

Dispatches Between the President and Mr. Winant -  
1943

MR 11

1943

Box 11

Map Room

#4  
W

27 December 1943

██████████  
PRIORITY

From: Opanav

To : Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND ██████████ FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Referring to your message 24/1412Z General Arnold feels that a public statement in regard to the Rocket airplane is now in order.

He is now in cable communication with Air Marshal Portal regarding agreement as to a release.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1600, EWT, 27 December 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff

BR

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

December 27, 1943.

  
PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR WINANT

Referring to your message 24/1412Z  
General Arnold feels that a public statement in regard  
to the Rocket airplane is now in order.

He is now in cable communication with  
Air Marshal Portal regarding agreement as to a release.

*Russell*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

FROM	The President	TO	Ambassador Winant
SERIAL	unnumbered	DATE	27 December 1945
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	--	VIA	
SUBJECT Announcement of Rocket Airplane.			

**ACTION** Answers Winant-President 24/1412 December 45, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 4, 24/1545Z. President, in his BLACK 1, 24/1800Z December, directed that it be referred to Admiral Leahy for reply.

Reply sent via Navy Department, 27 Dec 45.

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8 November 1943

PRIORITY

From: Cpnav  
To: Alusna, London

To Ambassador Winant from the President.

Your message of 8 November. I think it would be fine.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1135, EWT, 8 November 1943.

BOYCE P. PRICE,  
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972



OB/607  
NCR 496

WIS.  
K/11

[REDACTED]

FRIDAY

2 November 1943

From: Opanav  
To : Alusna, London.

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT TO WINANT.

You are absolutely right. I will let you know as soon as date  
can be arranged and you would meet us in North Africa.

It will be good to see you again.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1655, EMT, 2 November 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

[REDACTED]

WDCC  
24 Dec  
1451 Z

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. # 24/1430 Z  
To President from Winant.

In reading the exchange of messages between the Former Naval Person and yourself, I have felt that I neglected to tell you that with the British Tommies and the common people of Great Britain General Montgomery holds a unique position. I am not informed on the military judgments of our Chiefs of Staff but I do know that his appointment to command the British Invasion forces would have support of the people of Great Britain.

No sig

*Recd: 241540Z  
Sent to White 3  
241540Z  
RMB 1578*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
BY *RAP* Date MAR 14 1972

FROM Ambassador Winant	TO The President
SERIAL Unnumbered	DATE 24 December 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 24/1430Z	
TOP MAP ROOM 241540Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Command changes. Montgomery would have support of the people of Great Britain.	

**ACTION**

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 3.

*No acknowledgment. (See "Command" in control card file).*

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VPCC  
24 Dec  
1438 Z

DECLASSIFIED  
Atto Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
BY *RMP* DATE MAR 14 1972

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. # 24/1412 Z

To the President from Vinant. The question of some public statement on the Rocket Aeroplane is under immediate consideration. The British would prefer to have no publicity as was agreed on in relation to Radar. I understand that the US Navy would agree to no publicity but that our Army feel that with test planes operating from certain fields in the United States effective censorship is difficult. Cripps and Freeman called on me this morning. They are fearful that counter claims for credit of development will lead to ill will and controversy between us. I have followed in very considerable detail the development of this plane and know its history. I believe that if a statement is necessary at this time that Arnold and Portal should be in agreement on the statement. Would you ask that this be done? I would very much appreciate a reply as to your decision on this matter.

*Ref 9415402*  
*24 2415452*  
*8730 584*  
No Sig

## SAYS JET PLANES CUT LONG TRAINING

Brig. Gen. Chidlaw Tells of Experiencing Performance of New Propellerless Ship

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 (AP)—The Army Air Forces indicated today that one of the principal handicaps in the use of any new weapon against an enemy—the need for long training of personnel—has been avoided in the new revolutionary jet-propelled combat plane.

Brig. Gen. B. W. Chidlaw, chief of the material division of the Army Air Forces, suggested this in a discussion of some of the flying characteristics of the new propellerless plane, details of which the AAF and Great Britain's RAF announced last Thursday. In a brief address during the army hour broadcast over the NBC network General Chidlaw told of his impressions while flying the plane.

"I found," he said, "it acted as most conventional planes do. Its speed possibilities and performance at high altitude will make it valuable for combat purposes. Our pilots will find no trouble in operating these planes."

Further, he said he had two distinct sensations in flying the jet-propelled ship—lack of noise and absence of vibration. He added that "I don't mean to imply that the plane is noiseless or that it flies with the speed of sound," but that the elimination of propellers and the fact that the noise from propulsion was to the rear made for quietness in the cockpit.

One of the causes of pilot fatigue has been attributed to the thunder of the air blast from propellers and the roar of high-powered aviation engines. The absence of vibration should produce several advantages, including ease of handling of the aircraft, especially in tight maneuvers and by reducing wear and strain on structure, machinery and instruments.

General Chidlaw said, too, that while the first flight in this coun-

## DESCRIBES JET PLANE



Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw  
Associated Press Wirephoto

ed to clear away some concern that had arisen when the AAF-RAF statement officially reported the new weapon had been developed and was going into production. In many past instances, belligerents have made public announcement of new or improved weapons only when it was known that one of them had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

try of a jet-propelled plane was made about a year ago, the operations were kept "very secret" until the recent announcement.

"It was deemed propitious, however, at this time," he added, "to make a public news announcement of the jet-propulsion plane. While the German technique of propaganda in announcing new and secret weapons of war is to terrorize and frighten the enemy, our reason, however, for making it public now is prompted by a motive that only a free people can understand.

"Your sons will some day fly these planes. You are entitled to know, within the bounds of national security, that all our resources are still at work to turn out better planes and better equipment to make our Allied air forces the best air forces in the world."

This explanation of the circumstances of the announcement tend-

FROM	The-P Ambassador Winant	TO	The President
SERIAL	unnumbered	DATE	24 December 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	24/1412Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	24/1540Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Announcement of Rocket Airplane.		

**ACTION**

To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 4, 24/1545Z. President, in his BLACK 1, 24/1800Z December, directed that it be referred to Admiral Leahy for reply.

Reply sent to Winant 27 Dec 43. (See PRESIDENT-WINANT folder).

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From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 24/1020Z

For the President and Mrs. Roosevelt.

May the memory of Christmases past be with you and  
whatsoever things are of good report be yours in the year  
that lies ahead.

Signed John Gilbert Winant

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
BY *RMP* Date MAR 14 1972

*Rec'd 201153 L  
Holding for Col M's arrival*

*Dispatched to President on 24/1020Z  
241410Z*

*fu*

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 19th December 1943

To the President from Winant.

Downing Street reported to me this afternoon that they just received a cable stating that Colonel Warden's temperature is normal and that signs of pneumonia are disappearing.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
BY *RHP* MAR 14 1972

*To 1202 - via 2150-1-1505*

WB  
HH  
f24

WDCC  
20 Dec  
1157 Z

From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States

No. # 20 December 1943

Personal from Winant to the President. Jack Churchill called me to say that he received a telegram from Clemmie that Winston was much better.

No sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Order, 3-11-78  
BY *CRP* Date MAR 14 1972

16 December 1943

*for*

*Winston -  
fully agreed I had  
meeting in U.S.  
Roosevelt*

From London  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 641 Filed: 16/2105Z

Personal to the President from Winent.

I was delighted to hear that you were safely home again.

Clenny left London to be with Winston this afternoon. No announcement of her journey will be made until after her safe arrival. We had good news of him this evening. He had a comfortable night last night and has the best medical care.

The decisions at Cairo and Moscow are beginning to register here.

I hope you will agree to the ILO meeting in the United States this spring. I am certain it would give you the support of work groups everywhere in the world. We need a decision on this issue this evening in order to confirm the place of meeting tomorrow morning (London time).

In an informal meeting yesterday we got the European Advisory Committee underway. I feel certain it can perform a useful service.

No Sig

PROCESSED  
RHP  
MAR 14 1972

From: London  
To: President of the United States

Unnumbered, 15th December 1943

From Winant to the President.

I am forwarding to you in my immediately following message the complete text of Eden's address to the House of Commons on the conferences as reported in Hansard. You will note that Eden's reference to France is in effect an answer to Marshal Smut's address of some ten days ago. I did what you asked me to do the morning you left Cairo on the Greek situation.

Thank you for a great trip. I got a lot out of it which will be most useful to me as a member of the European Advisory Commission.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-70  
By *RMP* Date MAR 14 1972

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 14 December 1943

To the President. Following is complete text of Eden's speech

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden):

"My first sentence must be to express my warmest thanks to this House for their generous treatment of me in so kindly re-arranging business as to enable this debate to take place in the last week before the Christmas recess. I understand, of course, that that re-arrangement must have been inconvenient to many of my Hon. Friends in all parts of the House, and I am the more grateful to them. The fact is that it would not have been possible for me to take part in these recent Turkish conversations in Cairo and get back, despite the best efforts of the Royal Air Force, in time for a debate last Thursday. Again I express my thanks. Let me say also that I only too well understand the disappointment that Hon. Members must be feeling that the Prime Minister is not able to be here himself to give a first-hand account of these three conferences in which he has played so leading a part. My right Hon. Friend asked me to express his regret to the House, but there is still important work for him to do in the sphere where he now is, and he is sure the House would wish him to see that work through to the end. So this poor substitute "struts and frets his hour upon the stage."

We have spent three very strenuous weeks. Into that short time have been compressed three conferences of world significance any one of which in the ordinary leisured times of diplomacy would have taken a full month. But, with the rapid development of air communication, methods of consultation have been transformed, so it was possible within only a month of the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Moscow to open the yet more authoritative conferences of the heads of Governments in Teheran. These meetings between the three men who bear the chief responsibility in their respective countries must be a rare event. Their value can hardly be exaggerated. They impose a considerable additional burden on those who travel or take part in them. It is not so

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Order, 1-11-73  
BY *RHP* MAR 14 1972

much the intensity of the work that has to be done as the wide range of subjects through which the mind has to move from one to the other which adds so heavily to the burden. I do not believe even my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister, ardent as we know him to be for work, has ever devoted more hours of the day, and alas, of the night to unremitting labour than during these conferences. I am glad to be able to report to the House that, in spite of that, I left my Right Hon. Friend, though perhaps a little tired, in good health, stout of heart and most confident in spirit.

Now let me describe our work. It fell into three main, easily defined chapters. First, the first Cairo conference for the prosecution of the war against Japan, next the Teheran conference for the prosecution of the war against Germany, and then the second Cairo conference for discussions with the President and the Foreign Secretary of Turkey. I propose to say something about each, and also about a number of subsidiary and important matters which were discussed and dealt with in both Cairo and Teheran. The greater part of the time of the first two conferences in Cairo about the Far East, and in Teheran about the war against Germany, were taken up with military matters. It was possible for us to bring these matters to a state of complete and collective preparation far exceeding anything that had hitherto been realised in this war. The thought is, I think, quite well expressed in two sentences of the Teheran communique, to which I draw the attention of the House because they are, I think, the most important of all. It states:

"Our Military Staffs have joined in our round table discussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the east, west and south."

That is a message which it has never, as yet, been possible to give to the Allied peoples in this war. The words must ring ominously in German ears and in those of Germany's unhappy satellites. They could be applied textually to the earlier conference at Cairo in respect of the Far East. That conference had certain special features. It gave the Prime Minister, for instance, his first opportunity of meeting the Generalissimo and Madame

Chiang Kai-Shek. I think it was also the first time the President had met the Generalissimo. By the luck of good weather I arrived in Cairo on the evening when the Prime Minister was entertaining the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, this leader of indestructible China and his most gifted wife. It was a most memorable experience when the Prime Minister took his guests and Admiral Mountbatten, who is Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command, and who, of course, also came to Cairo for the conference into his map room, where for some hours we dived deep into war plans and projects.

If I may just strike one personal note, I would say that it is difficult not to be deeply impressed by the Generalissimo, even at a first meeting. Some of my Hon. Friends have already met him. I had never met him before, and that impression deepens as time goes on. Under the outward gentleness and gracefulness of this remarkable personality there is a core of supple steel. His is a strength, you feel, that cannot be broken; it can only be bent and then strike back with even greater force. From what I have said, the House will understand how readily the Generalissimo and our Prime Minister understood each other. They speak just the same language of determination. And all through that evening and many subsequent discussions and meetings Madame Chiang Kai-Shek was always there to help us with her sagacious counsel, her unrivalled experience of east and west, and her brilliant gifts as an interpreter. I am sure the House will not wish me to apologise for giving just this personal impression of meeting these very remarkable personalities. As I have said, our military mission agreed in Cairo upon future military operations against Japan, but we also thought it well to take this opportunity to set out the political principles for which we are fighting, and we did so in these words:

"The three great powers are fighting this war to resist and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion."

Such being our purpose, it is our determined intention that Japan shall be deprived of opportunities for further mischief; that she shall be expelled from all the territories, to whomsoever they belong, which she has taken and that reparation shall be made to

China for the wrongs which have been done to her. We thought it well, too, to take this opportunity to tell the people of Korea that we had not forgotten them and that their country would, in due course become free and independent again. The House may say and it is true, that there is, in all this, no new declaration of British policy. The House will remember that even before Pearl Harbour, the Prime Minister warned Japan that if she attacked the United States we would declare war within the hour. From that moment we have been committed to the objectives which are set out now, for the first time, internationally, in the Cairo agreement. We are committed to them because we understand that to destroy Germany and then make a compromise peace with Japan, would only sow the seeds of a Third World War.

Let me emphasise. The war with Japan is not one in which we in this country are playing the part of benevolent assistants. Even if we are compelled, for the time being, to devote the greater part of our human and material resources to the task of defeating Germany. We are still principals in the Far Eastern war. Japan is just as great a menace to the security of the British Commonwealth as she is to the security of either the United States or China. Ask any one of the splendid fighting men from Canada, Australia or New Zealand who are in this country, whether they have any doubts on this score or whether they could contemplate any future for their countries unless the power of Japan were broken. They and thousands of their fellows came here in 1939 to help us in our defense here. Many of them are still here, in spite of the dangers to their own countries and we should be utterly unworthy of our heritage and traditions, if we did not, at the earliest possible moment, deploy all our resources for the purpose of establishing their security on a firm basis. For that we have to fight Japan to the bitter end whatever the cost and however long it takes.

I have no doubt that this meeting between the leaders of the three great powers, upon whom rests the heaviest share in the conduct of the war against Japan, has been of the greatest service to our cause in the political as well as in the military sphere. I was able during these conversations to have some discussion with our Chinese friends on another matter in which I know the House takes an interest -- post-war collaboration between our two

countries both in policy and in commerce. I told our Chinese friends that it was the desire of this country that that collaboration should be as close and as cordial as possible. I found that to be their attitude also, and I hope, in fact I feel sure that we are going to be able to make steady progress in both those spheres.

Now, I invite the House to leave Cairo and the Far Eastern conference and, if they will, to take their places with me again upon the magic carpet --- in this instance the good aircraft "York" --- and fly across the Dead Sea over Iraq and the Persian hills to Teheran. This long journey which many, like my noble friend opposite, have performed in the past, we performed in the incredible space of five-and-half hours. The Teheran conference lasted four full working days and they were crowded days. We had, every afternoon, a plenary session of the heads of the Governments and their principal diplomatic and military advisers. All the mornings were devoted to preparation and to those numerous consultations which have to take place between delegations in the course of any successful conference. There was a welcome absence of formality about all our meetings. Both lunches and dinners served for the further prosecution of business. Except, perhaps for the Prime Minister's birthday celebrations, the party at these meals never totalled more than eight, with the necessary addition of interpreters. In this way, it is fair to say that all the waking hours and many hours normally devoted to sleep, were, during these four days and nights, devoted to discussions on any and every topic between the leaders of these three countries.

When I came back to this House from Moscow I ventured to give the House a message that I was confident that the foundation had been laid for enduring collaboration between this country, the United States and the Soviet Union. I am many times more confident of this today. The work of Teheran began just where the work of Moscow left off, but the Teheran conference, being a conference of leaders, carries a still more stirring message to the world. I would like to quote just an extract about the conference from the Soviet newspaper "Pravda," and I quote it because it expresses exactly my own feelings at the end of this conference. They say this:

"Only a short time separates us from the Moscow conference of the three Foreign Ministers of the Allied powers, the decisions of which not only demonstrated the strengthening of friendly co-operation between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the war period, but laid the basis for fruitful work together after the war. But what a tremendous step forward has now been taken along this path?"

I am convinced that that is true. Let me try to sum up the results of the Teheran meeting. The first result is that the war will be shortened. The close co-ordination of all our military plans which was reached at the conference will ensure it. Clearly, we can do better when there is a close interplay at every move, which we have not had until now. The Teheran conference laid the plans to this end. All is now agreed. Every plan is now agreed, and the timing is now agreed, and, in due course, the decisions of the Teheran conference will be unrolled on the fields of battle.

Even this is not all, because victory is a means to an end, and the end is a peace that will last. More than once before Allies have stood together in war and fallen apart in peace. In the last year or so many Hon. Members in all parts of the House must have said to themselves, "Is this going to be our experience once again?" Well, that will certainly be Germany's game. Let the House not doubt that. She will play it with all she knows from the moment the last shot is fired — to sow confusion, to sow doubt and division. That will be Germany's game, and thus to prepare for the next war. This recurrent threat of war can only be met if there is an international order firmer in strength and unity than any enemy that can seek to challenge it. Is there or is there not the possibility of creating such an order? Do the foundations exist?

Six months ago I could not have given any certain answer. It might have been so; it might not have been so. But today I can give the answer. It is an emphatic "yes". The foundations do exist, and I am truly confident that there is a possibility, and more than a possibility, a desire, among the three powers for continued co-operation not only during the war, not only in reshaping Europe when the armistice comes, but also, thereafter, in maintaining in the world an orderly progress and continuing peace. The foundations of that understanding were laid by us in

Moscow. They have been strengthened and confirmed in Teheran. We three worked together. We have set our hands to the task, and heavy is our responsibility to ensure that we do not fail.

I would like to give two illustrations of the beginning that has been made. When I came back from Moscow a month ago I told the House that we had set up there an advisory council for Italy, on which there would be representatives of our country, the United States, Soviet Russia and France. That committee -- that council -- has begun its work. Its members have had a number of meetings. They have been to Italy and surveyed the position there. I had the opportunity when I was away to see the representatives of all four of the countries, and each and all told me that the work was proceeding smoothly and well. That is the first step. And then there is the advisory commission for Europe, the commission agreed on in Moscow, which is to sit here in London. That has now been completed by the nomination by the United States of the American Ambassador in London, Mr. John Winant, a most admirable choice. I understand I am not telling secrets about another body which is to have its first preliminary informal meeting tomorrow. That is the beginning. These two bodies were planned in Moscow, but the scope of their work was greatly increased by the decisions taken at Teheran.

I will now pass to another matter - Turkey. It was decided in Teheran to invite the president of the Turkish Republic to attend a conference with the representatives of the three powers - The United States, Soviet Russia and ourselves in Cairo, on what was our homeward journey. The Turkish President accepted, and he was accompanied by his Foreign Secretary and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office. The British, the American and the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara accompanied him. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky, who was to have been the Russian representative to join us in that capacity, was away at the front in Italy, and he could not reach us until after the close of the talks, but I was able to see him before I left Cairo, and I gave him a full account of all that had passed, and discussed with him the outcome of our work. These conversations were in the nature of a fuller and more complete development of the earlier meeting which I had had with the Turkish Foreign Secretary in Cairo five weeks ago. I clearly cannot at this stage give details of these confidential discussions - too many people might be listening - but I can say that I have good hopes that they will

be found to have established a sound basis for future cooperation between the four countries -- ourselves, Soviet Russia, America and Turkey.

Since his return to Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister himself has made a statement which the House, perhaps, may not have noticed in which he said that the conversations in Cairo were so intimate and far-reaching that he could now say that Turkey's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union were almost as cordial and as strong as with Great Britain. Those who know the past history of this business will realize what an important statement that is. It augurs well, I think, for the progressive development of future relations between us four, and were it on account of this development alone I should feel justified in telling the House that we regard the Cairo conference No. 2 as encouraging. Further than that I cannot go to-day.

While we were in Cairo my Right Hon. Friend the member for Stockton (Mr. Harold MacMillan) and with my Hon. and Gallant friend the member for Carlisle (Major-General Sir Edward Spears), who is our minister at Beirut, as well as with the Minister of State in the Middle East. The House has already been informed of the development and of the conclusion of that crisis, but, if the House will allow me, I want to take this, my first opportunity, to say something about it. We have sympathy, deep sympathy, with the national aspirations of the Arab world.

We are the only country that has ever concluded a treaty with and withdrawn from an independent Arab state. Yet at the same time the preservation of order and tranquility in the Lebanon is an allied interest, for it closely affects the whole of our war effort in the Middle East. I understand that General Catroux is going back to Beirut on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, and he is to conduct negotiations to try and bring about a modus vivendi in the Levant states. No happier choice of representative, I think, could have been made by our French friends, and I am sure the House will share the earnest hope, which we have expressed already through diplomatic channels to the authorities concerned, that these negotiations will be conducted in a conciliatory spirit on both sides and that they will lead to early agreement. I am confident that all our Allies, all the members of the United

Our interest in this matter is twofold.

Nations, share that view.

It so happened that on my return journey one of the engines of our four-engined aircraft became tired of operating. Luckily when we were getting near the aerodrome of Algiers, and so we were landed and delayed there. As a consequence I had opportunities of meeting both M. Massigli and General Catroux himself and of conversations with them about this situation. Here let me say just one word --- which I hope the House will endorse --- to the people of France. We are at the heart of the fifth winter of this war. The suffering of the French people has been harsh and cruel. She has spent a long ordeal, which perhaps, but for the hazard of geography, the British people might have had to share. We believe that this great people, 40,000,000 strong, enriched by the moral and intellectual qualities that have been theirs throughout history, will find the spirit to lift them up again from the heavy blows which have been dealt them during the last four years. We believe that in the Colonial and French forces in Tunisia and in Libya, of which I have heard from our own officers who served with them, and in the heroic and ever increasing resistance movement in France, some of whose representatives I have met within the last few days --- we believe that in those people we have the real soul of France. So I say at this time that despite all the difficulties we extend to France our sympathy and our confidence.

What I have said, and said deliberately, applies not only to France but to all those nations now under German occupation. What we are seeking, what we are working for, when we approach these matters in harmony with the United States and Russia is not to impose a three-power will upon Europe. We are seeking to liberate those countries so that each and all can take their place in the European family again. There could not be anything exclusive in the arrangements between the three powers. We want to restore the liberty of these nations of Europe, great and small, so that they can play their part in Europe. I am one who believes that Europe has still perhaps the greatest contribution of all to make to the future of mankind.

Having said that, I must come to one or two of our troubles, for it would not be fair to ignore our troubles. There are two

countries in the Balkans about which I must say a word or two — Yugoslavia and Greece. It is, perhaps, inevitable that after three years of enemy occupation and guerilla fighting there is not a little internal confusion and chaos. It must be remembered that German propaganda, day and night, is trying to increase that confusion, trying to spread false reports of our intentions, trying to divide us from our Allies and play one off against the other. So I hope I may say to the House that in approaching these matters in public discussion we should use all possible restraint and above all, if I may add it, resist the temptation of fighting our own elections in all these Balkan lands. I laid down some time ago, with the assent of the cabinet, of course, three rules to try to guide us in this state of affairs, and I will give them to the House. First, to give all the practical help in our power to those elements in these countries which are actively resisting the enemy. Second, to make clear that so far as we can exert any authority it shall be used to ensure that these countries shall be free to choose their own governments when they are liberated. Third, to work in the closest possible concert with our Allies.

Having said so much, may we, on the basis of these rules, look at Yugoslavia? For many months past the head and front of resistance to the enemy in Yugoslavia have been the Partisans under their Commander-in-Chief, General Tito. From all the reports which we have received it is clear that these Partisans are containing and engaging a large number of German divisions. We are doing all we can to supply them with munitions and to support them in every possible way. Our action in this respect has, of course, been endorsed by our Allies.

Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw): By whom has it been endorsed?

Mr. Eden: By the Soviet Government and the United States Government several times over, at various conferences. Now if I may I would like to go back a little into past history. I want to show the House the development in this matter. As a result of information which we had, we decided as long ago as the spring of this year that we should ask General Tito to receive a British military mission. He replied, "Yes", and British officers have been with him ever since. Our mission has been and, as it happens, is under the leadership of a member of this House, my Hon. and Gallant Friend the member for Lancaster (Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean)

who has established most excellent relations with General Tito, As the House will have seen from the newspapers today, the Soviet government have decided also to send a military mission to the Partisan Commander-in-Chief. I want to make it quite plain where we stand in this. Mr. Molotov was good enough to discuss his project with me, both when I was in Moscow and more recently in Teheran. He said, "You have a mission with them, and we think of sending a mission, too." We, of course, endorsed this proposal --- the Prime Minister and I --- Mr. Molotov and I agreed that our two missions shall work together in the closest collaboration when the Soviet mission reaches the country. That is the position.

Now for another development since I left Teheran. As the House is aware, a supreme legislative committee and an executive national committee of liberation have recently been set up under the auspices of the Commander-in-Chief of the Partisan forces. So far as I am aware, this national committee does not claim authority outside the borders of the area in which it operates. It has certainly not claimed any form of recognition from His Majesty's government. As I understand the position and as it has been reported to me by our officers, the Partisans emphasize the provisional nature of this administration, and they hold that it is for the Yugoslav people, as soon as their country is liberated, freely to choose the form of government they prefer. If that is the position, this, too, is the view of His Majesty's government. It is also, as I know, because he has told us so, the desire of King Peter himself and the policy of His government. (Hon. Members: "Oh.") They have publicly declared it as their policy. We must be fair in all this. A public statement was made by the government that the moment the war was over they would lay down their portfolios and the country would choose what government they preferred.

Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale): Do the radio pronouncements of the Yugoslav government from Cairo confirm that statement?

Mr. Eden: Certainly, Sir. I am not trying to say that the government in Cairo agree on all points with the Partisans. Clearly that is not so. I am trying to make a fair approach to this very difficult question and what I am saying is that all, including the government in Cairo, have declared that the moment their country is

liberated they will lay down their offices and it will be for the country to choose its government. That is a point on which all are agreed -- the King, General Tito and the Yugoslav government. (Interruption.) I feel myself the greatest sympathy for this young king. He came to his responsibilities at a most critical hour in his country's history. He did his best to rally his country to the Allied cause, and he is now faced with the most difficult problems that any young monarch could be faced with. I repeat that we must try to be fair, and, if I may use the word, not too, partisan in our actions in the literal and not the military sense of the word. Finally on that subject, let me tell the House this. We are in consultation with other Allied governments on this policy, and the Prime Minister and I devoted no little time to it while we were in Cairo. We are now at work in conjunction with our Allies to bring all those in Yugoslavia or out of it together who want to fight the common German enemy. I hope that the contributions of this House will be made to that end.

One word about Greece. The position there is not on all fours with the position in Yugoslavia. There are warring bands, all of them in different degrees hostile to the Germans. There are also political controversies which cut right across the matter. It is our aim there to try and unite all these bands, or almost all of them, in common action against the enemy. We have some hope that we may have a measure of success in that. The recently published letter of the King of the Hellenes which he had written last November to his cabinet, shows clearly that the king is anxious to make his contribution so that his position shall not be a matter of controversy or get in the way of unity. I am not without hope that we may see some progress in the near future, though I do not pretend that the task is particularly easy.

I want to say something about the progress of the fighting in Italy, because it is wrong that we should adjourn for Christmas without the House being informed of the latest information that the government has. We must admit, first of all, that the advance of the Allied Armies in Italy during the third and fourth months of the campaign has not covered quite the spectacular distances we achieved in the first two months. That, of course, is not due to lack of initiative on the part of our armies. The truth is that we have now reached what is the narrowest part of the Italian peninsula. The Apennines stretch almost from coast to coast, and where the Apennines stop the swollen rivers take over. That is the position which confronts us. These natural facilities afford

exceptional opportunities for skillful defense, and the Germans, as they are forced relentlessly back, are making good use of these advantages. Add to this heavy persistent rains which swell every river and turn every approach into a sea of mud, and we have a fair picture of the background against which the Italian events should be reviewed. On 8th November, after a surprise sea borne attack on Termoli, the Eighth Army pressed on and secured a bridge head over the river Trigno while inland their left flank was moving up through the Apennines. Meanwhile, on the west General Clark's Anglo-American Fifth Army crossed the Volturno and fought their way to the next river obstacle. By the 8th, by a lightening thrust most characteristic of him, General Montgomery swept the Germans back across the Sangro River. The whole of the rest of his line moved forward at the same time while the Fifth Army kept pace in the western Apennines. It was then when, as I know, our commanders felt the campaign to be developing as they wished that we had another deluge and steadily worsening weather conditions which called a halt along the whole group of armies. That time was spent building up stocks, preparing rivers and roads and getting ready for the next offensive, General Montgomery waiting for a spell of fine weather.

At last it came and on the night of 27th November the Eighth Army, further strengthened by the arrival of the Second New Zealand Division, that most gallant veteran division, was able to launch its main assault. It was preceded, as has become almost the custom now, by a familiar and shattering bombardment and the full support of the Royal Air Force. The 78th and the 18th Divisions, both of them also veterans in fighting, advanced and secured Fossa Cesia Ridge. Down came the rain again and still our troops fought grimly on, as they are doing now to the line of the Moro and beyond. Far on the left Canadians have now relieved the 78th Division and they are pressing on towards Ortona. Inland the New Zealand Division is trying to gain the high ground which will help the Canadians further in their advance. Meanwhile, on the west of the Anglo-American Fifth Army began the battle for the Signano Gap. There was a struggle to secure this mountain feature and the enemy had plenty of time to prepare formidable defenses. But thanks to the gallantry of the Allied infantry all the more important of the hill features are now in our hands and it seems that the Germans may be forced to withdraw further. It would be unjust to make these references to the fighting in Italy without paying tribute to the

Royal Engineers and the administrative services. There has been an immense task to keep communications open and to reconstruct them where they are destroyed, and yet throughout this fighting the army has never lacked for a moment a shell or food or supplies of any kind. It is my duty to give the House the casualties from the moment of the landing on the mainland to 23rd November. The British casualties were 3,212 killed, 9,709 wounded and 3,153 missing. Total 16,074. The American casualties were to 25th November: 1,603 killed, 6,561 wounded, 2,685 missing. Total 10,849. Up to the most recent counting the German prisoners taken by the Allies total just over 6,000.

Let me sum up my impressions of these three weeks. My Right Hon. Friend and I were greatly encouraged by the outcome of our three conference. So I believe were all our Allied colleagues. To that extent I bring the House a message of good cheer. These events, of course, give no cause for easy optimism---far from it. If I were to do that I would give my message falsely. The truth, on the contrary, is that the very magnitude of the plans to which we have set our hands, to which the heads of other governments have given their approval, will call for an immense effort in the coming months from each and all of the United Nations. Plans, however good, can only yield results if the force of the citizens in all the lands is behind them. We have set ourselves a hard task in our determination to achieve victory at the earliest possible date. Great battles are impending. For this effort we shall need all our strength, all our courage, all our unity in greater measure perhaps than ever before. I ask this House to give the pledge that for our part that effort will be forthcoming."

Signed Winant

W. D.

[REDACTED]

8 November 1943

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered.

Filed 081125Z

To the President from Winant.

Would you object if I traveled out with our friend? He would like me to go with him.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
BY AMP Date MAR 14 1972

[REDACTED]

04 November 1943

From: Amembassy London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered ; Filed 04/16242

Personal and ~~secret~~ Winant to The President.

Thanks good message.

Last night I spoke with the Prime Minister. He was upset by the election returns. I let him have a summary of the recent poll appearing in the November issue of Fortune.

He told me while we were talking that he had asked you several questions and had only received a reply to a fraction of them. The issue that deeply disturbed him was your suggestion to introduce a Russian military representative in the projected Anglo-American Staff meetings. He is absolutely set against it.

Last week end Smuts and I were with the Prime Minister at Chequers. The withdrawing of landing craft from the Italian zone of action, the possibility of destruction by the rocket guns, the Greek islands, and the timing of the second front all troubled him. I think you will find that the Staff meetings will develop differences of immediate and future military planning that need to be settled.

No Sig

To Miss Lally,  
04/1425

DECLASSIFIED

Exec. Order 11652, 8-11-76

MAR 1 1972

2 November 1943

From: MA Londo.  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered,

Filed 021521Z

Personal and ~~secret~~ to the President from Winant.

There are three things I would like to do. I would appreciate your considering them:

1. If you travel I would like to meet with you. There would be no objection here and my transportation could be easily arranged. Never attending conferences has put me outside the lines of communications and has cut down my usefulness to you.


2. I would like to have a chance to serve on the European Advisory Commission in London.

3. If General Marshall comes here I thought he might like to share the embassy with me at Princes Gate. We could each have a floor to ourselves and use the ground floor and first floor with the dining rooms and sitting rooms for conferences or work rooms or for the occasional informal dinner which is a method of doing business here. I live very simply myself and I am sure I would be out of his way. I would be delighted to turn it over to him entirely if that seemed best. At any rate I am having it put in order.

*Winant  
How?*  
*Unnumbered*  
*No reply  
necessary*

No Sig.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-79  
By *ACP* MAR 14 1972



*Truman has  
seen  
W.H.*

23 October 1943

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No Number Filed: 23/1250Z

To the President from Winant.

I was terribly sorry to see in the papers  
this morning that you had been laid up. I wish  
I could be of more help to you.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By *RMP* Date MAR 14 1972

*Adm. and Bureau  
to file  
"W-22"*

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 13 October 1943 Filed 1707Z

To the President from Winant.

Your statement to the Press in relation to fellow travellers was enormously helpful here. It has taken the bitterness out of a controversy that was doing serious damage to the relationships of the two countries.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter. 1-11-73  
By RHP Date MAR 14 1972

FROM Ambassador Winant	TO The President
SERIAL Unnumbered	DATE 13 Oct 43.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 131707Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 13/14 <sup>50</sup> EST	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Travels of the Senators	

ACTION Taken to Miss Tully for the President at 14<sup>45</sup> by Lt. Graham.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: <i>Pre-Mixed.</i>
-------------------	--------------------------

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered, 13 October 1943 Filed 1707Z

To the President from Winant.

You sent an enquiry to the Prime Minister some days ago following a leakage of news on Stalin's message refusing to change the place of meeting of the foreign secretaries from Moscow to London. Since I have not seen a reply message go through, I thought you might be interested in the following information which I have been able to obtain in the interim. The report you referred to was made by Freddie Kuh, correspondent of the Chicago Sun, and printed in the Washington Post of October 1st. Your Stalin message to the Prime Minister did not reach here until October 2nd.

I have found out that Kuh has a direct line of communication into the Russian Embassy through Bogomolov. I feel certain that the London Russian Embassy was informed of Stalin's position and that this was the source of Kuh's information. He came in to see me on October 1st to confirm a report he had on Stalin's refusal and I told him I had no information.

On October 8th, he tried to see me again on the Portuguese developments but he talked with Howard Bucknell, our present counselor here, who told him he had no information. I warned Eden that Kuh again was in possession of confidential information and to see that the British censorship prevented leakage. A few hours later, Kuh tried to put through a story forecasting the British-Portuguese agreement which was rejected but he returned at midnight that same night and persuaded a weak censor to let through a deleted report which appeared the following day in the Chicago Sun. I do not think Kuh is an enemy of our country but he has such intimate relationships here and is so efficient and shrewd in his forecasting the news that he has on several occasions

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

~~SECRET~~ BY *REVP* DATE MAR 14 1972

From: London  
For: The President of the United States Page 2  
Unnumbered, 13 October 1943 1707Z

embarrassed both the British Government and ourselves by getting vital information through to the United States.

WASHINGTON

The information you received on General Falkenhausen which was forwarded by Admiral Stark to Admiral Horne I had previously discussed with the Brigadier. The Prime Minister has replied to your query in his message of this afternoon number 454.

Even if these reports were true, the unfortunate part of the refugee governments intervening in these situations is that their hand is given away to the German Secret Service under Admiral Canaris who has just been visiting Lisbon and Madrid. Whether they are reported by him to Himmler we do not know. If they are, those who are plotting against the Nazi Regime would probably have short shrift in Germany so long as Hitler remains in power.

Kesselring we know is commanding the German army fighting Eisenhower.

I thought you'd be interested in this background.

*Done after P*  
*Conference 19 Oct*  
*File*  
No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
By *BHP* Date MAR 14 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SERIAL: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: October 14, 1943.

TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: ADMIRAL BROWN

ACTION: Will you explain this whole situation to Elmer Davis?

F. D. R.

*Shown to Elmer  
Davis after Press  
Conference 19 Oct*

*File US*

FROM	Ambassador Winant	TO	the President
SERIAL	Unnumbered	DATE	13 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	131707Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	13/1450 RWT	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Publishing of Stalin's message refusing to change place of meeting by Frederick Kuh of the Chicago Sun.		

**ACTION**      Answers Pres-PM #373, 4 Oct 43.

        Taken to Miss Tully for the President at 1455, by Lt. Graham.  
        See also PM-Pres #455, 13 Oct 43.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: <i>Pres-Miss Tully</i>	

*Admiral B...  
File F-55*

COND  
Oct. 1, 1943  
1654 Z

From: MA London England  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed: 01/1640 Z

Winant to President [redacted]

In relation to the Prime Minister's cable number 430 it might be helpful to see my series of messages to the State Department on the reporting in British Newspapers on General Marshall, covering the last fortnight (numbers 6342, 6373, 6412, 6552, 6570 and 6609) and a single report on Mountbatten which appeared in The Mirror (my number 6586).

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
BY RMP MAR 14 1972

[redacted]

*Annual Summary file*

25 September 1943

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed 25/1113Z

To the President from Vinant.

As the result of last minute shifts in the Cabinet positions the following is a correction to the list I included in my message to you of last night. Anderson and Beaverbrook are respectively Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord Privy Seal but Cranborne was appointed Secretary of State for the Dominions. He will remain leader of the House of Lords. Attlee succeeds to Anderson's position as Lord President of the Council and will continue as Deputy Prime Minister. Richard Law becomes Minister of State in charge of postwar problems and will assist Eden. Anderson will continue to be a member of the War Cabinet but Beaverbrook and Law will not be included in the War Cabinet although they will be Ministers of Cabinet rank.

no sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
BY *RHP* Date MAR 14 1972

Admiral Burton  
To file  
September 24, 1943

From: London

To : The President of the United States

No : 520  
REF ID: A66332

To the President from Minant. Personal and ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The evening after the Prime Minister's return I dined with him and Mrs Churchill and Lory. They were all very grateful for all you had done for them on their journey. I talked with him for an hour and a half alone about what was done in Quebec and his meeting with you afterwards in Washington and except for what Brian had previously told me I have had no information from US sources on any major policy decisions.

Yesterday, Admiral Standley called me from Scotland for information. I had none to give him. He seemed equally uninformed. If I knew in what direction you were moving I could give guidance to the press here, particularly to the US correspondents who are either uninformed or take guidance from British or other London United Nation sources. The latter sent a committee to see me the other day to complain that the only statement they could get from the Embassy was to the effect that we had no information to give. I believe that we could be more helpful if we were better informed since reporting from here reacts on the American press.

This evening I was told that John Anderson would be appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. I was also told that Lord Cranborne would succeed to his position as Lord President of the Council and that Beaverbrook would probably be made Lord Privy Seal, although Cranborne would continue to be leader of the House of Lords for the government. Until late today it was thought that Oliver Lyttelton would succeed Wood. Anderson is perhaps the best administrator in the British Government but he has not got the flexibility of either Wood or Lyttelton and

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By RAV Date MAR 14 1972

Page 2

September 24, 1943

From: London

To : The President of the United States

No : 526

Filed 243532

his previous relationship with Keynes is a doubtful factor. I am told that Beaverbrooke's inclusion in the cabinet would not be popular with the members of the cabinet.

I believe your message to Congress was one of the great state papers of all time. It did much good here and had wide circulation in the press and received favorable editorial comment.

No Six

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By *RHP* Date MAR 14 1972

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 2 September 1943

to the President from Winant.

Today I had luncheon with Eden and Maisky and also had an opportunity to speak with Maisky following the luncheon. Although Maisky was still arguing that if a second front was opened it should relieve the Russians of forty or more divisions which might permit them to break through on the Eastern Front, he was still very friendly and interested in a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the three powers. I talked to him at some length on bombing which I urged him and his Government to recognize as a major contribution to the war effort some months ago. He acknowledged its effectiveness in cutting down the German Air Force on the Russian Front. In talking with me, he estimated the number of German fighters at 300 planes. I checked with Portal afterwards who agreed provided the night fighters were included. Portal also told me that the Russians today had to face only one sixth of the German Combat Force, the balance being regimented against the British and ourselves. Lord Trenchard told me that, although he realized the heavy losses which we had inflicted on the German Air Force, he felt that the Germans had been further weakened by the fact that they were on the defensive and therefore their ground troops and the areas subject to bombing were demanding protection which further disintegrated the striking power of the German Air Force. His evaluation of the situation reminded me of the Spanish War when many of our port cities were each asking for a battleship for protection. The same pressure was put on Trenchard at Paschendale and other times of stress in the last war.

The other bit of information I picked up was Eden's telling me that Maisky had said that if the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries were to be held at Moscow Stalin's presence could not be certain in the city as he might be at the front. A meeting in Moscow without his presence there might seem a bit flat.

The news on the Italian situation, I was told, was cabled you this morning.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
By **RAP** Date MAR 14 1972

1 September 1943

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered,

Fid 1/1000Z

To the President from Winant. Today I had lunch with Norman Davis, Eden, Richard Law, Lord Halifax and Strang at the Foreign Office.

We talked for some time on the Russian situation and the three power conference. As a result of this conversation, I would like to supplement my message to you of last night. All of us agree that London would be psychologically and as a matter of practical advantage a better meeting place than Moscow. The most important consideration in coming to this conclusion was the possibility of Mister Hull attending the conference.

Eden repeated two items of our conversation of yesterday which I omitted and which I think are important. The first was Maisky's apparent concern in regard to the Balkan States which Eden felt was an influence in the Russians wanting the conference. The second was the fact that in the entire discussion Maisky never mentioned frontiers.

In considering the possible date of the conference Maisky suggested early October. Eden felt that was a possible and convenient date. Eden also thought that if the conference were agreed upon it would be helpful to have Maisky stay on for it. His present plan is to return to Moscow sometime this month. I believe myself much good could come of such a conference.

DECLASSIFYING  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73

*RMH* MAR 14 1972

1 LCR  
Filed 1/0052Z  
rlw

WDCC  
1 September 1943  
0146 Z

From: Military Attache London England  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered 1 September 1943

To the President from Winant.

Late this afternoon I spent 2 hours with Mr Eden going over with him the decisions taken at Quebec. I have no other source of information on the conference and I hope that if there were decisions taken there that you want me to support here you will let me know.

Maisky called on Eden this morning. Maisky asked if Stalin had been informed on the Military decisions taken. Eden told him that he had been and showed him the summary that had been forwarded to Moscow. Maisky then made a kind of verbal bill of complaint against the British, beginning by saying that he did not think Stalin would be satisfied with the Military program agreed upon. He said that the Russians had suffered more than 2,500,000 casualties and that although he did not know what the American and British losses were he felt they were far below that figure. He seemed surprised, however, at Eden's statement of the estimated strength of the German divisions in Italy and was impressed by the number of bombing raids based on England that had been made into Germany and the tonnage of bombs dropped during the last 6 months. He said that it was felt in Russia that we were doing more than the British because of the large number of American trucks that were moving about the front and the food and other quantities of munitions that we were shipping to them. Eden forwarded to the Prime Minister a long and detailed summary of their conversation which the Prime Minister will undoubtedly show you. I felt that Eden was both patient and frank with

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By BMP Date MAR 1 1972

Maisky. He told him at one point in the conversation that rude messages were not particularly helpful in trying to work for better understanding. Maisky made no reply to this statement. Eden felt that Maisky appeared easy and confident and more like a man who had been promoted in office than removed from office.

The object of Maisky's visit here seemed to relate to Stalin's message to you and the Prime Minister in which he referred to "A meeting of representatives of our States and in particular of representatives in charge of foreign affairs" and in which he stated the necessity "In advance to define the scope of the questions for discussion by the representatives of the three powers and to draft the proposals which ought to be discussed and then presented to our Governments for final decision."

Maisky suggested that this meeting might take place at London or Moscow, the subjects to cover (1) the Military situation as it related to the Balkans (2) the immediate political problems, such as a Military-Political commission as suggested in Stalin's message of August 22, and (3) the postwar situation. While discussing the questions that might be put on the Agenda Maisky said it was possible to consider dividing Europe in 2 halves, the Russians being dominant in the eastern half and Great Britain and ourselves in the western half, or that all 3 countries might join together to find a common settlement. He said that the Russians preferred the latter plan but that if this were adopted and the British interested themselves in the Balkan situation and the United States in the Baltic situation, the Russians would expect that they could interest themselves in the French situation. As Eden recited this conversation to me I felt that Maisky meant by this illustration that Russia was to share fairly in the decisions to be made if collaboration of the 3 powers was to be agreed upon.

Eden made a further suggestion to me which I felt had merit, namely, that the 4 power pact or declaration which you and the Secretary and Norman Davis and others worked on and which I understand was discussed at Quebec be brought forward at the suggested meeting. We might want to introduce it at an appropriate time as part of our contribution to the Agenda.

6000  
6000  
RHP MAR 14 1972

- 3 -

I hope this message will be useful to you. I feel handicapped because so far as information is concerned I am working on a shoe string. I would not have known about Stalin's message in relation to the proposed conference if Dick Law had not had it on his desk when I called on him in regard to another matter last week. He was good enough to show it to me. Norman Davis who is here for the Red Cross told me of the 4 power pact or declaration and since I previously worked on Russian problems with Eden he let me read the notes on his conversation with Maisky.

I am sending this over your private circuit because it refers to a message on Military matters.

It was good to hear you were well and that the Quebec Conference had gone well.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Order, 1-11-72

By RMP Date MAR 1 1972

17 August 1943

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 17/1141Z

To the President only from Winant.

An approach has been made by Italians to the British Ambassador in Madrid. Their letter of introduction to him came from the British Minister at the Vatican. The British have the detailed story and I think it has also been called to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I can not evaluate the weighting of it., It recognizes the principle of unconditional surrender. I assume you have already been informed but I have no way of being certain so am forwarding this brief notice.

No Sig

Original filed in special "Italy" file.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RHP Date MAR 14 1972

*Julius White 92*

PODINT

13 August 1943

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

13/1151Z

To the President from Winant. Would you please tell Mrs Churchill that Sarah called me on the telephone to find out if the family had arrived safely and asked me to let her mother know that she is with her Uncle Jack at Brighton where they are having good weather and good fun and that she is much better. My best as always.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
By PAO Date MAR 14 1972

5 August 1943

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By BHP Date MAR 14 1972

From: Milattache London  
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 5/1824Z

~~Most secret~~ to the President from Winant.

1. This morning after reading number 405 to you over this circuit, I could not help feeling that it was questionable but that the Prime Minister had forwarded it as a matter of conscience. In checking with Eden I found he had also questioned the reliability of the information. He gave me the following additional story which the Prime Minister had authorized him to forward to you but asked that it be for your eyes only. It also originated with Marquis D'Aieta. Eden's statement follows:

There are two men of this name. The father is one of the King's Masters of Ceremonies. The son is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. We presume latter is person concerned but are confirming from Lisbon.

D'Aieta (son) up to the outbreak of war with Italy at any rate was a member of the "Cabinet" of Minister for Foreign Affairs and was known above all as one of Ciano's young men. Though friendly to British and Americans we have no doubt that he was sold to the type of opportunist Fascism represented by men like Ciano. With his connexion with the court and familiarity with the English he was an obvious choice as an emissary of the Badoglio Government.

Military information which he gave is exaggerated in following respect. We have no confirmation of the report that Germans are in possession of Bolzano and are massing troops round Innsbruck. We have reason to believe that reports to this effect are being put out by the Germans. We do not believe that Germans are in control of communications but we have

reason to believe that they have plans for obtaining control. And even if they did obtain such a control it is unlikely that they would be able to prevent the Italian troops from returning if they were determined to do so. This therefore strikes us as deliberately exaggerated in order to impress us.

My own strong feeling is that there is nothing in this approach that should deflect us from our present policy, including resumption of bombing of Rome. End of Eden's statement.

2. The following is the complete message on which the Prime Minister based his summary in his number 405.

"Marquis D'Aieta stated that the Germans have an armoured division in Calabria and a division (not armoured) he thought in Puglia. They have an armoured division just outside Rome and 1 or 2 battalions (he thought armoured) near the coast north of Rome, where they were expecting us to land. They are in possession of Balzano and are massing troops round Innsbruck (the Italian Consul there gave the figure of 150,000). Two divisions are coming in from Prevence. Germans are in control of communications with the Balkans as well as with France, thus making it impossible for the Italian forces to be withdrawn.

According to Marquis D'Aieta, Farinacci escaped to Germany by air and is at Hilter's headquarters. Mussolini is in detention somewhere. Place is being kept secret, as there is reason to know that Hitler is hoping to rescue him. Ciano, whom Marquis D'Aieta knows intimately, is in a miserable situation. He never wanted the war and did what he could to prevent it. But having stuck to his post, he is tarred with Mussolini's brush. The German Consul in Turin was beaten up.

Marquis D'Aieta naturally begged that no public use should be made of his information and that his own name should never be mentioned. He was terrified of coming to the Embassy. His mother is of American origin, and he asked that if any communication was made to the United States Government, Mr. Sumner Welles, who is godfather to one of his children, should be informed that he was the bearer of the message and that

PROLIFERATION  
State Dept. Jotter, 1-11-42  
RMP  
MAR 14 1942

[REDACTED]

"3"

he is in Lisbon".

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED

Execs Dept. letter, 1-21-72

By RAB Date MAR 14 1972

[REDACTED]

WAL

24 July 1943

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 24/1527Z

To the President from Winant.

I wanted you to know that both the Prime Minister and Eden have assumed that your number 321 is not an answer to the Prime Ministers message to you number 373. They believe that the 2 messages crossed.

I have not discussed either message with either the Prime Minister or Eden.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Review, 1-11-73  
By RHP Date MAR 14 1972

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 21 June 1943

From Ambassador Winant for General Marshall's eyes only.

Thank you for your good message. My reasons for cabling the President were based on my observation of General Chaney's experience here and my knowledge that General Andrews was not completely happy about his position here. Although I realize that the position of any American commander in this area is ultimately dependent upon activity in the area, I want General Devers to have the same full confidence of the British High Command that was accorded General Eisenhower, as European Commander. He is on his way to getting it but it would be helpful if the British understood that he was informed in full by us on global strategy and that such information should be passed on to him. This would not necessitate British Chiefs of Staff discussing with him details of global operations other than those in the European theater. It would show, however, that he had your full confidence.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
Exec Order 11652, 1-11-72

*RHP*

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 14 June 1943

To the President from Winant. Personal and ~~Secret~~.

The Prime Minister was delighted with the two messages he received from you today.

I showed him a copy of the Embassy's 3879 of June 7th to the State Department as you requested. I am attaching his directive to the British Press on De Gaulle at the end of this message as I thought it would interest you.

"The Prime Minister is somewhat concerned at the apparent bias in favour of De Gaulle in the Press messages from Algiers and in their presentation at this end. De Gaulle owes everything to British assistance and support, but he cannot be considered as a trustworthy friend of our country. Wherever he has been he has left a trail of Anglophobia behind him. An interview he gave at Brazzaville in August 1941 was only the first of many attempts to play Great Britain off against the United States and vice versa. He has done his utmost to cause friction between the British and French in Syria. It is part of his policy to gain prestige in France by showing how rough he can be with the British and now with the Americans. He has undoubtedly Fascist and dictatorial tendencies. At one time he represents himself as the sole barrier against Communism; at another as enjoying Communist support.

"Nevertheless, in spite of these just grounds for complaint we have always treated him with scrupulous fairness on account of the legend which has been raised about his name in France through the publicity facilities we have given him. We still hope that he will settle down to loyal teamwork with the new committee. Up to the present he is struggling for complete mastery. Should he succeed in this very serious differences will immediately open between him and the United States. We have to be very careful that these differences do not spread to the relations between Britain and America. The President, who is the best and truest friend that Britain and Europe ever had, has strong views on the subject. The military situation in North Africa is tense and General Eisenhower

(Copy filed in "De Gaulle" folder.)

(This original for file in "Press" folder.)

ENCLOSURES

State Dept. Action, 1-11-70

By BHP Date MAY 14 1972

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered, 14 June 1943

Page 2

has to think continually of the peace and order of the vast territories we have occupied and of the smooth working of their communications. It is from these territories that great operations will be launched and we cannot have there or the French Forces, which the Americans are arming, thrown into turmoil at this juncture.

"It is hoped, therefore, that the British newspapers will preserve an attitude of coolness and impartiality in these French quarrels and do their best to prevent them becoming an impediment to the vigorous conduct of the war."

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED

Exec. Dept. Order, 1-11-79

RHP

MAR 14 1972

WAT

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 14 June 1943

To the President from Winant. Personal and ~~Secret.~~

I want to make a suggestion to you which I think is important. It would greatly help General Devers' standing here if our Chiefs of Staff made known to the British Staff that we wanted him to be informed on total global strategy rather than having his information limited to plans in the European Theater only. Overall information should be helpful to him in making decisions in this area and the fact that some information is given to him and other information withheld from him limits his influence and position. I have never discussed this situation with him. He is doing a great job and is both liked and respected.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
Execs Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
By RAIP Date MAR 14 1972

~~SECRET~~

*Copy to General Marshall*

June 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Attached is a message from Ambassador  
Winant to the President, dated 14 June 1943,  
which is furnished for the information of General  
Marshall.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

W.S.F.

[REDACTED]

From: Amembassy London  
To: The President of the United States

No number May 5, 1943

~~Secret~~ to President.

Assume funeral services for General Andrews will be held in Iceland. Suggest you might want to direct that memorial services be held at a later date in Washington and London because of absenteeism here. If you approve, General Marshall might cable Major General Ingles, Deputy Commander European Theatre accordingly. General Ingles now aware of complications but have requested that he be informed by the British Military tomorrow morning.

Terribly sorry. Wired General Marshall message of sympathy.

Signed Winant.

Assistant to the Military Aide.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RHP Date MAR 14 1972

[REDACTED]

May 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

The President has directed that the enclosed message from Ambassador Winant to the President be delivered to the Chief of Staff for formulation of a reply.

CHESTER RANDOLPH,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

May 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

FORM 2  
Filed 5/6/252  
VI

COMM  
May 5, 1943  
1020Z

P R I O R I T Y

*WAR*  
*WZ*

From: London USFOR  
To: WAR

No. 9400 May 5, 1943

American Ambassador, Mr Winant, requests that the President be at once informed of Bishop Leonard's death and that the President be notified of the Ambassador's regrets and sympathy (signed keys) foregoing sent on request of Ambassador.

No Sig

Action: White House

Information: Sec. Gen. Staff

CM-IN-2779 (5 May 43) 1135Z vc

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

MAR 14 1972

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COPY No. 1

*White House*

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No: 356 Filed: 010958Z

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter. 1-11-72

To the President from Winant. *RAP* MAR 14 1972

In order to keep the record straight Cadogan gave me this morning certain alterations in the Prime Minister's message to Stalin which had been suggested by Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Moscow. Although these were telegraphed to you through Lord Halifax, I am attaching the corrected message which Kerr was instructed to give to Stalin:

"I cannot refrain from expressing my disappointment that you should have felt it necessary to take action in breaking off relations with the Poles without giving me time to inform you of the results of my approach to General Sikorski about which I had telegraphed to you on April 24. I had hoped that, in the spirit of our treaty of last year, we should always consult each other about such important matters, more especially as they affect the single front of the United Nations. I fear that, in the result, material has been provided for enemy propaganda directed towards splitting this front.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By BHP Date MAR 14 1972

"Eden and I have pointed out to the Polish Government that no resumption of friendly or working relations with Soviet Russia is possible while they make charges of an insulting character against the Soviet Government and thus seem to countenance the atrocious Nazi propoganda. Still more would it be impossible for any of us to tolerate enquiries by the International Red Cross held under Nazi auspices and dominated by Nazi terrorism. I am glad to tell you that they have accepted our view and that they want to work loyally with you. Their request now is to have the dependents of the Polish Army in Persia and the fighting Poles in the Soviet Union sent to join the Poles you have already allowed to go to Persia. This is surely a matter which admits of patient discussion. We think the request is reasonable if made in the right way and at the right time and I am pretty sure the President thinks so too. We hope earnestly that remembering the difficulties in which we have all been plunged by the brutal Nazi aggression, you will consider this matter in a spirit of magnanimity.

The Cabinet here is determined to have proper discipline in the Polish Press in Great Britain. Even miserable rags attacking Sikorski can say things which the German broadcast repeats open mouthed to the world to our joint detriment. This must be stopped and it will be stopped.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-78  
By RRP Date MAR 14 1972

"So far this business has been Goebbels greatest triumph. He is now busy suggesting that the USSR will set up a Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with them. We should not, of course, recognize such a government and would continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I expect this will also be the American view.

"My own feeling is that they have had a shock and that after whatever interval is thought convenient, the relationship established on July 30, 1941, should be restored. No one will hate this more than Hitler and what he hates most is wise for us to do.

"We owe it to our armies now engaged, and presently to be more heavily engaged, to maintain good conditions behind the fronts. I and my colleagues look steadily to the ever closer cooperation and understanding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the war. What other hope can there be than this for the tortured world?"

PRIME

[REDACTED]

From: Amcn Embassy London

To: The President of the United States

No. 355

Filed: 29/0505 Z

To the President from Winant.

Since the Russian-Polish break I have been following your messages to the Prime Minister and the Prime Ministers messages to you, the exchange of messages between the foreign office and Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador to Moscow, between the foreign office and the British Embassy in Washington, and I have been coordinating with Biddle who has been in contact with General Sikorski and who has been reporting to the State Department. I have sent no cables myself as I felt you had been kept fully informed. In relation to Biddles telegram number 24 April 27th 8 P.M. Polish series to the State Department, Edens interpretation of the situation was identical with Biddles reporting as it related to Sikorski. I felt myself in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this message that Romers reporting of the Russian intention to break with the Poles was probably correct and that

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

[REDACTED]

Date

1-11-72

his refusal to accept the note enabled the Russians to shift from a break to a suspension after receiving your message. Eden was inclined to agree with me on this.

The British have not been sure whether the action taken by the Russians was due to (1) a series of positions adopted by the Poles in opposition to them and culminating in Polish acceptance of the German charges and their request for an International Red Cross investigation in an effort to set up a smoke screen and counterpropaganda or (2) whether the Russians had come to believe that they had been carrying the brunt of the attack against the German armies and were growing weaker while the British and ourselves were growing stronger and therefore had decided that they were in a better position at this time rather than later to force us to discuss the Polish Russian frontiers or (3) to make plain now a determination on their part to disregard the present Polish Government looking toward later action to establish a puppet government in Poland. It was to knock out this latter possibility that prompted the Prime

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State Dept. letrov, 1-11-78

RHP date MAR 11 1978

Minister to state in the third paragraph of his cable to Stalin his determination to continue relations with Sikorski.

It is also possible that the Russians may intend to recruit a Polish Army. This latter I suggested to Eden and he agreed it was a possible danger.

Edens lead to the press here has been to cut down speculation and not to take sides. Brendan Bracken this morning without consulting him gave a different lead to the press and this afternoon the political writers, as contrasted with the diplomatic correspondents who had alone been handling news on this subject, came out and supported the Russians. This very much annoyed Eden as he did not want to encourage the Russians at this stage in the controversy.

Neither the Prime Minister nor Eden had seen Maisky on this issue but were conducting negotiations directly with Moscow. This evening however Eden telephoned to Maisky because of the harsh attacks on General Sikorski in the Soviet War news issued in London by the Russian Embassy. Maisky was very truculent and said the situation was more serious than

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State Dept. letter, 2-11-72

MAR 14 1972

Eden realized. He was also angrily critical of the last statement by the Poles although on this he could not have had time to consult his Government. The statement was forwarded to you this evening by the Prime Minister. You will see that it was influenced by British restraint. The theory on which it was based was an effort to look toward the future rather than the dead past. I believe this is sound but I also told Eden that I thought that German propaganda would take the line that the reference to refugees was an effort, prompted by fear of the Poles, to get out of Russian hands those Poles that still remained under Russian control.

I would appreciate you explaining to Mr Hull that I am using Army communications to expedite this message as it is 4 o'clock in the morning here and I hoped in this way you would receive it late in the evening your time.

I am appending the foreign office instruction which has just been forwarded to their Moscow Embassy:

"You will have seen that Polish statement

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

RIP MAR 14 1972

issued today in reply to the Soviet note breaking off relations concentrates upon the future rather than the past and instead of raking up the Katyn story emphasises the importance of getting out of Poland recruits for the Polish Army and the relatives of Polish troops and civilians now outside the Soviet Union. This change of emphasis has enabled the Prime Minister to address the message to M. Stalin contained in my telegram number 452.

You will have realized from the Prime Ministers messages to M. Stalin of April 24th and April 25th that we attribute the greatest importance to assisting Poles in the Soviet Union and so maintaining the morale of their compatriots abroad and more particularly of the Polish fighting men here and in the Middle East.

The Prime Ministers messages will I hope have left Soviet Government in no doubt that we regard their action in breaking off relations with the Polish Government as a blow to the War effort of the United Nations and an invaluable contribution to German propropaganda.

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RHP Date MAR 14 1972

We are determined to spare no effort to break the present Polish Soviet deadlock and so to deprive German propaganda of the most effective weapon with which it has been presented since the outbreak of war. With this object we have counselled moderation on the Poles and despite the provocative character of the Soviet note breaking off relations we have persuaded the Poles to issue a very moderate reply. It seems to us essential to encourage them in maintaining this moderate attitude by removing the very real practical grievances arising out of the presence of large numbers of Poles in the Soviet Union in altogether abnormal circumstances.

Basing yourself mainly upon the importance of preserving Allied unity and depriving German propaganda of a valuable weapon, you should urge Soviet Government most strongly to resume diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, and to revert to the position as it was on July 30, 1941.

Apart from that, I should like to see the situation in regard to Polish citizens in the USSR restored to that existing last year when Polish relief

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

*RWP*

MAR 14 1972

organisations were still allowed to function under proper control and the Soviet authorities were still prepared to recognize as Polish citizens racial Poles now in the Soviet Union. At least I hope the Soviet Government could be brought to agree to the first practical proposal put forward by the Polish Ambassador summarized in my telegram no. 367 (of April 11th). Despite your telegram number 264 of April 13th I doubt the advisability of raising the second proposal I E that of an international relief organization with the Russians. On the other hand as you know from the Prime Ministers messages we are anxious to receive recruits for the Polish Armed Forces and to relieve the Soviet Union of the care (A) of those Poles who have close relatives in the Polish Army or among Polish civilians now in territory under our control and (B) of orphans and young children. Suitable practical arrangements will have to be made to prevent the removal of these persons proving too great a strain upon Allied communications etc, more particularly in Persia. This will no doubt mean a controlled evacuation spread

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By *RMP* Date \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 14 1972

out over a certain period. We are also prepared take the close relatives of any recruits for the Polish Army who will be premitted to leave the USSR. We shall however have to consider ways and means carefully in the light of possible reactions in Persia and the general international refugee situation.

You should make it clear to the Soviet Government that such regulated evacuation is not only in the interest of general Allied unity but directly in the interests of the Allied War effort. We are as you know, directly responsible for the morale of the Polish forces in the Middle East, where there is now serious disturbance of mind. These forces are now becoming a well equipped Army of 80,000 men which we hope to use in Europe against the Nazis as soon as possible. We also have to consider 40,000 Polish fighting men here, including the Polish airmen, who are among the very best we have, and are rendering gallant service in our attacks on German industry. We are especially anxious to get out of the Soviet Union as many racial Poles of fighting

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State Dept. Letter 1-31-72

RHP

MAR 14 1972

SECRET

age as possible in order to maintain the Polish Army which will shortly be moving to Syria from Iraq. The numbers concerned may seem small compared to the scale of Soviet military affairs but they would help to make and keep in the field compact forces for use against the under-belly of the Axis whether in Italy, the Balkans or even possible Southern France.

Action on the above lines would only be an extension of the very wise policy pursued by the Soviet Government in regard to the original evacuation of Polish troops and civilians last year. I am confident that this coupled with the restoration of diplomatic relations would provide the best means of reducing the present tension and demonstrating to the world the real unity of the United Nations and thus explode and confound recent German propaganda.

Prime

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Order 1-11-72  
By *RMP* MAR 14 1972

April 11, 1943

From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered. Filed: 1925Z

~~SECRET~~ for the President from the Ambassador.

A week ago today I arrived in London. I have been slow in cabling you because it has taken a little time to get the feel of things here again and I understand from Anthony that Harry was on his way over. After reading his message to the P M however, I realized that Anthony had misunderstood the time of Harry's coming. Anthony spent his first night in England at Chequers and I had lunch the following day with the Prime Minister alone. They were both very happy about his visit and deeply grateful to you for the time you gave and the friendly reception he received there. The overall concept and use for policemen I believe fall in your 95 percent area of agreement and I felt that the idea of a general assembly was also acceptable. The intermediate machinery will require further exploration and examination before minds meet. The Prime Minister in thinking out loud used the analogy of the American Armies with the overall organization and area controls. I am also very sure we would not want the Madam sitting on a control board in

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State Dept. Order, 1-11-78

~~SECRET~~ PMP MAR 14 1972

the European Area. He had the same opinion as Anthony in relation to armament in the Allied European States in the Post War period, and I felt that the Prime Ministers thinking on the future of Germany and Italy was not different from that expressed by Anthony in your study the Saturday afternoon of our conference. I believe the Prime Minister has a deep personal interest in the Post War period.

It may be unnecessary to reiterate the Prime Ministers message to you urging that Harry and General Marshall come over here shortly. I wanted you to know however that his reasons for wanting them made sense to me. His view of the present military situation as it relates to future action made me think of what you said when we were talking together in your study 2 weeks ago.

Archbishop Spellman dropped in to see me just before leaving last Monday. He wanted you to know that he is happy about his trip. He was very well and sent you his best.

Governor Lehman has gotten under way with his conferences and already feels that his coming was worth while. He has been both wise and constructive in his exploration of the relief problem as it is developing here.

I had a long talk with Tony Biddle and also saw Margaret. I believe he sees the need of continuing in London. A personal word from you would give his decision to stay the lift of carrying on a very worth-while job.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73

RWP

MAR 14 1972

Yesterday I had a cable from Secretary Hull directing me to ask Philip Reed to accept the appointment as Director of War Economic Operations in North and West Africa, and asking me to urge his acceptance. Today Harry wire Averell supporting Secretary Hull's request. I was not sure from the messages that either Harry or the Secretary realized that his work went way beyond Lend-Lease. He services the War Production Board, shipping and other activities, but aside from his great usefulness to us I wondered if the attacks made on him in the Congress in relation to patents while he was still Chairman of the Board of General Electric wouldn't be raked up again and a further charge of reaction ~~by~~ action in North Africa be subject for continuing controversy in that area. I realize the unfairness of all this and am certain he would do a good job but it might be unfair to him and unwise under the circumstances. We would greatly miss him here. He has been invaluable to us. We could not ask for a better man and he knows this field.

Thank you both ever so much for the photographs with their good messages and for the present. It was like coming back to another Christmas. I am writing Mrs. Roosevelt. Please tell her she is very much remembered here.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By *ALP* Date MAR 1 5 1972