MAP ROOM PAPERS

Box 8

Roosevelt to Stalin

July - September, 1943
OUTGOING
DISPATCHES

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
TO
PREMIER STALIN

JULY thru SEPTEMBER
1943
15 July 45. POTUS-STALIN. Sinking of Russian ships in North Pacific; Congratulations on Kerak offensive; Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin (Casablanca) meeting. (Amended 8 S-P 8 Aug 45)

22 July 45. AMBASSADOR DAVIES-STALIN. Request for information on Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting.

5 Aug 45. POTUS-STALIN. Congratulations to Red Army on victory at Oral.

18 Aug 45. ADMIRAL BROWN-AlUSKA MOSCOW. Procedure to be followed in handling POTUS & FM-STALIN message, 18 Aug 45 (immediately following).

18 Aug 45. POTUS & FM-STALIN. Meeting at Quebec; suggestion for meeting of Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin; approval for meeting of Foreign Office level; statistics on conquest of Sicily. (Amended 8 S-P 8 Aug 45)


25 Aug 45. ADMIRAL BROWN-GENERAL WATSON. Message acknowledging receipt of Stalin's message to POTUS & FM to be given to Soviet Charge d'Affaires for transmission to Stalin.


28 Aug 45. POTUS & FM-STALIN. Meeting of Foreign Office Representatives to Military-Political Control Commission. (Amended 8 S-P 8 Aug 45)

2 Sept 45. CPRAY-AlUSKA MOSCOW. Procedure for handling POTUS & FM-STALIN message of 2 Sept 45 (immediately following).

2 Sept 45. POTUS & FM-STALIN. Signing of Terms of Surrender X0001. (Amended 8 S-P 7 Sept 45)

4 Sept 45. POTUS-STALIN. Meeting of Foreign Office representatives; Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting; Control Commission for Italy, and French representation thereon. (Amended 8 S-P 8 Sept 45)

9 Sept 45. POTUS & FM-STALIN. Unconditional surrender of Italy. (Amended 8 S-P 10 Sept 45)
9 Sept 43. POTUS-STALIN. Control Commission for Italy, French representation thereon; meeting of Foreign Office representatives; Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting. (Annexed 2 P 11 Sep 43)

21 Sept 43. HULL-AMERICAN EMBASSY. Surrender of Italy; Control Commission for Italy; co-belligerency of Italy. (Annexed 1 P 26 Sep 43)

25 Sept 43. POTUS-STALIN. Meeting of Foreign Office representatives. (Annexed 5 P 21 Sep 43)

28 Sept 43. POTUS-STALIN. Long Term Surrender Document for Italy should be kept in a confidential status. (Annexed 1 P 2 Oct 43)

30 Sept 43. ADMIRAL BROWN-ALUSKA MOSCON. Request for information on meeting of Foreign Office representatives; procedure for acknowledgment of POTUS-STALIN messages. (Annexed 2 P 1 Oct 43)

Filed under above message.

4 Oct 43. ALUSKA MOSCON-ADMIRAL BROWN. (040846). Message contained in ADMIRAL BROWN-ALUSKA MOSCON, 30 Sept 43, delivered to Molotov at 05/1800.
July 15, 1943.

From: Oppen
To: Stalin, Moscow.

Personal and from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I am deeply sorry for unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in North Pacific and have directed every possible future precaution.

Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk.

I hope to hear from you very soon about the other matter which I still feel to be of great importance to you and me.

Roosevelt

[Signature]

Released from the White House Map Room at 1650, EST, July 15, 1943.

Owen Collins
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

(Receipt acknowledged at Moscow)
(18/21 August 1943)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.

By W. J. Stewart Date APR 1, 1972.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1943.

MR. STALIN

I am deeply sorry for unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in North Pacific and have directed every possible future precaution.

Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk.

I hope to hear from you very soon about the other matter which I feel to be of great importance to you and me.

Can you let me know answer to operations discussed in Moscow by Davies?

ROOSEVELT
July 22, 1943

TO MARSHALL STALIN

I am a bit worried because we have heard nothing about my last conversation with you. Could you let us know soon.

Joseph E. Davies
To Mr. Stalin

I am a bit worried because we have heard nothing about my last conversation with you. Could you let us know soon.

Joseph E. Davies

P.S.
July 22, 1943

Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko,
Charge d'Affaires,
Soviet Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Gromyko,

This will introduce Lieutenant Boyse
P. Price who will hand you a message, signed by
Mr. Davies, which the President requests that you
send to Mr. Stalin in Moscow.

Very sincerely yours,

Harry L. Hopkins
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

5 August 1943

PERSONAL and from the President to Marshall Stalin.

Sincere congratulations to the Red Army, the People of the
Soviet Union and to yourself upon the great victory of Orel.

During a month of tremendous fighting your forces by
their skill, their courage, their sacrifices and their ceaseless
effort have not only stopped the long planned German attack but
have launched a successful counter offensive of far reaching
import.

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic
accomplishments.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1950, EWT, August 5, 1943.

Robert W. Bogue,
Lt. (jg), USNR.

(Receipt acknowledged in Moscow,)
(070900 August.)
OF PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluane, Moscow

and personal to Marshal Stalin from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

We have both arrived here with our staffs and will probably remain in conference for about ten days. We fully understand the strong reasons which lead you to remain on the battlefront, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not repeat not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

Should it prove impossible to arrange the much needed meeting of the three heads of governments, we agree with you that a meeting of the foreign office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective governments.

Generals Eisenhower and Alexander have now completed the conquest of Sicily in thirty-eight days. It was defended by 315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans, total 405,000 soldiers. These were attacked by thirteen British and United States divisions and with a loss to us of about 18,000 killed and wounded, 23,000 German and 7,000 Italian dead and wounded were collected and 150,000 prisoners. Apart from these Italians who have dispersed in the countryside in plain clothes, it can be assumed that all Italian forces in the island have been destroyed. Wages of guns and munitions are lying scattered about all over the island. Over 1,000 enemy aircraft have been taken on the airfields. We are, as you know, about soon to attack the Italian mainland in heavy strength.

Released from the White House Map Room at 20:00 EST, August 18, 1943.

Churchill-Roosevelt

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
18 August 1943

Of Priority
From: Opnav
To: Alusna Moscow

From Admiral Brown, Naval Aide to the President.

My immediately following message is most secret and should be seen only by Alusna, decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is requested to deliver it personally to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Released from the White House
Map Room at 2020 EST 18 August 1943.

[Signature]
Robert W. Bogue

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 12 1972

190058
OPNAV 190115 received Aug 19th at 2330 local. Upon immediate inquiry informed that Stalin was "out of town". In his absence I decided to deliver message to Molotov whom I saw at 0040 local. Molotov stated he would immediately transmit your message to Stalin.

P1A ACTION

FILE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept, letter, 1-11-72
By L. Date APR 12 1972

SEALED
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (c) NAVSECNAV)
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: OOney
To: Aluksa, Moscow

and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.

The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increasing scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross channel invasion.

A large-scale buildup of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross channel operations. A bridgehead in the continent once secured will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions per month. This operation will be the primary British and American ground and air effort against the Axis.

The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance, and the occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany.

Our operations in the Balkans will be limited to the supply of Balkan Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Commandos, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in the Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1030 EST, August 28, 1943.

Botche P. Price
Captain, C.E.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Suggested message to be sent to Premier Stalin.

There is enclosed a suggested message for you to transmit to Premier Stalin in the event that you consider such action to be necessary.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

A. F. BROOKE,
General,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

By RT
Date: JAN 8 1974
To Marshal Stalin, from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

Quote - In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.

The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increasing scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross channel invasion.

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REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
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We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japan's air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

August 26, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna Moscow

From Admiral Brown, Naval Aide to the President.

My immediately following message is most secret.

It should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him, and the ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin, message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Release by
Lt. H. Hall, USNR
White House Map Room

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 1 2 197
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT.COM, GERMAN) 272986 NCR 3367
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

TEXT (THIS IS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR STANDLEY)

YOUR 256619——

IN ABSENCE OF STALIN JOINT MESSAGE DELIVERED TO

MOLOTOV LAST NIGHT AT 11:20 P.M. WHO STATED HE WOULD

IMMEDIATELY TRANSMIT IT TO STALIN.

---

DISTRIBUTION:
CP1A,...ACTION.
FILE.

SEALED SECRET
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (c) NAVREC)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED 2/27/68
Date: 8-19-71
Signature: RHP

LDRMT
To General Watson,

You will please send for the Soviet Charge d'Affaires and give him the following in your capacity as Secretary to the President, which he may feel at liberty to transmit to Marshal Stalin.

QUOTE. The Marshal's message to the President and the Prime Minister has been transmitted to the President, who has left the Conference in Quebec and because of absence will not be available until early next week. Any reply by the Marshal to the telegram from the President and the Prime Minister to the Marshal relating to a joint meeting will of course be transmitted to them. UNQUOTE.

Wilson Brown
General Watson,

You will please send for the Soviet charge d'affaires and give him the following in open capacity, as Secretary to the President, which he may feel at liberty to transmit to Marshall Stalin.

Quot: The Marshall's message to the President and the Prime Minister has been transmitted to the President, who has left.
The conference in Quebec and demise of advance will not be available until early next week. Any reply by the Marshall of the telegram from the President and the Prime Minister of the Marshall relating to a point resting will be examined and transmitted to them.

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

Wilson Rounds
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I have carried out your instructions regarding the message to the Russian Charge d'Affaires (Gromyko), to be transmitted to Marshal Stalin.

He assured me that he would do everything he could to expedite a reply to the original message from you and the Prime Minister. He and I will be in constant touch until your return.

Everything is quiet along the Potomac and we are looking forward eagerly to your arrival in the city.

Respectfully,
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT.
TO: MARSHAL STALIN (Via Soviet Embassy, Washington).

We are considering your proposals and have little doubt that plans satisfactory to all of us can be made both for the meeting on the Foreign Office level and for the Tripartite Commission. Prime Minister and I will be meeting again early next week and will telegraph you further.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1500, EWT, August 28, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
2 September 1943

From: Oppen
To: Alusma, Moscow

Follow procedure my 250619 in immediately following message except that delivery may be made to Molotov in absence of Marshal Stalin.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 2 September 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

September 2, 1943

From: Sžnav
To: Alusma, Moscow

President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, and personal.

1. We have received from General C. a statement that the Italians accept and that he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this refers to the short military terms which you have already seen, or to the more comprehensive and complete terms in regard to which your readiness to sign was specifically indicated.

2. The military situation there is at once critical and hopeful. Our invasion of the mainland begins almost immediately, and the heavy blow called AVALANCHE will be struck in the next week or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in extricating themselves from Hitler's clutches may make a still more daring enterprise necessary, for which General Eisenhower will need as much Italian help as he can get. The Italian acceptance of the terms is largely based on the fact that we shall send an airborne division to Rome to enable them to hold off the Germans, who have gathered Panzer strength in that vicinity and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling administration probably under Farinacci. Matters are moving so fast there that we think General Eisenhower should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians for the sake of the differences between the short and long terms. It is clear that the short terms are included in the long terms, that they proceed on the basis of unconditional surrender and Clause Ten in the short terms places the interpretation in the hands of the Allied
Commander-in-Chief.

3. We are therefore assuming that you expect General Eisenhower to sign the short terms in your behalf if that be necessary to avoid the further journeying of General C. to Rome and consequently delay and uncertainty affecting the military operations. We are of course anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain and the United States. The date of the surrender announcement must of course be fitted in with the military coup.

ROOSEVELT.

CHURCHILL.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 2 September 1943.

GEORGE M. EVANS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.
1. We have received from General C. a statement that the Italians accept and that he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this refers to the short military terms which you have already seen, or to the more comprehensive and complete terms in regard to which your readiness to sign was specifically indicated.

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3. We are therefore assuming that you expect General Eisenhower to sign the short terms in your behalf if that be necessary to avoid the further journeying of General G. to Rome and consequent delay and uncertainty affecting the military operations. We are of course anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain and the United States. The date of the surrender announcement must of course be fitted in with the military coup.

ROOSEVELT.

CHURCHILL.
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER TO MARSHAL STALIN.

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We are of course anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain and the United States. The date of the surrender announcement must of course fit in with the military coup.

[Signature]

Churchill
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

4 September 1943

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusma, Moscow

Personal and from the President to Marshal Stalin

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting on the State Department level.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale Combined Chiefs' Conference.

5. If Mr. Molotov comes and Mr. Eden I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will
try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with
the work of the Combined Staffs.

6. The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I con-
gratulate you again.

7. While this coming conference is a very good thing, I still hope that
you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could
arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth
and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away
from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitu-
tion, no one can sign for me when I am away.

8. Turning now to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with
carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer
to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans
who are now working on this very subject?

9. I have no objection to adding a French member to their meetings
because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions
in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the
French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of
Italy. If the Italians go through with the surrender terms already signed
I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops.
On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the
French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military
elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

10. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs
later on.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2040 EST 4 September 1943.

For Classification

Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Beymer  Date APR 11 1974
FOR: MARSHAL STALIN

September 4, 1943.

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or Moscow, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

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If Mr. Molotov comes I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles, because he has such good knowledge of all shipping, lend-lease and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.

The tenacity and drive of your Army is magnificent and I congratulate you again.

While this coming Conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a
place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

S. Turning now to a question to set a task in connection with carrying out of further settlement with Italy, why not send an officer to Trenkau's headquarters where he would join with the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?

(Enclosed)

10
FOR: MARSHAL STALIN.

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting on the Foreign Office level.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September 25th?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Algiers or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

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the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale
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to send Mr. Hall, but I do not believe that the latter
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Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such
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8. Turning now (I-n-regard) to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?

Formerly para. 5.

2. I have no objection to adding a French member to their meetings, because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with surrender terms already signed, I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

Formerly para. 6.

10. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.
September 4, 1943.

FOR: MARSHAL STALIN

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or Edinburgh, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Algiers or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop into a full-scale Combined Staffs' Conference.
I have no objection to adding a French member to the meeting, because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with surrender, I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.

If Mr. Molotov comes, I would wish to send Mr. Bull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping, lend-lease and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.

The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I congratulate you again.

While this coming Conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a
place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and
December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot
be away from Washington more than about twenty days because,
under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am
away.

W. H. Seward

As to regard to a commission to sit in Italy in
connection with carrying out of further
settlements with Italy, why not send an
officer to AEneas's headquarters where
he would join the British and Americans
who are now working on this very subject?

Respectfully,

William H. Seward
MR. PRESIDENT.

It seemed to me that your draft message to Stalin did not draw clear enough distinction between the Mediterranean Commission and the Three-Power Conference. I have ventured therefore to suggest some alterations which you will be able to identify on the re-typed copy annexed.

I also annex a re-draft of my message, in which I have made some changes. In particular, you will see that I show Stalin I am aware that you propose a different procedure, and I suggest an argument in favour of adopting it.

4.9.43
From: Opnav
To: Altvna, Moscow

From the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalina.

We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted the unconditional surrender of Italy, the terms of which were approved by the United States, the Soviet Republics and the United Kingdom.

Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact with German forces.

Allied troops are also making good progress in the Southern end of the Italian peninsula.

Released at 1155, EWT, September 9, 1943, from the White House Map Room by

Chester Halford
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 11 1972
From President and Prime Minister to Stalin.

We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted the unconditional surrender of Italy, the terms of which were approved by the United States, the Soviet Republics and the United Kingdom.

Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact with German forces.

Allied troops are also making good progress in the Southern end of the Italian peninsula.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: Cusnav
TO: Aleuca, Moscow

From the President to Marshal Stalin personal and secret

Thank you for your message received today.

1. I agree on the immediate setting up of the Military-Political
   Commission but I think Algiers better than Sicily on account of com-
   munications and, therefore, suggest that they meet in Algiers on
   Tuesday, September twenty-first. They will be given full information
   in regard to progress of current and future negotiations but, of
   course, should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of
   course, have to be referred to their Governments before final action.

   I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this
   Commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all
   their deliberations be fully maintained.

2. In regard to the meeting of our three representatives, I will
   cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the date
   the beginning of October — say Monday, the fourth. I will send you
   in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects to be
   discussed, but I think the three members should feel free, after
   becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any other matters
   which may come up.

3. I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the
   third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is all
   right. I fully understand that military events might alter the
   situation for you or for Mr. Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, we
   can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation is the
place but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our Constitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days and Teheran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means going by way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean. For these reasons I hope that you will consider some part of Egypt, which is also a neutral state and where every arrangement can be made for our convenience.

4. I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2206 W.T., 9 September, 1943

BOYCE F. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
September 9, 1943.

FOR: PREMIER STALIN

Thank you for your message received today.

1. I agree on the immediate setting up of the Military-Political Commission but I think Algiers better than Sicily on account of communications and, therefore, suggest that they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, September twenty-first. They will be given full information in regard to progress of current and future negotiations but, of course, should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their Governments before final action.

I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this Commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained.

2. In regard to the meeting of our three representatives, I will cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the date the beginning of October -- say Monday, the fourth. I will send you in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects to be discussed, but I think the three members should feel free, after becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any other matters which may come up.

[Signature]

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date
3. I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is all right. I fully understand that military events might alter the situation for you or for Mr. Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, we can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation is the place but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our Constitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days and Teheran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means going by way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean.

4. I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 11 1942
TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SSt)

U.S. URGENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

MOSCOW, (U.S.S.R.).

881

At the direction of the President and in view of the military situation in Italy, you are instructed to inform the Soviet Government that it is proposed to send the following message to General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean theater. In conveying this message to the Soviet Government you should transmit a very close paraphrase:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions.

"2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians, within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany."
3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammeled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

5. You will encourage, in all practicable ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany.

6. You are authorized to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

September 20, 1943

In accordance with the recommendation made this date by you and the Secretary of War, the President is today requesting concurrence by the Prime Minister of Great Britain with the following message for General Eisenhower.

He desires that you inform Moscow without delay that this government proposes in view of the military situation in Italy to send to the Supreme Allied Commander General Eisenhower the following message:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions.

"2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians, within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany.

"3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammeled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5. You will encourage, in all practicable ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany.

"6. You are authorised to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable."

WILLIAM D. LEHANY
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief
Memorandum for the Secretary of State

In accordance with the recommendation made this date by Mr. and the Secretary of War for the President's appointment, by the Prime Minister of Great Britain with the following message for General Eisenhower:

He desires that you inform Moscow without delay that this government proposes in view of the military situation in Italy to send to the Supreme Allied Commander in Great Britain the following message:

Yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan.
25 September 1943

From: Opnav.
To: Alusna, Moscow.

For Marshal Stalin from the President.

I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but on further consideration I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden.

Mr. Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult for physical reasons. Would it be possible therefore for the conference to be held in England? It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr. Hull could personally attend the conference.

I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change.

Could the date be made October 15 for the opening session?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1235, EDT, 25 Sept 1943.

George W. Elsey,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date
APR 11 972
In Marshall, Stalin
From The President

I am anxious to have Secretary Hull attend the preliminary conference with Molotov and Mr. Eden, but would find the long flight to Moscow for physical reasons. Would it be possible therefore for the conference to be held in England? It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr. Hull could personally attend the conference.

Prospect

I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but on further consideration, I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden.

I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. Could the date for the meeting be moved October 15 for the opening session.

Prospect
28 SEPTEMBER 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.
THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN AND I HAVE AGREED WITH
A RECOMMENDATION OF GENERAL EISENHOWER THAT THE LONG TERM SURRENDER
DOCUMENT AFTER IT IS SIGNED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE
RETAINED IN A CONFIDENTIAL STATUS AND NOT PUBLISHED AT THE PRESENT
TIME.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1150, EST, 28 September, 1945.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By N. J. Stewart Date APR 1 1 1972
September 28, 1943.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO STALIN

The Prime Minister of Great Britain and I have agreed with a recommendation of General Eisenhower that the long term surrender document after it is signed by the Italian Government should be retained in a confidential status and not published at the present time.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 11 1972
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

30 September 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

From Naval Aide to the President

Will you go to the proper authorities and say quote the President is enquiring relative to his message concerning the place of the meeting of the heads of the foreign offices unquote.

With all future messages to Marshal Stalin from the President, would appreciate it if you will continue to acknowledge receipt of message in Moscow immediately and in addition send later dispatch giving time of delivery to Stalin.

WILSON BROWN

Released from the White House Map Room at 1850, EWT, September 30, 1943.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-30-43
Signature- Wilson Brown
To: Naval Attaché

From: Naval Attaché to the President.

Will you go to help authorities and my quote the President in urging relative to his message concerning the place of the meeting of the heads of the foreign offices at

Winston Churchill

Would appreciate if you will
FOR THE NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT.

YOUR MESSAGE WITHOUT DATE TIME GROUP* RECEIVED 0700 OCT 3 AND GIVEN SAME DAY AT 1800 TO ASST COMMISSAR FOREIGN AFFAIRS VISHINSKI WHO STATED ANSWER TO PRESIDENTS MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT SEPT 22. (our copy is dated Sept 26)

*BELIEVE THIS REFERS TO 302353. D/T GROUP APPARENTLY DROPPED IN TRANSMISSION.

NAVAIDE ACTION

FILE

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1900.9 (9/27/58)

Made original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art 79 (e) NAVREG.)