MAP ROOM PAPERS
Box 8
Stalin to Roosevelt
July - September, 1943
INCOMING
DISPATCHES

PREMIER STALIN
TO
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

JULY thru SEPTEMBER
1943
8 Aug 45. STALIN-POTUS. (Answers POTUS-STALIN 15 July 45.) Stalin informs President he is unable to meet with him and Churchill; congratulations on successes in Sicily and collapse of Mussolini; acknowledgement of President's congratulations to Red Army for successes at Orel (POTUS-STALIN 5 Aug 45.)

10 Aug 45. STALIN-POTUS. Informs POTUS that Stalin is unable to meet with him and the President; congratulations on Sicilian operations and Mussolini's overthrow.

22 Aug 45. STALIN-POTUS & PM. Negotiations for surrender of Italy and terms of armistice; organization of Military-Political Commission.


Filed under above message:

27 Aug 45. AMBASSADOR STANLEY-POTUS. POTUS informed by STANLEY that above message was given to him but is not being transmitted since the Soviet Embassy in London was instructed to repeat it to the President.

7 Sept 45. STALIN-POTUS & PM. (Answers POTUS-STALIN 2 Sept 45). Authorizes Eisenhower to sign Brief Terms of Italian Armistice in behalf of Soviet Union.

8 Sept 45. STALIN-POTUS. (Answers POTUS-STALIN 4 Sept 45). Creation of Military-Political Commission; Meeting of Foreign Office representatives; meeting of Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin; acknowledgement of congratulations on Soviet Army; congratulations to Anglo-American troops on successes in Italy. (Amended 9 Sept 45).

8 Sept 45. STALIN-PM. (Answers PM's message, 8 Sept 45). Reprisals to Germans for use of gas in war against Italy.

10 Sept 45. STALIN-POTUS & PM. (Answers POTUS-STALIN 9 Sept 45). Congratulations on landings at Naples and surrender of Italy.
12 Sept 43. STALIN-POTUS & PM. (Answers Notes-STALIN 9 Sept 43). Russian
Representative to Military-Political Commission; meeting of Foreign Office
Representatives; meeting of Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin.

26 Sept 43. HAMILTON-SECRETARY OF STATE. Forwards memo from Molotov re:
(1) Expediting of signature of Italian Armistice Terms; (2) Lightening
of terms of military armistice for Italy; (3) Establishment of
Military-Political Commissio and Allied Control Commission; (4)
Approval of Italy's fighting on side of Allies; (5) Right of Italian
people to choose form of Government.

26 Sept 43. STALIN-POTUS. (Answers POTUS-STALIN 25 Sept 43). Meeting of
Foreign Office Representatives.
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM PREMIER I. V. STALIN
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

1. Only now, having come back from the front, I can answer your message of July 16th. I have no doubt that you take into account our military position and will understand the delay of the answer.

Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive not in June, but in July, and now the battles are in full swing. As it is known, the Soviet Armies repelled the July offensive, recaptured Orel and Belgorod and now is putting the further pressure upon the enemy.

It is easy to understand that under the present acute situation at the Soviet-German front, a great strain and utmost vigilance against the enemy actions are required from the Command of the Soviet troops. In connection with the above, I have at the present time to put aside other questions and my other duties, but the primary duty -- the direction of action at

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* Original 15/25, July 1943
at the front. I have frequently to go to the different parts of the front and to submit all the rest to the interests of the front.

I hope that under such circumstances you will fully understand that at the present time I cannot go on a long journey and shall not be able, unfortunately, during this summer and autumn to keep my promise given to you through Mr. Davis.

I regret it very much, but, as you know, circumstances are sometimes more powerful than people who are compelled to submit to them.

I consider that a meeting of the responsible representatives of the two countries would positively be expedient. Under the present military situation, it could be arranged either in Astrakhan or in Archangel. Should this proposal be inconvenient for you personally, in that case, you may send to one of the above-mentioned points your responsible and fully trusted person. If this proposal is accepted by you, then we shall have to determine a number of questions which are to be discussed and the drafts of proposals which are to be accepted at the meeting.
As I have already told Mr. Davis, I do not have any objections to the presence of Mr. Churchill at this meeting, in order that the meeting of the representatives of the two countries would become the meeting of the representatives of the three countries. I still follow this point of view on the condition that you will not have any objections to this.

2. I use this opportunity to congratulate you and the Anglo-American troops on the occasion of the outstanding successes in Sicily which are resulted in collapse of Mussolini and his gang.

3. Thank you for your congratulation sent to the Red Army and the Soviet people on the occasion of successes at Orel.

August 8th, 1943.
The attached message from the Prime Minister to the President, quoting a message from Marshal Stalin, was also sent to the President by the Prime Minister in PM 4410, 11 August 43.

The Prime Minister's reply to Marshal Stalin was repeated to the President in PM 4411, 12 August 43.

The "British Government's message of August 7" referred to herein is not on file.
Message received on August 10 from Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill.

On my return from the front I have familiarized myself with the British Government's message of August 7.

1. I agree that it is absolutely desirable to have a meeting of the Heads of the three Governments. Such a meeting must be realised at the first opportunity having arranged with the President the time and place of the meeting. I ought to say, at the same time, that in the existing situation on the Soviet-German front I have no opportunity, to my regret, to absent myself and to leave the front even for one week. Although recently we have had several successes on the front an extreme strain on the strength and exceptional watchfulness are required in regard to the new possible actions of the enemy from the Soviet troops and from the Soviet Command just now. In this connection I have to visit the troops on that or other parts of our front more often than usual. In the circum-
stances, at the present time I am not able to visit Scapa Flow or any other distant point for a meeting with you and the President. Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the questions which interest our countries it would be expedient to organize a meeting of the responsible representatives of our states, and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future concerning the place and date of such a meeting. Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which have to be accepted. Without that the meeting will hardly give any tangible result.

(2) I take this opportunity to congratulate the British Government and the Anglo-American troops on the occasion of their most successful operations in Sicily. These operations have caused already the downfall of Mussolini and the break-up of his gang.

ENDS.
Sent to President at Georgian Bay
as WHIT 3.
31 July 1943

The following is a memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State:

"Memorandum for the President.

"It is my feeling that some message along the lines of the following draft should be sent at this time as it is obvious the Soviet Government is becoming concerned over the Italian situation, as indicated in telegram No. 977, July 30, from Moscow, a copy of which is also attached.

"I would like to get off a telegram along these lines if it covers your policy toward the Italian situation, and would be glad to have your reaction or any alterations you may suggest.

"Cordell Hull"

Draft of proposed message from Hull to Winant referred to in above memorandum follows: (The President approved this draft on 31 July as BLACK S).

"AMBASSADOR LONDON.

[Redacted] FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

"Please arrange to see Eden at his earliest convenience and state to him that we agree that in the interest of the war effort the United States and British Governments should at once inform the Soviet Government regarding developments in Italy and give the Soviet Government to understand that we would welcome any suggestions with respect to the Italian situation that it may care to offer.

"We propose that we address a communication to the Soviet Government of the character set forth below and that the British Government simultaneously hand to the Soviet Government a similar communication:

"The Government of the United States is of the opinion that following the disappearance of Mussolini, Italian resistance is rapidly crumbling and that within a relatively short period full capitulation is to be expected. The Allied Commander-in-Chief of the area is being authorized to accept unconditional surrender from anyone who in his judgment is in a position to offer it. He is also being authorized to take such military measures as may seem to him to be appropriate in order to preserve order, guarantee
the security of the Allied forces in Italy, and to prepare for his next immediate future military operations.

"The Government of the United States continued to share the view that it is essential that the United States, British, and Soviet Governments keep each other fully informed regarding military developments in the various areas in which their respective armed forces are operating and also that they maintain constant touch with each other regarding such developments of a political nature as may arise from the immediate military developments.

"Any suggestions with regard to the situation in Italy which the Soviet Government may at this or at any future time care to offer would, therefore, be welcomed by the United States Government. Furthermore, the United States Government would be glad to reply to any specific inquiries which the Soviet Government might care to make with regard to the Italian situation."

Now follows State Department telegram Number 977 of 30 July 1943 referred to in the Secretary's memorandum:

"Moscow.
July 30, 1943.

No. 977, July 30, 4 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

"Ilya Ehrenburg told AP correspondent Cassidy today that the President's disavowal of the OWI broadcast attacking Badoglio and the King of Italy had seriously disturbed Moscow. He said that the TASS dispatch reporting this incident had not yet been published as they wished to avoid stirring up public opinion but he intimated that the Soviet Government might ask for an explanation. He was very frank and tended to be bitter about the failure of Great Britain and the United States to consult with the Soviet Government on such questions. He said that the Russians felt they had a right to be consulted as they had been fighting Italians on this front for some time and that the fact that Germany was so heavily engaged in Russia that it could not support Italy was one of the main reasons for Mussolini's downfall.

"Ehrenburg said that the Russians had understood the use of Darlan because of military necessity and had not protested because the North African affair was to them a relatively unimportant question. Dealing with Badoglio, however, he said was a question of major importance. He asked whether this indicated that we would eventually be prepared to deal with Goering in Germany."
"Cassidy pointed out that the President had in his speech reiterated our demand for the unconditional surrender of Italy. Cassidy then referred to the "Free Germany" movement, to which Ehrungen replied in effect that two could play at this game and that this was the Soviet answer in advance to any attempt to extend the 'Darlan' policy to Europe.

"I am not aware of the extent to which Ehrungen may be reflecting the attitude of the Soviet Government. I am also not aware of the extent to which we the British may have informed the Soviet authorities of our plans in respect to Italy, especially with reference to such matters as what regime we expect to function in Italy during the period of the military occupation and the manner in which and the degree to which we shall permit that regime to discharge governmental and general administrative functions. I realize that there may be compelling reasons why we should desire to leave decision regarding such matters with the appropriate authorities of the countries whose armed forces are actually carrying on military operations in Italy. I have in mind also the fact that the Soviet Government has as yet declined to enter into general discussions on an overall basis as evidenced by Stalin's decisions not to attend the Casablanca Conference. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to point out the great importance of everything feasible being done as the campaign in Italy progresses and as other military operations ensue to avert developments which would give the Soviet Government plausible ground for believing or affirrnng that a sufficiently cooperative attitude had not been shown toward the Soviet Government.

"The communication to the Soviet Government of information in regard to our Government's plans and intentions is, of course, only one step in a possible program of coordination of policies and the Department and other agencies of the Government may have in mind additional steps toward that end.

"I have no knowledge of the policies and procedure which our Government is following other than as reflected in the press and public statements. I am, therefore, making the foregoing comments in the dark. The British or the American Governments may already have established procedures for keeping the Soviet Government currently informed on the subject under discussion. If not, I feel that the most serious consideration should be given to establishing a procedure whereby such information will be promptly and currently communicated to the Soviet Government through me or through such channels as you and the President may deem most appropriate."

"Standley"
London
Dated August 2, 1943
Reo'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

SUBJECT: Draft instrument of surrender for Italy.

URGENT

5032, August 2, 9 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

Thank you for your good message 4656, August 1, 1 p.m., which came in late last night. I could not reach Eden until three o'clock this afternoon London time as he was out of town. I found that since I sent you my message 4661, July 26, 6 p.m., he had communicated with the Russians. He explained to me that he felt obligated to do this because of the British-Russian treaty. I know that he had the support of the War Cabinet in this although I was not informed.

I will let him state the action taken in the aide memoire which I asked him to prepare for me and which, together with copies of the documents given to the Russians, follow below.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

A day or two ago the Soviet Charge d'Affaires was given a summary of the draft instrument of surrender which is still before the United States Government (Annex One). It was made clear that this instrument was purely provisional, pending agreement with the U.S. Government, and that its terms might have to be notified. A note has now been received from Monsieur Sobolev saying that the Soviet Government consider the provisions contained in this summary to correspond fully to the existing conditions, and have no objection to them.

Since communicating the above to the Soviet Government, the President has suggested a shorter formula for a purely military arrangement to be used by General Eisenhower in case of necessity. The Prime Minister has indicated to the President that in case of emergency General Eisenhower may be authorized to present this document. But he has asked the President to consider further the draft instrument already communicated to Washington, so that, if agreement can be reached on it before the emergency arises, General Eisenhower may be authorized to present this fuller document in reply to any Italian request.

The Soviet Government are now being given a summary of the shorter document (Annex Two), with an explanation of the circumstances in which

- 1 -

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Handwritten date: APR 1, 1972]
it was drafted, and in which it may be used. End Aide Memoire.

ANNEX "1"

Summary of draft instrument of surrender for Italy.

The governing consideration is the prosecution of the war against Germany. Our aim is thus to secure the maximum strategic advantage and to avoid unnecessary commitments involving any dissipation of the war effort.

Provision is made for:

1. Acknowledgment of total defeat.

2. Italian participation in the war to cease in all theaters.

3. Withdrawal of the Italian armed forces from all areas outside Italian territory as and when directed.

4. Occupation of much parts of Italian territory as may be required.

5. Such measure of demobilization and disarmament as may be prescribed.

6. The Italian fleet to assemble and to be dealt with as prescribed.

7. Control of airfields, ports and transport systems.

8. All merchant shipping and inland transport equipment to be made available.


10. Control of all inter communications and imposition of censorship.

11. War material to be stored and dealt with as prescribed.

12. Industrial and financial controls.

13. Severance of relations with the other Axis powers and prohibition of all intercourse with them.
14. Interment of Axis forces in Italy.
15. Surrender of war criminals.
17. Immediate handing over of all Allied prisoners of war.

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**ANNEX "B"**

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.
2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.
3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.
4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.
5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.
8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.
9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied military government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilisation and demilitarisation. End Annex Two to Aide Memoire.

In so far as the communications that have passed between the President and the Prime Minister in regard to terms with Italy are concerned, I have been fully informed, but there has been no discussion with me as regards the Russians except as I reported to you following my talk with Eden on July 26. The first information given to the Russians was on July 30.

Eden thought that the statement you forwarded was excellent but of course recognised that it was too late to make it a joint statement. He suggested that we make it our own statement and add at the end of it that "we understand that the British Government has kept you informed of our joint ideas on the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy", and perhaps add that "we were in accord with this procedure."

I helped draft the above statement, except the last sentence. It is my opinion that your statement with the added paragraph would be worth doing. You have asked the Russians in the last paragraph of the statement for suggestions and agreed to reply to specific inquiries. The British have done neither; they have limited both their messages to simply informing them. Their method calls for no reciprocal action beyond giving them information in similar circumstances. Ours puts the Russians under an obligation to seek suggestions from us and to reply to specific inquiries by us if we choose to make them.

W. M. W.
Text of telegram received by Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow dated August 26th.

SECRET

I asked Molotov last night what he thought of the latest peace feelers and the way they were being handled.

2. He said that Stalin was preparing an answer to the message from the Prime Minister and the President. It would be to the effect that the Soviet Government "considered it necessary" to set up an Anglo-Soviet-American politico-military commission to examine the terms of surrender of Italy and of all the other countries likely to fall away from their allegiance to Germany. The commission should be established in Sicily and should get to work at once. The Soviet Government were making this suggestion because they were conscious of their aloofness from such questions and felt that they should properly take a part in them. They recognised that they had been kept fully informed of decisions taken, but they thought the time had come for them to play a part in the taking of them. I asked if he had any criticisms to make of terms of surrender. He said "No".

3. Some such suggestion as this was bound to come sooner or later. Here we had some sense of its likelihood. It has probably now been brought to a head by Quebec meeting and by discussion in Anglo-American press of the absence of a Soviet representative. An article entitled "Quebec and the Soviet Union" in the current number of "War and the Working Classes", which you will doubtless have seen, (Reuters correspondent covered it fully) shows which way the wind is blowing.
briskly.

4. I expect that at first sight Soviet Government proposal when made will be unwelcome to you, because at this stage presence in our councils of a Soviet representative (suspicious and probably inarticulate until prompted from Moscow) will be a nuisance. But for myself I feel strongly that we should face this nuisance and accept the proposal without demur, because it seems to me that immediate and full Soviet participation in our debates about Italy would go a long way not only towards stilling grievances but, more important, towards laying the foundations of real cooperation in the settlement of Europe. Admission of the Soviet Government to our present councils would open the door to ourselves and Americans when the time came to provide for the future of Finland and Eastern Europe.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Sent to the President at Quebec Conference as WHITE 1574, 27 Aug 45.
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM
PREMIER I. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND TO PREMIER MINISTER WILSON CHERCHILL.

1. I have received Your message concerning the
negotiations with the Italians and the new terms of armistice
with Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed
about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say,
that Mr. Eden's statement does not correspond with reality,
as I have received your message in which long passages are
omitted and which has no concluding paragraphs. In view of
this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government
is not informed about the negotiations of the British and
the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance
that within a short time he will receive the complete text
of your message; although the three days have passed, and
Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of

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the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

2. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

3. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.

August 22, 1943.
The following message for the Prime Minister and the President, was handed to the Foreign Office by the Soviet Charge d'Affaires on the night of August 26th, 1943.

PERSONAL AND

From Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Mr. W. Churchill and President Mr. F.D. Roosevelt.

I have received your joint message of August 19th.

I entirely share your opinion and that of Roosevelt about the importance of a meeting between the three of us. In this connexion I beg you most earnestly to understand my position at this moment, when our armies are carrying on the struggle against the main forces of Hitler with the utmost strain and when Hitler not only does not withdraw a single division from our front but on the contrary has already succeeded in transporting, and continues to transport fresh divisions to Soviet-German front. At such a moment, in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot without detriment to our military operations leave the front for so distant a point as Fairbanks although if the situation on our front were different Fairbanks undoubtedly would be very convenient as a place for our meeting as I said before.

As regards a meeting of representatives of our states and in particular of representatives in charge of Foreign Affairs, I share your opinion about the expediency of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting however ought not to have a purely exploratory character but a practicable and preparatory
character in order that after that meeting has taken place our Governments are able to take definite decisions and thus that delay in the taking of decisions on urgent questions can be avoided. Therefore I consider it indispensable to revert to my proposal that it is necessary in advance to define the scope of questions for discussion by representatives of the Three Powers and to draft the proposals which ought to be discussed by them and presented to our Governments for final decision.

Yesterday I received from Sir A. Clark-Kerr additions and corrections to your and Mr. Roosevelt's message, in which you informed me about instructions sent to General Eisenhower in connexion with conditions of surrender worked out for Italy in negotiations with General Castellano. I and my colleagues think the instructions given General Eisenhower correspond entirely to the aim of unconditional surrender of Italy and therefore cannot lead to any objections on our part.

But I think the information so far received is quite insufficient in order to be able to judge what measures are necessary on the part of the Allies during negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity for participation of a Soviet Representative in taking decisions in the course of negotiations. Therefore I think that the time has fully come for establishment of a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries which I mentioned to you in my message of August 22nd.
YOUR 192040.

I HAVE RECEIVED A NOTE FROM MOLOTOV DATED AUGUST 24 SETTING FORTH "FOR MY INFORMATION" A SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM STALIN TO YOU AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO DATED AUGUST 24 IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF AUGUST 19. [THIS IS MOSCOW 261229 FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR STANLEY].

MOLOTOV'S COVERING NOTE STATES THAT STALIN'S MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO THE SOVIET CHARGE D' AFFAIRS IN LONDON FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I AM INFORMED TODAY BY MOLOTOV'S SECRETARY THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPEAT THE MESSAGE TO YOU. I AM THEREFORE NOT TELEGRAPHING THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE.

SIGNED STANLEY.

<Pила......ACTION>

SEALEO
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM

PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL

I have received your message of September 4th.*

The question raised in your message as to whether the
Soviet Government agrees to authorize General Eisenhower
to sign the brief terms of the armistice with Italy in
its behalf is answered by the letter of September 2nd
of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mr. V.M.
Molotov addressed to Mr. Kerr British Ambassador.

This letter said that the authority given by the
Soviet Government to General Eisenhower covers also the
signing of the brief terms of the Armistice.

September 7, 1943

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ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ОТ ПРЕМЬЕРА
И.В. СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Г. ФРАНКЛИНУ Д. РУЗВЕЛЬТУ
И ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ Г. УИНСТОНУ ЧЕРЧИЛЮ.

Ваше послание от 4 сентября я получил. Поставленный Вами в этом послании вопрос о том, согласно ли Советское Правительство на подписание от его имени генералом Эденхаузером кратких условий перемирия для Италии, следует считать исчерпанным письмом Народного Комиссара Иностранных Дел В.М. Молотова на имя посла Великобритании г-на Керра от 2 сентября с.г. В этом письме сообщалось, что полномочия, данные Советским Правительством Эденхаузеру, относятся к подписанию им также и кратких условий перемирия.

7 сентября 1943 года.
PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] MESSAGE FROM

PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Your message in which you touched upon several important questions I received on September 6th.*

First, I still consider, as I did before, that the question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries with its residence at the beginning in Sicily or in Algiers is the most urgent one. Sending of a Soviet officer to the Staff of General Eisenhower can by no means substitute the Military-Political Commission, which is necessary for directing on the spot the negotiations with Italy (as well as with other countries dissociating themselves from Germany). Much time has passed, but nothing is done.

As to the participation of the French representative in this Commission, I have already expressed my opinion on  

*Accidents message of Sep 6th 1943 (Card 020101 207160)
on this subject. However, if you have any doubt, in this case this question can be discussed after the Commission is created.

Second. I consider that the beginning of October as the Prime Minister suggested, would be convenient time for the meeting of the three our representatives, and I propose as the place of the meeting -- Moscow. By that time the three Governments could have reached an agreement regarding the questions which have to be discussed as well as the proposals on those questions, without which (agreement) the meeting will not give the necessary results in which our Governments are interested.

Third. As to our personal meeting with participation of Mr. Churchill I am also interested to have it arranged as soon as possible. Your proposal regarding the time of the meeting seems to me acceptable. I consider that it would be expedient to choose as the place of the meeting
meeting the country where there are the representations of all three countries, for instance, Iran. However, I have to say that the exact date of the meeting has to be defined later taking into consideration the situation on the Soviet-German front where more than 500 divisions are engaged in the fighting in all, and where the control on the part of the High Command of the USSR is needed almost daily.

Fourth. I thank you for congratulations on the occasion of the successes of the Soviet Armies. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and Anglo-American troops on the occasion of the new brilliant successes in Italy.

September 8, 1943
ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ПРЕМЬЕРА
И. В. СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Г-НУ Ф. Д. РУЗВЕЛЬТУ.

Получил 6 сентября Ваше послание, в котором Вы касаетесь ряда важных вопросов.

Первое. Наиболее неотложным вопросом я попрежнему считаю создание военно-политической комиссии из представителей трех стран, с ее местопребыванием на первое время в Сицилии или в Альпах. Посылка советского офицера в штаб генерала Эйзенхауэра или в какой мере не может заменить военно-политическую комиссию, которая необходима для руководства на месте переговорами с Итальией (а также и с правительствами других отпадающих от Германии стран). Времени прошло уже немало, и дело стоит на месте.

Что касается участия французского представителя в этой комиссии, то я уже высказывался об этом. Впрочем, если у Вас имеются сомнения, то можно, конечно, обсудить этот
эта вопрос и после создания комиссии трех.

Второе. Для встречи трех наших представителей дата начало октября, как предлагает премьер-министр, было бы подходящим временем, причем местом встречи я предлагаю Москву. К этому времени можно было бы согласовать междуд тремя правительствами круг подлежащих обсуждению вопросов, а также предложения по этим вопросам, без чего это совещание не может дать необходимых результатов, в которых заинтересованы наши правительства.

Третье. Что касается нашей личной встречи с участием г. Черчилля, то я также стремился осуществить ее в возможно скором времени. Ваше предложение о времени встречи мне представляется приемлемым. Местом же встречи было бы целесообразно назначить страну, где имеется представительство всех трех государств, например, Иран.

Однако, я считаю необходимым сказать, что придется еще дополнительно уточнить момент встречи, счинаясь с обстановкой на советско-германском фронте, где втянуто в войну с обеих сторон свыше 500 дивизий и где контроль со стороны Верховного Командования СССР требуется почти кратдневно.
каждодневно.

Четвертое. Благодарю Вас за поздравление по случаю успехов советских армий. Пользуясь случаем поздравить Вас и англо-американские войска с новыми блестящими успехами в Италии. 8 сентября 1943 года.

5 September 1943
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

The Prime Minister has asked me to send you, for the President's information, the enclosed copy of a message to Mr. Churchill from Marshal Stalin dated September 8, which was handed to Mr. Eden by Monsieur Maisky in London today.

M.M.M.
9.9.43

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

By 

APR 11 1972
Personal and confidential.

I received your message of the 8th September in which you inform me that you and President have given the General Eisenhower instructions to warn the Germans concerning possible reprisals in case they will use gas in war against Italy.

2. For my part, I consider these instructions quite just and have no objections that you and President have given them.
War Department
Classified Message Center
Outgoing Message

Combined Chiefs of Staff
September 6, 1943

TO: CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

USFOR LONDON for
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorize you to make the following statement at the moment considered most appropriate by you. For Eisenhower, Freedom Algiers, PAN 221, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"In the name of the U.S. and British Governments, I wish to make it plain that the use of poison gas against the Italians will call for immediate retaliation upon Germany with gas, using the allied air superiority to the full."

CM-OUT-3572 (8 Sept 43) 0646Z
CM-OUT-3573

Above message approved by the President and the Prime Minister. (The Prime Minister was in Washington, following the Quebec Conference).

Regraded Unclassified
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM
PREMIER I.V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND TO PREMIER MINISTER CHURCHILL.

I have received your message of September 10. I congratulate you with new successes and especially with landing at Naples. There is no doubt that the successful landing at Naples and break between Italy and Germany will deal one more blow upon Hitlerite Germany and will considerably facilitate the actions of the Soviet armies at the Soviet-German front.

For the time being the offensive of the Soviet troops is successfully developing. I think that we shall be in a position to achieve more successes within the next two-three weeks. It is possible that we shall have recaptured Novorossiisk within the next few days.

September 10, 1943
ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ
ОТ ПРЕМЬЕРА И.В.СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Г-НУ РУЗВЕЛЬТУ
И ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ Г-НУ ЧЕРЧИЛЛЮ

Ваше послание от 10 сентября получил. Поздравляю с новыми успехами, особенно с высадкой в районе Неаполя. Не может быть сомнения, что успешная высадка в районе Неаполя и разрыв Италии с Германией нанесут еще один удар по гитлеровской Германии и значительно облегчать действия советских армий на советско-германском фронте.

Наступление советских войск идет пока что успешно. Думаю, что в течение ближайших двух-трех недель будут еще успехи. Возможно, что на днях займет Новороссийск.

10 сентября 1943 года.
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM

PREMIER I. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

AND PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL

I have received your message of September 10th.

1. The question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission we may consider in general to be solved.

Vice-Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, whom you know well, was appointed by the Soviet Government as its plenipotentiary.

Mr. A. E. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the USSR to the Allied Governments in London was appointed as Vice-Plenipotentiary.

They will take with them the group of the responsible Military and Political experts and the small technical staff.

I think that the beginning of work of the Military-Political Commission can be set for September 25-30. I have no objections regarding Algiers as the place of work of the Commission at the beginning, having in view that the Commission itself

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
itself will decide the question of expediency of its going to Sicily or to any other place in Italy.

I find that the consideration of the Prime Minister regarding the functions of the Commission are sound, but I consider that some time later, we shall be able to determine more precisely the functions of the Commission regarding Italy as well as other countries, taking into consideration the first experience of the Commission's work.

2. As to the question of the meeting of our representatives, I propose to consider, as agreed upon that Moscow be the place of the meeting, and October 4, as President suggested be the date of it.

I still consider, as I did before, and about what I had previously written to you, that in order to make this meeting successful it is necessary to know in advance text of the proposals, which the British and the American Governments have and which are to be considered at the meeting of the three representatives. I, however, do not propose any limitation regarding the agenda.

3. As to the meeting of the heads of the three Governments, I do not have any objections regarding Tegar in as the place of the meeting, which (Tegar) is more appropriate than
than Egypt where the Soviet Union does not have its representation.

September 12, 1943
ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ОТ ПРЕМЬЕРА
И.В. СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Г-НУ Ф.Д. РУЗВЕЛЬТУ И
ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ Г-НУ У. ЧЕРЧИЛЮ.

Ваше послание от 10 сентября получили.

1. В отношении военно-политической комиссии можно
считать вопрос в основном разрешенным. Советским Пол-
номочным Представителем нами назначен Заместитель Пре-
седателя Совета Народных Комиссаров и Заместитель На-
родного Комиссара Иностранных Дел Вышинский А.Я., ко-
торый Вам известен. Заместителем его назначен Богомо-
лов А.Е., посол СССР при Союзных Правительствах в Лон-
доне. С ними командируется группа ответственных воен-
ных и политических экспертов и небольшой технический
аппарат.

Я думаю, что начало работы военно-политической
комиссии можно приурочить к 25-30 сентября. Не возра-
жая против того, чтобы комиссия начала свою работу в
Алжире, с тем, чтобы в дальнейшем она сама установила
целесообразность выезда в Сицилию или в какое-либо
другое место в Италии.

Я нахожу правильными соображения премьер-министра
относительно функций комиссии, но считаю, что через
некоторое время, с учетом первого опыта работы комис-
сии, мы сможем уточнить эти функции, как в отношении
Италии, так соответственно и других стран.
2. По вопросу о встрече наших представителей предлагаю считать согласованным место встречи — Москву, а также время встречи — 4 октября, как это предложил Президент.

Я все же считаю, что в интересах успеха этого совещания необходимо заранее знать тексты предложений, которые имеются у английского и американского правительств для рассмотрения на совещании трех представителей, о чем я уже писал ранее. При этом, однако, я не предлагаю никаких-либо ограничений в отношении порядка дня.

3. Что касается встречи трех глав правительств, то я не возражаю против Тегерана, как места встречи, что мне представляется более подходящим, чем Египет, где у Советского Союза все еще нет своего представительства.

12 сентября 1943 года.
Moscow

Dated September 26, 1943
Rc'd 9:55 a.m., 27th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S., URGENT

1470, September 26, 1 p.m.,

FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 881, September 21, 11 a.m.

There was delivered at the Embassy this morning
a secret communication dated September 25, signed by
addressed
Molotov, reading in translation made by an officer of
the Embassy as follows:

The Soviet Government, having taken note of your letter
of September 22, 1943 in which is set forth contents
of the proposed message of the President to General
Eisenhower concerning Italy, considers it necessary
to inform the Government of the United States of
America of the following:

One. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to
expedite the signature with Italy of detailed armistice
terms.

Paraphrase read to 0/few 27, September 1943
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHCB Date APR 1 2, 1972
-2-, #1470, September 26, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

terms, which is particularly necessary in view of
the situation existing in Italy at the present time.

Two. The Allies obviously must be interested in the
strict execution by Italy under the control of the
Allies of the detailed terms of the armistice agreed
upon and ratified by them. Therefore, the Soviet
Government sees no reason for giving instructions re-
garding the lightening of the terms of the military
armistice for Italy as is proposed in point two of the
message, particularly since it is not clear from the
contents of point two exactly what lightening of the
terms is under consideration. It is also necessary to
keep in mind that a change of the provisions ratified
by the Allied Governments obviously can take place
only with the agreement of these Governments.

Three. The Soviet Government considers that the estab-
ishment of an Allied Commission with the functions
and powers set forth in point four of the message is
not necessary in view of the fact that, as is well
known, after the ratification of the detailed armistice
terms there was established by the decision of the three
Governments the Military Political Commission, as a
result of which the question of a control commission
envisioned
-3-, #1470, September 26, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

Unvisaged in Article 37 of the detailed terms should be considered as falling away. Therefore, in opinion of Soviet Government there should be included in the work of the Military Political Commission the coordination and direction of the activities of all military organs organized won enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities with regard to questions of the armistice and of control over the execution of the terms of the armistice and, consequently there should be included in the functions of the Military Political Commission the issuance from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative questions for the Badoglio Government while military operational questions remain entirely under the direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Soviet Government, therefore, sees no reason for establishment of an Allied Commission under the direction of General Eisenhower with above mentioned functions.

Four. The Soviet Government is opposed to Italy fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany.

Five. The Soviet Government agrees to the consideration expressed

See attached memo.
4-, #1470, September 26, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

expressed in point three of message concerning the inalienable right of the Italian Peoply to make a decision concerning the form of Government which they will eventually adopt and also agrees to points five and six of the message.

HAMiLTON

REP
MEMORANDUM FOR LT. COL. CHESTER HAMMOND

September 29, 1943

With reference to telegram No. 1470 from the Embassy in Moscow regarding a secret note dated September 25 signed by Molotov you are informed that telegram No. 1487 has just been received from the Embassy at Moscow stating that there was an error in the translation of paragraph No. 4 of Mr. Molotov’s note and that the correct translation reads to the effect that the Government of the Soviet Union states that it is in favor of Italy fighting with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States against Germany. As a further check the telegram in question quoted the pertinent Russian text which has been verified by our people here to be translated correctly as above.

John Stone

DECASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By D.P. Date APR 12 1972
PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM
PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"Today I have received your message of September 27th."

I share your opinion regarding the desirability
of the Secretary of State Mr. Hull's presence at the
forthcoming conference of the representatives of the
three governments.

At the same time I have to inform you about great
difficulties which could have appeared in case of change
of the decision, previously agreed upon, regarding Moscow
as the place of the forthcoming conference.

The fact is that in case the conference would not
be held in Moscow but in Britain, as you propose,
Mr. V. M. Molotov could not have come to the conference
at the appointed time, whose presence at the conference
I consider to be necessary. Mr. V. M. Molotov's departure
from the USSR, at least in near future, is absolutely
impossible, because as you know, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky,
the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, will very soon
go to Algiers.

Besides,
Besides, as it is known, the press in the United States and in Britain has already widely published the information that the forthcoming conference will take place not elsewhere but in Moscow, and, therefore, the choice of a new place for the conference could have caused undesirable perplexities.

I have no objections against October 15th as the date of the conference.

It is assumed that by that time the agenda of the three partite conference will be finally agreed upon among the three Governments.

September 28, 1943.
ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
РУЗВЕЛЬТУ ОТ ПРЕМЬЕРА И. В. СТАЛИНА.

Я получил сегодня Ваше послание от 27 сентябрь.

Я разделяю Ваше мнение о желательности личного присутствия Государственного Секретаря Г-на Хэлла на предстоящем совещании представителей трех правительств.

Вместе с тем я должен сообщить Вам о тех больших затруднениях, которые встретились бы в случае изменения уже согласованного решения об избрании Москвы местом предстоящего совещания. Дело в том, что в случае созыва совещания не в Москве, а в Англии, как это Вы сейчас предлагаете, на это совещание не смог бы в намеченное время выехать В. М. Молотов, присутствие которого на совещании трех в качестве представителя Советского правительства я считаю необходимым. Выезд из СССР В. М. Молотова, по крайней мере, в ближайшее время является невозможным уже потому, что в скором времени, как Вам
известно, предполагается выезд в Аликр А. Я. Вышинского, являющегося первым заместителем В. М. Молотова по Народному Комиссариату Иностранных Дел.

Кроме того, как известно, печать в США и в Англии уже широко распубликовала, что предстоящая встреча состоится именно в Москве и выбор нового пункта встречи мог бы породить неожидальные недоумения.

"Против установления 15 октября, как даты совещания, возражений с моей стороны не имеется. Надо полагать, что к этому сроку удастся ........

.............................................................. правительства.

28 сентября 1943.