From: Opnav
To: Alamein, Moscow

MEMORANDUM AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT

1. Underlined sentence deleted before delivery to Stalin. See attached dispatches and STATUS SLIP.
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**DISPATCH**

1. **URGENT**
2. **PRIORITY**
3. **ROUTINE**
4. **DEFERRED**
5. **BASEGRAM**

**Codeword**: Recd - 18/12/42

**Sent Red**: 18/12/42

**NDC**: 18/12/42

**IF OPERATIONAL**: 35

**CHECK BELOW**: 17

---

**Personal and secret**: For the President from Harriman

I recommend that you consider omitting from your message to Marshall Stalin your see 171442 the following sentence:

*Quote your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago.* Unquote. The implication of this sentence is that Marshall Stalin should fly over enemy occupied territory. Because of the dangers inherent in such a flight I feel there may be resentment on the part of Stalin's principal advisors which might jeopardize the prospects of the meeting itself. Because of the real fear that I have of such a reaction by the Soviets I have taken the

---

**File**: 2

**Chartroom**: 37-1

**Special**: 50

---

**SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

---

**Declassified**: DECLASSIFIED

**Date**: MAR 9 1972

---

**Oper 19-70**
LIBERTY OF HOLDING DELIVERY OF YOUR MESSAGE

WAITING YOUR REPLY.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter: 1-21-72

By: [Signature] Date: MAR 9 1972

NAVIADE (M & M) .......ACT

ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 37-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPECIAL

SECRET

Hand only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.
18 July 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, Moscow

MEMORANDUM. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Replying to your message 181050, you are authorized to delete before delivery the following sentences:

QUOTE. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1:50, EST, 18 July 1944.

Owen S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

SERIAL or FILE NO. #27, 17 July 44.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Suggested conference in Scotland with Prime Minister.

ACTION:

1. PRESIDENT-STALIN #27 written by the President on Hawaii-Alaska trip. Sent to the Map Room for transmission to Stalin as BLUE 35, 17 July 44.

2. In HARRITAN-PRESIDENT 181050 July (filed herewith), Harriman recommended deletion of a sentence from PRESIDENT-STALIN #27. Sent to President as RED 112.

3. Reply approving deletion written by the President; sent to Map Room as BLUE 39; sent to Harriman as PRESIDENT-HARRITAN #29, 18 July 44.

4. PRESIDENT-STALIN #27 therefore was delivered by Harriman to Stalin with deletion of the paragraph, "Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago." (Underlined in File Copy of dispatch.)

5. Answered by STALIN-PRES 22 JULY 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-FM Conferences.
27 July 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Oppen
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 31. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
MARSHAL STALIN.

I have received your telegram about the Polish situation and
I hear from the Prime Minister that Nikolajczyk is leaving to call
on you. It goes without saying that I greatly hope you can work this
whole matter out with him to the best advantage of our common effort.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0700, EST, 27 July 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt., ADH.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

DATE 31, 27 July 44

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ACTION:

1. The Prime Minister, in his #735, 25 July 44, informed the President of Nikolajczyk's going to Moscow, and stated "anything you say to Stalin that will induce him to give Nikolajczyk a good welcome... will be invaluable." This message was transmitted to the President on HAWAII/ALASKA trip as RED 180.

2. In STALIN-PRES 23 July 44, Stalin forwarded to President copy of message he sent to Churchill. Sent to President as RED 172, 24 July 44.

3. In BLUE 47, the President sent a message to the Map Room for transmission to Stalin, which answers both messages in 1 & 2 above.

4. Answered by Para 2 of STALIN-PRES 2 AUG 44.

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (COPY)
27 July 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 32. AND PERSONAL. FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a
conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid-
military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a
conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as
possible. Such a meeting would help me domestically and we are
approaching the time for further strategical decisions.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 070, EKT, 27 July 1944 by

F. H. GRAHAM,
Capt., Med.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 72 1972

27/07/11 MCR 2934
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO. #32, 27 July 44.

DATE

TO: MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT: Suggested conference in Scotland with Prime Minister

ACTION:

1. Answered STALIN-PRES 22 JULY 44, which was sent to the President on Hawaii/Alaska trip as RED 171.
2. *Written by the President; sent to the Map Room as BLUE 50, 27 July 44, for transmission to Stalin.
3. Answered by STALIN-PRES 2 AUG 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 PRES-PW Conferences.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 42. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.

AND PERSONAL.

I am most grateful for your telegram of August 9 in which you were good enough to give me a resume of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk's conversations in Moscow both with you and with the Polish Committee.

As you know it is my earnest hope that some solution satisfactory to all concerned will emerge out of these conversations and which will permit the formation of an interim legal and truly representative Polish Government.

In regard to Lange, I am sure you will recognize the difficulty of this Government taking official action at this stage. Of course he as a private citizen has every right under our law to do what he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. You will, I am sure, understand why, under the circumstances and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations between Premier Mikołajczyk, whose Government we still recognize officially, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States does not want to become involved in nor express any opinion concerning the request of the Polish Committee that Professor Lange join it as head of the section on Foreign Affairs.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0530, EWT, 12 August 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE, CAPTAIN CE
FROM STEITNITUS TO THE PRESIDENT:

In regard to the question of Professor Lange there is much more involved in the present suggestion than there was in his previous visit as a private citizen to the Soviet Union, and I do not see how this Government can lend its support or offer any facilities to an American citizen, even should he renounce such citizenship, accepting an official post in a Committee which is frankly and openly a rival to the government which we officially recognize. Any such action on our part, apart from its obvious impropriety would be particularly unfortunate at this moment when, as Stalin indicates, the conversations between Nikolajczyk and the Polish Committee offer some prospect of compromise solution.

The desire to have Professor Lange is obviously a tactical move designed to strengthen the claims of the Polish Committee to be recognised as the legal government of Poland, since until Poland is liberated and such government set up, questions of foreign affairs do not arise.

Any disinclination to have Dr. Lange go over now to take a post on this Polish Committee would be without prejudice to any question of his being invited later to accept a portfolio of a Polish government legally constituted as a result of a reconstruction of that government following the present conversations between Nikolajczyk and the Polish Committee.

Proposed answer to Stalin:

"I am most grateful for your telegram of August 9 in which you were good enough to give me a resume of Prime Minister Nikolajczyk's conversations in Moscow both with you and with the Polish Committee.

"As you know it is my earnest hope that some solution satisfactory to all concerned will emerge out of these conversations, which will permit the formation of an interim legal and truly representative Polish Government."
"In regard to Lange, of course he as a private citizen has every right under our law to do what he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. You will, I am sure, understand why, under the circumstances and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations between Premier Mikolajczyk, whose government we recognize, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States become involved in or express any opinion concerning the request of the Polish Committee that Professor Lange join it as head of the Section on Foreign Affairs."
FROM: The President

TO: Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 42, 12 Aug 44

DATE: 12 Aug 44

TO MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations; visit of Lange to Moscow

ACTION:

1. For complete file on this subject, see "UR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" Answers STALIN-PRES, 9 Aug 44, which was sent to the President on HAWAII/ALASKA trip as RED 293, 10 Aug 44.

2. BLUE 103, 11 Aug 44, President referred message to SecState with comment, "What reply do you suggest sending to Marshal Stalin's RED 293. It is my thought that we can raise no objection to Professor Lange's going as he is really a free agent and we let him go once before."

3. SecState replied in memo to the President, 11 Aug 44, attaching draft message to Stalin, which was sent to the President as RED 306.

4. President approved draft reply, with minor change in last paragraph, sent to Map Room for transmission to Stalin as BLUE 112; sent to Stalin 12 Aug 44.

5. No direct reply by Stalin.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: MARSHAL STALIN

DATE: 19 AUGUST 1944

I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do now that would be of more assistance in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion.

ROOSEVELT

Sent through Ambassador Harriman (Navy Channels)
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO. 19 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Use of Soviet far eastern bases.

ACTION:


2. In his #4, to Harriman, the President forwards suggested message to Stalin (prepared by Admiral Leahy) to be sent to Stalin at discretion of Harriman. In 203502Z, Harriman notified President that message had been delivered to Stalin.

3. Answered by STALIN-PRES. 22 Aug 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

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330 JAPAN.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: MARSHAL STALIN
DATE: 20 AUGUST 1944

We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazi's in Warsaw
are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do
the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope
that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles
in Warsaw, or will agree that our planes should do it very quickly or you
will agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly.¹ We hope you will
approve. The time element is of extreme importance.

CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT

¹. will agree = as originally drafted but deleted by
Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Kerr.
See Harriman's 201610 August 1944.

will agree = addition by Ambassadors Harriman and
Clark Kerr.
ACTION:

1. After Soviet refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to drop supplies to Warsaw, the Prime Minister suggested to the President that a joint message be sent to Stalin (PM-PRES #760, 18 Aug 44).

2. The President drafted a message for joint signature and sent it to the Prime Minister, suggesting that it be transmitted to Stalin if approved by the Prime Minister (PRES-PM #601, 19 Aug 44).

3. In PM-PRES #762, 20 Aug 44, the PM stated "The message in your #601 has been sent on to U.S. over our two signatures. Our thoughts are one."

4. On 20 Aug 44, Ambassador Harriman cabled the President that, after discussion with British Ambassador, they had changed the wording of a portion of the message to avoid misunderstanding and had delivered message to Stalin, (HARRIMAN-PRES, 201610 Aug 44, filed "WR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."). Changes shown on file copy of PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER-STALIN attached hereto.

5. In PRES-HARRIMAN #47, 23 Aug 44 (filed "WR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS") the President informed Harriman that action taken by him and the British Ambassador, as stated in Harriman's 201610, was approved.

6. Answered by STALIN-PRES/PM 22 AUGUST 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
FROM: GPNAY
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 55, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshall Stalin:

...QUOTE. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I am much concerned at the reference made by your delegation at Dumbarton Oaks that the Soviet Government might desire to have the sixteen constituent republics considered for individual membership in the new international organization. Although it was made clear by your delegation that this subject would not be raised again during this present stage of the conversations, I feel I must tell you that to raise this question at any stage before the final establishment and entry into its functions of the international organization would very definitely imperil the whole project, certainly as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly other important countries as well. I hope you will find it possible to reassure me on this point.

This would not prejudice later discussion of the question after the organization came into being. The Assembly would then have fully authority to act. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EDT, 31 August 1944.

COLIN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

4 September 1944

This memorandum is to inform you that the State Department draft of a message to Ambassador Harriman, incorporating a message to Stalin re representation of sixteen constituent republics in the new International Organization being formed at Dumbarton Oaks, was dispatched to Ambassador Harriman on 31 August 1944 as President's 655.

This message was sent as drafted by the State Department, with the addition of the following paragraph at the end:

"This would not prejudice later discussion of the question after the organization came into being. The Assembly would then have full authority to act."

RICHARD PEARCE, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please deliver the following message from the

President to Marshal Stalin:

I am much concerned at the reference made by your delegation at Dumbarton Oaks that the Soviet Government might desire to have the sixteen constituent republics considered for individual membership in the new international organization. Although it was made clear by your delegation that this subject would not be raised again during this present stage of the conversations, I feel I must tell you that to raise this question at any stage before the final establishment and entry into its functions of the international organization would very definitely imperil the whole project, certainly as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly other important countries as well. I hope you will find it possible to reassure me on this point.

This would not prejudice later discussion of the question after the organization came into being. The Assembly would then have fully authority to act.

[Handwritten note:]

APR 27 1944

[Signature]
**Subject:** Dumbarton Oaks Conference; consideration of 16 Soviet constituent republics for individual membership.

**ACTION:**

1. Draft dispatch written in State Department.
2. President approved with additional of Para at end of message.
3. Answered by STALIN-FR55, 7 Sept 44.

---

**COPIES TO:**

---

**DATE:**

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**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---
8 September 1944

From: Opnav
To: Ukraine, Moscow

NUMBER 50. AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR
MAYNARD.

Please deliver the following message (SPAND) from the President to
Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have just had a pleasant and interesting talk with your Ambassador in
regard to the progress of the Dumbarton Oaks talks. There is apparently only
one issue of importance on which we have not yet reached agreement and that is
the question of voting in the Council. The British and ourselves both feel

strongly that parties to a dispute should not vote in the decisions of the Coun-
cil even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council, whereas I
gather from your Ambassador that your Government holds the opposite view.

Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have
never voted in their own case and I know that public opinion in the United States
would neither understand nor support a plan of international organization in
which this principle was violated. Furthermore I know that this same view is
held by many nations of the world and I am entirely convinced that the smaller
nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization in which
the great powers insisted upon the right to vote in the Council in disputes in
which they themselves were involved. They would most certainly see in that an
attempt on the part of the great powers to set themselves up above the law.

Finally, I would have real trouble with the Senate. For these reasons I hope you

will find it possible to instruct your delegation to agree with our suggestion

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stowell Date APR 27 1972
on voting. If this can be done the talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily con-
cluded with complete and outstanding success. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1350, 8 September 1944.

J. A. TIERE, JR.
Lt. Comdr., USN.

81839 NCR 4826
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Under Secretary of State.

There is returned herewith a copy of a message drafted by your office for transmission to Marshal Stalin. The message was dispatched with the addition by the President of the following sentence:

"Finally, I would have real trouble with the Senate."

The additional sentence was inserted before the one beginning with the words: "For these reasons...."

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOONE,
Lieutenant, USNR

Encs
State Dept. draft msg. 9/3/44
EE;CEB;LIS;DFS.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
Miss Tully:

I am attaching a redraft of the telegram which was discussed with the President this morning, to be despatched immediately if it meets with his approval.

[Signature]

[Footer]
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

AMBASSADOR

MOSCOW

PLEASE deliver the following message (SPAM) from the President to Marshal Stalin:

AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have just had a pleasant and interesting talk with your Ambassador in regard to the progress of the Dumbarton Oaks talks. There is apparently only one issue of importance on which we have not yet reached agreement and that is the question of voting in the Council. The British and ourselves both feel strongly that parties to a dispute should not vote in the decisions of the Council even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council, whereas I gather from your Ambassador that your Government holds the opposite view. Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have never voted in their own case and I know that public opinion in the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972

NOT SENT NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR
States would neither understand nor support a plan of international organization in which this principle was violated. Furthermore I know that this same view is held by many nations of the world and I am entirely convinced that the smaller nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization in which the great powers insisted upon the right to vote in the Council in disputes in which they themselves were involved. They would most certainly see in that an attempt on the part of the great powers to set themselves up above the law. For these reasons I hope you will find it possible to instruct your delegation to agree with our suggestion on voting. If this can be done the talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily concluded with complete and outstanding success.

Pompeo

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date 27 1972
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO.: #58, 8 Sept 44

DATE: 8 Sept 44


ACTION:

1. Draft dispatch written by the State Department; approved by the President with minor change, 8 Sept 44. (State Dept notified 8 Sept 44)
2. Answered by STALIN-FREE, 14 Sept 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM:

Subject: Messages for Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The enclosed messages approved by the President and Prime Minister are forwarded here-with for dispatch to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

[Signature]

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of MEMOR

[Signature] [Date: JAN 8 1974]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: THE PRIME MINISTER:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the enclosed draft telegrams to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of the OCTAGON Conference.

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, A. J. McPARDLAND,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Combined Secretariat

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
JAN 8 1974
To: Alusna, Moscow
From: Naval Aide to the President.

My immediately following message is top secret. It should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

To: Alusna, Moscow

Top secret and Personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

1. In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.

Operations in North West Europe

2. It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.
Operations in Italy

3. As a result of our present operations in Italy
   (a) Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or
   (b) Kesselring's army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.

Operations in the Balkans

4. Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.

Operations against Japan

5. We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.

6. Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-8-72
JAN 8 1974

Enclosure "A"
ENCLOSURE "B"

From: Agvar

To: Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China-Burma-India, Forward Echelon - Chungking, China

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

From: Agvar

To: Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China-Burma-India, Forward Echelon - Chungking, China

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

Top secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 6-3-72
JAN 8 1974

Enclosure "B"
First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

Third: Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to prepare a large scale amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

Fourth: We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.
Ambassadors Tell Stalin
Of Quebec Decisions

By the Associated Press.

LONDON, Sept. 23.—The Moscow radio said tonight that Premier Stalin had received the American and British Ambassadors, W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who "on behalf of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill informed him of decisions taken at the Quebec conference."
FROM PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER TO MARSHAL STALIN

SERIAL or FILE NO. #65 & #66, 18 Sept 44.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: OCTAGON (Quebec II) Conference decisions

ACTION:

1. Dispatches written by Chiefs of Staff at OCTAGON (Quebec II) Conference. Forwarded by memo, signed by Combined Secretariat, to the President and the Prime Minister on 16 Sept 44. Pencilled notation, "Approved by President and Prime Minister. W.D.L." written on memo by Admiral Leahy.

2. Forwarded by memorandum to the White House Map Room by General McFarland, Secretary CCS, on 18 Sept 44, for transmission to Stalin.

3. See 5 messages from Harriman to the President (232021, 232038, 232114, 232319, & 251400) in which Harriman reports his meeting with Stalin at which he and the British Ambassador presented the OCTAGON Conference decisions to Stalin. (Filed herein, 23 Sept 44.)
FROM: NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT

TO: ALUSMA, MOSCOW

Number 65.

My immediately following message is It should be seen only by Alusma, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

W. THOMAS

Released from the White House Map Room at 1100, EST, 18 September 1944.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOV

NUMBER 66, AND PERSONAL TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

1. In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.

Operations in North West Europe

2. It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.

Operations in Italy

3. As a result of our present operations in Italy
   
   (a) Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or
   
   (b) Kesselring's army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.
NUMBER 66 to STALIN.

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.

Operations in the Balkans

4. Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.

Operations against Japan

5. We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.

6. Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL.

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1103, EWT, 18 September 1944.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.
4 October 1944

FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 76. HARRIMAN

Your number 031404 received.

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

QUOTE. While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.

You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador In Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By N. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
You will, by this time, have received from General Deane, the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours. UNQUOTE.

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bi-lateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that when this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the discussions are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1345, EWT, 4 October 1944.

F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD.
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin (Via Harriman)

SERIAL or FILE NO. 76, 4 October 1944.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: CHURCHILL-STALIN Conference.

ACTION:

1. In HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT 024442, 4 Oct 44, Harriman requested guidance in forthcoming conference between Churchill and Stalin.

2. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy, written 4 Oct 44, was approved by the President. Before being dispatched, message was read by Mr. Hopkins, who, after conversations with the President, directed that the message be held up a few hours.

3. Reply prepared by Mr. Hopkins, approved by the President; sent to Harriman for delivery to Stalin as PERS-HARRIMAN #76, 4 Oct 44. Dispatch by Leahy, mentioned in para 2 above, was cancelled. (See HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT folder for original drafts.)
AMBASSADOR
MOSCOW
FOR THE CHARGE D'APPARES
Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PERSONAL AND FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. The recent enlargement of the Consultative Assembly has made these authorities more representative of the French people. It is expected that in the very near future the French, with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up a real zone of the interior which will be under French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate time to recognize the French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. I am informing you in advance of our intentions in this regard in case you wish to take some similar action at the time the zone of the interior is set up under French administration.

END QUOTE.
10/30/44

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 19, 1944

With reference to your reply to Prime Minister Churchill on the question of recognizing a Provisional Government of France, I believe you may wish to consider the desirability of also informing the Soviet Government of your intention. I believe it is safe to assume that the British Government will promptly inform the Soviet Government. I therefore attach a suggested draft message which you may wish to send to Marshal Stalin.

Encl.

Draft message.

To Comrade Stalin, Head of Government.

[Handwritten signature]

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

APR 27 1972

[Stamp]
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

DATE: Yom (State Dept msg), 20 Oct 44.

SUBJECT: Recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION: (See file "Oil France" for complete correspondence)

1. Draft message sent to President by SecState by memo, 19 Oct 44. (Copy attached). The "reply to Prime Minister" referred to in memo is PRS-PM #631, 19 Oct 44.
2. President approved without change. Sent to Marshal Stalin thru State Department channels.
3. Answered by STALIN-PRS 22 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: Oil France

DATE: __________________

BY DIRECTION OF: __________________

Oil France.
24 OCTOBER 1944

FROM: OPMAY
TO: ALJUSHA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 100, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19 and from reports by Ambassador Harriman of the success attained by you and Mr. Churchill in approaching an agreement on a number of questions that are of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a satisfactory and a durable peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when the three of us should come to a full agreement on our future activities and policies and mutual interests.

We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held, such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.

I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, Athens, or Cyprus if my getting into the Black Sea on a ship should be impracticable or too difficult. I prefer travelling and living on a ship.

We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Cyprus are satisfactory.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

Please let me have your suggestions and advice.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1130, EDT, 24 October 1944.

RICHARD PEARL, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
PRESIDENT TO STALIN:

I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19 and from reports by Ambassador Harriman of the success attained by you and Mr. Churchill in approaching an agreement on a number of questions that are of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a satisfactory and a durable peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when the three of us should come to a full agreement on our future activities and policies and mutual interests.

We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held, such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.

I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, Athens, or Tunis if my getting into the Black Sea on a ship should be impracticable or too difficult. I prefer traveling and living on a ship.

We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Tunis are satisfactory.
I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

Please let me have your suggestions and advice.

[Signature]
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

SUBJECT: Churchill-Stalin conference; three-power meeting.

ACTION:

1. Answered STALIN-PRES, 19 Oct 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-491, 22 Oct 44.
2. MR-IN-174, 22 Oct 44, from the President to Admiral Leahy stated: "Re MR-OUT-491. Please prepare reply for me to send Tuesday morning."
3. Admiral Leahy's draft reply approved without change by the President.
4. (See also PRES-PM #635, 24 Oct 44, which quotes this message to Churchill.)
5. Answered by STALIN-PRES, 29 Oct 44.
10 November 1944

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW 101817Z, NCR

NUMBER 114. PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I am very pleased to have your message of congratulations and happy that you and I can continue together with our Allies to destroy the Nazi tyrants and establish a long period of peace in which all of our peace-loving peoples, freed from the burdens of war, may reach a higher order of development and culture, each in accordance with its own desires.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 101817Z, November 1944

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Captain, C.E.
November 10, 1944

THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN:

I am very pleased to have your message of congratulations and happy that you and I can continue together with our Allies to destroy the Nazi tyrants and establish a long period of peace in which all of our peace-loving peoples, freed from the burdens of war, may reach a higher order of development and culture, each in accordance with its own desires.

[Signature]

[Annotation: #114]
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 114, 10 November 1944

DATE

TO Whom VIA

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of election congratulations.

ACTION:

1. Answers STALIN-PRES, 9 Nov 44, which was sent to the President via Usher.
2. Reply by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President Nov 10, 1944.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

000.1
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSNA, MOSCOW

18 NOVEMBER 1944

NUMBER 124, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

All three of us are of one mind — that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth.

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as it would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will have rail travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which...
should provide a fairly good climate at that time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that
I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action
on Legislation — a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to
get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you
from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meet-
ing longer than the end of January or early February.

Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disin-
tegrate quickly, we would have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer
the meeting at the end of January.

A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but
this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern
Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's
problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I
have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out
the problem between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is
making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 10:15:17, Nov 1944.

RICHARD P'ARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1977
THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN, YOUR 181637, WAS DELIVERED TO MOLOTOV'S OFFICE BY THE CHARGE-D'AFFAIRES AT NINETEEN HUNDRED.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT 5000.9 (9/27/58)

DATE: 8/1/71

NAVAIDE (#1 & #2) ACTION

SIGNATURE: R. H. Parks

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPECIAL

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70. Keep Segregated.
THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RECEIVED FROM MOLOTOV AT 1230Z A LETTER STATING THAT YOUR TOP SECRET 181637 HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO FINAL DESTINATION.

Read 201937Z.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
NAVYD((1-2))....ACTION

---

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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Date: 8/19/71
Signature: #HP

---

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 7B, Navy Regulations.
November 18, 1944.

To: MARSHAL STALIN
From: THE PRESIDENT

All three of us are of one mind -- that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth.

You should take the same ship a little further

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as it would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested of Jerusalem and Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under the
Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will have seen travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which should provide a fairly good climate at this time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on Legislation— a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January.
or early February.

Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disintegrate quickly, we should have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer the meeting at the end of January.

A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out the problem between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you.  

ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEARY

Will you let me know what

you think?

F. D. R.
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

DATE 124, 18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Tripartite meeting.

ACTION:
1. Replies to STALIN-PRES 29 October 1944.
2. Written by the President. President's draft sent by memo, signed F.D.R., 17 Nov 44, to admiral Leahy with following notation: "Will you let me know what you think?"
3. Approved by Adm Leahy; dispatched 18 November 1944.
4. (See PRES-PM #650, 18 Nov 44, which quotes this message to the Prime Minister.)
5. Answered by STALIN-PRES 21 November 1944.
5 December 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

FOR THE URGENT AND PERSONAL ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM STETTINIUS, STATE DEPARTMENT NUMBER 2784.

1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal Stalin in order to deliver the following message from the President to him, White House Number 1321:

QUOTE. In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between us are still unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am asking Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message to you and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Mr. Churchill.

After giving this whole subject further consideration, I now feel that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:

PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTER ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

You will note that this calls for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I can see, as a practical matter, that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character each permanent member would always have a vote.

At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members. But I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting. I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position.
as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests of the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations.

Neither the Soviet nor the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks contained specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature. Our representatives there were not, of course, in a position to reach a definite agreement on the subject. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have so well carried forward on our behalf.

If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council as I now suggest, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Mr. Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference? UNQUOTE.

2. We assume that you will wish to have a careful Russian translation made of the foregoing message so that you can hand to Marshal Stalin both the English and Russian texts of the President's message.

3. The contemplated meeting referred to in the last paragraph of the President's message would be an informal one in which only two or three representatives of each of the three countries would participate. In other words, we do not have in mind anything in the nature of a reconvening of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. We have no fixed idea at the present time as to just who these representatives would be or as to where they should meet, although perhaps
London might prove to be appropriate and convenient.

4. You may wish to present orally, and perhaps in a separate memorandum, additional observations in support of the President's views which necessarily are stated in restricted compass in the message itself. Among the additional considerations which impress us and some or all of which you should feel free to use as you see fit as representing the views of your Government are the following:

Unanimity of thought and action on the part of the great powers in all decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security is of the greatest importance. With the great powers unanimous in thought and in action and equally and instantly ready to employ measures of enforcement in behalf of peace and security when and as necessary, there will be the greatest inducement for parties to disputes to arrive at peaceful settlements. Such a atmosphere of harmony among the great powers and general willingness to resort to measures of peaceful settlement should result in conditions of more assured stability in international relations than has ever before obtained in history. These realizable conditions will mean that all states will look first to the major powers themselves to abide by the obligations contained in the charter of the organization to seek peaceful adjustment or settlement of any differences in which they may be concerned. We can conceive of no more effective justification of the special position of the great powers as principal guardians of the peace than the voluntary undertaking by each of them, along with all other members of the organization, to abstain in any controversy in which it may be engaged from voting on procedures which in the eyes of mankind will partake of an impartial examination of the controversy by the highest tribunal of the world society. This should further make evident that the leadership of the great powers is to be based not alone upon size, strength, and resources, but on those enduring qualifications of moral leadership which can
raise the whole level of international relations the world over. The assurance and the enhancing of this leadership is in the interest of each of the great powers, as well as of all the world.

5. We have great confidence in your ability to convince Marshal Stalin of the reasonableness of our views which we feel are fully as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as in those of all other states. We do not, of course, feel that we are in any sense asking simply for a yes or no answer, although we would naturally be highly gratified to ascertain that Marshal Stalin agrees with our views. We agree entirely with the view which you emphasized in Washington that, even if you are not entirely successful at this time in persuading the Marshal to adopt as his own the views expressed in the President's message, it is essential to keep the issue open and to avoid any crystallization of a negative attitude on the part of the Soviet Government on this vitally significant matter.

STETTINIUS

Released from the White House Map Room at 051728Z, December, 1944.

ROBERT W. HOUG, Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSEFIED
State Dept. Letter; 1-11-78

By Date MAR 8 1972
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of European Affairs

December 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The Secretary is in entire agreement with the suggestion that the President delay his reply to Stalin until he has heard from Churchill. If Churchill’s views do not raise new questions requiring further consideration, there is attached a suggested reply from the President to Marshal Stalin to be sent after he has heard from Churchill. If the President does not hear within a day from Churchill, it would be advisable for the President to take the initiative and endeavor to ascertain his views on these French questions.

/s/ C. E. BOHLEN

HE:CHEB:TMT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAP ROOM

Subject: Messages for Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill

Please send forward promptly the attached messages to Prime Minister Churchill and to Marshal Stalin, the latter being incorporated, you will note, in a telegram to Ambassador Harriman. The President approved these messages on November 22 and authorized the time of their dispatch to coincide with Ambassador Harriman's arrival in Moscow. As Ambassador Harriman is expected to reach Moscow in the very near future, it is important that the messages now go forward.

The Moscow telegram should, of course, be sent to Harriman, secret for him alone, but the one to London should be sent directly to the Prime Minister.

RECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 3-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 9 1972
PRIORITY

6 December 1944

From: Opnav

To: Marshal Stalin, Moscow

NUMBER 133. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR

MARSHALL STALIN.

Thank you for your two informative messages of December two and December three.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General De Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General De Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 061652Z, December, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. APR 27, 1972

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR.

By V. J. Stewart Date_
PERSONAL AND]

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

Thank you for your two informative messages of December 2 and December 3.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General de Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable.
16 DECEMBER 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALIUSNA, MOSCOW

1701162 NCR

NUMBER 136, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

QUOTE. 1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general postwar settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.

3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have no objection if the Government and the people of

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.

UNQUOTE.

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By V. J. Stewart Date APR 27 1972
form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

Released 17O1162 Dec 1944.

ODEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM  The President  TO  Marshal Stalin

Do NOT FILE NO.  136, 16 December 1944

TOP MAP ROOM  1701162  Via

SUBJECT:  Poland

ACTION:

1. See PM-FHES #853, 16 Dec 1944, in which the Prime Minister suggests that the President send a message to Stalin. PM #853 sent to the President at Warm Springs as RE-OUT-566, 1615102; also sent by Adm Brown to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

2. In WH-IN-236, 1620442, the President forwarded two suggested messages— one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given WH-IN-236. He requested, however, that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen WH-IN-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-OUT-670 (1621152).

3. At 1622322, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-OUT-672: "My suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."

4. In WH-IN-238, 1623352, the President approved Stettinius' draft messages—"Your WH-OUT-672 approved. Please notify the PM in my name."

5. Message sent to Marshal Stalin in this message, PMES-STALIN #136; OX-282.

COPIES TO:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
repeated to the Prime Minister in Fhki-P4 #675, 16 Dec 44.
6. See MI-NQ-PRC 2108355, 21 Dec 44, which explains four-day delay
in delivery of this message to Stalin.
7. Answered by STA-ASA, 27 December 1944.
23 December 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusma, Moscow

NUMBER 144. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send to Moscow a fully qualified officer of his staff to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front, in order that all of us may have information essential to our coordination of effort. We will maintain complete secrecy.

I hope you will see this officer of Eisenhower's Staff and arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of the next phase.

In view of the emergency an early reply to this proposal is requested.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 231731Z, December, 1944.

H. W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 27, 1972
December 23, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT

TO STALIN

Your 567. It is my opinion that better results would be obtained if you should send a message to Stalin
as follows:

I am informed by President Roosevelt that he wishes to direct General Eisenhower to send to Moscow a fully qualified officer of his staff to discuss with you General Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front, in order that all of us may have information essential to our coordination of effort. We will maintain complete secrecy.

I hope you will see this officer of Eisenhower's Staff and arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of the next phase.

Roosevelt

The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of the

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By U. J. Stewart Date APR 27, 1972
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

SECRET or FILE NO. 444, 23 Dec 44.

DATE

TO WHOM VIA

SUBJECT: Eisenhower's sending representatives to Moscow.

ACTION: (See AR 340 (2) for complete file)
1. See FM-PRESS #657, 23 Dec 44, in which Churchill suggests joint telegram to Stalin. This was referred to Admiral Leahy and the JCS by the President.
2. This message to Stalin was drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched to Stalin 231731.
3. Quoted to Churchill in FM-PRESS #677, 23 Dec 44.
4. Answered by FM-PRESS 2317302, 23 Dec 44.
5. Also see HARRIMAN-PRESS 2317302, in which Harriman advises that Stalin had approved Eisenhower's sending representative.

COPIES TO:
340 (2)

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:
PRIORITY

FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

30 DECEMBER 1944

NUMBER 153, PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition.
from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Nikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Nikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Nikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position.

[Handwritten note: By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.]

[Handwritten note: By J. Stewart, Date APR 2, 1972]
of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military angle, see any great objection to a delay of a month.

ROOSEVELT

Released 3019532 December 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.M.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Pres. wishes this
message referred to R. M. in
acknowledging letters 864 and
"You will see that we are
in with"

Alone in handwriting of
Mr. Bolten, State Dept. The last
sentence to the message.
Message delivered to Map Room by Mr. Bolten
at 1500 EWT, 8 Dec. 44
and Personal from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain
Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic
relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own
that I see no prospect of this Government's following
suit and transferring its recognition from the Government
in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form.
This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings
for the London Government. The fact is that neither the
Government nor the people of the United States have as
yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of
its creation or from subsequent developments to justify
the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present
constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot
ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction
of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated
from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned
truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity
to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of
Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular
support is established, the attitude of this Government
would
would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

SERIAL or FILE NO. 153, 30 December 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Poland; Recognition of Lublin Committee

ACTION:

1. Answers STALIN-PRES 27 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as JR-OUT-712, 291220Z.

2. At 291355Z, in JR-OUT-713, Adm Leahy sent the following message to the President: "Referring to Stalin's message dated 27 Dec (JR-OUT-712) permission is requested to send it to State Department for preparation of a draft reply.

   "It would seem appropriate or necessary to send Stalin's message to Churchill before replying to U.S."

3. JR-IN-252, 291655Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "Refer to your JR-OUT-713 and 712. For State Department for consideration of reply." This, however, did not answer Adm Leahy's request in JR-OUT-713 that message be sent to Churchill.

4. To straighten out above point, Adm Brown sent the following msg to the President at 291338Z as JR-OUT-716: "Does your JR-IN-252 to Admiral Leahy authorize sending a copy to Churchill, or shall we hold until your return?"

5. President's reply to Admiral Brown, JR-IN-253, 292003Z, stated: "Re your JR-OUT-716. Message to Churchill may go."

6. Stalin's message sent to Churchill as PRESS-FM #681, 292017Z, with notation, "I should like your comments before making a reply."

7. PM replied in his #864, received 301727Z. Shown to Mr. Bohlen by Admiral Leahy's office.

O-V-E-R

COPIES TO: MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: 

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052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS