EXCHANGE
OF DISPATCHES
BETWEEN
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
and
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
1941-1942
29 December 1941. PRES—CHIANG. Creation and command of Chinese Theater.

13 April 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Chiang's comments on unpreparedness of Burma area; request for 300 planes for Burma defense.


26 May 1942. LAUCHLIN CURRIE—MADAME CHIANG. Aid to China. (Answers Madam Chiang's message 23 May 1942.)

24 June 1942. PRES—CHIANG. Ordering of heavy bombers of the 10th Air Force to Middle East; no decision on assignment of squadron of A-29 light bombers.

5 June 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Stilwell's duties as Chief of Staff to Chiang, and as controller of Lend-Lease aid to China.

6 July 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Stilwell's duties. (Continuation of 5 July 1942 message).

15 July 1942. PRES—CHIANG. Stilwell's command and duties. (Answers Chiang's messages of 5 and 6 July 1942).

25 July 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Indian National Congress situation.

Also filed under above message:


2. Ltr, UNDERSEC OF STATE—PRES, 28 July 1942, forwarding suggested reply to Generalissimo. (Suggested message not sent; President sent text of message from Generalissimo instead. See PRES—PM #172).

3. PRES—PM, #172, 29 July 1942, quoting message from Generalissimo, 25 July 1942.

4. PM—PRES, #125, 30 July 1942. PM's reply to PRES's #172.


28 July 1942. PRES—LAUCHLIN CURRIE. Stilwell's position. (Answers Currie's message of 28 July 1942.)

11 August 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Arrest of Working Committee of the Indian Congress.

12 August 1942. PRES—CHIANG. Indian National Congress situation. (Answers Chiang's message 11 August 1942).


16 November 1942. CHIANG—PRES. Congratulations on North African landings.


December 2, 1942.

FOREIGN MINISTRY
CHUNGKING CHINA #1769

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR GENERALISSIMO CHAING KAI-SHEK.

Your message of November 14th testifies to our common objective to join hands on a practical basis for a course of action that will lead to victory in the Far East.

I have been greatly pleased to learn of the action which you have initiated with reference to movement of additional troops to the Rangoon Training Project, your approval of the CNAC contract, the concentration of veteran Chinese units in Yunnan, and the progressive steps you have taken with reference to the 30-Division Plan, all of which is indicative of the strong support you are giving General Stilwell in his efforts to strengthen the allied position in the Far East. The reinforcement of your Yunnan forces with available weapons in China including artillery I regard as a major contribution.

We should continue to exploit our available means with a view to carrying out further effective steps looking toward the recapture of Burma, which will enable supplies to be moved into China again over the Burma Road. With this end in view we are dispatching officers to India and China to assist in the training at Rangoon and with your forces in China. We have given priority to the shipment of essential combat Lend Lease material such as pack artillery, anti-tank guns,
infantry mortars, 105mm howitzers, and ammunition for these weapons as well as 7.92 mm ammunition for your small arms.

We are alert to the need for increasing the effectiveness of the India-China Air Transport Line, and will do everything within our available resources to this end. To the present air transport fleet there will be added at least 22 bi-motored and 12 four-motored cargo planes by March. The line will be placed under the control of the Army Air Force Transport Command, effective December 1st. This will relieve General Stilwell of administrative and technical problems connected with operation of the air freight route. He will retain however the control of priorities for material and personnel moved over this line. These steps will, I am sure, increase the cargo capacity of this line which in turn will permit more complete support to General Chennault's force as well as provide a steadier flow of essential material to your forces.

The shortage of air transport personnel, planes, and air line equipment make it impracticable to consider, for the present, the establishment of the new air freight routes proposed between India and China. Accordingly I am convinced the now available air transport resources can be more profitably spent in the improvement of the existing route.

In view of the heavy demands on our available stocks of war materials by current offensive operations in other theaters vital to both your people and mine, we are not now in a position to advance the foregoing schedule for the delivery of cargo planes for the India-China run.
I am very hopeful about the outcome of our operations in North Africa. Success on this front will greatly improve our air route to China. We are bending every effort to increase our assistance to you.

I am well aware that the way to strike Japan by air is from Chinese bases.

Your wife is in good hands here and I am looking forward to seeing her soon. My wife had a delightful visit with her last Saturday. With my very warm regards,

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0020, EWT, December 2, 1942.

/s/ R. R. Dodderidge

R. R. DODDERIDGE,
Capt., U.S.A.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Support of China.

A message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek dated November 11, 1942 raised the following

Three Points

Transports India-China Air Freight Route to be increased to 100 by January 1st and to 150 by March 1st.

Two new air transport routes to be established: Dinjan to Chengtu and Peshawar to Shzechuan. Fifty four-motored cargo planes to be assigned these routes.

Tenth Air Force to be kept up to strength; supply arrangements for China Air Task Force to be perfected.

War Department Action

India-China Air Freight Route will be taken over by Army Air Forces Air Transport Command effective December 1st.

Twenty-two bi-motored and twelve four-motored transport planes will be added to the line by March.

Combat effectiveness China Air Task Force will be increased by above action.

Considered more desirable to concentrate available air transport means on existing route than to establish new routes.

Additional assistance to Air Freight Route must await outcome of present operations in Africa, the North Atlantic and the South Pacific.

I recommend for your approval the attached reply to the Generalissimo.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec. Army
by TAG pac 720724
by Rhee Date JUN 14 1972

Chief of Staff.
SECRET

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

The President desires that you hand following message for General Stilwell's eyes alone to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

"Your message of November 14th testifies to our common objective to join hands on a practical basis for a course of action that will lead to victory in the Far East.

I have been greatly pleased to learn of the action which you have initiated with reference to movement of additional troops to the Ramgarh Training Project, your approval of the CNAC contract, the concentration of veteran Chinese units in Yunnan, and the progressive steps you have taken with reference to the 30-Division Plan, all of which is indicative of the strong support you are giving General Stilwell in his efforts to strengthen the allied position in the Far East. The reinforcement of your Yunnan forces with available weapons in China including artillery I regard as a major contribution.

We should continue to exploit our available means with a view to carrying out further effective steps looking toward the recapture of Burma, which will enable supplies to be moved into China again over the Burma Road. With this end in view we are dispatching officers to India and China to assist in the training at Ramgarh and with your forces in China. We have given priority to the shipment of essential combat Lend Lease material such as pack artillery, anti tank guns, infantry mortars, 105mm howitzers, and ammunition for these weapons as
well as 7.92mm ammunition for your small arms.

We are alert to the need for increasing the effectiveness of the India-China Air Transport Line, and will do everything within our available resources to this end. To the present air transport fleet there will be added 22 bi-motor'd and 12 four-motor'd cargo planes by March. The line will be placed under the control of the Army Air Force Transport Command, effective December 1st. This will relieve General Stilwell of administrative and technical problems connected with operation of the air freight route. He will retain however the control of priorities for material and personnel moved over this line. These steps will, I am sure, increase the cargo capacity of this line which in turn will permit more complete support to General Chennault's force as well as provide a steadier flow of essential material to your forces.

The shortage of air transport personnel, planes, and air line equipment make it impracticable to consider, for the present, the establishment of the new air freight routes proposed between India and China. Accordingly I am convinced the now available air transport resources can be more profitably spent in the improvement of the existing route.

In view of the heavy demands on our available stocks of war materials by current offensive operations in other theaters vital to both your people and mine, we are not now in a
position to advance the foregoing schedule for the delivery of cargo planes for the India-China run. The outcome of present operations in Africa, the North Atlantic and the South Pacific will determine the extent to which we can go in providing additional assistance to your forces. Just as soon as our position in these areas is clarified and additional material and shipping becomes available, our support to your people will be increased.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

I am very hopeful about the outcome of operations in North Africa. Success on this front will greatly improve our air route to China. We are bending every effort to increase our assistance to you. I am well aware that the way to strike Japan by air is from Chinese bases. Your wife is in good hands here and I am looking forward to seeing her soon.
24 November 1942

Message from Chiang Kai Shek to the
President of this date filed in Naval
Aide's file A/16 China with letter
of General Marshall dated 27 Nov 42.
I am deeply grateful to you for your message of November sixteenth. In the planning for the attack on French West and North Africa, I have had very definitely in my mind the thought that soon we may be able to control the whole of the south shore of the Mediterranean. This, of course, will make the transit of munitions of all kinds far more easy, especially in the time element for the transport of munitions to India and thence into China. I honestly believe that the success of the operation may become the turning point of the war for all of us who are so well united in our high hopes and ideals.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1755, EWT, November 17, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Chinese Ambassador has requested that there be transmitted to you the following telegraphic message dated Chungking, November 16, 1942, addressed to you by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

"The Chinese army and people are jubilant at the astounding feat performed by the forces of our American allies in North Africa. We hail it not only as a strategic success of the very first order that brings final victory of the United Nations measurably nearer, but also for high technical efficiency and flawless precision displayed by all arms, far surpassing the best efforts of the vaunted axis legions. May victory continue to perch on your banners!"
Chungking, China

November 14, 1942

For the eyes of President Roosevelt alone.

Paraphrase of Chiang Kai-shek's reply to the President follows:

"General Stilwell has given me your telegram of October 12 for which I thank you. Since our common aim is to secure victory, we will not hesitate to do our utmost in anything that can contribute to attaining it. With respect to use of the Chinese National Aircraft Corporation for cargo, in order to consider and meet comprehensively and equally the needs of both the Chinese and American Air Forces, I have already agreed to the necessary measures for the signing of a contract with your government.

"For your renewed assurance of aid to the Chinese I am deeply grateful. However, in order to reach the greatest efficiency in our combined operations, I am firmly convinced that further action is necessary to maintain and strengthen the fighting power of the Chinese Army and Air Force.

"Your telegram mentioned certain practical measures on which I venture to present my views in all frankness.

"1. The 10th Air Force will, we hope, be kept up to strength in order to participate efficiently in operations in this theater. In this connection, however, attention must be given to the supply of gasoline and ammunition, since neither can now be produced inside China, but must have to be shipped in by air. In order to reach the greatest efficiency in operations, therefore, supply of these items must be included in the program of air transport."
2. As to the combat planes supplied us under Lend Lease agreements, I plan to organize them so as to employ them in the most effective way. General Stilwell has, in addition, proposed a plan for the use of the 10th Air Force in China to which I have, in general, already agreed. I have informed General Stilwell that any plans of operation of the 10th Air Force in China must have my prior approval and should be subject to my direction and to my judgment as to necessary changes. I am confident that with this understanding, future operations of the 10th Air Force in the China Theater can be perfectly coordinated with those of the Chinese Forces. If the circumstances render it desirable, I agree that the Chinese Air Force may be placed under General Chennault's operational control to participate in the proposed Burma offensive.

3. Considering the present meagre capacity of the ferry line, it is almost impossible to supply the needs of both Chinese and American Forces in this theater. Aside from your suggestion of increasing cargo capacity on the India-China run, if the number of transports could be brought to 100 by January 1st; and to 150 by March 1st; this would greatly strengthen China's power to resist. Also if new lines could be established from Dinjan to Chengty, and from Peshawar in India to Shacheh in Sinfung, with 25 four motored high altitude transports on each end, this would help us materially. Plans like this are not idealistic, for they can be accomplished easily, and they would be one of the most effective ways of helping China. I have for this reason brought the matter to your attention repeatedly.

If, in the near future, these plans cannot be put into effect, I hope that supply arrangements for the American Air Force in China can be perfected as soon as possible, so as to ensure smooth functioning of our
joint plans against the enemy. Since there are few Chinese troops in India, and since American troops cannot be sent to this theater, China's greatest need today is to increase the cargo capacity of the India-China ferry line in order to allow of large shipments of gasoline, mountain artillery, anti-tank guns, field artillery, other ordnance supplies, and spare parts for aircraft. This matter is equally important, both for our preparations against Burma and for the support of China's resistance in general. The effect of increasing the capacity of the ferry line will, I am convinced, be even greater than the aid given us in training the Ramgarh Force or the increase in air strength.

"Intense training is now being given the troops in Yunnan and we are making plans to select 6 veteran Army Corps to be employed there, while other units are on the move towards Yunnan. If Lend Lease ordnance could be shipped to China, it could be used to equip these units, which would then be ready for service anywhere.

"I wish to repeat, in closing, that by increasing the capacity of the ferry line, the completion of our plans for the Burma offensive can be accelerated, and China's power of resistance can be maintained and strengthened.

"I have already ordered the Operations Section to take up with General Stilwell the plans for the Burma offensive and the minimum strength needed for the operation. I prefer not to touch on the results of these discussions here, as General Stilwell may have already reported to you on them.

"For your assurance of continued aid to China, I take this opportunity of renewing the expression of my heartfelt gratitude. I trust you will find it possible to give us promptly the help we so urgently need."
To: AMISCA
CHUNGKING
CHINA
Number 1469

For General Stilwell's eyes alone. The President desires that you hand the following message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

"My special representative, Lauchlin Currie, has told me of the warm reception you accorded him and of your cordial discussions of our mutual problems. From his assurances I am pleased to know that the progress you both have made is due in particular to your understanding and spirit of cooperation in our joint effort.

"This is especially borne out by the arrangements General Stilwell advises us that you have made. The increase of the Panzehr force by about 23,000 men and the pooling of facilities and spare parts are of first importance. Your agreement to place under control of General Stilwell the 28 lend-lease transports through contract with CNAC is a real contribution to the air freight route. I am delighted at these definitely constructive steps that you have taken to make possible the development of our mutual efforts.

"It is my desire, and I know it also is yours, that additional steps be taken to exploit fully the means immediately available to our respective forces so that the maximum combat effectiveness of our joint effort may rapidly be attained. This will require appropriate measures both by China and the United States. A joint program must of course be our primary objective. In this connection after careful consideration of Dr. Currie's verbal report to me summarizing your views, I outline below a series of further measures which I hope you will agree should be carried out.

"Firstly: The 10th Air Force to continue in support of the China Theater; the United States to build this unit up to and maintain it at the following strength: 6th Fighter Squadrons (160 Operational Planes) 4 medium Bombardment Squadrons (87 Operational Planes) 4 heavy Bombardment Squadrons (35 Operational Planes) 1 Photo Reconnaissance Squadron (13 Operational Planes)."
"Deliveries to the 10th Air Force to be accelerated so as to provide by October 31st the following airplanes, including those now on hand: at least 160 Fighters, 40 medium bombers, 31 heavy bombers, and 15 Photo Reconnaissance. Every effort will be made to accelerate further deliveries so as to reach the full operational strength of 15 Squadrons as soon after October 31st as is possible.

"Secondly: In order to utilize to the greatest advantage the Lend-Lease Combat Planes which the United States has been sending to China it would seem best that the Chinese Air Force organize appropriate Squadrons with these airplanes. For purposes of coordination, it would also seem highly desirable that these Squadrons be under the operational control of General Chennault.

"Thirdly: The United States to develop the freight carrying capacity of the China India Air Freight Route to the maximum.

"There are now 64 transports (United States and China Lend-Lease) on hand for this purpose exclusive of 8 enroute or about to depart. Beginning this month, if our present production schedules are met, 2 Lend-Lease and 4 U.S. Air Force Transports will be sent each month until a combined total of 100 Transport Planes in the Theater is reached.

"The desirability of employing American Troops in your theater is fully understood. However, the extremely serious shortage of ocean shipping for Troop transport, including Naval escorts for such convoys through dangerous waters, not to mention the long turn around to India, make it impracticable this Fall to send and maintain United States Divisions in China, India Theater, much as I should like to do so. The United States is waging this war on far flung fronts and demands for men and particularly materials and ship tonnage are now beyond our present capacity.

"The United States must concentrate on exploiting every possible means to build up an American Air Force to support a Burma campaign. We shall assist to the maximum in the Panzerh Training Plan. Immediate use will be made of our Lend-Lease program in connection with this training project.

"Our joint efforts outlined above should thus go far in preparations necessary for the recapture of Burma.

"General Stilwell's plan for the retaking of Burma which Dr. Currie discussed with you is now being developed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and their Planners. Burma must be recaptured in order to establish a practical supply route to China. The Air
Freight Route will never be able to transport to you in sufficient quantity the supplies which I wish and intend that you shall get.

"I am not including as part of our joint plan at this time the organization of a Chinese unit in Yunnan under specially selected leaders similar to the Tamzech project. At the same time, if this could be worked out by you it would be of the greatest importance in obtaining our mutual objectives. In this connection, and in order to re-prepare on a practical basis your requirements in Land-Lease combat material, it would be most helpful if you advise me of the progress being made with the Yunnan Group. Due to the limitation of supply by Air, there appears to be little justification for accumulating in India our vitally needed combat equipment beyond the needs of say 45,000 Chinese Troops at Tamzech and the available capacity of our Air Freight Route to China. On the other hand, the reopening of the Burma Road would afford the United States the opportunity to complete the equipping of the units of the 30 Division plan. I am discussing this with you frankly, in the interest of determining upon a course that will enable us to render aid in the most effective way.

"Again I assure you that the United States will continue to do everything possible to support your forces. Signed Franklin D. Roosevelt."

MAESHiAL

ORIGINATOR: OSS
INFO COPIES: OPD, LOG, GEN ARNOLD, GEN STORNG

(This message despatched from War Department. Copy brought to Map Room by Major McCarth-Oct. 15, 1942. Original "yellow" copy given to Miss Barney. Paraphrased copy given to Dr. Soong.)

CH-OUT-03212 (10-10-42) 1556Z cob
October 10, 1942

Dear George:

The President has approved this this morning. When it goes can you send a copy back?

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.
October 10, 1942

Dear George:

The President has approved this this morning. When it goes can you send a copy back?

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Support of China.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek on June 28, 1942 handed General Stilwell a memorandum setting forth for the maintenance of the China Theater:

Three minimum requirements

Three American Divisions in India to cooperate with the Chinese Forces to restore lines of communication through Burma.

500 planes continuously maintained at the front.

5,000 tons aerial freight into China per month.

On August 6, 1942, the Generalissimo in conference with Dr. Lauchlin Currie receed considerably from the above requirements.

Revised requirements

One American Division.

Immediate and substantial air reinforcement.

5,000 tons aerial freight per month as quickly as possible.

Immediate action.

I recommend for your approval the attached reply to the Generalissimo which has been worked out in collaboration with Dr. Lauchlin Currie. Commitments of our forces made in this message represent the maximum that we are able to undertake at this time.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADOLF A. BERLE, Jr.

Please talk this over with
the Secretary at once and if he
approves, send it off.

F.D.R.

Send via
State Dept.
August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have had a new copy made of the proposed message to Chiang Kai-shek and have substituted some paragraphs for those which I have marked out with the pencil line.

What do you think?

F. D. R.
August 12, 1942.

All countries and peoples seeking to defeat the Axis powers will doubtless agree, without reference to the merits, that the unsettled controversy between those forces in India led by Mr. Gandhi and the British Government is unfortunate -- equally unfortunate for all concerned. You and I naturally deplore this situation. The United Nations are especially interested in it by reason of its relation to the war situation. We have every desire to contribute to its adjustment.

It is scarcely necessary to reiterate the deep interest of this Government both under its longstanding policy and especially under the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, in independence for those who aspire to independence. This policy has been stated and reiterated over a long period and up to this hour by the official spokesmen of the American Government. It has been put into practical application in such cases as that of the Philippines. No one can misinterpret or misunderstand these crystal-clear acts and utterances of the Government of the United States.

It seems clear that despite all efforts on your part and on my part, without becoming actual parties to the internal controversy existing between the British Government and Mr. Gandhi speaking for himself and his followers, to
aid in bringing about an amicable adjustment of this serious disagreement and controversy, it has thus far been impossible to do so. The Government of the United States has thus far been of the opinion that it could exert its influence and efforts more effectively in this matter by refraining from offering active mediation to both sides in the controversy which seems to be a combination of many facts and factors.

You and I realize that irrespective of the merits of the case, any action which slows up the war effort in India results no in theoretical assistance, but in actual assistance to the armed forces of Japan.

We have sought in every consistent way to promote an adjustment which would tide over the war period in order that we may win a victory against barbarism.

We need India's help in this and I wish Mr. Gandhi could see more clearly the need for this immediate help, and also that he could understand that the very worst thing that could happen to the people of India would be victory by the Axis powers.

I told the Pacific War Council today, including Mr. Soong, that I think your position and mine should be to make it clear to the British Government and to Mr. Gandhi and his followers that we have not the moral right to force ourselves upon the British or the Congress Party;
but that we should make it clear to both sides that you and I stand in the position of friends who will gladly help if we are
called on by both sides. At the same time I think we should intimate to both sides that because both of them and China and the United States and all the other United Nations are in a struggle for existence, the assistance of India is vital to the common cause, including the cause of the people of India themselves.

I have in mind the history of the Thirteen American Colonies in 1775. Each Colony was a separate sovereignty. They set up differing republican forms of government. They had a loose Confederation, but when their independence was acknowledged in 1783 they realized they must have a breathing spell before they could set up a permanent constitutional form of federal government. They, therefore, went through a six year period of trial and error and discussion. Finally, they adopted a Federal Constitution which is in existence today -- one hundred and fifty-three years later.

I think that you and I can best serve the people of India at this stage by making no open or public appeal or pronouncement but by letting the simple fact be known that we stand ready as friends to heed any appeal for help if that appeal comes from both sides. It is my thought that this simple fact need not even be put on paper because it should be obvious to all.
If we both pursue the policy above recommended we can later consult together as to the desirability and feasibility of making available our friendly offices should they be desired by the parties to the controversy.

For your information the following orders have been given to the American forces in India:

"The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area the primary aim of the Government of the United States is to aid China. American forces are not to indulge to the slightest degree in activities of any other nature unless India should be attacked by the Axis powers, in which event American troops would aid in defending India. American forces in India will exercise scrupulous care to avoid the slightest participation in India's internal political problems, or even the appearance of so doing. American forces will resort to defensive measures only in the event that their own personal safety or that of other American citizens is endangered."

I send you my very warm personal regards.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 12, 1942.

Memorandum for the President

Herewith is attached proposed reply of yourself to the message from Chiang Kai-shek, dated Aug. 11, 1942.

You have the original of this message in your office, and Miss Tully is requested to bring it to your attention in connection with this proposed reply.
All countries and peoples seeking to defeat the Axis powers will doubtless agree without reference to the merits that the unsettled controversy between those forces in India led by Mr. Gandhi and the British Government is unfortunate—equally unfortunate for all concerned. You and I naturally deplore this situation. The United Nations are especially interested in it by reason of its relation to the war situation. We have every desire to contribute to its adjustment.

It is scarcely necessary to reiterate the deep interest of this Government both under its longstanding policy and especially under the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, in independence for those who aspire to independence. This policy has been stated and reiterated over a long period and up to this hour by the official spokesmen of the American Government. It has been put into practical application in such cases as that of the Philippines. No one can misinterpret or misunderstand these crystal-clear acts and utterances of the Government of the United States.

It seems clear that despite all efforts on your part and on my part, without becoming actual parties to the internal controversy existing between the British Government and Mr. Gandhi speaking for himself and his followers
followers, to aid in bringing about an amicable adjustment of this serious disagreement and controversy, it has thus far been impossible to do so. The Government of the United States has thus far been of opinion that it could exert its influence and efforts more effectively in this matter by refraining from becoming an active partisan on either side of the controversy between Mr. Gandhi and the British Government, which seems to be a combination of many facts and factors, all of which normally partake of the nature of an internal problem and an internal controversy. I and the Government of the United States, while maintaining and standing unalterably behind our well known policy of freedom and independence for all who aspire to it, have at the same time felt that this objective would best be obtained in the end by refraining on our part from becoming an active partisan in these controversies between the British Government and Gandhi and his followers. We have, therefore, refrained from passing on the merits of this controversy within itself, but sought in every consistent way to promote an adjustment of the controversy along lines which could be agreed upon by the parties immediately concerned. You are aware that at this time there appears to be a deadlock between them. The British Government has offered India independence after the war with certain adjustments in the meantime.

Mr. Gandhi
Mr. Gandhi is understood to be standing firmly on a demand for unconditional independence now. This deadlock has come about despite our best efforts to encourage an adjustment, as stated. The whole situation is badly confused by conflicting and contradictory contentions by the two opposing sides in regard to what would or would not occur in its relation to aiding the allied cause, if the demands and the contention of the opposing side should be granted at this time. I need not go into these widely different predictions of chaos and other disasters which would happen in the event either side should have its way.

In the circumstances, I see no recourse except for allied nations like yours and mine to maintain their original attitudes toward both the doctrine of independence to all nations and all peoples aspiring to it, and also a non-partisan attitude toward those matters of difference between the British Government and Gandhi which are responsible for the deadlock. In no other way can we continue to hold ourselves ready even individually to approach both sides with further pleas and representations calculated to bring about an adjustment of their differences, as and when future opportunity
opportunity and developments make them acceptable. If we become a partisan on either side with respect to these matters of immediate controversy between them, a state of feeling would probably result which would render it still more impossible than at present to bring about a solution, and make more impossible even than at present independence for any peoples who are aspiring to it at this time.

As I said in my last message to you, I believe it would be greatly in the interest of our two countries as well as the interest of the ultimate victory of the United Nations' cause, if neither one of us at this stage made any open or public appeal or pronouncement.

If we both pursue the policy above recommended we can later consult together as to the desirability and feasibility of making available our friendly offices should they be desired by the parties to the controversy.

For your information the following orders have been given to the American forces in India:

"The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area the primary aim of the Government of the United States is to aid China. American forces are not to indulge to the slightest degree in activities of any other nature unless India should be attacked by the Axis powers, in which event American troops would aid in defending India. American forces in India will exercise scrupulous care to avoid the slightest participation in India's internal
internal political problems, or even the appearance of so doing. American forces will resort to defensive measures only in the event that their own personal safety or that of other American citizens is endangered.
MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM THE GENERALISSIMO, CHUNGKING  
AUGUST 11, 1942  

"I feel certain that you are concerned as I am at the news of the arrest of the Working Committee of the Indian Congress including Gandhi and Nehru. In my last telegram I expressed my dread that such a development would prove to be a great setback to the Allied cause in the Far East and would certainly have a disastrous effect on the entire war situation. I fear also that if matters are allowed to deteriorate further the influence of the Axis powers would be considerably strengthened and the avowed object of the Allies in waging this war would no longer be taken seriously by the world and the professed principles of the United Nations would lose much of their spiritual significance. At all costs the United Nations should demonstrate to the world by their action the sincerity of their professed principle of ensuring freedom and justice for men of all races. I earnestly appeal to you as the inspired author of the Atlantic Charter to take (effective?) measures which undoubtedly have already occurred to you to solve the pressing problem now facing India and the world so that normalcy will return and unimpeded war effort may continue to hasten our common victory. Your policy will serve as a guide to all of us who have resisted for so long and so bitterly the brute force of the aggressors. Trusting you will favor me with an early reply."

Chiang Kai-shek"

[Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, I, 714-715]
August 11, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received from Dr. T. V. Soong a further message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which I enclose herewith.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

August 8, 1942

I have been giving, as you will of course realize, the utmost consideration and thought to your message regarding the Indian situation, which reached me through Dr. T. V. Soong on July 29.

I fully share the opinion you express that for the sake of our common victory the Indian situation should be stabilized and the participation of the Indian people should be secured in the joint war effort. I likewise agree that only the Axis powers would reap benefit if India should start a movement against Britain or against the United Nations and that such an eventuality would seriously affect the whole course of the war.

I know, however, that you will understand the difficulty which is presented to me in your suggestion that this Government should advise both the British Government and the people of India "to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution". The British Government believes that proposals which it has proffered to the peoples of India should permit of an adjustment fair to both sides, which should result in more active participation by India in the war effort in support of the United Nations, postponing until victory comes any final steps to be taken
to meet the desires for independence of the Indian people.

Furthermore, the British Government feels that suggestions coming at this moment from other members of the United Nations would undermine the authority of the only existing government in India and would tend to create that very crisis in India which it is your hope and my hope may yet be averted.

Under these circumstances, I feel that it would be wiser for you and for myself to refrain from taking action of the kind which you had in mind for the time being. This does not preclude further consideration at a moment's notice of some of the steps which you have suggested, should the course of events in India in the next week or two reach a more serious stage. You may be certain that I will have all of your suggestions fully in mind and that I deeply appreciate the constructive and frank communication which you have made to me. Please continue to communicate with me at any moment with regard to any of the matters affecting the common cause to which our two countries are dedicated.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Original delivered to Mr. T. V. Soong for transmission to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
TO: CHUNGKING

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

FOR MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER NINE-NINE-EIGHT; JULY TWENTY-EIGHT. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATUS OF THE SENIOR AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL STILWELL, IN CHINA, IS AS STATED IN A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR BY DR. SONG ON JANUARY THIRTY, 1942: "I WISH TO CONFIRM MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY REPRESENTATIVE ARE TO BE GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS: TO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL ALL U.S. DEFENSE AID AFFAIRS FOR CHINA; TO COMMAND UNDER THE GENERALISSIMO ALL U.S. FORCES IN CHINA AND SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE ASSIGNED TO HIM; TO REPRESENT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON ANY INTERNATIONAL WAR COUNCIL IN CHINA AND ACT AS CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE GENERALISSIMO." IT, THEREFORE, FOLLOWS FROM THE ABOVE THAT IN ALL DEFENSE AID MATTERS, AND AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON ANY WAR COUNCIL, STILWELL IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IN ALL OTHER COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS, HE IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE GENERALISSIMO AS SUPREME COMMANDER. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE GENERAL STILWELL'S ARRIVAL, CAN CONTINUE TO BE SATISFACTORY TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S THREE REQUESTS ARE BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT. DECISION THEREON WILL BE DEFERRED UNTIL YOU RETURN.

THE MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD HAS ALLOTTED TO CHINA, 3,500 TONS FOR THE MONTH OF JULY. THIS PROGRAM WILL BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH AS YOU SUGGEST.

28 JULY 1942

[Initial]
TO: CHUNGKING
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
FOR MR. LAUGHLIN CURRIE — PAGE TWO —

THE WAR DEPARTMENT HAS MADE IT A PRACTICE TO FURNISH GENERAL
STILLWELL INFORMATION OF ALL MESSAGES WHICH ARE TO GO TO CHIANG KAI-
SHEK WHENEVER IT HAS HAD KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH MESSAGES.

I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY CONTEMPLATED DECISIONS.

IF YOU FIND IT ADVISABLE IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIANG
KAI-SHEK, YOU ARE AT LIBERTY TO TRANSMIT TO HIM ANY OR ALL OF
THIS MESSAGE.

ROOSEVELT

RELEASED AT 2019, EWT, JULY 28, 1942

J. D. COFFEE JR.,
ENSIIGN, USNR, RATCH OFFICER,
MAP ROOM, WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

    Subject: Message from Mr. Currie.

General Marshall has directed me to send you the attached radiogram received in the War Department this afternoon from Mr. Currie for transmission to you.

There is also attached, a radiogram received from General Stilwell on July 26, which is self-explanatory.

It is suggested that a reply be sent to Mr. Currie along the lines indicated in the attached draft.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
In Laughlin Currie

Reference your No. 998, July 28, it is my understanding that the status of the Senior American Representative, General Stilwell, in China, is as stated in a letter to the Secretary of War by Dr. Soong on January 30, 1942: "I wish to confirm our understanding that the functions of the U. S. Army Representative are to be generally as follows: To supervise and control all U. S. defense aid affairs for China; to command under the Generalissimo all U. S. Forces in China and such forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the U. S. Government on any international war council in China and act as Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo."

It, therefore, follows from the above that in all defense aid matters, and as United States Representative on any war council, Stilwell is responsible only to the United States Government. In all other command and staff functions, he is responsible to the Generalissimo as Supreme Commander.

It is my hope that this arrangement, which has been in effect since General Stilwell's arrival, can continue to be satisfactory to the Generalissimo.

Chiang Kai-shek's three requests are being carefully studied in the War Department. Decision thereon will be deferred until you return.

The Munitions Assignment Board has allotted to China, 3,500 tons for the month of July. This program will be continued for at least one month as you suggest.

The War Department has made it a practice to furnish General Stilwell information of all messages which are to go to Chiang Kai-shek whenever it has had knowledge of such messages.
I will keep you informed of any contemplated decisions.

If you find it advisable in your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek, you are at liberty to transmit to him any or all of this message.

Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D. C. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
July 28, 1942.

From: Chungking
To: Govt. WD Agwar for Amnisca
No: 998, July 28, 1942.

For Chief of Staff to transmit to the President.

Am making good progress in clearing up delicate situation here. Your first answer to Chiang Kai-Shek on Stillwell's status would have helped materially if it had been sent, as it was explicit and supported Stillwell in position he had taken. Message actually sent by Soong was ambiguous. It quotes War Department on dual role of Stillwell, then quotes you as saying that since Lend-Lease matters are handled by Soong and Hopkins, and there is no War Council here, this leaves Stillwell's only role as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-Shek but this overlooks Stillwell's role in receiving and turning over Lend-Lease goods, in making recommendations, and as acting as C-in-C of American Forces in China and India. Moreover, it does not make clear that when acting as Chief of Staff this refers to inter-allied forces in this area. General Ho Ying-Chin is Chief of Staff for Chiang Kai-Shek for the Chinese Army in China. This is important distinction. Original agreement on Stillwell's role was explained by Soong to Chiang Kai-Shek and much confusion and misunderstanding has resulted therefrom.

Hope to have full understanding and cordial relations established by end of week, but important that you sustain Stillwell's dual role. Would also appreciate your deferring decision on Chiang Kai-Shek's three requests until I return home. Expect to obtain some leeway in adjusting them to an over-all strategic plan providing it is agreeable to Chiang Kai-Shek. Would appreciate the continuance of the 3500-ton program for at least one more month.

Suggest that both written and verbal messages to Soong for Chiang Kai-Shek be transmitted to Stillwell for his information. For example, Chiang Kai-Shek was never informed of agreement to grant authority to Stillwell to arrange for transfer of title of goods shipped after May 1. Since Soong's message to Chiang Kai-Shek was shown me in confidence, please consider this message confidential. Very helpful to me to get prior information of any contemplated decisions.
From Chungking
To AGWAR for AMMISCA
Washington DC

No. 992 July 26, 1942

I assume an effort is being made to deprive me of all control of CDS. Personal for Marshall from Stilwell. Reurad 1065. If this is done, our most effective means of influencing situation here will be lost. Long-range decisions on CDS will also make it impossible to deal properly with the necessities of a changing situation in the Theater War. It is now time for us to take a firm stand. Otherwise, I can see no worthwhile future for this Mission. I strongly recommend that we stick to our guns, that my original directive be unchanged, and that the President's reply be sent as written.

Stilwell.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There are enclosed herewith:

(a) Copy of message for the President from Generalissimo, 25 July, 1942. (This despatch was quoted in its entirety to the Prime Minister.)

(b) Copy of letter from the Under Secretary of State of 22 July, 1942.

(c) Copy of Prime Minister's despatch No. 125 of July 30, 1942.

In conversation you asked that I also send up Mr. Soong's memorandum on the same subject. I have no such memorandum and neither has the Under Secretary of State. Could it be that you refer to Mr. Soong's remarks made to the Under Secretary on instructions from the Generalissimo which seem to be set forth in pretty much detail in the Under Secretary's letter attached hereto?

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

John H. Am
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE GENERALISSIMO

DATED CHUNGKING, JULY 25, 1942

"With both sides remaining adamant in their views, the Indian situation has reached an extremely tense and critical stage. Its development in fact constitutes the most important factor in determining the outcome of the United Nations war and especially the war in the East. The war aims which the anti-aggression nations have proclaimed to the world are twofold, first to crush brute force and second to secure freedom for all mankind. If India should start a movement against Britain or against the United Nations, this will cause deterioration in the Indian situation from which the Axis powers will surely reap benefit. Such an eventuality will seriously affect the whole course of the war and at the same time the world might entertain doubts as to the sincerity of the lofty war aims of the United Nations. This will not only prove a great disadvantage to Britain but will also reflect discredit to the democratic front.

"At this juncture the United Nations should do their best, when there is yet time, to prevent the occurrence of such an unfortunate state of affairs. Your country is the leader in this war of right against might and Your Excellency's views have always received serious attention in Britain. Furthermore for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand on the side of justice and equality. I therefore venture to lay before you my personal views on this question.

"Inevitably Britain will regard the Indian National Congress' recent demand as an attempt to take advantage of her present predicament. The step contemplated by the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, however, still leaves sufficient time and opportunity for the reaching of an agreement. During my recent visit to India, I earnestly advised the Indian people to consider their primary duty to join the anti-aggression front in a common struggle for mankind.

"From the point of view of the Indian people, their consistent purpose is to secure national freedom. With this object in view the Indian National Congress, in seeking national independence, is dominated by sentiment rather than by reason. Consequently I believe attempts at repression in the form of either public censure or force, whether military or police with a view to compelling the Indian people to capitulate, will have the opposite result.

"From the psychological point of view of the Indian, he considers that India before attaining her national freedom is not the master of her own vast territory and abundant resources. Just because he owns nothing, he has nothing to be afraid of. Moreover beyond national independence and freedom he demands nothing of the world. Likewise the Indian people as a whole only desire freedom for their country and their only expectation is that the United Nations would sympathize with them in their aspiration.

"The Indian people are by nature of a passive disposition but are apt to go to extremes. I think that in launching its freedom movement today when Axis aggression is a pressing reality, the Indian Congress must have felt in their hearts a certain amount of anguish. If however the United Nations should show them no sympathy and pursue a laissez-faire policy and thereby cause them to despair, I greatly fear that following the National Congress meeting in August
there is danger of the situation getting out of control. In case an anti-British movement or some other unfortunate incident occurs in India, the United Nations war in the East will be adversely affected immediately. For the sake of our common victory the United Nations must seek to stabilize the Indian situation and to secure the Indian people's participation in the joint war effort.

"The United Nations depend upon India for her to contribute to the war whereas the Indian people have little need to depend upon the outside world. From their own point of view their movement for independence and freedom is not something new that has come into existence after the outbreak of war. Hence they do not stop to think whether their movement will have any harmful effect on the world situation. This being the case they have no hesitation in taking whatever steps they may think necessary in furtherance of their national movement. Whether they are right or wrong is immaterial. The fact remains they have now already become irresponsible to even well-considered public opinion or a realistic analysis of India's real interests. Once they abandon hope of an amicable settlement, they are liable to take any risk without hesitation even to the extent of sacrificing themselves and others.

"The only way to make them reconsider their course of action is for the United Nations, and especially the United States which they have always admired, to come forth as third parties and to offer them sympathy and consolation. This will help them to regain their sense of proportion and strengthen their faith that there is justice in this world. Once the situation is eased it can be stabilized and the Indian people, grateful to the United Nations for what they have done, will willingly participate in the war. Otherwise the Indian people in despair will have the same feeling towards other members of the United Nations as towards Britain and when this comes to pass it will be the world's greatest tragedy in which Britain is not the only loser.

"So far as Britain is concerned she is a great country and in recent years she has been pursuing an enlightened policy towards her colonial possessions. She is one of the principals in this war against aggression. On the other hand India is a weak country. With this unprecedentedly extensive war in progress, naturally things cannot be handled in the ordinary manner. It is my opinion that in order to uphold the British Empire's prestige and safeguard her real interests, the British should unhesitatingly show extraordinary courage, forbearance, farsightedness and resolution by removing the causes which tend to aggravate the situation. In this way the deceptive Axis propagandists will have no occasion to take advantage of these causes.

"Should however the situation be allowed to drift until an anti-British movement breaks out in India, any attempt on the part of the British to cope with the crisis by enforcing existing colonial laws or by resorting to military and police force, will only help to spread disturbances and turmoil. The greater the oppression, the greater the reaction. Even if such measures should prove effective in curbing the non-violence movement, the spiritual loss and blow to the United Nations will far exceed that resulting from any reverse in the field. Such a situation will particularly be detrimental to Britain's interests.

"There is no doubt a section of the Indian people which, having lost their sense of proportion, is asking if India will never attain freedom, what choice does she have between Britain and Axis Powers. This mistaken idea the United Nations should of course do everything possible to correct. On the other
hand the wisest and most enlightened policy for Britain to pursue would be to restore to India her complete freedom and thus to prevent Axis troops from setting foot on Indian soil. If Britain would reorientate her present attitude and spirit, I firmly believe that not only will Indian sentiment towards Britain undergo a radical change for the better but Britain's action will have an ameliorating effect on the whole situation. Therefore I earnestly hope that the United States would advise both Britain and India in the name of justice and righteousness to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution, for this affects vitally the welfare of mankind and has a direct bearing on the good faith and good name of the United Nations. The United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem.

"In saying so I have not the slightest intention to arouse attention by exaggerated statements. The war aims of the United Nations and our common interests at stake make it impossible for me to remain silent. An ancient Chinese proverb says: "Good medicine, though bitter, cures one's illness; words of sincere advice, though unpleasant, should guide one's conduct." I sincerely hope that Britain will magnanimously and resolutely accept my words of disinterested advice, however unpleasant they may be, and believe that they are voiced in the common interests of the United Nations.

"In view of the critical situation and in view of China's responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, I have ventured to offer you my views. This despatch is strictly confidential. It is only for Your Excellency's personal reference. I hope Your Excellency will give the minutest consideration to such practical measures as will break the existing deadlock and avert crisis. I shall persevere in my efforts. My only feeling is that the United Nations should lose no time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation and in striving for its realization, so that our entire war effort will not suffer a major setback. I ardently hope Your Excellency will favor me with your sound judgment."

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
My dear Mr. President:

T. V. Soong has just left with me the attached urgent message addressed to you by Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Soong stressed the following points:

1. Chiang Kai-shek believes the situation in India is unquestionably going to blow up after the meeting of the Indian Congress unless some outside help is given;

2. He believes that the Indians anticipate a further extension of their movement by the Japanese towards India as soon as the monsoon is over, which would be in the relatively near future;

3. He believes the British are completely blind to the two facts set forth above;

4. He feels that the Indian Congress actually represents the desire of the Indian people and can be compared in its importance and representative capacity to the Chinese National Revolutionary Committee of some years ago;

The President;

The White House.
5. He is convinced that the question of India is regarded by all of the people of Asia as a test case in ascertaining the sincerity of the United Nations;

6. He believes that the Indian National Congress will accept much less than they are asking, but solely provided that the Chinese Government and the United States Government participate in negotiations between the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the British Government as friends of both sides and provided that both China and the United States underwrite the carrying out of the terms of any agreement reached;

7. Chiang Kai-shek believes that this question is of the utmost urgency and that the outcome of this question may in very great part determine the outcome of the war in the Far East.

You will see T. V. Soong at your meeting with the Pacific War Council tomorrow and, in view of the time element involved, you may wish to let him have at least your preliminary reactions after the meeting in order that he may be enabled to send some word to Chiang Kai-shek.

Believe me

Faithfully yours

Enc.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request which Miss Tully made of me, I am sending you herewith a preliminary draft of a suggested telegram for you to send to Mr. Churchill with regard to the message which you have just received from Chiang Kai-shek.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
Draft message to
Mr. Churchill.

The President,
The White House.
SUGGESTED DRAFT OF TELEGRAM TO MR. CHURCHILL

I have received this evening a long and urgent message from Chiang Kai-shek. He asks me to regard this message as strictly confidential, but in view of its nature I naturally wish to inform you immediately of its contents and also of the additional statements made by T. V. Soong when he delivered it.

Chiang Kai-shek commences by stating that the Indian situation has reached an extremely tense and critical stage and that "its development in fact constitutes the most important factor in determining the outcome of the United Nations war and especially the war in the East."

He continues by stating that the step contemplated by the Congress Working Committee still leaves sufficient time and opportunity for the reaching of an agreement. He expresses the firm opinion that if no agreement is reached, the Indian people will have no hesitation in taking whatever steps they may think necessary in furtherance of their national movement. He goes on to say that in his opinion "in order to uphold the British Empire's prestige and safeguard her real interests, the British should unhesitatingly show extraordinary courage, forebearance, farsightedness and resolution by removing the causes which tend to aggravate the situation". He then states "should however the situation
be allowed to drift until an anti-British movement breaks out in India, any attempt on the part of the British to cope with the crisis by enforcing existing colonial laws or by resorting to military and police force will only help to spread disturbances and turmoil. The greater the oppression, the greater the reaction. Even if such measures should prove effective in curbing the non-violence movement, the spiritual loss and blow to the United Nations will far exceed that resulting from any reverse in the field. Such a situation will particularly be detrimental to Britain's interests."

In conclusion he states, "If Britain would reorientate her present attitude and spirit, I firmly believe that not only will Indian sentiment towards Britain undergo a radical change for the better but Britain's action will have an ameliorating effect on the whole situation. Therefore I earnestly hope that the United States would advise both Britain and India in the name of justice to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution."

Soong made the following more direct and specific statements supplementing Chiang Kai-shek's message:

1. The Chinese Governments believes the situation in India is unquestionably going to blow up after the meeting of the Indian Congress unless some outside help is given.
2. The Chinese Government is confident that the Japanese intend a further move upon India as soon as the monsoon is over and that the Indians are counting upon this as a means of exerting leverage in their bargaining negotiations with you.

3. Chiang Kai-shek is convinced that the question of India is regarded by all of the people of Asia as a test case in appraising the sincerity of the United Nations and the declarations contained in the Atlantic Charter.

4. He believes that the Indian National Congress will accept much less than they are asking, but solely provided that the Chinese Government and the United States Government sit in in the negotiations between the representatives of the British Government and of the Indian National Congress as friends of both sides and provided that both China and the United States express a willingness to underwrite the carrying out of the terms of any agreement reached.

I felt warranted in bringing this matter immediately to your attention with the utmost frankness in view of my own belief that the situation in India holds the elements of very grave danger to the common cause in which we are all so vitally concerned. It may be that the suggestion
of Chiang Kai-shek for the friendly mediation of China and the United States would prove to be a means of bringing about some agreement which would be satisfactory to you in view of recent developments and which would keep the Indians in line during the war and which might even make them inclined to adopt a policy of full cooperation.

I feel the situation is inherently so dangerous that every possibility should be canvassed.

I shall have to give a reply to Chiang Kai-shek in the near future and I shall be grateful if you will let me have as soon as possible your thoughts and any suggestions you may wish to offer with regard to the nature of the reply I should make to him.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister
NO: 172, 29 July 1942

I have today received a long and urgent message from Chiang Kai-shek. He asks me to regard this message as strictly confidential, but in view of its nature I naturally wish to inform you immediately of its contents.

The following is the text of this message:

QUOTE. With both sides remaining . . . . .

(Quoted here verbatim was the Generalissimo's message to the President, 25 July 1942.)

. . . . favor me with your sound judgment. UNQUOTE.

I shall have to give a reply to Chiang Kai-shek in the near future and I shall be grateful if you will let me have as soon as possible your thoughts and any suggestions you may wish to offer with regard to the nature of the reply I should make to him.

ROOSEVELT
From: London  
To: The President of the United States,  
The White House.  
Number 125 from London, England July 30, 1942  
Former Naval Person to the President. Personal and —

Para. 1. We do not agree with Chiang Kai Sheks estimate of the  
Indian situation. The Congress Party in no way represents India and is  
strongly opposed by over ninety million Mohammedans, forty million un-  
touchables, and the Indian States comprising some ninety millions, to whom  
we are bound by treaty. Congress represents mainly the intelligentsia of  
non fighting Hindu elements, and can neither defend India nor raise re-  
volt. The military classes on whom everything depends are thoroughly loyal,  
in fact over a million have volunteered for the Army and the numbers recently  
volunteering greatly exceed all previous records. Their loyalty would  
be greatly impaired by handing over the Government of India to Congress  
control. The reckless declarations of Congress have moreover given  
rise to widespread misgiving, even among its own rank and file.  

Para. 2. The Government of India have no doubt of their ability  
to maintain order and carry on government with efficiency and secure  
Indias maximum contribution to the war effort whatever Congress may say  
or even do, provided of course that their authority is not undermined.  
His Majestys Government here have no intention of making any offer beyond  
the sweeping proposals which Sir Stafford Cripps carried to India and in  
fact could not do so without creating grave internal trouble in India.
So far as I am concerned, I could not accept responsibility for making further proposals at this stage. We have however only today in Parliament made clear that while the specific proposals suggested by Cripps failed to secure agreement we stand firmly by broad intention of our offer which is that India should have the fullest opportunity at the earliest possible moment after the war to attain to complete self government under constitutional arrangements of her own devising. I earnestly hope therefore, Mr President, that you will do your best to dissuade Chiang Kai Shek from his completely misinformed activities, and will lend no countenance to putting pressure upon His Majesty's Government.

Prime
July 16, 1942

One copy of outgoing despatch to Dr. Soong.

One copy taken to Col. Deane, War Department by Major Hammond, July 16.

This copy for file.
July 15, 1942.

My dear Dr. Soong:

In view of the fact that the Generalissimo's despatch in regard to the attached matter was delivered to the President by you, I have been directed to place in your hands the President's reply, for transmission to the Generalissimo.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Dr. T. V. Soong,
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs,
1601 V Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
MESSAGE TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM THE PRESIDENT

From the start it has been my continued purpose to provide the most effective aid possible to China in her struggle against the Japanese. Every official of this government concerned in the matter has operated under direct orders from me accordingly.

The American Military Mission under General Magruder was sent to China with the primary objective of increasing and making more effective our Lend-Lease assistance to the Chinese Army. This Mission necessarily operated under instructions from the United States Government.

After our entry into war and by agreement with you it was considered desirable that a senior American officer be sent to China. Accordingly, General Stilwell was selected to act as your Chief of Staff and to command American Forces in China under you as the Supreme Commander. For these particular functions and duties he was and is under your command. However, it was apparent that to avoid duplication of effort and to insure coordination it was desirable that this officer also supervise and control all defense aid to China under the Lend-Lease Law. This administration of Lend-Lease matters was necessarily under instructions from the American Government. General Stilwell's authority relative this activity must flow directly...
from this Government since Lend-Lease was set up by and functions under the laws of the United States.

It was understood that this dual status of the senior American officer was definite and clear. In a letter of January 30, 1942 to the Secretary of War, Dr. Soong stated "I wish to confirm our understanding that the functions of the U. S. Army Representative are to be generally as follows: To supervise and control all U. S. defense aid affairs for China; to command under the Generalissimo all U. S. Forces in China and such forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the U. S. Government on any international war council in China and act as Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo."

It appears evident from the above that General Stilwell concurrently functions in a dual capacity: first as representative of the United States, secondly as your Chief of Staff and Commander of American Forces in your theater. It is therefore obviously impracticable for all General Stilwell's duties to be subject to your orders. He couldn't, for example "represent the U. S. Government on any international war council in China" in a capacity other than a subordinate of this government.

My conclusion is that in all defense aid matters and as U. S. representative on any war council General Stilwell is responsible only to the U. S. Government, but that in all other command and staff functions in the China Theater he is subject to your orders as Supreme Commander.
I hope that this will work out satisfactorily. It seems to me personally that if you find this method does not work out we could separate the functions by limiting General Stilwell's authority to one function or the other, sending another General to undertake one of the functions, but not both.

I hope, nevertheless, that because of General Stilwell's great friendship for you and the Chinese people and because of his understanding of very many problems, you will be able to work things out.

ROOSEVELT
Proposed Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

From the start it has been my continued purpose to provide the most effective aid possible to China in her struggle against the Japanese. Every official of this government concerned in the matter has operated under direct orders from me accordingly.

The American Military Mission under General Magruder was sent to China with the primary objective of increasing and making more effective our Lend-Lease assistance to the Chinese Army. This Mission necessarily operated under instructions from the United States Government.

After our entry into war and by agreement with you it was considered desirable that a senior American officer be sent to China. Accordingly, General Stilwell was selected to act as your Chief of Staff and to command American Forces in China under you as the Supreme Commander. For these particular functions and duties he was and is under your command. However, it was apparent that to avoid duplication of effort and to insure coordination it was desirable that this officer also supervise and control all defense aid to China under Lend-Lease Law. This administration of Lend-Lease
matters was necessarily under instructions from the American Government. General Stilwell's authority relative this activity must flow directly from this Government since Lend-Lease was set up by and functions under the laws of the United States.

It was understood that this dual status of the senior American officer was definite and clear. In a letter of January 30, 1942 to the Secretary of War, Dr. Soong stated, "I wish to confirm our understanding that the functions of the U.S. Army Representative are to be generally as follows: To supervise and control all U.S. defense aid affairs for China; to command under the Generalissimo all U.S. Forces in China and such forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the U.S. Government on any international war council in China and act as Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo."

It appears evident from the above that General Stilwell concurrently functions in a dual capacity: first as representative of the United States, secondly as your Chief of Staff and Commander of American Forces in your theater.
It is therefore obviously impracticable for all General Stilwell's duties to be subject to your orders. He couldn't, for example "represent the U.S. Government on any international war council in China" in a capacity other than a subordinate of this government.

My conclusion is that in all defense aid matters and as U.S. representative on any war council General Stilwell is responsible only to the U.S. Government, but that in all other command and staff functions in the China Theater he is subject to your orders as Supreme Commander.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By M. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
Relative to proposed message to Chiang Kai Shak drafted in the War Dept:
(Copy of which is there).

On page 1 - last line, the President strikes out "affairs for China" and inserts in their place: "to China under the Lend-Lease Law."

That is the only amendment to the written text. Add at end:

"I hope that this will work out satisfactorily. It seems to me personally that if you find this method does not work out we could separate the functions by limiting General Stilwell's authority to one function or the other, sending another General to undertake one of the functions, but not both.

"I hope, nevertheless, that because of General Stilwell's great friendship for you and the Chinese people and because of his understanding of very many problems, you will be able to work things out."

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By M. Margaret Stewart Date MAR 9 1977
I hope that this will work out satisfactorily. It seems to me personally that if you find this method does not work out, we could separate the functions by limiting General Stilwell's authority to one function or the other, sending another General to undertake one of the functions but not both.

I hope nevertheless that because of General Stilwell's great friendship for you and the Chinese people and because of his understanding of very many problems, you will be able to work things out.

ROOSEVELT
July 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is attached hereto proposed reply to the Generalissimo’s message of July 5 to Dr. T. V. Soong relative the status of General Stilwell.

Chief of Staff.

2 Incls.
    Incl. 1 - Memo from Mr. Hopkins, July 9, 1942 w/2 incls.
    Incl. 2 - Proposed message to Chiang Kai-Shek.
Proposed message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

From the start it has been my continued purpose to provide the most effective aid possible to China in her struggle against the Japanese. Every official of this government concerned in the matter has operated under direct orders from me accordingly.

The American Military Mission under General Magruder was sent to China with the primary objective of increasing and making more effective our Lend-Lease assistance to the Chinese Army. This Mission necessarily operated under instructions from the United States Government.

After our entry into war and by agreement with you it was considered desirable that a senior American officer be sent to China. Accordingly, General Stilwell was selected to act as your Chief of Staff and to command American Forces in China under you as the Supreme Commander. For these particular functions and duties he was and is under your command. However, it was apparent that to avoid duplication of effort and to insure coordination it was desirable that this officer also supervise and control all defense aid affairs for China. This administration of Lend-Lease...
matters was necessarily under instructions from the American Government. General Stilwell's authority relative this activity must flow directly from this Government since Lend-Lease was set up by and functions under the laws of the United States.

It was understood that this dual status of the senior American officer was definite and clear. In a letter of January 30, 1942 to the Secretary of War, Dr. Soong stated: "I wish to confirm our understanding that the functions of the U.S. Army Representative are to be generally as follows: To supervise and control all U.S. defense aid affairs for China; to command under the Generalissimo all U.S. Forces in China and such forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the U.S. Government on any international war council in China and act as Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo."

It appears evident from the above that General Stilwell concurrently functions in a dual capacity: first as representative of the United States, secondly as your Chief of Staff and Commander of American Forces in your theater.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
It is therefore obviously impracticable for all General Stilwell's duties to be subject to your orders. He couldn't, for example "represent the U.S. Government on any international war council in China" in a capacity other than a subordinate of this government.

My conclusion is that in all defense aid matters and as U.S. representative on any war council General Stilwell is responsible only to the U.S. Government, but that in all other command and staff functions in the China Theater he is subject to your orders as Supreme Commander.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
July 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

This was handed to the President by Dr. Soong. The President wants to know from you how it should be answered.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.,
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972
TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERALISSIMO, CHUNGKING,
JULY 5, 1942

I am cabling to you a memorandum I received today from General Stilwell.

I have always held in high esteem both the status and the duties assigned to General Stilwell. I have refrained from issuing orders to him in my capacity of Supreme Commander in the Chinese theatre of war. However, General Stilwell has maintained throughout that he is the representative of the President of the United States and has acted accordingly. I refrained from questioning this frame of mind and took no action.

Recently a new situation was created when I asked for the transfer to the Aviation Commission of my Headquarters of two Lend-Lease transport planes which had been assigned to and operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. General Stilwell wired the American staff of this Chinese Government controlled corporation to refuse the transfer.

His attitude is since clarified by the memorandum to me in which he takes the position that the Supreme Commander in the Chinese theatre of war must beg of him Lend-Lease supplies already delivered to China.

What kind of situation does this create?

Under the circumstances I have no choice but to request you to discuss the situation so created openly and frankly with the United States Government so as to prevent the deterioration of the most friendly spirit which now prevails between the two nations.

I hold that the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander of the China theatre in the performance of the duties of his office within the scope of that theatre must obey orders of the Supreme Commander. In the performance of these duties no other status he holds can prevail. Otherwise the Chief of Staff claiming to act as the representative of the President of the United States could challenge decisions of the Supreme Commander of the Chinese theatre.

Such a situation could not but affect adversely the spirit in which the American Government offered their assistance to China and their policy of utmost friendliness to our nation.
TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERALISSIMO JULY 6th 1942
Memorandum for Generalissimo from General Stilwell:

"First, reference two transport planes desired by Generalissimo. Although a technicality exists as to the passing of title the real issue is of course how best to get on with war. Under these circumstances as the representative of the President I will assume responsibility of saying that these planes may be used by Generalissimo wherever he considers that they may be most effectively employed to prosecute the war. Second, in this connection it may be well for me to state my position to avoid possible misunderstanding. My directive gives me a rather complicated status.

1. I am U.S. Government representative on any war council held in China. This means that I must present and maintain the policy of the United States of America as it is communicated to me and that in any such council no other status I may hold is effective.

2. I am in command of American forces in China, Burma and India and therefore have responsibility beyond the limit of China war theatre. Since Burma and India are not in China war theatre I have to cooperate with British in those areas (in China war theatre of course Generalissimo in the supreme commander and commands all forces that operate there).

3. I am charged with the supervision and control of Lend-Lease materials and as to decide the place and time that title passes. After title passes Generalissimo controls disposition of the materials. I was given this responsibility to ensure that American Lend-Lease equipment would be employed solely for the effective prosecution of the war and in such matters I act as the representative of the President who can under the law recall Lend-Lease materials any time prior to delivery.

4. I am the Chief of Staff of the Generalissimo's Joint Staff which functions when forces of the Allies carry on operations in China war theatre in conjunction with Chinese Army. As Chief of Staff my duties are concerned with planning, organisation, training and operation in the field and do not extend to procurement of materials. I prepare plans as directed by the Generalissimo and when they are approved by him transmit them to various contingents for execution.

5. And intrinsically I have my basic status as an officer of the U.S. Army sworn to uphold the interests of the U.S.A.

6. Within above limitations my only objective is the effective prosecution of the war our common cause."

[Signature]
General Stilwell states under item 4 of his memorandum that "As Chief of Staff...... my duties do not extend to procurement of materials". On the one hand therefore General Stilwell claims to be the representative of the President with the right to supervise and control Lend-Lease supplies already delivered to China and on the other he declines responsibility for securing implements of war for the fight against the common enemy. His status as defined in the memorandum would entitle him to render decisions as he sees fit and to grant favors, if he so pleases, to the Supreme Commander under whose orders he has been placed. Clearly all this could not have been the original intention of the United States Government.

For several months I have refrained from asking for war supplies from General Stilwell. The reason is simple; I did not want to run the risk of refusal by my own Chief of Staff.

To sum up – I entertain feelings of respect and of greatest friendliness towards everyone assigned by the United States Government to assist in our war effort, including General Stilwell. But in view of the attitude adopted and the psychology revealed by General Stilwell I am compelled to request the United States Government to reconsider and clarify the duties of the Chief of Staff in the China theatre of war. I feel strongly that in this theatre the officer assigned to act as my Chief of Staff cannot concurrently function in any other capacity. Otherwise both military and political relations will be adversely affected.

China can feel nothing but gratitude to the United States for its assistance and there is no place whatever in the cordial relationship between the two nations for controversy regarding respective rights and position. I trust the United States Government will understand that in raising the matter I am prompted entirely by the desire to derive the fullest benefit from our mutual determination for the most complete cooperation.
TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERALISSIMO, CHUNGKING, JULY 5, 1942

I am cabling to you a memorandum I received today from General Stilwell.

I have always held in high esteem both the status and the duties assigned to General Stilwell. I have refrained from issuing orders to him in my capacity of Supreme Commander in the Chinese theatre of war. However, General Stilwell has maintained throughout that he is the representative of the President of the United States and has acted accordingly. I refrained from questioning this frame of mind and took no action.

Recently a new situation was created when I asked for the transfer to the Aviation Commission of my Headquarters of two Lend-Lease transport planes which had been assigned to and operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. General Stilwill wired the American staff of this Chinese Government controlled corporation to refuse the transfer.

His attitude is since clarified by the memorandum to me in which he takes the position that the Supreme Commander in the Chinese theatre of war must beg of him Lend-Lease supplies already delivered to China.

What kind of a situation does this create?

Under the circumstances I have no choice but to request you to discuss the situation so created openly and frankly with the United States Government so as to prevent the deterioration of the most friendly spirit which now prevails between the two nations.

I hold that the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander of the China theatre in the performance of the duties of his office within the scope of that theatre must obey orders of the Supreme Commander. In the performance of these
Translation of Telegram from the Generalissimo, Chungking, July 5, 1942 Page 2.

...duties no other status he holds can prevail. Otherwise the Chief of Staff claiming to act as the representative of the President of the United States could challenge decisions of the Supreme Commander of the Chinese theatre.

Such a situation could not but affect adversely the spirit in which the American Government offered their assistance to China and their policy of utmost friendliness to our nation.

General Stilwell states under item 4 of his memorandum that "As Chief of Staff .............. my duties do not extend to procurement of materials". On the one hand therefore General Stilwell claims to be the representative of the President with the right to supervise and control Lend-Lease supplies already delivered to China and on the other he declines responsibility for securing implements of war for the fight against the common enemy. His status as defined in the memorandum would entitle him to render decisions as he sees fit and to grant favors, if he so pleases, to the Supreme Commander under whose orders he has been placed. Clearly all this could not have been the original intention of the United States Government.

For several months I have refrained from asking for war supplies from General Stilwell. The reason is simple; I did not want to run the risk of refusal by my own Chief of Staff.

To sum up - I entertain feelings of respect and of greatest friendliness towards everyone assigned by the United States Government to assist in our war effort, including General Stilwell. But in view of the attitude adopted and the psychology revealed by General Stilwell I am compelled to request the United States Government to reconsider and clarify the duties of the Chief of Staff in the China theatre of war. I feel strongly that in this theatre the officer assigned to act as my Chief of Staff cannot concurrently function in any other capacity. Otherwise both military and political relations will be adversely affected.
China can feel nothing but gratitude to the United States for its assistance and there is no place whatever in the cordial relationship between the two nations for controversy regarding respective rights and position. I trust the United States Government will understand that in raising the matter I am prompted entirely by the desire to derive the fullest benefit from our mutual determination for the most complete cooperation.
Memorandum for Generalissimo from General Stilwell:

"First, reference two transport planes desired by Generalissimo. Although a technicality exists as to the passing of title the real issue is of course how best to get on with war. Under these circumstances as the representative of the President I will assume responsibility of saying that these planes may be used by Generalissimo wherever he considers that they may be most effectively employed to prosecute the war. Second, in this connection it may be well for me to state my position to avoid possible misunderstanding. My directive gives me a rather complicated status.

1. I am U.S. Government representative on any war council held in China. This means that I must present and maintain the policy of the United States of America as it is communicated to me and that in any such council no other status I may hold is effective.

2. I am in command of American forces in China, Burma and India and therefore have responsibility beyond the limit of China war theatre. Since Burma and India are not in China war theatre I have to cooperate with British in those areas (in China war theatre of course Generalissimo is the supreme commander and commands all forces that operate there).

3. I am charged with the supervision and control of Lend-Lease materials and am to decide the place and time that title passes. After title passes Generalissimo controls disposition of the materials. I was given this responsibility to ensure that American Lend-Lease equipment would be employed solely for the effective prosecution of the war and in such matters I act as the representative of the President who can under the law recall Lend-Lease materials any time prior to delivery.

4. I am the Chief of Staff of the Generalissimo’s Joint Staff which functions when forces of the Allies carry on operations in China war theatre in conjunction with Chinese Army. As Chief of Staff my duties are concerned with planning, organisation, training and operation in the field and do not extend to procurement of materials. I prepare plans as directed by the Generalissimo and when they are approved by him transmit them to various contingents for execution.

5. And intrinsically I have my basic status as an officer of the U.S. Army sworn to uphold the interests of the U.S.A.

6. Within above limitations my only objective is the effective prosecution of the war our common cause."
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

27 June 1942

Please hand the following message personally and promptly to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I have just received your message forwarded to me by General Stilwell.

The rapid advance of the Axis forces in the Middle East, suddenly confronted the United Nations with a most critical situation. This movement, if not stopped, will result in the severance of the Air Routes to India and China, and seriously interfere with, if not interrupt, our sea lanes to India. It is imperative that the Middle East be held. All reinforcements possible are being rushed to block the Axis advance.

The urgency of the situation demanded that any and all means immediately available be dispatched to preserve our lines of communication to the China Theater. Accordingly the heavy bombers of the 10th Air Force were ordered to the Middle East.

The diversion of these planes is a temporary measure compelled by this sudden crisis. Upon arrival of sufficient air power to secure our lines of communication, the planes will be returned to the 10th Air Force.

A decision has not been made as to the theater in which the squadron of A-29 light bombers now departing from the United States will be used. This squadron has been ordered to await instructions at Khartoum. In the meantime the medium bombardment and pursuit echelon of the 10th Air Force will continue in the support of your Forces.

I reassure you that the United States and our allies do regard China as a vital part of our common war effort and depend upon the maintenance of the China Theater as an urgent necessity for the defeat of our enemies.
June 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I assume from your conversation with me the other day that this matter has been settled and also that Chiang Kai-shek has been notified.

H.L.H.
FOR THE PRESIDENT.

TAKE UP WHEN I GET BACK

We really want to reply to this.
TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK

DATED CHUNGKING MAY 27, 1942

THE LOSS OF THE BURMA ROAD, FOLLOWED BY HEAVY JAPANESE ATTACKS NOW DEVELOPING ON THE VITAL SECTORS OF OUR DEFENCES IN SOUTHERN, CENTRAL AND NORTHWESTERN CHINA, HAS CREATED A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. IN ADDITION, OUR PEOPLE ARE GREATLY DEPRESSED BY THE CONTINUOUS UNITED NATIONS REVERSES IN THE PACIFIC AND ON THE ASIATIC MAINLAND, AND THE APPARENT LACK OF READINESS TO COUNTER-ATTACK. OUR WAR OF RESISTANCE HAS NOW ARRIVED AT THE MOST CRUCIAL STAGE SUCH AS I NEVER EXPERIENCED BEFORE.

I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH YOU IN PERSON, BUT AT PRESENT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO LEAVE CHINA. I STRONGLY REQUEST YOU TO SEND MR. HARRY HOPKINS IMMEDIATELY TO CHINA SO THAT I COULD ACQUAINT HIM WITH THE SITUATION, AND CONSULT YOU INTIMATELY THROUGH HIM. I WAIT MOST ANXIOUSLY YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

The attached proposed message was dispatched by me today, with one change verbally suggested to me by the President. This consisted of deleting from the last sentence the words "by 60" and inserting the word "strongly" before "reinforced."

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JOHN L. McCREA,
NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose the following reply by Mr. Lauchlin Currie to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's message of May 23rd:

Every possible measure has already been taken to meet the situation described in your message of May 23rd. The 10th Air Force offers the most immediate means of effective assistance. Orders were issued May 24th placing it completely under General Stilwell's control, to be employed at his discretion in the China-Burma-India Region. Stilwell has acknowledged these instructions, reiterates his belief in the decisive strategic importance of China, and states that plans are complete for maximum employment of 10th Air Force in direct support of China Theater and will be put into effect at the earliest possible time. The 10th Air Force is being reinforced by 88 planes, now en route, and by antiaircraft units, an aircraft warning company, engineer and medical units, and the ground echelon of medium bombardment squadrons, all of which are leaving immediately.

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Secretary.

Incls.
Memo. from Lauchlin Currie to the President, 5-25-42.
Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-Shek to Lauchlin Currie, 5-23-42.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Attached cable from
Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

I understand that cables even more pessimistic have been received by General Hsiung, head of the Chinese Military Mission.

The most effective and indeed almost the only worthwhile thing we can do at the moment would be to put some additional pursuit planes in China. I think the situation is sufficiently critical to justify urging the British to transfer one or two fighter squadrons from India to China immediately.

Lauchlin Currie
CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO LAUGHLIN CURRIE

MAY 23, 1942.

MORALE OF ARMY AND PEOPLE NEVER LOWER DURING FIVE YEARS OF WAR THAN SINCE FALL OF BURMA. THREE DIVISIONS ESCAPED JAPANESE ENCIRCLEMENT NORTH OF MYITKYINA, BUT MANY AMONGST THEM DIED OF STARVATION. REACTIONARIES HERE ACTIVELY RAISING UGLY HEADS, MAKING HEADWAY WITH ANTI-WAR PROPAGANDA. FOR FIRST TIME SINCE 1937, CHIEF IS PESSIMISTIC, ADMITS SITUATION DANGEROUS. THIS FOR YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BECAUSE FUTURE IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL. MAGRUDER IS TAKING YOU IMPORTANT LETTER.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A message has just been received from General Stilwell in which he states that your message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek in which you outlined the airplanes destined for delivery to the A.V.C. in Burma has been delivered to the Generalissimo. He desires that you be informed that this message was appreciated and that he will reply direct to you.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

[Signature]

JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
TO: AMISCA, Chungking, China.

April 21, 1942.

This message is to be delivered personally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek stop I have carefully examined all our plans for providing you as rapidly as possible with the air support that you require in the great battle you are waging in Burma stop No repeat no airplanes consigned to the AVG will be diverted to the Tenth Air Force comma and the total number of airplanes scheduled for the AVG remains unchanged stop I give you the following schedules of shipments colon sixty-one pursuit and six cargo airplanes have already arrived at Karachi stop This number includes those actually delivered to the AVG stop One hundred twenty pursuit planes are now at sea in various ships comma some of which will arrive at Karachi in the very near future stop There are now flying to China from the United States six cargo planes stop Soon to leave the United States are thirty two light bombers and twenty two cargo planes stop Future departures include two hundred nine pursuit planes comma ninety one of which are scheduled to leave this country in April stop.

I repeat that all the airplanes above listed are being delivered to you for operations under your direction stop The airplanes now being sent to the Tenth Air Force for operations in India and to preserve air communications to China are from British and American allocations and have no repeat no relationship to planes previously consigned or promised to China stop.

I give you this information in detail so that you may have a definite basis for planning and so that you may be reassured with respect to the questions you have raised stop You will note that the total number of airplanes allocated for operations in China is four hundred fifty six and of these the portion that has not yet left the United States will be dispatched as soon as we are able to do so stop.

I again congratulate you on the magnificent effort your troops are making and I am earnestly hopeful that with the air assistance represented in the above schedule of arrivals and shipments your situation will rapidly improve.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Note: Original draft of this despatch (initialled by the President) returned to Miss Tully. 
1 copy to code room (Army) 
1 copy to Miss Berney 
This copy to FILE
War Department Classified Message Center

April 18, 1942.
4:04 P.M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for AMMISCA

No. 540 AMMISCA, April 18, 1942.

Plans and efforts for assisting and supporting China outlined under 459 were personally explained to Generalissimo. He understood the situation fully. He requested that War Dept. advise: 1 - date AVG will be brought to full strength in aircraft and personnel, 2 - specifically how many and what type airplanes would be diverted to 10th Air Force and on what date, 3 - what action the President will take on Generalissimo's urgent request for 300 airplanes for Burma defense? After conversation with Madame Generalissimo expressed strong anti-British feeling, became quite angry and excited and stated he does not consent to diversion of Chinese Aircraft for defense of India. He desired to protest the diversion, he stated it was a breach of faith, that it would have a demoralizing effect on morale of Chinese Army officers and men, that it would adversely effect the good will and mutual understanding between China and the United States to divert Aircraft promised and delivered to China, and that he opposes the diversion with all his strength. It was made clear that unless India was defended and lines of communication to China kept open little or no US aid could reach China. The Generalissimo stated his decision was final, requested that Washington be informed and politely withdrew. Bissell end.

Stilwell


ACTION: OPD

INFO COPIES - TAG LOG FILE A-2: SGS CF-AAF G-2 JIC MAJ HAMKOND

Copies of this despatch made by Map Room and distributed as follows:
4-19-42 1 copy to Admiral King
4-21-42 1 copy to Miss Berney (for Mr. Hopkins)
4-22-42 This copy to file.
4-22-42 (Original copy returned to Miss Tully with marked up draft of reply).
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING

War Dept. No. 449

Urgent for either General Stilwell or Bissell.

Reports concerning General Wavell's efforts to divert Chinese Lend Lease Aircraft as stated in your number 506 are not understood. All concerned have been frequently informed that no diversion of China Lend Lease property is authorized except with the approval of Stilwell acting under supreme control of the Generalissimo. Our number 427 outlined a plan for providing immediately 80 pursuit planes for the 10th Air Force in India using certain planes already in India that are consigned to AVG but are over and above current operational requirements of the AVG. This plan contemplates the earliest possible employment of 2 pursuit groups under Stilwell's direct control namely the AVG and the pursuit group of the 10th Air Force. Moreover the 80 reserve planes so used are to be promptly replaced from shipments from here. It is repeated that no one has any authority to divert planes from intended uses and no such request has been received here.

Reference special project referred to execution of first special mission is so imminent that it is impossible to recall. This particular mission involves landing only for fuel and prompt take off after which planes pass to permanent control of Stilwell. Their arrival at field agreed upon should be immediately anticipated and all arrangements perfected. Our understanding of your number 506 that you refer to the 2nd special mission which will require repeated use of the fields indicated. These planes pass to Stilwell's control upon arrival in region and will operate under his orders. The special mission will be coordinated as to time by Stilwell so as to conform to Generalissimos desires. Acknowledge receipt of this message promptly. Impossible to repeat your message AMISCA number 506.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD
Info Copies: AG
FILE
CO AAF
SGS

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec. Army
by TAG-pec 220724
By REVER Date JUN 1 4 1972
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Urgent

April 14, 1942

Dear General Watson,

I shall be grateful if you will kindly give the enclosed letter to the President.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

April 14, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I am asked by the Generalissimo to transmit to you the enclosed urgent message. He has also requested me to transmit the text of the same message to Prime Minister Churchill through our Embassy in London.

I am at your disposal for any reply you may wish to make. In this connection Lieutenant General Hsiung Shih-hui has just arrived with the other members of the Chinese Military Mission, and you may desire to discuss with him at once regarding the situation in Burma.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
While on my recent tour of inspection at the Burma front, I became acutely aware of numerous weaknesses on the allied side and of the pressing need for remediying these deficiencies. The most signal failings were the lack of organisation in the rear and the disaffection and poor morale of the people. In all my life-long military experience I have seen nothing to compare with the deplorable unpreparedness, confusion and degradation in the war areas of Burma.

To mention one aspect of the situation, on April 7th I arrived at Mandalay, a city which had been bombed by the Japanese on the 4th, more than half the city being destroyed. I arrived on the third day after the raid, yet I found fires still blazing, since there were no fire-extinguishing apparatus and personnel. There was an intolerable stench from the corpses of those killed in the raid and from the carcasses of animals which had not been removed. The same was the case with corpses in the houses, for the whole population had completely disappeared. The personnel responsible for the maintenance of communications had also made off.

A complete absence of fighting spirit was to be observed among the civilian defence personnel, the public servants and the masses alike. They seemed to think of nothing but their own safety. The whole scene was therefore one of desolation and disorder. Rolling stock damaged in the raid was left on the rails with the result that railway traffic had come to a standstill. Nothing had been done to repair the means of telegraphic communication.

From the military point of view the Burmese forces showed themselves incapable of winning the people's confidence and of enlisting their cooperation, while they were themselves so lacking in fighting spirit that they presented a spectacle which I can scarcely attempt to describe in the present telegram. Owing to the lack of organisation and leadership, the majority of the people were being utilised by the enemy. Anti-British sentiment was especially marked among the lamas. Fifth columnist activities were so extensive that it was almost impossible to deal with such. The situation was depressing and alarming to a degree.

Another point I wish to emphasise is that the greatest handicap experienced by the Chinese forces lay in the complete superiority of the enemy in the air. They have been fighting in Burma nearly one month, yet not a single machine of the Allied air forces has been used for their protection and assistance. As a consequence the enemy has been able to coordinate his movements on land and in the air with the utmost ease, while the Chinese forces have found themselves fighting under the worst possible conditions and forced to make excessive sacrifices.
present state of public morale in this war zone, the inadequacy of the auxiliary services in the rear, and the utter disparity of air power make it impossible for the Allied forces to remain in the field, not to speak of operating with any hope of success. Nevertheless the Chinese forces are continuing to hold a salient more than 60 miles in depth from Yedoche to Pyminia, and by sustained hand-to-hand combat with the enemy are thus covering the exposed flanks of the British and Burmese forces.

"The Chinese expeditionary force is, it is true, concerned on the one hand with the protection of China's means of communication and on the other with contact with our Allies, knowing that this is necessary for the preservation of the only available base on the continent of East Asia for a counter-attack upon Japan. At the same time, however, the aim that above all inspires a tremendous effort is that of defending the continent of India. The Chinese forces are perfectly well aware of the difficulties attendant upon the maintenance of public health, transport, telegraphic and telephonic communications in the war zone of Burma and they are fully prepared to make all sacrifices demanded of them. They went to Burma however in the belief that they would be afforded Allied air protection.

"They have been astonished to find nothing of the sort and the general conditions under which they have to fight are even inferior to those on the front in China. The difficulties in some respects far exceed those encountered in China. If nothing is done to effect improvements, a very bad impression of their allies will be formed in the minds of Chinese officers and men, which it will be difficult to remove in the future. Fierce fighting is now proceeding in Central Burma. Should Central Burma be lost and Northern Burma become the battlefield, India will be exposed to the immediate threat of invasion by land.

"I am by no means ignorant of the fact that Great Britain and U. S. A. are doing everything possible to increase production and are meeting with many difficulties in their conduct of the war. I have therefore been most reluctant to express impatience or to make complaints which might add to your causes for anxiety. What I have myself witnessed has, however, so impressed me with the gravity of the crisis that I feel bound to inform you of the facts. If no vigorous action is taken in Burma to change the attitude of the masses and non-combatant public servants at the front and in the rear, if nothing is done to raise their morale, and if strength in the air cannot be increased, defeat in Burma is inevitable.

"The most urgent need is air power. Small numbers of machines will be of little use. At least 300 aircraft ought to be brought rapidly
to the scene in order that air superiority may be obtained and a new complexion put upon the present perilous situation. The left flank of the threatened continent of India may thus be protected. I am of the opinion that the Burma war area cannot be regarded as merely a subsidiary field of operations. It is, on the contrary, an area of basic importance for the conduct of the war in the Far East. We must lean on it as an essential support in our resistance to Japan. If Burma is lost, nothing will stand in the path of the Japanese forces to India. The lines of communication and transport between China and her Allies will be cut. The base for land operations against Japan will be lost and the difficulties of the Allies will be greatly multiplied. The enemy will be able to develop the offensive to the east or the west at will.

"I make this report of my observations on the spot in the hope that your country will immediately make use of the greatest possible number of aircraft in Burma in accordance with the request stated above, that the urgent need of our land forces may be met, encouragement given to the Chinese expeditionary force, and the base for counteroffensive operations against Japan be kept firmly in our hands.

"I shall await your reply with the greatest eagerness to know what may be your views on the points I have made in this communication."

Chiang Kai Shek

*This undoubtedly means British forces in Burma.*
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

DECEMBER 29, 1941

TO:

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK,
CHUNGKING,
CHINA.

IN ORDER TO INSURE IMMEDIATE COORDINATION AND CO-
OPERATION IN OUR COMMON EFFORT AGAINST THE ENEMY, THERE
IS BEING ESTABLISHED A SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALL BRITISH,
DUTCH AND AMERICAN FORCES IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER.

THE ADVISABILITY OF A SIMILAR COMMAND OF ACTIVITIES
OF THE UNITED POWERS IN THE CHINESE THEATER APPEARS EVIDENT.
THIS THEATER WE SUGGEST, SHOULD INITIALLY INCLUDE SUCH
PORTION OF THAILAND AND INDO-CHINA AS MAY BECOME ACCE-
SIBLE TO TROOPS OF THE UNITED POWERS. IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH AND DUTCH GOVERNMENTS
I DESIRE TO SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOULD INDERTAKE TO EXERCISE
SUCH COMMAND OVER ALL FORCES OF THE UNITED POWERS WHICH
ARE NOW, OR MAY IN THE FUTURE BE OPERATING IN THE CHINESE
THEATER.

IT IS OUR THOUGHT THAT, IN ORDER TO MAKE SUCH COM-
MAND EFFECTIVE, A JOINT PLANNING STAFF SHOULD AT ONCE BE
ORGANIZED CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH,
AMERICAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS. IF YOU CONSIDER IT
PRACTICABLE AND RUSSIA AGREES, A RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE
MIGHT BE INCLUDED. THIS STAFF SHOULD FUNCTION UNDER
YOUR SUPREME COMMAND.

THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER AND THE
COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN INDIA WOULD BE DIRECTED
TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST LIAISON WITH YOUR HEADQUARTERS. A
MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF LIAISON OFFICERS BETWEEN THE THREE
HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ENABLE YOUR COUNSEL AND
INFLUENCE TO BE GIVEN EFFECT ON THE FORMULATION OF THE
GENERAL STRATEGY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN ALL THEATERS.
YOUR VIEWS IN THIS MATTER WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY ME.

ROOSEVELT.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By F. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
December 30, 1942.

PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI SHEK:

The receipt is acknowledged of your message of December 28 in regard to the proposed Burma campaign.

In view of the existing shortage in shipping and present difficulties in providing supplies and reinforcements at that great distance, it is my present thought that an opening of the Burma Road is more important at the present time to our war effort than an occupation of Southern Burma.

It is my understanding that the light British naval vessels needed for operations in the Bay of Bengal are now being used to hunt Japanese ships in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope a very necessary employment for them at the present time.

I will definitely take up with the highest allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without any avoidable delay.

Please accept my warm personal regards and my wishes for great and final success in the New Year.

Roosevelt

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Y. J. Stinnett, M.A.
Mar. 9, 1972