Box 11
Map Room
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

13 February 1945

NUMBER 193. ADVICE AND PERSONAL FROM THE NAVAL AIDES TO THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR ZINNANT, INFORMATION ADMIRAL HEMITT.

Request information when and where Judge Rosenman expects to join the USS QUINCY.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1318h, February 1945.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the G.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

TOP-SECRET
TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM: Opnav

TO: Alusna, London

122334 NCR 367

NUMBER 168. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

I am expecting you to meet me at Alexandria on the morning of the
fifteenth (15th). Best regards.

ROOSEVELT

Released 122334Z Feb 1945

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

MAR 9 1972
11 February 1945

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London 111743Z, NCR

NUMBER 186. CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Will you please make arrangements to be able to come to Alexandria some time about the 14th to have the visit together which I have been counting upon. I shall let you know the exact date later.

Released from the White House Map Room at 111743Z, February 1945.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C. E.
1 January 1945

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

011916Z NCR 2510

NUMBER 15A, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Thank you for your messages, Numbers 2027 and 2028.

ROOSEVELT

Released 011916Z Jan 45.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1972

TOP-SECRET
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR BINANT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 054, 1 JANUARY 1945

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Acknowledges BINANT-PRESS 2027 and 2028.
2. Prepared by Col Park at direction of Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 2122

I have just read the Prime Minister's Number 934 and 935. They were received at our sending station at such a late hour that I was unable to discuss them with him prior to dispatch.

I have followed the Bern incident and the chronology of events that took place thereafter. I stated some time ago my regret that you were not informed prior to informing the Russians of the British decision to exclude the Russians from the preliminary meeting at Bern. It seemed to me not improbable that this approach was incident to the transferring of Kesselring from the Italian theater to the German western front and done to create dissension in Allied ranks. Its timing immediately preceded Ribbentrop's desire to approach the Russians. It is possible that the Japanese were used by the Germans to misinform the Russians. It is my own opinion that your message to Stalin was responsible for the breaking of the Russian-Japanese agreement and the
resignation of the Japanese cabinet. I may be wrong but I believe you have completely wiped out Russian distrust. I am not sure that the timing of the Prime Minister's message to Stalin (935) will be particularly helpful. The third paragraph of the Prime Minister's Number 934 relating to "provisional zones of occupation in Austria" is not completely accurate. Only yesterday Gouzev advanced in the European Advisory Commission a compromise proposal on zoning in Austria and control machinery that seemed to me to show a desire on the part of his government to reach agreement in this area.

END
FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT TO THE PRESIDENT

Serial or File No. #2122, 6 April 1945

Date

For Map Room 060440Z Via Army Code Room

Subject: German surrender negotiations; zones of occupation in Austria

Action:

1. Winant's comments on PM-PRES #934 and #935.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-355, 6 Apr 45.
3. No answer.

Copies To: MR 370 GERMANY (2)

Date:

By Direction Of:

370 GERMANY; 371 AUSTRIA
From: Military Attaché, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 2117
Pl: 021755Z

To the President from Ambassador Winant.

This is just a message hoping that you have had a good Easter day and to give you a brief informal judgement on one or two matters here. Baruch's trip has been a great success and he has already done much good. He will be cabling you himself in detail in a day or two.

I have been following your messages on the Polish question with the Prime Minister. He was delighted to get your cable yesterday accepting the three amendments and approving his message.

I thought you would like to know that Churchill feels that if the Russians get tough and ask that the acceptance of the Lublin Committee be a condition of their attending at San Francisco, he would be set on going through with the conference.

Although Eden does not think that such action on the part of the Russians is likely, he is of the same mind. If, on the other hand, the Russians go forward with their plans to attend the conference, I do not think you would get opposition.
here to postponing the conference if we wanted it postponed.
The British feel that it is our business and not their busi-
ness to make this decision. The suggestions for postponement,
as they have appeared here, have all originated in the U. S.
press.

I thought you would be glad to know that Gousev, the
Russian Ambassador, told us this afternoon he was now ready
to work out zoning and control machinery for Austria in the
European Advisory Commission.

Yesterday, after a five-hour meeting of the Chiefs of
Staff, the Prime Minister forwarded to you a message which he
hoped would be satisfactory. I know he tried hard to make it
so.

I liked your message on Bretton Woods. If the Congress
supports this legislation I feel sure it will be approved by
the Parliament.

Clocks here were put forward one hour beginning today.

End.
11 March 1945

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 2094  Filed 111450Z.

To the President from Winant. Nr 2094.

Today I forwarded to the Department (Embassy's MO 2530) a copy of the leading editorial in the Sunday Observer. This paper as you will remember is owned by the Waldorf Astors. It is edited by the son David Astor. Major William Bullitt now in the French Army spent some time with the Astors here last week. This fact might be worth noting in connection the French position as it related to the Yalta conference. I have not repeated this message to the State Department.

End.

March 11 1945
Secretary of State,
Washington.

2530, Eleventh

Following is leading editorial in the OBSERVER:

"Realism?

The child in Hans Anderson's fairy-tale, asked to admire the emperor's gorgeous new clothes, burst out in astonishment: "But the emperor is naked".

We are reminded of this when we are asked to admire the new "realistic" security system, laid out at Dumbarton Oaks and now capped by the Yalta voting formula. It may be realistic, but it is certainly not a security system. One evil of the old League of Nations was that it gave us the illusion of providing a safety, which it could not in fact guarantee. We must, above all, avoid making that mistake again.

The essential feature now is a refusal openly and in advance, to provide security against the only cases of aggression which are ever likely to trouble seriously the peace of the world; aggression by a great power or aggression by a smaller one which can count on a great power's support. In both cases the offending great power has, according to the project, the lawful right to veto any action by the security council. If the new dispensation had been valid in 1935 Italy, if she were then listed as a great power, would have had the right simply to veto sanctions against her aggression on Abyssinia.
We are told that this is realistic because in such a case the basis of peace would anyhow have broken down. A strange argument. To admit that murder does occur is no reason to make murder lawful. Under the law of Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, the stigma of international crime would apparently attach, not to the aggressor, but to any powers which despite his lawful veto took action against the aggressor.

It is possible to hold the pessimistic view that international anarchy is beyond remedy, and that war will always be with us. If so, let us refrain from high words and find what precarious, fleeting security we can in pragmatical alliances and the balance of power. It is also possible to believe that international anarchy, like inter-individual anarchy before, can be and must be overcome by law. In that case let us faithfully undeterred by one failure, build a new and stronger supernational authority, pledged to apply law all round, a law admitting no exceptions.

There is still time to amend the Dumbarton Oaks plans. Even with the Yalta addition, they remain "tentative proposals." They will not become the new world constitution unless the San Francisco meeting of 45 nations makes them so. And, in the measured language of the Dutch Government: "It is by now a well-known fact that the plan will have to be amended in some respects if it is to command the general and wholehearted support of the smaller powers".

What form these amendments could take will be a matter of keen international discussion in the weeks between now and the San Francisco meeting. The Dutch Government itself has already gone on record with a reasoned memorandum which tries to reintroduce the fundamental difference of right and wrong into the new charter of international conduct. There
is also an interesting proposal to accord groups of small powers equal standing with the great. But, whatever the fate of these detailed suggestions, the grant of a liberum veto which "puts each great power above its own law" should go; there is wide agreement among the smaller nations about that.

And Britain? Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are, of course, parties to the Yalta "compromise" on voting in the security council. But the "compromise" has never been debated, let alone ratified, by Parliament and in any event Britain's hands cannot be regarded as finally tied by an agreement about the formulation of "tentative proposals." It is well known that the Dominions view these proposals with the same doubts and misgivings as the smaller nations of Europe. Is it thinkable that Britain could isolate herself from the Dominions and Europe in order to become a champion of might against right? Would that still be "realism"?

Please deliver copy to the White House promptly.

WINANT

State Dept delivered copy of above to President at 120023. This copy typed for my room use.
To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 2079
Filed 221810Z.

To The President from Rhant. For The President's eyes only. Sr Nr 2079.

Thank you for sunshine and a friendly cruise and useful conversations.

Yesterday I had a long talk with Eden who told me that he had just seen Nikolaczyk and Romy. He told me that they both said that they were willing to go on to Moscow to discuss problems relating to the reconstitution of the Liblin Government. On the other hand they did not go out of their way to thank him for what had been done.

Eden especially asked that I explain to you personally that he invited Elsault French Foreign Minister to London before he knew of your invitation to General De Gaulle to meet you in Algiers and his reply.

You told me that you were afraid that even with loan of the USS Hurry that in the end we might be outdone by the
British in the courtesies we extended to our distinguished Middle Eastern potentate. I think you were right because I found that he was returned in a British cruiser with permission to carry as many sheep as he liked and privileged to roast them in the quarter deck.

I went into some details with him about your trip here. The landing the train trip to London the drive to The Palace with The King and the return drive with The Prime Minister is easily arranged. The difficulty is the Parliament and Mansion House. We feel that this all could be avoided by asking that you talk to the people of England on the radio. A 10 or 15 minute address would be sufficient and would eliminate the need of the other two visits without offense to anybody and with great appreciation on the part of the people of Great Britain.

I believe what you said the other day that the only way to have a friend is to be one. Emerson came from New England.

End.

Top Secret

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By R.P. Date MAR 9 1972
13 January 1945

TOP SECRET - TOT


For: The President of the United States

Number: 2052  File 131835Z

For the President from Winant. TOP SECRET. Sr

Nr. 2052.

A favorable message was forwarded today through the British Embassy in Washington in answer to your Number 666 of 5 December. (See Embassy's 225 January 6, 6 P.M.) Eden had planned to have it sent to you by the Prime Minister in answer to your message to him, but inadvertently it was transmitted through the Embassy channel. I hope you won't mind. Eden worked hard to get it cleared. He wanted to send it out earlier this week, but it has been a little difficult the last few days to expedite business as the Prime Minister has been laid up with a cold.

End

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By DAD Date MAR 9 1972

Rc'd 13/2006

MR-007-13
10th January 1945

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 2047 Filed 09/2336Z

Personal and SECRET for the President from Warant. Number 2047.

I have been informed by the State Department that the agreement on control machinery recommended by the European Advisory Commission, and the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and area of Berlin, likewise recommended by the European Advisory Commission, will shortly be before you for final approval by the U.S. Government.

The control machinery agreement has been approved by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I understand similar approval will be given to the German occupation protocol when the Combined Chiefs of Staff have come to an agreement on the U.S. control of Bremen and Bremerhaven, which includes rail, highway and canal facilities for the
supply of our troops in the American zone. Both these papers have had governmental approval by the U.K. Government. Gousev tells me the Russians are favorably considering them, and I believe they are waiting action by us.

It has been my hope that these together with the surrender instrument, might be agreed upon by the three Governments prior to January 14th, which marks the completion of one year of work of the European Advisory Commission. These are the three basic agreements which are necessary to Allied control of Germany. Their acceptance will release many other papers of secondary importance that have been considered during the past year. I also believe it would be very useful to have these agreements an accomplished fact before your meeting with Churchill and Stalin.

The only basic policy directive that we have received from the heads of the three governments was agreement on unconditional surrender. The surrender terms were based on that directive and are in conformity with it. They provide for the three Allies taking
complete military and civil power over Germany.

The agreement on control establishes the necessary machinery to implement the surrender terms but in no way prejudices the policy which may be applied toward Germany. It simply establishes the mechanics essential to any program that may be determined by those responsible for policy.

The German occupation protocol is an agreement on the delineation of zones of occupation in Germany and the division of areas for joint occupation of Berlin. It also defines the agreed area of Berlin. Again this paper in no way prejudices policy with respect to the treatment of Germany.

The unconditional surrender instrument is drawn so that surrender can be signed by both civil and military German authorities, or can be signed by either the civil or the military. If the defeat of Germany, on the other hand, can only be accomplished by the surrender of local commanders, the instrument can, with few verbal changes, be issued as a surrender proclamation.
All these three documents were recommended by the European Advisory Commission prior to the admission of a French representative. Whatever changes may be asked for by the French, and agreed to by the three Governments, can be accomplished by later amendment. The important thing in my judgment is to get agreement by the three major powers.

End.

FXR/vbw

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 9 1972
Admiral Radcliffe, in a 22 Jan conference at the White House, reported to

State that unless Japan submitted to the demands, it would be declared

indefinitely in a "state of belligerency". The President, according to Radcliffe, refused to act.

There is nothing to do, concluded the Admiral, but "file it without a reply."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEARY

FOR PREPARATION OF R.P.L.V.

F.D.R.

Sent to State Dept. for preparation of a reply

[Signature]
10th January 1945

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 2047 Filed 09/23362

Personal and SECRET for the President from
Winant. Number 2047.

I have been informed by the State Department that the agreement on control machinery recommended by the European Advisory Commission, and the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and area of Berlin, likewise recommended by the European Advisory Commission, will shortly be before you for final approval by the U.S. Government.

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supply of our troops in the American zone. Both these papers have had governmental approval by the U.K. Government. Gousev tells me the Russians are favorably considering them, and I believe they are waiting action by us.

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All these three documents were recommended by the European Advisory Commission prior to the admission of a French representative. Whatever changes may be asked for by the French, and agreed to by the three Governments, can be accomplished by later amendment. The important thing in my judgment is to get agreement by the three major powers.

End.

FDR/VBD

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RIT
15 January 1945

TOP SECRET - TOT

For: The President of the United States
Number 2058

To the President from Winant. Personal and Top

Secret. Sr Nr 2058.

1. Just after forwarding you my 2028 on my con-
versation with Massigli I spent the week end with Eden. In
my message I told you that Massigli had stated to me that
Eden had failed to show him the exchange of messages between
Churchill and Stalin as to the British position on a bipartite
Franco Russian treaty as contrasted with a tripartite Anglo
Russian French treaty. Eden said that the reason for this
was due to the failure of De Gaulle to let him know that he
was going on to Moscow and that the British were entirely
dependent upon the Russians for information concerning these
negotiations. He felt that the Russians had kept him fully
informed.

2. On January 2nd (my 2035) I told you that Churchill
and Eden were very much disturbed because of a secret cable
that the King of Greece had forwarded to his government follow-
ing the long night conference in which the King had agreed to
the establishment of a regency under the Archbishop. I have since learned that one of the reasons for their concern was knowledge that the Russians were thought to have a method of intercepting these communications. Whether they read the message or not I cannot say. Last night when I was at Chequers the Prime Minister told me that he believed that Stalin had completely kept his agreement to keep out of Greece. The Prime Minister also told me that both he and Eden and the Cabinet were anxious to end the fighting with ELAS. Therefore they had pressed their own representatives in Athens to come to terms and were willing that concessions be made, but they were thinking of geography and other points at issue. The question of hostages had dropped out of their minds and they were greatly surprised to find that Scobie had given way on the question of hostages. However, they are today well aware of the fact that the ELAS insistence on keeping hostages has not helped ELAS as far as liberal opinion is concerned.

3. In spite of Peters refusal to accept the Regency the Prime Minister while talking with me laid great stress on the fact that the Regency agreed upon was referred to in the exchanges as a Royal Regency.

4. When the Turks broke off diplomatic relations with Japan I asked Eden if the Russians had been kept informed of these negotiations. I was not clear from his reply that they had been. Gouisev had told me the day before that he had first
heard of Turkish action in the London newspapers. I suggested to Eden that in his discussions with the Russians that he emphasize the importance of the Japanese Embassy at Ankara to the Japanese and to the Germans as an espionage center affecting the Western Theatre as well as the Eastern Theatre. He has done this. I was afraid the Russians might think that the Turkish interest in moving with us was because the Turks wanted our support in the Dardanelles. I do not know whether the Russians were informed or not but certainly their contribution in the west and their possible contribution in the east is of grave concern to us.

5. I saw in your message to the Prime Minister that Harry was coming over here shortly. Last night there was some suggestion that he might stay at 10 Downing Street as there are no extra rooms in the Annex. It was then decided that he might prefer stopping at a hotel because it gave him greater freedom. There is only one difficulty with that which involves date of leaving and security. I wish you would tell him that I would be delighted to put him up if it will be in any way a convenience to him.
2 January 1945


To: The President of The United States.

Mr. Winant to President Roosevelt, Personal and TOPSECRET.

Eden told me the following tonight. The Greek King after his long conference with the Prime Minister and with Eden agreed not to communicate with Papandreou or others in his government in Athens. The British have now found that he did send a message through, misrepresenting the British position. Among other things the King stated that the British agreed that the E.M. would not be represented in the new government and that the Archbishop was to consult with the King on policy. This has caused trouble. The Prime Minister is very angry. Eden is to see the King tomorrow afternoon.

I told Eden that I thought I should forward this information to you at once as the Prime Minister had sent you a message suggesting that you send a cable of consolation to the King.

End.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RRF Encl MAR 9 1972
2 January 1945

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 2035  Filed 0222202.

Mr. Winant to President Roosevelt, Personal and TOPSECRET.

Eden told me the following tonight. The Greek King after his long conference with the Prime Minister and with Eden agreed not to communicate with Papandreou or others in his government in Athens. The British have now found that he did send a message through, misrepresenting the British position. Among other things the King stated that the British agreed that the EAM would not be represented in the new government and that the Archbishop was to consult with the King on policy. This has made trouble. The Prime Minister is very angry. Eden is to see the King tomorrow afternoon.

I told Eden that I thought I should forward this information to you at once as the Prime Minister had sent you a message suggesting that you send a cable of consolation to the King.

End.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By. MAR 9 1972