INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 150

From: THE PRESIDENT

To: AMBASSADOR WINANT

Date: 30 DECEMBER 1944

Your 2020 December 29 received.

FILED: 051 GREECE (1)
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 149

From: THE PRESIDENT

To: AMBASSADOR WINTATT
   for KING OF GREECE
   to be repeated to
   PM CHURCHILL

Greece. Message to Ambassador Winant for him to deliver to King of
Greece. Also to be repeated to Churchill in answer to his #359 and
#360 to the President.

FILED: 051 GREECE (1).

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0822
18 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0822, 23 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

20 DECEMBER 1944

NUMBER 138, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your No. 2010 of 20 December.

Thank you for the information contained therein regarding present British attitude toward allocation of shipping and future strategy.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Released, 201627z Dec 44. By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

JOHN A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.
December 20, 1944

PRESIDENT TO WINANT:

Your No. 2010 of 20 December.

Thank you for the information contained therein regarding present British attitude toward allocation of shipping and future strategy.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
3 December 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON 040122Z NCR 2807

NUMBER 131. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT

It goes without saying that I want you to keep right on. It is most important that you do this at least until the war with Germany is ended. I need you just where you are - especially at this time.

With my affectionate regards,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
0401102Z December 1944

OGDEN KNIFFIN
Major, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 14 1972

By W. J. Stewart Date 
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State

At the direction of the President, a copy of a telegram from the President to Ambassador Winant is furnished the Secretary of State.

OGDEN KNIPPING
Major, C.E.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT

It goes without saying that I want you to keep right on. It is most important that you do this at least until the war with Germany is ended. I need you just where you are—especially at this time.

With my affectionate regards,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
NUMBER 126, PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Please take the following message personally to Winston and convince him that he has got to come through. You will understand how important it is that he does.

QUOTE. I have read carefully the message in your 827 and am replying to it in my next telegram. I am afraid you do not yet fully appreciate the importance of reaching a satisfactory agreement. Our people have gone as far to meet yours as I can let them go. If the conference should end either in no agreement or in an agreement which the American people would regard as preventing the development and use of the great air routes the repercussions would seriously affect many other things.

We are doing our best to meet your lend-lease needs. We will face Congress on that subject in a few weeks and it will not be in a generous mood if it and the people feel that the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial air agreement. They will wonder about the chances of our two countries, let alone any others, working together to keep the peace if we cannot even get together on an aviation agreement.

I hope you will review the situation once more and see if we cannot get together. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released, 241607Z Nov 44.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
U.S. URGENT

AMBASSADOR,

LONDON.

WITHDRAW MESSAGE

F. C. REACT

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Please take the following message personally to Winston
and convince him that he has got to come through. You will
understand how important it is that he does.

QUOTE I have read carefully the message in your 827
and am replying to it in my next telegram. I am afraid you
do not yet fully appreciate the importance of reaching a
satisfactory agreement. Our people have gone as far to meet
yours as I can let them go. If

If the conference should end either in no agreement or in an
agreement which the American people would regard as preventing
the development and use of the great air routes the repercussions
would seriously affect many other things.

We are doing our best to meet your lend-lease needs. We
will face Congress on that subject in a few weeks and it
will not be in a generous mood if it and the people feel that
the United Kingdom has blocked a generally beneficial air
agreement. They will wonder about the chances of our two
countries, let alone any others, working together to keep the
peace if we cannot even get together on an aviation agreement.

Furthermore, I cannot see your people's point on the escalator clause. What good is an escalator clause covering only traffic going all the way from New York to Calcutta and not touching part-way traffic? We have got to get together on this. Can't you give Swinton sufficient leeway to work it out? F. D. R. UNQUOTE.

I hope you will review the situation once more and see if we cannot get together. Unquote.
FROM: The President  TO: Winant (for Prime Minister)

DATE: 126, 24 Nov 44.

SUBJECT: Aviation conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES. #327, 22 Nov 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as W-OUT-541, 22 Nov 44.
2. By direction Mr. Hopkins, paraphrased copy of PM #327 sent to State Dept for preparation of reply.
3. Draft reply submitted by State Department to Mr. Hopkins. Several changes made by Mr. Hopkins. Sent to the President at Hyde Park for his approval as W-OUT-545, 24/11/00Z.
4. President telephoned Mr. Hopkins giving his approval to the message as written. Message sent to the Navy Code Room for transmission to London.
5. By direction of Mr. Hopkins, exact copy of #126 sent to Mr. Achilles in the State Department. Mr. Achilles called Mr. Hopkins' office, suggesting that the clause "and am replying to it in my next telegram" be deleted from the message since no further message from the President would be sent. Mr. Hopkins agreed. Navy Code Room notified and directed to make change.

Note that this message was sent to Ambassador Winant to be delivered personally to the Prime Minister. Therefore the message to the Prime Minister was unnumbered.

6. Answered by W/INIT-PRES #1069, 27 Nov 44; PM-PRES #335, 27 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #336, 28 Nov 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT

NUMBER 95, CO. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Replying to your message 191635.

There has been no change in the boundaries of zones of occupation for United States and British forces as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and Prime Minister at Quebec as set out in 320/27.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are now considering a suggestion of the British Chiefs for a more detailed delineation of the previously agreed boundary.

I think you have all the information you need for dealing, with the European Advisory Commission on this matter.

Detailed delineation of the boundary will be sent to you as soon as Combined Chiefs of Staff reach agreement within a few days.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1625, EST, 20 October 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant, USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
PRESIDENT TO MR. WINANT:

Replying to your message 19/635,

There has been no change in the boundaries of zones of occupation for United States and British forces as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and Prime Minister at Quebec as set out in 320/27.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff are now considering a suggestion of the British Chiefs for a more detailed delineation of the previously agreed boundary.

I think you have all the information you need for dealing with the European Advisory Commission on this matter.

Detailed delineation of the boundary will be sent to you as soon as Combined Chiefs of Staff reach agreement within a few days.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date May 14, 1972
19 October 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 94. CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Hope you can get home not later than the twenty-sixth. Chiefs of Staff will clear zones of occupation tomorrow.

ROOSEVELT.

Release from the White House Map Room at 1940, EWT, 19 October 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 4 1972
October 19, 1944.

WINANT
LONDON

HOPE YOU CAN GET HOME NOT LATER THAN THE
TWENTY-SIXTH. CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL CLEAR ZONES OF
OCCUPATION TOMORROW.

ROOSEVELT

Block as # 94 - 19 Oct 1944 - 1940 GWT.
TOP SECRET

9 October 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 81. Top Secret and Personal. From the President

For Ambassador Winant.

Referring to your 081530, I am pleased with your suggestion regarding the possible bearing of the Army's Educational Program on college credits and Labor Union memberships but I do not consider it desirable to give any publicity whatever to such matters at the present time. Please be guided accordingly.

After the surrender of Germany it is my intention to return from Europe to the United States as many of our troops as possible and at the earliest practicable dates.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, 9 October 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

092253
NCR 9106
Saying to President

The following draft reply to Wyoming's message of 8 October is forwarded for your consideration. Hopkins approves.

President to Wyoming.

Referring to your 081530.

I am pleased with your suggestion regarding the possible teaching of the army's educational program on college credits and labor union membership but I do not consider it desirable to give any publicity whatever to such matters at the present time. Please be guided accordingly.

After the surrender of Germany it is the intention to return from Europe to the United States as many of our troops as possible and at the earliest practicable dates.
INDEX SHEET

FROM:  THE PRESIDENT

TO :  AMBASSADOR WINANT

NO :  50, 26 AUGUST 1944

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED:  "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)
NO: 49, 24 AUGUST 1944

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your message Number 921 is acknowledged. Thank you very much.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 6 July 1944

OODEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant, USNR

DECASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
6 July 1944

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT TO WINANT

Your message Number 921 is acknowledged. Thank you very much.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
FROM The President TO Ambassador Winant

SERIAL or FILE NO.  

DATE 6 July 44  

TOR MAP ROOM VIA  

SUBJECT: Acknowledges Winants message re Robot Bombs and ANVIL operation.  

ACTION:

1. Answers WINANT's #921, 4 July 44.
2. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:  

070 Robot Bombs; 310 ANVIL
CONFIDENTIAL

6 July 1944

From: Opanav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Receipt is acknowledged of your two informative messages filed 03/2300.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 6 July 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
PRESIDENT TO WINANT:

Receipt is acknowledged of your two informative messages filed 03/2300.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Ambassador Winant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>6 July 44.</td>
<td>DATE</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOR MAP ROOM</th>
<th>VIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of Winant's messages on ANVIL decision and Robot Bombs.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Acknowledges WINANT's #919 and #920, 3 July 44.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change; sent to Winant on 6 July 44.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>COPIES TO:</th>
<th>DATE:</th>
<th>BY DIRECTION OF:</th>
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</table>

| 070 ROCKET BOMBS: 310 ANVIL |
23 June 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Receipt of your message filed 1400 Z on the 21st is acknowledged. Glad to know.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 23 June 1944

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
23 June 1944

PRESIDENT TO WINANT

Receipt of your message filed 1400 Z on the 21st is acknowledged.

Blair D. Fair, [signature]

231617 NCR 310
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Ambassador Winant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>231617 NCR 310</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>23 JUNE 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acknowledgement of Winant's message on British delegates to Oil Conference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers Winant's 21/14002.
2. Draft of reply written by Captain Wood; approved by the President with minor change.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

210 OIL CONFERENCE.

**FILED:**
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND TOP-SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your 130035 received. We do not at the present time wish to become involved in the political questions brought up by the establishment of a new Government in Italy.

I am informed that Moscow has expressed in advance no objection to any action the U.K. and U.S. may take in regard to the new Italian Government.

Your action in the matter of MacFarlane's speaking for the United States has my full approval.

In regard to the Greek-Roumanian difficulty, I have informed Churchill of my agreement with his proposal made in paragraph seven of his number 700, and added that we must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of influence.

The French political controversy also interests the American Press. I have advised Churchill that we will continue to use the supplementary French currency exactly as we have planned in agreement with the British Treasury and which was understood by representatives of the French Committee in Washington.

General De Gaulle is expected here for a visit within a month and I will try then to direct his attention toward our war effort for the liberation of France. I do not feel that it would be helpful to a solution of De Gaulle's difficulties for Eden to come to Washington at this time.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1730, EWT, 13 June 1944.
June 13, 1944

PRESIDENT TO WINANT:

Your 130035 received. We do not at the present time wish to become involved in the political questions brought up by the establishment of the new Government in Italy.

I am informed that Moscow has expressed in advance no objection to any action the U.K. and U.S. may take in regard to the new Italian Government.

Your action in the matter of MacFarlane's speaking for the United States has my full approval.

In regard to the Greek-Roumanian difficulty, I have informed Churchill of my agreement with his proposal made in paragraph seven of his number 700, and added that we must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of influence.

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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Ambassador Winant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>132148 NCR 8563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>13 June 44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TO MAP ROOM VIA**

**SUBJECT** Italian situation; Spheres of influence in Balkans; French political situation; De Gaulle's visit to Washington.

**ACTION**

1. Answers Winants 130035, 13 June 44.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 13 Jun 44.

**ACT1ON COMPLETED:**

002 FRANCE; 011 ITALY; 051 GREECE;
051 RUMANIA; 052 RUSSIA-GR-BRITAIN; 011 FRANCE; 00019 (De Gaulle)

**FILED:**

[Signature]
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Replying to your message of June 8, I have read Phillip's message to Secretary of State.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 9 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
June 9, 1944

PRESIDENT TO WINANT.

Replying to your message of June 8.
I have read Phillip's message to Secretary of State.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
22 March 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your 221035, I will be pleased to receive the verbal messages which you will send by George Kennan.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1225, EWT, 22 March 1944.

Robert H. Myers
Lt. (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
March 22, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO WINANT

Your 221035, I will be pleased to receive the verbal messages which you will send by George Kennan.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By H. J. Steward Date MAR 14 1972
FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Winant

SERIAL: Unnumbered
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER:
TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Return of George Kennan to Washington

ACTION: Answers msg, WINANT-POTUS, 22 Mar 44.

Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 22 March 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

Subject: Replies to Ambassador Winant.

With reference to your memorandum of February 28, and conversations between Captain Putnam and Mr. Hayden Raynor of my staff, I am enclosing for your records copies of two cables which I have sent to Ambassador Winant in reply to messages which he sent directly to the President on February 27 concerning petroleum discussions and a United Nations organization for economic matters.

Enclosures:
1. Copy of Cable 1565 to London.
2. Copy of Cable 1540 to London.
NO DISTRIBUTION  

February 29, 1944  
10 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY  

LONDON  

NO. 1263  

PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY.

1. The President has turned over to me your telegram of February 27 regarding his messages to the Prime Minister.

2. Our thought, as explained in the messages, is that the time has come for pushing vigorously forward the question of creating some kind of United Nations machinery to plan and coordinate activities in the field of international economic cooperation. The messages were prompted in part by the fact that we have had no reaction from either the British or the Soviet governments to the suggestion made by Secretary Hull at Moscow (see document entitled "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation" attached to the Protocol of the Moscow Conference), and in part by the emerging question of what to do about the future of the Combined Boards.

3. The message regarding United Nations machinery was sent to both the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The message regarding the Combined Boards went only to the Prime
Prime Minister, since these Boards are still an Anglo-
American affair.

4. What we are after fundamentally is the inauguration
of discussions looking toward the following:
   a. Creation of some United Nations machinery
      for joint planning of international discussions and
      'possible conferences in the various separate fields
      of international economic relations;
   b. Creation of some general United Nations
      agency for the coordination of the activities of
      such separate agencies as may be set up in the
      various fields -- for example, food and agriculture,
      monetary relations, labor etc. It may well be that
      a United Nations conference, held within the next
      few months, would provide the most effective method
      of setting up such a general agency.
   c. Development of a policy for the possible
      utilization, especially during the transitional
      period, of such wartime mechanisms as the Combined
      Boards.

5. The Moscow proposal envisaged the creation of
   a small Commission to do the initial planning. Such a
   Commission could well, at the beginning, be a kind of
   steering group. We proposed a Commission of seven --
   the four
the four major powers plus Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil. It may well be that a Commission of the four major powers only would be more effective.

6. The British Government may have other ideas as to procedure. If so, we should very much like to have their views.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>State Department</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Winant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>#1565</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 Feb 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Establishment of machinery for Post War economic collaboration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

Answers WINANT-POTUS, Unnumbered, 27 Feb 1944, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE #35. By direction of the President (BLACK 8, 28 Feb 44) copy sent to State Department. Answered directly through State Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LILSON BROWN

Subject: Replies to Ambassador Vincent.

With reference to your memorandum of February 28, and conversations between Captain Putnam and Mr. Hayden Raynor of my staff, I am enclosing for your records copies of two cables which I have sent to Ambassador Vincent in reply to messages which he sent directly to the President on February 27 concerning petroleum discussions and a United Nations organization for economic matters.

E. B. STETTINIUS, JR.

Enclosures:
1. Copy of Cable 1565 to London.
2. Copy of Cable 1540 to London.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT
NO: 1540, 29 FEBRUARY 1944.

Reply to telegram of February 27 to the President regarding oil situation.

ORIGINAL filed "MR 604 (2) - Oil Conference"
INDEX SHEET

COPY
FROM: ORNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

13 January 1944

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR WILAND FROM HOPKINS.

The President has advised Stimson that he is opposed to any American newspapers being reprinted for distribution to our troops in Theaters of War.

HARRY HOPKINS

ORIGINAL filed "100 Hopkins"
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 2028 Filled 31/1/45

31st December 1944

To the President from Mr. Winant. Number 2023. Personal

Yesterday I dropped in to wish Kassigil a happy new year. He had just returned from France. I had heard that he had talked to both DeGaulle and Bidault after their return from Moscow about their trip and he also wanted to discuss with me his conversations in Paris on the French position in regard to the European Advisory Commission. The latter subject I reported to the Department in Embassy's 11575, December 30th.

Kassigil told me that neither DeGaulle nor Bidault had intended to raise the issue of a Franco-Russian treaty. This subject was raised by Stalin himself. He proposed that the French suggest a draft. The French based their draft largely on the Anglo-Russian treaty. After presenting it, the Russians said they would propose a counterdraft. In these conversations
Stalin said that Churchill was opposed to a Franco-Russian treaty, but that regardless of that he was willing to go ahead with such a treaty. In this connection Massigni told me that the British had not informed him of the Prime Minister's message to Stalin discussing a bipartite as contrasted with a tripartite treaty and therefore neither DeGaulle nor Bidault were aware of the British position. (This you will find in Churchill's message to you.) It would be difficult to interpret this message as a refusal on Churchill's part to acquiesce on a bipartite Franco-Russian treaty. When the two drafts were under consideration the Russians rejected the stipulation in the French draft which included provision for non-interference in the internal affairs of either country. They acknowledged there was such a clause in the Russo-Czecho-Slovakian treaty but explained that similar inclusion was not necessary in a great country such as France and denied any reference to the subject in the Anglo-Russian treaty. Massigni further told me that when it came to the point of signing the treaty they asked him for the recognition by the French of the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland. It was under this pressure that DeGaulle worked out his compromise. I have asked that two other messages from an intelligence source be shown to you on this subject.
31st December 1944

To : The President of The United States
Nr : 2027

Personal and Number 2027. To the President from Mr. Winant.

Thank you for your action on my 2020. I was thinking particularly of the distaff side. When I saw your 654, I felt it was one of the ablest messages I had ever read. Two hours later Eden called me to tell me that both the Prime Minister and he were "tremendously impressed" by it.

May all you hope and care for be realized this new year.

End.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

D. MAR 1 4 1972

Filed 31/18452

Rec 3121002
To President in Boston's office
By Capt. Price.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2020

Date: 29 December 1944

From: ABBEYWIN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Greece; Churchill's safe arrival in London from Athens.

FILED: 051 GREECE (1)
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT

TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 2027

DATE: 31 December 1944

TOR MAP ROOM: 312100Z

VIA: ARMY CODE ROOM

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Comments on PRES-P4 #583 and PRES-P4 #634.
2. Shown to the President in Docto'r's office by Capt Price.
3. On 1 Jan, after seeing President, Admiral Leahy directed this message be acknowledged. Message prepared by Col Park; sent to Winant as PRES-WINANT #154, 1 Jan 45.

EXTRACT: 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: 051 GREECE

BY DIRECTION OF:

EXTRACT: 051 GREECE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 051 GREECE
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2026

Date: 30 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR WIRANT

To: THE PRESIDENT

GREECE.

FILED: WR 051 GREECE (1)

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
10 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 13 May 1929, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
20 December 1944

From: U.S.N.A. London, England
To: The President of The United States
Hrs: 2010, 20 December 1944 Filed 201110Z

Number 2010. Personal and

To the President from

I thought it might be helpful if I could suggest to you deeper trends and realizations which may affect policy and action here. I believe they are more important than the surface disturbances that have been apparent to all of us over the last weeks, even including the German break through on the Western Front.

There is a general belief among those in control here that both the British and ourselves had planned on the defeat of Germany by the end of this year, and that because of this we had felt free to step up our forward advance in the Pacific against the Japanese. I am not defending this assumption but merely stating it. Only a short time ago people were thinking in terms of available harbor tonnage in relation to the battle on the Western Front. They are not concerned about the limitation of shipping and use this as a concrete example to support a reassessment of allocations in meeting a winter war in Europe. This has been accentuated by accumulating
demands in cleared Western European areas, in France Belgium and Italy for supply for civil use to stabilize the political situation in those countries and to make certain of orderly control to protect the rear of our Anglo American Armies. The disturbances in Greece are acknowledged to be due to other causes.

The journey of Richard Law to the United States to review the overall shipping situation and the sudden realization here of the need of an efficient UNRRA organization are evidences of this trend. At the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff I believe you will find the British pressing for a greater effort in the west which they believe can only be accomplished by a less rapid advance in the east.

I felt that the two main objectives at Teheran were to get agreement with the British on the Channel invasion and to make certain that the Russians would synchronize their advance in the east with our attack from the west. The success of this combined venture has established confidence and mutual trust between the three great military powers. If the Anglo American invasion had failed to materialize or the Russians had found reason for changing the timing of their attack on the Eastern front we might have been in a very different situation than we are today. Adherence to the overall plan meant everything. I am troubled at the present time by necessary
postponements on our side while we hear that the Russians plan to commence their major advance when frozen ground and winter conditions permit. It has seemed to me that we should have the same complete understanding with regard to schedules with our Russian allies as they had with us when we crossed the English Channel and freed Western Europe. You have probably thought much more about this than I have because I know no one who has been more concerned about the next generation, even when taking in your stride the next election.

A carolist this evening was singing Holy Night outside the Embassy in London fog while I was writing this message to you. It is still a good world.

End.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 11-11-72
Br. NIP Date: MAR 14 1972
5 December 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Mr: 1068 Filed 05/12592

To POTUS serial number 1068 Personal for the President.

Thank you for your thoughtful message. I believe I can help you staying here until Germany is defeated. You made this post a worthwhile war job. No one could ask for more. As always (signed) John Gilbert Winant.

End.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By: RLP

MAR 1 4 1972
20 November 1944


To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered  Filed 291640Z

To The President from Winant. Personal for
The President.

Tomorrow is the Prime Minister's birthday.
You will remember that we were with him at Teheran
a year ago.

End.

Rec'd 29/11/44 Z

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RAM Date MAR 1-4 1972
From: AMBASSADOR WINANT
To: THE PRESIDENT

Air conference at Chicago; British White Paper.

FILED: "AIR 210 AIR CONFERENCE."
28th November 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 1081

Filed 28/2300Z

To the President from Minant, Number 1081, Personal and

The other day Mr. Stettinius asked me to forward to you my resignation as Ambassador to Great Britain. This I now do. I would appreciate your accepting it within your present term of office at your convenience.

Minant
26th November 1944


To: The President of The United States

Mr: 1072 Filed 26/23352

From Mr. Winant to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Number 1072.

Your prompt answer much appreciated.

In releasing British version tonight the following amendment has been added after the reference to Lieutenant General Mark Clark and immediately preceding the last paragraph:

"The dates of the actual transfer of command will be regulated in accordance with operational and other requirements."

Winant
From: The U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Nr: 1069 Filed 26/13352

To the President from Visant. Number 1069.

1. Since wiring you last Monday on the Argentine coal contract I have been able to see the Prime Minister and members of the War Cabinet. When the Cabinet met, I understand they agreed to extend the month to month buying for six months. Unfortunately before this information was communicated to you a message from the State Department, number 9732 November 18th, which I had not seen and which was delivered before I reached here had been given by our counselor to the head of the British South American Division in the Foreign Office. This took four to five days to get up to Churchill and Visht. It had to do with withholding 13 tons of synthetic rubber which was to be used in a sealing compound for the Argentine coal pack, destined for the United Kingdom. There were reasons for the action taken but unfortunately the message as a whole was interpreted as pressure action taken on our part and here described as a blockade against an ally in time of war. It was immediately after clearing this situation that I received your wire asking that I con-
vince Winston that the British should meet us in settling the
differences which were blocking agreement at the air conference.
Your message arrived Friday night. I at once called Downing
Street and found that Churchill had gone to Chequers and arran-
ged to see him there Saturday morning. We had a serious talk
on this subject that lasted more than an hour and a half. He
outlined in detail the exchanges at the conference. I was at
a disadvantage because the only information I had was limited
to your two brief messages on the subject. He felt he was
being pushed and was disturbed about the reactions in Parlia-
ment if he were to concede the points which we insist upon.
I think I made him realize that your message was a friendly mes-
 sage and looked beyond the immediate differences to larger issues.
He told me that the ministers who were handling this problem for
him were Beaverbrook and Cripps. When your message was read to
Beaverbrook I happened to know that it was not well received.
However, the Prime Minister insisted that I meet Beaverbrook in
London at seven o'clock that evening. Then he called on me at
the Embassy last night he was most affable and explained that
the difficulty was the Prime Minister who was upset because of
the delayed trilateral meeting, the message on synthetic rubber,
a further recent message involving Land-Lease and British
exports which I had not seen and a sense of being pressured into agreeing to concessions in aviation that would be interpreted in Great Britain as damaging to their interests. I had found out enough about the subject by that time to give reasonable answers to the questions on the immediate issues and I am certain that I made him understand the larger problems involved. I am never sure of him but if he reported honestly I think my conversation with him was helpful.

2. It was my understanding that the Prime Minister planned also included for information and asked to be telegraphed to me today. I saw two friendly cables, one relating to General Wilson and another thanking you for the courtesies shown Cherwell but nothing beyond that has gone through our Signal Office.

3. We had a grand meeting at Albert Hall Thanksgiving evening with thousands of people present. It was a tribute to America. The Prime Minister and I both spoke and I think it went well. During the very moving musical program which preceded the speaking we talked of the happy Thanksgiving dinner we had in Cairo with you last year when you carved the turkey. Having read your proclamation in the morning at Westminster Abbey and again at the American luncheon I was guilty of the grossest plagiarism in incorporating a large part of it in my speech.

Winant
27 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following messages are forwarded to the State Department for preparation of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill for the President's signature: KINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44; PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44; and PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.

Also included for information are messages referred to in the Prime Minister's #832.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.

7 Incls.
Incl 1. KINANT-PRES #1069, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 2. PM-PRES #832, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 3. PM-PRES #833, 26 Nov 44.
Incl 4. PM-PRES #830, 14 July 44.
Incl 5. PM-PRES #731, 14 July 44.
Incl 6. PRES-PM #538, 22 July 44.
Incl 7. PRES-PH #628, 10 Oct 44.

- 1 -
From: London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 1063, Filed 202015Z

To The President from Minant. Personal and

My arrival here was delayed until Saturday because of bad weather. I got in touch with Eden at once on the Argentine situation. Your message to the Prime Minister could not have been more timely. I spent the weekend with him. He has forwarded you in printed form the exchange of messages on this subject and sent you a message saying that he was doing it. He wanted you to know that it was not a matter of cost that troubles but a genuine concern about the meat ration for the workers of England. I would suggest that you ask that both Llewellyn and Leathers go on to Washington to discuss this problem. Both the Food and Transport Ministries are concerned but more important Leathers has the complete confidence of the War Cabinet as a competent hard-headed official. The British realize that we are trying to get rid of a nest of Nazis in the Argentine but they also
know that a further cut in the meat ration here would go hard with the present government. I am sure that there is some formula that could be worked out that would protect them on this essential item. They have not got here the protein substitutes that we enjoy at home. The government here is very alive to your promise to protect them on the meat ration provided they did certain other things in relation to the Argentine which we have asked them to do and which they have done. Please read the record. They mean to stay with us but it is necessary that we work out a constructive formula.

End
From: London, England
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 1062, Filed 202015Z

To The President from Winant. Personal and

The Prime Minister had already formulated his
325 before I had a chance to talk with him. He had an
idea that you had been upset because of his Paris trip
and that you did not plan to come to England. The
postponement of the Tripartite Meeting had also worried
him. I am sure that he now understands the situation.
He was like a happy and delighted boy about the election
results.

End

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By: [Signature] Date: MAR 4, 1972
19 October 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number: None Filed 191635Z

To President Roosevelt from John G. Winant.

It is my understanding that you cleared these delineation of the zones of occupation in Germany with the Prime Minister in Quebec. I have got agreement in principle with the Russians on these changes. We also have General Eisenhower's approval. The State Dept tells me they are in accord. I am told that the Chiefs of Staff have failed to date to take final action thereon and the whole work of the European Advisory Commission is held up because of it.

I have been asked to go home by the Secretary who tells me it is also your wish that I do so. I do not want to return home until the European Advisory Commission has reached some agreement on the primary political-military problems on Germany. Anything you can do to expedite business in this field will be deeply appreciated. The blocking point appears to be the Chiefs of Staff.

Ref Bundy-Groves matter, I also hope to close the contract by early next week. Their foreign minister expects to be here the first of the week to pass final papers. Could I postpone my
departure without inconvenience to you until the middle of next week.

Minant
8 October 1944

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 1019, 8 October 1944 Filed 081530Z

President from Winant.
The breakthrough was good news today.

Yesterday I sent a message to State Dept number 8485 of 7th October for the European Advisory Commission which I asked be shown to you. My reasons for sending it are in part embodied in the message. I wanted you also to know that Eden is seeing Molotov and asking him to expedite business in the Commission. Ambassador Gousev left yesterday for Moscow for the same purpose.

I believe we should make sure that we can count on prompt clearances from Washington. All three governments have had their share of slowdowns but time is now pressing and I want to see our three party agreements on surrender and control machinery in Germany completed in time for use of the military commanders. I have done everything I could to push both the British and the Russians. I did not feel free in my department message to explain the journeys to Moscow.
There is another matter I would like to call to your attention. In the last war the occupation was a difficult period. I understand that an educational program is being planned for the forces in the European Theatre to cover this phase which would include academic and technical study and schooling. It occurred to me that you might get the colleges and universities to give credit for the courses taken and the labor unions to give membership on completion of technical training, all of which would be of advantage to our soldiers and our younger officers on their return to civil life. A man I believe who could organize this for you if you thought well of the plan is President Dykstra of Wisconsin University. He was your first appointee as director of the Selective Service Board and I should think would be glad of the opportunity to help the men he had inducted into the service in their return to private life. This may be a premature suggestion but it would take time to organize. I should think that both the educational institutions and the labor unions would be happy to show
their appreciation to our fighting men by giving this recognition.

Please keep well.

No Sig.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)

TO: THE PRESIDENT

No.: Unno, 18 September 1944

Aid to Warsaw. 107 planes dropped supplies over Warsaw.

FILED: "AR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 1605, 101715Z September 1944

Forwards for information of the President three messages from
Amb Clark Kerr, British Embassy, re aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : Unno, Filed 04/23252, September 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"

*(Sh) Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.*
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: Unno, Filed 24/2200Z AUGUST 1944

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : Unno, Filed 2417052, 24 August 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "AR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 978, Filed 23/2128Z, 23 AUGUST 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: None, Filed 181550Z, 18 AUGUST 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
8 July 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 924 Filed: 03/1755Z

Wingant to the President sr nr 924
filed 1755Z.

Following up my 920, I now have some figures on the material damage in the London area. I am told that 500 houses are destroyed and 21,000 damaged each day. In the first twelve days of the attack, it was possible to repair about 8,000 houses per day, but as the damage increased, the ratio of repairs to damage fell off. Therefore, some 50,000 workers were brought into the London area this week. The morale here is good. The Prime Minister's speech helped greatly.

I hope you will be able to work out the French problem satisfactorily. I have the two Republican Congressmen you sent over to me in a tanker.

This morning, General Alexander came
To: The President of the United States
Number 924 Filed: 06/1755Z

in to see me. He seemed fit and fine. He has been here for four or five days and leaves tomorrow. He paid a great tribute to our troops in Italy.

End

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By: MAP Date: MAR 1, 1972
FROM: Ambassador Winant  
TO: The President  
SERIAL or FILE NO.  
DATE: 924, 8 July 1944  
TOR MAP ROOM: 08/1940Z  
VIA: Army Code Room  
SUBJECT: Damage from flying bombs; French problem; 300 Italy.  

ACTION:
1. Further to WINANT's #920.  
2. Taken to President by Admiral Brown with evening news; original returned by President.  
3. No reply or further action, per Admiral Leahy, 12 July 44.

070 ROBOT BOMBS; 011 FRENCH; 300 ITALY.
4 July 1944

To: The President of the United States

Number 921

To the President from Winston. This is a follow up of my two messages to you last night, my 920 on the fly bomb and my 919 on the Prime Minister's reaction on ANVIL.

1. The Prime Minister, because of the accumulating knowledge on the fly bomb and its relation to public opinion here, has postponed his report to Parliament and his radio talk to the public until Thursday.

2. Today, Eden sat next to me at the 4th of July luncheon at which we both spoke. He told me that he thought that the misunderstanding in relation to ANVIL was due to the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff did not recognize that they were definitely committed to this operation. He blamed Sir Allan Brooke, GISS, for not raising it when our Chiefs of Staff were here and told me that he sympathized with the reaction of our Chiefs of Staff on having it raised after they had returned to the United States. He told me he felt
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 521 Filed: 04/13/32

that the failure to have minds meet would have been avoided had Sir John Dill been well enough to come on here or be present at the later conferences in Washington. He said that, for the first time, he thought the Prime Minister had come to appreciate the contribution that Sir John Dill had been making on his Washington assignment.

End

RECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
FROM: Ambassador Winant
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 921, 4 July 1944

DATE: 4 July 1944

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Rocket bombs; ANVIL operation.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 120, 04/1538 July.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President; sent to Winant on 6 July 44.

070 Robot Bombs; 310 ANVIL
From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

#720
Unnumbered, Filed 03/23002.

From Minant to the President.

1. I thought you might be interested in facts and reactions to the pilotless aircraft. There was originally a generally accepted theory that this latest German weapon was a retaliatory measure originated in part for propaganda purposes within Germany but which would be costly to the Germans because it diverted man hours and material from the production of fighter aircraft. Although there is argument to support this point of view there is developing a contrary judgement. This is partly due to the wide diversions of opinion as to the quantity of production of these robots and the relative effort of manufacture. Today one of the officers attached to the embassy in visiting the air defenses near a coastal town found that they had shot down two of these planes within the past week almost intact, one rusted with a serial number 52,000 the other apparently just out of the factory with a serial number of 188,000.
It may be that these serial numbers are used to exaggerate the production. There were originally discovered 88 fixed launching platforms with cement skids, identified through aerial photography. Since then 47 additional improvised platforms have been identified. It is believed that these latter take only four days to build. It has been assumed that 20 of the original 88 were destroyed by bombing. It is estimated that it requires 220 tons of bombs to destroy each platform. It was found that shooting down these planes over London whether from ground fire, by balloon wire or by fighter airplanes rarely exploded them in the air and simply insured their falling in the city area. Therefore a balloon belt and a line of anti aircraft defense has been established in coastal country in the line of approach, with the fighter aircraft attempting to knock them down over the channel or before they reach populous districts. None of these methods of interception are effective in bad weather. It has now been decided that the most effective method of attack would be at manufacturing centers, assembly centers, and at transit centers, as well as bombing the emplacement positions. All this would mean diversion on a considerable scale. I heard Morrison, who is Home Secretary and responsible for the London Area, suggest to the Prime Minister that the invasion might be turned to

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By: [Signature] MAR 14 1972
include the Pas De Calais area. The Prime Minister as well as the military are rightly determined that nothing shall interfere with the air support in the battle area or an aggressive air offensive beyond it. A plane lands in the London area about every thirteen minutes. Two thousand planes have killed about 2,000 people but many who have been seriously injured would have to be added to the death list. The explosive carried is approximately one ton. The penetration is very slight because of a sensitive fuse. It has great blast effect. The fact that this raiding is continuous, with warning sirens still operating, has disturbed people more than the heavy bombing of earlier periods. Fatigue seems to be the worse general result. Morrison has been plainly disturbed by the effect on the London District. The Prime Minister planned to make a short reading tomorrow to parliament and will speak briefly on the radio in the evening. The question of reprisals has been discussed. It has been suggested that if the Germans did not desist a threat might be made to bomb a hundred of the smaller and less protected towns in Germany. The suggestion included giving a warning to the 100 towns to be selected. The justification for taking such action was that the flying bomb was an indiscriminate weapon.

It is an interesting fact that this weapon is introduced to coincide with the decline of production of German bombers and shortly
after the sharp increase in British deep penetration night bomber losses, due to increasingly effective counter measures.

End
FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 920, 3 July 44. (Filed 03/2300.)
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT: Robot Bombs.

ACTION:

1. To President as WHITE 117, (Hyde Park), 04,2452.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved without change by the President, sent to Winant on 6 July 1944.

COPYES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

000 ROBOT BOMBS.
From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, Filed 03/23/02.

For the President from Minant.

I have seen a great deal of the Prime Minister during the last few days and I am familiar with the exchange of messages in relation to military planning.

I wanted you to know how deeply the Prime Minister has felt the differences that have ended in his accepting your decision. I have never seen him as badly shaken. He believed completely in the program he was supporting.

It was only his great friendship for you, the personal consideration you showed him in your exchange of messages, the knowledge of the greater contribution we were making in the campaign and a recognition that time was pressing that prevented continued resistance on his part and aided in his forwarding a directive to General Wilson.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By: Ray
Late, MAR 14 1972

End
FROM THE Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 919, 3 July 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's reactions to ANVIL decision.

ACTION:
1. To President at WHITE 116, 041245.
2. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change; sent to Winant 6 July 44.
21 June 1944

To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered

Filed: 21/1400Z

For the President's eyes only from Winant.

After reading the Prime Minister's message to you, number 708, I feel you should know the exact situation in the Cabinet in relation to oil. Last week the Cabinet decided in principle to continue the oil conferences. The appointment of conferees was left to the Prime Minister. It is recognized that the ablest man to conduct these negotiations is Leathers, but he is not available as he is needed to handle transport for the second front operations. The Cabinet Committee in charge of this problem, therefore, recommended John Brown, Lloyd and Halifax. This group felt that a friendly conciliatory approach would be the constructive approach. This recommendation had the support of Eden, John Anderson and Leathers. Beaverbrook has been
representing a table thumping opposition to our position. It would be a shred guess to assume that the Prime Minister in his suggestion to you believes that the simplest method of meeting this opposition is to appoint Beaver-brook to represent the British Government in the negotiations. It might, also, be wise, from our point of view, to accept this judgment but I wanted you to understand the underlying situation.

I must ask you to protect me in forwarding this information as its disclosure would bring about serious consequences to those who have informed me.

No Sig
FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL 21/1400Z DATE 21 June 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 21/1600Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Re British delegates to Oil Conference.

ACTION
1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 84, 21/1600Z.
2. (See also PM #703).
3. Reply prepared by Captain Wood; approved with minor change by the President 23 June; sent to Winant as 231617 NCR 210.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 

FILED:

210 OIL CONFERENCE.
From: M A London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. Unnumbered Filed: 130035 Z

Warrant to the President.

Just before General Marshall and I reached Chequers Saturday night the Prime Minister had received a message from General MacFarlane telling him that Badoglio had been dropped by the Italians, and of the formation of the new control under Bonomi. He was very indignant that this had been accomplished without conference with the three powers. He made this very clear both to General MacFarlane and to Sir Noel Charles. The latter he told me with Ambassador Kirk were both at Naples. The Prime Minister did not learn until the next day that the new group had assumed the obligations undertaken by Badoglio. His first reaction was to upset what had been done but Eden whom he had summoned to Chequers persuaded him to do nothing until he had communicated with you and there had been time to consult with the Russians. In a Department message No. 4636 of June 11th which I received this morning I understand that MacFarlane speaking for the United States as well as Great Britain objected to the appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister. I called Eden this afternoon and told him...
of our surprise that the General should express an opinion of the United States Government without first consulting us, and that General MacFarlane did not correctly represent the views of the United States. I asked that no further representations of our Government be made by General MacFarlane without knowledge of the views of our Government. Eden assured me that this would not happen again.

The Prime Minister was disturbed by your reply to his number 667. He has since forwarded you his No. 700. I read this message with some care and listened to his background explanation. He wants the Russians as well as ourselves to support him in Greece and to strengthen his Greek position would like us in turn to join with him in supporting Russian action in Romania. He distinguishes between long term policy and the necessity for prompt decision in the military phase. He feels that committee consultations and recommendations are ineffective in emergency situations. He wanted me to support his position. I made no objection to the content of his message as I understood from General Marshall that you wanted to be clear of Balkan entanglements.

The French situation is welling up in the press here. Please see Embassy messages 4684 of June 11th, and 4686, 4689 and 4690 all of June 13th. The news and radio situation here would not bother me if it were not for the division in the Commons and the sharp difference of opinion in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is trying to support
your position, with Eden, the Foreign Office and a number of ministers in opposition. On this particular issue the men who are uniformly in support of United States collaboration do not see eye to eye with us on DeGaulle. I realize that on a showdown the United States would stand back of you almost to a man against French leadership that showed ingratitude to the great contribution that we are making in men and materials to free France. And yet the proximity of France to Great Britain and four years of build-up of DeGaulle is a force to be reckoned with here and in France. Collaboration with Great Britain and Cabinet support of Churchill by ministers normally friendly to the United States are important to us. So far I have been able to prevent an open clash between Eden and Churchill but it has not been easy.

The issuance of French currency without consultation with and an underwriting by the Free French Committee have been the immediate cause of controversy. At present Eden is trying to explore a working agreement with the French that might be acceptable to them and to us. This is being approached on a less than Cabinet level. You will be kept informed.

I have felt that it might be helpful for Eden to go to Washington and explain the British position to you. It would clear the political situation here but it might make your conversations with DeGaulle more difficult. If you approve of this idea it would be well to keep the Russians informed.

I am sorry to burden you with a political controversy while our soldiers are so gallantly moving forward on the western front.
FROM  Ambassador Winant  
TO  The President  
SERIAL  Filed 300035Z  
DATE/TIME  13 June 44.  
OR FILE NUMBER  
TOR MAP ROOM  13/035Z  
VIA  Army Code Room  
SUBJECT  Italian situation; spheres of Influence in Balkans; French situation  

ACTION  
1. To President via Usher.  
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor change; sent to Amb Winant as 1321L8 NCR 8553.

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED: 05/8 Balkans; 05/2 France; 05/1 Italy; 05/1 Greece; 05/1 Romania; 05/2 Russian-Or Britian; 05/1 France.
9 June 1944

For: The President of the United States
DTG: 092004Z June 1944

To the President from Winant.

Chiefs of Staff with Lovett arrived London this evening. General Marshall, General Smuts and I are spending tomorrow night at Checkers. I thought you might want to send some message.

I liked your prayer.

No Sig
From: M. A. London, England
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Tool: 081413 Z

To the President from Winant.

Please see Ambassador Phillips' message to Secretary Hull "SecState Washington 4582 June 8th, 4 P M". You will have already seen the Prime Ministers message number 894 forwarded to you early this morning. Phillips has not seen this message.

No Sig
BE-406
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SIGNED)

London
Dated June 8, 1944
Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

U.S. URGENT
4582, June 8, 4 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM PHILLIPS

Since his arrival on D minus two, General de Gaulle has proved a difficult and non-cooperative guest of the British Government. There has been constant friction and no one has been more annoyed than the Prime Minister himself. The first impasse arose in connection with the Eisenhower proclamation to the people of Western Europe and with regard to de Gaulle's own broadcast. He took exception to parts of the Eisenhower message and General Koenig indicated to the Chief of Staff that therefore de Gaulle might not deliver his broadcast and furthermore might forbid the participation of the French liaison officers (who had been in training in England for a year at the expense of the British Government) to accompany the invasion forces. However, late in the afternoon of "D" day, de Gaulle made his broadcast, the text...
-2- #4532, June 8, 4 p.m. from London

the text of which was passed on a technical level without formal approval yesterday, de Gaulle permitted twenty French liaison officers to participate in the invasion and today, in reply to a question it was stated that the remainder of the five hundred will not be allowed to go.

The issuance of the scaef (repeat scaef) currency proclamation, which was approved by the combined Chiefs of Staff, has been delayed in the hope that de Gaulle would issue, at the same time, a supporting statement since it was felt here that some French recognition should be given to the presence in France of our currency notes. The General has refused to do so on the ground that France was being treated in this respect, precisely like Italy and that he alone, as President of the FCNL has the right to issue such a proclamation. Our proclamation, therefore, will be issued at midnight tonight, without his support and with as little publicity as possible.

I have learned that in spite of his non-cooperative attitude, the sentiment in Parliament and in the press is growing more and more in his favor on the ground that he is not being given proper consideration.

It seems
-3- #4582, June 8, 4 p.m. from London

It seems possible that he may be invited, as President of the FCNL to agree to the plans which have been worked out for the administration of civil affairs in France.

WINANT

WWC
24 April 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number None

Filed 241030Z

To the President from Winant.

Since sending you my preceding message last night, I have talked to Sherwood. We know definitely now that the source of propaganda charging us with bomb damage done by the British in France emanated from Vichy German sources and is related to their general propaganda thesis of standing as the protectors of Europe. They continue to concentrate their attack against us and the Russians.

No Sig
FROM Ambassador Winant  
TO The President  

SERIAL  None  
DATE 24 April 1944  

DATE/TIME 241030Z  
OR FILE NUMBER  

TOR MAP ROOM 241130Z VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT Propaganda re American bombing of occupied countries.  

ACTION  
1. Further to Winant's Unno, filed 231929 Apr.  
2. Sent to President at Waccamaw as WHITE 104, 241345Z.  
3. See WINANT-PRESIDENT, 231929Z, 23 Apr 44, which has complete report of action on these two messages.  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED:
From: Military Attache London England  
To: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered  
Filed: 231929 Z  

For the President's Eyes Only.

You know I have always supported daylight bombing. With the equipment we have it permits the selections of military targets and brought up the German fighters when RAF fighter sweeps failed to do this. The British concentrated on night bombing which has injured enemy industry but the weight of its attack has fallen largely on communities. Insofar as the enemy was concerned night raids against the civil population in Germany can be justified by the initiative taken by the Germans in their bombing of British towns and cities. We have been spared this form of attack.

Except for their bombing of Helsinki the Russians have in the main confined bombing to military objectives. This is particularly true in the Balkan States. On the other hand 85% of the effort to strike at Sofia, Budapest
and Bucharest has been contributed by us. These attacks were aimed at both community morale and marshalling yards. I believe that combining these objectives is ineffective. In order to destroy marshalling yards that can be rapidly repaired you should be nearby based and the attacks should be frequent. The justification on a purely military basis for a long distance daylight bombing raid is that it should be undertaken against a particular target the destruction of which does injury to the enemy's war effort for a considerable period of time, such as knocking out a ball bearing factory or destroying an enemy aircraft plant. Therefore I believe the attacks on Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest will be recognised as political actions directed at the morale of these communities. Certainly they have created ill-will for us in the minds of the people in these areas and the fact that the Russians have abstained from taking similar action has reacted to their political advantage.

The decision in selecting these targets was made by the JIC here in which we are not represented. These target directives are turned over to Portal and given by him to US Air Command for execution. There is no doubt in my mind that they are based on a carefully considered political judgement by British authorities and although carried out by US Military Command are not subject to political review by us. Such actions involve high policy and will influence
for a long time to come our position in Europe.

The suggested selection of targets in France which has been scheduled, particularly as it relates to Marshalling yards, is more than a military decision as it will inevitably involve a heavy loss of civilian life in France. I am not questioning the probable necessity of taking Allied life in freeing France but I do believe you should have an awareness of the factors involved and an opportunity to measure the repercussions which will result. The British will take a like responsibility but I believe they are doing more than we are to build up an understanding in that country. Sherwood said last week that for some unaccountable reason we are being blamed for the destruction and casualties that have resulted from British night bombing last month in France.

The nearness of the British Government to the scene of action and their form of Government which calls for Cabinet decisions wherever political considerations are involved is in part accountable for their closer coordination in political and military matters. Under our Constitution you alone as the elected Representative of the People with the authority of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces are in a position to intervene with the military to exercise political judgements. I feel that with this great responsibility there must be some way of improvising machinery that
would keep you currently informed of military actions that involve political decisions.

I do believe that British political considerations are integrated in military decisions in the European area and that they do not necessarily conform with the long term interests of the United States.

I would like very much to help you in any way I could but I believe that if you sent someone here like Jack McCoy he might be more acceptable to the military command. I am certain that you need coverage in the political sphere.

I have done my best to keep before those directly concerned your wishes in regard to unconditional surrender and zones of occupation Germany.

John G Winant
FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY FOR CAPTAIN WOOD.

Send to Secretary Hull in person WHITE 102 with the following message from the President:

"Please let me know by telegraph whether or not you would approve of sending General Hurley to cover American interests in the political sphere as recommended by Winant."

RECD 24/1845Z.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State

I have been directed by the President to forward you a paraphrased copy of a message from Ambassador Winant to the President of 23 April. A copy is herewith attached.

The President further directed that I deliver to you the following message from him:

"Please advise me by dispatch as to whether or not you would approve of sending General Hurley to cover American interests in the political sphere as recommended by Winant."

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc. (HW)
1. Msg. Winant to President
   23 April 1944.

Delivered 24/1745 Q

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By M. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
I have always given my support to daylight bombing, as you know. Because of the equipment we have, it makes possible the selection of military targets and brought up the German fighters when RAF fighter sweeps failed to accomplish this. The concentration of the British on night bombing has injured enemy industry but communities have borne the weight of its attack. Night raids against the civilian population in Germany can be justified in so far as the enemy is concerned by the initiative taken by the Germans in the bombing of British cities and towns. We have not been subjected to attacks of this type.

With the exception of their bombing of Helsinki, the Soviets have largely confined themselves to the bombing of military objectives. In the Balkan states this is particularly true. On the other hand, we have contributed 85% of the effort to strike at Sofia, Budapest and Bucharest. The objectives of these attacks was both marshalling yards and community morale. In my opinion the combining of these objectives is ineffective. To destroy marshalling yards which can be repaired rapidly you should be based nearby and attacks should be frequently made. On a purely military basis the justification for long distance daylight bombing attack is that it should be made against a particular target, the destruction of which injures the enemy war effort for a considerable time such as smashing an enemy aircraft plant or destroying a ball-bearing factory. I believe, therefore, that the attacks on Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia will be looked upon as political actions aimed at the morale of these cities. In
the minds of the people in these areas they have certainly created ill will for us and the fact that the Russians have withheld similar action has been to their advantage politically.

The selection of these targets was made by the J.I.C. here in which we do not have a representative. These target directives are passed to Portal and forwarded by him for execution to the United States Air Commands. In my mind there is no doubt that they are based on political judgment carefully considered by British authorities and are not subject to political review by us although carried out by United States Military Commands. High policy is involved in such actions and they will influence our position in Europe for a long time to come.

The schedules of proposed targets in France, particularly as it applies to marshalling yards, is more than a military matter since inevitably it will produce in France a heavy loss of civilian life. I do not question the probable necessity in freeing France of taking Allied life. I do believe that you should be aware of the problems concerned and should have an opportunity to judge the resulting repercussions. A like responsibility will be taken by the British, but in my opinion they are doing more to build up an understanding in that country than we are. Last week Sherwood stated that we are being blamed for some unknown reason for the casualties and destruction produced last month in France by British night bombing.

The British Government's proximity to the scene of action and their form of Government which demands Cabinet decisions where political considerations are involved, is accountable in part for their closer cooperation in military and political actions. According to our constitution, you along with the chosen representative of the people with the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, are in the position of exercising political judgments through
intervention with the military. With this great responsibility, I feel that there must be some means of setting up machinery that would keep you informed currently of military operations that involve political considerations.

In the European area I believe that British political considerations are integrated in military decisions and that they do not conform necessarily with United States long term interests.

In any way that I could, I would like very much to be of assistance. But I believe it might be more acceptable to the military command if you sent someone here like Jack McCloy. I feel sure that you need coverage in the sphere of politics.

In regard to unconditional surrender and zones of occupation in Germany, I have done my best to keep your wishes before those directly concerned.
May 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Reference: Your Memorandum of April 26 in regard to Assigning General Hurley to London on a Special Duty.

1. Prior to making a decision in this matter I should like to have from you a suggested draft of instructions that should be given to General Hurley if it is decided to send him on this special mission.

2. In regard to your question as to whether he should have the assistance of some political officer, it appears to me that his instructions should direct him to obtain pertinent political advice from our Ambassador in London.

F. D. R.
April 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference: Telegram from Ambassador Winant, April 23, 1944, re Bombing on the European Continent and the Balkans.

I entirely approve of sending General Hurley to take care of this situation as any bombing which is not absolutely essential and is not directed against military objectives will have unfortunate repercussions against the United States in our relations with the enemy-occupied countries.

I am also wondering whether General Hurley should not have the advice and assistance of some political officer thoroughly acquainted with the European political situation.

Cf

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By BWP Date MAR 14 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADAM LEARY

TO PREPARE REPLY.

F.D.R.

Reference:
White 16 2
White 10 4
Black 6 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 102, 240330Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In black 65, 241845Z, the President directed message be sent to SEC STATE with following notation: &quot;Please let me now by telegraph whether or not you would approve of sending Gen Hurley to cover American interests in the political sphere as recommended by Winant.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. On Apr 26, 44, the Sec of State sent to the President a memo stated, &quot;I entirely approve of sending General Hurley to take care of this situation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. May 3, 1944, President replied &quot;Prior to making a decision in this matter, I should like to have from you a suggested draft of instructions to be given to General Hurley.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. On 17 May 44 the Sec State sent a memo to the President stating that until recently decisions as to what targets would be bombed were made by the JCS in Washington, and in view of that he did not think it necessary or advisable to send someone to London.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FROM:** Ambassador Winant  
**TO:** The President  
**SERIAL:** Unno  
**DATE:** 23 Apr 44  
**DATR/TIME:** 231929Z  
**OR FILE NUMBER:** 232215Z  
**TOR MAP ROOM:** 232215Z  
**VIA:** Army Code Room  
**SUBJECT:** American bombing of European targets; need for political coverage in Europe.
66. On 18 May the President approved Sec Hull's suggestion that Gen Hurley not be sent to London.
7. No reply was considered necessary to Winant.
26 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number Filed 261600Z

To the President from Winant.

Matters go well here. General Eisenhower, I believe, deserves great credit for working out a practical and effective solution for air control under the European Command. Your directive to him on the status of the French has opened a way for a realistic approach to that difficult problem. The Prime Minister's message to you on "hardening for OVERLORD" together with preparations that are going on here fixes that position.

If I can get a clear understanding from Kennan of what you want done in the European Advisory Commission, after he has explained to you the situation as we see it here, I believe we can go ahead and get the job done.

I am having a small private row with Anthony on CHROME because I didn't like the idea of your spending time on that subject and not having the work count. I am sure, however, we will reach a sensible conclusion.
Sir John Anderson and I are making progress working on your special assignment.

The Prime Minister was completely satisfied to accept your decision on the Bermuda meeting. He had two great days with our troops and has returned in good spirits and with his old enthusiasm.

Everybody here is looking forward to Stettinuus' visit.

I hope you have a wonderful trip and come back completely well.

No Sig
FROM: Ambassador Wannent

TO: The President

DATE: 26 March 1944

DATE/TIME: 261600

OR FILE NUMBER: 26/17442

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous ....

ACTION

To President at Hyde Park as White 3, 2617442.

Per Admiral Leahy, 2 Apr 1944, no answer or acknowledgment is to be made on this message.

ACTION COMPLETED: 380 France; 100 Filed:

Kahina; 210 EAR; 601 Unrn; 210 Bermuda; 100 Statinius.
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. Unnumbered Filed: 221035 Z
To the President from Winant.

Since General Wickersham was returning to report to the Chiefs of Staff on the progress of the European Advisory Commission I have asked George Kennan who is assigned to me especially by the State Department to return with him. I have given Kennan some special verbal messages for you and I hope very much that you will see him. The messages are not limited to information on the European Advisory Commission.

No Sig
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Ambassador Winant</th>
<th>TO The President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>Unnumbered</td>
<td>DATE 22 March 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>221035Z</td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>221205 Z</td>
<td>VIA Navy Code Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Return of George Kennan to Washington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

To President via Admiral Leahy with morning news.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 22 Mar 44; sent to Winant 22 Mar 44.
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered

Filed: 191700 Z

To the President for his eyes only.

Since my message last night the Prime Minister showed your letter to the President of Turkey to Eden. Eden asked for delay and the Prime Minister is cabling you to that effect. I am seeing Eden in the morning.

Signed Winant

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

FILE COPY

MAR 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that
the attached messages be sent to the Depart­
ment of State for preparation of reply.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

3 Incls.
PM-POTUS, #627,
19 March 1944.
PM-POTUS, #628,
19 March 1944.
WIN.ANT-POTUS, #191700,
19 March 1944.
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 191700, 19 MARCH 1944

Subsequent to my message of last night your letter to the President of Turkey was shown to Eden by the Prime Minister. Eden requested delay. A message to that effect is being sent to you by the Prime Minister. Tomorrow morning I am seeing Eden.
FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL Unnumbered DATE 19 March 1944
DATE/TIME 191700Z OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM 191850Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Blockade of Turkish chrome to Germany.

ACTION
(Further to WINANT 190140, 19 Mar 44.)

To the President via usher, 191850.

By direction of the President, sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.

In memo to the President 29 Mar 44, Sec Hull said, "I do not think any reply is necessary to Ambassador Winant's telegram of March 19 except a word of thanks, which I have sent him on your behalf." Although this memo referred specifically to HARRIMAN's 190140 March, per Captain Wood it was interpreted to apply also to this message. (Copy of this memo filed with HARRIMAN's 190140 March.)
19 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number

Filed 190140Z

For the President's eyes only. Signed Winant.

Today I gave the Prime Minister your letter on chrome which you are sending to the President of Turkey. He was in complete agreement and said he would do everything he could to support our position even to a blockade of Turkey if it were necessary.

The Prime Minister is sending a personal letter to Salazar supporting our position on wolfram. Sir Ronald Campbell left tonight. He is taking it back to Lisbon with him.

When I was with the Prime Minister today, I again brought up the necessity of immediate action in connection with the oil conversations. I have pressed this with Eden and others. The Prime Minister told me that a memorandum had been prepared for him and that he would study it over the week-end and have an answer for me on Monday. They have already appointed a Cabinet Committee but it is contrary to British custom and procedure to make public the names of Cabinet Committees.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number
Filed 190140Z

I am trying to get the technical experts appointed at once and an announcement made of the Cabinet Committee.

This evening I had a message from Myron Taylor suggesting that Sir Herbert Emerson and Malin of the Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Committee go on to Washington to meet with the War Refugee Board. I am certain I can get them to go and will so reply to Myron Taylor. I have no direct way of communicating with Henry Morgenthau. I know that for some time he has wanted the British to agree to permit limited funds to be made available to refugees within areas controlled by the enemy. The British have been reluctant to do this because they felt it would permit foreign exchange to fall into the hands of the enemy for purchases of strategic material. I think I have been able to work out a formula for credits which would be as effective as the use of Allied currency and to which the British are willing to be generous contributors. Emerson will explain this to Morgenthau. The British have also appointed a Cabinet Committee of which both Eden and John Anderson are members with others to coordinate with your War Refugee Board but again custom and procedure prevent them from making their names public. In this instance, I do
not think a public announcement is necessary. It does, however, greatly strengthen support of the Inter-Governmental Committee.

Major Traynor arrived today.

After talking at great length with the Prime Minister, I am certain that Tripping has nothing to do with timing.

I am replying to Myron Taylor through the State Department. I will forward through Secretary Hull both the Prime Minister's assent to your letter to the President of Turkey and his formal reply on the oil situation.

Thank you for helping me.

No Sig
20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of a message from Ambassador Winant to the President be forwarded to the Department of State for the preparation of a reply.

L. MATHESON,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
Msg. Winant to the President, 19 Mar 44.
From: Ambassador Winant
To: The President

Your letter on chrome which you are sending to the President of Turkey I today gave to the Prime Minister. In complete agreement, he said that if it were necessary, he would do everything he could to support our position even to a blockade of Turkey.

A personal letter supporting our position on wolfram is being sent by the Prime Minister to Salazar. Sir Ronald Campbell is taking it back to Lisbon with him. He departed tonight.

I again brought up, when I was with the Prime Minister today, the need for immediate action with reference to the conversations on oil. I have pressed this with Eden and others. The Prime Minister said he would have an answer for me on Monday, after studying over the weekend a memorandum which had been prepared for him. A Cabinet Committee has already been appointed, but the names of the Cabinet Committee have not, in accordance with British custom and procedure, been made public. I am trying to get the technical experts appointed as soon as possible and the Cabinet Committee announced.

I had a message from Myron Taylor this evening suggesting that Sir Herbert Emerson and Malin of the Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Committee meet with the War Refugee Board in Washington. I feel sure that I can get them to go and will so advise Myron Taylor. I know that Henry Morgenthau, with whom I have no direct way of communicating, for some time has wanted the British to allow limited funds to be made available to refugees within areas under enemy control. Because they felt foreign ex-
change might fall into the hands of the enemy for purchases of strategic material, the British have been reluctant to do this. I have been able to work out, I think, a formula for credits which would be as effective as the use of Allied currency and to which the British will contribute generously. Emerson will explain this to Morgenthau. A Cabinet Committee of which both Eden and John Anderson are members with others, has also been appointed by the British to coordinate with your War Refugee Board but again their names cannot be made public because of custom and procedure. While I do not in this case think announcement is necessary, it does strengthen greatly the support of the Inter-Governmental Committee.

Major Traynor arrived today.

I am certain, after talking at great length with the Prime Minister that Tripping has nothing to do with timing.

I will forward the Prime Minister's assent to your letter to the President of Turkey and his formal reply on the oil situation through Secretary Hull. I am replying to Myron Taylor through the State Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to Colonel Mathewson's letter of March 20, I do not think that any reply is necessary to Ambassador Winant's telegram of March 19 except a word of thanks, which I have sent him on your behalf.
TO
SERIAL Unnumbered DATE 19 March 1944

FILED 190140Z

ARMY CODE ROOM

19/0220Z VIA

VIA

TO

ACTION

To President via usher, 19/0220.

By direction of the President, sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.

In memo to the President 29 Mar 44, Sec Hull said, "With reference to Col Mathewson's letter of March 20, I do not think that any reply is necessary to Ambassador Winant's telegram of March 19 except a word of thanks, which I have sent him on your behalf." (Memo filed with this message.)
13 March 44.

From: London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, Filed 13/1626Z

To the President from Winant.

Yesterday I was staying with the Prime Minister. He is very grateful to you for the messages you forwarded to him last week.

No Sg.
**FROM** Ambassador Winant  
**TO** The President  
**SERIAL** Unnumbered  
**DATE** 13 March 1944  
**DATE/TIME** 13/16262  
**OR FILE NUMBER**  
**TOR MAP ROOM** 13/17302  
**VIA** Army Code Room  
**SUBJECT** Informs POTUS that PM was very grateful for messages from POTUS.  
**ACTION** Shown to President with evening news.  
   No answer or acknowledgement, per the President.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:**
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT 6 MARCH 1944
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: UNNUMBERED, 06/23102

Forwards message from the PRIME MINISTER re suggested statement to press on oil conference.

ORIGINAL filed "604 (2) Sec. 1"
March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number

For the President's eyes only. Signed Winant.

I wanted you to know that after the Reuters flash reporting your press conference which referred to a third of the Italian Fleet going to Russia the situation here was not easy. I persuaded our friend to radically change his message to you and simply ask if the report was correct. I had just forwarded his message when your message came in which very much helped the situation. Your further message on the oil situation was also most welcome and the announcement of Stettinius coming on to London further eased sensibilities here as the Government has been very conscious of insistence by us that major conferences be held in Washington. Cabinet ministers needed the Prime Minister on this score. I will report to you shortly on the reactions here on oil as it relates to the Middle East area. I believe your messages in the last 24 hours have carried us over a serious crisis in relationships.
I was glad that the Prime Minister talked over these problems with me before communicating with you. I am learning the art of British understatement.
FROM: Ambassador Winant
TO: The President

SERIAL: Unnumbered
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 042340Z
TOR MAP ROOM: 05/0130Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Comments on PM's reaction to release of Italian ships transfer to Russia, and on the oil situation.

ACTION:
To the President via usher.

No answer, per Col. Mathewson, 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
From: London

For: The President of the United States

No number

Filed 271845Z

From Winant to the President for his eyes only.

The defeat of the Conservative candidates in the recent by-elections disturbed both the Prime Minister and the Government. It is my opinion that the Prime Minister still has the unquestioned support of the Cabinet, the Parliament, and the people. I believe, however, that the electorate is beginning to distinguish between Churchill the Prime Minister and Churchill the leader of the Conservative Party. Both Government candidates and Independent candidates state their support of Churchill as Prime Minister. This, together with the fact that the Parliament now meets four days a week, is responsible for Eden's spending an increasing amount of time on his duties as leader of the House of Commons. He also sits in, as you know, with the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The work in the Foreign Office is still heavy. I doubt if he can carry all three assignments without breaking. I can see no substitute for him as leader of the Commons. If he were to withdraw as Foreign Minister, I believe Cranborne would take his
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number

place. They work together well. It would not mean that Eden would not continue to influence foreign policy.

I have felt that the Prime Minister has lost some of the physical endurance he had before his recent illness. Some of his colleagues have also suggested this to me. He has on occasions, however, seemed in a more philosophical mood than at any time I have known him.

I am very fond of him and I believe he likes me but my contacts with him these days are largely social. I rarely have an opportunity to talk public matters with him. I understand the reasons for this. Direct communications and the pressure of military affairs have quite naturally changed an official relationship I once had with him. He does business with the men who do business with him. I felt that I might be more useful to him in understanding us and therefore more useful to you if you could occasionally throw a little business my way. I am thinking of the difficult months that lie ahead.

No Sig

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By P.H.H. Date MAR 14 1972
FROM: Ambassador Winant
TO: The President

SERIAL: Unnumbered
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 2718452
TOR MAP ROOM: 27/2150Z
VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Comments on British political situation.

ACTION:
To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 36, 272230Z.
No answer or acknowledgment.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
27 February, 1944

From: Military Attaché London

To: The President of the United States

No. Unnumbered - 27 February, 1944

To the President from Vinant:

Your message to the Prime Minister in relation to the establishment of machinery for Post War economic collaboration was welcomed here. He turned it over to Eden and the job of coordinating the British position has been given to Dick Law who is now a full Secretary of State but in the Foreign Office, a unique assignment under usual British procedure. He deals with economic and social problems that involve international relationships. I have been asked to consult with him on the problems raised. It would be very helpful to me if I knew our thinking in this field which I understand has been considered by a group in the State Department.

I am wiring you directly as the subject matter relates to a cable you personally addressed to the Prime Minister.

No Sig
28 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

By direction of the President, the attached copies of two unnumbered messages from Ambassador Winant to the President, dated 27 February 1944, are forwarded for your information.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

2 Incls.
Incl 1-Oil conference. (See WP 604(2)).
Incl 2-Establishment of machinery for post-war economic collaboration.
FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL Unnumbered DATE 27 February 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 27/2150Z VIA Army Code Room

TOR MAP ROOM SUBJECT Establishment of machinery for Post War economic collaboration.

ACTION (Refers to POTUS-PM #476 & 477.)

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 35, 272230Z.

By direction of President, (BLACK 8, 28 Feb 44), copy sent to State Department.

Answered by State Department #1565, 29 Feb 44, sent directly from the State Department to Winant. (Copy filed on "outgoing" side of this folder.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

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ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: UNNUMBERED, 27/20302.

Oil conference.

ORIGINAL filed "MR 604 (2) - Oil Conference."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623
May 1944
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WIMANT
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PRESIDENT
NO: 1177, 11 February 1944, 11 a.m.

Forwards message from the PRIME MINISTER to the PRESIDENT, quoting minutes of meeting between the PRIME MINISTER and the POLISH PRIME MINISTER on Russian-Polish relations.

ORIGINAL filed in "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.
INDEX SHEET

From: Ambassador Winant
To: Mr. Harry Hopkins
No.: Unnumbered, 21 Jan 44.

Appointments on European Advisory Commission.

ORIGINAL filed "100 Harry Hopkins"
14 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States

No number

For the President from Ambassador Winant.

1. I have just received the following confidential communication dated January 13th from Mr. Eden regarding a matter which you discussed with him at your recent meeting in Egypt:

"13th January, 1944. My dear Ambassador,

"1. Before I left Egypt the President mentioned to me that Father Hughes, an English priest who is at present in charge of the Apostolic Delegation in Cairo, had complained to him of the treatment by the authorities concerned of Italian priests and nuns who had been arrested or interned. I told the President at the time that I was sure that there was another side to this question, and informed Lord Killiearn of the conversation. I have now in front of me several reports from Lord Killiearn which show that I was right, and that Father Hughes, in making these complaints, had, to say the least, allowed his heart to rule his head."
"2. I should accordingly be much obliged if you would let the President know that I have been into the question since he drew my attention to it and that the position is briefly as follows.

"3. When Italy entered the war it was essential on security grounds to intern a number of Italian priests and members of religious orders. It is an unfortunate fact, but a fact nevertheless, that some of our more active political enemies in the Middle East were servants of the Roman Catholic Church. Of these persons, a considerable number, against whom there is no definite political charge, have already been released; and those who are still interned are looked upon as definitely dangerous from the security point of view. But these cases, too, are kept under review, and further releases will be recommended as and when possible. Father Hughes has also been interesting himself in the cases of certain persons, amongst them two priests and a nun, who were arrested at the request of the military authorities for organising the escape, by means of forged passports, of Italian prisoners of war - a
serious matter as the President will agree - but nevertheless Father Hughes representations have been communicated by Lord Killearn to the proper authorities.

"4. I am not sure which of these categories the President had in mind when speaking to me, but in neither case do I feel that Father Hughes complaints of undue harshness have any justification. Yours sincerely, Anthony Eden."

No Sig
INDEX SHEET

COPY.
FROM: London
FOR: MR. HARRY HOPKINS
No Number, Filed 1737/12 January 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RFP Date MAR 14 1972

PERSONAL AND FOR HARRY HOPKINS FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Since the Daily Mail has established an edition in the United States, the Chicago Sun has asked for facilities in England to publish a paper here, limited to a circulation of 5,000.

I have also found that General Ulio, Adjutant General, made a ruling on December 16th that all American commercial papers, who were willing to provide their own paper from their PWB quota, and who could find printing facilities in England, will receive Army aid in shipping their paper to this country. The Army, according to General Ulio's ruling, will distribute their newspapers or magazines to the troops, subject to the ruling of the general in command of the theater.

As a result of this ruling, the Chicago Tribune is now planning to send paper to England and to print an edition here for the American troops. I am told that they have been successful in finding printing facilities in the British Isles.

I am told that General Barr, Chief of Staff in ETO, has protested to Washington, saying that he does not think the general in command in a theater of operations should be asked to decide what American newspapers may or may not be printed in his area.

I am not at all certain that these suggested publications do not lend themselves to a propaganda campaign that would be detrimental rather than helpful to establishing unity of purpose to forward our primary objective of making war on a common enemy.

I would appreciate your advice and counsel and also support in such action as you feel necessary.

For reply, see HOPKINS-WINANT, 13 Jan 1944, filed "100 HOPKINS."

ORIGINAL filed "100 HOPKINS."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

COPY
W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 19-23
3 January 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

To the President from Winant.

After reading the Prime Minister's number 530 to you, I wanted you to know that a message from Mr. Hull instructed me to take up the question of what was said in relation to unconditional surrender at Teheran with the Prime Minister on his return to London. At the same time, the Secretary wired Ambassador Phillips who had been pressing for a review of the decision on unconditional surrender as it related to Germany of his message to me. The answer to Ambassador Phillips was reported back to Eden from COSSACK and he in turn took the matter up with me. I hope the Prime Minister's query to you was in a form acceptable to you. Eden meant it to be so and the Prime Minister followed his suggestion in his cable to you. Eden thought that the subject had come up at a luncheon conversation at the Russian Embassy. There has been no further word from Stalin.

UNCLASSIFIED
State Dept Letter 1-11-72

By Letter Date MAR 14 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No. Filed 16477/03

2. The words "unconditional surrender" in the United States carry us back to Grant's ultimatum at Fort Donaldson. They have a grimmer connotation here.

3. At the time the unconditional surrender statement was made at Casablanca it gave a great lift to the Allied cause in my opinion. In talking with Eden Sunday night he recognized that a statement of actual terms of surrender would seem equally harsh to the Germans. He told me that the Foreign Office was drawing up a paper suggesting a possible statement that might be made to the Germans on surrender. If their effort is worth considering they will send us a draft copy and I will forward it to you.

4. I am sending this cable directly to you as it refers to a message from the Prime Minister to you. I would appreciate your showing it to Mr. Hull.

No Sig
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Ambassador Winant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement on &quot;unconditional surrender&quot; of Germany.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

To President via usher at 03/2030Z.

(See also PM-POTUS 530, 3 January 44; and POTUS-PM #436, 6 Jan 44.)

President desires to take no action.

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**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
3 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
No #: Filed 031410Z

To the President from Winant.

Following from C in C Home Fleet:

"The Home Fleet is most honoured to receive your message. (Signed) Bruce Fraser."

Above message will probably be given to press in London.

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<tr>
<th><strong>FROM</strong></th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<td><strong>VIA</strong></td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT</strong></td>
<td>Congratulations on sinking of Scharnhorst.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**
To President via usher. No acknowledgment.

*(See also POTUS-PW, #428, 27 Dec 43 and PM-POTUS #525, 29 Dec 43.)*
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No Number Filed: 01/1532Z

To the President.

Happy New Year. I hope you are having a quick recovery from the flu. Last Sunday, I took Mary down to Chequers where we had a Christmas party for the grandchildren and children of the neighborhood around your Christmas tree. It was a happy time for them. I wish you might have been there.

Winant

Red 01/1735
To other 11

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Issuer, 3-11-78
By P.M. Date MAR 14 1972
FROM: Ambassador Winant
TO: The President
SERIAL: unnumbered
DATE/TIME: 01/1632Z
OR FILE NUMBER:
TOR MAP ROOM: 01/1735Z
VIA:
SUBJECT: Happy New Year. Christmas at Chequers.

ACTION
To President via usher.
No acknowledgment.

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: