule during the last quarter of the calendar year and, if possible, for the balance of the Protocol year.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1845 June 16, 1945.

W. A. Burns, Jr.
W. A. BURNS JR.
LT. U.S.N.P.

~~TOP SECRET~~

162259

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

CS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Attached is another cable to
Stalin.

This is the best I can get
out of the WPB but I think it
means a substantial increase in
aluminum to Russia.

H.L.H.

encl.

JUNE 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND ██████████ FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN
Marshal

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SPECIAL REQUEST IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOUR COUNTRY FROM THE PRODUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA DURING JULY AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER FIVE THOUSAND LONG TONS PER MONTH OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM AND ONE THOUSAND LONG TONS OF HIGH GRADE SECONDARY ALUMINUM OF THE TYPE WE OURSELVES ARE USING IN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE. BECAUSE OF THE ~~SHORTAGE~~ SHORTAGE OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO AGREE TO INCREASE THE OFFER CONTAINED IN THE THIRD PROTOCOL AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO CURTAIL SHIPMENTS DURING SUCCEEDING MONTHS TO THE EXTENT THAT SHIPMENTS OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM ONLY EXCEED THE FOUR THOUSAND LONG TONS PER MONTH SCHEDULED IN THE PROTOCOL, ALTHOUGH I HOPE THIS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY. THE SECONDARY ALUMINUM IS IN ADDITION TO THE PROTOCOL OFFERING. WE WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION AGAIN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND LET YOU KNOW THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF THE CALENDAR YEAR AND, IF POSSIBLE, FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PROTOCOL YEAR.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U. S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESS

PRECEDENCE

FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	RDO WASHN	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			RRRRRR
DATE <u>17 JUNE 1943</u>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1546</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>DE LANNOY</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT HATCH

170645 NCR 7789

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

YOUR 162258 AND 162259

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- APR 7 1972

Signature: *R. H. [unclear]*

NAVAIDE TO PRES.....ACT
FILE.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**~~SECRET~~**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 24

DECLASSIFIED

Published in Stalin's Correspondence with
Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman:
E.F. Burton, New York, 1958.

Volume 1 Page(s) 133-135 No. 163

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO : The President
NO : 322, 20 June 1945.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most
secret No. 322. I send you the telegram to Stalin in the final form
in which it went:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, personal and secret.

"1. I have received a copy of your telegram of about 11th June
to the President. I quite understand your disappointment but I am sure
we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is phy-
sically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia
if we threw away 100,000 men in a disastrous cross-channel attack such
as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present con-
ditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be
gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all my expert military
advisers, we should, even if we got ashore, be driven into the sea, as
the Germans have forces already in France superior to any we could put
there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main
lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through
any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a
great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies. It
might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it
had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under
pressure from you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in
my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross channel attack
which I believed would lead only to useless massacre.

"2. The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not
by losing them. This we have done in Tunisia, where the long arm of
British and United States sea power has reached across the Atlantic
and 10,000 miles around the Cape and helped us to annihilate great Axis
land and air forces. The threat immediately resulting to the whole
Axis defensive system in the Mediterranean has already forced the Ger-
mans to reinforce Italy, the Mediterranean Islands, the Balkans and
Southern France with land and air forces. It is my earnest and sober
hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, and by doing so
we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means
open. The great attack that is now not far off will absorb the capaci-
ties of every port under our control in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar
to Port Said inclusive. After Italy has been forced out of the war, the
Germans will have to occupy the Riviera, make a new front either on the
Alps or the Po, and above all provide for the replacement of the 32
Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish
participation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bomb-
ing of the Rumanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

PM #322, 20 June 1943 (Continued).

already we are holding in the west and south of Europe the larger part of the German air forces and our superiority will increase continually. Out of a first line operational strength of between 4800 and 4900 aircraft, Germany, according to our information, has today on the Russian front some 2,000 compared with some 2,500 this time last year. We are also ruining a large part of the cities and munitions centers of Germany, which may well have a decisive effect by sapping German resistance on all fronts. By this coming autumn this great air offensive should have produced a massive return. If the favourable trend of the anti-U-boat warfare of the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the movement of the United States forces to Europe which is being pressed to the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tributes than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have lately given to the exertions of your two western allies. It is my firm belief that we shall present you before the end of the year with results which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction.

"3. I have never asked you for detailed information about the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been, and are still, bearing the brunt on land. I should however be glad to have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the Russian front and whether you think a German attack is imminent. We are already again in the middle of June and no attack has been launched. We have some reason to believe that the unexpectedly rapid defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa has dislocated German strategy, and that the consequent threat to southern Europe has been an important factor in causing Hitler to hesitate and to delay his plans for a large scale offensive against Russia this summer. It is no doubt too soon to pronounce decidedly on all this, but we should be very glad to hear what you think about it.

"4. At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whither we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree upon. I and my advisers believe that Soapa Flow, our main naval harbour in the north of Scotland would be the most convenient, the safest and if secrecy be desired probably the most secret. I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from your British and American comrades.

PRIME

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 18, 1945.

From: Opanav
to : Aluzna, Moscow.

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President to Marshal Stalin.

As I was away when your message came, I am a few days late in answering it. I am in full accord with what the Prime Minister telegraphed you. I assure you that we are really doing everything that is possible at this time.

I trust you will appreciate that our shipping situation is still tight, though we are cheered by the progress of our campaign against the submarines for the past two months, giving us a good net gain in shipping available.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1730, EWT, June 18, 1945.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

~~SECRET~~
192230
KCR 5159

63
June 18, 1943

TO: MARSHAL STALIN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I am a few days late in answering your message as I was away when it came. I fully subscribe to what Mr. Churchill telegraphed you and I want to assure you that at this time we are really doing everything that is possible. I hope you will understand that the shipping situation is still tight, though we have been greatly encouraged by the better progress of our anti-submarine campaign during the last two months which shows us a good net gain in available ships.

ROOSEVELT

Class 1, 18 June 1943, from the President
at Hyde Park to the Map Room.
Sent to Prime Minister on 28th 18 June
1943.
Paraphrased and sent to
Alison, Moscow.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		NAVCOM WASHINGTON	OPOROROPOP
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE 28 JUNE 1943.	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
TOR CODERON 1415/28.			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT. GERMAN)

28030 NCR 9692

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

RADIO WASHINGTON 191745.*

*** THIS IS REENCIPHERMENT RADIO WASHINGTON 182230 NCR 5150.**

DISTRIBUTIONS:
 PIA... ACTION.
 FILE.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDC 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-19-71

Signature- RHP

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-4 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 24

208030 - Pres. Stalin

SECRET

25 June 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA MOSCOW

Personal and [redacted] from the President to Ambassador Standley.

Your 240908 affirmative.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
2020 ENT 24 June 1943

Ogden Kniffin
OGDEN KNIFFIN
Captain CE

NCR 6339
256045

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 7 1972

[redacted]

250045
6339