

**EXCHANGE  
OF DISPATCHES  
BETWEEN  
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
and  
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK**

**1944**

NOTE FOR WATCH OFFICERS

Future messages to the Generalissimo should be addressed:

FROM: WAR  
TO : CG US ARMY FORCES, CHINA, BURMA AND INDIA FORWARD ECHELON,  
CHUNGKING, CHINA.

NUMBER \_\_\_\_ . FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL HURLEY. PLEASE  
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE GENER-  
ALISSIMO.

10 Jan 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#25) (Acknowledges PRES-CHIANG 30 Dec 44.)  
Campaign in Burma; opening and defense of Burma route. (Answered by  
PRES-CHIANG #4277, 14 Jan 44.)

14 Jan 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4277) (Answers CHIANG-PRES #25, 10 Jan 44.)  
Dispatching of 2 Fighter Groups to China; opening of Burma route.  
(Answered by CHIANG-PRES #79, 3 Feb 44.)

3 Feb 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#79) (Answers PRES-CHIANG #4277, 14 Jan 44; also  
msg from PRES-CHIANG 26 Jan 44. sent via State Department with no copy  
in Map Room.) China's economic situation; opening of Ledo road. (An-  
swered by PRES-CHIANG #4457, 7 Feb 44.)

7 Feb 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4457) Acknowledges CHIANG-PRES #79, 3 Feb 44.

9 Feb 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4473) American Observer Mission to China.

22 Feb 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#123) American Observer Mission to China.

Filed with above dispatch:

23 Feb 44. HEARN-MARSHALL. (#128) Advising that authority to visit  
provinces does not carry with it authority to visit communist oc-  
cupied area.

1 Mar 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4646) American Observer Mission to China.

17 Mar 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4762) Situation in Northern Burma; offensive  
at Imphal; use of Chinese Yunnan troops.

17 Mar 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#184) Prosecution of war in Far East; bombing  
of Chinese troops at Hopan by Soviet planes.

20 Mar 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#4783) (Answers CHIANG-PRES #184, 17 Mar 44.)  
Bombing of Chinese troops at Hopan by Soviet planes; American Observer  
Mission.

29 Mar 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#15407) (Answers PRES #4783, 20 Mar.)  
Situation in Sinkiang; use of Chinese troops.

31 Mar 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#16747) (Answers CHIANG #15407, 29  
Mar.) Situation in Sinkiang; use of Chinese troops.

3 Apr 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#17956) Use of American trained and  
equipped Chinese "Y" force.

4 Apr 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#15672) (Answers PRES #4783, 20 Mar;  
and #15407, 29 Mar) Exchange of correspondence between China  
and Soviet on bombing incident at Sinkiang.

8 Apr 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#20631) (Answers CHIANG #15672, 4 Apr)  
~~Bombing of Chinese troops at Sinkiang.~~ Mongolian-Sinkiang border.

12 Apr 44. PRES-CHIANG. (C#22183) Command of VLR bomber groups.

13 Apr 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#16035) (Answers PRES #20631, 8 Apr 44) Outer Mongolian-Sinchiang border incident; policy of restraint. Ambassador Wei's return to Washington.

~~14~~ 14 Apr 44. PRES-CHIANG. (#22891) (Answers CHIANG #16035, 13 Apr 44.) "Will be glad to see Ambassador Wei. In meantime will have your problems very much in mind."

23 Apr 44. CHIANG-PRES. (#16433) (Answers PRES #22183, 12 Apr) Command of VLR bomber groups. "I shall endeavour my utmost to facilitate the missions of long range bombing operations under my jurisdiction."

31 May 44. CHIANG-PRES (Aide-Memoire delivered by Gen Shang Chen). Request that (1) 14th US AAF be strengthened, (2) entire stock of gasoline, spare parts and aircraft stored in Chengtu be immediately turned over to 14th AAF to be concentrated for operation along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, (3) Chinese Air Force be strengthened, and (4) ground troops be strengthened by delivery of 8000 rockets. (Answered by ltr, PRES-GEN CHEN, 12 June 44.)

12 June 44. PRES-GEN SHANG CHEN, Ltr. (Answers Aide-Memoire, 31 May 44.) Requests that major share of tonnage of China Natl Aviation Corp be devoted to supplies for 14th Air Force.

6 July 44. PRES-CHIANG. (SVC 6080) Command set-up in Chinese Theatre.

~~SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV  
TO : COMNAVGP, CHINA

26 OCTOBER 1944

NUMBER 101, FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL HURLEY FOR GENERALISSIMO  
CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Thank you for your message of October 20 conveying congratulations  
on the successful landing of American troops in the Philippines.

Since that date the American Navy has also made a great con-  
tribution to our eventual defeat of Japan which should measurably  
shorten the war.

We are now hopeful of an earlier liberation of China than we  
could heretofore expect.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1235, EWT, 26 October 1944.

*Richard Park, Jr.*  
RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

261722 NCR 1827

President to General Huxley  
For Chiang Kai Chak

Thank you for your message  
of October 20 conveying congratulations  
for the successful landing of  
American troops in the Philippines.

Since that date the American  
navy has also made a great  
contribution to our eventual  
defeat of Japan which should  
measurably shorten the war.

We are now hopeful of an  
earlier liberation of China than  
we could heretofore expect

Roosevelt  
WRZ

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

24 October 1944

FROM: OPNAV  
TO : COMNAVGP, CHINA

NUMBER 98, ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL HURLEY.

Please inform Generalissimo that I will make public the following announcement on October 28 at noon Washington time:

QUOTE. General Stilwell has been relieved as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, as Deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, Commander of the South East Asia Command, and as U.S. Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater and has been recalled to Washington. The former China-Burma-India Theater will be divided into two theaters under separate commanders. The U. S. Forces in the China Theater will be commanded by Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, who will also hold a staff position under the Generalissimo. General Wedemeyer is now Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten. The India-Burma Theater will be commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, now Deputy Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1115, EWT, 24 Oct 44.


RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

File Copy

241673 - NCR 1410

-1-  
~~TOP SECRET~~

  
October <sup>24</sup> 23, 1944

#98

PRESIDENT TO GENERAL HURLEY:

Please inform Generalissimo that I will make public the following announcement on October 28 at noon Washington time:

QUOTE: General Stilwell has been relieved as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, as Deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, Commander of the South East Asia Command, and as U.S. Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater and has been recalled to Washington. The former China-Burma-India Theater will be divided into two theaters under separate commanders. The U. S. Forces in the China Theater will be commanded by Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, who will also hold a staff position under the Generalissimo. General Wedemeyer is now Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten. The India-Burma Theater will be commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, now Deputy Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater. UNQUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By N. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

*Robert*

**SECRET DISPATCH**

DRAFTER <b>COMNAVGROUP CHINA</b>	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	<b>OP OP OP</b>	
RELEASED BY <b>24 OCTOBER 1944</b>		<b>THE PRESIDENT</b>	PRIORITY 2	
DATE <b>240037</b>			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM <b>BALDWIN</b>			DEFERRED 4	
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5	
PARAPHRASED <b>BALDWIN</b>	CHECKED BY <b>GARDNER</b>	FOR ACTION	BASEGRAM 6	
BY <b>BALDWIN</b>	DITTO BY <b>BALDWIN</b>		FOR INFORMATION	BASEGRAM 7
ROUTED BY				BASEGRAM 8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			PRIORITY 9	
<b>PAGE 1 OF 2</b>	<b>231830</b>	<b>NCR 934</b>	ROUTINE 10	
			DEFERRED 11	
			BASEGRAM 12	
			BASEGRAM 13	
			BASEGRAM 14	
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
			<input type="checkbox"/>	

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

(FOLLOWING FROM HURLEY FOR EYES OF PRESIDENT ALONE) NG TEXT

MESSAGE FROM THE GISSIMO TO THE PRESIDENT:

"I AM MOST GRATIFIED BY YOUR HEARTENING MESSAGE. IT IS MY CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT THE RECENT CHANGES WILL INAUGURATE A PERIOD OF SINO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION MORE UNDERSTANDING MORE INTIMATE AND MORE FRUITFUL THAN EVER BEFORE. WE CAN NOW CONCENTRATE OUR UNITED EFFORTS TO THE DEFEAT OF THE COMMON ENEMY. SIGNED CHIANG KAI SHEK"

TODAY THE GISSIMO ASKED ME TO SAY TO YOU THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SEND GENERAL WEDEMEYER TO CHUNG-KING SOON.

WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE GISSIMO WE ARE HAVING CONFERENCES WITH THE LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST TROOPS. THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES CAN BE UNITED

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RAP Date MAR 10 1972

no. 1 ADMIRAL.      no. 2 FILE.      no. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.      no. 4 SPECIAL.

**TOP SECRET**

File Copy

231830

COPY NO. /

~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COMNAVGROUP CHINA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY 2
RELEASED BY	24 OCTOBER 1944		ROUTINE 3
DATE			DEFERRED 4
TOR CODEROOM			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		FOR ACTION	6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 9
BY	BY		ROUTINE 10
BY	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED 11
ROUTED BY	BY	INFORMATION	BASEGRAM 12
			13
			14
			15

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2                      231830                      NCR 934

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WITH THE NATIONAL ARMY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTING THE UNITED MILITARY FORCE OF CHINA AGAINST JAPAN. THE GISSIMO HAS ALSO STATED THAT HE WILL MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES THAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN BOTH HIS MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. THE GENERALISSIMO IS GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE HELP YOU ARE GIVING HIM IN BRINGING ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF CHINA AND IN PROMOTING EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By ABP Date MAR 10 1972

NAVAIDE(#1-2).....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL                      No. 2 FILE                      No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM                      No. 4 SPECIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" regulations contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY 10.

231830

100 23 11  
MAY 1944

1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR  
MY SIGNATURE.

F.L.R.

8  
TELEGRAM

The White House  
Washington

MLZ  
WS

1WN FV 92 VIA RCA

CHUNGKING, 1020 Oct. 20, 1944

THE PRESIDENT:

URGENT/ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE I  
WISH TO SEND YOU OUR HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE  
SUCCESSFUL LANDING OF AMERICAN FORCES RETURNING TO THE  
PHILIPPINES THIS GRAND ACHIEVEMENT IS A VINDICATION OF  
THE MASTERLY STRATEGY THAT HAS GUIDED AMERICAN FORCES  
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THE PROSPECT WHICH THIS PHILIPPINES  
ACTION OPENS BEFORE US IS IMMEASURABLY HEARTENING TO OUR  
PEOPLE AND WILL SPUR THEM TO THEIR UTMOST EFFORTS TO  
CO-OPERATE WITH YOU IN ENCOMPASSING THE COMPLETE DEFEAT  
OF JAPAN IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

RECD/500PM

20 October 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To : Com Nav Gp, China

NUMBER 96. ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL HURLEY FOR DELIVERY TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

Your message 201700 received.

Please deliver the following to Chiang Kai Shek:

" I am very pleased with your message transmitted by General Hurley agreeing to my proposed change of American officers in the China and Burma theaters which will be made effective at the earliest possible date.

I join with you in a hope that these changes will result in an early favorable change in the military situation in China, and in an accelerated improvement in our combined already favorable campaign in Burma, which should make possible increased shipments over the Hump and an earlier opening of the Burma Road.

Your problems are constantly in our minds and we are confident of your success in eventually expelling the Japanese invaders from your country.

I will make public announcement of the changes here in Washington within a few days and will inform you in advance the time of the announcement."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2240, ENT, 20 October 1944

HENRY W. PUTNAM,  
Captain, A.C.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

210305

NCR 970

File Copy

20 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Admiral Leahy has submitted the following as a suggested reply by you to the Generalissimo's message which was transmitted by General Hurley in his 201700:

" From the President to General Hurley.

Your message 201700 received.

Please deliver the following to Chiang Kai Shek.

' I am very pleased with your message transmitted by General Hurley agreeing to my proposed change of American officers in the China and Burma theaters which will be made effective at the earliest possible date.

I join with you in a hope that these changes will result in an early favorable change in the military situation in China, and in an accelerated improvement in our combined already favorable campaign in Burma, which should make possible increased shipments over the hump and an earlier opening of the Burma Road.

Your problems are constantly in our minds and we are confident of your success in eventually expelling the Japanese invaders from your country.

I will make public announcement of the changes here in Washington within a few days and will inform you in advance the time of the announcement.' "

Your copy of General Hurley's 201700 is returned herewith for reference.

Very respectfully,  
*Henry W. Putnam*  
HENRY W. PUTNAM, Capt., A.C.

*W. J. Stewart*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

Adm He... suggested reply to Gleason 201700 -  
your copy returned herewith -

President to General Hurley

Your message 201700 received

Please deliver the following  
to Chiang Kai Shek.

I am very pleased with your message transmitted by General Hurley, agreeing to my proposed change of American affairs in the China and Burma theaters which will be made effective at the earliest possible date.

I join with you in a hope that these changes will result in an early favorable change in the military situation in China, and in an accelerated improvement in our combined already favorable campaign in Burma, which should make possible increased shipments over the Hump and an earlier opening of the Burma road.

Your problems are constantly in our minds and we are confident of your success in eventually expelling the

Japanese invaders from your  
country.

I will make public  
announcement of the changes  
here in Washington within  
a few days and will inform  
you in advance the time of  
the announcement

WS

FROM	GENERAL HURLEY	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
DATE	25 OCTOBER 1944.	FOR ACTION	2 PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM	1836/ 2002		3 ROUTINE
DECODED BY	GLUNT	INFORMATION	4 OP OP OP OP OP
PARAPHRASED BY	GLUNT		5 DEFERRED
CHECKED BY	KNIGHT		6 BASEGRAM
DITTOED BY	GLUNT		7
ROUTED BY	GLUNT		8
			9 PRIORITY
			10 ROUTINE
			11 DEFERRED
			12 BASEGRAM
			13
			14
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15 IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	201700	9302	16 <input type="checkbox"/>
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			17
			18 (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 RECEIVED /S 201613 NCR 9302  
 PART 2 RECEIVED /S 201646 NCR 9303  
 PART 3 RECEIVED /S 201700 NCR 9345

DECLASSIFIED  
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-78  
 By RHP Date MAR 10 1972

FROM HURLEY TO THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
 GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI SHEK FOR TRANSMISSION TO YOU.

" ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY  
 THROUGH GENERAL HURLEY.

1. THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED IN YOUR TELEGRAM OF  
 OCTOBER 16TH ARE ENTIRELY AGREEABLE TO ME.

2. I SHALL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO APPOINT GENERAL  
 WEDEMEYER AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CHINA THEATRE. I AM  
 GLAD THAT YOU ARE APPOINTING HIM CONCURRENTLY IN COMMAND  
 OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN CHINA AND I ASSUME OF COURSE

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

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Answered by 496 - 20 Oct 1944

COPT NO. 2

**DISPATCH**

EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
GENERAL HURLEY	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____	<b>THE PRESIDENT</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>24 OCTOBER 1944</u>		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____		DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY _____		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____		BASEGRAM 6
CHECKED BY _____		7
DITTOED BY _____		8
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2	201700	NCR 9302 <input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THAT THESE FORCES ARE UNDER MY OVERALL COMMAND.

3. YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF MY FULLEST COOPERATION IN BURMA.

I SHALL DELEGATE TO GENERAL SULTAN COMMAND OF CHINESE FORCES IN INDIA BURMA AND PROVIDE NECESSARY REPLACEMENTS FOR THESE FORCES AND THE RAINGARH TRAINING CENTER. GENERAL SULTAN WILL HAVE FULL DISCRETION IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT THAT ON BROAD STRATEGICAL OBJECTIVES IN BURMA WHERE CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE ENGAGED I SHOULD BE CONSULTED. I SHALL ALSO MAINTAIN THE EFFORTS OF THE YOKE FORCE IN ITS ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES AND I AM SENDING REPLACEMENTS WITH THE UTMOST DISPATCH. I AGREE THAT OUR JOINT EFFORT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY AND EASILY COORDINATED THROUGH GENERAL WEDEMEYER.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RRP Date MAR 10 1972

No. 1 ADMRAL.      No. 2 FILE.      No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.      No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
GENERAL HURLEY	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE 20 OCTOBER 1944.		ROUTINE 3
FOR CODEROOM _____		DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY _____		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____	FOR INFORMATION	6
CHECKED BY _____		7
DITTOED BY _____		8
ROUTED BY _____		9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		10
IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW		11
DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72		12
By <u>RCW</u> Date <u>MAR 10 1972</u>		13
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IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW		15
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PAGE 3 201700 NCR 9302  
 Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)  
 ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

4. I ASSUME THAT GENERAL WEDEMEYER WILL CONTROL ALLOCATIONS OF HUMP TONNAGE TO THE VARIOUS MILITARY PROJECTS IN CHINA. I TRUST THAT HE WILL ENTER UPON HIS DUTIES HERE WITHOUT DELAY SINCE I BELIEVE THAT DETERMINED ENERGETIC ACTION BY HIM MAY STILL ASSIST US TO HOLD THE REMAINING VITAL BASES IN EAST CHINA.

5. IN CONCLUSION I WISH TO ASSURE YOU ONCE AGAIN THAT I SHALL WELCOME GENERAL WEDEMEYER MOST WARMLY AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH HIM IN INTIMATE COLLABORATION. SIGNED CHIANG KAI SHEK".

THE GENERALISSIMO SAID THAT HE IS HAPPY TO BE IN COMPLETE COOPERATION WITH YOU.

THE GISSIMO HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO SAY THAT YOU ARE

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~



October 18, 1944

WAL

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

*General Hurley to deliver*

Your message of 9 October 1944 was transmitted to me through General Hurley. I am issuing instructions to recall General Stilwell from the theater immediately.

General Stilwell was not responsible for the decisions with respect to attacking in North instead of South Burma. This decision was made by the Combined British and American Staff and was fully approved by the Prime Minister and myself. Our conclusions, which were inescapable, were reached only after serious consideration of all pertinent facts. Your decision to employ Yunnan forces on the Salween was sound in my opinion. The maintenance and the increased facilities for a supply route into China demanded the occupation of Myitkyina and I am now informed that the vital gas supply and low level flying route are assured by the opening of the pipeline at Myitkyina on September 29.

As stated in my October 6 message, I do not feel that an American should in the present situation assume responsibility in a command position for the operations of Chinese forces in China. However, I will furnish a qualified officer to serve as your Chief of Staff. General Hurley

has informed me that you prefer either Generals Patch, Wedemeyer

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972 1 -



or Krueger. General Patch is commanding an army now attacking the Germans in the vicinity of Belfort, France and cannot be spared. General Krueger is commanding an army now launched in a most difficult offensive operation. General Wedemeyer can be made available after confirmation from you that he will become your Chief of Staff. I would also appoint him Commander of all U.S. Forces in the China Theater.

The recall of General Stilwell and appointment of General Wedemeyer will necessitate changes of which I will outline the most important. What has heretofore been the U.S. China-Burma-India Theater will be separated into two theaters so far as American interests are concerned, of which China will be one and the India-Burma Theater under General Sultan will constitute the other. The 14th Air Force will remain in the China Theater under General Chennault who in turn will be under Wedemeyer as Commander U.S. Forces in the China Theater. I assume that you desire that the Ramgarh training and the supply and training <sup>of (EPM)</sup> the X Forces should be continued, otherwise the fighting power of these units will inevitably and quickly dwindle away. I hope that the necessary replacements will be furnished to enable the X Force to continue on its present mission, and that you will delegate control of Chinese forces in India-Burma to General Sultan. Please let me hear from you on these points.

[REDACTED]

The offensive operations of the Y Forces will continue to be most important and I should like your assurance that they will advance in conjunction with the offensive operations in Burma of Admiral Mountbatten. Coordination between operations of the China-based Yunnan forces and Chinese forces based in Burma could be effected by General Wedemeyer as your Chief of Staff in communication with Sultan and Mountbatten.

I think all the above is the best solution and that it will expedite the solution of our immediate joint problem. Let me hear from you as soon as possible.

/S/ Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

October 18, 1944

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO:

Your message of 9 October 1944 was transmitted to me through General Hurley. I am issuing instructions to recall General Stilwell from the theater immediately.

~~I cannot pass by the statement made in your message to me of 9 October and in your aide memoire to General Hurley of the same date. General Stilwell was not responsible~~

for the decisions with respect to attacking in North instead of South Burma. *This decision was made by the Combined* Decisions of the Prime Minister and myself.

*British and American Staff and was fully approved by* ~~led to the choice and I will add that~~ Our conclusions, which

were inescapable, were reached only after serious considera-

tion of ~~the most~~ <sup>all</sup> pertinent facts. Your decision to employ

Yunnan forces on the Salween was sound in my opinion. The maintenance and the increased facilities for a supply route

into China demanded the occupation of Myitkyina and I am now

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

are assured by the opening of the pipeline at Myitkyina on September 29.

As stated in my October 6 message, I do not feel that an American should in the present situation assume responsibility in a command position for the operations of Chinese forces in China. However, I ~~am willing to~~ <sup>will</sup> furnish a qualified officer to serve as your Chief of Staff. General Hurley has informed me that you prefer either Generals Patch, Wedemeyer or Krueger. General Patch is commanding an army now attacking the Germans in the vicinity of Belfort, France and cannot be spared. General Krueger is commanding an army now launched in a most difficult offensive operation. General Wedemeyer can be made available after confirmation from you that he will become your Chief of Staff. I would also appoint him Commander of all U. S. Forces in the China Theater.

The recall of General Stilwell and appointment of General Wedemeyer will necessitate changes of which I will

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

- 2 -

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

[REDACTED]

outline the most important. What has heretofore been the U.S. China-Burma-India Theater will be separated into two theaters so far as American interests are concerned, of which China will be one and the India-Burma Theater under General Sultan will constitute the other. The 14th Air Force will remain in the China Theater under General Chennault who in turn will be under Wedemeyer as Commander U.S. Forces in the China Theater. I assume that you desire that the Ramgarh training and the supply and training of the X Forces should be continued, otherwise the fighting power of these units will inevitably and quickly dwindle away. I hope that ~~you will assure me that~~ the necessary replacements will be furnished to enable the X Force to continue on its present mission, and that you will ~~agree to~~ delegate control of Chinese forces in India-Burma to General Sultan. *Please let me hear from you on these points*  
The offensive operations of the Y Forces will continue

to be most important and I should like your assurance that

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

they will advance in conjunction with the offensive operations in Burma of Admiral Mountbatten. Coordination between operations of the China-based Yunnan forces and Chinese forces based in Burma could be effected by General Wedemeyer as your Chief of Staff in communication with Sultan and Mountbatten.

*I think all the action of the first solution and that it ~~an early reply to this message~~ will expedite the solution of our immediate joint problem. Let me hear from you on this as possible.*

*Rawson*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 12, 1944

The President has received the following message from  
The Generalissimo of China:

"Chungking

October 11, 1944

"His Excellency Franklin Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D. C.

"In the name of the Chinese people I wish to thank you and the American people most sincerely for the message of congratulation you sent me on the occasion of our National Day. In our present war of resistance, which has already lasted more than seven years, the unbounded sympathy of the American people has always been an unfailing source of encouragement to us. As the time for the Allied powers to deal a death blow to the aggressors is fast approaching, China, as one of the Allies, will do her utmost to drive the enemy from her shores and help bring about his final collapse. The people of China are deeply indebted to the American Nation for her friendship in lending hearty support to China's cause. We have the deepest admiration for the prodigious efforts you have made to lay a solid foundation for a better world order and will never cease to strive for the realization of the democratic ideals we have long cherished so as to usher in a new era of peace, freedom and justice for all mankind.

"CHIANG KAI-SHEK"

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd 111155Z

11th October 1944

WR

From: Commanding General, United States Army Forces,  
Chungking, China

To : The President of The United States

Nr : CFB 24103 Filed 10/1300Z

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

TOP SECRET Eyes of The President Alone. CFB 24103. From  
Hurley signed Stilwell.

The following message dated 9th October 1944 was handed  
me by Generalissimo with request I transmit to you immediately.

"To The President:"

"It was with regret that I read your telegram of October  
6th.

I am willing and indeed anxious to meet your wishes,  
whether by the appointment of an American Officer to command all  
Chinese Forces, or one to command only those in Yunnan and Burma.  
I am likewise agreeable to your other proposals. The officer  
chosen, however, must be one in whom I can repose confidence, and  
must be capable of frank and sincere cooperation. You will, I am  
sure, agree with me that these are indispensable qualifications.

As I have set forth at length in my aide memoire of Sept-  
ember 25th, General Stilwell has shown himself conspicuously  
lacking in these all-essential qualifications and you will

*1 copy to Asst Secy for forwarding  
to War Dept. (see 30-11-44)*

File Copy

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- 2 -

understand that I cannot maintain in authority such an officer.

In taking this stand, there has not been any change or reversal in my approach to the problem, which has consistently been to require of the principal American officer cooperation and comportment deserving of my confidence.

I therefore stand on my original request that you will relieve General Stilwell and replace him with another officer better equipped to discharge duties of such import. I can assure you that the policies which you advocate will then be executed without delay. Let me repeat that we are in entire agreement on all points of policy, and that I am grateful to you for the splendid and unvarying friendship and great aid you have always given to China. But in good conscience, considering my tremendous responsibility to the nation I cannot knowingly confide the execution of policies of such profound importance to an officer who in my opinion does not possess the qualifications essential for success.

I am moved to make this request by the compelling realities of the situation. I have discussed it more fully with General Hurley, and have asked him to elaborate on this brief statement if necessary. Sensible to the urgency of the crisis which now confronts us, I greatly hope that you can take prompt action."

(Signed) Chiang Kai Shek

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- 3 -

Here follows an aide memoire from the Headquarters of the Gissimo dated October 9th, 1944.

"To Major General Patrick J. Hurley."

"In my telegram replying to The President which I have just handed to you, you will note that in order to avoid what may be considered controversial matter, I have purposely limited it to a simple statement of lack of confidence in General Stilwell and a request for his recall. So long as I am Head of State and Supreme Commander in China, it seems to me that there can be no question as to my right to request the recall of an officer in whom I can no longer repose confidence.

There are, however, certain essential points which I wish to make informally, with a view to obtaining full and clear personal understanding between the President and myself. I am anxious to secure such an understanding since the President's courageous and farsighted leadership in the war against Axis aggression has won my unbounded admiration, and since he has my lasting gratitude for his generous assistance to China in her struggle to win independence and her rightful place in the family of nations. The President has been a constant inspiration to me and to my people, so that any misunderstanding between us distresses me most deeply.

Both the President and the War Department are dependent

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on General Stilwell for information concerning the military situation in China. Thus the President may not be aware that I not only have no confidence in General Stilwell, but also lack confidence in his military judgment. I believe the record sustains my opinion, and I shall summarize it briefly.

General Stilwell and I have never agreed about the Burma campaign. I have most naturally been anxious for a campaign in Burma which would reopen land communications with China. At the same time, in view of the enemy's superior communications in that area, and the difficult terrain, I have always insisted that the only strategically sound campaign in Burma was one which included amphibious operations in south Burma to insure rapid collapse of the enemy's resistance. From the first, I have repeatedly warned General Stilwell that a limited offensive in north Burma would be more costly than could be justified by the results and might even prove exceedingly dangerous. I had also given my opinion to the President when we met at Cairo.

At the Cairo conference, commitments were finally made by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain which appeared to insure the kind of Burma campaign which I could approve. Unhappily, those commitments were abandoned shortly after I left Cairo. General Stilwell then came to me and announced that he proposed to proceed with a limited

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- 5 -

offensive in north Burma. I again warned him of the consequences, stating specifically that I feared the project would be difficult and costly, and would engage all of China's limited resources at a time when this would be dangerous. He treated my warning lightly, and intimated that if I maintained my attitude, China would be suspected of wishing to withhold any real contribution to the Allied cause. At length I consented to his employing the Rangarrh troops, which were entirely American trained and equipped with the clear understanding that these forces were all that would be forthcoming.

It was not long before my warning was substantiated. The moment obstacles were encountered in Burma, General Stilwell began to use every sort of pressure to induce me to commit additional forces. I shall not enter into details. It is enough to say that by the beginning of May, the Burma campaign had drained off most of the properly trained and equipped reserves in China. At the same time, it had greatly reduced the incoming supply tonnage so that during critical ensuing months it was impossible to strengthen the military position in any area within China. It was not until June that the Hump tonnage, exclusive of the B-29 project, again reached the January level.

As I had feared, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity thus offered to launch an offensive within China attacking first in Honan and then in Hunan. Owing to the Burma

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- 6 -

campaign, no adequately trained and equipped reinforcements were available for these war areas. Owing to the effect of the Burma campaign on the Hump tonnage, supplies were not forthcoming for the Chinese armies stationed in Honan and Hunan. The forces brought to bear by the Japanese in their offensive in east China were six times as great as those confronting General Stilwell in north Burma, and the consequences of defeat were certain to outweigh in China all results of victory in the north Burma campaign. Yet General Stilwell exhibited complete indifference to the outcome in east China; so much so that in the critical days of the east China operations, he consistently refused to release Lend-Lease munitions already available in Yunnan for use in the East China fighting. Prior to June 1944, with the exception of the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the entire Chinese Army did not receive a single rifle or piece of artillery from American Lend-Lease. It was not until the first week of June 1944, that General Stilwell at last visited Chungking to discuss the east China situation with me. When the enemy's offensive was already well on the way to its objectives, General Stilwell finally consented to give a small quantity of equipment to the Chinese armies in east China, and to facilitate more effective air support. In all, excepting the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the Chinese armies have received 60 mountain guns, 320 anti-tank rifles and

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- 7 -

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506 Bazookas.

In short, we have taken Myitkyina but we have lost almost all of east China, and in this General Stilwell cannot be absolved of grave responsibility. Even now he appears to be unaware of the implications of this fact and the grave damage to prestige and morale of the Chinese Army. It is possible that this fact, fundamentally important as it is, had not been pointed out to the President. Whatever my opinion of General Stilwell as a man may be, I might bring myself to appoint him to command in China if I thought well of him as a military leader. However, with all the facts before me I have come to the conclusion that he is not competent to envisage or deal with a problem of such range and complexity as now confronts us.

From what I have said above, it is also specifically evident that the various areas of war in China cannot be divided into independent sectors. Already what has happened in Yunnan and Burma has instantly and vitally affected all of China. To limit General Stilwell's authority to Yunnan and Burma does not constitute a solution of the problem.

In his last telegram, the President asserts that the China situation has deteriorated so far that he is now inclined to feel the U.S. Government should not assume the responsibility involved in the appointment of an American commander of the

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- 8 -

Chinese Forces. I do not altogether understand this statement, for two reasons. First, no matter what happens, no matter what command arrangements are adopted, I cannot personally escape ultimate responsibility for the future of the China Theatre. Even the responsibility of General Stilwell's errors must be borne by me since I allowed myself to be overpersuaded against my judgment to countenance them. Second, I cannot feel that the deterioration is so serious as the President suggests. After long years of experience and first hand knowledge of Japanese methods and strength, despite the defeats in east China, I cannot foresee any disaster fundamentally incapacitating China.

The statement was also distressing to me in another sense. While I do not anticipate disaster, the situation in China is indeed critical. Aid is most needed in an hour of crisis. Yet the statement I have referred to appears to imply that aid will be withheld precisely because this is an hour of crises.

I am disturbed by the fact that the President has expressed regrets at my "reversal of agreement" with respect to the appointment of General Stilwell in command of Chinese Forces. My telegram to the President dated August 12th, showed great readiness to meet his wishes as far as humanly possible. Developments which I described in aide memoire of September 25th, have, I trust, made it clear why it has become impossible to appoint General

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Stilwell.

I am wholly confident that if the President replaces General Stilwell with a qualified American officer, we can work together to reverse the present trend and achieve a vital contribution to the final victory."

The following are my comments:-

"I have been in almost constant conference with the Generalissimo. I spent last week end with him in the country. Our discussions of the Stilwell matter have been continuous. Before I left Washington you told me that your overall purpose is to prevent a collapse of China and keep the Chinese Army in the war. As a part of your plan to do this you had decided to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek. In studying the situation here I am convinced that there is no Chinese leader available who offers as good a basis of cooperation with you as Chiang Kai Shek. There is no other Chinese known to me who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek and Stilwell are fundamentally incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai Shek and Stilwell. There is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek has agreed to every request, every suggestion made by you except the Stilwell appointment."

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ DISPATCH

CHAPTER <u>COMNAVGROUP CHINA</u> <sup>EXT</sup> FROM _____ RELEASED BY <u>6 OCTOBER 1944</u> DATE <u>0918</u> TOR CODEROOM <u>KOTFEEN</u> DECODED BY <u>MILLER</u> _____ <u>MILLER</u> PARAPHRASED BY <u>MILLER</u> CHECKED BY _____ ROUTED BY _____ DITTOED BY _____	ADDRESSEES ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE <u>RADIO WASHINGTON</u> FOR ACTION INFORMATION	PRECEDENCE <u>OP 0302 OP</u> PRIORITY 1 ROUTINE 2 DEFERRED 3 BASEGRAM 4 PRIORITY 5 ROUTINE 6 DEFERRED 7 BASEGRAM 8 PRIORITY 9 ROUTINE 10 DEFERRED 11 BASEGRAM 12 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
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Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT  
(COMNAVGROUP CHINA SENDS TO RADIO WASHINGTON FOR DELIVERY.)

FOR THE PRESIDENT WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON.  
YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 5TH. RECEIVED.  
SIGNED.

HURLEY

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAJDE (#1 & #2) ..... COG  
FILE.....

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RHBR Date MAR 10 1972

#2

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

October 5, 1944

#77

~~Proposed~~ message from the President to the Generalissimo  
to General Hurley for delivery:

Your message of September 25th has been carefully considered. I must state my surprise and regret at the reversal of your agreement of August 12th to accept Stilwell for the command of all forces in China. The ground situation in China has so deteriorated since my original proposal that I now am inclined to feel that the United States Government should not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of your ground forces throughout China.

However, the maintenance of the Hump tonnage is of such tremendous importance to the stability of your Government that the continuance of a reasonably secure situation regarding operations over the Hump demands that Stilwell be placed in direct command under you of the Chinese forces in Burma and of all Chinese ground forces in Yunnan Province, it being understood that adequate support in replacements and supplies be furnished these armies by you. Otherwise I am convinced that the Hump tonnage will be interrupted by Japanese action.

I accept your proposal that he be relieved as your Chief of Staff and I intend to relieve him of further responsibility in connection with Lend-Lease matters.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

*From Opnar to Comnargroup, China*

*#77*

I am willing in the present situation to continue General Chennault in command of the 14th Air Force and for General Hurley to continue as my personal representative with you regarding military affairs in China.

Tonnage over the Hump will be under the direction of General Sultan in Burma. There are further details regarding American administrative responsibilities not pertaining to Chinese personnel which will affect the arrangement of affairs in China but instructions regarding these matters will be issued as soon as the various details can be carefully considered. This would include matters relating to the training by American officers of Chinese units other than the forces of Yunnan Province and the Chinese forces in Burma. The training of these latter should of course be under General Stilwell. At an early date, I will designate an officer to assume supply responsibilities for the U.S. forces in China and who can serve as an advisor to you in similar matters for Chinese forces.

I hope that you will inform me by telegraph that the foregoing proposals are acceptable because I feel that should we remove Stilwell from the Burma campaign the results would be far more serious than you apparently realize.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
MAR 10 1972  
By W. J. Stewart Date \_\_\_\_\_

*Roosevelt*  
*WJL*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

Dec 27 1944  
W. H. C. G.  
F. J. G.  
S. G.

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ. GEN. E. M. WATSON;

General Marshall has directed me to transmit the attached dispatch to him from General Stilwell for the President's attention.

*Frank McCarthy*  
FRANK McCARTHY,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Secretary, General Staff.

Incl.

~~SECRET~~

From: General Stilwell

To: General Marshall

22 September 1944

"From reliable source I learn that Chiang Kai-shek has forbidden the I Force to take any further offensive action until British and Ledo Chinese attack. Date for this move not yet fixed, but cannot be for a month at least. For that period of time the situation at Lungling will be dangerous, since no reinforcement is in sight beyond 10,000 fillers now flying in. Chiang Kai-shek will not send another division. Japs have remained quiet there for past few days. At Kweilin, Japs are closing in. No news yet of any change in Chinese dispositions to meet the threat. We are still waiting for Chiang Kai-shek to make up his mind. "

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By Authority of Sec Army

by TAG per 72D 724

By RWP/ps Date JUN 14 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

Nr: CFB 23089

23 September 1944

To Marshall for Admiral Leahy Chief of Staff  
to the President nr CFB 23089 from Stilwell reurad 67  
September 18.

09302. Message WAR to AMMISCA number 68 dated September  
18th from the President to the Generalissimo was delivered  
1630 hours local time September 22 by the American and  
British Ambassadors together, the latter acting without  
instructions from his government.

End

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

ACTION: Adm Leahy

Date- MAR 10 1972

Signature- *PAHP*

CM-IN-21618 (23 Sep 44) 1218Z bja

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**SENT**  
SEP 18 1944  
W. D. CODE CENTER

18 SEPTEMBER 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

FROM: AGWAR

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA-BURMA-INDIA,  
FORWARD ECHELON, CHUNGKING, CHINA.

NUMBER 68, FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT.

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL TO GENERAL-ISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM PRESIDENT  
ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL.

WE HAVE JUST CONCLUDED OUR CONFERENCE IN QUEBEC DURING WHICH WE  
DISCUSSED WAYS AND MEANS TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEFEAT OF  
GERMANY SO THAT WE CAN REORIENT THE ENTIRE WEIGHT OF OUR FORCES AND RE-  
SOURCES AGAINST JAPAN. WE HASTEN TO INFORM YOU OF PLANS FOR OUR MUTUAL  
EFFORT, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

FIRST: WE ARE DETERMINED FULLY TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES  
TOWARD THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE INVASION OF THE JAPANESE HOMELAND. TO THIS  
END WE HAVE DEVISED COURSES OF ACTION AND ARE TAKING VIGOROUS STEPS TO  
EXPEDITE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN FOLLOWING  
THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY.

SECOND: TO CONTINUE AND EXTEND PRESENT OPERATIONS UNDER ADMIRAL  
MOUNTBATTEN IN NORTH BURMA TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR INTERMEDIATE  
AIR FERRY BASES IN THE MYITKYINA AREA, AND AT THE BEGINNING OF FAVORABLE  
WEATHER TO LAUNCH A DETERMINED CAMPAIGN TO OPEN OVERLAND COMMUNICATIONS  
BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA. THESE OPERATIONS WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE  
COOPERATION OF THE CHINESE TROOPS WHO HAVE ALREADY SO DISTINGUISHED  
THEMSELVES IN BURMA, AS WELL AS OF YOUR ARMIES THAT ARE NOW ENGAGED WEST  
OF THE SALWEEN. ALL THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE FULLY SUPPORTED BY OUR

- 1 -

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MAY 15 1972

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NUMBER 68 TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

PREPONDERANT AIR STRENGTH, AND BY ADEQUATE AIR SUPPLY. SMALL-SCALE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ON THE ARAKAN COAST, AND ACTIVITIES BY LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUPS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR SUCCESS. WE FEEL THAT THE VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF THESE OPERATIONS SHOULD RESULT IN SECURING AN AREA BY NEXT SPRING WHICH WILL PERMIT THE EXTENSION OF THE LEDO ROAD WITH ACCOMPANYING PIPELINES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE HEROIC EFFORT OF YOUR FORCES.

THIRD: ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN HAS BEEN FURTHER DIRECTED TO PREPARE A LARGE SCALE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN THE BAY OF BENGAL TO BE UNDERTAKEN AS SOON AS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER WILL ALLOW THE NECESSARY RESOURCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE.

FOURTH: WE HAVE AGREED ON FURTHER OPERATIONS TO INTENSIFY THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE JAPANESE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER, INCLUDING THE OPENING OF A SEAWAY INTO CHINA.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL.

*W. Brown*

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1107, EWT, 18 September 1944.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

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MAY 15 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

18 SEPTEMBER 1944

FROM: AGWAR

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN CHINA-BURMA-INDIA,  
FORWARD ECHELON, CHUNGKING, CHINA.

NUMBER 67, FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT.

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND SHOULD BE SEEN ONLY BY GENERAL STILWELL, A DECODER APPOINTED BY HIM, AND THE AMBASSADOR WHO IS THEN TO DELIVER IT TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR UPON RECEIPT. IF POSSIBLE IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY THE TWO AMBASSADORS AT THE SAME TIME TO THE GENERALISSIMO. MESSAGE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY BUT CLOSELY PARAPHRASED BEFORE DELIVERY. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND DELIVERY.

*W. Brown*  
Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1105, EWT, 18 September 1944.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.



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MAY 15 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

16 September 1944

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:  
THE PRIME MINISTER:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the enclosed draft telegrams to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of the OCTAGON Conference.

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES  
Brigadier

A. J. McFARLAND,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,

Combined Secretariat

"Approved by  
President and Prime Minister"

"W.D.L."

*For original see  
Pres. Stalin file*

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MAY 15 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.

18 September 1944

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM:

Subject: Messages for Marshal  
Stalin and Generalissimo  
Chiang Kai-shek.

The enclosed messages approved by the President and  
Prime Minister are forwarded herewith for dispatch to Marshal  
Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

A. J. McFARLAND,  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,  
Secretary.

*Enclosed # 67 + # 68.*

*For original, see  
Over-Stalin file.*

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MAY 15 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK  
SERIAL or FILE NO. WH #67 & #68, 18 Sept 44.  
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA  
SUBJECT: OCTAGON (Quebec II) Conference decisions.

ACTION:

1. Dispatches written by Chiefs of Staff at OCTAGON (Quebec II) Conference. Forwarded by memo, signed by Combined Secretariat, to the President and the Prime Minister on 16 Sept 44. Pencilled notation, "Approved by President and Prime Minister. W.D.L." written on memo by Admiral Leahy.
2. Forwarded by memorandum to the White House Map Room by General McFarland, Secretary CCS, on 18 Sept 44, for transmission to the Generalissimo.
3. In message, CFB 23089 23 Sept 44, CM-IN-21618, 23 Sept 44, General Stilwell advised Admiral Leahy that #68 was delivered at 1630, local time, 22 Sept, to the Generalissimo by American and British Ambassadors.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
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PRIORITY

16 SEPTEMBER 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMISCA, CHUNGKING

WH NUMBER 64, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

AFTER READING THE LAST REPORTS ON THE SITUATION IN CHINA MY CHIEFS OF STAFF AND I ARE CONVINCED THAT YOU ARE FACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH THE DISASTER I HAVE FEARED. THE MEN OF YOUR "Y" FORCES CROSSING THE SALWEEN HAVE FOUGHT WITH GREAT COURAGE AND RENDERED INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE TO THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH BURMA. BUT WE FEEL THAT UNLESS THEY ARE REINFORCED AND SUPPORTED WITH YOUR EVERY CAPACITY YOU CANNOT EXPECT TO REAP ANY FRUITS FROM THEIR SACRIFICES, WHICH WILL BE VALUELESS UNLESS THEY GO ON TO ASSIST IN OPENING THE BURMA ROAD. FURTHERMORE, ANY PAUSE IN YOUR ATTACK ACROSS THE SALWEEN OR SUGGESTION OF WITHDRAWAL IS EXACTLY WHAT THE JAP HAS BEEN STRIVING TO CAUSE YOU TO DO BY HIS OPERATIONS IN EASTERN CHINA. HE KNOWS THAT IF YOU CONTINUE TO ATTACK, COOPERATING WITH MOUNTBATTEN'S COMING OFFENSIVE, THE LAND LINE TO CHINA WILL BE OPENED IN EARLY 1945 AND THE CONTINUED RESISTANCE OF CHINA AND MAINTENANCE OF YOUR CONTROL WILL BE ASSURED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE MANPOWER FOR YOUR DIVISIONS IN NORTH BURMA AND, IF YOU FAIL TO SEND REINFORCEMENTS TO THE SALWEEN FORCES AND WITHDRAW THESE ARMIES, WE WILL LOSE ALL CHANCE OF OPENING LAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHINA AND IMMEDIATELY JEOPARDIZE THE AIR ROUTE OVER THE HUMP. FOR THIS YOU MUST YOURSELF BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES AND ASSUME THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

I HAVE URGED TIME AND AGAIN IN RECENT MONTHS THAT YOU TAKE DRASTIC ACTION TO RESIST THE DISASTER WHICH HAS BEEN MOVING CLOSER TO CHINA AND TO

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT-CHIANG KAI-SHEK, #64.

YOU. NOW, WHEN YOU HAVE NOT YET PLACED GENERAL STILWELL IN COMMAND OF ALL FORCES IN CHINA, WE ARE FACED WITH THE LOSS OF A CRITICAL AREA IN EAST CHINA WITH POSSIBLE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES. THE JAPANESE CAPTURE OF KWILIN WILL PLACE THE KUNMING AIR TERMINAL UNDER THE MENACE OF CONSTANT AIR ATTACK, REDUCING THE HUMP TONNAGE AND POSSIBLY SEVERING THE AIR ROUTE.

EVEN THOUGH WE ARE ROLLING THE ENEMY BACK IN DEFEAT ALL OVER THE WORLD THIS WILL NOT HELP THE SITUATION IN CHINA FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME. THE ADVANCE OF OUR FORCES ACROSS THE PACIFIC IS SWIFT. BUT THIS ADVANCE WILL BE TOO LATE FOR CHINA UNLESS YOU ACT NOW AND VIGOROUSLY. ONLY DRASTIC AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON YOUR PART ALONE CAN BE IN TIME TO PRESERVE THE FRUITS OF YOUR LONG YEARS OF STRUGGLE AND THE EFFORTS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE TO SUPPORT YOU. OTHERWISE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ALIKE ARE GOING TO BE SWALLOWED IN MILITARY DISASTER.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE JUST DECIDED AT QUEBEC TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY THE OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE LAND LINE TO CHINA ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT YOU WOULD CONTINUE AN UNREMITTING ATTACK FROM THE SALWEEN SIDE. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE ONLY THINGS YOU CAN NOW DO IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE JAP FROM ACHIEVING HIS OBJECTIVES IN CHINA IS TO REINFORCE YOUR SALWEEN ARMIES IMMEDIATELY AND PRESS THEIR OFFENSIVE, WHILE AT ONCE PLACING GENERAL STILWELL IN UNRESTRICTED COMMAND OF ALL YOUR FORCES. THE ACTION I AM ASKING YOU TO TAKE WILL FORTIFY US IN OUR DECISION AND IN THE CONTINUED EFFORTS THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO TAKE TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE OUR AID TO YOU. THIS WE ARE DOING WHEN WE ARE FIGHTING TWO OTHER GREAT CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE AND ACROSS THE PACIFIC. I TRUST THAT YOUR FAR SIGHTED VISION, WHICH HAS GUIDED AND INSPIRED YOUR PEOPLE IN THIS WAR, WILL REALIZE THE NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION. IN THIS MESSAGE I HAVE EXPRESSED MY THOUGHTS WITH COMPLETE FRANKNESS BECAUSE IT APPEARS

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT-CHIANG KAI-SHEK, #64.

PLAINLY EVIDENT TO ALL OF US HERE THAT ALL YOUR AND OUR EFFORTS TO SAVE CHINA  
ARE TO BE LOST BY FURTHER DELAYS.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1145, EWT, 16 September 1944:

J. A. TYREE, Jr.,  
Commander, U. S. N.,  
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

*Recd by adu - 181716Z.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 16, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you send the  
attached proposed message to the Generalissimo.

*W. A. Rorer*  
Chief of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

After reading the last reports on the situation in China my Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your Y forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's coming offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not provide manpower for your divisions in North Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

-1-

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 197

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant air attack, reducing the hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.

Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.

The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only things you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I trust that

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By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~

your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.

*Roosevelt*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

*JH*

*125*

From General Stilwell for General Marshall's eyes  
only 15 September 1944.

From Kweilin returned today. Arrangements made to safeguard American personnel. Situation that area now hopeless. Only remaining reliable Chinese units will defend Kweilin by getting inside city. The place will then become another rat trap, like Changsha and Hengyang. These dispositions are by personal orders of Gissimo.

For defense of Liuchow, there remains the remnants of the Ninety Third Army, which is unreliable, and two regiments of militia. The jig is up in South China. We are getting out of Kweilin now, and will have to get out of Liuchow as soon as the Japs appear there.

The disaster south of the Yangtze is largely due to lack of proper command—the usual back seat driving from Chungking. The trouble continues to be at the top.

The Gissimo called me in today and proposed a withdrawal from Lungling to the east side of the Salween. I was appalled and protested strongly, pointing out that we are fighting for a road to China, and that with Lungling in our possession we control the entire trace of that road. It made no impression on him.

He is afraid the Japs will advance to Kuaming if we are beaten at Lungling, but he has failed utterly in keeping the Y Force supplied with the fillers. It is now down to an effective combat strength of 14,000 and we are making frantic efforts to get replacements flown in.

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By Authority of Sec Army  
by TAG-pax 720724  
By RAH Date: JUN 14 1972

*310 CB 8*

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INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

Page 2

The Gissimo says that if I do not attack from Myitkyina toward Bhamo within a week, he will withdraw the Y Force, thus throwing away the results of all our labors.

I am now convinced that he regards the South China catastrophe as of little moment, believing that the Japs will not bother him further in that area, and he imagines he can get behind the Salween and there wait in safety for the US to finish the war.

Our conferences on command are dragging, and tomorrow we are going to try some plain talk with T V Soong, in the hope of getting the Gissimo some faint glimmer of the consequences of further delay and inaction.

End

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**SECRET**

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FROM The President TO Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek  
SERIAL or FILE NO. #64, 16 September 1944  
DATE

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TOR MAP ROOM VIA  
SUBJECT: Operations in China; reinforcement of Salween Armies; placing  
Stilwell in command of all Chinese troops.

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ACTION:

1. See "Eyes only" dispatch from General Stilwell to General Marshall, 15 Sept 44, which prompted this message.
2. Dispatch written by General Marshall's office at the OCTAGON (Quebec II) Conference, and forwarded to President, 16 Sept 44, for approval.
3. Approved without change by the President at Quebec; forwarded to the Map Room as MR-IN-158, 161512Z.
4. See last paragraph of HURLEY-PRESIDENT CFB 23212, 25 Sept 44, (copy filed herein) for account of Stilwell's delivery of this message to the Generalissimo.

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COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

~~TOP SECRET~~

WR  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Joint Chiefs of Staff

15 September 1944

Commanding General  
USAF China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon  
Chungking, China

Number: WAR 31060

TOPSEC from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell.

1. The Chinese Government has informally suggested to the State Department a conference of U.S., British and Chinese representatives to discuss the military administration of civil affairs in reconquered eastern Asiatic areas.
2. The State Department does not favor a tripartite discussion but considers it inadvisable that we ignore or give a flat negative reply to the Chinese. The State Department considers it desirable that some information regarding U.S. planning for civil affairs be discussed with Chiang Kai-Shek.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department have agreed to the following:

a. "The Chinese government might be informed that all United States planning for civil affairs is based solely upon military considerations; that the military administration of any territory recovered from the Japanese by United States Forces is on a purely temporary basis and is entirely without prejudice to the future political status of the territory in question; that the scope and the structure of military administration of any area is to be left largely to the discretion of the local commander because of the need of fitting in military administration with the local military situation; that the personnel of the military administration depends primarily upon the composition of the forces engaged in conducting the actual military operation.

CM-OUT-31060

(15 Sep 44)

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By Authority of

JCS

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927/495-1

By RAH/RS

Date APR 21 1972

~~SECRET~~

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*Chiang Kai Shek File*

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Number: WAR 31060

15 September 1944

b. "The Chinese Government might be further informed that in the event strategic developments bring about the occupation by American Forces of Chinese territory now occupied by the Japanese, the administration of civil affairs will be turned over to the Chinese governmental authorities as soon as military exigencies permit.

c. "Finally, the Chinese Government might be informed that if any long term military administration of Japan proper is found necessary, it is hoped that participation in such an administration will be on a broad practical basis and that the administration will include personnel of powers which have actively engaged in the war against Japan, including, of course, China."

4. The State Department believes that the Chinese, when informed that the U.S. do not favor a tripartite discussion, will request a U.S.-Chinese agreement. The State Department considers it expedient politically to enter into such an agreement to satisfy the Chinese in the matter of "face".

5. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable that you (General Stilwell) or your Chief of Staff inform Chiang Kai-Shek orally, and in strict confidence of the contents of Paragraph 3 above. Ambassador Gause has been advised of this matter by the State Department and directed to arrange to accompany you to call on President Chiang for this purpose.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell,  
Gen Hilldring, Adm King, Mr McCloy, C of S

CM-OUT-31060

(15 Sep 44)

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927/4951

By RH/ER Date APR 21 1972

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FROM Joint Chiefs of Staff TO General Stilwell

SERIAL or FILE NO. WAR 31060, 15 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

1. This message included for general information.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

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9 September 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NUMBER 59. PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR  
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS EXPRESSED TO ME HIS GREAT NEED FOR MANPOWER TO MEET GROWING SERVICE TROOP NEEDS IN ACCELERATING HIS ADVANCE FROM NEW GUINEA. WE CANNOT MEET HIS REQUIREMENT BECAUSE OF A SHORTAGE OF SERVICE TROOPS CAUSED BY DEPLOYMENT OF THE BULK OF OUR MANPOWER ON COMBAT DUTY. ALSO, UNTIL THE EUROPEAN WAR IS ENDED, THE WEIGHT OF OUR FORCES THERE CANNOT BE RELEASED TO ASSIST HIM. HE NEEDS PROMPTLY AT LEAST 50,000 MEN TO MEET HIS IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS. DO YOU THINK YOU COULD FILL THIS NEED? ARE NOT SOME OF THE MANY THOUSANDS OF MEN WHO WORKED ON THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER FIELDS AVAILABLE FOR THIS? CIVILIAN MANPOWER FROM CHINA COULD BE MOVED THROUGH CALCUTTA TO NEW GUINEA. THE ORGANIZATION COULD BE THAT OF PROVISIONAL SERVICE FORCE. ULTIMATELY THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR RETURN TO CHINA. THERE WOULD NATURALLY BE VARIOUS DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSION YOUR SUGGESTION WOULD BE HELPFUL AS TO PROPER WAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PAY.

IN TRANSMITTING THIS PROPOSAL I AM PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT X AND Y FORCE OPERATIONS WOULD SUFFER NO INTERFERENCE. PERSONNEL AND REPLACEMENTS FOR THESE FORCES HAVE, ACCORDING TO MY UNDERSTANDING,

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

BEEN DISAPPOINTING AND IT IS OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR COMMON CAUSE THAT THE X AND Y FORCES BE MAINTAINED AT FULL STRENGTH. FURTHERMORE, I APPRECIATE THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN EASTERN CHINA AND WOULD NOT WANT YOUR ASSISTANCE TO GENERAL MACARTHUR TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO STEM THE TIDE OF JAPANESE ADVANCE. IN THIS REGARD I AM ANXIOUSLY AWAITING INFORMATION ON YOUR FINAL ARRANGEMENTS PLACING ALL CHINESE AND AMERICAN FORCES IN CHINA UNDER GENERAL STILWELL'S COMMAND REPORTING DIRECTLY TO YOU.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT OUR FORCES IN NEW GUINEA WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMBINE WITH CHINA'S PEOPLE IN THE COMMON MISSION OF BRINGING ABOUT THE EARLIEST DEFEAT OF THE JAPANESE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COUNTRY'S ASSISTANCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1845, EWT, 9 September 1944.

F. H. GRAHAM,  
Capt, AOD.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

*WHL*

#59

9 Sept 44

FOR GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI SHEK FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

General MacArthur has expressed to me his great need for manpower to meet growing service troop needs in accelerating his advance from New Guinea. We cannot meet his requirement because of a shortage of service troops caused by deployment of the bulk of our manpower on combat duty. Also, until the European war is ended, the weight of our forces there cannot be released to assist him. He needs promptly at least 50,000 men to meet his immediate requirements. Do you think you could fill this need? Are not some of the many thousands of men who worked on the very long range bomber fields available for this? Civilian manpower from China could be moved through Calcutta to New Guinea. The organization could be that of provisional service force. Ultimately the United States would be responsible for their return to China. There would naturally be various details to be worked out, but for purposes of discussion your suggestion would be helpful as to proper wage for the United States to pay.

In transmitting this proposal I am proceeding on the assumption

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

that I and I Force operations would suffer no interference.

Personnel and replacements for these forces have, according to my understanding, been disappointing and it is of vital interest to our common cause that the I and I Forces be maintained at full strength. Furthermore, I appreciate the critical situation in Eastern China and would not want your assistance to General MacArthur to interfere in any way with your efforts to stem the tide of Japanese advance. In this regard I am anxiously awaiting information on your final arrangements placing all Chinese and American forces in China under General Stilwell's command reporting directly to you.

I can assure you that our forces in New Guinea would welcome the opportunity to combine with China's people in the common mission of bringing about the earliest defeat of the Japanese and would be grateful for your country's assistance..

*Russell*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Assistant Sec. of the U.S., .....  
By ..... MAR 10 1972

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP  
SECRET

WAL  
WB.  
Personal  
0918009

From: G3 Rear Echelon General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department

No: C 16995 2 September 1944

Personal for General Marshall from General MacArthur replying WAR 23629 2nd. C 16995.

Your suggestion of Chinese labor units is a brilliant one and if accomplished promptly would solve the problem. Recommend initial negotiation on basis of 50,000.

End.

ACTION: OPD  
INFO : C OF S

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By Authority of Sec Army  
by TAG per 720724  
By REH/RS Date JUN 14 1972

CM-IN-1151 (2 Sep 44) 0328Z mcs

COPY NO. 34

DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Executive Office, Operations Division 2904 TTH

1 September 1944

Commander in Chief  
Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia

Number WAR 23629

Personal to General MacArthur from General Marshall.

I have discussed with Generals Giles, Hull and Bissell your service troop problem. If we can secure Chinese labor at a possible rate of twenty or thirty thousand a month, to be shipped direct from Calcutta to the Southwest Pacific other than Australia, there to be organized in improvised units, would you care to have such a force? If your opinion is favorable I will take it up immediately with the Generalissimo.

We have a large capacity for carrying people from China to Calcutta. There would be the problem of securing shipping space from Calcutta but under the urgency of the situation I think we could find a solution to that. Please let me have your view as soon as possible.

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Cofs

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By Authority of Sec Army

by TAG per 720724

By RHRS Date JUN 14 1972

CM-OUT-23629 (1 Sept 44) 1505Z bjm

COPY NO. 25

RET  
TIME  
GE CENTER  
MESSAGE

FROM The President TO The Generalissimo  
SERIAL or FILE NO.  
DATE #59, 9 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Sending of Chinese labor units to SW Pacific theater.

ACTION:

1. See GEN MARSHALL-GEN MacARTHUR, WAR 23629, 1 Sept 44, and reply, GEN MacARTHUR-GEN MARSHALL, C16995, 2 Sept 44 (filed herein) which form background for this message.
2. Dispatch written in Office of Chief of Staff; approved by the President without change 9 Sept 44.

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PRIORITY

21 AUGUST 1944

NUMBER 46, [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

I AM GLAD THAT YOU FIND GENERAL HURLEY AND MISTER NELSON ACCEPTABLE FOR THE IMPORTANT MISSIONS THEY WILL PERFORM FOR US. NOW THAT MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO YOU HAVE BEEN DECIDED UPON, I THINK WE SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO TAKE THE POSITIVE STEPS DEMANDED BY THE MILITARY SITUATION. I URGE THAT YOU TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PLACE GENERAL STILWELL IN COMMAND OF THE CHINESE FORCES, UNDER YOUR DIRECTION, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. EXTENDED DELIBERATIONS AND PERFECTION OF ARRANGEMENTS MAY WELL HAVE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES IN THE LIGHT OF THE GRAVITY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.

IN MY POSITION I CAN WELL APPRECIATE YOUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND PARTICULARLY THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY OF INSTALLING AN AMERICAN OFFICER IN THE DESIRED COMMAND POSITION. I FEEL CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT BETWEEN GENERAL HURLEY AND GENERAL STILWELL THERE WILL BE AN ADEQUATE COMPREHENSION OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS YOU FACE. I AM URGING ACTION IN THE MATTER OF STILWELL'S APPOINTMENT SO STRONGLY BECAUSE I FEEL THAT, WITH FURTHER DELAY, IT MAY BE TOO LATE TO AVERT A MILITARY CATASTROPHE TRAGIC BOTH TO CHINA AND TO OUR ALLIED PLANS FOR THE EARLY OVERTHROW OF JAPAN.

AS TO MATTERS OF DETAIL WHICH DOCTOR KUNG PRESENTED:

I DO NOT THINK THE FORCES TO COME UNDER GENERAL STILWELL'S COMMAND SHOULD BE LIMITED EXCEPT BY THEIR AVAILABILITY TO DEFEND CHINA AND FIGHT THE JAPANESE. WHEN THE ENEMY IS PRESSING US TOWARD POSSIBLE DISASTER, IT APPEARS UNSOUND TO REFUSE THE AID OF ANYONE WHO WILL KILL JAPANESE.

PRESIDENT-CHIANG KAI-SHEK, NO. 46,  
21 AUGUST 1944.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING STILWELL'S TITLE BUT I THINK IT OUGHT TO IMPLY THAT DIRECTLY UNDER YOU HE COMMANDS THE ARMED FORCES IN CHINA—THAT OF THE HEAD OF THE STATE WITH HIS COMMANDER IN THE FIELD.

I FEEL SURE THAT GENERAL HURLEY WILL BE HIGHLY USEFUL IN PROMOTING RELATIONS WHICH WILL FACILITATE GENERAL STILWELL'S EXERCISE OF COMMAND AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATED POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO DELAY MATTERS UNTIL EACH DETAIL IS CONSIDERED AND SETTLED.

I PROPOSE PROPOSING A NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR HANDLING LEND-LEASE MATTERS, RELIEVING GENERAL STILWELL OF THIS BURDEN, AND WILL COMMUNICATE MY PROPOSAL TO YOU LATER.

DOCTOR KUNG INFORMS ME THAT YOU WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT OUR AGREEMENT. IN THIS MESSAGE I HAVE BEEN MOST FRANK, MY SOLE EFFORT BEING DIRECTED TOWARD THE FREEDOM OF CHINA AND THE COMPLETE DEFEAT OF JAPAN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. GENERAL HURLEY AND MISTER NELSON WILL LEAVE HERE ABOUT AUGUST 23RD.

I HAD A MOST SUCCESSFUL INSPECTION TRIP IN HAWAII AND THE ALBUTIAN ISLANDS AND ALASKA. I THINK WE HAVE JAPAN VERY MUCH WORRIED AND THAT BY CONTINUING THE PRESSURE EVERY DAY HER POSITION WILL BECOME STILL WORSE.

MY WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1350, EWT, 21 August 1944:

HENRY W. PUTNAM,  
Captain, A. C.

August 21, 1944.

TO: THE GENERALISSIMO  
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

*Blue 128 - Hyde Park  
(incoming)*

I am glad that you find General Hurley and Mr. Nelson acceptable for the important missions they will perform for us. Now that my personal representatives to you have been decided upon, I think we should proceed immediately to take the positive steps demanded by the military situation. I urge that you take the necessary measures to place General Stilwell in command of the Chinese forces, under your direction, at the earliest possible date. Extended deliberations and perfection of arrangements may well have fateful consequences in the light of the gravity of the military situation.

In my position I can well appreciate your political problems and particularly the political difficulty of installing an American officer in the desired command position. I feel certain, however, that between General

Hurley and General Stilwell there will be an adequate comprehension of the political problems you face. I am urging action in the matter of Stilwell's appointment so strongly because I feel that, with further delay, it may be too late to avert a military catastrophe tragic both to China and to our allied plans for the early overthrow of Japan.

As to matters of detail which Dr. Kung presented:

I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's command should be limited except by their availability to defend China and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to refuse the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese.

I am not suggesting Stilwell's title but I think it ought to imply that directly under you he commands the armed forces in China -- that of the head of the State with his Commander in the field.

I feel sure that General Hurley will be highly useful in promoting relations which will facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command and his understanding of the related political problems, and that it will not be necessary to delay matters until each detail is considered and settled.

I propose proposing a new arrangement for handling lend lease matters, relieving General Stilwell of this burden, and will communicate my proposal to you later.

Dr. Kung informs me that you will take the necessary administrative steps to implement our agreement. In this message I have been most frank, my sole effort being directed toward the freedom of China and the complete defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment. General Hurley and Mr. Nelson will leave here about August 23rd.

I had a most successful inspection trip in Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. I think we have Japan very much worried and that by continuing the pressure

every day her position will become still worse.

My warm regards.

ROOSEVELT

NOTE FOR COLONEL PARK FROM MAJOR GREER.


Miss Tully informs me that certain changes have been made in this message from the original draft submitted by General Marshall. She asks that you advise Mr. Hopkins that you have the approved message for transmission and furnish him information copy.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

18 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a proposed answer to the  
Generalissimo's message of 12 August 1944.

  
Chief of Staff.

Incl.  
Proposed message.

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Grace —

HLH has been attached &  
has corrected it in longhand —

St

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT

I am glad that you find General Hurley and Mr. Nelson acceptable for the important missions they will perform for us. Now that my personal representative<sup>✓</sup> to you has been decided upon, I think we ~~must~~ <sup>should</sup> proceed immediately to take the positive steps demanded by the military situation. I urge that you take the necessary measures to place General Stilwell in command of the Chinese forces, under your direction, at the earliest possible date. Extended deliberations and perfection of arrangements may well have fateful consequences in the light of the gravity of the military situation.

In my position I can well appreciate your political problems and particularly the political difficulty of installing an American officer in the desired command position. I feel certain, however, that between General Hurley and General Stilwell there will be an adequate comprehension of the political problems you face. I am urging action in the matter of Stilwell's appointment so strongly because I feel that, with further delay, it may be too late to avert a military catastrophe tragic both to China and to our allied plans for the early overthrow of Japan.

As to matters of detail which Dr. Kung presented:

I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's command should be limited except by their availability to defend China and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to refuse the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese.

(A)

I suggest that General Stilwell's title be "Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces in China." The relationship between you and General

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By E. J. Stewart Date MAY 15 1972

~~SECRET~~

Stilwell, as I see it, would be that of the head of a state directly with his Commander-in-Chief in the field. I feel sure that General Hurley will be highly useful in promoting relations which will facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command and his understanding of the related political problems, and that it will not be necessary to delay matters until each detail is considered and settled.

I propose proposing a new arrangement for handling lend lease matters, relieving General Stilwell of this burden, and will communicate my proposal to you later.

Dr. Kung informs me that you will take the necessary administrative steps to implement our agreement ~~and I trust that you will complete necessary action in the near future.~~ In this message I have been most frank, my sole effort being directed toward the freedom of China and ~~accelerating the war against~~ <sup>complete defeat of</sup> Japan. ~~I am instructing~~ <sup>at the earliest possible moment.</sup> General Hurley and Mr. Nelson, who will leave here about August 23.

(B)

*Roosevelt*

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BY E. J. Stewart Date MAY 15 1972



COPI

Aug 15, 1944

TRANSLATION

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

Received in M.R-15 Aug 44.  
Dated 23 July 1944.

1.

The basis of Sino-American cooperation rests upon high moral principles, mutual confidence, and unity of purpose. In the seven years of China's war of resistance, President Roosevelt has, from the very beginning, made the most earnest effort to assist her. As an industrially undeveloped and militarily unprepared nation, China has been able to attain her present position principally through the United States' consistent policy of aid to China, and this can never be forgotten, but will be gratefully remembered, by the entire Chinese people.

The extent of close cooperation between China and the United States cannot, indeed, be compared or equaled by any other countries. Consequently China has always supported President Roosevelt's views and plans, whether in relation to China or to the world at large, and has not failed to accept any proposal which might advance the common purpose of China and the United States, and does not prejudice the fundamental national interests of China.

It was, therefore, without hesitation that the Generalissimo accepted, in principle, the proposal of the President to place General Stilwell in command of China's forces, directly under the Generalissimo. In regard to the actual implementation of such proposal, however, the Generalissimo has found it necessary to give it the fullest consideration in the light of the realities of the situation so that the proposal may be carried out satisfactorily without the slightest hindrance. In other words, while it is

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State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

By R. H. Parks Date 10-20-72

~~TOP SECRET~~

realized that swiftness of action is desirable, the Generalissimo feels it incumbent on him as an ally to present fully and frankly the difficulties of the situation when he feels there is at stake the future of Sino-American cooperation and the common objective of the joint war efforts. This was the spirit and purpose underlying the previous telegram of the Generalissimo.

II:

Since the receipt of the President's second telegram the Generalissimo is able to appreciate all the more the President's concern over the military situation in China, and is particularly moved by the earnestness and sincerity with which the President has reiterated and explained his original proposal. The Generalissimo has given the matter the most careful and comprehensive consideration, which leads him to the conclusion that certain factors are essential for the implementation of the proposal, namely: (1) Due regard should be given to the political circumstances obtaining in China; (2) The psychology of the Chinese army and people should be taken into account; (3) General Stilwell should be enabled, under the command of the Generalissimo, to direct military affairs in the most effective manner for the actual furtherance of the joint war effort.

In view of these practical considerations it is therefore felt that a preparatory period is required; for, otherwise, to put the proposal into effect hastily, without insuring proper understanding on the part of the Chinese army and people, may give rise in their minds to certain doubts and apprehensions and lead to unfavorable consequences, both politically and militarily.

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By R. H. Parks Date 10-20-72

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

III.

In the light of the considerations set forth above, the Generalissimo wishes to make the following observations:

- (1) In accordance with the expressed hope of the President, the Generalissimo will do his utmost to proceed with the necessary preparations in order to achieve complete cooperation in the shortest possible period.
- (2) The Chinese forces to be placed under the command of General Stilwell as referred to the President's first telegram should be understood to mean all forces under the control of the Chinese National Government serving at the front. The scope of such command and the arrangements connected therewith should be specifically stated. The question of inclusion of communist troops under such command should not be decided upon for the time being, until it is ascertained that they will henceforth submit faithfully to the administrative and military orders of the Central Government.
- (3) In order to enable General Stilwell to exercise effectively his duties under the Generalissimo, there should be clearly defined, prior to the assumption of duty by General Stilwell, the following matters, namely; (a) General Stilwell's functions and authority; (b) his title; and (c) the relation between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell. On these matters in particular, it is desired first to consult the views of the President so that appropriate arrangements may be formulated.
- (4) The distribution and disposal of all military supplies under the Lend-Lease arrangements should, in accordance with the spirit underlying the Lend-Lease Act, be placed entirely under the authority of the Chinese Government or its Commander-in-Chief. The Generalissimo, however, is prepared to delegate authority to certain officers of the United States army to supervise over the disposal of such supplies.

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By E. H. Parks Date, 10-20-72

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TOP SECRET

In addition to the four points stated above, the Generalissimo will take the necessary steps to bring about proper appreciation and understanding of the proposal by the entire Chinese army and people, and at the same time secure the consent of the Supreme National Defense Council.

IV.

Finally, the Generalissimo wishes to express the hope that the President will send to China at an early date a personal representative in whom the President has full confidence, and with whom the Generalissimo can talk as if personally with the President. Such a representative should be in a position not only to discuss and decide all questions relative to the advancement of Sino-American cooperation and the co-ordination of the war effort in the China and the Pacific theatres, but, it is hoped, will also be able politically to understand the realities of the situation in China, so that cooperation between the two countries in both political and military spheres can be further strengthened.

July 23rd, 1944.

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State Dept. Exec. 10-5-72  
By E. H. Parks Date 10-20-72

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TOP SECRET

(Sent from Map Room to President  
on Hawaii/Alaska trip as RED 331,  
16/2130Z August 1944)

FROM: GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK  
TO : PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

DATE: 12 AUGUST 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

I am glad to receive your telegram dated August 10.

The views which I requested Dr. Kung to convey to you personally were reached after most careful and comprehensive consideration. Being anxious to effectuate your proposal regarding General Stilwell, I have already taken positive preparatory steps with the great hope that it can be expeditiously realized within a short period of time. However, as this proposal will not only involve the success or failure of the China War-Theater, both militarily and politically, but will have a far-reaching effect on the future course of Sino-American cooperation and the whole situation in the Far East, every effort must be made to ensure its being carried out without the slightest hindrance. It is, therefore, necessary to have first adequate preparation and thorough deliberation for the actual implementation of such a proposal in order that it will bring about substantial improvement to the entire war situation.

I learn with pleasure that you are sending General Hurley as your personal representative accompanied by Mr. Nelson. Both General Hurley and Mr. Nelson are men of high standing and proved ability and I extend to them my warm welcome.

I am deeply touched by the sympathetic concern you expressed in your telegram over China's war situation, and I wish to assure you that I will do my utmost in successfully fulfilling my responsibilities in the China Theater.

In regard to the many pending problems, I hope you will discuss thoroughly with Dr. Kung with a view to their early solution.

Please accept the sincerest assurance of my highest consideration.

/s/ Chiang Kai-shek.

Copy to Gen Marshall by  
direction Mr. Hopkins.

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM CHUNGKING DATED August 12, 1944

[Printed in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1944, VI, 141]  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I am glad to receive your telegram dated August 10.

The views which I requested Dr. Kung to convey to you personally were reached after most careful and comprehensive consideration. Being anxious to effectuate your proposal regarding general Stilwell, I have already taken positive preparatory steps with the great hope that it can be expeditiously realized within a short period of time. However, as this proposal will not only involve the success or failure of the China War-Theater, both militarily and politically, but will have a far-reaching effect on the future course of Sino-American co-operation and the whole situation in the Far East, every effort must be made to ensure its being carried out without the slightest hindrance. It is, therefore, necessary to have first adequate preparation and thorough deliberation for the actual implementation of such a proposal in order that it will bring about substantial improvement to the entire war situation.

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In regard to the many pending problems, I hope you will discuss thoroughly with Dr. Kung with a view to their early solution.

Please accept the sincerest assurance of my highest consideration.

Chiang Kai-shek

[Stamp]

~~TOP SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

9 AUGUST 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMISCA, CHUNGKING

NUMBER 39. ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERALISSIMO  
CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO OUR DISCUSSIONS REGARDING GENERAL STILWELL AND  
YOUR DESIRE FOR THE DESIGNATION OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM ME:

I FEEL THAT THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN YOUR THEATER REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION  
SO FAR AS STILWELL IS CONCERNED, OTHERWISE IT WILL BE TOO LATE.

I HAVE THIS PROPOSAL NOW TO MAKE: THAT GENERAL PATRICK J. HURLEY, FORMER  
SECRETARY OF WAR, FORMER MINISTER TO NEW ZEALAND, AND RECENT SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
OF MINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BE DESIGNATED BY ME AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH  
YOU. GENERAL HURLEY HAS HAD BROAD DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL AND BUSINESS EXPERIENCE.  
HE IS A WELL KNOWN AND RESPECTED FIGURE IN PUBLIC LIFE IN THIS COUNTRY. HE SERVED  
ACTIVELY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND KNOWS OUR ARMY. HE SHOULD BE OF GREAT SERVICE  
IN ADJUSTING RELATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND GENERAL STILWELL. HE MET YOU IN CHUNGKING  
AND APPEARS HIGHLY QUALIFIED FOR THIS MOST IMPORTANT DUTY.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASSOCIATE WITH HIM HONORABLE DONALD M. NELSON WHO FOR TWO  
YEARS HAS BEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF OUR WAR PRODUCTION BOARD AND WAS BEFORE THE WAR THE  
HEAD OF SEARS-ROEBUCH AND COMPANY. HE HAS DONE A SPLENDID PIECE OF WORK AND I CAN  
SPARE HIM ONLY BECAUSE THE PRODUCT ON PROBLEM IS GOING SO WELL. HE WOULD, I THINK,  
SUPPLEMENT THE WORK OF GENERAL HURLEY IN THE NON-MILITARY FIELD AND SHOULD BE ABLE  
TO BE OF REAL ASSISTANCE TO YOU.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1040, EWT, 9 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,  
Colonel, GSC.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

BACKGROUND OF

PRESIDENT-GENERALISSIMO #39, 9 AUGUST 1944

-----

Exchange of messages on President's HAWAII/ALASKA trip.

-----

FROM: GENERAL MARSHALL  
TO : ADMIRAL LEAHY

NO : RED 246, 5 August 1944 (Filed 051450Z)

Since no reply to the President's last message has been received from the Generalissimo it appears that he is waiting for the President to propose the third party discussed in the previous messages. In the meantime the situation in China continues to deteriorate. I do not think we can afford to allow such a critical matter to drift and there follows a proposal from me for a message from the President to the Generalissimo. Incidentally, Mr. Stimson is aware of this suggestion and highly approves.

"With further reference to our discussions regarding General Stilwell and your desire for the designation of a personal representative from me:

"I feel that the critical situation in your theater requires immediate action so far as Stilwell is concerned, otherwise it will be too late.

"I have this proposal now to make: that General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War, former Minister to New Zealand, and recent Special Representative of mine in the Middle East, be designated by me as my personal representative with you. General Hurley has had broad diplomatic, political and business experience. He is a well known and respected figure in public life in this country. He served actively in the First World War and knows our Army. He should be of great service in adjusting relations between you and General Stilwell. He met you in Chungking and appears highly qualified for this most important duty."

-----

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MR. HARRY HOPKINS

NO : BLUE 81, 7 AUGUST 1944 (Filed 080230Z)

Please speak to General Marshall about his proposal to send General

Hurley to China. Get him to show you his proposed message to Chiang Kai-shek (RED 246). My thought is to add to the proposed message to Chiang the following:

"I would like to associate with him Honorable Donald M. Nelson, who for two years has been the Chairman of our War Production Board and was before the war the head of Sears-Roebuck and Company. He has done a splendid piece of work and I can spare him only because the production problem is going so well. He would, I think, supplement the work of Hurley in the non-military field and should be able to be of real assistance to you."

I think Wilson would stay with W.P.B. if promoted to Nelson's place but not otherwise.

I think Nelson would willingly go to China.

Let me have your views.

- - - - -

FROM: MR. HARRY HOPKINS  
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : RED 271, 8 AUGUST 1944 (Filed 0823352)

I have General Marshall's agreement on sending Nelson with Pat Hurley to China. Have also cleared the matter with Ed Stettinius.

Inasmuch as I am assuming that you want this done, Jimmy and I are going to see Nelson tomorrow in order to get this sewed up. I think it is important that we move swiftly because it is very apt to get out to the Press.

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will assume that it is settled that we shall try to induce Nelson to go to China and that Wilson is to be offered Nelson's job with W.P.B. I, personally, agree with this procedure because I think there is a real danger of a further blowup any time between Wilson and Nelson and that would not be good for us.

(No reply)

- - - - -

FROM: COLONEL PARK ( MAP ROOM )  
TO : ADMIRAL LEAHY

NO : RED 277, 9 AUGUST 1944 (Filed 0915452)

On instructions from Mr. Hopkins, message to the Generalissimo, reference our RED 246, has been sent with the President's added paragraph unchanged, reference BLUE 81. [Sent as PRES-CHIANG #39, 9 Aug 44]

- - - - -

FROM: JAMES F. BYRNES  
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : RED 281, 9 AUGUST 1944 (Filed 092130Z)

Nelson accepts assignment. No announcement until your return.

9 August 1944

PI  
WAL  
W

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

In view of RED 277, advising that the message which General Marshall suggested be sent to the Generalissimo together with the additional paragraph written by the President has been sent, we have delayed transmission of the two attached messages.

The message as sent varies little from the message attached. I have underlined the portions of the message which were deleted in the final transmission.

Mr. Cornelius

WT  
NS

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 9, 1944.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MR. HOPKINS

REPLYING TO RED 271, I HAVE TODAY INFORMED CHIANG  
OF MY DESIRE TO SEND HURLEY AND NELSON TO CHINA.

THIS PROPOSAL CAN NOT BE DEFINITELY CARRIED OUT  
UNTIL WE HAVE THE APPROVAL OF CHIANG. I HOPE NELSON  
WILL AGREE TO GO TO CHINA AND THAT WILSON WILL AGREE  
TO TAKE OVER NELSON'S JOB IN W.P.B.

F.D.R.

*HR*

*Cancel*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

August 9, 1944.

WSP  
HR

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI SHEK

With further reference to our discussions regarding General Stilwell and your desire for the designation of a personal representative from me:

I feel that the critical situation in your theater requires immediate action so far as Stilwell is concerned, otherwise it will be too late.

I have this proposal now to make: First that General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War, former Minister to New Zealand, and recent special representative of mine in the Middle East, be designated by me as my personal representative with you. General Hurley has had broad diplomatic and political experience. He is a well known and respected figure in public life in this country. He served actively in the first World War and knows our army. He should be of great service in adjusting relations between you and General Stilwell. He met you in Chungking and appears highly qualified for this most important duty.

Second: I would like to associate with him Honorable Donald M. Nelson, who for two years has been the Chairman of the War Production Board and was before the war the head of Sears Roebuck and Company. He has done a splendid piece of work and I can spare him only because the production problem is going so well. He would, I think, supplement the work of General Hurley in the non-military field and will be able to be of real assistance to you.

May I request an early reply to this message?

Cancel

HR

ROOSEVELT.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM The President TO Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek  
SERIAL or FILE NO.  
DATE #39, 9 August 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA  
SUBJECT: Sending Patrick Hurley and Donald Nelson to China.

ACTION:

1. See PRES-CHIANG #25, 13 July 44, and MEMORANDUM, 23 July 44.
2. Also see attached background summary, which includes RED 246, BLUE 81, RED 271, RED 277, and RED 281, which gives complete action on this message.
3. Answered by CHIANG-PRES, 12 August 1944.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

WAR DEPT.  
CODE CENTER #1

13 JULY 1944

1944 JUL 14 00 30 Z

SENT  
14 JUL 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMDISCA, CHUNGKING

NUMBER 25, ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ~~GENERAL~~  
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF THE 8TH OF JULY AND GREATLY APPRECIATE THE FRANK EXPRESSION OF YOUR VIEWS. I RECOGNIZE THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS MUST HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON MAJOR MILITARY DECISIONS. I AM VERY GLAD TO LEARN THAT IN PRINCIPLE YOU ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PROPOSAL TO PLACE GENERAL STILWELL IN ABSOLUTE COMMAND UNDER YOU OF THE CHINESE TROOPS WITHOUT ANY HINDRANCE.

THE DIFFICULTY INVOLVED IN EFFECTING THIS IS APPARENTLY ONE OF TIMING. MY PROPOSAL, I REALIZE, REPRESENTED A MAJOR CHANGE, AND I WAS AWARE THAT MANY DIFFICULTIES MUST BE INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION WITH ITS DANGER TO OUR COMMON CAUSE CALLS FOR QUICK ACTION. IF DISASTER SHOULD OVERTAKE OUR COMBINED EFFORTS AGAINST THE JAPANESE IN CHINA THERE WILL BE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION. THEREFORE, SOME CALCULATED POLITICAL RISKS APPEAR JUSTIFIED WHEN DANGERS IN THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION ARE SO SERIOUS AND IMMEDIATELY THREATENING.

I AM SEARCHING FOR A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH FARSIGHTED POLITICAL VISION AND ABILITY TO COLLABORATE WITH YOU.

THE EMERGENCIES ARE PRIMARILY MILITARY, AND WHAT I HAD IN MIND WAS THE URGENT NECESSITY FOR DELEGATING AT ONCE TO ONE INDIVIDUAL THE POWER TO TAKE IMMEDIATE MILITARY DIRECTION OF FORCES AND OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL CHINA. FROM THE LONGER TERM POLITICAL VIEWPOINT YOUR SUGGESTION APPEALS TO ME, AND I AM GIVING IT THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. I WILL HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date 3-10-72 1 - ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

RIGHT MAN IS SELECTED FOR THE JOB, WHICH PRESENTS MANY DIFFICULTIES AND WE SHOULD EXPLORE THIS MATTER FULLY. IN THE MEANTIME I AGAIN URGE YOU TO TAKE ALL STEPS TO PAVE THE WAY FOR GENERAL STILWELL'S ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

DR. KUNG IS BEING FURNISHED A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE, BUT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THIS MATTER AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SPEED OF TRANSMISSION, I AM FORWARDING IT DIRECTLY TO YOU THROUGH MY COMMUNICATION CHANNEL.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1715, EWT, 13 July 1944.

*Franklin H. Graham*  
FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM  
Captain, AGD

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 13, 1944

Dear Dr. Kung:

I have this date transmitted the  
enclosed message to the Generalissimo.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

Dr. H. H. Kung  
2371 Woodland Drive  
Washington, D. C.

July 13, 1944

PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK:

I have just received your message of the 8th of July and greatly appreciate the frank expression of your views. I recognize that internal political conditions must have an important bearing on major military decisions. I am very glad to learn that in principle you are in agreement with the proposal to place General Stilwell in absolute command under you of the Chinese troops without any hindrance.

The difficulty involved in effecting this is apparently one of timing. My proposal, I realize, represented a major change, and I was aware that many difficulties must be involved. However, the situation with its danger to our common cause calls for quick action. If disaster should overtake our combined efforts against the Japanese in China there will be little opportunity for the continuance of Sino-American cooperation. Therefore, some calculated political risks appear justified when dangers in the overall military situation are so serious and immediately threatening.

I am searching for a personal representative with farsighted political vision and ability to collaborate with you.

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By E. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

The emergencies are primarily military, and what I had in mind was the urgent necessity for delegating at once to one individual the power to take immediate military direction of forces and operations in central China. From the longer term political viewpoint your suggestion appeals to me, and I am giving it the most careful consideration. I will have to be sure that the right man is selected for the job, which presents many difficulties and we should explore this matter fully. In the meantime I again urge you to take all steps to pave the way for General Stilwell's assumption of command at the earliest possible moment.

Dr. Kung is being furnished a copy of this message, but in view of the urgency of this matter and to take advantage of speed of transmission, I am forwarding it directly to you through my communication channel.

*I. P. [Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Can you get this to the  
Joint Staff before we leave? There  
is a good deal in what the Generalissimo  
says.

F. D. R.

Translation

[Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, VI, 120-121]

Chungking  
July 8, 1944.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

*Delivered to Map Room  
with answer by  
Admiral Leahy  
13 July 44.*

My dear Mr. President:

I have much pleasure in acknowledging receipt of your telegram which came on July 7, conveying to me your deep concern over the war situation in China and your effective suggestion to meet it.

While I fully agree with the principle of your suggestion that directly under me General Stilwell be given the command of all Chinese Army and American troops in this theater of war, I like to call your attention to the fact that Chinese troops and their internal political conditions are not as simple as those in other countries. Furthermore, they are not as easily directed as the limited number of Chinese troops who are now fighting in north Burma. Therefore, if this suggestion were carried out in haste it would not only fail to help the present war situation here but would also arouse misunderstanding and confusion which will be detrimental to Sino-American cooperation. This is the real fact of the situation and in expressing my views on your exacting and sincere suggestion, I have not tried to use any misleading or evasive language. Hence, I feel that there must be a preparatory period in order to enable General Stilwell to have absolute command of the Chinese troops without any hindrance. In this way I shall not disappoint you in your expectation.

I very much hope that you will be able to despatch an influential personal representative who enjoys your complete confidence, is given with full power and has a far-sighted political vision and ability, to constantly collaborate with me and he may also adjust the relations between me and General

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Stilwell so as to enhance the cooperation between China and America. You will appreciate the fact that military cooperation in its absolute sense must be built on the foundation of political cooperation.

Our people have an unwavering faith in your friendship and sincerity towards China. I had already explained in detail to Vice President Wallace on this subject and I trust he will transmit my views to you.

I shall much appreciate it if you will discuss directly with Dr. Kung on any important question of this nature whenever it should arise in the future. If you have any telegram for me you can give it to him for transmittal.

With my warmest personal regards.

Yours truly,

(signed by) Chiang Kai-Shek

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[Printed in U.S. Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Command Problems, 383-384]


WAR DEPT.  
CODE CENTER #1

6 JULY 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : ADMISCA, CHUNGKING

1944 JUL 06 18 59 Z

NO : Svc 6080



FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH RESULTS FROM JAPANESE ADVANCES IN CENTRAL CHINA, WHICH THREATEN NOT ONLY YOUR GOVERNMENT BUT ALL THAT THE U. S. ARMY HAS BEEN BUILDING UP IN CHINA, LEADS ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT DRASTIC MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY IF THE SITUATION IS TO BE SAVED. THE CRITICAL SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS, IN MY OPINION CALLS FOR THE DELEGATION TO ONE INDIVIDUAL OF THE POWER TO COORDINATE ALL THE ALLIED MILITARY RESOURCES IN CHINA, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST FORCES.

I THINK I AM FULLY AWARE OF YOUR FEELINGS REGARDING GENERAL STILWELL, -NEVERTHELESS I THINK HE HAS NOW CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED HIS FAR-SIGHTED JUDGMENT, HIS SKILL IN ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING AND, ABOVE ALL, IN FIGHTING YOUR CHINESE FORCES. I KNOW OF NO OTHER MAN WHO HAS THE ABILITY, THE FORCE, AND THE DETERMINATION TO OFFSET THE DISASTER WHICH NOW THREATENS CHINA AND OUR OVER-ALL PLANS FOR THE CONQUEST OF JAPAN. I AM PROMOTING STILWELL TO THE RANK OF FULL GENERAL AND I RECOMMEND FOR YOUR MOST URGENT CONSIDERATION THAT YOU RECALL HIM FROM BURMA AND PLACE HIM DIRECTLY UNDER YOU IN COMMAND OF ALL CHINESE AND AMERICAN FORCES, AND THAT YOU CHARGE HIM WITH THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE COORDINATION AND DIRECTION OF THE OPERATIONS REQUIRED TO STEM THE TIDE OF THE ENEMY'S ADVANCES. I FEEL THAT THE CASE OF CHINA IS SO DESPERATE THAT IF RADICAL AND

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9

PROMPTLY APPLIED REMEDIES ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTED, OUR COMMON CAUSE WILL SUFFER A DISASTROUS SET-BACK.

I SINCERELY TRUST THAT YOU WILL NOT BE OFFENDED AT THE FRANKNESS OF MY STATEMENTS AND I ASSURE YOU THAT THERE IS NO INTENT ON MY PART TO DICTATE TO YOU ON MATTERS CONCERNING CHINA; HOWEVER, THE FUTURE OF ALL ASIA IS AT STAKE ALONG WITH THE TREMENDOUS EFFORT WHICH AMERICA HAS EXPENDED IN THAT REGION. THEREFORE I HAVE REASON FOR A PROFOUND INTEREST IN THE MATTER.

PLEASE HAVE IN MIND THAT IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN ITALY, IN FRANCE, AND IN THE PACIFIC THAT AIR POWER ALONE CANNOT STOP A DETERMINED ENEMY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE GERMANS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS AND LAUNCHED DETERMINED COUNTER-ATTACKS THOUGH OVERWHELMINGLY OUTNUMBERED IN THE AIR.

SHOULD YOU AGREE TO GIVING STILWELL SUCH ASSIGNMENT AS I NOW PROPOSE, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT GENERAL SULTAN, A VERY FINE OFFICER WHO IS NOW HIS DEPUTY, BE PLACED IN COMMAND OF THE CHINESE-AMERICAN FORCE IN BURMA, BUT UNDER STILWELL'S DIRECTION.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1205, EWT, 6 July 1944.

*Ogden S. Collins*  
OGDEN S. COLLINS,  
Lieutenant, USNR.

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

4 July 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a proposed message to Chiang Kai Shek are for your consideration.

We are in full agreement that this action is immediately necessary to any chance to save the situation in China.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

*William D. Leahy*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the Commander  
in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure A: Memorandum for The President from U.S. Chiefs of  
Enclosure B: Message from The President to the Staff  
Generalissimo.

[Printed in U.S. Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater,  
Stilwell's Command Problems, 381]



REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

7/4/44

[Printed in Stilwell's Command Problems, 381-382]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

The situation in Central China is deteriorating at an alarming rate. If the Japanese continue their advances to the west, Chennault's 14th Air Force will be rendered ineffective, our very long-range bomber airfields in the Chengtu area will be lost and the collapse of China must inevitably result. Whether or not there is a possibility of our exerting a favorable influence on the chaotic condition in China is questionable. It is our view, however, that drastic measures should be taken immediately in an effort to prevent disaster to the U.S. effort in that region.

The Chinese ground forces in China, in their present state of discipline, training and equipment, and under their present leadership, are impotent. The Japanese forces can, in effect, move virtually unopposed except by geographical logistic difficulties.

From the beginning of the war, we have insisted on the necessity for building up the combat efficiency of the Chinese ground forces, as the only method of providing the necessary security for our air bases in China. The pressure on us from the Generalissimo throughout the war has been to increase the tonnage over the hump for Chennault's air in particular, with the equipment and supply for the ground forces as incidental only. This presents the problem of an immense effort in transportation, with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure. Chennault's air alone can do little more than slightly delay the Japanese advances. We have had abundant proof of this in our operations against the German army.

Our experience against both the Germans and the Japanese in theaters where we have had immensely superior air

~~SECRET~~

power has demonstrated the inability of air forces alone to prevent the movement of trained and determined ground armies. If we have been unable to stop the movement of German ground armies in Italy with our tremendous air power, there is little reason to believe that Chennault, with the comparatively small air force which can be supported in China, can exert a decisive effect on the movement of Japanese ground forces in China. The more effective his bombing of their shipping and the B-29 operations against Japan the more determined will be the Japanese thrusts in China.

Under the present leadership and organization of the Chinese armies, it is purely a question of Japanese intent as to how far they will advance into the interior of China. The serious pass to which China has come is due in some measure to mismanagement and neglect of the Army. Until her every resource, including the divisions at present confronting the communists, is devoted to the war against the Japanese, there is little hope that she can continue to operate with any effectiveness until the end of the war.

The time has come, in our opinion, when all the military power and resources remaining to China must be entrusted to one individual capable of directing that effort in a fruitful way against the Japanese. There is no one in the Chinese Government or armed forces capable of coordinating the Chinese military effort in such a way as to meet the Japanese threat. During this war, there has been only one man who has been able to get Chinese forces to fight against the Japanese in an effective way. That man is General Stilwell.

The British are pressing for a readjustment of command relationships in the Southeast Asia Command, maintaining that General Stilwell's position as Deputy Supreme Commander and that of Commander of the Chinese Corps in India are incompatible. The

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~~SECRET~~

British would undoubtedly concur in the relief of General Stilwell from his present assignment.

After full consideration of the situation in China, we recommend:

a. That you dispatch to the Generalissimo the attached message, urging him to place General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armed forces.

b. That you promote General Stilwell to the temporary grade of General, not only in recognition of his having conducted a brilliant campaign with a force, which he himself made, in spite of continued opposition from within and without and tremendous obstacles of terrain and weather, but in order to give him the necessary prestige for the new position proposed for him in China.

We are fully aware of the Generalissimo's feelings regarding Stilwell, particularly from a political point of view, but the fact remains that he has proved his case or contentions on the field of battle in opposition to the highly negative attitudes of both the British and the Chinese authorities. Had his advice been followed, it is now apparent that we would have cleared the Japanese from northeast Burma before the monsoon and opened the way to effective action in China proper. Had his advice been followed the Chinese ground forces east of the <sup>Hump</sup> hump would have been far better equipped and prepared to resist or at least delay the Japanese advances.

c. That in case Stilwell goes to China, we propose the following arrangements in the Southeast Asia Command to the British Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Sultan to command the Chinese Corps in Burma under the general direction of Stilwell.

**SECRET**

(2) Wheeler, now Senior Administrative Officer on Mountbatten's staff, to succeed Stilwell as Deputy to Mountbatten.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

July 6, 1944

Message from The President to the Generalissimo.

The extremely serious situation which results from Japanese advances in Central China, which threaten not only your Government but all that the U. S. Army has been building up in China, leads me to the conclusion that drastic measures must be taken immediately if the situation is to be saved. The critical situation which now exists, in my opinion calls for the delegation to one individual of the power to coordinate all the allied military resources in China, including the communist forces.

I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless I think he has now clearly demonstrated his far-sighted judgment, his skill in organization and training and, above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China and our over-all plans for the conquest of Japan. I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full General and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American Forces, and that you charge him with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advances. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and promptly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous set-back.

I sincerely trust that you will not be offended at the frankness of my statements and I assure you that there is no intent on my part to dictate to you on matters concerning China; however, the future of all Asia is at stake along with the tremendous effort which America has expended in that region. Therefore I have reason for a profound interest in the matter.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

-1-

ENCL "B"

~~SECRET~~

Please have in mind that it has been clearly demonstrated in Italy, in France, and in the Pacific that air power alone cannot stop a determined enemy. As a matter of fact, the Germans have successfully conducted defensive actions and launched determined counter-attacks though overwhelmingly outnumbered in the air.

Should you agree to giving Stilwell such assignment as I now propose, I would recommend that General Sultan, a very fine officer who is now his Deputy, be placed in command of the Chinese-American force in Burma, but under Stilwell's direction.

*Parsons*

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1944

My dear General:

I have had a most careful study made of the problem presented in your aide-memoire of May 31 on the situation in China.

While our information does not permit complete agreement with that contained in your aide-memoire, we do share with the Generalissimo considerable concern over the movements of the enemy in Central and Southeast China. Every practicable step should be taken to prevent the enemy from consolidating his position in this strategically important area. We have recognized from the beginning the importance of affording Chinese ground forces the maximum of air support. The principle of stationing in China the greatest air strength capable of support by lines of communication from Assam to Kunming has always been fundamental with us.

Acting immediately in this emergency to furnish the Generalissimo's ground forces all possible air support, General Stilwell has taken the following specific action to increase the effectiveness of General Chennault's force:

1500 tons from other activities in China have been diverted to the 14th Air Force.

General Stilwell requested the approval of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the diversion of the 10th Air Force Heavy Bombardment Group to transportation service, thus increasing supplies to the 14th Air Force by about 2000 additional tons. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff have approved this diversion as an emergency measure.

Until Myitkyina is secure, however, and facilities established there, little additional increase in tonnage over the Hump appears feasible. Once the Myitkyina area is available,

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

the wider and lower altitude channel into China with the greater flexibility resulting from these additional facilities, will materially increase our ability to fly supplies over the Hump into China. The need for these additional facilities makes it mandatory that we push the ground offensive in North Burma, both on the Mogaung and the Salween fronts even though we must use some of our air tonnage in the supply of the ground troops operating on these fronts.

During the monsoon, the total tonnage deliverable to China by air will still depend upon the number of instrument let-down fields, for bad weather landings, available in the Kunming area. There are now only two such fields suitably spaced, the one at Kunming and the other at Chengkung, and these are both being operated to capacity. The provision of any substantial tonnage beyond that resulting from the above measures will also require early completion of a third instrument let-down field in the Kunming area. I am therefore hopeful that your government will press the early completion of the field at Luliang. We shall then be able to make full utilization of our available transport aircraft and existing facilities in India, currently restricted by insufficient facilities in China.

Pending the buildup of total Hump lift, General Stilwell will continue to allocate such additional tonnage to the 14th Air Force as is not urgently required for operations on the Salween front and which he considers safe to withdraw from all other activity in China.

Any strengthening of the Chinese Air Force or the flying into China of large quantities of material such as the 2600 tons of rockets you request would necessarily be at the expense of building up the effectiveness of the 14th Air Force and our Chinese-American Wing. We shall continue the steady build up of the Chinese-American Composite Wing whose operations have been of increasing effectiveness. As for the rockets, we are considerably short in production. We have, however, made 500 rocket launchers and 50,000 rockets available for early shipment by air to China.

Due to the present restricted capacity of the United States air line into China and your need for the rockets, I wonder if it would be found practicable to devote

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

- 2 - By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

for the period of the emergency a major share of the tonnage of the China National Aviation Corporation to supplies for the 14th Air Force. This would certainly help.

The resources in the Chengtu area are needed in their entirety for proposed operations against Japan. Their diversion to the 14th Air Force would force an untimely delay of these pending operations.

I am encouraged by the progress of operations on all Burma fronts and am hopeful that the unrelinquished vigor of our joint operations there will permit us to further develop the lines of communication to China.

Sincerely,

*(S) Franklin D. Roosevelt*

General Shang Chen  
Chief of the Chinese Military Mission  
to the United States of America  
2311 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

31 May 1944

AIDE-MEMOIRE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT  
(Delivered by General Shang Chen, 31 May 1944.)

President Chiang Kai-Shek of the National Government of China has directed in his cablegram of May 29th, 1944, that the following information regarding present critical situation in China be transmitted to the President of the United States of America:

I. In Manchuria Japan originally had twenty divisions, five of which, i.e., 2D, 14D, 16D, 52D, and 54D, have already been transferred to the South Pacific prior to the signing of the Fishery Agreement with Soviet Russia, and three more divisions, i.e., 10D, 29D, and 53D, followed after the Agreement has been concluded. In addition, 27D, 71D, 9D, and 28D, have been transferred to China; 11D and 12D are also being transferred to the south. Now it has come to our knowledge that 28D is in the Honan battle-front and 9D in Hongkong. At present Japan's total strength in Manchuria is only six divisions.

II. Four hundred seventy-one (471) trainloads of enemy troops moved southward from Manchuria via the Tientsin-Pukow Railway during the period of March 1 and April 8, 1944, and again one hundred thirty-three (133) trainloads between April 9 and May 8. Enemy troops numbering sixty thousand (60,000) also reached Nanking between May 8 to 13. Ever since March 1 troops totalling approximately five hundred thousand (500,000) have been transported uninterruptedly by rail to the south on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

III. The enemy has already taken definite steps to reinforce his troops in the war areas of China with units of the Kwangtung Army and to launch a general offensive in all directions.

(1) In North China, the enemy has succeeded in crossing the Yellow River on April 18 and is pushing south along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and also attacking on the west from the Lunghai Railway. His aim is to seize the entire line of the Peiping-Hankow Railway and to threaten Sian, the seat of China's war of resistance in the north-west.

(2) In Wuhan of Central China, the enemy has concentrated 3D, 13D, 27D, 34D, 39D, 40D, 58D, 68D, and 116D, as well as 17, 5, 7, and 12 Independent Brigades, totalling eleven (11) divisions; and beginning from May 25 has crossed the Sinchiang River and is attacking Changsha from four different columns. In Canton, the enemy has concentrated four (4) divisions, attempting to attack from both the North and the South with the ultimate aim to seize the Canton-Hankow Railway and to occupy the airfields in Kweilin and Hengyang.

(3) In Indo-China, the enemy is now concentrating his troops ready to attack Kuming.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

(4) Part of the enemy troops moving south from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway is now concentrating in the central part of the Yangtze River thereby threatening Chungking.

IV. President Chiang believes that the most immediate and effective ways to remedy the present critical situation in China are:

(1) The 14th U.S. Army Air Force should be strengthened. With the exception of whatever small amount that is absolutely necessary, the air tonnage between India and Kurming should all be allocated for the shipment of gasoline and spare parts for the said Air Force. It is therefore urgently requested that the total tonnage for shipment of supplies to the 14th U.S. Army Air Force be increased to at least ten thousand (10,000) tons.

(2) The enemy has already commenced attacking the Canton-Hankow Railway and intends to seize the entire railway line in a month's time. Unless the air force along the Canton-Hankow Railway be immediately strengthened, in case the enemy should succeed in seizing the railway line and realize his dreams of conquest of the continent of East Asia, it would mean a delay of at least three more years in defeating Japan. Request is therefore made that the entire stock of gasoline, spare parts and aircrafts stored in Chengtu be immediately turned over to the 14th U.S. Army Air Force to be concentrated for operation along the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

(3) It is also requested that the Chinese Air Force be strengthened, if possible.

(4) The ground troops should also be strengthened. Request is made to have eight thousand (8,000) launcher rockets, each with one hundred (100) ammunition, delivered as soon as possible in order that the fire power of the Chinese troops in the various war areas may be effectively increased.

to Jerry

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Memo for  
Admiral Leahy

I told the President

you asked if

he wanted to

send something

like this. He

said he thought

it was not

necessary. JS

ROUGH DRAFT

~~SECRET~~  
From: The President.  
To : Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

General Shang Chen delivered your aide memoire to me a week or more ago and I have had careful studies made to see what we can do to help. General Marshall will inform Stilwell. We will continue every effort to increase our assistance to you.

ROOSEVELT.

*This is approved  
WS*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 15 1972

**TOP SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

**Subject: Delivery of Messages to Chiang Kai Shek from the President.**

In reply to your memorandum dated May 3, 1944, reference the delivery of your messages to Chiang Kai Shek, the following message has been sent to General Stilwell:

"The President in forwarding Gauss' message of 24 April re delivery of messages to CKS has indicated that he desires if possible that all messages from the President to Chiang be delivered in person to Chiang with a careful Chinese translation.

"It is desired that you take the necessary action to carry out the President's desires."

We have further requested him to inform us promptly as to the date of delivery of such messages.

Acting Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

**DECLASSIFIED**

**EOB** MAR. 5200,9 (9/27/58)

Return to Originating Office of War Dept.  
Showing Action Taken Into- MAR 10 1972



**TOP SECRET**

Signature- *BJP*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1944

  
MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL MARSHALL.

Enclosed is a copy of a message dated April 28, 1944, received from the Department of State.

If you consider it possible for General Hearn to deliver directly in person to Chiang, with a careful Chinese translation, all messages from the President to Chiang, I should like to have you issue the necessary instructions.

F. D. R.

(Sgd) FDR

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL LEAHY.

TO LOOK INTO.

F.D.R.

*adm. Leahy -  
attached hereto are  
copies of the messages  
referred to.*

*Pr  
-  
Pres. Chiang # 17956.  
# 16747.*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1944.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A secret telegram of April 24 from Ambassador Gauss reports a strictly confidential conversation with General Hearn, Chief of Staff to General Stilwell, in which General Hearn informed the Ambassador that (1) a message from the President to Chiang in regard to an important military matter (assumed to relate to the use of American-trained Chinese troops in western Yunnan against the Japanese in Burma) had been delivered to Madame Chiang in accordance with usual Army procedure; (2) Hearn had reason to believe that Madame Chiang had not delivered the message promptly to Chiang and that Madame Chiang had even sought to have the President's message toned down; and (3) the chief military aide to Chiang stated that he was not informed of the receipt of any message on the subject by Chiang. Some days later General Hearn informed the Ambassador that the message had been received by Chiang in some form and that Madame Chiang had told him (Hearn) that action would be taken; that Chiang would not reply to the President directly; but that our military would be informed of the action through Chinese military channels.

Ambassador Gauss comments to the Department on reports of marital intranquility between the Chiangs. (Informed officers of the Department state that such reports have been current for a number of years. They are inclined to discount the importance of these reports but they do not discount the very real importance of employing channels more direct and official than Madame Chiang for communicating messages from the President to Chiang.)

Ambassador Gauss informed General Hearn that the Embassy endeavored always to deliver messages for Chiang personally even though there might be some delay in doing so and that, when personal delivery was impracticable, delivery was made through the Foreign Office.

The Department has telegraphed to Ambassador Gauss requesting him (1) to suggest to General Hearn that, if he has not already done so, he inform the War Department of the situation; and (2) to suggest again to General Hearn that he deliver messages from the President for Chiang directly and in person accompanied by a careful Chinese translation.

C. H.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By RJA Date MAR 10 1972



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FROM General Marshall TO General Stilwell

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE Unno, 8 May 44

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TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT:

Instructions for delivery of Presidential messages to Chiang Kai-shek.

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ACTION:

1. On 28 April 44, Sec State sent a memorandum to the President citing marital intransquility between the Chiangs, and delayed delivery and apparent revision of President's messages to Chiang. (Cites specifically PRES-CHIANG 17956, 3 Apr 44.)

2. President referred to Admiral Leahy, 3 May 44, by memo stating "To look into. F.D.R."

3. By memo to Gen Marshall, 3 May 44, President sent Sec State's memo of 28 Apr 44 to Gen Marshall, requesting him to issue necessary instructions to Stilwell for future delivery of messages to Stilwell.

4. By memo of 8 May 44, President was advised that instructions had been sent to Stilwell.

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COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*To President at Navamans  
as White 96, 23/12252.*

ES ONLY

**EYES ONLY**

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces, China Burma India,  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

Number CFB 16433, 23 April 1944

Eyes alone Marshall for transmission to President Roosevelt of this message from the Gissimo sgd Hearn, this being a paraphrased copy of message CFB 16433.

"I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your telegram of 13 April regarding the command of the very long range Strategic Air Forces in the China Theater. I shall endeavour my utmost to facilitate the missions of these long range bombing operations under my jurisdiction in order to achieve the perfect coordination necessary for success."

Signed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.

ACTION: White House

No Sig

INFORMATION: CofS

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

By R. H. Parks Date 10-30-72

CM-IN-16972 (23 Apr 44)

1035Z bjm

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PRIORITY

13 APRIL 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NO : WAR22891

FOR STILLWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ONLY FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOW-  
ING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

YOUR MESSAGE CFB 16035 RECEIVED. WILL BE GLAD TO SEE AMBASSADOR WEI  
WHEN HE RETURNS. IN MEANTIME WILL HAVE YOUR PROBLEMS VERY MUCH IN MIND.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2300, FWT, 13 April 1944

*Ogden S. Collins Jr.*  
OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.  
Lieutenant USNR

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

FROM Chiang Kai-Shek	TO The President
SERIAL 16433	DATE 23 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Command of VLR bombers.	

ACTION

1. Answers PRES-CAS 22183, 12 Apr 44.
2. Sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 96, 231225Z.
3. In BLA Ca 62, 241450Z, the President stated, "No reply will be made to White 96."

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

FROM	The President	TO	Chiang Kai Shek
SERIAL	WAR 22891	DATE	13 Apr 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT "Will be glad to see Ambassador Wei."			

**ACTION**

Answers CHIANG's CFB 16035, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 24, 13/1605Z. President sent this reply in BLACK 14, 14/0147Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
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**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*To President at Macassar  
as White 24, 13/16052.*

**EXCERPTS ONLY**

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

Re: GFB 16035, 13 April 1944

Eyes alone General Marshall signed Hearn for delivery following message from The Generalissimo to the President. Cite our GFB 16035.

"I am in receipt of your message of April 10th and I sincerely accept your recommendations. China's policy towards world problems and towards the common enemy alike in belief and action is identical with that of the US and I gladly support your ideas. However, looking at the realities of the situation here, I greatly fear it is not in the exercise of self restraint on the part of China alone that the real answer could be found; should even more serious developments occur, which would not permit the problem to be postponed until the end of the war against Japan, it will have unfortunate consequences on the world as a whole.

Therefore I feel confident that you will exert your best efforts wherever possible, so that the policy of extreme restraint on my part may prove effective.

CM-TH-9198 (13 Apr 44)

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

By R. H. Parks Date 10-20-72

**SECRET**

COPY No. 1  
*White House*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

~~EYES ONLY~~

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Forward Echelon, New Delhi, India

Page 1/2

Ref: OFB 16035, 13 April 1944

I have asked Ambassador Wei to return to Washington and he will be able to let you know the full situation. Signed Chiang Kai Shek."

No Sig.

ACTION: White House

OM-IN-9298 (13 APR 44) 1421Z bjm

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

By R. H. Parks Date 10-22-72

1

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

FROM Chiang Kai Shek	TO The President
SERIAL 16035	DATE 13 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Sinkiang incident; China's policy of restraint.	

ACTION

Answers PRES #20631, 8 Apr 44.

To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 24, 13/1605Z.  
President sent reply in BLACK 14, 14/0147Z.

Reply sent to Chiang as PRES #WAR 22891.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:	

~~SECRET~~

12 APRIL 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NO : 22183

FOR STILWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ONLY FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

GENERAL STILWELL HAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION YOUR VIEWS WITH REGARD TO COMMAND OF THE VLR STRATEGIC AIR FORCES BASED IN CHINA.

IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT ALL THE VLR BOMBERS BASED IN DIFFERENT AREAS MUST BE UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND IN ORDER TO SO COORDINATE THEIR EFFORT AS TO SECURE MAXIMUM EFFECT AGAINST THE ENEMY. THIS SINGLE COMMAND STRATEGIC DIRECTION WILL BE EXERCISED FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF BY GENERAL ARNOLD WITH HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON.

IN ALL AREAS THE COORDINATION OF VLR OPERATIONS WITH THOSE OF OTHER OR LOCAL UNITS WILL BE UNDER THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE THEATRE CONCERNED. IN THE CHINA THEATRE IT WILL BE UNDER YOU.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR WIDESPREAD COOPERATION OF THE VLR BOMBER GROUPS.

CARE WILL BE TAKEN TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED IN REGARD TO DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF TO VLR BOMBERS BASED IN AREAS UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1705, EWT, 12 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

At the President's direction, a message has been sent to the Generalissimo along the lines proposed by you yesterday.

A paraphrased copy of the message as sent is transmitted herewith to you by further direction of the President.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assist. Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl.  
Msg, President to Generalissimo, 12 Apr 44.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

DATE: 12 APRIL 1944

Your views with regard to command of the VLR Strategic Air Forces based in China has been brought to my attention by General Stilwell.

In order to so coordinate their effort as to secure maximum effect against the enemy, it has been decided that all the VLR bombers based in different areas must be under a single command. General Arnold, with headquarters in Washington, will exercise this single strategic direction for the Chiefs of Staff.

The Supreme Commander in the theatre concerned will have under him the coordination of VLR operations with those of other or local units and this will be you in the China Theatre.

You will understand, I am sure, the advantage of this arrangement for widespread cooperation of the VLR bomber groups.

We will take care to see that you are fully informed concerning directives issued by the Chiefs of Staff to VLR bombers which are based in areas over which you have jurisdiction.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

DECLASSIFIED

DATE 10/11/82 BY 1-11-72

EX-111

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

11 April 1944

White 9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Stilwell informs me that the Generalissimo insists that he command the VLR (B-29) Project. He maintains that his authority in relation to our VLR forces should be the same as he enjoys in connection with 14th Air Force. As stated by General Stilwell, no trouble is anticipated if we inform the Generalissimo that his authority in this matter is the same as that of Supreme Commanders in other theatres to which units of the VLR are to be sent.

It is suggested that you dispatch a message to him along the lines of the attached draft. This requirement on the part of the Generalissimo is primarily a matter of face.

*[Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

*Answered by Black 10  
transmitting message from  
President to Chiang Kai Shek.*

Incl.  
Draft of message

112015Z-08C

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of Sec. Army  
by TAG per 720724  
~~TOP SECRET~~ By RAPR Date JUN 14 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT

General Stilwell has brought to my attention your views with regard to command of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces (VLR) based in China. The operations of the very long range bombers which are being based in China must be coordinated with the direction of similar units which are being based in other theaters. Their objectives will usually be remote from their bases, as are those of the Pacific Fleet, for example, and their employment to secure maximum effect against the enemy must be closely coordinated with similar groups and with the rapidly moving campaign in the Pacific.

For these reasons, it is necessary that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff retain the strategic direction of all of the very long range bombers wherever they may be based, that is, the deployment or redeployment of the planes and the assignment of missions, including priority of targets. The coordination of their operations with those of other or local units will be under the Supreme Commander in the particular theater concerned, which in this case is Your Excellency.

To secure the desired flexibility of this Strategic Force a new Air organization, of which the 20th Bomber Command (now moving into the Far East) is a part, has been created under the direct control of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. It will operate under the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, General Arnold, with headquarters here in Washington.

Care will be taken to keep you fully informed as to strategic decisions made or directives issued by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with regard to the missions of very long range bombers from areas under your jurisdiction.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 720724

By REVER Date JUN 14 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM The President	TO Chiang Kai-Shek
SERIAL 22183	DATE 12 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Command of VLR bombers.	

**ACTION**

1. On 11 Apr 44, Gen Marshall sent to the Map Room a memo for the President enclosing suggested message to Chiang Kai-Shek. This was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 9, 11 Apr 44.
2. In BLACK 10, 122042Z, the President sent to the Map Room for transmission a message to Kai-Shek (Revision of Gen Marshall's draft-WHITE 9.)
3. Paraphrased copy to Gen Marshall by direction of the President.
4. Answered by Chiang Kai-Shek's #16433, 23 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

~~TOP SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

8 April 1944

*W.D.L.*

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NO. : WAR 20631

FOR STILWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ONLY FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

I APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERATION IN FULLY INFORMING ME IN REGARD TO THE INCIDENT ON THE OUTER MONGOLIAN-SINKIANG BORDER AND HAVE GIVEN THE MATTER IMMEDIATE AND CAREFUL ATTENTION.

THE OCCURRENCE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES AT A TIME WHEN UNITY AMONG ALL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IS EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE. IT APPEARS THAT NO FURTHER INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE MIDDLE OF MARCH AND I THEREFORE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT EVERY PRECAUTION WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID MEASURES WHICH MIGHT GIVE RISE TO A RECURRENCE OF DIFFICULTIES. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT ANY ATTITUDE OR ACTION WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL TO OUR UNITED EFFORT IN WINNING THE WAR WOULD BE UNWARRANTED AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH MAY ARISE AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE DISPELLED BY THE EXERCISE OF SELF-RESTRAINT AND GOOD-WILL.

AFTER ALL, THE WORLD AS A WHOLE WOULD FEEL THAT PERSPECTIVE AND PROPORTION ARE WHOLLY OUT OF LINE IF INCIDENTS ON THE OUTER MONGOLIA-SINKIANG BORDER BECOME DETRIMENTAL TO THE GREAT OBJECTIVE OF WINNING THE WAR AND DESTROYING THE DANGER OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION FOR ALL TIME.

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By E. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

AS A MATTER OF PRACTICAL REALISM, I SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENT  
INCIDENTS BE PLACED ON ICE UNTIL THE END OF THIS WAR WITHOUT ABANDON-  
MENT OF ANY SOVEREIGNTY OR RIGHT BY ANYONE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1700, 8 April 1944

*Richard Park, Jr.*

RICHARD PARK, JR.  
Colonel, General Staff

~~SECRET~~

12 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This memorandum is to confirm the message conveyed yesterday by telephone to Mr. Gray of your office by Captain Price.

The President has approved the State Department's request to send to Ambassador Gaus a summary of the President's message to the Generalissimo of 8 April regarding Outer Mongolia-Sinkiang border incidents. A paraphrase of this message is in the hands of the Department.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

6 April 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be informed that your drafted reply to the Generalissimo from the President has been approved and dispatched on 8 April 1944. A paraphrased copy of this message is attached herewith.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc. (HW)  
Msg. President to  
Generalissimo, 8 Apr 44.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 April 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~  
PARAPHRASE

From: The President

To : Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek

I have given the matter with regard to the Outer Mongolian-Sinkiang Border incident immediate and careful attention and I am appreciative of your consideration in fully informing me of this.

It is extremely unfortunate that these difficulties have occurred at a time when unity of all United Nations is so essential to the effective prosecution of the war. In order to avoid measures which might give rise to recurrence of the difficulties, it is my earnest hope that every precaution will be taken in the future, as it appears that no further incidents have occurred since the middle of March. I am sure you will agree that, under the circumstances, any attitude or action which would be harmful to our united effort in winning the war would be unwarranted. By exercising self-restraint and good-will, I am confident that misunderstandings which may arise among members of the United Nations can be dispelled.

The world as a whole, after all, would feel that perspective and proportion are wholly out of line if the Outer Mongolian-Sinkiang Border incidents become detrimental to the great objectives of winning the war and for all time destroying the aggression of the Japanese.

My suggestion is that the recent incidents be placed on ice until the end of the war, as a matter of practical realism, without anyone abandoning any sovereignty or right.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

7 April 44.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is some doubt in our mind as to the advisability of being more "definite" in this matter. The most recent telegram from our Ambassador at Chungking (no. 618, April 6) reports that:

Some usually well informed Chinese state Generalissimo now desires avoid magnifying incident and that he may endeavor remove Sheng Shih Tasi (semi-autonomous military commander and chairman of the provincial government) both as means of placating Soviet Russia and of increasing Central Government influences in Sinkiang. Movement of Central Government troops into Sinkiang would be necessary with removal of Sheng contemplated."

The telegram also refers to alleged statement of Chinese official that "Chinese Government brought incident to attention of American and British representatives -- in hope of obtaining Anglo-American intervention against Soviet and increasing friction between Anglo-American powers and Russia...."

If your additional statements are to be included it is suggested that they be modified. We believe it inadvisable to include the final paragraph. The Soviet Government has not communicated with us in the matter. There is every probability that Chiang would accept your suggestion, but there is every probability that the Soviet Government would resent such an approach and that no advantage would be gained. In your second paragraph you may consider it inadvisable to raise, by implication, expectation that we may be involved in a settlement of the status of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Government recognized "Chinese sovereignty" over Outer Mongolia but in dealing with Outer Mongolia, accords it consideration as an independent state. In your first paragraph it is suggested that, for the phrase "in Outer Mongolia", there be substituted the phrase "on the Outer Mongolia-Sinkiang border".



CH

I appreciate your consideration in fully informing me in regard to the incident on the Outer Mongolian-Sinkiang border and have given the matter immediate and careful attention.

The occurrence of these difficulties at a time when unity among all of the United Nations is so essential to the effective prosecution of the war is extremely unfortunate. It appears that no further incidents have occurred since the middle of March and I therefore earnestly hope that every precaution will be taken to avoid measures which might give rise to a recurrence of difficulties. Under the circumstances I am sure you will agree that any attitude or action which would be harmful to our united effort in winning the war would be unwarranted and I am confident that misunderstandings which may arise among members of the United Nations can be dispelled by the exercise of self-restraint and good-will.

After all, the world as a whole would feel that perspective and proportion are wholly out of line if incidents <sup>in the</sup> Outer Mongolia <sup>in Sinkiang</sup> become detrimental to the great objective of winning the war and destroying the danger of Japanese aggression for all time.

As a matter of practical realism, I suggest that the present incidents be placed on ice until the end of this war without abandonment of any sovereignty or right by anyone.

If you think it advisable I would be glad to telegraph the Soviets to this effect.

ROOSEVELT

*FR*

APR 10 1944  
RECEIVED  
STATE DEPT.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I want to be a little bit more definite with Chiang. What do you think of my adding the enclosed to the draft of message you sent to me?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I want to be a little bit more definite with Chiang. What do you think of my adding the enclosed to the draft of message you sent to me?

F. D. R.

Hold until  
released by Treasurer  
WS.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to President Chiang Kai-shek's message to you, contained in the War Department's message, no. 15672 of April 4, 1944, in regard to incidents on the border between Sinkiang Province and Outer Mongolia, which message was referred to me for comment by Admiral Leahy, I attach for your consideration a draft of a suggested reply which you may wish to send to President Chiang Kai-shek.

If you approve of the draft reply, I think it would be helpful, if you concur, that the essential part of President Chiang Kai-shek's message to you and the substance of your reply be communicated to Ambassador Gauss for his information.

CH

Enclosure:

Draft message to  
President Chiang Kai-shek.



DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RMG Date 3-10-72

FROM The President TO Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek  
SERIAL or FILE NO.  
DATE 20631, 8 April 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA  
SUBJECT: Outer Mongolian-Sinkian border incident

ACTION:

1. Answers CHIANG-PRES, 15672, 4 Apr 44, which was referred to the Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply, 6 April 44.
2. By memo, 7 April 1944, Sec. Hull submitted a draft message for the President's approval, and suggested that if message were sent to Chiang, that essential parts of Chiang's 15672 and the President's reply be communicated to Ambassador Gauss for his information.
3. 7 April 1944, President returned Sec Hull's proposed draft with addition of three paragraphs written by the President, with note saying, "I want to be a little bit more definite with Chiang. What do you think of my adding the enclosed to the draft of message you sent to me?"
4. Returned to the President on evening of 7 Apr 44 by Sec Hull with memo stating, "There is some doubt in our mind as to the advisability of being more 'definite' in this matter....If your additional statements are to be included it is suggested that they be modified. We believe it inadvisable to include the final paragraph."
5. Final paragraph deleted by the President; minor modification made in message. This message sent 8 Apr 44.
6. Paraphrased copy to Sec State on 8 Apr 44. On 12 April, Sec State was advised that President approved of sending summary to Ambassador Gauss, as requested in Sec Hull's memo to the President, 7 Apr 44 (see Para 2 above).

(O V E R)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Sec State for Ambassador Gauss	12 Apr 44	The President

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

To President via *ushe*  
051100Z  
State Department  
Ready for prep of reply

GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India,  
Forward Echelon Chungking, China

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72

To: War Department

By R. H. Parks Date 10-10-72

Nr: 15672, 4th April 1944

Eyes alone to General Marshall for the President  
from Chiang Kai Shek from Hearn cite our 15672.

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your two telegrams of March 22nd and April 1st in reply to my message concerning the Sinkiang incidents. I was on the point of replying when much to my surprise the Soviet Government suddenly released yesterday its version of the incidents. With the desire of keeping you fully informed I append below the latest developments.

Subsequent to the incidents which occurred on and before March 13th, a lone Soviet plane appeared on March 14th and again machine gunned our troops, while on March 15th 5 Soviet planes carried out further bombing attacks. In order to prevent aggravation of the situation our troops obeyed orders to withdraw to Erh Tai, which is 120 kilometers within Sinkiang, but Soviet planes followed and both bombed and machine gunned them. During the period from March 16th to 22nd Soviet planes made repeated reconnaissance flights in the region.

Our foreign office on 4 occasions asked the Soviet Ambassador Mr. Paniushkin for explanations and urged that the Soviet Government investigate the identity of the planes with a view to preventing a recurrence of these incidents.

However, no reply was made to our communications until March 31st, which was the day after the conclusion of the Soviet Japanese agreements covering fisheries rights and North Sakhalin oil and coal concessions. On that day the Soviet Ambassador called on our Foreign Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong and made the following oral communication;

CM-IN 2949 (5 Apr 1944)

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 2

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

**EYES ONLY**

Page 2

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India,  
Forward Echelon Chungking, China

Nr: 15572, 4th April 1944

"According to reliable information obtained by the Soviet Government, the local authorities in Sinkiang started to move the Kazak population from the Altai area to the southern part of the Province in the latter part of 1943. Some of the Kazaks, who were opposed to this transfer, fled across the frontier into the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. The authorities of the Mongolian People's Republic, in view of the fact that their Kazaks were seeking refuge, admitted them into Mongolian territory. Thereupon the Chinese troops in the north-eastern part of Sinkiang, who were pursuing the Kazaks, invaded the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic and machine gunned from the air these refugees and some inhabited localities of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Under these circumstances the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic were constrained to take appropriate measures to resist the Sinkiang troops which had violated Mongolian territory.

In view of the above, I have the honour to declare under the instructions of the Soviet Government that, if the Sinkiang troops should again violate the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in future, the Soviet Government, in accordance with the protocol signed between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic on March 12th, 1936, would be compelled to extend to the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic all necessary assistance and support for protecting the safety of the territory of the said republic."

I have directed the Foreign Minister to make the following oral reply;

"Based on reliable information in the possession of my Government while our troops were engaged in the suppression of Bandits in the A-San region, which is situated in Sinkiang, 75 kilometers within the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia border,

GN-IV-2949 (5 Apr 44)

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

2

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

By H. H. Patten Dtd. 10-20-72  
10-5-72

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Page 3

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India,  
Forward Echelon Chungking, China

Nr: 15672, 4th April 1944

they were subjected to machine gun and bombing attacks by airplanes bearing the Red Star insignia. During the operations of our troops at no time was any AG plane employed by us. These facts have all been duly communicated to your Excellency in our previous conversations.

According to Article 5 of the agreement on the general principles for the settlement of the questions between China and the Soviet Union signed on May 31st, 1924, the Soviet Government recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein. Upon the signing of the protocol between the Soviet Union and the so called Mongolian People's Republic on March 12th, 1936, the Chinese Government on the 7th of the following month lodged a formal protest with the Soviet Government. N Litvinov then Foreign Commissar of the USSR stated in his reply dated April 8th 1936 that "The Soviet Government confirms once more that the above mentioned agreement (the Sino Soviet agreement of 1924), as far as the USSR is concerned, remains in force in future."

The above clearly reveals Soviet policy in the Far East, vitally affecting the general war situation. My Government regards the question as having entered a crucial stage, and cannot but consider the adoption of necessary measures. I believe you will also regard this as a vital matter which has arisen among the United Nations, and consequently would appreciate your advice thereon.

No Sig

ACTION: White House

CM-IN-2949 (5 Apr 44)

0145Z med

*Rec'd 050510Z-066  
TPVU 051200Z*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Index, 10-5-72

By R. H. Parks Date 10-10-72

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 2

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FROM Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek TO The President

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SERIAL or FILE NO.

15672, 4 April 1944

---

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

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SUBJECT:

Sinkiang bombing incident.

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ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-CHIANG #4783, 20 Mar 44 (here referred to as 22 Mar), and PRES-CHIANG #16747, 31 Mar (here referred to as 1 Apr 44). Sent to the President via usher.
2. Referred to Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply, 6 April 1944.
3. By memo, 7 April 1944, Sec. Hull submitted a draft message for the President's approval, and suggested that if message were sent to Chiang, that essential parts of Chiang's 15672 and the President's reply be communicated to Ambassador Gauss for his information.
4. 7 April 1944, President returned Sec Hull's proposed draft with addition of three paragraphs written by the President, with note saying, "I want to be a little bit more definite with Chiang. What do you think of my adding the enclosed to the draft of message you sent to me?"
5. Returned to the President on evening of 7 Apr 44 by Sec Hull with memo stating, "There is some doubt in our mind as to the advisability of being more 'definite' in this matter....If your additional statements are to be included it is suggested that they be modified. We believe it inadvisable to include the final paragraph."
6. Final paragraph deleted by the President; minor modification made in message; sent to Chiang on 8 April 44 as WAR 20631.

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COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State for Amb Gauss

12 April 44

The President

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Ben*  
*to file*  
*File*  
*WB.*

4 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Mission to North China.

General Stilwell has informed me that the Generalissimo refuses to authorize any U. S. officer or Consular official to go into the Yen-an District (Communistic Area). This amounts to a withdrawal of his statement to you in his message of 23 February 1944, in which he indicated, "he would do all he could to facilitate the plan." Refusal to permit the mission to enter Communistic areas negates the purpose of the proposed mission.

In view of the importance of persuading the Generalissimo to order some offensive action by the Yunnan force, I doubt the advisability of pressing him at this time to reverse his decision regarding the visit to the Yen-an District.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 720724

By PH/RS Date JUN 14 1972

*[Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

*Since above was dictated the attached message from Chungking has arrived.*

*I still think my proposal is par. 2 above is sound. yes*



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

From: General Stilwell

April 1, 1944

To: General Marshall

The Ambassador and I are in agreement that it is essential that an observer mission proceed without delay to the Communist Areas. Military reasons include the need of remedying the present flow of enemy intelligence from north China and Manchuria, assistance to air operations, including evasion and rescue work in guerrilla and occupied areas which will become of increasing importance, and study of possible utilization of Communist guerrillas in ground operations in North China. Political reasons include the important bearing of Chinese Communist relations with the Central Government and with Russia on future developments in China, particularly the North and Manchuria.

We therefore feel that there is strong ground for the President to address the Gissimo along the following lines:

With reference to my radiogram delivered to you on February 10th and your reply thereto on February 22nd, we have been informed that you have discussed with General Stilwell the question of the dispatch of the purely investigatory American observer mission to Yen-an and the so-called border or Communist Areas. I am confident that you will wish to reconsider your stated attitude in regard to this matter. I base this confidence on your spirit of cooperation, on the vital need of expelling all possible sources of enemy intelligence from North China, and on the necessity of giving all practical support to our forthcoming expanded air operations over North China, including such measures, important to morale both to the personnel involved and to their families at home, as organization of assistance to air crews in distress.

I can see no reasonable ground for objection in any friendly quarter to a visit to Yen-an and the border areas by an American observer mission whose findings will be of benefit to the Chinese as well as to the American forces, China's only ally actually engaged in helping to drive the Japanese from Chinese soil. I am therefore directing General Stilwell to prepare for the dispatch of a mission to that area about April 15th and earnestly hope that you will telegraph me that you fully approve. I may say frankly, in the spirit of our talks at Cairo, that I very much fear that failure to extend this important facility to the United States forces in the China Theater, if it should become known as it must surely, could not but seriously affect the universal good will toward China of the American people and their continuing confidence in China's whole hearted cooperation in an all-out effort to defeat our common enemy, Japan. (End of proposed message)

Naval attache is informing Navy Department of his concurrence and asking its support. Please transmit a copy of this to Secretary of State.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of Sec Army

by TAG per 720724

By RH Date JUN 14 1972

C O P Y

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NO : WAR 17956

3 APRIL 1944

FOR STILWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ONLY FOR TRANSMISSION OF  
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE BY THE JAPS IN THE IMPHAL AREA IS  
DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE L-OF-C WHICH MAKES POSSIBLE THE  
TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS TO CHINA. IF THE JAPANESE SUCCEED  
IN THEIR INTENTIONS IN THIS DRIVE, THEY CAN THEN CONCENTRATE  
AGAINST AND DESTROY THE LEDO FORCE AND TURN AGAINST YOUR "Y"  
FORCE AT THEIR LEISURE.

THE BRITISH ARE ABLY MEETING THE STRONG JAPANESE THREAT TO  
THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION TO CHINA AND THE SUPPLY ROUTE WHICH  
SUPPORTS YOUR CORPS IN THE MOGAUNG VALLEY.

WHILE HEAVY FIGHTING IS IN PROGRESS IN WEST BURMA AND ON  
THE ARAKAN COAST, THE SALWEEN FRONT HAS REMAINED QUIET AND AS  
A RESULT THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DIVERT ELEMENTS OF THE  
56TH DIVISION TO MEET STILWELL'S THRUST DOWN THE MOGAUNG VALLEY  
AND THE THREAT OF THE LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUPS IN NORTH  
BURMA. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO ME THAT YOUR "Y" FORCES, WITH  
THEIR AMERICAN EQUIPMENT, WOULD BE UNABLE TO ADVANCE AGAINST  
THE JAPANESE 56TH DIVISION IN ITS PRESENT DEPLETED STRENGTH.  
TO ME THE TIME IS RIPE FOR ELEMENTS OF YOUR 71ST ARMY GROUP TO  
ADVANCE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY AND SEIZE THE TENGCHUNG-LUNGLING  
AREAS. A SHELL OF A DIVISION OPPOSES YOU ON THE SALWEEN.  
YOUR ADVANCE TO THE WEST CANNOT HELP BUT SUCCEED.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1977

~~SECRET~~

TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JUST SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY, WE HAVE, DURING THE PAST YEAR, BEEN EQUIPPING AND TRAINING YOUR "Y" FORCES. IF THEY ARE NOT TO BE USED IN THE COMMON CAUSE OUR MOST STRENUOUS AND EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO FLY IN EQUIPMENT AND TO FURNISH INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED. THEY SHOULD NOT BE HELD BACK ON THE GROUNDS THAT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH BURMA COAST IS NECESSARY PRIOR TO THEIR ADVANCE. PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS NEGATE SUCH A REQUIREMENT. THE JAP HAS DEPLOYED THE BULK OF 7 DIVISIONS IN HIS OPERATIONS ON THE ARAKAN, THE CHINDWIN, AND IN THE LOGAUNG VALLEY.

I DO HOPE YOU CAN ACT.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1425, EWT, 3 April 1944.

*Boyce P. Price*

BOYCE P. PRICE,  
Captain, C. E.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

3 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Our information from Burma is to the effect that a part of the Japanese 56th Division has been withdrawn from the Chinese Salween (Yunnan) Front in an effort to check the operations of the Ledo Forces and of the Long Range Penetration Groups. This has necessarily weakened the Japanese on this front, where they have now something less than a full division opposing the Yunnan Forces of approximately ten divisions. The Chinese Yunnan Forces should and could, in my opinion, advance. I do not believe the Generalissimo will act unless you urge him to. I, therefore, suggest that you dispatch a message to him along the lines of the attached draft.

  
Chief of Staff.

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By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 720724

By RH/RS Date JUN 14 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT

The present offensive by the Japs in the Imphal area is directed primarily against the L-of-C which makes possible the transportation of materials to China. If the Japanese succeed in their intentions in this drive, they can then concentrate against and destroy the Ledo Force and turn against your "Y" Force at their leisure.

The British are ably meeting the strong Japanese threat to the line of communication to China and the supply route which supports your Corps in the Mogaung Valley.

While heavy fighting is in progress in West Burma and on the Arakan Coast, the Salween front has remained quiet and as a result the Japanese have been able to divert elements of the 56th Division to meet Stilwell's thrust down the Mogaung Valley and the threat of the long range penetration groups in North Burma. It is inconceivable to me that your "Y" Forces, with their American equipment, would be unable to advance against the Japanese 56th Division in its present depleted strength. To me the time is ripe for elements of your 71st Army Group to advance without further delay and seize the Tengchung-Lungling areas. A shell of a division opposes you on the Salween. Your advance to the West cannot help but succeed.

To take advantage of just such an opportunity, we have, during the past year, been equipping and training your "Y" Forces. If they are not to be used in the common cause our most strenuous and extensive efforts to fly in equipment and to furnish instructional personnel have not been justified. They should not be held back on the grounds that an amphibious operation against the South Burma coast

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Stewart Date Jan 10 1972

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is necessary prior to their advance. Present developments negate such a requirement. The Jap has deployed the bulk of 7 divisions in his operations on the Arakan, the Chindwin, and in the Mogaung Valley.

*I do hope you can act*

*Roosevelt*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

General Marshall has asked me to send the two attached messages to you with the request that they be called to the attention of the President.



H. M. PASCO,  
Lt. Col., General Staff,  
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

2 incls.  
Radio to Gen. Marshall  
fr Gen. Stilwell  
Radio to Gen. Marshall  
fr Hearn

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By Authority of Sec. Army  
by TAG per 220724  
By RAH/ks Date JUN 14 1972



~~SECRET~~

2 April 1944

FOR MARSHALL FROM STILWELL, Number CHC 95.

For the purpose of arranging all possible cooperation and to clarify Mountbatten's needs in Imphal area, I have arranged a conference with Mountbatten tomorrow, April 3rd, at Jorhat. Am expecting request for Chinese troops in Dinapur area. Our further progress will be stopped if it comes to this. I will have to release the 38th Division and arrival of troops from China will not be in sufficient time to avoid a slowdown in our offensive. Of any diversions, Generalissimo will have to be informed and despite vital necessity for protection of Assam Base, he may object. I may need help on this. Direct command of Chinese units by British probably will be objected to by Generalissimo, but I think we can handle this. I will do everything possible to assist in preventing a catastrophe at Dinapur.

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By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 22D724

By RAP Date JUN 14 1972

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~~SECRET~~

2 April 1944

FOR MARSHALL FROM HEARN (Stilwell's No. 1 man at Chungking) No. CFB 15614

Information: Stilwell (evidently en route to Jorhat for conference with Mountbatten) and Sultan (Stilwell's deputy at New Delhi)

Our Ambassador has just informed me that he has made a critical report to the State Department reference the recent reorganization of the Theater Hq. There has been made no change in the designation of the Chungking office as it is still designated as Forward Echelon, Theater HQ., the same designation which has been in effect for more than a year. Without changing the designation or the function of the forward echelon with regard to the Chinese, Rear Echelon has now been designated theater headquarters for the purpose of simplifying administrative procedure.

General Ferris (Stilwell's former Chief of Staff at New Delhi) is being transferred to forward echelon as Deputy Chief of Staff to further strengthen this HQ.

This matter has been under study for months and was recently approved on urgent recommendation of General Sultan and myself.

The transfer of General Ferris to Chungking as an additional member of the staff is being announced to the press to counter any possible concern felt by the Chinese regarding this change. If there are any political repercussions they cannot help but be beneficial to our present financial negotiations and requests for reciprocal visits to all China fronts.

The reorganization has been briefly explained to Madame Chiang, who has expressed no concern over the changes being made.

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By RAH/BS Date JUN 14 1972

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TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

31 MARCH 1944

*WHL*

FROM: WAR

TO : CHUNGKING #16747

TO BE SEEN BY GENERAL STILLWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ALONE FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

I AM VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR REASSURING MESSAGE C.F.B. 15407.

WE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION IN SINKIANG REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE WILL CLARIFY ITSELF IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THAT YOUR ARMY AND PEOPLE CAN BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ARE MAKING EVERY PRACTICABLE EFFORT TO DEFEAT OUR COMMON ENEMIES.

WE ARE ALL IN AGREEMENT I AM SURE THAT A SUCCESS BY THE JAPANESE ARMY AGAINST IMPHAL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ENEMY AIR BASES IN THAT AREA WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN OR INTERRUPT OUR AIR TRANSPORT FROM INDIA TO CHINA AND THEREFORE YOUR DECISION TO SEND BY AIR FROM YUNNAN AS MANY OF YOUR TROOPS AS CAN BE SPARED TO REINFORCE THE TROOPS IN LEDO WILL BE HELPFUL TO OUR COMMON WAR EFFORT.

TOGETHER WITH YOUR VALIANT ARMY I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE IN OUR EVENTUAL VICTORY OVER JAPAN.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1145, ENT, 31 March 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.  
Colonel, General Staff

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 30, 1944. WJ

PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI CHEK # 16747

I am very pleased to receive your reassuring message C.F.B. 15407.

We hope that the situation in Sinkiang referred to in your message will clarify itself in the near future and that your army and people can be brought to understand that the United Nations are making every practicable effort to defeat our common enemies.

We are all in agreement I am sure that a success by the Japanese Army against Imphal and the establishment of enemy air bases in that area would seriously threaten or interrupt our air transport from India to China and therefore your decision to send by air from Yunnan as many of your troops as can be spared to reinforce the troops in Ledo *will be helpful to our common war effort.*

Together with your valiant army I have every confidence in our eventual victory over Japan.

*Roosevelt*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM The President	TO The Generalissimo
SERIAL #16747	DATE 31 Mar 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Situation in Sinkiang; use of Chinese troops.	

**ACTION**

Answers CHANG's CFB 15407, 29 Mar 44.

This message drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 31 Mar 44.

*Answered by Chiang - President #15672,  
4th April 44.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

29 March 1944

From: Chungking  
To: The President of the United States  
No. CFB 15407, Filed 290140Z.

Rec'd 30/0425Z  
Held for AM 300  
To POTUS via [unclear]

What follows is message for President Roosevelt from the Generalissimo eyes alone Merihall sgd Stilwell. Msg nr CFB 15407.

"In reply to your message of March 20th concerning the Burma campaign I wish to lay before you my views as follows: The situation in the China Theater has recently become so grave that I deem it imperative to acquaint you with it. The state of affairs in Sinkiang has become tense since its invasion by Soviet planes and Outer Mongolian troops about the middle of this month, with the result that our army and peoples belief in concerted action by the United Nations has been somewhat shaken; in other words, our army and people are beginning to ask themselves whether the United Nations pledges and declarations hold good.

At the present moment, what China can possibly do to fulfill her obligation to the Allies as well as to discharge her duty to herself are: First, to devote all her

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State Dept. Order, 10-5-72  
By R. N. [unclear] 1020-72

-2-

energy and resources to the maintaining of the various fronts in the China Theater against any surprise attack by the enemy, this theater being the only land base from which to bomb Japan proper on a large scale and with certain effect; and second, to prepare herself for the day - may it not be distant - when Allied land and naval forces can be dispatched to the China coast and the Chinese Army can cooperate with them in consolidating our position in East Asia, which will be an important base for the invasion of Japan. These are the most important tasks which have devolved upon China today and which constitute at the same time an obligation she has assumed to the Allies.

In this connection it may be observed that 7 years of war have taken China's material and military strength to such an extent that to insist upon her doing something beyond her power would be to court disaster, the results of which would seriously affect not only Yunnan and Szechwan, but also the whole situation in this theater. Should this happen, the Japs would invade Yunnan and Szechwan, the revolt in Sinkiang and the Communist activities in Shensi would assume a new aspect in furtherance of their plan of Bolshevizing this country so that our government

10-5-72  
10-20-72

would not be in a position to do its part in this global war, and the Allies in East Asia would be deprived of a base of operations against Japan.

For these reasons and bearing in mind our obligation to the Allies and our duty to ourselves, I am of the opinion that as long as our line of defenses has not been adequately strengthened, it is impossible that our main forces undertake an offense from Yunnan. In the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that when the British began large scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous attack on Burma with all their might. That promise will be made good when the time comes. I realize that reinforcements should be sent to Burma in view of the military situation there and that although this does not fall within the *our work, still we should do what we can in compliance with your request.* scope of ~~\*\*\*\*\*~~ with your request. I have therefore decided to send to India by air as many of our troops in Yunnan as can be spared in order to reenforce the troops in Ledo, thus enabling the latter to carry on their task of defeating the enemy.

In conclusion I may add that so far as land operations in East Asia are concerned, China bears a very heavy

~~SECRET~~ 10-5-72  
10-20-72

responsibility; and, appreciative of the kind and sympathetic aid you have rendered her all these years, she is determined to discharge that responsibility to the best of her ability. I have explained to you quite frankly the present situation in this theater of war and the plan of coping with it, in the hope that you will continue to place confidence in my country and in who is your good friend. China, on her part, will not fail to do her utmost in the discharge of her responsibility vis -  
A - vis the Allies."

No Sig.

~~\* Omission in message being serviced.~~

10-5-72  
10-20-72

~~SECRET~~

Recd. 30/1201Z  
To POTUS via usher  
with original. Hxf

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

From: CG U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Forward Echelon Chungking, China

To: The President of the United States

No: CFB 15407, Filed 29/0140

What follows is message for President Roosevelt from the Generalissimo eyes alone Marshall sgd Stilwell. Msg Nr CFB 15407.

Please insert following correction on Page 3 at Line 13:

I realize that reinforcements should be sent to Burma in view of the military situation there and that although this does not fall within the scope of our work, still we should do what we can in compliance with your request. I have therefore decided to send to India by air as many of our troops in Yunnan as can be spared in order to reinforce the troops in Ledo, thus enabling the latter to carry on their task of defeating the enemy.

No Sig

10-5-72  
10-20-72

~~SECRET~~



From: CG US Army Forces, CBI, Forward Echelon  
Chungking, China

To : War Department

Nr : 15442, 30 March 44

Eyes alone General Marshall Nr. CFN 15442 from  
Stilwell.

Chiang Kai-shek definitely refuses to allow any U.S.  
Army officer or Consular official to go into the Yen-an  
District (Communist Area).

He says the President does not understand the conditions  
and the sinister intentions of the Communists.

\* \* \* \* \*

~~SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

20 March 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : CHUNGKING \*4783

TO BE SEEN BY GENERAL STILWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ALONE FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

YOUR AMISCA 184 OF 17 MARCH, I REGRET VERY MUCH TO LEARN OF YOUR BORDER TROUBLES REPORTED THEREIN BUT FROM SUCH INFORMATION AS I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN BY INQUIRY IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR APPREHENSION IN REGARD TO POSSIBLE SOVIET-JAPANESE AGREEMENT IN THAT AREA IS NOT FULLY JUSTIFIED.

IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN THE EFFORTS OF ALL OF US TO GET MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION FROM THAT AREA WHEN MY MILITARY OBSERVERS AUTHORIZED IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 22 FEBRUARY ARRIVE ON THE SCENE.

GENERAL STILWELL HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE MINISTER OF WAR FOR THE MISSION'S ITINERARY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1830, EWT, 20 March 1944

*Robert H. Myers*

ROBERT H. MYERS,  
Lieut.(jg), USNR

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAL

March 20, 1944

PRESIDENT TO CHIANG KAI SHEK

Your AMISCA 184 of 17 March, I regret very much to learn of your border troubles reported therein but from such information as I have been able to obtain by inquiry it is believed that your apprehension in regard to possible Soviet-Japanese agreement in that area is not fully justified.

It will be helpful in the efforts of all of us to get more accurate information from that area when my military observers authorized in your message of 22 February arrive on the scene.

General Stilwell has been instructed to complete arrangements with the Minister of War for the mission's itinerary as soon as practicable.

*R. Rowlett*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM The President	TO The Generalissimo
SERIAL #4783	DATE 20 MARCH 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Bombing by Soviet planes of Chinese troops at Hopan; American Military Observers.	

**ACTION**

Answers CKS-PRES AMMISCA #184, 17 Mar 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of reply. Draft reply approved by the President 20 Mar 44.

*Answered by Chiang - President 15672,  
4th April 1944.*

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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

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CORRECTED COPY  
CORRECTED COPY

17 March 44

From: Chungking

To: The President of the United States

Nr: AMMISCA 184

Filed 17/0301Z

Personal and ~~secret~~ for eyes alone President

Franklin D. Roosevelt from Chiang Kai Shek. Cite AMMISCA 184.

For your personal information, I should like to advise you of recent significant developments which are matters of grave concern to the prosecution of war in the Far East.

First, on the 11th instant while Chinese troops stationed at Sinkiang were engaged in suppressing bandits at Hopan a place situated between Chenghwa and Gitai about 70 kilometers from the border of outer Mongolia, they were bombed and machine gunned twice by planes which flew over from the direction of outer Mongolia Province, first batch consisted of 2 planes and the second 10. They all bore the Soviet Red Star insignia. On the 12th, planes bearing the same insignia came twice and dropped bombs. On the 14th, they reappeared and machine gunned. This cannot be construed as a local incident, but as a very significant indication of the Soviet Far Eastern Policy both now and in the

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10-5-72  
10-20-72

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CORRECTED COPY

future.

Second, though the Chinese Communist Party have outwardly professed support of the Chinese Government's policy of resistance against Japanese aggression, since February they have been secretly assembling their guerrilla units from various places and concentrating them in North Shensi, evidently preparing for an opportune moment to rise in revolt and take Sian, the base of our operations in the Yellow River Valley. The indications are manifest and considering the matter objectively, it does not seem likely that the Chinese Communist Party would dare to make such a move without some understanding having been reached between the Soviet and the Japanese.

Third, I have information that the Japanese in the near future will launch a large scale offensive in the Chengchow-Loyang area on the Hankow-Peiping railroad line. The enemy is moving troops from Manchuria for this purpose.

Fourth, regarding definite intelligence reports of the Japanese Navy I shall shortly forward same to you.

Signed Chiang Kai Shek

Rec'd 17/12452.

322.  
To Kees via [unclear]

~~SECRET~~

, 10-5-72  
10-20-72

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*my Room*

March 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you take this up with  
the Joint Staff and prepare a  
reply?

F. D. R.

Message to the President from  
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, dated  
March 18, 1944, No. Ammisca 184,  
Filed 170201Z, re Soviet planes  
bombing Chinese troops at Hopan.

*Answered by #4783,  
to Chungking, 20 Mar  
44.*

FROM	The Generalissimo	TO	The President
SERIAL	AMMISGA 184	DATE	17 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	Filed 17/0301		
TOR MAP ROOM	19/1245Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Prosecution of war in Far East; Soviet planes bombing Chinese troops at Hopan.			

ACTION Referred by the President to Admiral Leahy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of reply. Draft message approved by the President 20 Mar 44; sent to the Generalissimo as WAR #4783 to Chungking, 20 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:		

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
L. E. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM: WAR

17 MARCH 1944

TO : CHUNGKING

#4762

TO BE SEEN BY GENERAL STILWELL'S OR HEARN'S EYES ALONE FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN BURMA HAS REACHED A VERY CRITICAL STAGE, ONE WHICH I THINK CAN BE CAPITALIZED TO OUR GREAT ADVANTAGE OR, IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES, MIGHT RESULT TO OUR SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE.

YOUR CHINESE CORPS ON THE LEDO ROAD HAS ADMINISTERED A SEVERE SETBACK TO THE JAPANESE WITH HEAVY LOSSES TO THE ENEMY IN MEN AND ALSO IN GROUND AND PRESTIGE. IT IS A MAGNIFICENT OUTFIT. GENERAL STILWELL WAS ABLE TO EMPLOY THE U.S. REGIMENT TO CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE AND ALTOGETHER THE HEAVY REVERSE ADMINISTERED TO THE CRACK 18TH JAPANESE DIVISION REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT VICTORY.

COUPLED WITH THIS THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE ARAKAN COAST HAVE ADMINISTERED HEAVY LOSSES TO THE JAPANESE TROOPS WHICH ENDEAVORED TO CUT THE BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS.

PROBABLY WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, HIGHLY TRAINED BRITISH LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUPS TRANSPORTED BY A SPECIALLY ORGANIZED AMERICAN AIR FORCE AND WITH AMERICAN ENGINEERS, HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED RATHER FIRMLY IN THE VICINITY OF KANDAW, APPROXIMATELY 160 MILES IN THE REAR OF THE JAPANESE LINES, HAVE BEEN GENEROUSLY SUPPLIED, HAVE TRANSPORT, ANTI-AIRCRAFT, RADAR DETECTION EQUIPMENT, AND FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIR UNITS. THESE LAST ON ONE DAY DESTROYED ON THE GROUND APPROXIMATELY 20% OF THE

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JAPANESE AIRCRAFT IN BURMA. THE LOCATION OF THIS UNIT PROVIDES AN IMMEDIATE AND VERY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE JAPANESE SUPPLY LINES LEADING UP TO THE 18TH DIVISION, CONFRONTING YOUR TROOPS ON THE LEDO ROAD, AND THE LINE SUPPLYING THE JAPANESE DIVISION FACING YOUR YUNNAN TROOPS.

QUITE EVIDENTLY WITHOUT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR COMMUNICATIONS THE JAPANESE HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ADVANCE THREATENING IMPHAL AND THE BASE COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE HUMP TRAFFIC. SERIOUS AS THIS THREAT MIGHT ORDINARILY BE, UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS IT CAN BE DEVELOPED INTO A CATASTROPHE FOR THE JAPANESE. GENERAL STILWELL REPORTS THAT THE CHINESE LEDO CORPS IS NOW AT JAMBU BUM AND IN A FEW DAYS SHOULD BE NEAR SHADUPUP. HE REPORTS THAT YOUR MEN ARE FULL OF FIGHT AND HAVE CARRIED THEMSELVES SPLENDIDLY DURING THE MOST DIFFICULT OPERATIONS OF THE PAST THREE WEEKS. HE FEELS THAT IF YOUR YUNNAN FORCE WOULD ADVANCE INTO TENGCHUNG AND POSSIBLY TO LUNGLING THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE FOR THE LEDO CORPS TO REACH MYITKIINA.

HOWEVER, I DOUBT IF GENERAL STILWELL, DEEP IN THE JUNGLE AND HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FIGHTING THERE, FULLY REALIZES THE EXTENT OF THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH IS NOW PRESENTED TO US. I AM TOLD HERE THAT UNLESS SOME REINFORCEMENT REACHES THE REMNANTS OF THE 18TH JAPANESE DIVISION THAT UNIT MUST CRUMPLE BEFORE THE ADVANCE OF YOUR TROOPS. IT IS PROBABLE THAT SUCH AN EFFORT OF REINFORCEMENT WILL BE MADE BY WITHDRAWING A REGIMENT FROM THE 56TH DIVISION FACING YOUR YUNNAN TROOPS SINCE THE UNEXPECTED APPEARANCE OF THE STRONG FORCE NEAR KANDAW WILL DETOUR THE JAPANESE FROM MOVING ANY UNITS OF THE RESERVE DIVISIONS IN THAT VICINITY TOWARDS THE LEDO FRONT. THE HEAVY

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By H. J. Stewart Date 12/11/01

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~~SECRET~~

FIGHTING ON THE ARAKAN FRONT AND ON THE IMPHAL FRONT TOGETHER WITH THE PROGRESS OF ANOTHER OF WINGATE'S PENETRATION GROUPS TOWARDS THE HEART OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MANDALAY AND MYITKYINA, SHOULD INVOLVE THE JAPANESE IN A MOST SERIOUS DISPERSION OR WITH THE NECESSITY OF CONSIDERABLE WITHDRAWALS, TO OUR GREAT ADVANTAGE. HOWEVER, IF NO AGGRESSIVE ACTION IS TAKEN BY OUR TROOPS, THE ENEMY WILL CERTAINLY RECOVER FROM HIS PRESENT DISADVANTAGE.

I AM COMMUNICATING MY VIEWS TO YOU AT LENGTH AND IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN THE HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE ORDERS TO THE COMMANDER OF YOUR YUNNAN FORCE TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING WHAT APPEARS TO BE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY. I SEND MY VERY WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1700, EWT, 17 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

*RUB*

~~SECRET~~

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~~DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO~~

The situation in northern Burma has reached a very critical stage, one which I think can be capitalized to our great advantage or, if we fail to take advantage of the opportunities, might result to our serious disadvantage.

Your Chinese Corps on the Ledo Road has administered a severe setback to the Japanese with heavy losses to the enemy in men and also in ground and prestige. <sup>✓ It is a major first in the war</sup> General Stilwell was able to employ the U.S. regiment to considerable advantage and altogether the heavy reverse administered to the crack 18th Japanese Division represents an important victory.

Coupled with this the British forces on the Arakan coast have administered heavy losses to the Japanese troops which endeavored to cut the British communications.

Probably what is the most important of all, highly trained British Long Range Penetration Groups transported by a specially organized American Air Force and with American Engineers, have been established rather firmly in the vicinity of Kawdaw, approximately 160 miles in the rear of the Japanese lines, have been generously supplied, have transport, anti-aircraft, radar detection equipment, and fighter and bomber air units. These last on one day destroyed on the ground approximately 20% of the Japanese aircraft in Burma. The location of this unit provides an immediate and very serious threat to the Japanese supply lines leading up

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

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to the 18th Division, confronting your troops on the Ledo Road, and the line supplying the Japanese Division facing your Yunnan troops.

Quite evidently without any knowledge of this serious threat to their communications the Japanese have become involved in an advance threatening Imphal and the base communications for the Hump traffic. Serious as this threat might ordinarily be, under present conditions it can be developed into a catastrophe for the Japanese. General Stilwell reports that the Chinese Ledo Corps is now at Jambu Bum and in a few days should be near Shadupup. He reports that your men are full of fight and have carried themselves splendidly during the most difficult operations of the past three weeks. He feels that if your Yunnan force would advance into Tengchung and possibly to Lungling there is a good chance for the Ledo Corps to reach Myitkyina.

However, I doubt if General Stilwell, deep in the jungle and heavily preoccupied with the fighting there, fully realizes the extent of the opportunity which is now presented to us. I am told here that unless some reinforcement reaches the remnants of the 18th Japanese Division that unit must crumple before the advance of your troops. It is probable that such an effort of reinforcement will be made by withdrawing a regiment from the 56th Division facing your Yunnan troops since the unexpected appearance of the strong force near Kawdaw will deter the Japanese from moving any units of the reserve divisions in that vicinity towards the Ledo front. The heavy fighting on the Arakan front and on the Imphal front together with the progress of another of Wingate's Penetration Groups towards the heart

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

- 2 -

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

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~~SECRET~~

of the Japanese communications between Mandalay and Myitkyina, should involve the Japanese in a most serious dispersion or with the necessity of considerable withdrawals, to our great advantage. However, if no aggressive action is taken by our troops, the enemy will certainly recover from his present disadvantage.

I am communicating my views to you at length and in considerable detail in the hope that you will give orders to the commander of your Yunnan force to cooperate in developing what appears to be a great opportunity.

*I send my very warm regards*

*P. H. ...*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

FROM The President	TO Generalissimo Kai-Shek
SERIAL #4762	DATE 17 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Situation in Northern Burma; offensive at Imphal; Use of Chinese Yunnan troops.	

**ACTION**

(See SEACOS 117 and 118 from Mountbatten, filed with PRES-Pm #505, 20 Mar 44, discussing situation in Burma. Also see PM-PRES #626, 19 Mar 44.)

This message to Generalissimo was prepared in Chief of Staff's office; approved by President with 2 changes; sent to the Generalissimo via Stilwell.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 MARCH 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : CHUNGKING  
NO : 4646

TO BE SEEN BY GENERAL STILWELL'S AND HEARN'S EYES ALONE FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO.

QUOTE. THANK YOU FOR THE STEPS YOU HAVE INITIATED AS STATED IN YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 22ND TO FACILITATE OUR PLAN FOR SENDING AMERICAN OBSERVEES INTO NORTH CHINA TO GAIN MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION REGARDING LARGE JAPANESE CONCENTRATIONS THERE AND IN MANCHURIA. THE AREA OF NORTH AND NORTHEAST CHINA SHOULD BE A PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL SOURCE OF IMPORTANT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OF THE JAPANESE. WE SHALL THEREFORE PLAN ON THE DISPATCH OF THE OBSERVERS MISSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM  
at 1210, ENT, 1 March 1944.

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM~~  
THE PRESIDENT

To be seen by General Stilwell's and Hearn's eyes alone  
for transmission of the following message from the President  
to the Generalissimo.

*Quote* Thank you for the steps you have initiated as stated  
in your message of February 22nd to facilitate our plan for  
sending American observers into North China to gain more  
accurate information regarding large Japanese concentrations  
there and in Manchuria. The area of North and Northeast  
China should be a particularly fruitful source of important  
military intelligence of the Japanese. We shall therefore  
plan on the dispatch of the observers mission in the near  
future. *unquote*

*Roosevelt*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

28 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: U.S. Observers Mission to North China.

On 9 February in a message to the Generalissimo, the President stated that information regarding the enemy in North China and Manchuria is exceedingly meager, that the principal concentration of the Japanese Army is in this area. In order to increase the flow of information as to the enemy in this area and to survey the possibility of future operations, the President said that it appears of very great advisability that an American Observer Mission be dispatched immediately to North Shensi and Shansi Provinces and such other parts of North China as may be necessary, and asked for the Generalissimo's support and cooperation.

The Generalissimo replied on 22 February (white 2) that he would do all he could to facilitate the plan to send an American Observer Mission to gain more accurate information as to Japanese troop concentration in North China and Manchuria; that he had issued instructions to the Ministry of War to get in touch with Stilwell's Headquarters with a view to mapping out a prospective itinerary for the mission in all areas where the political authority of the National Government extends and wherever the Chinese Army is located.

General Hearn (Stilwell's Chief of Staff in Chungking) informed the War Department on 23 February that the Generalissimo explained to him at great length that the area authorized by the Generalissimo to be visited by the observers excluded the Chinese Communist area.

On 11 February we learned from Ambassador Gauss that the Chinese Army's Chief of Ordnance, Yu Ta-Wei, had approached General Hearn on the possibility of the Chinese Government forces using American Lend-Lease equipment against the Chinese Communists. General Hearn replied to Yu Ta-Wei that such a step could not be successfully explained by the Chinese to the people of the United States.



DECLASSIFIED


By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 720724

By REH/PA Date JUN 14 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If our observers can get into the Communist area it is believed that much worth-while information of the Japanese could be obtained. It is therefore desirable that the President's reply place the proposition squarely up to the Generalissimo by indicating that steps would be taken to dispatch the American Mission to the North China area for the purpose of gaining more accurate information of the common enemy there and in Manchuria. I recommend the President approve the attached message.

  
Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of Sec. Army  
by TAG per 720724  
By RAH/ES Date JUN 14 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM	THE PRESIDENT	TO	CHIANG KAI-SHEK
SERIAL	4646	DATE	1 March 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT Sending of American Observers' Mission to China.			

**ACTION**

Answers CHIANG-POTUS, #123, 22 Feb 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 2, 231405Z; President in BLACK 1; 23/1520Z, directed message be referred to Admiral Leahy and General Marshall.

Draft reply prepared in Chief of Staff's office, sent by memorandum to Admiral Leahy; approved by the President.


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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE



*White 2*

[Printed in FRUS, 1944, VI, 348-349]

GENERAL MARSHALL'S ~~FILE~~

From: Chungking  
To: WAR

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

Number 123, 22 February 1944

To be eyed by Gen Marshall only for transmission to President Roosevelt from Chiang Kai Shek and Hearn Nr. 123.

"I have just returned from the front and found your message of 10 February awaiting me. I shall be glad to do all I can to facilitate your plan to send an American Observer Mission to gain more accurate information regarding the troop concentration of our common enemy in North China and Manchuria. I have already issued instructions to the Ministry of War to get in touch with Gen Stilwell's Headquarters in order to map out a prospective itinerary for the mission in all areas where the political authority of the National Government extends and wherever our Army is stationed.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION: CoFS

No Sig

*21 Feb*  
*Marshall is*  
*inserting*  
*copy*

CM-IN-15839 (23 Feb 44) 0239Z 1cm

*To President at Hyde Park  
as White #2, 23 Feb 44*

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

2

FROM	CHIANG KAI-SHEK	TO	THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL	123	DATE	22 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT Sending of an American Observers' Mission to Shensi and Shansi Provinces.			

**ACTION**

Answers POTUS-CHIANG #4473, 9 Feb 44.

To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 2, 231405Z; President in  
BLACK 1, 23/1520Z, directed message be referred to Admiral Leahy and  
General Marshall.

Draft reply prepared in Chief of Staff's Office; sent by memo-  
randum to Admiral Leahy; approved by President. Answer sent as  
POTUS-CHIANG #4646, 1 Mar 44.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

P R I O R I T Y  
CORRECTED COPY  
EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

From: Chungking  
To: WAR 128  
Ledo India 104

23 February, 1944.

Just for the eyes of Gen Marshall Fr 128 from Hearn  
info Stillwell Fr 104.

Before GTO sent reply to Mr Roosevelt reference  
observer mission to Szechuan and Shensi provinces he had me  
over and explained at great length that such authority  
granted did not include Chinese communist area, and pointed  
out that one US Army Officer had been interesting himself  
too much in communist affairs. Purpose of this, I was sure,  
to impress upon me that authority to visit above provinces  
did not carry with it authority to visit communist occupied  
area.

Policy here reference reciprocal visits of Chinese  
officers to our fronts and US must permit us to send officers  
to all Chinese fronts including communist area. There are  
several Chinese awaiting clearance. Doubt if Chinese will  
approve including communist area.

No Sig

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-16409 (23 Feb 44) Gen Handy

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFORMATION: White House ✓

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of Sec. Army

by TAG per 72D724

By REH Date JUN 14 1972

CM-IN-17622 (25 Feb 44) 15212 mlc

~~SECRET~~

HH  
10

~~SECRET~~

9 FEBRUARY 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMASCA, CHUNGKING #4473

EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL STILLWELL, PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM THE PRESIDENT.

AS OUR COMMON WAR AGAINST JAPAN INCREASES IN INTENSITY AND AS WE STEADILY MOVE TOWARD THE CITADEL OF JAPAN, IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT, IN ADDITION TO DEFEATING JAPAN ON THE SEAS AND IN THE AIR, WE MUST ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE MAIN BODY OF THE JAPANESE ARMY BEFORE WE CAN SURELY ATTAIN THE FINAL VICTORY. THE PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATION OF THE JAPANESE ARMY IS IN NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA. WE NOW BEGIN WITH PREPARATIONS TO CRUSH THAT FORMIDABLE JAPANESE FORCE.

INFORMATION AT PRESENT REGARDING THE ENEMY IN NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA IS EXCEEDINGLY MEAGRE. TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF SUCH INFORMATION AND TO SURVEY THE POSSIBILITIES OF FUTURE OPERATIONS, BOTH GROUND AND AIR, IT APPEARS TO BE OF VERY GREAT ADVISABILITY THAT AN AMERICAN OBSERVERS' MISSION BE IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO NORTH SHENSI AND SHANSI PROVINCES AND SUCH OTHER PARTS OF NORTH CHINA AS MAY BE NECESSARY.

MAY I HAVE YOUR SUPPORT AND COOPERATION IN THIS ENTERPRISE?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1245, EWT, 9 February 1944.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,  
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

Delivered address 100116Z

**SECRET**

WAZ

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE GENERALISSIMO FROM  
THE PRESIDENT

As our common war against Japan increases in intensity and as we steadily move toward the citadel of Japan, it becomes apparent that, in addition to defeating Japan on the seas and in the air, we must engage and destroy the main body of the Japanese Army before we can surely attain the final victory. The principal concentration of the Japanese Army is in North China and Manchuria. We now begin with preparations to crush that formidable Japanese force.

Information at present regarding the enemy in North China and Manchuria is exceedingly meagre. To increase the flow of such information and to survey the possibilities of future operations, both ground and air, it appears to be of <sup>very great importance</sup> ~~the utmost importance~~ that an American observers' mission be immediately dispatched to North Shensi and Shansi Provinces and such other parts of North China as may be necessary.

May I have your support and cooperation in this enterprise?

*Roosevelt*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

What do you think? You  
might talk with Marshall about this  
also.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

Here is a memo which reached me today from John Davies, Jr., who, you will recall, is the man you talked to with Stilwell in Cairo. He is attached, by the State Department, to Mountbatten's army.

I think he makes an excellent recommendation here and I hope you will send the cable which he suggests.

I agree with Davies that you are the only person who could get Chiang to do this.

It would be very important that the army and the State Department assign just the right people to this job.

H.L.H.

encls.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart 1446 MAR 10 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

OBSERVERS' MISSION TO NORTH CHINA

Only one official American observer has ever visited the Chinese "Communist" area. That was six years ago. Since then we have been officially uninformed, dependent upon what we can learn from conflicting reports, second-hand.

This much, however, seems clear. In Communist China there is: (1) a base of military operations in and near Japan's largest military concentration and second largest industrial base, (2) perhaps the most abundant supply of intelligence on the Japanese enemy available to us anywhere, (3) the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese regime in China, (4) the greatest single challenge in China to the Chiang Kai-shek government, (5) the area which Russia will enter if it attacks Japan, and (6) the foundation for a rapprochement between a new China and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese Communists have repeatedly indicated that they would welcome American observers. But future developments may cause their attitude to change.

We need to dispatch immediately, while it is still welcome, a military and political observers' mission to Communist China to collect enemy information, assist in and prepare for certain limited operations from that area, obtain accurate estimates of the strength of Communist armies, report on Russian operations in North China and Manchuria should Russia attack Japan, and assess the possibility of North China and Manchuria developing into a separate Chinese state — perhaps even as a Russian satellite.

Chiang's blockade of the Communists and their consequent isolation are forcing them toward dependence upon Russia. An American observers' mission would break this isolation, reduce the tendency toward dependence upon Russia and, at the same time, serve to check Chiang's desire to attempt liquidation of the Communists by civil war.

The Generalissimo will naturally be opposed to the dispatch of American observers to Communist China. His permission cannot be obtained through ordinary diplomatic and military channels. The request should come to him directly from the President, who can overcome any initial refusal by exercise of our ample bargaining power.

(s) John Davies,

New Delhi, India.  
January 15, 1944

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RAH Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

COORDINATED ATTACK ON JAPAN'S INNER ZONE

South East Asia Command's plans for the future heavily discount the importance of China as an ally and the Chinese position on Japan's flank. These plans suggest that SEAC regards the aggregate jungles of Sumatra, Malaya and Thailand as less impenetrable than those of Burma alone. These plans envisage so circuitous and tardy an advance that the Anglo-American force under Lord Louis Mountbatten will have reached its southernmost extension and not have started in the direction of Japan until the time that American forces from the east are scheduled to be striking at the heart of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, some 1500 miles to the north.

Because of American attacks from the east, the Japanese may be expected to be withdrawing from their southernmost positions to their inner zone at or about the time SEAC mounts its assault on the southern periphery. Such a Japanese retirement will almost certainly occur if the Soviet Union has by that time entered the war against Japan. Lord Louis' plans, therefore, hardly seem to warrant the employment of fleets, armies and air forces. The exigencies of the situation, if the SEAC timetable is followed, would seem to be adequately met by resolute British colonial police and pacification units for the emancipated areas.

SEAC's plans reinforce the argument that Lord Louis' command is primarily concerned with the reoccupation, under British leadership, of colonial Southeast Asia.

The main American concern is, of course, to strike the Japanese where it hurts them most. That is not in Sumatra and Malaya. It is in East China, Formosa, Manchuria and Japan itself. The quickest and most direct approach to this vital area -- Japan's inner zone -- is straight across Burma into southeast China.

General Stilwell cherishes no illusions about the military value of the present Chinese regime. But he does feel that the Generalissimo can be persuaded to do more than he has -- if only American bargaining power is coordinated and applied. He feels that China's strategic position on Japan's flank is of great value to us. He wants to capitalize on that position: expand Crenault's operations, put in American ground forces, take a south China port and carry the war to Formosa, Northeast China and Japan.

To do this he must have a land line of communications across northern Burma. To synchronize his major effort with that of Nimitz and MacArthur and join in a concentration of American strength on Japan's vital inner zone, he must get that road through to Kunning by the fall of 1944.

(s) John Davies

New Delhi, India.  
January 16, 1944

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RAH Date MAP 10-1972

**SECRET**

FROM THE PRESIDENT	TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
SERIAL #4473	DATE 9 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Sending of an American Observers' Mission to Shensi and Shansi Provinces.	

ACTION

Message drafted by Mr. Hopkins; referred to Admiral Leahy and General Marshall by the President; sent to the Generalissimo on 9 Feb 44.

Answered by CHIANG-POTUS #123, 22 Feb 44.

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WB  
V/DL (5)

~~SECRET~~

7 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: WAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING  
NO : 4475 4457

GENERAL STILWELL'S EYES ONLY FOR DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 3 FEBRUARY. WE WILL  
CONTINUE A MOST CAREFUL STUDY OF THE QUESTIONS CONTAINED THEREIN.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1215, EWT, 7 February 1944.

*Franklin H. Graham*  
FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,  
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED  
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
BY H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

7 February 1944

WAR #4475 to AMMISCA CHUNGKING

PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO

Thank you very much for your message of 3 February. We will continue a most careful study of the questions contained therein.

*Roosevelt*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM	The President	TO	The Generalissimo
SERIAL	4475	DATE	7 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT Assam route, China's finance situation.			

**ACTION** Answers Chiang's msg to POTUS of 3 Feb 44.  
 Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

P R I O R I T Y

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY.

From: Chungking  
To: War Hr. 79  
New Delhi Hr. 305

03 February 1944.

Delivery to President Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shok eyes alone Gen Marshall War 79 info Sultan 305 sgnd Hearn.

"I have received your message dated 26th January transmitted by Ambassador Gausa and I deeply appreciate your efforts to help me and my government. I have consulted with Dr Kung regarding the suggestion contained therein and have requested him to acquaint the Ambassador and Gen Stilwell's representative with the decisions he and I have agreed on. I trust that very shortly a solution satisfactory to both our countries may be reached. I wish to assure you that Dr Kung and I have exerted our utmost to meet your wishes short of jeopardizing China's economic front to the breaking point, and short of endangering the morale of our people in the prosecution of continued resistance.

Regarding the proposals of the American Treasury Dept embodied in a previous telegram you sent to me, Dr Kung has replied directly and in detail to Mr Morgenthau. I shall be glad if you could find time to look over them, for they give a concise picture of China's financial and economic situation. "

I wish to acknowledge also your telegram sent thru Gen Stilwell's Headquarters on 1st January 15th.

I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a

CM-IN-1911 (3 Feb 44)

State Dept. File, 10-5-72

By E. H. Brien Date 10-20-72

~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

Page 2

From: Chungking  
To: War  
New Delhi  
03 February 1944

Nr. 79  
Nr. 305

desire which is also my great concern since it is only thru the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points.

I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.

I am leaving for the Hunan front tomorrow and shall be away for a fortnight. Any message from you will be forwarded. I know you realize that this year will prove a most critical period for China both in the economic and military sense but I am confident that with your help we shall pull through. Madame Chiang is accompanying me and I shall ask her to write you on other matters which I have not mentioned in this cable.

No Sig

ACTION: White House

CM-IN-1911 (3 Feb 44) 1517Z e jv

MAILED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72  
By R. H. Becke Date, 10-20-72

Prod: 0310202  
#1 To Pres via Wokai-03 **SECRET** *PJB*

COPY No. 2

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12 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Forwarded herewith for your information are extracts from a message sent to the President by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, dated 3 February 1944, which Admiral Leahy directed be sent to you.

A similar copy is being furnished the State Department.

L. MATTHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl -  
Msg, Chiang Kai-Shek to  
President, 3 Feb 44.

11 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LYNCH:

In response to your request for a copy of the Generalissimo's message to the President of 3 February, 1944, that portion which is in reply to the President's message of 26th January transmitted by Ambassador Gauss is submitted herewith.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

3 February 1944

~~SECRET~~  
From: Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek  
To : President Roosevelt

I have received your message dated 26th January transmitted by Ambassador Gauss and I deeply appreciate your efforts to help me and my government. I have consulted with Dr. Kung regarding the suggestion contained therein and have requested him to acquaint the Ambassador and General Stilwell's representative with the decisions he and I have agreed on. I trust that very shortly a solution satisfactory to both our countries may be reached. I wish to assure you that Dr. Kung and I have exerted our utmost to meet your wishes short of jeopardizing China's economic front to the breaking point, and short of endangering the morale of our people in the prosecution of continued resistance.

Regarding the proposals of the American Treasury Department embodied in a previous telegram you sent to me, Dr. Kung has replied directly and in detail to Mr. Morgenthau. I shall be glad if you could find time to look over them, for they give a concise picture of China's financial and economic situation.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By H. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

FROM CHIANG KAI-SHEK	TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL #79	DATE 3 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	CM-IN-1911 (3 Feb 44)
FOR MAP ROOM 03/1620Z	VIA Army Classified Msg. Center.
SUBJECT China's economic situation; opening of Ledo road.	

**ACTION**

Answers msg. sent by PRESIDENT to CHIANG, 26 Jan 44, sent by State Department (no copy in Map Room); and POTUS-CHIANG #4277, 14 Jan 44.

To PRESIDENT via usher, 03/1630Z.

Acknowledged by POTUS-CHIANG #4457, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO: (Extracts sent to:)	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Secretary of Treasury	12 Feb 44	Adm Leahy
Mr. Lynch, State Dept.	11 Feb 44	Adm Leahy
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	

HH

~~SECRET~~

14 JANUARY 1944

FROM: AGWAR  
TO : AMMISCA, CHUNGKING #4277

GENERAL STILWELL'S EYES ALONE FOR DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

YOUR UNQUALIFIED AND GENEROUS ASSURANCE OF MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH AVAILABLE LABOR AND MATERIALS TO BRING ABOUT SPEEDY COMPLETION OF THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER FIELDS IN THE CHENGTU AREA IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

AS TO THE NUMBER OF FIGHTERS FOR THIS PROJECT, WE ARE DISPATCHING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS FROM ANOTHER ACTIVE THEATRE TWO FIGHTER GROUPS EACH EQUIPPED WITH 75 HIGH SPEED HIGH ALTITUDE OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT AND 50 PER CENT RESERVE. THESE UNITS AS I MENTIONED BEFORE WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE VERY LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCE.

THE OPENING OF A ROAD TO CHINA ACROSS BURMA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT IS, I AGAIN AGREE, THE BEST AND MOST IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO YOUR PRESENT SITUATION. I AM INFORMED THAT THE LEDO FORCES ARE TRAINED, EQUIPPED AND IN POSITION AGAINST THE ENEMY IN NORTH BURMA AND THAT THE PROGRESS OF THE LEDO ROAD SECURED BY THESE TROOPS IS MAKING GOOD HEADWAY. I AM OF THE OPINION THEREFORE THAT ALL OF US SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS WITH THE MEANS AT HAND TO PUSH VIGOROUSLY ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AS WILL ASSIST THIS ROAD PROJECT. MOUNTBATTEN'S PLAN AND EXTENT OF OPERATIONS DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE, AS YOU ARE AWARE, UPON SUPPORT FROM YUNNAN. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE IN AGREEMENT THEREFORE THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE WITH AVAILABLE MEANS BE EXERTED BY YOUR YUNNAN FORCES IN COORDINATION WITH ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN'S OPERATIONS FOR INDIA. IF THE YUNNAN FORCES

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

CANNOT BE EMPLOYED IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE SHOULD AVOID FOR THE  
PRESENT THE MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL MATERIALS TO THEM OVER THE LIMITED  
LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND CURTAIL THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF STOCK  
PILES IN INDIA BEYOND THAT WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR SOON AGAINST  
THE ENEMY.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1200, ENT, 14 January 1944.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,  
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE GENERALISSIMO  
FROM THE PRESIDENT

General Stilwell's eyes alone for delivery of the following message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

\*Your unqualified and generous assurance of maximum effort with available labor and materials to bring about speedy completion of the very long range bomber fields in the Chengtu area is deeply appreciated. ~~Meaning, I am quite anxious for a much more equitable exchange rate for United States dollars and anticipate in the near future any proposal that you are willing to make. I hope that we can effect a considerable reduction in the otherwise extremely great cost of the airdrome construction. I should also welcome from time to time any comments that you might care to pass on to us as to construction progress.~~

As to the number of fighters for this project, we are dispatching within the next few months from another active theatre two fighter groups each equipped with 75 high speed high altitude operational aircraft and 50 per cent reserve. These units as I mentioned before will be an integral part of the very long range bomber force.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The opening of a road to China across Burma at the earliest possible moment is, I again agree, the best and most immediate solution to your present situation. I am informed that the Ledo Forces are trained, equipped and in position against the enemy in North Burma and that the progress of the Ledo Road secured by these troops is making good headway. I am of the opinion therefore that all of us should concentrate our efforts with the means at hand to push vigorously all military operations as will assist this road project. Mountbatten's plan and extent of operations depend in large measure, as you are aware, upon support from Yunnan. I know that you are in agreement therefore that it is most important that all possible pressure with available means be exerted by your Yunnan Forces in coordination with Admiral Mountbatten's operations for India. ~~Situations~~ <sup>If the Yunnan forces can not be employed</sup> we should avoid for the present the movement of critical materials to ~~the Yunnan stations~~ <sup>them</sup> over the limited lines of communication ~~as well as the continued~~ <sup>and curtail the continuing</sup> build-up of stock piles in India beyond that which will be brought to bear soon against the enemy.

*employe it would appear that*

*Rawson W*

DECLASSIFIED  
 By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
 By W. J. Stewart 1966 ~~MAR 10~~ 1972

~~SECRET~~

FROM	The President	TO	The Generalissimo
SERIAL	4277 CM-IN-5337	DATE	14 January 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	--		
TOR MAP ROOM	--	VIA	Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Assignment of fighter groups to China; use of and supplies to Funnan forces.			

ACTION Answers msg from Generalissimo, 10 Jan 44, #25.

Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy.

Answered by CHIANG-KAI-SHANG, 3 February 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:		

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*WHL*  
**EXES ONLY**

*Return to Coast Room*

**GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY**

From: Chungking  
To: AGWAR

No. 25, 10 January 1944

Eyes alone to General Marshall for delivery to President Roosevelt. Signed Chiang Kai Shek.

On January 2nd I received your telegram informing me of the total tonnage of Japanese ships sunk by the United States destroyers during the past three months, I welcome this gratifying news as a good beginning for the current year.

*President's message said "submarines"*

With regard to the Plan of Campaign against the enemy in Burma, I have exchanged views with Admiral Mountbatten and replied to him direct for fear of giving you unnecessary trouble. As for your request concerning the very long range bomber fields in China, you may rest assured that I will do my utmost to speed up the work with all the manpower and materials available in the different localities. However, in view of the fact that the Japanese Air Bases are only 600 miles approximately from the five big airfields under construction, and that the enemy is in a position to destroy them at any time, it would be impossible to protect them effectively with a small number of fighters. For this reason I very much hope that you will let me know the number of fighters which will be put in service so that the necessary preparations may be made.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter # 5-22  
OCT 20 1972

GN\*IN-6471 (10 Jan 44)

By E. H. Parks Date

*Shirley Hume*

*Recd 10/2330 2  
Tel. Rec via inter* **(K)**

~~SECRET~~

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*Copy #2 destroyed*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

From: Chungking  
To: AGWAR

Page #2

No. 25, 10 January 1944

There being no hope of reopening the Burma Route before the coming autumn, China has to face a most difficult situation, and the present year is the most critical yet in our War against aggression. I find it impossible to give a satisfactory explanation to the Chinese Army and people and I fear their morale might be shaken to the detriment of the whole War situation of our Allies and to your disappointment in your sincere desire to help China. Such has been my anxiety day and night.

Knowing full well your deep concern for China, I deem it unnecessary to say anything more. At the same time I am constrained by the actual situation as it exists here to give you my candid opinion which, I trust, will receive your due consideration.

No Sig.

ACTION: White House

CM-IV-6471 (10 Jan 44) 2159Z med

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 10-5-72  
By R. H. Parks Date OCT 20 1972

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~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

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FROM	The Generalissimo	TO	The President
SERIAL	AMMISCA 25	DATE	10 January 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	--		
TOR MAP ROOM	10/23303	VIA	Army
SUBJECT Acknowledges POTUS msg of 31 Dec 43; construction and defense of airfields; construction of Burma route.			

**ACTION**

To President via usher. Answers POTUS msg of 31 Dec 43.

Referred to Leahy for action. Draft message approved by  
President, sent to Stilwell as AGWAR 4277, CM-OUT-5337, 14 Jan 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	