FROM: WAR # 4167
TO: AMMISCA, CHUNGKING

FOR GENERAL STILWELL'S EYES ONLY FOR DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

FOR YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION I KNOW YOU WILL BE INTERESTED
TO LEARN THAT DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF NINETEEN FORTY THREE
OUR UNITED STATES SUBMARINES HAVE SUNK A TOTAL OF TWENTY-TWO
JAPANESE SHIPS AMOUNTING TO NEARLY TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND TONS EMPLOYED
IN SUPPLY SERVICE TO CHINESE, INDO-CHINESE, SIAMESE AND MALAYAN PORTS.
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO STATE WHAT VAST QUANTITY OF STORES WERE THUS
LOST TO THE ENEMY. THE ABOVE FIGURES WERE ACCOMPLISHED BY OUR SUB-
MARINES ALONE AND THE LOSSES IMPOSED BY OUR CHINESE-AMERICAN AIR
FORCES ARE IN ADDITION.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1210, EWT, 31 December 1943.

L. MADEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1976
From: The President.
To: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

For your confidential information I know you will be interested to learn that during the last three months of Nineteen Forty-Three our United States submarines have sunk a total of twenty-two Japanese ships amounting to nearly two hundred thousand tons employed in supply service to Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Siamese and Malayan ports. It is not possible to state what vast quantity of stores were thus lost to the enemy. The above figures were accomplished by our submarines alone and the losses imposed by our United Air Forces are in addition.

ROOSEVELT.

Eyes Only General Stillwell
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Generalissimo</th>
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**ACTION**

Drafted by Admiral Brown from data supplied by Navy Department.

Answered by Amnissa, Chungking, #972,
31 December 1943.
Answered by Chungking #25, 10 Jan 1944.
From: Chungking  
To: AFWAR  
Nr: #972  31 December 1943

Backwell from Stillwell for President Roosevelt.

Just before Christmas to my surprise and unbounded delight ten volumes of your speeches and public papers reached me. I hasten to thank you for your kindness in autographing them and in sending them to me. They are amongst my most treasured possessions and I shall eventually will them to the State Library. By a happy coincidence on the day they arrived my новогоtint eye for the first time showed marked improvement and my doctor thinks that if all goes well after a fortnight I shall have normal vision again. I shall then celebrate my recovery by studying and enjoying the thoughts which have constantly been your companions for the last ten years. I am grieved that you are indisposed with a cold. The Generalissimo fully sympathizes with you for he is suffering from a similar ailment.

To which you have so selflessly dedicated yourself may 1944 bring to you rich fulfillment in the grave task and to both you and Mrs Roosevelt continued health and happiness. The Generalissimo joins me in warmest personal greetings to you both.

No Sig

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION: C OF S

RECEIVED 01/12/43
Delivered to usher 01/12/43

CN-IN-228 (1 Jan 44) 0613Z

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET

FROM: WAR
TO: MAJECA, CHUNGKING 4139
YOUR NUMBER 955 DECEMBER 23.

ONLY FOR GENERAL STILWELL'S EYES FOR DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

"I FULLY AGREE TO THE NEED AS EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 23RD FOR ADEQUATE FIGHTER PROTECTION FOR THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER BASES IN CHINA. THE CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE THEREFORE LOOKED INTO THIS MATTER AND HAVE INCLUDED SUFFICIENT FIGHTER PLANES TO PROTECT THE BASES INVOLVED. IN ORDER NOT TO PLACE TOO HEAVY AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE AGAINST THE AIR FERRY ROUTE FOR THEIR SUPPORT, THESE FIGHTERS WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER PROJECT WHICH WILL SUPPORT ITSELF.

"I AM MOST ANXIOUS, IN THE MEANTIME, FOR WORD AS TO THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN CHINA ON THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER FIELDS UPON WHICH THE SUCCESS AND IMPLANT ACTION OF THIS ENTIRE BOMBER OPERATION COMPLETELY DEPEND.

"I KNOW YOU WILL AGREE, DESPITE POSTPONEMENT OF THE YUNNAN FORCE OPERATION AGAINST BUKHARA, THAT IN THE INTERIM EVERY FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY MUST BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST WITH THE MEANS AVAILABLE." KOHTHATTEN IS PLANNING A VERY INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN WITH THE MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE PLACED THE BUKHARZ AND LDSO FORCES AT HIS DISPOSAL. AGAIN I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY VIEWS AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE BEING EXERTED BY YOUR YUNNAN FORCES. CONSIDERABLY CRITICAL MATERIALS AND INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL FOR THE YUNNAN DIVISIONS ARE CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO BE MOVED BY AIR TO CHINA. THE RATE OF THIS BUILDUP TO MY KIND REFERS TO A LARGE DEGREE UPON THE CODE TO BE MADE OF THESE

SECRET
DIVISIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID AT THIS TIME, THE USE OF THE RESTRICTED AIR LIFT OR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE RESOURCES.

IN AN EFFORT, THE FULL IMPACT OF WHICH UPON THE ENEMY WILL BE DELAYED.

"I AM INFORMED THAT ON CHRISTMAS DAY A TOTAL OF TEN THOUSAND TONS OF FREIGHT HAD BEEN CARRIED OVER THE HUMP INTO CHINA SO FAR IN DECEMBER.

THAT IS GOOD NEWS FOR US BOTH."

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

Released from the White House Map Room at 1555, EUT, 27 December 1943.

L. MATTHEWS
Colonel, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: Attached Draft of Message to the Generalissimo.

Attached is a proposed reply from the President to the Generalissimo's message of the 23rd of December.

Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOCS 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date: MAR 9 1972
Signatures: [Handwritten]
PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR GENERAL STILWELL TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM THE PRESIDENT

On 958 December 23.

Only for General Stilwell's eyes for delivery of the following message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

"I fully agree to the need as expressed in your message of December 23rd for adequate fighter protection for the very long range bomber bases in China. The Chiefs of Staff have therefore looked into this matter and have included sufficient fighter planes to protect the bases involved. In order not to place too heavy an additional charge against the air ferry route for their support, these fighters will be an integral part of the very long range bomber project which will support itself.

"I am most anxious, in the meantime, for word as to the progress being made in China on the very long range bomber fields upon which the success and early action of this entire bomber operation completely depend.

"I know you will agree, despite postponement of the Yunnan force operation against Burma, that in the interim every favorable opportunity must be exploited to the fullest with the means available. Mountbatten is planning a very intensive campaign with the means at his disposal and I am particularly pleased that you have placed the Rangarh and Ledo forces at his disposal. Again I wish to emphasize my views as to the importance of all possible pressure being exerted by your Yunnan forces. Considerable critical materials and instructor personnel for the Yunnan divisions are currently scheduled to be moved by air to China. The rate of this buildup to my mind depends to a large degree upon the use to be made of these divisions in the
near future. We should therefore avoid at this time, the use of the restricted air lift or the employment of these resources in an effort, the full impact of which upon the enemy will be delayed.

"I am informed that on Christmas Day a total of ten thousand tons of freight had been carried over the hump into China so far in December. That is good news for us both."
From: Chungking
To: War

No: 955, 23 December 1943

Eyes alone for Marshall from Hearn for delivery.

"President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I have received your telegram of December 21st. Since our meeting at Cairo, I have been even more keenly aware of your friendly assistance to and deep concern for China, and have therefore accepted your suggestion of delaying our all-out offensive in Burma until we can have a large scale amphibious operation as outlined in your telegram of December 7th. As regards the general strategy decided by the British American council of Chiefs of Staff to use all available resources to defeat Germany first, I was not present during the deliberations and was therefore not in position to express my views. I place the greatest confidence in the soundness of your judgment. I must however say quite frankly that judging by the latest military dispositions and activities the Allied strategy of relegating the China War Theater to the background has given rise to serious misgivings on all sides. The success or failure of the Burma campaign is a matter of life and death for China. You will recall that at Cairo I emphasized the fact that to dispatch our Rumanian troops to begin operations in south Burma to outflank the enemy is to court disaster—a plan of campaign to which I am unable to agree. However, whatever Chinese forces which could be used in the Burma campaign without vitally affecting the China theater of war, such as the Lako and Funglu troops, I have already turned over to Perlstetten and Stilwell. While sharing your view that very long range air operations against Japan proper from China should do much to heighten the morale of both our nations, I am strongly of the opinion that in order to assure the success of these operations the present American Air force stationed in China should be immediately increased to such an extent as to be able to protect our air bases.
From: Chungking
To: War
No. 1 955, 23 December 1943

From attack or destruction by the enemy. As a Military man, I feel constrained to acquaint you with the actual situation as it exists today. The coming year is the most critical year for the China theater of war both from the military and the economic point of view and I am apprehensive lest the unfavorable turn of events in this theater should affect the whole war situation in the Pacific. Signed Chiang Kai Shek.

No. 615

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

CM-IN-13570 (23 Dec 43) 15352 bjm

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 10-6-43

No B.5 Policy Date Jul 24-42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO. 18
FROM: WAR
TO: AMITSCA, CHUNGKING #4092

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL STILWELL'S EYES ALONE.

THE PRESIDENT DESIRES THAT YOU HAND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

"YOUR TWO MESSAGES WERE RECEIVED BY ME ON MY RETURN. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE STRATEGY OF CONCENTRATING ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO DEFEAT GERMANY FIRST UNITS ALL OF US COMPLETELY.

"I FULLY APPRECIATE THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHINA AS OUTLINED BY YOU. I AM STILL CONVINCED, THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION THAT WE CAN MAKE TO RELIEVE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHINA IS TO UNDERTAKE DURING THIS DRY SEASON, THE DRIVING OF A LAND ROUTE OF SUPPLY ACROSS BURMA TO CHINA. THE OPERATIONS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD IN THE MEANTIME RESULT IN MUCH GREATER SECURITY FOR THE AIR TRANSPORT ROUTE AND ENABLE US TO REDUCE LOSSES OF OUR PLANES BY ENEMY ACTION. PLANS ARE NOW BEING MADE BY MOUNTBATTEN TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS ON AS LARGE A SCALE AS MAY BE POSSIBLE WITH THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM, AND IT IS HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY PRACTICABLE EFFORT TO GET YOUR TURKISH FORCE PREPARED TO BEGIN OPERATIONS IN NORTH BURMA IN SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORT WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES FROM INDIA.

"AS TO THE AIR FORCES IN CHINA, YOU ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE FULL POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF CHERNAULT'S FORCES IS STILL SEVERELY LIMITED BY SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES. WE MUST STRIVE FIRST, THEREFORE, TO IMPROVE THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE AIR FERRY ROUTE TO CHINA BEFORE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO ANY FURTHER INCREASE OF THE AIR FORCES IN CHINA BEYOND PRESENT"
ARRANGEMENTS.

"AS YOU KNOW, PREPARATIONS ARE NOW BEING MADE TO UNDERTAKE VERY
LONG RANGE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN PROPER FROM THE AREA IN CHINA
YOU KNOW ABOUT. THE EFFECT OF CARRYING THE ATTACK BY THIS MEANS TO THE
VERY HEART OF THE ENEMY SHOULD DO MUCH TO HEIGHTEN THE MORALE OF BOTH
OUR NATIONS.

"REGARDING THE AIR FERRY ROUTE, THERE ARE ABOUT 100 LARGE TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT NOW ON THE WAY OR BEING PREPARED FOR MOVEMENT TO THE THEATER.
THESE PLANES SHOULD GO FAR TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE EARLY ATTAINMENT OF OUR
PRESENT TARGET CAPACITY FOR THE AIR ROUTE. WE WILL CONTINUE STRIVING
WITH UTMOST ENERGY TO BUILD UP THIS ROUTE, AND TO IMPROVE OPERATING
CONDITIONS. IT IS YET TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO PREDICT WHAT ACTUAL ADDITIONAL
CAPACITY CAN BE ACHIEVED. OUR BUILDUP, MEANWHILE, WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD
ATTAINING AN EARLY GOAL OF 12,000 TONS PER MONTH. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN
BE REACHED PROVIDED THERE IS NO DIVERSION OF THE AIRCRAFT ALLOCATED TO THE
AIR TRANSPORT ROUTE, AND PROVIDED A JAPANESE INTERRUPTION OF THE AIR LINE
IS PREVENTED BY THE ADVANCE OF OUR LAND FORCES.

"THE QUESTION OF A LOAN AND RELATED FINANCIAL MATTERS IS BEING
WORKED ON BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND I WILL WIRE YOU VERY SOON."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1320, EWT, 20 December 1943.

L. MATHESON,
Colonel, General Staff.
December 20, 1943

PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT

General Stilwell's eyes alone. The President desires that you hand the following message to the Generalissimo: "Your two messages were received by me on my return. Your acceptance of the strategy of concentrating all necessary means to defeat Germany first unites all of us completely.

"I fully appreciate the military and economic situation in China as outlined by you. I am still convinced, that under the circumstances, the major contribution that we can make to relieve the present situation in China is to undertake during this dry season, the driving of a land route of supply across Burma to China. The operations required to accomplish this would in the meantime result in much greater security for the air transport route and enable us to reduce losses of our planes by enemy action. Plans are now being made by Mountbatten to undertake operations on as large a scale as may be possible with the resources available to him, and it is hoped that you will continue to make every practicable effort to get your Yunnan
force prepared to begin operations in North Burma in support of our effort with British and American forces from India.

"As to the Air Forces in China, you are well aware that the full potential effectiveness of Chennault's forces is still severely limited by supply difficulties. We must strive first, therefore, to improve the lines of communication and the air ferry route to China before committing ourselves to any further increase of the Air Forces in China beyond present arrangements.

"As you know, preparations are now being made to undertake very long range air operations against Japan proper from the China area. The effect of carrying the attack by this means to the very heart of the enemy should do much to heighten the morale of both our nations.

"Regarding the Air Ferry Route, there are about 100 large transport aircraft now on the way or being prepared for movement to the theater. These planes should go far to make possible the early attainment of our present target capacity for the
Air Route. We will continue striving with utmost energy to build up this route, and to improve operating conditions. It is yet too early, however, to predict what actual additional capacity can be achieved. Our buildup, meanwhile, will be directed toward attaining an early goal of 12,000 tons per month. We believe that this can be reached provided there is no diversion of the aircraft allocated to the Air Transport Route, and provided a Japanese interruption of the air line is prevented by the advance of our land forces.

"The question of a loan and related financial matters is being now receiving my serious consideration, and will be made the subject of a later message."

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 8 1944

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 8 1944
18 December 1943

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: WAR

TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING.

PERSONAL AND MOST-SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

I HAVE JUST GOT BACK SAFELY TO WASHINGTON AND I AM GLAD TO GET
YOUR MESSAGE. I HAVE TALKED WITH THE TREASURY AND WILL TELEGRAPH YOU
ON MONDAY.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1500, EWT, 18 December, 1943

Olga Kniffin
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
C. H. S.

I have just got back safely to Washington and am glad to get your message.
I have talked with the Treasury and will telegraph you on Monday.
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OPERATIONS DIVISION
DECEMBER 10, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
ANNISCA, CHUNGKING, CHINA

NUMBER 4025

EYES ONLY FOR STILWELL OR HEARN FROM McNARNEY

Believe you should tell Generalissimo that his message to President of December 9th has been received Washington and will be brought to President's immediate attention upon his return from abroad.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/53)

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: C of S (Colonel Mathewson)

CH-OUT-3868 (10 Dec 43) 1845Z med
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: WAR

Number 919, 9 December 1943

Eye's alone for Gen Marshall from Hearn. The following message is transmitted for delivery to President Roosevelt.

"I have received your telegram of December 6th. Upon my return I asked Madame Chiang to inform you of the gratifying effect the communiqué of the Cairo conference has had on the Chinese Army and people in uplifting their morale to continue active resistance against Japan. This letter is on the way and is being brought to you by the Pilot Captain Shelton.

First: Prior to the Cairo conference there had been disturbing elements voicing their discontent and uncertainty of America and Great Britain's attitude in waging a global war and at the same time leaving China to shift as best she could against our common enemy. At one stroke the Cairo communiqué decisively swept away this suspicion in that we three had jointly and publicly pledged to launch a joint all-out offensive in the Pacific.

Second: If it should now be known to the Chinese Army and people that a radical change of policy and strategy is being contemplated, the repercussions would be so disheartening that I fear of the consequences of China's ability to hold out much longer.

Third: I am aware and appreciate your being influenced by the probable tremendous advantages to be possed by China as well as by the United Nations as a whole in speedily defeating Germany first. For the victory of one theater of war necessarily affects all other theaters; on the other hand, the collapse of the China theater would have
equally grave consequences on the global war. I have, therefore, come to this conclusion that in order to save this grave situation, I am inclined to accept your re-commendation. You will doubtless realize that in so doing my task in rallying the nation to continue resistance is being made infinitely more difficult:

(1). Because the danger to the China theater lies not only in the inferiority of our military strength, but also, and more especially, in our critical economic condition which may seriously affect the morale of the Army and people, and cause at any moment a sudden collapse of the entire front. Judging from the present critical situation, military as well as economic, it would be impossible for us to hold on for six months, and a fortiori to wait till November 1944. In my last conversation with you, I stated that China's economic situation was more critical than the military. The only seeming solution is to assure the Chinese people and Army of your sincere concern in the China theater of war by assisting China to hold on with a billion gold dollar loan to strengthen her economic front and relieve her dire economic needs. Simultaneously, in order to prove our `resolve determination to bring relentless pressure on Japan, the Chinese Air Force and the American Air Force stationed in China should be increased, as from next Spring, by at least double the number of aircraft already agreed upon, and the total of air transportation should be increased, as from February of next year, to at least twenty thousand tons a month to make effective the operation of the additional planes.

(2). In this way it might be possible to bring relief to our economic condition for the coming year, and to maintain the morale of the Army and the people who would be greatly encouraged by America's timely assistance. What I have suggested is, I believe, the only way of remedying the drawbacks of the strategy concerning the China and Pacific theaters. I am sure you will appreciate my difficult position and give me the necessary assistance. I have instructed General Stillwell to return immediately to Chungking and I shall discuss with him regarding the details of the
proposed changed plan and shall let you know of my decision as to which one of your suggestions is the more feasible. From the declaration of the Teheran conference, Japan will rightly deduce that practically the entire weight of the United Nations forces will be applied to the European front thus abandoning the China theater to the mercy of Japan's mechanized air and land forces. It would be strategic on Japan's part to:

(3). Liquidate the China affair during the coming year. It may therefore be expected that the Japanese will before long launch an all-out offensive against China so as to remove the threat to their rear, and thus recapture the militarists' vanishing popularity and bolster their fighting morale in the Pacific.

This is the problem which I have to face. Knowing that you are a realist, and as your loyal colleague, I feel constrained to acquaint you with the above facts. Waiting an early reply." Chiang Kai Chek.

No Sig

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
10 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADmiral King

Herewith is a copy of the Generalissimo's reply to the President's message of 5 December.

L. Mathewson,
Colonel, General Staff
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: WAR - 3982 - 060187
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING

8 DECEMBER 1943

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

CONFERENCE WITH MARSHAL STALIN INVOLVES US IN COMBINED GRAND
OPERATIONS ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT IN LATE SPRING GIVING FAIR PROSPECT OF
TERMINATING WAR WITH GERMANY BY END OF SUMMER 1944. THESE OPERATIONS
IMPOSE SO LARGE A REQUIREMENT OF HEAVY LANDING CRAFT AS TO MAKE IT
IMPRacticABLE TO DEVOTE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER TO THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
IN BAY OF BENGAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH LAUNCHING OF THE ADVANCE ON INDAW
KATHA AREA OF BURMA TO INSURE SUCCESS OF OPERATION.

THIS BEING THE CASE, WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH
THE INDAW KATHA OPERATION AS NOW PLANNED, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO
MAINTAIN NAVAL CONTROL OF BAY OF BENGAL COUPLED WITH NAVAL CARRIER AND
COMMANDO AMPHIBIOUS RAIDING OPERATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH LAUNCHING OF
THE INDAW KATHA OPERATION? ALSO THERE IS THE PROSPECT OF B-29 BOMBING
OF RAILROAD AND PORT BANGKOK.

IF NOT, WOULD YOU PREFER TO HAVE THE INDAW KATHA OPERATION
DELAYED UNTIL NOVEMBER TO INCLUDE HEAVY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. MEANWHILE
CONCENTRATING ALL AIR TRANSPORT ON CARRYING SUPPLIES OVER THE HUMP TO
AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN CHINA.

I AM INFLUENCED IN THIS MATTER BY THE TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE TO
BE RECEIVED BY CHINA AND THE PACIFIC THROUGH THE EARLY TERMINATION OF
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.

ROOSEVELT
Cairo,  December  5,  1943.

MEMORANDUM  FOR:

The Prime Minister.

The President proposes to send over his signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight.  Do you concur in this action?

"Conference  with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944.  These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of Tarzan to insure success of operation.

"This being the case: Would you be prepared go ahead with Tarzan as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of Tarzan?  Also there is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok.

"If not, would you prefer to have Tarzan delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China.

"I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.

FDR
Matthewson pass following personal and secret message for the Generalissimo from the President. Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of Tarzan to insure success of operation.

Paragraph. This being the case, would you be prepared to go ahead with Tarzan as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of Tarzan? Also there is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok. Paragraph. If not, would you prefer to have Tarzan delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China. Paragraph. I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.

ROOSEVELT.

Released:

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Contents of this message included in memo from the Pres.
to the Prime, who informed the Pres. the President,
Capt. Royal, at 11:30 p.m., informed Premier
Churin, that the President directed the message be
transmitted to the Generalissimo.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1972

By V. J. Stewart Date
29 November 1943

The following message was sent by the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek on 10 November 1943:

"Much earlier than previously seemed possible, we hope to be able to launch heavy bombing attacks upon vital Japanese homeland objectives.

For this purpose we will need in the general Chengtu area five long range bomber airfields, with limited housing facilities, for the new and very powerful planes. To ensure their readiness by the end of March 1944 we need your close support in the construction of these fields.

The technical engineering supervision we can supply, but so as not to draw on the air supply line we must rely on you to provide the necessary labor and materials.

If it will expedite and ensure the completion of the work on the desired schedule, I will undertake to make available the necessary funds through lend-lease appropriations.

By this sudden surprise attack I am personally convinced we can deal the Jap a truly crippling blow; something so close to both our hearts." Signed Roosevelt.

Original of this paraphrase was delivered to General Marshall's office by Colonel Mathewsman, 30 November 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

A check with Mr. Benchard of the State Department at 131040 revealed that subject message had not been dispatched. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of State's office was quite concerned over the final disposition of this message and inquiries had been made of Miss Tully the afternoon before.

I accordingly advised Mr. Benchard that it was the President's wish that messages be sent as drafted. He replied that they would get it off right away.

L. H. BISHOP, Colonel, General Staff
12 November 1943

From: AGWAR
To: ANNISCA, CHUNGKING.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I AM JUST OFF FOR NORTH AFRICA AND OUR MEETING PLACE WHERE I AM SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BY THE TWENTY SECOND. I EXPECT TO STAY THERE UNTIL THE TWENTY-SIXTH WHEN I WILL GO TO SEE OUR FRIEND FROM THE NORTH AND THEN RETURN TO OUR CONFERENCE PLACE IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS.

I DO HOPE YOU CAN COME BY THE TWENTY-SECOND AND THAT MADAME CHIANG IS MUCH BETTER. PLEASE GIVE HER MY WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR 9 1972

Released from the White House Map Room at 2135, EST, by

F. H. GRAHAM
1st Lt, AGD.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I AM JUST OFF FOR FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND OUR MEETING PLACE WHERE I AM SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BY THE TWENTYSECOND. I EXPECT TO STAY THERE UNTIL THE TWENTYSIXTH WHEN I WILL GO TO SEE OUR FRIEND FROM THE NORTH AND THEN RETURN TO OUR CONFERENCE PLACE IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS.

I DO HOPE YOU CAN COME BY THE TWENTYSECOND AND THAT MADAME CHIANG IS MUCH BETTER. PLEASE GIVE HER MY WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Released:

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9, 1972

DESPATCHED from Nellis, Nevada by carrier (H. Dugan) to Colonel Mathewson in Map Room for transmission.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LAUNCH HEAVY BOMBING ATTACKS UPON VITAL JAPANESE HOMELAND OBJECTIVES CONSIDERABLY EARLIER THAN PREVIOUSLY SPEEDED POSSIBLE.

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WILL REQUIRE FIVE LONG-RANGE BOMBER AIRFIELDS, FOR THE NEW AND VERY POWERFUL PLANES, WITH LIMITED HOUSING FACILITIES, IN THE GENERAL CHENGTU AREA IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHICH WE NEED YOUR CLOSE SUPPORT TO ENSURE THEIR READINESS BY THE END OF MARCH 1944.

WE CAN SUPPLY THE TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SUPERVISION BUT MUST RELY ON YOU TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LABOR AND MATERIALS SO AS NOT TO DRAW ON THE AIR SUPPLY LINE.

I WILL UNDERTAKE TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE NECESSARY FUNDS THROUGH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATIONS, IF THAT WILL EXPEDITE AND ENSURE THE COMPLETION OF THE WORK ON THE DESIRED SCHEDULE.

I AM PERSONALLY CONVINCED WE CAN DEAL THE JAP A TRULY CRIPPLING BLOW, SO CLOSE TO BOTH OUR HEARTS, BY THIS SUDDEN, SURPRISE ATTACK.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

Subject: Acquisition of Airfields in India and China for B-29's.

Attached hereto are two cablegrams which I would like very much to have sent. They are very important as I can see no other way by which we can get the airfields in India and China in time to permit the operations of the 150 B-29's which will be available for these missions next March.

The project has been approved by Joint Army and Navy planners and these cablegrams have been approved by General Marshall.

The one to the Generalissimo should be sent through General Stilwell. If you will let me know when they are sent I would like to send General Stilwell also a copy of the one sent to the Prime Minister.

Earliest possible action is desired.

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: 2 cablegrams
PROPOSED DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISomo

We hope to be able to launch heavy bombing attacks upon vital Japanese homeland objectives considerably earlier than previously seemed possible.

To accomplish this will require five long-range bomber airfields, for the new and very powerful planes, with limited housing facilities, in the general Chengtu area in the construction of which we need your close support to ensure their readiness by the end of March 1944.

We can supply the technical engineering supervision but must rely on you to provide the necessary labor and materials so as not to draw on the air supply line.

I will undertake to make available the necessary funds through Lend-Lease appropriations, if that will expedite and ensure the completion of the work on the desired schedule.

I am personally convinced we can deal the Jap a truly crippling blow, so close to both our hearts, by this sudden, surprise attack.

[Signature]

DESIGNATED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By M. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
SECRET

10 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: WAR
AMISCA, CHUNGKING 3939

TO: FONG MAO, CHUNGKING

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

I AM TERRIBLY SORRY TO LEARN OF MADAME CHIANG'S ILLNESS AND
SINCERELY HOPE THAT SHE WILL BE FULLY RECOVERED IN TIME FOR OUR CON-

FERENCE.

I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH GENERAL SOMERVELL AND APPRECIATE
VERY MUCH YOUR COURTESIES TO HIM. HE HAS GIVEN ME YOUR PRIVATE
MESSAGE AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO YOU.

I AGREE WITH YOU FULLY THAT WE SHOULD MEET TOGETHER BEFORE I
SEE STALIN. I WANT SO MUCH TO HAVE SOME GOOD TALKS WITH YOU SO,
NATURALLY, I AM EAGERLY LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1000, EST, 10 November 1945.

L. MATTHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
NOVEMBER 10, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

I AM TERRIBLY SORRY TO LEARN OF MADAME CHIANG'S ILLNESS AND SINCERELY HOPE THAT SHE WILL BE FULLY RECOVERED IN TIME FOR OUR CONFERENCE.

I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH GENERAL SOMERVELL AND APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR COURTESIES TO HIM. HE HAS GIVEN ME YOUR PRIVATE MESSAGE AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO YOU.

I AGREE WITH YOU FULLY THAT WE SHOULD MEET TOGETHER BEFORE I SEE STALIN. I WANT SO MUCH TO HAVE SOME GOOD TALKS WITH YOU SO, NATURALLY, I AM EAGERLY LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date
FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ALONE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR
Nr: 858  9th November, 1943
Text verified by originator.

WDCG.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOB LR. 8200.0 (9/27/56)

Date-
Signature- RH

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-5893 (10 Nov 43) White House

ACTION: White House

CM-IN-6173 (10 Nov 43) 1924 Z ned

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

8 NOVEMBER 1943

FROM: AGWAR
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING #3788

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, PERSONAL AND SECRET.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I AM LEAVING FOR NORTH AFRICA IN TWO OR THREE DAYS AND I HOPE TO GET TO CAIRO ON THE TWENTY-FIRST. CHURCHILL WILL MEET ME THERE. WE HOPE TO MEET MARSHAL STALIN IN EPSIA ABOUT THE 26TH OR 27TH. HOWEVER I WOULD PREFER THAT YOU AND CHURCHILL AND I MEET BEFORE THAT. THEREFORE CAN YOU TRY TO REACH CAIRO BY THE 22ND OF NOVEMBER? WE WILL ARRANGE GOOD ACCOMMODATIONS AND GUARD FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTY IN OR NEAR CAIRO. PLEASE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS YOU CAN.

ROOSEVELT
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek

Many Thanks for your message. I am leaving for North Africa in two or three days and I hope to get to Cairo the 21st. Churchill will meet me there. We hope to meet Marshall Stalin in Persia about the 26 or 27. However I would prefer that you and Churchill and I meet before that. Therefore can you try to make some
By the 27th Nov. we will arrange good accommodations and guard for you and your party in or near Cairo. Necessary supplies. Are you going with you? Please let me know as soon as you can. Russell.
Col. Mathewson,

The President is not sure whether the message to Chiang has been sent by State. If it has not been sent please ask them to send.

W.B.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
November 6, 1943  

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  

There are attached the text of a message, dated November 3, 1943, addressed to you by President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China upon the occasion of signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, and a suggested reply which you may care to make to his message.  

Enclosures:  
1. From President Chiang, November 3.  
2. To President Chiang.  

[Handwritten Notes]  

The President is not sure whether the message to Chiang has been sent by State, if it has not been sent please ask them to send.
US URGENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

Please convey the following message from the President to President Chiang Kai-shek:

QUOTE I have received with deepest pleasure the cordial message from Your Excellency upon the occasion of the signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, and I reciprocate your feeling of satisfaction at its consummation. I welcome the association of China in the work of establishing a better world order. The Declaration gives assurance that the close coalition for war will be blended into an effective and lasting coalition for peace. Upon our two countries and the other nations associated with us in this undertaking will rest the responsibility for the preservation and extension of the principles of freedom, justice, and integrity among nations, for which we are now fighting. The participation of China in this historic Declaration has afforded Secretary Hull and me deep gratification, as it has the American people. The immediate task before us is that of vanquishing the aggressors. Along with this and beyond are the tasks of reconstruction looking toward creating conditions of lasting peace. Formidable though all these tasks are, we march forward to their accomplishment confident of the full and active cooperation of your Government and people. UNQUOTE
The foregoing is in response to a message dated November 3, from President Chiang, which was transmitted through the Chinese Embassy.

Acting
Telegram to President Roosevelt
from President Chiang Kai-shek
Chungking, November 3rd, 1943

"I and the people and army of our entire nation
feel deeply gratified on learning of the signature of
the Joint Four-Nation Declaration. This act of historic
importance makes manifest to the world the righteousness
of the cause against aggression. It will not only
strengthen the cooperation of our Four Nations for the
fulfilment of our common faith, but will also give all
peace-loving peoples of the world an assurance of the
establishment of international peace and general security,
and thereby constitutes an unsurpassed contribution to
the future of the world. China is proud to have taken
part in the consummation of the Declaration, and I wish
to offer you, Mr. President, my heartiest congratulations.
This Declaration owes much in its making to your wise
directions and the endeavors of Secretary of State Cordell
Hull at the Conference, which command our deepest admir-
tion. Please accept my sincere and grateful appreciation."
2 November 1943

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S EYES ONLY

From: Chungking
For: The President of the United States
Unnumbered, Filed 020915Z

From the Generalissimo to his Excellency President Roosevelt.

I am in receipt of your telegrams transmitted to me by General Hearn on October 28th and 29th and November 1st. I am delighted to accept the suggestions contained in your last telegram and am looking forward to meeting you and Mr. Churchill. Everything will be kept strictly secret here. The signing of the Four Nation Declaration is a splendid success which is entirely due to your firm stand for justice and solidarity. This declaration constitutes one of the greatest contributions to the peace and security of the Post War World. Please accept my warm and sincere thanks for your deep concern for our common cause and kindly convey to Mr. Hull my appreciation of the excellent results he has achieved at the conference. Best regards.

No Sig
30 October 1943

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: AGWAR
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING 3734

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

I HAVE NOT HEARD DEFINITELY FROM MARSHAL STALIN BUT THERE IS
STILL A CHANCE OF CHURCHILL AND ME MEETING HIM NEAR PERSIAN GULF.

VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, I HOPE YOU WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET
WITH CHURCHILL AND ME IN GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD OF CAIRO ABOUT
NOVEMBER TWENTY-SIXTH.

I AM DELIGHTED THAT SUCH EXCELLENT PROGRESS IS MADE FOR FOUR
POWER PROPOSAL. WE HAVE CRACKED THE ICE, AND I THINK THAT YOU AND I
HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE.

BEST REGARDS

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2350 EMT 30 October 1943

By

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

OGDEN KNIPPIN

Captain CE

By J. Stewart Date Mar 9 1972
30 October 1943

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: AGWAR
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING 3734

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

I have not heard definitely from Marshal Stalin but there is
still a chance of Churchill and me meeting him near Persian Gulf.

Very confidentially, I hope you will make arrangements to meet
with Churchill and me in general neighborhood of Cairo about
November twenty-sixth.

I am delighted that such excellent progress is made for four
power proposal. We have cracked the ice, and I think that you and I
have successfully established the principle.

Best regards

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2350 ETT 30 October 1943

By Deputy Archivist of the U. S.

By W. J. Stewart Date May 1972
Telegraphic<br>Official Business—Government Rates

Cable

Madame Chiang Kai Shek
Ch’angking, China

Many thanks for kind wire. President greatly improved.

Eleanor Roosevelt

Mrs. Roosevelt—Madame Chiang file

October 29, 1943
From: AGWAR
To: WISCA, CHUNGKING.

FROM MRS ROOSEVELT TO MADAME CHIANG KAI SHEK, PERSONAL AND

MANY THANKS FOR KIND WIRE. PRESIDENT GREATLY IMPROVED.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: May 1972

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1615 EWT, 29 October 1943 by

L. HATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

This is to advise you that by radio of October 27 the President expressed to the Generalissimo the great hope that he (the Generalissimo) might authorize his ambassador to Moscow to sign the Moscow Pact.

L. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
27 October 1943

FROM: ACHAR
TO: AMISCA, CHUKING

#3702

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

I GREATLY HOPE YOU CAN AUTHORIZE YOUR AMBASSADOR TO SIGN THE MOSCOW PACT. IT IS AT THE LEAST AN EXCELLENT START.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

BY N. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

Released from the White House Map Room at 1920 EWT, October 27, 1943 by

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
Generalissimo,

I greatly hope you can authorize

you as commander to sign the Moscows

part. It is at least the excellent

start.

Roosevelt.
Six. That, following the defeat of the enemy, they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

Seven. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

Eight. That this declaration is without prejudice to the relationship between the respective signatories and nations with which such signatories are not at war.

It will be recalled that the discussion of this declaration has proceeded with the question of whether China would be admitted as an original signatory held in abeyance. This question will presumably come up at the regular meeting on the twenty-sixth when the drafting committee's agreed text is considered, at which time I shall press for China's inclusion as an original signatory.

CSB

HARRIMAN
From:  AMISCA, CHUNGKING.

TO:  AGWAR

27 October 1943

#3701

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU OF YOUR SATISFACTION WITH YOUR MEETING WITH MOUNTBATTEN AND SOMERVELL.

THE CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW HAS MADE SPLENDID PROGRESS UP TO THE MOMENT AND I AM VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE RESULTS WILL BE BENEFICIAL ALL AROUND. I AM PRESSING FOR THE FULL BLOWN PARTNERSHIP OF CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

I AM NOT YET SURE WHETHER STALIN CAN MEET ME BUT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM ANXIOUS TO MEET YOU WITH CHURCHILL AT A REASONABLY EARLY DATE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWENTIETH AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH OF NOVEMBER. I THINK ALEXANDRIA WOULD BE A GOOD MEETING PLACE.

THERE ARE GOOD ACCOMODATIONS THERE.

I WILL BRING A SMALL STAFF WITH ME INCLUDING OUR HIGHEST RANKING ARMY, NAVY AND AIR OFFICERS. I SHOULD THINK THE CONFERENCE WOULD LAST ABOUT THREE DAYS. I KNOW YOU WILL NOT WANT TO BE AWAY FROM CHINA LONG, BUT IT IS FAR BETTER FOR ME TO GET AWAY NOW THAN LATER.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU BECAUSE I AM SURE THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED IF WE CAN MEET FACE TO FACE. PLEASE KEEP THIS VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1930 EWT, October 27, 1943 by

L. WATSON
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1977
OCTOBER 27, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU OF YOUR SATISFACTION WITH YOUR MEETING WITH MOUNTBATTEN AND SOMERVELL.

THE CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW HAS MADE SPLENDID PROGRESS UP TO THE MOMENT AND I AM VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE RESULTS WILL BE BENEFICIAL ALL AROUND. I AM AWARE OF THE FULL BLOOM PARTNERSHIP OF CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

I AM NOT YET SURE WHETHER STALIN CAN MEET ME BUT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM ANXIOUS TO MEET YOU WITH CHURCHILL AT A REASONABLY EARLY DATE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWENTIETH AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH OF NOVEMBER. I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING. AS I THINK "ALONIA" WOULD BE A GOOD MEETING PLACE, THERE ARE GOOD ACCOMMODATIONS THERE.

I WILL BRING A SMALL STAFF WITH ME INCLUDING OUR HIGHEST RANKING ARMY, NAVY AND AIR OFFICERS. I SHOULD THINK THE CONFERENCE WOULD LAST ABOUT THREE DAYS. I KNOW YOU WILL NOT WANT TO BE AWAY FROM CHINA LONG. BUT IT IS FOR BETTER OR WORSE THAN LATER.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU BECAUSE I AM SURE THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORY SETTLED IF WE CAN MEET FACE TO FACE. PLEASE KEEP THIS VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart
For General Ulio's Eyes Alone

PRIORITY

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR

No: 340 26 October 1943

Eyes alone for Ulio from Kearn. Rush following message for Mrs Roosevelt from Madame Chiang Kai Shek.

The Generalissimo and I are distressed to learn from the papers of the President's indisposition. Will you kindly convey to him our sincerest wishes for his speedy recovery. Signed Maylin Soong Chiang.

No Sig.

ACTION: White House

INFORMATION: SGS
Gen Ulio

CM-IN-15525 (26 Oct 43) 0740Z

Date- MAR 9 1972

Signature

Original to Mrs R. and usher 300900

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DoD Dir. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

The Making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden
FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR
No. 829, 21 October 1943

For Marshall’s eyes alone for the President from Stilwell:

Madam Chiang Kai Shek has requested the following message be delivered to the President of the United States. Message begins: “I wish to thank you for your kind telegram. Admiral Mountbatten, General Somervell and General Stilwell have held several conferences with the Generalissimo and his staff. I am glad to inform you that so far as I know everything portends to the fullest cooperation and that the Generalissimo is very favorably impressed with both Admiral Mountbatten and General Somervell.

“You will also be glad to know that your hopes of what General Stratmeyer can accomplish seem to be taking place. Send warm greetings to you and Mrs Roosevelt in which the Generalissimo joins. Signed Mayling Soong Chiang.”

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

No Sig.

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DBD DIR. 5240.9 (6/27/58)
MAR 9 1972

Date-

Signature:

CM-IN-12709 (21 Oct 43) 1600Z mos

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. H
14 September 1943

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

From: War Department
To: AMISCA, Chungking #3372

For General Stilwell to deliver the following message from
the President to Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

I appreciated your gracious letter of June 30 and have had the
matters you outlined carefully examined. We are taking the necessary
steps to assign two additional fighter squadrons for the 14th Air Force
as soon as adequate protection for the Assam area can be provided which
should be by the latter part of September. We are also providing adequate
replacements for the fighters and medium bombers now a part of the 14th
Air Force, although our schedule was interrupted when a ship carrying
plane was sunk. I regret that P-51's cannot be delivered at this time
but feel that the fighter role can be fulfilled by the present P-40's
available, reinforced by the P-38's. We also plan to transfer additional
medium bombers now in India to China as soon as they can be supplied and
maintained there. This, of course, is in addition to the fighters and
bombers which have been allocated to the Chinese Air Force, 89 fighters
of which have already been shipped.

It is extremely unfortunate that our air deliveries to China
have been hampered by the weather, floods and failure to complete air-
dromes as rapidly as had been planned. The matter has also been compli-
cated by the necessity for the adjustment of mechanical defects usual in
new planes and which have been necessary in the case of the C-46 trans-
ports. I believe that we have gone a long way towards meeting these dif-
ficulties and we will drive ahead to reach our goal of 10,000 tons per
month as soon as it is within our power to do so.

- 1 -
President—Madame Chiang Kai-shek,
14 September 1943.

It is hoped that the establishment of the Southeast Asia Com-
mand will vitalize the united effort against Japan and the rapid develop-
ment of the air route through Burma to China. General Stratemeyer,
who has been recently sent to India, is an officer of ability and wide
experience and will, I am sure, contribute materially to the solution
of operations and maintenance out of India into China.

As you know, Mrs. Roosevelt is still in the Southwest Pacific,
but if she were here she would join me in very warm regards to you
and the Generalissimo.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9, 1972

Released from the WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM
at 1830, EWT, 14 September 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Telegram to Madame Chiang.

I do not think you should send such a telegram to Madame Chiang and I have therefore had drafted a revised message, much shorter and less detailed but still giving the essential facts.

I hope this will be satisfactory. General Arnold is in agreement with me as to the draft of the message.

Chief of Staff.

Incl. 12560 H.S.

Send as altered.

DECLASIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)
Date—Mar 9 1972
Signature—J
Proposed Telegram to Madame Chiang Kai-shek

I appreciated your gracious letter of June 30 and have had the matters you outlined carefully examined. We are taking the necessary steps to assign two additional fighter squadrons for the 14th Air Force as soon as adequate protection for the Assam area can be provided which should be by the latter part of September. We are also providing adequate replacements for the fighters and medium bombers now a part of the 14th Air Force, although our schedule was interrupted when a ship carrying plane was sunk. I regret that P-51's cannot be delivered at this time but feel that the fighter role can be fulfilled by the present P-40's available, reinforced by the P-38's. We also plan to transfer additional medium bombers now in India to China as soon as they can be supplied and maintained there. This, of course, is in addition to the fighters and bombers which have been allocated to the Chinese Air Force, 89 fighters of which have already been shipped.

It is extremely unfortunate that our air deliveries to China have been hampered by the weather, floods and failure to complete air-dromes as rapidly as had been planned. The matter has also been complicated by the necessity for the adjustment of mechanical defects usual in new planes and which have been necessary in the case of the C-46 transports. I believe that we have gone a long way towards meeting these difficulties and we will drive ahead to reach our goal of 10,000 tons per month as soon as it is within our power to do so.

It is hoped that the establishment of the Southeast Asia Command will vitalize the united effort against Japan and the rapid development
of the air route through Burma to China. General Stratemeyer, who has been recently sent to India, is an officer of ability and wide experience and will, I am sure, contribute materially to the solution of operations and maintenance out of India into China. As you know.

We enjoyed very much having you visit us here. Mrs. Roosevelt is still in the Southwest Pacific, but if she were here she would join me in warm regards to you and the Generalissimo.

very

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1972
BY Lt. Col. Stewart date
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Do you think I should send this long, detailed telegram to Madame Chiang? It was prepared by General Giles.

F. D. R.
I appreciate your letter of June 30, and especially your kind personal reference to Mrs. Roosevelt and myself. We enjoyed very much having you visit us. Since distance and official duties have made it difficult to arrange a meeting between the Generalissimo and me, I feel that we are fortunate indeed in being able to exchange views through you.

I am glad you sent me the detailed report of air conditions in China, based on Chennault's interview with the Generalissimo. In consultation with General Arnold, I have carefully considered each of the points you raised and I shall give you all the facts that are known to us.

Many of the problems you mention are well on the way to solution. We have, however, met with delays and disappointments caused by circumstances beyond anyone's control, such as the sinking of one of the ships carrying airplanes and equipment for the 60th Fighter Group, and the flood conditions in India and Yunnan.

With reference to paragraph two of your summary of the interview, in which you set out the agreed program and its current status, I have the following comments:

a. As you know, June deliveries of 1,626 tons of aviation supplies fell short of the planned 3,000 tons for which priority was given. July and August deliveries also fell short of the planned 4,700 tons. Total deliveries by the Air Transport Command for June were 2,392 tons and for July 3,451 tons. Estimated total deliveries for August were 4,200 tons. Our objectives have not been met because of difficulties in modification of transport aircraft, scarcity of operational spare parts, failure to complete airfields in Assam as rapidly as had been planned and floods in India and Yunnan. All C-46 aircraft were grounded for a period of time for adjustment of mechanical defects usually found in new airplanes. Action has already been taken to correct these defects, and it is expected that the serviceability of C-46s in the future will be greatly improved. Airfields and transport aircraft are now nearing program levels. The Air Transport Command objective for September is 10,000 tons, priority being given to 7,000 tons of aviation supplies. Every effort is being made to meet this program and it appears now to be within our capabilities.
b. The two additional P-40 squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group, now in Assam, will be transferred to the Fourteenth Air Force and moved to China as soon as the 30th Fighter Group is able to assume the defense of the Assam area. This is expected to be the middle or latter part of September. One P-38 squadron, the 449th Squadron of the 31st Group, was activated in China sometime ago. Provision has been made to ensure the maintenance of this squadron at the operational level of 25 airplanes. The 11th Squadron of the 31st Group of B-25s is, as you know, a part of the 14th Air Force. Two squadrons of this Group now in India will be transferred to China as soon as they can be supplied and maintained there.

c. Provision has been made for attrition and for required reserves of aircraft in all categories. Provision has also been made for necessary spare parts. Reserves of airplanes almost invariably will be greater than the fifteen percent that you mention.

d. Everything possible is being done to enable Chennault to employ types of fighters superior to the enemy's having in mind the practical consideration of the advisability of adding new type airplanes. Failure to meet production goals of P-40s and the need to correct certain mechanical defects make it impossible to deliver any aircraft of this type to China at this time.

e. Allocation of replacement B-25 aircraft to the 14th Air Force is on a basis of two with cannon to one without cannon. There appears now to be little doubt that this ratio will be maintained and that the B-25 squadron now in the 14th Air Force will be kept fully operational at this ratio.

f. Assignment for service in China of all the specially experienced personnel requested by Chennault is not practicable, as some are hospitalized, some are in other theaters, and others are indispensable in the training of new pilots for service in China.

g. Last spring 150 P-40s were allocated to the Chinese Air Force, and also 150 A-24s. When Chennault was in Washington he stated that A-24s are not suitable for operations in China, and it was accordingly agreed to allocate an additional 150 P-40s instead of the A-24s. At present, therefore, 300 P-40s are allocated to the Chinese Air Force, 89 of which have already been shipped. 48 B-25s, in addition to the 10 old B-25s from the 10th Air Force that are used for OTU training in India, have also been allocated to the Chinese Air Force.

h. Employment of available aircraft for training purposes in the theater is a theater problem, which in my opinion we may safely entrust to the good judgment of General Stratemeyer.

In paragraph 3 of your summary you mention the measures which the Generalissimo and Chennault agree must be decisively adopted, air transport expansion continuing, in order to attain full success. The above comments that I have made cover most of these measures, but for your convenience I shall summarise the entire matter:
a. Action has been taken to assure maintenance of 25 P-38s as a continuously operational squadron in the 14th Air Force. Two squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group will be transferred to China as soon as the 80th Fighter Group can assume the defense of the Assam area, which should be the middle or latter part of September. Movement of two additional B-25 squadrons to China is contingent upon sufficient tonnage being carried over the hump to support their operation.

b. Action has been taken to ensure necessary equipment reserves.

c. B-25s in China will be replaced on a basis of two with cannon to one without cannon. Allocations of reserves are approximately 50 percent of unit equipment. Allocations for attrition are approximately 10 percent a month. Return to the former replacement schedule would mean fewer aircraft than are being delivered under the present schedule.

d. P-51s cannot be delivered to China at this time. For the present the fighter role, both in India and in China, must be carried out by the P-40 type fighter with reinforcement by the P-38.

e. Assignment for service in China of selected personalities as requested by Chennault is not practicable. Officers with the qualifications required have however been supplied.

f. Shipping is not now the limiting factor in the flow of supplies to China. Pending the opening of land communications through Burma to China, the principal problem is the colossal task of moving supplies over the hump by air, and the one on which we are most earnestly working at this time.

Establishment of the Southeast Asia Command will, I believe, do much to ensure a vigorous united effort on a large-scale against Japan, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China. We are certain that by unifying our combined efforts in the forthcoming Burma operations, we shall hasten the liberation of China and the defeat of Japan.

As you know, I have sent General Stratemeyer to India to command all United States aviation operations in India and Burma. He is an officer of ability and wide experience, and was sent to India for the express purpose of aiding in the solution of your air problems from the India end.

With kindest personal regards to you and the Generalissimo,
September 6, 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: WAR

TO: MISCA, Chungking. #33/8

From the President to General Stillwell for delivery to the Generalissimo.

Thank you much for your message. I have asked Mountbatten to go to see you in Chungking as soon as possible after he gets to Burma. I understand he will be there before the end of the month. There is nothing like a first hand picture and I know you will realize the difficulty of making final decisions when we are as far away as Quebec and Washington.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, September 6, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.

Delivered to Chungking 0330Z 9/8/43
September 6, 1943

FOR: The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
FROM: President Roosevelt

Thank you much for your message. I have asked Mountbatten to go to see you in Chungking as soon as possible after he gets to Burma. I understand he will be there before the end of the month. There is nothing like a first hand picture and I know you will realize the difficulty of making final decisions when we are as far away as Quebec and Washington.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]
Washington, D. C.,
September 6, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have received the enclosed message for you from the Generalissimo and hasten to forward it to you.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I have received your telegram of August 28th, and feel especially gratified that the Allied nations will have the able services of Admiral Mountbatten as Commander-in-Chief in the Southeast Asia theatre.

I greatly appreciate your informing me of the plans for the recapture of Upper Burma and for increased aid to the army and airforce in the China theatre. However, I cannot help feeling deeply concerned regarding the plan of coordination of amphibious operations, which I have not understood clearly. In my opinion, unless the important centers of communication along the coastal line of Lower Burma are definitely occupied, there will be no way of cutting the enemy's supply line. If this be the case, it may be difficult to carry out according to schedule the operations in Upper Burma. I am constrained to speak frankly in this matter, in consideration of the enemy's present situation and the topography of the country, and in view of the experiences gained in the failure of the operations in Burma last year. But I am equally sure that you will have called Admiral Mountbatten's attention to these considerations, so that he will be enabled to plan and execute his campaign to fulfill his most important mission.

I shall have occasion to communicate with you again after meeting and discussing with Admiral Mountbatten.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Chungking, September 4, 1943
YOUR 251753 DELIVERED BY REPRESENTATIVES AS INSTRUCTED.
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES WERE RECEIVED BY
THE ADDRESSEE AT ¥43Ø/27:

25135Ø  251612  251732
251741  251753  25162Ø

FILE.
Priority

From: Opnav
To: Alusna Chungking

From admiral Leahy Chief of Staff to the President.

By immediately following message is confidential and should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0900 EWT, 25 August.

Boyce P. Price
Capt. Boyce F. Price, C.E.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Chungking

To Alusna, Chungking and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Yai-shek from
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

In order to vitalize operations in Burma, a command, separate
from India, has been set up under Vice Admiral The Lord Louis
Mountbatten to operate directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
This, we think, will be an improvement in organization and further
the concept of aggressive operations. Thus, we hope to obtain unity
in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma operations. Unity
must be achieved if success is to be attained.

At the conclusion of the conference in Quebec, I hasten to
bring to you certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations
in your theaters and areas contiguous thereto.

First, to accelerate the buildup of the air freight route into
China to provide greatly increased support for your air and ground
forces.

Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications
from Calcutta to Assan requires immediate increase in their
capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river
and railroad transportation facilities which should result in an
eventual lift of two hundred thousand tons a month into Assam.

Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry
season for the capture of upper Burma with a view to increasing the
capacity of the air route, and to making possible the reopening of
an overland route to China. The security of these land and air
routes is considered of vital importance to the build up of an air
offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the
form of an attack from Assan into Burma via Imphal and Ledo,
coordinated with an advance at the same time from Yunnan. These
corresponding attacks are to be facilitated by the employment of long
range penetration groups in front of each column similar to those
employed by Brigade Wingeate last spring. These columns are to be
organized by Wingeate. They will include British, American, and
Indian contingents, all to be supported and supplied by air.

Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed to contribute to the success of the North Burma campaign. At the same time steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure our naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean Area and to interdict the enemy's sea communications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibious attacks is still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground.

Released from the White House Map Room at 01140 EWT, August 25, 1943

Boyer P. Price

BOYER P. PRICE
Captain, C.F.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
MAY 15 1972

SECRET
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This, we think, will be an improvement in organization and further the concept of aggressive operations. Thus, we hope to obtain unity in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma operations. Unity must be achieved if success is to be attained.

At the conclusion of the Conference in Quebec, I hasten to bring to you certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations in your theaters and areas contiguous thereto.

First, to accelerate the build-up of the air freight route into China to provide greatly increased support for your air and ground forces.

Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications from Calcutta to Assam requires immediate increase in their capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river craft and rail transportation facilities which should result in an eventual lift of 200,000 tons a month into Assam.

Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry season for the capture of Upper Burma with a view to increasing the capacity of the air route, and to making possible the reopening of an overland route to China. The security of these land and air routes is considered of vital importance to the build-up of an air offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the form of an attack from Assam into Burma via Imphal and Ledo, coordinated with an advance at the same time from Yunnan. These converging attacks are to be facilitated by the employment of long range penetration groups in front of each column similar to those
employed by Brigadier Wingate last spring. These columns are to be organized by Wingate. They will include British, American, and Indian contingents, all to be supported and supplied by air.

Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed to contribute to the success of the North Burma campaign. At the same time steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure our naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean area and to interdict the enemy's sea communications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibious attacks is still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground.

Please deliver to British Ambassadors at same time request. A possible should be delivered as last two Ambassadors at the same time.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS

Declassification Group
By RHJ. Date JUN 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO: Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Draft Message to the Generalissimo.

Before his departure, General Marshall sent me the proposed draft message to the Generalissimo. He suggested that if the President expressed a desire to have such a message, this one be presented to him. I am, therefore, sending it to you to give to the President if you think it desirable to do so.

[Signature]

DEANE
From: Chungking
To: War

No. 639, 26th July 1943

I am instructed by the Generalissimo to send you the following message for President Roosevelt: "President Roosevelt, Washington, D.C. I have received your telegram informing me of your decision to appoint General Stratmeyer to direct and coordinate supplies crews and personnel through India to China and to appoint General Haynes as Chief of the 10th Air Force. I am in full agreement of the wisdom of the steps you have undertaken and I feel sure that these steps will aid materially and morally in the effectiveness of air operations in China, India, and Burma. On my part I have appointed General Chennault as Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the China theater of war. Chiang Kai-Shek."

No Sig

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 19-5-72

By E.H. Purks Date 10-10-72

CH 19-10029
(26 July 43) 1330Z mje

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT YOU SHOULD APPOINT GENERAL CHENNAULT AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE IN THE CHINA THEATRE.

GENERAL CHENNAULT WILL, OF COURSE, REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 14TH AIR FORCE.

WE HAVE DECIDED TO BRING GENERAL BISSELL, WHO HAS BEEN COMMANDING THE 10TH AIR FORCE, BACK TO THE UNITED STATES AND REPLACE HIM WITH GENERAL HAYNES WHO, I BELIEVE, IS KNOWN TO YOU. I AM SURE THESE MOVES WILL ENABLE THE 10TH AND 14TH AIR FORCES TO ENTER INTO THE INTIMATE COOPERATION WHICH IS SO DESIRABLE.

I AM SENDING GENERAL STRATMEYER TO INDIA TO COMMAND ALL OF THE UNITED STATES AVIATION OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND BURMA. HE WILL NOT BE OVER GENERAL CHENNAULT BUT WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEING THAT SUPPLIES, PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL GET TO THE 14TH AIR FORCE. HE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE SUPPLIES TO THE AIR FORCES IN CHINA FROM INDIA AND FOR TRAINING ALL AIR PERSONNEL IN INDIA FOR THE 14TH AIR FORCE AND THE CHINESE AIR FORCE.

GENERAL STRATMEYER IS A MAN OF REAL CAPABILITY AND, I BELIEVE, WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION ON THE INDIA END. I HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF MATERIEL GETTING OVER THE MOUNTAINS BUT WE ARE ALL HOPEFUL
THAT IT WILL BE INCREASED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

OUR CAMPAIGN IN SICILY IS GOING BETTER THAN WE HAD HOPED AND, WHILE I THINK WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SOME HARD FIGHTING THERE, I BELIEVE THE FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE ENEMY FORCES IN SICILY IS INEVITABLE.

I SAW SOONG THIS MORNING AND HAD AN INTERESTING TALK WITH HIM ABOUT HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO ENGLAND.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
JULY 16, 1943

FROM: WAR
TO: AMISCA, CHUNGKING

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO
CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT YOU SHOULD APPOINT GENERAL
CHENNAULT AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF YOUR AIR FORCE IN THE CHINA
THEATRE.

GENERAL CHENNAULT WILL, OF COURSE, REMAIN IN COMMAND
OF THE 14TH AIR FORCE.

WE HAVE DECIDED TO BRING GENERAL RUSSELL, WHO HAS BEEN
COMMANDING THE 10TH AIR FORCE, BACK TO THE UNITED STATES AND
REPLACE HIM WITH GENERAL HAYNES WHO, I BELIEVE, IS KNOWN TO
YOU. I AM SURE THESE MOVES WILL ENABLE THE 10TH AND 14TH
AIR FORCES TO ENTER INTO THE INTIMATE COOPERATION WHICH IS
SO DESIRABLE.

I AM SENDING GENERAL STRATEMEYER TO INdochINA TO COMMAND ALL
OF THE UNITED STATES AVIATION OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND BURMA.
HE WILL NOT BE OVER GENERAL CHENNAULT BUT WILL HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEING THAT SUPPLIES, PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL
GET TO THE 14TH AIR FORCE. HE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
EFFICIENCY OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE SUPPLIES TO THE AIR
FORCES IN CHINA FROM INDIA AND FOR TRAINING ALL AIR PERSONNEL
IN INDIA FOR THE 14TH AIR FORCE AND THE CHINESE AIR FORCE.

GENERAL STRATEMEYER IS A MAN OF REAL CAPABILITY AND, I
BELIEVE, WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION
FROM THE INDIA END. I HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE AMOUNT
OF MATERIEL GETTING OVER THE MOUNTAINS BUT WE ARE ALL HOPEFUL
THAT IT WILL BE INCREASED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

OUR CAMPAIGN IN SICILY IS GOING BETTER THAN WE HAD
HOPED AND, WHILE I THINK WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SOME HARD
FIGHTING THERE, I BELIEVE THE FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE ENEMY
FORCES IN SICILY IS INEVITABLE.

I SAW SONG THIS MORNING AND HAD AN INTERESTING TALK
WITH HIM ABOUT HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO ENGLAND.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2045 EWT, July 16, 1943

Boye P. Price
1st Lieutenant, C. E.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT YOU SHOULD APPOINT GENERAL CHENNAULT AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE IN THE CHINA THEATRE.

GENERAL CHENNAULT WILL, OF COURSE, REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 14TH AIR FORCE.

WE HAVE DECIDED TO BRING GENERAL BISSELL, WHO HAS BEEN COMMANDING THE 10TH AIR FORCE, BACK TO THE UNITED STATES AND REPLACE HIM WITH GENERAL HAYNES WHO, I BELIEVE, IS KNOWN TO YOU. I AM SURE THESE MOVES WILL ENABLE THE 10TH AND 14TH AIR FORCES TO ENTER INTO THE INTIMATE COOPERATION WHICH IS SO DESIRABLE.

I AM SENDING GENERAL STRATEMEYER TO INDIA TO COMMAND ALL OF THE UNITED STATES AVIATION OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND BURMA. HE WILL NOT BE OVER GENERAL CHENNAULT BUT WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEING THAT SUPPLIES, PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL GET TO THE 14TH AIR FORCE. HE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE SUPPLIES TO THE AIR FORCES IN CHINA FROM INDIA AND FOR TRAINING ALL AIR PERSONNEL IN INDIA FOR THE 14TH AIR FORCE AND THE CHINESE AIR FORCE.

GENERAL STRATEMEYER IS A MAN OF REAL CAPABILITY AND, I BELIEVE, WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE INDIA END. I HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF MATERIEL GETTING OVER THE MOUNTAINS BUT WE ARE ALL HOPEFUL
THAT IT WILL BE INCREASED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

OUR CAMPAIGN IN SICILY IS GOING BETTER THAN WE HAD HOPED AND, WHILE I THINK WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SOME HARD FIGHTING THERE, I BELIEVE THE FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE ENEMY FORCES IN SICILY IS INEVITABLE.

I SAW SOONG THIS MORNING AND HAD AN INTERESTING TALK WITH HIM ABOUT HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO ENGLAND.

\[\text{Signature}\]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
TRANSLATION OF

TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

DATED CHUNGKING, JULY 13, 1943.

I have received your telegram transmitted to me by General Stilwell to which I beg to reply as follows:

(1) You have proposed to send General Stratemeyer to China and India to coordinate the various problems relating to the Air Force so as to increase and unify the fighting strength of the 14th Air Force, and in doing so, you will not place General Stratemeyer above General Chennault so that the direct and close relations between General Chennault and myself will not in any way be affected. I greatly appreciate the consideration and thoughtfulness underlying your proposal. I would further appreciate it if you would be so good as to inform me more fully of the proposed title and status of General Stratemeyer in his new appointment and whether he is to serve under General Stilwell as a member of his staff.

(2) On the basis of my observations of the real conditions in China and India, and with a view to further developing the effectiveness of the Air Forces in China and India and increasing their fighting strength, I venture to submit some of my views for your consideration. I wish to request you to permit General Chennault to be appointed by me as Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the China theatre, or as Chief Adviser to the Chinese Air Force. I propose to place the Chinese Air Force under his full command so that the effectiveness of the Air Force in the China theatre will be further developed.
(3) If you can appoint at the same time someone else who can work harmoniously with General Chennault to the command of the 10th Air Force now stationed in India and thereby enable the 10th Air Force and the 14th Air Force to enter into close cooperation, I believe full and effective results will be achieved by the Air Forces in China and India. Otherwise even with General Stratemeyer coming out to help, the obstacles that existed in the past would not be completely removed. I would especially urge this point for your consideration as I believe that in this way notable effect will be brought about in increasing the fighting strength of the Air Forces in China and India.

(4) The suggestions as stated in (2) and (3) above are put forward after careful consideration on my part and from an entirely objective point of view. I therefore venture, as your ally and with all humility, to present them for your consideration.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK
URGENT

MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR

No 630 9 July 1943.

Following message (for the eyes of Gen Marshall alone signed Stilwell) just received for transmission to the President:

"President Roosevelt Washington DC your telegram of 4th July has been received. And I am in full accord with your suggestions. Madame Chiang has informed me in detail of her conversations with you. I am delighted with the results and that we see eye to eye on many questions. I anticipate with pleasure our meeting in the near future. For many years I have been wishing that we could discuss together in person various problems of mutual interest. I venture to suggest that any time after September would be most convenient and suitable to you would be possible for me. Should necessity arise, however, for our meeting before then, I should appreciate your letting me know at least a fortnight in advance of my departure signed Chiang Kai-Shek."

No Sig

Reference not in WDCMC files.

ACTION: White House

INFORMATION: C of S

CM-HH-5994 (9 Jul 43) 1250M con
FROM: WAR
TO: AMBISCA, CHUNGKING

JUNE 30, 1943

PERSONAL

I HAVE CONCLUDED A SERIES OF VERY SATISFACTORY
TALKS WITH CHING KAI-SHEK WHICH SHE WILL TELL
YOU ABOUT.

I HAVE TOLD HER OF MY ANXIETY TO MEET YOU
SOMETIME THIS FALL. I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT
THAT WE GET TOGETHER. IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS I
SUGGEST SOME PLACE MIDWAY BETWEEN OUR TWO CAPITOLS.
I WOULD APPRECIATE VERY MUCH HEARING FROM YOU
RELATIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1610 EWT, June 30, 1943

Boyece P. Price
1st Lieutenant, CE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR 9 1972
JUNE 30, 1943

PERSONAL

TO

THE

THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE CONCLUDED A SERIES OF VERY SATISFACTORY TALKS WITH MME CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND I HOPE SHE ARRIVES SAFELY. I AM SURE SHE IS LOOKING AND FEELING MUCH BETTER THAN WHEN SHE CAME LAST WINTER.

I HAVE TOLD HER OF MY ANXIETY TO MEET YOU SOMETIME THIS FALL. I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE GET TOGETHER. IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS I SUGGEST SOME PLACE MIDWAY BETWEEN OUR TWO CAPITOLS. I WOULD APPRECIATE VERY MUCH HEARING FROM YOU RELATIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

Roosevelt
The following memorandum was prepared by a member of this office in close contact with certain responsible officials.

To a considerable extent it confirms what the Naval Attaché has observed to be the opinion of a considerable cross-section of officials, although perhaps not as frankly expressed as set forth here.

**CHINESE OFFICIALS OPINION ON THE ADVANTAGES OF A CHIANG-ROOSEVELT MEETING**

In conversation with one of the officials who is very close to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, he said he failed to understand the reason why no effort had been made to arrange a meeting between Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt. Much publicity and importance had been given to the Churchill-Roosevelt parley. He frankly expressed his belief that it was the intention of the United Nations to crush Hitler in Europe before they come to China's assistance and that it might be that the leaders of the United Nations regard the China front as unimportant and that the Chinese are capable of carrying on the war against the Japanese invaders indefinitely and that a little delay would not seriously jeopardize her position. He, in a way, admitted that this is probably the best plan and that the leaders of the United Nations are doing everything possible to help win the war. He even went so far as to express his opinion that failure of President Roosevelt to invite Chiang Kai-shek to a conference might be attributed to the fact that the Allied Leaders regard China as an inferior power and that no possible advantage could be gained by such a meeting.

When assured that this was not the case and that everything is being worked out and will be carried out when the time is ripe and that all military strategy must be kept secret until the time
is ripe to expedite them, he acknowledged the soundness of the plan
and he hinted that a Chiang-Roosevelt meeting would serve to bolster
up the ebbing morale of the Chinese people. He stated that before
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chinese morale was at its lowest and on
the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Chinese looked forward to better
days and that more help would be given China by the United States and
other Allies. The loss of Burma and the closing of the Burma Road
was a serious blow to Chinese morale and with the lapse of almost one
and one-half years, during which time only a fraction of Lease-Lend
materials trickled into China by air transport, Chinese morale took
another downward dive. He pointed out that a Chiang-Roosevelt meeting,
even if nothing important is discussed other than a friendly exchange
of greetings, would enhance Chinese morale to such an extent that it
would be even better than all the Lease-Lend materials the United
States could get into China. If such a meeting could be brought about
at the invitation of President Roosevelt, Chinese officials and the
Chinese populace would be made to realize that at least such powerful
nations as the United States recognizes that China still has a place,
if not an equal place, in the ranks of the Allied Council, and on the
strength of this, China would gain politically and financially. Resto-
ration of confidence that help is within the horizon would tend to
cause merchants and traders to reflect that with Allied financial and
material bookings the day would not be far off when goods would be
flowing freely and in abundance into blockaded China. If the people
can be brought into this frame of mind, confidence on the strength of
Chinese currency would prevail and prices of various commodities would
automatically be lowered.

He admitted that Chiang could have asked for such a conference
but that he refrained from doing so on account of "face", which is
still the predominating force in the Chinese political and social
world.
From: War
To: AILISCA, Chungking. #2904

Personal from the President to General Stilwell for delivery to the Generalissimo.

Madame Chiang departed from Florida early yesterday morning. I consider her visit here to have been a great success, in addition to the deep pleasure we have had in seeing her in our home. She looks definitely better than when she arrived but her Doctors are most anxious that she have a full week of complete rest when she arrives in Chungking after the long and strenuous journey.

My warm personal regards to you.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

Released from the White House Map Room at 1435, EWT, June 29, 1943.

F. H. Grahm
F. H. GRAHAM,
2nd Lieutenant, AGD.
June 29, 1943.

PERSONAL

TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

Madame Chiang departed from Florida early yesterday morning. I consider her visit here to have been a great success, in addition to the deep pleasure we have had in seeing her in our home. She looks definitely better than when she arrived but her Doctors are most anxious that she have a full week of complete rest when she arrives in Chungking after the long and strenuous journey.

My warm personal regards to you.

ROOSEVELT
June 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Attached is a copy of message, AMHISCÄ, Chungking 42903, dated June 28, 1943, from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, which is furnished for your information.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
1st Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972
By J. J. Stewart Date
From the President to General Stilwell for delivery to the Generalissimo.

General Marshall and General Arnold have convinced me that the present air organization in India, Burma, and China is not conducive to the best interests of the air effort under Chennault in China, which is the ultimate purpose of the entire organization. Maintenance, meaning the delivery of fuel and materiel, the mechanical repair set-ups required to keep planes in the air, and the transportation facilities—ship, air, and ground—from Karachi to Kunming, lack the necessary expert coordination at the present time. Equally vital to Chennault is the pilot and crew training program for the new fighter and bombardment groups. Economic use of gasoline and other critical supplies in China dictates that this training be carried on in India, specifically Karachi and Lahore. It is for these impelling reasons that General Arnold discussed the matter with Dr. Soong several weeks ago.

I think it is important that the deficiencies of the present situation be corrected by the assignment of a competent air officer to coordinate all Air Corps matters relating to administration, transportation, logistics of supply and maintenance and training. At the present time the details of these questions have to be referred to Washington. They should be settled by a responsible officer on the spot who is intimately familiar with local conditions at the moment.

I am considering for this duty the appointment of General Arnold's present Chief of Staff, Major General George E. Stratemeyer, who recently was in Chungking. With a small staff of selected air officers
SECRET

he could devote his entire time to straightening out and improving the orderly movement of personnel, crews, and supplies through India and Burma into China. This officer would not interfere with the intimate and direct relationship between you and General Chennault and would be given specific instructions accordingly.

Under existing conditions General Stilwell, by force of necessity, is called upon to decide innumerable technical Air Corps questions for which he has not the time or necessary assistance, therefore, in many instances these matters are referred back to Washington. Also, at the present time there are innumerable complications regarding the improvement of airfields in Assam to facilitate the more rapid movement of transport aircraft, and in connection with the transit of material through India, and at the ports of Karachi and Calcutta. All of this operates to the disadvantage of Chennault's 14th Air Force in China.

I would like your concurrence in my nomination of General Stratemeyer for this important duty. His appointment does not put him over Chennault, but is intended solely to improve the operating and fighting capacity of Chennault's forces.

Roosevelt,

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Stewart

Chester Hammond,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
DRAFT OF SUGGESTED CABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

General Marshall and General Arnold have convinced me that the present air organization in India, Burma, and China is not conducive to the best interests of the air effort under Chennault in China, which is the ultimate purpose of the entire organization. Maintenance, meaning the delivery of fuel and material, the mechanical repair set-ups required to keep planes in the air, and the transportation facilities—ship, air, and ground—from Karachi to Kunming, lack the necessary expert coordination at the present time. Equally vital to Chennault is the pilot and crew training program for the new fighter and bombardment groups. Economic use of gasoline and other critical supplies in China dictates that this training be carried on in India, specifically Karachi and Lahore. It is for these impelling reasons that General Arnold discussed the matter with Dr. Soong several weeks ago.

I think it is important that the deficiencies of the present situation be corrected by the assignment of a competent air officer to coordinate all Air Corps matters relating to administration, transportation, logistics of supply and maintenance and training. At the present time the details of these questions have to be referred to Washington. They should be settled by a responsible officer on the spot who is intimately familiar with local conditions at the moment.

I am considering for this duty the appointment of General Arnold's present Chief of Staff, Major General George E. Stratemeyer, who recently was in Chungking. With a small staff of selected air officers he could devote his entire time to straightening out and improving the orderly movement of personnel, crews, and supplies through India and Burma into China. This officer would not interfere with the intimate and direct relationship between you and General Chennault and would be given specific instructions accordingly.

DESCRIBED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J.戈内
MAR 0 1977

SECRET
Under existing conditions General Stilwell, by force of necessity, is called upon to decide innumerable technical Air Corps questions for which he has not the time or necessary assistance; therefore, in many instances these matters are referred back to Washington. Also, at the present time there are innumerable complications regarding the improvement of airfields in Assam to facilitate the more rapid movement of transport aircraft, and in connection with the transit of material through India, and at the ports of Karachi and Calcutta. All of this operates to the disadvantage of Chennault's 11th Air Force in China.

I would like your concurrence in my nomination of General Stratemeyer for this important duty. His appointment does not put him over Chennault, but is intended solely to improve Chennault's operating and fighting capacity of Chennault's forces.

Roosevelt
May 13, 1943.

From: War

To: AMISCA, Chungking, China. # 2661

Personal and secret from the President for Generalissimo
Chiang Kai Shek.

For the allied forces in the African theater of war I should
like to express appreciation of your message of congratulations
on the complete destruction of the enemies of liberty in Africa.

We hope in the near future to take together with your
gallant army the initiative in Asia and bring to an end the war
which you have for many years carried on successfully in spite
of all difficulties.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1545, EWT, May 13, 1943.

Chester Hammond,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
May 13, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI SHEK:

For the allied forces in the African theater of war I should like to express appreciation of your message of congratulations on the complete destruction of the enemies of liberty in Africa.

We hope in the near future to take together with your gallant army the initiative in Asia and bring to an end the war which you have for many years carried on successfully in spite of all difficulties.

Roosevelt
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

May 10, 1943

Dear General Watson:

I have an urgent message for the President, which I shall be grateful if you will lay before him as soon as possible, as he is having a staff conference on the subject this afternoon.

Thanking you, and with kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Major General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Washington, D. C.
May 10, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

On returning to my office I found another cable from the Generalissimo, who has evidently been seriously disturbed by the possibility of a compromise arrangement on India-China air tonnage suggested by Madame Chiang's conversation with you.

On considering the matter further, he instructed me to re-emphasize the absolute necessity that the next three months be devoted entirely to carrying air supplies. His reason is as follows:

It is generally agreed, by your experts as well as by ours, that the tonnage estimates included in General Chennault's plan for air action in China are the absolute minima on which it is possible to support effective offensive action and to support Chinese ground troops.

The Generalissimo considers therefore that merely to reinforce General Chennault slightly, and to give him a little more supplies, will not meet the situation. For General Chennault's force will then be neither strong enough to undertake offensive action, nor sufficiently powerful to help the ground troops to ward off determined attacks by the enemy.

I shall be grateful if you will let me know the results of your discussion today with the General Staff, for transmission to the Generalissimo.

Respectfully yours,

[signature]

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM RE AIR OFFENSIVE IN CHINA

I am instructed by the Generalissimo that after careful consideration, he has concluded all resources must be concentrated in the immediate future on launching an air offensive in China. Specifically, after weighing the various claims, he now desires that the entire air transport tonnage during the months of May, June and July be devoted to carrying into China gasoline and aviation supplies, in order to build up the required reserves for decisive offensive action. It is the Generalissimo's view that since initiation of the air effort is both most urgent and presently feasible, and since the ground effort has been deferred until next autumn, military logic demands the requested alteration in schedules.

It will be recalled that in past conversations the decision was taken to launch a China air offensive at the earliest date possible, and that the only obstacle to prompt action was shortage of air transport tonnage for the purpose. Since the existing capacity of the air transport line is believed to be sufficient to support an air offensive, no obstacle to prompt action now appears to remain. It is hoped, therefore, that the small quantities of needed additional planes and equipment may be allocated; that the needed supplies may move forward at once, and that the offensive may start as soon as preparations for it can be completed.

Such a concentration of present resources on the air effort need not, in the Generalissimo's opinion, interfere with the program of ground action. The question is not whether the ground effort is to be finally sacrificed to the air effort, but whether ground supplies or air supplies are to be carried into China in the months just ahead. It will be understood that after the required reserves for the air offensive have been accumulated, the percentage of air transport tonnage into China allocated to aviation supplies can be reduced to the total needed merely to maintain the air effort. The capacity of the air transport line into China is planned to expand very rapidly; and as this expansion occurs, all needed ground supplies may also be carried into China in ample time to be in hand when called for. Indeed, the Generalissimo believes that the air offensive will not only have great strategic results, in and of itself; but also, and perhaps more importantly, will serve as direct preparation for the ground effort by weakening the enemy air strength and attacking his main line of communication to the Southward.

The Generalissimo also wishes me to transmit to you his personal assurance that in the event the enemy attempt to interrupt the air offensive by a ground advance on the air bases, the advance can be halted by the existing Chinese forces.

The Generalissimo requested that General Chennault return to the United States to acquaint you with the detailed plans for the proposed air offensive. As General Chennault has now arrived in the United States he can explain what a relatively small number of planes and amount of equipment is needed for this purpose.

April 29, 1943.
1) The Generalissimo, who has been informed by Madame Chiang of your discussions with her, has asked me to reiterate his request that the entire air transport tonnage for the next three months be assigned to General Chennault, and thereafter priority be given him for the tonnage he needs to sustain an air offensive against the Japanese enemy. The Generalissimo feels that this decision is of the utmost urgency. The Japanese are now engaged in operations in many parts of China. China's position has become increasingly desperate each month since the loss of Burma. Only immediate air support can enable the Generalissimo's armies to hold this ground, and maintain the China theatre.

General Chennault needs 4700 tons per month for three months, and 7000 tons monthly thereafter to permit operations which have as their immediate objective an attack on Japan's vital water-borne supply lines, both within China and along the China coast. It is calculated that such an attack will destroy 500,000 tons of enemy shipping in four to six months, besides greatly weakening the enemy air strength.

2) The Generalissimo feels strongly that implementation of the Casablanca decision in favor of immediate air action in China is only possible by thus cutting the Gordian knot of the air transport problem. The Generalissimo also reiterates his request for effective measures to implement the other decision reached at Casablanca to launch a major offensive against Burma next autumn, which was confirmed at the meetings in Chungking and Calcutta. He asks again for three American divisions.

He has asked me to reject again General Stilwell's alternative proposal for a limited operation in North Burma. He believes that the superiority of the supply lines available to the enemy over those which are available to us in North Burma renders such an operation exceedingly dangerous. He considers that the defeat at Akyab sufficiently demonstrated that limited offensives against Japanese ground forces cannot produce good results.

If for any reason the Casablanca decisions have been altered, and the plan to relieve China and to use the China base for attacking Japan has been abandoned, the Generalissimo desires that the changed plans be explained frankly to him.

3) The Generalissimo also desires me to tell you on his behalf, with the utmost earnestness, that the entire weight of his long experience is behind his two convictions, that only immediate air action can relieve the situation in China, and that the risk of action is relatively far smaller than the risk of inaction. He emphasizes his conviction that with American air strength to support the Chinese ground forces, the danger of a successful Japanese counter-offensive need not be seriously considered; on the other hand, he foresees grave consequences if the desired action is not pressed now.

May 10, 1943
P08 37
CHUNKING CH GVT 100 10

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
WASHINGTON DC

ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE ARMY AND PEOPLE I OFFER MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SIGNAL SUCCESS OF THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH TROOPS IN NORTH AFRICA STOP THE GALLANTRY OF OUR ALLIED TROOPS UNDER THE ABLE COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER AND GENERAL ALEXANDER CANNOT FAIL TO BE A SOURCE OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND INSPIRATION TO OUR ARMY AND PEOPLE STOP THE VICTORY OF THE ALLIED ARMS IN THIS THEATER OF WAR WILL I AM SURE HASTEN THE TOTAL COLLAPSE OF THE AGGRESSOR NATIONS

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
APRIL 14, 1943.

From: War
To: AMISCA, Chungking, China.

Your suggestion that Chennault be summoned (for General Stilwell's eyes alone from the President for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek signed Roosevelt) to Washington fits in with plans already afoot to bring Stilwell and Chennault here at about the commencement of the monsoon season, for a conference regarding the necessary coordination of all our efforts, particularly as regards ANAKIN. General Handy, Chief of U.S. Army Operations with General Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces are now in Africa under orders to proceed to Chungking before turning homeward. They are instructed to determine the practicability of calling in Stilwell and Chennault as indicated. The leading British officials in India, Army, Air, and Naval, have been summoned to London for a similar conference.

Therefore I am directing General Marshall to proceed with arrangements for the conference in Washington at a suitable date in the near future.

released from the White House Map Room at 1120, EWT, April 14, 1943.

CHESTER HAIMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

Your suggestion that Chennault be summoned to Washington fits in with plans already afoot to bring Stilwell, and Chennault here at about the commencement of the monsoon season, for a conference regarding the necessary coordination of all our efforts, particularly as regards ANAKIM. General Handy, Chief of U. S. Army Operations with General Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces are now in Africa under orders to proceed to Chungking before turning homeward. They are instructed to determine the practicability of calling in Stilwell, Chennault and Bishop as indicated.

The leading British officials in India, Army, Air, and Naval, have been summoned to London for a similar conference.

Therefore I am directing General Marshall to proceed with arrangements for the conference in Washington at a suitable date in the near future.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Generalissimo's request for Chennault to report to Washington.

The attached message from the Generalissimo creates an embarrassing situation. To call in Chennault and ignore Stilwell, which is the probable purpose of the Generalissimo's proposal, would create such a definite division of authority in the China Theater as to necessitate Stilwell's relief and Chennault's appointment to command of ground and air, which so far as I am concerned would be a grave mistake.

As a matter of fact we were in process of arranging for Stilwell to come to Washington to talk over the ANAKIN situation. Field Marshal Wavell, Air Marshal Peirse, and Admiral Somerville from India, have been summoned to London in regard to ANAKIN. General Handy, Chief of Operations in the War Department, is now in Africa with the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces, with the final destination of Chungking. He has instructions to take up with Stilwell the question of his, Stilwell's, return to Washington with Handy; his absence from the Theater occurring during the early weeks of the monsoon season.

Under the circumstances I therefore suggest that the request of the Generalissimo be met by including Stilwell and Bissell in the party for a conference here. This would parallel the military Pacific conference just completed, and the conference about to occur in London on the special subject of ANAKIN. A draft for such a message is attached.

Since dictating the above your memorandum of today has been received.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec. Army
by TAG per 72D 024
By Chief of Staff.

By Date JUN 1 1972
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

Your suggestion that Chennault be summoned to Washington fits in with plans already afoot to bring Stilwell, Bissell and Chennault here at about the commencement of the monsoon season, for a conference regarding the necessary coordination of all our efforts, particularly as regards ANAKIM. General Handy, Chief of U.S. Army Operations with General Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces are now in Africa under orders to proceed to Chungking before turning homeward. They are instructed to determine the practicability of calling in Stilwell, Chennault and Bissell as indicated. The leading British officials in India, Army, Air, and Naval, have been summoned to London for a similar conference.

Therefore I am directing General Marshall to proceed with arrangements for the conference in Washington at a suitable date in the near future.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec. Army
by TAG per 22D724
By R. B. Date JUN 1 4 1972
"Chungking, China
April 10, 1943

"Many thanks for your reply to my note of March 25. All ground facilities are being rushed according to plan and I can assure you that they will be ready at the appointed time. In the meanwhile I would urge that you summon General Chennault to Washington to lay before you and General Arnold the plan I have been discussing with him. I believe this is most necessary in order to make effective our mutual desire to strike the enemy by air. I believe General Chennault could conveniently come now, since later it may not be feasible."
March 31, 1943.

From: A.M. War.
To: A.M.C.S.A. Chungking, China. 

This is in reply to your note handed me by Dr. Soong on March 25th. (For General Stilwell's eyes alone from the President for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek signed Roosevelt).

General Chennault has been advised by General Arnold that we are prepared and anxious to build up air force in China just as soon as Chennault advises Arnold that the ground facilities are available for additional combat units. We have had no word from Chennault to indicate that these facilities are ready to receive the combat planes and as soon as we get word from Chennault the planes will be sent to you.

We are sending additional transports at once. I have noticed that the tonnage carried has been substantially increased and I understand that as we get to 4,000 tons a month 1,500 tons will go for Chennault's air and 2,500 tons to your ground forces. I have hopes that we will get up to 6,000 tons early in the summer in which case I think Chennault should get all of the gasoline and supplies that he needs.

Chennault already has authority at this time to employ Chinese personnel and equipment when available. He will be advised again by the army on this point.

A high ranking officer of the United States Army Air Forces in Washington has been designated to work closely with General Hox and CDS to coordinate operations in China. The schedule of planes depends

3 Copies furnished
Adm. Leahy.
entirely on the facilities being available and General Chennault fully understands this. I earnestly hope that you will do everything to rush the completion of these facilities. I am fully convinced that from a strategic point of view one of the most important things we can do this year is to strike the enemy by air from China and I want to assure you that we will send the planes just as rapidly as the supplies and facilities are available to fight them with.
March 29, 1943

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

THIS IS IN REPLY TO YOUR NOTE HANDED ME BY DR. SOONG ON MARCH 25TH.

GENERAL CHENNAULT HAS BEEN ADVISED BY GENERAL ARNOLD THAT WE ARE PREPARED AND ANXIOUS TO BUILD UP AIR FORCE IN CHINA JUST AS SOON AS CHENNAULT ADVISES ARNOLD THAT THE GROUND FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR ADDITIONAL COMBAT UNITS. WE HAVE HAD NO WORD FROM CHENNAULT TO INDICATE THAT THESE FACILITIES ARE READY TO RECEIVE THE COMBAT PLANES AND AS SOON AS WE GET WORD FROM CHENNAULT THE PLANES WILL BE SENT TO YOU.

WE ARE SENDING ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTS AT ONCE. I HAVE NOTICED THAT THE TONNAGE CARRIED HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AND I UNDERSTAND THAT AS WE GET TO 4,000 TONS A MONTH 1,500 TONS WILL GO FOR CHENNAULT'S AIR AND 2,500 TONS TO YOUR GROUND FORCES. I HAVE HOPES THAT WE WILL GET UP TO 6,000 TONS EARLY IN THE SUMMER IN WHICH CASE I THINK CHENNAULT SHOULD GET ALL OF THE GASOLINE AND SUPPLIES THAT HE NEEDS.

CHENNAULT ALREADY HAS AUTHORITY AT THIS TIME TO EMPLOY CHINESE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WHEN AVAILABLE. HE WILL BE ADVISED AGAIN BY THE ARMY ON THIS POINT.

A HIGH RANKING OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH GENERAL NOW AND CDS TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN CHINA. THE SCHEDULE OF PLANS DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE FACILITIES BEING AVAILABLE AND GENERAL CHENNAULT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THIS. I EARTHILY HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO EVERYTHING TO RUSH THE COMPLETION OF THESE FACILITIES. I AM FULLY CONVINCED THAT FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS WE CAN DO THIS YEAR IS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY BY AIR AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL SEND THE PLANES JUST AS RAPIDLY AS THE SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO FIGHT THEM WITH.

By Deputy Undersecretary of the U.S. [Signature]

By N. J. Stenbert [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Suggested Cable to General Chiang Kai Shek

In connection with the attached, recommend the following cable be sent to General Chiang Kai Shek:

THIS REFERS TO DOCTOR SOONG'S CONFERENCE AT WHITE HOUSE PERIOD PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL CHERNAULT CONTEMPLATIVE HIS NOTIFYING WAR DEPARTMENT WHEN HE HAS FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR ADDITIONAL COMBAT UNITS PERIOD HE HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT ADDITIONAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS CAN BE CREATED BY HIM AS CHINESE PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES BECOME AVAILABLE PERIOD TO DATE WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM GENERAL CHERNAULT THAT HE IS READY FOR TWO ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS PARA REFERENCE ALLOCATION OF CARGO ON THE INDIA CHINA AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE GENERAL STILL WILL DETERMINES PRIORITY OF SUPPLIES PARA GENERAL CHERNAULT HAS THE AUTHORITY AT THIS TIME TO EMPLOY CHINESE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WHEN AVAILABLE PERIOD HE WILL BE SO INFORMED PERIOD A HIGH RANKING OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH GENERAL CHINA FOR COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS IN CHINA PARA SCHEDULE FOR BUILDING THE AIR FORCE IN CHINA TO STRENGTH OF FIVE HUNDRED FIRST LINE COMBAT PLANES IS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT UPON FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN CHINA PARA GENERAL CHERNAULT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THIS AND HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO NOTIFY THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS THESE FACILITIES COINA SUPPLIES COINA AND PERSONEL BECOME AVAILABLE SO THAT NEW UNITS CAN BE CREATED FOR OPERATION IN THAT THEATRE.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAC doc 22072.4
By Pub Date JUN 14 1972

Incl: Letter to Miss Tully from
M. Hopkins, 3/25/43
Dr. Soong's notes re China
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY

SUBJECT: Dr. Soong's notes re China

Dear Grace:

The President wants this given to him when he sees General Marshall and General Arnold tomorrow.

Harry L. Hopkins
encl.
We have been advised by the Generalissimo that the plan for General Chennault's operations in China is falling down and needs the following action:

(1) The tonnages received by the U. S. Airforce in China via the air transport route were as follows:

- January - 441 tons of which 266 were gasoline
- February - 775 tons of which 565 were gasoline
- March - Less than 100 tons were received in the first half of the month.

This airforce tonnage was less than one-fourth of the total tonnage going over the route.

To achieve the desired objectives of bombing the Japanese sea-lanes, General Chennault needs immediately two more fighter squadrons to permit occupation and retention of Chinese airfields near the coast. From these airfields Japanese shipping from Shanghai to Camranh Bay can be attacked with both level and dive bombers.

Half the airplanes operating from India to China should be definitely assigned by Washington to carry aviation gasoline and supplies for General Chennault's operations.

(2) General Chennault has requested that he be authorized to employ Chinese personnel and equipment when available. This authority should be given to him from Washington.

(3) A high-ranking officer of the United States Airforce in Washington should be designated to work closely with General Now and C.D.S. to coordinate the program for air operations in China and to receive and act on suggestions from China.

(4) The Generalissimo would like to know the schedule pursuant to which it is expected to reach a force of 500 first-line combat planes for the 14th Airforce by December.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Letter, 10-5-72
By R. H. Parks Date, 10-10-72
The Generalissimo's note of February 7th was handed me by General Arnold upon his return. (For General Stilwell's eyes alone from the President for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek) General Stilwell has already informed you of the organization of American air units in China as the 14th Air Force, separate from the 10th Air Force, with General Chennault as the air force commander.

I want to assure you that we are going to move as rapidly as possible to build up General Chennault's command to at least 500 planes. This will be done as General Chennault assures us that the facilities can handle the increased number. I appreciate the vital importance of an air force in China in 1943 of a size which will enable Chennault to strike the enemy hard.

We are asking Generals Stilwell and Chennault to advise us periodically of the increase in facilities so that the planes can move in concurrently.

137 cargo planes, with a tonnage capacity of at least 4,000 tons, will be available by March 15th. The number of these planes will also be increased as rapidly as planes and crews can be made available and operational facilities permit.

I have every reason to believe that as we gain experience and with increased facilities, this tonnage, carried by the cargo planes, can be materially increased. Furthermore, as the facilities are improved, additional transport planes will be added to the line, with an
The air freight route alone will, of course, never be able to transport the combat essentials for your armies, your air force, and Chennault's air force in sufficient quantities to deal a death blow to the enemy at your door. Accordingly, we must keep constantly in mind our first essential, namely, that the land route of supply to China through Burma must be opened at the earliest possible moment. This is the positive approach, as I see it, to bring heavy and sustained air pressure against the heart of the Japanese Empire and make secure the bases from which this air power must operate. To this end we have dispatched a task force of American engineers, medical troops, and other essential services to augment the forces already engaged in the construction of a land route from Ledo. This task force will amount to over 10,000 service troops with their equipment and in addition 25,000 tons of special construction equipment. The majority of these troops and equipment are already on the way.

In the meantime, we shall spare no effort to increase the flow of combat materials over the air line to your Yunnan ground forces and to Chennault's air force for employment in the operations against Burma this year, both before and after the monsoon. Once a land route through Burma to China is opened, the air line will be a valuable auxiliary supply route.

General Arnold discussed with you a plan, which I approve, for the augmentation of your air force. Our objective is to create Chinese fighter squadrons and later light bombardment squadrons equipped with U.S. combat planes.
President - Stilwell (for Chiang Kai Shek)
March 6, 1943.

Your assurances of assistance in the expansion of the air
transport command and the Chinese Air Force through the provision of
necessary air fields and ground facilities comprise further testimony
of our mutuality of cooperation which is the basis for the effectiveness
of our joint effort.

I wish to thank you most warmly for inviting General
Arnold to Chungking for the joint conferences over which you presided
and which resulted in positive plans for the early commencement of the
campaign against Burma. The conclusion of this campaign will permit us
to adequately support our joint forces to ret at vitals of the Japanese
Empire in force.

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1050, EST, March 6, 1943.

[Signature]
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
PROPOSED RADIO TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR DELIVERY TO THE GENERALISSIMO

March 3, 1943.

The Generalissimo's note of February 7th was handed me by General Arnold upon his return. (For General Stilwell's eyes alone from the President for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek). General Stilwell has already informed you of the organization of American air units in China as the 14th Air Force, separate from the 10th Air Force, with General Chennault as the air force commander.

I want to assure you that we are going to move as rapidly as possible to build up General Chennault's command to at least 500 planes. This will be done as General Chennault assures us that the facilities can handle the increased number. I appreciate the vital importance of an air force in China in 1943 of a size which will enable Chennault to strike the enemy hard.

We are asking Generals Stilwell and Chennault to advise us periodically of the increase in facilities so that the planes can move in concurrently.

137 cargo planes, with a tonnage capacity of at least 4,000 tons, will be available by March 15th. The number of these planes will also be increased as rapidly as planes and crews can be made available and operational facilities permit.

I have every reason to believe that as we gain experience and with increased facilities, this tonnage, carried by the cargo planes, can be materially increased. Furthermore, as the facilities are improved, additional transport planes will be added to the line, with an ultimate goal of 10,000 tons.

The air freight route alone will, of course, never be able to transport the combat essentials for your armies, your air force, and...
Chennault's air force in sufficient quantities to deal a death blow to the enemy at your door. Accordingly, we must keep constantly in mind our first essential, namely, that the land route of supply to China through Burma must be opened at the earliest possible moment. This is the positive approach, as I see it, to bring heavy and sustained air pressure against the heart of the Japanese Empire and make secure the bases from which this air power must operate. To this end we have dispatched a task force of American engineers, medical troops, and other essential services to augment the forces already engaged in the construction of a land route from Ledo. This task force will amount to over 10,000 service troops with their equipment and in addition 25,000 tons of special construction equipment. The majority of these troops and equipment are already on the way.

In the meantime, we shall spare no effort to increase the flow of combat materials over the air line to your Yunnan ground forces and to Chennault's air force for employment in the operations against Burma this year, both before and after the monsoon. Once a land route through Burma to China is opened, the air line will be a valuable auxiliary supply route.

General Arnold discussed with you a plan, which I approve, for the augmentation of your air force. Our objective is to create Chinese fighter squadrons and later light bombardment squadrons equipped with U.S. combat planes.

Your assurances of assistance in the expansion of the air transport command and the Chinese Air Force through the provision of necessary air fields and ground facilities comprise further testimony of our mutuality of cooperation which is the basis for the effectiveness of our joint effort.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR
I wish to thank you most warmly for inviting General Arnold to Chungking for the joint conferences over which you presided and which resulted in positive plans for the early commencement of the campaign against Burma. The conclusion of this campaign will permit us to adequately support our joint forces to get at vitals of the Japanese Empire in force.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR 0 1943
February 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reply to Generalissimo's Memorandum.

Cargo Planes.

The additional 30 cargo planes you desire be added to the India-China Air Freight Line can be made available in the theater from production by April 1. The effect of such an increase, however, must be brought to your attention.

Assignment of these planes to India-China will be at the direct expense of U. S. units now engaged or already committed to planned operations. On the other hand, the tonnage increase to China by such diversion will not be proportionate to the number of planes involved because of the present critical shortage of the highly trained personnel required for this difficult route.

Cost of Diversion.

Under present conditions the cargo plane situation will not permit us to bring the air-borne divisional units which are now being prepared for Husky, to more than two-thirds strength by April 1 and the division is due to leave for Africa in April.

General Eisenhower has just asked for five additional troop carrier groups (total of 260 planes) for Husky.

Meanwhile, a cable from the British Chiefs of Staff today indicates that General Eisenhower's requirements have been estimated too low, being based on a plane capacity of 20 men, whereas they estimate the plane capacity for the range required to be 12. (See attached messages from Eisenhower and the British.)

At present we can see our way clear to furnish only three groups (156 planes). The diversion of 30 additional
planes to China therefore directly jeopardizes the success of Win.

Because sufficient cargo planes are not available, General DeWitt's request for two troop carrier squadrons (26 planes) for the shifting of personnel to and from Amchitka, and for a further operation in the Aleutians, has been denied.

General MacArthur's urgent requirement for an additional group (52 planes) to carry forward his operations is being delayed because of lack of planes.

**Flight and Ground Personnel.**

In order to increase the tonnage carried into China the dispatch of additional crews to India-China is being accelerated to the maximum possible extent. Because of critical shipping shortages and the heavy requirements of all theaters, we have been unable to provide the necessary ground service and support units required by the large number of cargo planes now committed to the India-China route. The delivery of extra crews and maintenance units has lagged behind our rapid expansion of the cargo plane strength of the India-China Freight Run. Actually, we are now "plane rich" on the India-China Run. This condition will continue until two or even three flight crews per plane and additional ground personnel can be provided to develop the full capabilities of the planes now assigned.

The addition of planes alone in the next two or three months will not commensurately increase the tonnage delivered to China. The addition of 30 more planes, without 60 to 90 more flight crews and 500 more ground personnel, would only place on the India-China route airplanes which could not be kept in continued operation, but which would be grounded much of the time.

I must therefore conclude that the dispatch of an additional 30 cargo planes to India-China, would be at the direct expense of our own forces, with little resulting benefit to China.

I recommend that no increase be made at this time in the present commitment of cargo planes for the India-China Theater and that the attached radio reply to the Generalissimo's Memorandum of February 7 be approved without changing the cargo plane figure.

**DECLASSIFIED**
By Authority of Sec. Army
by TAG par 720224
By RMA Date JUN 14 1972

Chief of Staff.
EXTRACT

To: J.S.O. Washington for
Combined Chiefs of Staff

From: Chiefs of Staff

IMPORTANT

Following from Chiefs of Staff C.O.S. (I) 499.

Reference 1852(NAF 152) of 20 February, 1943.

6. Assumption of 20 parachutists per aircraft is not correct
51st troop carrying group in North Africa has limited load on
range of 400 miles to target to 4000 lbs. which is about 12 men
and 6 containers. Our technical advice confirms this.
From: Algiers
To: War
No. 1852 Feb. 19, 1943

1. Early clarification airborne forces and transport aircraft situation necessary for development Husky Plan. Outline plan envisages use 5 parachute regiments (British Brigades) of which 3 regiments are dropped simultaneously on D plus 3. Use of glider elements of airborne division now under examination. For Combined Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower. This is my NAF number 152.

2. a. American units available or set up are 1 battalion 509th Parachute Regiment now in theater and 82nd Airborne Division now in US.

b. British units are understood to be First Parachute Brigade now in Tunisia, 1 brigade forming in Kideast and possibly 2 brigades from UK.

3. Units already here will require replacements, reequipment and retraining. Training resources in Kideast sever training of Kideast brigade. State of training of units in US and UK unknown.

4. Assuming 20 men with equipment per plane, estimate 6 groups (312 aircraft) required for 3 regiments to be dropped simultaneously on D plus 3. Allowing for 75 percent serviceability and for rehearsal and D day losses considers 40 percent reserve, or 2 additional groups necessary, making total of 8 groups. This makes no allowance for requirements of glider element of 82nd airborne division.

5. At present in theater are 3 groups. AGWAR telegram 1898 of 6 February indicates that 2 groups can be sent here from US about 15th April and possible a third withdrawn from training in US or from Kideast.

6. If all aircraft in paragraph 5 can be made available there will still be a shortage of 2 groups.
7. Consider that employment of parachute regiments is essential part of present outline plan. If Allied resources will not meet requirements stated above effect on plan and chances of success must be examined without delay. Request therefore firm data regarding provision of airborne and transport units and state of training of those now in US and UK.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Chinese Theater.

The Generalissimo's letter to you of February 7, 1943, is returned herewith. The following action has been taken:

U.S. Air Force in China

General Stilwell has been directed to organize a new air force (the 14th Air Force), separate from General Bissell, consisting of all U.S. air units in China, with General Chennault as the commander. General Stilwell has informed the Generalissimo. It is suggested that you may wish to mention it to Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

India-China Air Transport Wing

The promised 137 cargo planes will be in service on the India-China run by the end of March, with a contemplated tonnage capacity by that time of 4,000 tons per month.

Chinese Air Force

General Arnold's plan to build up the Chinese Air Force, under Chennault, has been described to you and has received your approval.

I recommend for your approval the attached radio reply to the Generalissimo's memorandum of February 7.
PROPOSED RADIO TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR DELIVERY TO THE GENERALISSIMO

The Generalissimo's note of February 7th was handed me by General Arnold upon his return. (For General Stilwell's eyes alone from the President for delivery to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.) General Stilwell has already informed you of the organization of American air units in China as the 14th Air Force, separate from the 10th Air Force, with General Chennault as the air force commander.

As General Arnold promised, 137 cargo airplanes with a tonnage capacity of 4000 tons per month will be in service in the theater by April 1st. An air freight capacity of 10,000 tons per month prior to the second phase of Burma operations will be our goal. However, as I have mentioned before, the air freight route alone will never be able to transport the combat essentials for your armies, air force, and Chennault's air force in sufficient quantity to deal a death blow to the enemy at your door. Accordingly we must keep constantly in mind our first essential, namely that a land route of supply to China through Burma must be opened up at the earliest possible moment. This is the positive approach, as I see it, to bring heavy and sustained air pressure against the heart of the Japanese Empire, meanwhile securing the basis from which this air power can operate. To this end we have dispatched...
a task force of American engineers, medical troops, and other essential services to augment the forces already engaged in the construction of a land route from Ledo. This task force will amount to over 10,000 service troops with their equipment and in addition 25,000 tons of special construction equipment. The majority of these troops and equipment are already on the way.

In the meantime, we shall spare no effort to increase the flow of combat materials over the air line to your Yunnan ground forces and to Chennault's air force for employment in the operations against Burma this year both before and after the monsoon. Once a land route through Burma to China is opened, the air line will be a valuable auxiliary supply route.

General Arnold discussed with you a plan, which I approve, for the augmentation of your air force. Our objective is to create Chinese fighter squadrons and later light bombardment squadrons equipped with U.S. combat planes.

Your assurances of assistance in the expansion of the air transport command and the Chinese Air Force through the provision of necessary air fields and ground facilities comprise further testimony of our mutuality of cooperation which is the basis for the effectiveness of our joint effort.
I wish to thank you most warmly for inviting General Arnold to Chungking for the joint conferences over which you presided and which resulted in positive plans for the early commencement of the campaign against Burma. The conclusion of this campaign will permit us to adequately support our joint forces to get at the vitals of the Japanese Empire in force.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO CHINA

Chungking, February 7, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I am deeply grateful to you for sending Lieutenant General Arnold to Chungking to advise me in detail of the Casablanca conference, and the 1943 strategy that emerged therefrom; as well as to consider ways and means to increase effective aid to China.

General Arnold unfolded with great clarity the decisions taken and the motives for them.

I have also presented to him, with the frankness of a comrade-in-arms, my requests on three main points:

1) General Chennault should not only receive increased air strength; his authority should also be enhanced by conferring on him an independent air force command. His present subordination to the 10th Air Force in India is inherently unworkable. The air units in China ought to be a separate air force, under his leadership. Here is one man of genius in the Far East, whose talents should be given full play, both for more effective offensive operations against the enemy, and because General Chennault is the one American airman who enjoys the confidence of the Chinese air force and the entire Chinese army. Only with him is it possible to work with the necessary unquestioning cooperation.

2) There are now in all only 62 transport planes carrying freight between India and China, and the total of freight carried was 1,700 tons in January. General Arnold promises to have 137 planes in service by the end of March, so that beginning April 1, tonnage carried will be 4,000 tons monthly.
By November this year, when the Burma campaign is to begin, the minimum Chinese requirements for the Army and Air Force will be 10,000 tons monthly, as against the Burma Road's capacity of 17,000 tons. There are any number of reasons that may be given why it will be impossible to gradually build up to such a tonnage by air into China. You and I have all heard in the past tales of the impossibility of flying during the monsoon; of the Japanese threat to the air transport route; and how twin-engine transports are supposed to be unable to make the grade. Yet surely the United States, with its great industrial power, its air production, and its bold ingenuity, will be able to meet this challenge, which must be met if China's minimum requirements are to be satisfied.

Fortunately Field Marshal Sir John Dill is here with General Arnold, and has promised to impress upon the authorities in India the critical importance of making available the additional rail tonnage, airfields and other ground facilities needed there if the air transport line is to be expanded. With that aspect of the problem solved, I feel certain that nothing more is necessary to success except replace the negative approach of the past with a sense that the job must be done.

3) I requested long ago that the Chinese air force should be increased to a combat strength of 500 planes. Despite the mounting production of aircraft by the United Nations, very little has yet been done. General Arnold assures me that airplanes are there, but asserts that the difficulty lies in bringing into China gasoline, spares parts and other material necessary to maintain this strength. If out of the total of 10,000 tons monthly, 5,000 tons are allocated to the air force, I am assured by competent authorities that the air force I ask for will be fully ready to bear its part in carrying forward the task assigned to China.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
CHINA

I should like to give you my personal assurance that in the expansion of the air transport service and the Chinese Air Force, all airfields and ground facilities needed in China will be promptly provided. Thus, by the energy and co-operation of the American and British comrades-in-arms, we can achieve the expansion of the air transport service and establish effective Chinese Air Force --- both of which are in my opinion absolutely indispensable to success in our campaign against Japan.

Finally, I wish to assure you that in the combined plan of operation for the Burma campaign which was prepared after joint consultations, the Chinese Army will be in readiness to perform its assigned task at the specified time without fail.

With warm regards,

Cordially yours,

Chiang Kai-shek
CASABLANCA  
January 23, 1943.

My dear Generalissimo:

This note will be given to you by Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, U. S. Army, the commander of our Air Force. I am sending him to you because I am determined to increase General Chennault's air force in order that you may carry the offensive to the Japanese at once. General Arnold will work out the ways and means with you and General Chennault.

General Arnold will also tell you about the plans to intensify our efforts to drive the Japanese out of the Southwest Pacific. As I wired you, I have been meeting with the Prime Minister and our respective Chiefs of Staff to plan our offensive strategy against Japan and Germany during 1943. I want Arnold to talk all this over with you in the greatest detail because I think it would be best that I not put it on the cables.

Mrs. Roosevelt has seen Madame Chiang Kai-Shek several times and we are all hoping that she can come to see us very soon. Her health is improving rapidly.

I have great hopes for the war in 1943, and like you, I want to press it home on the Japanese with great vigor. I want to convey not only my warm regard for you personally, but my everlasting appreciation of the service which your armies are giving to our common cause.

Cordially yours,

[Signature]

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,  
Chungking.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.

My dear Generalissimo:

As you probably know, the Prime Minister and I have recently conferred in North Africa with our respective Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of determining the course of action that would most effectively facilitate the defeat of our enemies. Global strategy was discussed in general and specific theaters were studied in detail, with a view to determining the most advantageous allocation of resources. It was agreed that we should wage war with an ever increasing tempo against Japan. The United States will intensify her efforts to drive the Japanese from the South Pacific Islands and will relentlessly harass Japanese naval and air forces, shipping and land armies.

I am sending Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the U. S. Army Air Forces, to you as my personal emissary to explain more fully our contemplated plans for Burma and to examine the situation
with reference to air operations in the India-Burma-China area.

We will intensify our efforts to improve the situation by augmentation of the flow of supplies, particularly for the support of larger air forces to operate in China.

Mrs. Roosevelt has informed me that Madame Chiang Kai Shek is making excellent progress in the restoration of health. We are looking forward with the greatest pleasure to her visit in our home at the White House. With the victorious conclusion of the War, we will hope to have the pleasure of a visit by you which will give us the opportunity to welcome you at the White House to accept the tribute of the citizens of the United States to your heroic leadership of the Chinese people.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.

My dear Generalissimo:

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23 January 1943

Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek,

My dear Generalissimo:

As you probably know, the Prime Minister and I have recently conferred in North Africa with our respective Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of determining the course of action that would most effectively facilitate the defeat of our enemies. Global strategy was discussed in general and specific theaters were studied in detail, with a view to determining the most advantageous allocation of resources. It was agreed that we should wage war with an ever increasing tempo against Japan. The United States will intensify her efforts to drive the Japanese from the South Pacific Islands and will relentlessly harass Japanese naval and air forces, shipping and land armies.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Chiang Kai-shek-General Stilwell.

The inclosed message has just been received from General Stilwell indicating that Chiang Kai-shek is calling off the Burma operation and is sending you a message to that effect.

Since you may have departed by the time the expected message from Chiang Kai-shek is received, it is suggested that you dispatch the inclosed suggested reply.


Incl.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR. 6200.9 (9/27/68)
Date-MAR 9 1972
Signature-
CHUNKING, CHINA.

January 9, 1943.

Number 30.

CKS is sending a message to the President. It will come in after this one.

CKS is calling off the operation because the Japs would probably fight hard; because they have had time to dig in; because they can concentrate more quickly than we can; because we have poor supply lines; because the British force is inadequate; because it is necessary to take the Japs in the rear with a sea-borne expedition; because we risk being defeated. So unless the Navy can guarantee control of the sea, he thinks a cautious role the only one open to him. He proposes an air offensive to prepare for the ultimate general offensive, and wants the British to set a date when they will have an adequate force ready. He says he will be ready whenever his allies are ready but that another failure in Burma is too serious to risk.

This will delight the British. It is just what they want. They can say they were ready and the Chinese ruined it. It will delight a large group of Chinese, who want to coast and let somebody else do it. The Americans are expected to go on carrying the load in the air, bringing in supplies, and building up a force that will make China safe for the Kuomintang.

I am unable to say definitely whether CKS really expects to attack next fall, but I am sure that at that time the Japs will still fight, our supply lines will be bad, the Japs will have had more time to dig in, they will still be able to concentrate more quickly than we can, and we will still risk defeat. The British may or may not have an adequate force ready and they may or may not be able to put on a sea-borne attack, but if CKS is to be the judge of British adequacy, he can still block action.

I have warned the Chinese of the possible serious consequences of sitting back; loss of prestige, loss of time, loss of morale and material support by the United States. I must now pass the ball to you. What do you want me to do?

I can threaten and roar, but I am convinced it will do no good. I can try and shame them into concessions and continue as before with training, hoping for a better attitude next fall. This is the course to take if we want to make the best of a bad bargain. We got the horse almost to the water, but he is not going to drink.
Draft of Radio to General Stilwell
for Delivery to Chiang Kai-shek

General Stilwell informs me that you are seriously considering abandoning Chinese participation in the proposed Burma operation. This is a matter which gives me grave concern.

In my message to you of January 2 I told you that I would definitely take up with the highest Allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without avoidable delay. Confidentially and for your personal information only, I expect to confer shortly with the Prime Minister in person. I urge you to delay final decision in the matter until you hear from me further. I hope to send you word in about a week.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR DELIVERY TO
CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Your message to me dated January 9, 1943, saying you are
seriously considering abandoning Chinese participation in the
proposed Burma operation.

In my message to you of January 2 I told you that I would
definitely take up with the highest Allied authorities at the
earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road
without avoidable delay. Confidentially and for your personal
information only, I expect to confer shortly with the Prime
Minister in person. I urge you to delay final decision in the
matter until you hear from me further. I hope to send you word
in about a week.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1650, EWT, January 9, 1943.

CHESTER HAMLIN
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.
URGENT

From: Chiang Kai-shek
To: AGWAR

Number 31, January 9, 1943

I am deeply grateful for your message (FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S WIRE ALONE FROM GENERALISMO CHIANG KAI-SEK) dated January second. With reference to it, the following points suggest themselves to me.

1. The Japanese are fully aware that their final defeat will be accomplished, not by slow and costly reduction of island after island in the southwest Pacific, but by hard blows at the heart of their system of new conquests, on the mainland of Asia.

2. Their resistance has been extremely tenacious, even when fighting superior numbers for points not strategically vital, as in New Guinea. It is reasonable to assume that when the first hard blow at the heart is struck, they will fight still more obstinately and with infinitely more carelessness of the resources expended, in advance into Burma, even if limited to North Burma alone, would be such a blow. Furthermore the Japanese have now had ample time to establish themselves and fortify their positions in Burma, and to repair the facilities of the numerous supply lines, river, rail, and road, by which they may reinforce and munition their armies. In a campaign in North Burma supply lines which would be available to us both on the Indian and on the Chinese side, are weak and exceedingly restricted.

3. Therefore I am convinced that the attempt to retake Burma must be a combined overland and airborne operation. Unless the Navy could prevent enemy reinforcements by sea, or enable a landing force to take the Japanese in (CH-EN-3626 1-9-43)

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 1
the rear in South Burma, the enemy will be in a position to concentrate rapidly against our armies in the north. Owing to the weakness of our supply lines, we shall not be able to match the Japanese concentration, whatever strength we may have available in the rear. Thus I consider it possible, and even likely, that in an advance restricted to North Burma our armies would ultimately be exposed to the risk of defeat. I am also convinced that to avoid defeat, the Allied forces must somehow muster satisfactory numbers and quality on the Indian as well as on the Chinese side, and I consider that the forces which Field Marshal Wavell now proposes to engage are too inadequate.

4. For these reasons, I reluctantly conclude that if the Navy is unable to control the Burma sea, it will be better to wait a few months longer, or even until the Monsoon season ends next autumn, than to run the risks involved in the suggested North Burma campaign. Similarly as China desires the reopening of her land communications, ready as I am to do anything in my power to bring the day nearer, I cannot forget that another failure in Burma would be a disaster for China so grave that the results cannot now be predicted. Under the circumstances, the more cautious course appear the only one open to me.

5. Although the advance into Burma is temporarily deferred, there is no reason why preparatory measures in this theatre should not be pushed forward as rapidly as is consistent with the grand strategy of the United Nations. The remarkable potentialities of an air offensive in China have already been demonstrated by a small and ill-supported force. I believe that an early air offensive is feasible, since, owing to the peculiar tactical conditions which prevail there, neither the supply, material and personnel requirements are such as to embarrass the United Nations air effort elsewhere. The return, I predict, will be out of all proportion to the investment, and by further weakening the Japanese air
arm and striking at their sea-borne communications with their new conquests, an air offensive in China will directly prepare for the ultimate general offensive to which we both look forward.

6. I would also urge that even if the British are not now able to muster sufficient strength, everything be done to induce them to set a definite date by which time they will have already concentrated adequate land and naval forces for a Burma campaign.

7. On the part of the Chinese Army, I reiterate that we are proceeding with our preparations with all possible speed. We shall be ready to strike whenever our Allies are ready.

I have placed our position before you with the utmost frankness, which the gravity of the situation demands. I repeat, it is with the deepest regret and only after the most careful thought, that I have reached the conclusions herein expressed.

Stillwell

Action Copy: President Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. 93, 10-5-72

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. 93, 10-10-72
January 9, 1943.

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

General Stilwell informs me that you are seriously considering abandoning Chinese participation in the proposed Burma operation. This is a matter which gives me grave concern.

In my message to you of January 2 I told you that I would definitely take up with the highest Allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without avoidable delay. Confidentially and for your personal information only, I expect to confer shortly with the Prime Minister in person. I urge you to delay final decision in the matter until you hear from me further.

Roosevelt

[Signature]

Revised March 26, 1972.

Release from the White House Map Room at 14:45, EST, January 9, 1943.

Charles A. Sullivan, Jr.

Charles A. Sullivan, Jr.
Captain, Inf-Res.
White House Map Room.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart, Jr., March 9, 1972.
January 2, 1943.

AMISCA CHUNGKING CHINA 41942

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL STILWELL FOR GENERALISSIMO

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

The receipt is acknowledged of your message of December 26 in regard to the proposed Burma campaign.

In view of the existing shortage in shipping and present difficulties in providing supplies and reinforcements at that great distance, it is my present thought that an opening of the Burma Road is more important at the present time to our war effort than an occupation of Southern Burma.

It is my understanding that the light British naval vessels needed for operations in the Bay of Bengal are now being used to hunt Japanese ships in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope a very necessary employment for them at the present time.

I will definitely take up with the highest allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without any avoidable delay.

Please accept my warm personal regards and my wishes for great and final success in the New Year.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1245, EWT, January 2, 1943.

CHESSTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff