

FDR - Harriman Dispatches 1943

MR 11 ✓

Box 11
Map Room

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

FROM: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
TO: The President
NO: 301825 NCR 6699, 1 January 1944

Answers POTUS-HARRIMAN 291729 December. Quotes minutes prepared by Bohlen of Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill conference with reference to transfer of Italian ships to the Soviet Union.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

WDCC
28 Dec
0212 Z

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By BWP Date MAR 13 1972

From: MOSCOW
To: WAR

Unnumbered Filed: 27/1224

Personal and ~~secret~~ for the President from Harriman.

At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc, paraphrase of which follows:

"There is no objection in principal, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airdromes for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military

representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.

With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943".

Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations. Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:

"Under point A of the President's memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date MAR 13 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

With reference to weather information referred to in the President's memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.

Regard to the other questions contained in the President's memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time."

In making this statement Mr Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words "at the present time".

I there upon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date. Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin

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By 1807 Date MAR 13 1972

had made this quite clear.

I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin's objectives.

Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.

Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.

No Sig

*Recd: 280630Z - "RWB"
To Pres Via Ulsker.*

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHP Date MAR 13 1972

INDEX SHEET

FROM: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
TO: The President
NO: 252019 NCR 1812, 24 December 1943

Answers POTUS-HARRIMAN 211720, December 1943.

~ Informs President that request made by Stalin at Teheran was for a specific number of Italian ships (1 BB, 1 CL, 8 DD, 4 SS) and not for 1/3 of the Italian ships.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

FROM: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
TO: The President
NO: 201719 NCR 9929, 21 Dec

Requests information on action taken to carry out commitment made to Stalin at Teheran by Roosevelt and Churchill to transfer Italian ships requested by the Soviets.

ORIGINAL filed 450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>27 NOVEMBER 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1556/27</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>			DEFERRED

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LT. CGMR. CARLSON 26154 NCR 3610

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM SPALDING TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AT CAIRO.

SDKYT

TODAY DEKANOV DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING ANSWER TO YOUR MESSAGE QUOTE:

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM THE PEOPLES COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VM MOLOTOV TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR MR. HARRIMAN.

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE FROM CAIRO. GENERAL CONNOLLY MAY ADDRESS HIMSELF THROUGH THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN TEHERAN TO GENERAL ARKADIEV WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS WHICH INTEREST HIM REGARDING COORDINATION OF MEASURES. I HOPE TO MEET WITH YOU SOON. MOST CORDIAL GREETINGS. 25 NOV.

NAVAIDE.....ACTION

FILE.....

DECLASSIFIED
 By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
 By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNA@	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>8 DECEMBER 1943</u>	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>2106/08</u>			PRIORITY
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LT. COMDR. A.L. CARLSON 072211 NCR 2223 (PAGE ONE OF TWO)

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT (PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

I DELIVERED TO MOLOTOV THIS EVENING YOUR PERSONAL CABLE TO STALIN ADVISING HIM OF THE SELECTION OF GENERAL EISENHOWER TO COMMAND THE CROSS CHANNEL OPERATION. MOLOTOV INQUIRED WHETHER EISENHOWER WOULD BE RELIEVED OF HIS PRESENT COMMAND OR WHETHER THIS WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO IT. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE FORMER WAS THE CASE AND THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER WOULD COMMAND THE CROSS CHANNEL AND SOUTHERN FRANCE OPERATIONS. I UNDERSTOOD THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND WOULD BE GIVEN TO A BRITISH GENERAL. MOLOTOV HAD OCCASION TO GIVE THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR CABLE TO STALIN ON THE TELEPHONE AND TOLD ME THAT STALIN REACTED FAVORABLY STATING THAT EISENHOWER WAS EXPERIENCED IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND IN DIRECTING LARGE FORCES IN COMBAT. I ALSO DELIVERED TO MOLOTOV THE COMBINED CABLE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF TO STALIN REGARDING THE SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY DECISIONS REACHED IN CAIRO. MOLOTOV ASKED WHETHER I HAD ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE CONFERENCE WITH THE TURKS. I TOLD HIM I HAD NOT BUT ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD HEAR

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE By *W.D.* No. 3 CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

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RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>8 DECEMBER 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

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Ø72211 NCR 2223

(PAGE TWO OF TWO)

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

FROM YOU IN DUE COURSE. STALIN AND HIS PARTY FINALLY REACHED MOSCOW YESTERDAY BY TRAIN. MOLOTOV REPORTS THAT STALIN IS WELL BUT TIRED. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS GONE ALL OUT IN ENTHUSIASTIC COMMENTS ON THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE.

NAVAIDE.....ACTION
FILE.....

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By *[Signature]* Date MAR. 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

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NAVAL MESSAGE *File*

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNA V ROUTINE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>13 NOV 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>0116</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>HATCH</u>			ROUTINE
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120001 NCR 2731

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	QCT

TEXT

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

UNLESS YOU MEET US SOME PLACE EARLIER, I PLAN TO BE IN CAIRO BY THE 22ND WITH DEANE, BOHLEN, LT MEIJVEJOHN AND AN ARMY INTERPRETER CAPT WARE. NONE OF US HERE HAVE HEARD OF ANY SENIOR SOVIET STAFF OFFICER WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH AND MOLOTOV COULD NOT THINK OF ONE WHEN I ASKED HIM. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW MANY SOVIET STAFF OFFICERS YOU EXPECT IN CAIRO AS YOUR CABLE SPEAKS OF A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SINGULAR AND CHURCHILLS CABLE TO STALIN EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT MOLOTOV WILL BRING A STRONG STAFF. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU WOULD CABLE ME URGENTLY SO THAT I CAN CLARIFY THIS POINT TO MOLOTOV.

NAVAIDE....ACTION

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 State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
 By RCHP Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

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To take up
with Mr. Churchill

[REDACTED]

WDCC
11 Nov 1943
2130 Z

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RCP Date MAR 13 1972

From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States

No. SD 1 Filed: 2255Z/10

Personal and ~~secret~~ for the President from Harriman.

A problem which is almost certain to arise at the coming conference is Soviet insistence on the importance of Sweden cooperation in the war. Molotov has made their attitude plain on several occasions since the conference ended.

Yesterday I had a talk with the Swedish Minister in which he described his talk with Molotov at the reception, indicating that although he considered Molotov's attitude toward him friendly he considered very significant Molotov's statement criticizing Swedens neutrality. He explained further that this subject was intimately connected with Finland's dropping out of the war also he told me of his talk with Secretary Hull in which the Secretary said that the United States had expressed to Finland our views on the

[REDACTED]

advisability of her dropping out of the war and that this was as far as the United States was prepared to go. The Swedish Minister stated that he considered it probable Finland would withdraw from the war promptly if she could be given assurance that Soviet troops would not occupy Finland under the guise of protecting her from the Germans. Finland would prefer to fight it out with the Germans on her own even though it would mean a difficult period of German occupation. In this connection he said that he considered the United States would be the only effective means of preventing Russian occupation of Finland but that this effectiveness would be considerably reduced if not exercised at once.

Explained to him of course that I could add nothing to what the Secretary had told him. As Sweden was so much interested in the Finnish withdrawal from the war before it was too late, I asked whether he considered Sweden could do anything about it on their own. He said the Swedes would be ready to supply Finland with food for the next six months which would be necessary when shipments from Germany stopped, and perhaps take other steps which would risk German retaliation, but he was not optimistic about Sweden being able to influence the Soviet Governments present determination to occupy Finland. He said he considered

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
BY Date
MAR 13 1972

that the next few weeks was the critical time and that they were certainly ready to advise the Finns, if they had the opportunity, to accept harsh terms from the Soviet Government now rather than very much harsher terms if they continued in the war, but he was not optimistic that this would move the Finnish Government in time.

It was his opinion that the Finnish Government were placing too much reliance upon the goodwill of the United States in its effect on their future status and that they did not realize it was their responsibility to work their problems out with the Soviet Government on their own.

As to Swedens participation in the War, the Swedish Minister indicated that the Swedes he thought were ready to take certain risks. He himself would be ready to go further than the Swedish Government. He pointed out that it was the ambition of the King to lead his people through the war without the suffering that would come from participation. He talked quite frankly about the difficulties that neutrality to the end would present in their permanent relations with the Soviet Government and indicate that he considered the Swedish Government should weigh this seriously as against the policy pursued up to now by the King and his advisors.

I have the feeling that the Swedish Minister was

(4)

~~SECRET~~

anxious to get advice from me. As I have no instructions
I avoided expressing any opinion.

No Sig

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RAH

Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA MOSCOW		OPNAV	URGENT ROUTINE DEFERRED
RELEASED BY				
DATE	10 NOVEMBER 1943.			
TOR CODEROOM	1527/10.		DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <i>PLP</i> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
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PARAPHRASED BY	GERMAN			

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(LT.CDR.GERMAN)

092359

NCR 776

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT (PERSONAL AND **SECRET**) FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

AS STALIN IS LAID UP WITH THE GRIPPE FOR A FEW DAYS I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 8 TO MOLOTOV. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY IT AT ONCE TO STALIN. WE WENT OVER THE CABLE IN DETAIL AND HE ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO BE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD THE SUGGESTED ARRANGEMENTS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT WHAT MILITARY SUBJECTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN CAIRO SO THAT THE SOVIET STAFF COULD BE ADEQUATELY PREPARED, ALSO HOW LARGE A STAFF YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TAKING. I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE ME SOME INFORMATION ON THESE SUBJECTS TO PASS ON TO MOLOTOV.

HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT YOU HAD NOTICED IN STALIN'S CABLE OF NOVEMBER 5 THAT STALIN HAD SAID HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN RESISTING HIS LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF THE GREAT COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED STALIN'S OFFER TO MEET YOU AT TEHRAN STILL STOOD.

MOLOTOV MADE IT CLEAR HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK FOR STALIN. NEVERTHELESS I EMPHASIZED TO MOLOTOV THE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

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FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		OPNAV	PRIORITY
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DATE _____			DEFERRED
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SHEET TWO OF TWO SHEETS ALUSNA MOSCOW 092359 NCR 776

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

URGENCY OF YOUR RECEIVING A FAVORABLE REPLY BEFORE YOU LEFT.

STALIN'S ILLNESS IS GENUINE BUT NOT SERIOUS. MOLOTOV ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD BE UP AND ABOUT AGAIN IN TWO OR THREE DAYS.

I SHALL CERTAINLY INSIST ON SEEING HIM IF ANY DIFFICULTY ARISES.

DISTRIBUTION:

P1A.....ACTION.

FILE.

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 By RPD Date MAR 13 1972

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>10 NOVEMBER 1943.</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1233/1246/10 1946/9</u>		DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>RAVP</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY
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(LT.CDR.GERMAN) 091027 NCR 55

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

PART 1 091015 NCR 711
 PART 2 091021 NCR 733
 PART 3 091027 NCR 55

(PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

NOVEMBER SEVENTH HAS COME AND GONE.

YOUR TELEGRAM WAS QUOTED IN FULL IN THE MORNING PAPERS. THE MORE IMPORTANT STREETS HAD BEEN MODESTLY DECORATED WITH RED FLAGS, SLOGANS AND HUGE PICTURES OF PAST AND PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS. THERE WERE NO FORMAL PARADES BUT HOLIDAY CROWDS STROLLED THE STREETS WHERE LOUDSPEAKERS RE-BROADCAST STALIN'S SPEECH AND PATRIOTIC MUSICAL PROGRAMS. EARLY IN THE EVENING GUNS AND FIREWORKS CELEBRATED THE RED ARMY'S RAPID ADVANCE TO FASTOV.

SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED THE CELEBRATION STARTED AT 8:30 P.M. WHEN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WAS INVITED TO AN ENORMOUS RECEPTION AT SPYRIDONOVKA A LARGE ORNATE FORMER PRIVATE HOUSE. THE WIVES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE THEIR LARGEST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE THE WAR AND THEY AND LEADING SOVIET WRITERS, ARTISTS AND MUSICIANS MINGLED FREELY WITH FOREIGNERS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <i>DAV</i> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

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SHEET TWO ALUSNA MOSCOW 091027 NCR 55

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT

MOLOTOV AND THE SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS WERE RESPLENDENT IN THEIR NEW DRESS UNIFORMS CUT IN MILITARY STYLE.

THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE INVITED TO WEAR WHITE TIES AND I REGRET TO SAY THAT I WAS AMONG THE GREAT MAJORITY UNABLE TO COMPLY.

ENTERTAINMENT STARTED WITH A CONCERT LASTING ABOUT AN HOUR. THE MOST DISTINGUISHED SOVIET ARTISTS WERE PRODUCED ONE AFTER ANOTHER. THE FOUR CHAIRS IN THE FRONT ROW WERE OCCUPIED BY KATHLEEN, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, MOLOTOV AND MYSELF.

WE THEN WENT IN TO A BUFFET SUPPER. MIKOYAN AND COL. GEN. SHCHERBAKOV WERE DETAILED TO TAKE CHARGE OF ME WHILE MOLOTOV DID HIS ROUNDS WITH THE OTHER AMBASSADORS. MOLOTOV GREETED THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SATO BRIEFLY AND FORMALLY. DURING THE EVENING SATO WAS WELL SURROUNDED BY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE. A HEATED CONVERSATION BETWEEN MOLOTOV, VYSHINSKY AND THE SWEDISH MINISTER WAS OVERHEARD DURING WHICH VYSHINSKY SAID "WE DON'T LIKE NEUTRALS" WHICH MOLOTOV SUPPORTED.

OUR TABLE IN THE ROOM SET ASIDE FOR AMBASSADORS GRADUALLY EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, KATHLEEN AND MOST OF THE

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No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE	
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		FOR ACTION	OPNAV			PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY _____						ROUTINE	
DATE _____						DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM _____		INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED			PRIORITY	
DECODED BY _____			State Dept. letter, 1-11-72			ROUTINE	
PARAPHRASED BY _____			By <i>PCP</i> Date MAR 13 1972			DEFERRED	

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SHEET THREE ALUSNA MOSCOW 091027 NCR 55

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT

VICE COMMISSARS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND SOME OF THEIR WIVES INCLUDING WANDA WASSI HWSKA. CLARK KERR AND I WERE OBVIOUSLY SINGLED OUT FOR ATTENTION AND HAD PRETTY TOUGH GOING WITH THE TOASTS WE WERE EXPECTED TO DRINK INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. WHEN MOLOTOV JOINED US I CONGRATULATED HIM ON STALIN'S SPEECH. HE ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO ASSURE HIMSELF THAT MY COMMENT WAS NOT MERELY PERFUNCTORY AND THAT WE WERE REALLY SATISFIED WITH THE PARTS OF THE SPEECH RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE AND OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

IT HAS BECOME MY HABIT TO TALK ABOUT NEWS OF THE PACIFIC WAR WHENEVER I GET THE CHANCE AND I HAVE YET TO FIND ANYONE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHO DOES NOT SHOW GREAT INTEREST AS A MATTER OF VITAL CONCERN TO THEM. VICE COMMISSAR KORNECHUK SAID "DON'T WORRY, WE WILL BE SLAUTERING JAPS TOO."

SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT THE PARTY WAS GETTING SOMEWHAT HILARIOUS. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WEAKENING. KATHLEEN WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED A GREAT DEAL TO THE INTEREST AND ENTERTAINMENT OF OUR SOVIET FRIENDS, HAD THE GOOD SENSE TO SUGGEST LEAVING BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

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DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

SHEET FOUR OF FOUR SHEETS ALUSNA MOSCOW 091029 NCR 55
 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

I PROPOSED A FAREWELL TOAST TO MARSHAL STALIN AND THE
 RED ARMY HE LED AND MOLOTOV IMMEDIATELY ADDED TO IT YOUR NAME AND
 THAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

DISTRIBUTION:

P1A.....ACTION.

FILE.

NOTE: THIS IS A COMPLETE WRITE-UP. PART
 THREE WAS RECEIVED EARLIER AND
 DISTRIBUTION MADE SINCE THERE WAS
 NO INDICATION ON THE PART OF THE
 ORIGINATOR THAT THIS WAS A THREE
 PART MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RAM Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-80500-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

7 November 1943

From: Moscow
For: The President of the United States

Number SD 8 0721272

For the President from Harriman.

I saw Molotov again today. He told me that Stalin and the Soviet General Staff had expressed dissatisfaction that our Italian effort is not sufficient to prevent withdrawal of German divisions from Italy and the Balkans to the eastern front. Molotov himself shared their dissatisfaction because of the political significance.

The conversation was earnest but friendly and deserves a full reply. Deane has recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they send a comprehensive estimate of the Italian situation which may be conveyed to the Soviet authorities.

No Sig

Note: Delay caused by error in enciphering.

WDCC

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By hkr Date MAR 13 1972

*Copy sent to [unclear]
re: [unclear]*

See COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA, MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			URGENT
DATE 8 NOVEMBER, 1943.	FOR INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-73 By <i>REL</i> Date MAR 13 1972	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0648			DEFERRED
DECODED BY ROBINSON			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY ROBINSON			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT COM ROBINSON

071641

PART 1-071632 NCR 8915
PART 2-071641 NCR 8895

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

(PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

MOLOTOV HAS INFORMED ME OF U.J.'S CABLE TO YOU 5 NOVEMBER REGARDING THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT YOU WANT ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM ME ON THIS SUBJECT, I CANNOT HELP BUT OFFER THEM AS I PLACE SUCH SUPREME IMPORTANCE ON THIS MEETING.

(1) THE FOLLOWING MIGHT APPEAL TO YOU AS A POSSIBLE PLAN.

(A) THAT U.J. BE INVITED TO SEND MOLOTOV AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RED ARMY STAFF TO THE MILITARY CONFERENCE WITH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOUR RESPECTIVE STAFFS.

(B) THAT IF THE PLACE OF THIS MEETING IS SELECTED, SAY, IN THE CAIRO AREA THE QUESTION OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE THREE

OF YOU BE HELD OPEN. IF AT SOME TIME DURING THIS MEETING THE WEATHER APPEARS TO BE PROPITIOUS, U.J. COULD FLY DOWN FROM

MOSCOW AND YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER COULD LEAVE YOUR PLACE FOR TEHRAN THE SAME MORNING. THE FLYING TIME FROM CAIRO TO

TEHRAN IS ABOUT 6 HOURS. FROM MOSCOW TO TEHRAN ABOUT 8 HOURS. YOU MIGHT PLAN TO REMAIN IN TEHRAN 36 HOURS, WHICH WOULD GIVE

(CONTINUED ON SHEET 2)

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50520-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA, MOSCOW	OPNAV	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____		ROUTINE
DATE _____	INFORMATION DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>BAEP</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>		ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____		DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

071641 (SHEET 2)

NCR 8895

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT
 (PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~); PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN; SHEET 2)

REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR TWO 3-CORNERED MEETINGS AND FOR YOU TO SEE U.J. ALONE AS WELL.

(2) I HAVE CHECKED THE WEATHER EXPERIENCE IN AND OUT OF TEHRAN AND FIND THAT DURIVE NOVEMBER '41 AND '42, REGULAR SCHEDULED FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN CAIRO AND TEHRAN WITH ONLY TWO FLIGHTS DELAYED AND NEITHER OF THESE MORE THAN 24 HOURS. IN OUR OWN EXPERIENCE LAST YEAR WITH DELIVERY OF PLANES TO RUSSIA FROM ABADAN TO TEHRAN, 3 FLIGHTS WEEKLY WERE MAINTAINED DURING NOVEMBER LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER IN DECEMBER BECOMES PROGRESSIVELY LESS FAVORABLE, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY ARE THE REALLY BAD WEATHER MONTHS OF THE YEAR. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE, AT LEAST DURING THE END OF NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER, OF MAKING FORWARD PREDICTIONS OF THE WEATHER FOR THREE DAYS. THE RISK OF DELAY FROM WEATHER IS GREATER TO U.J.; ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE UNTIL YOU WERE SURE THAT HE WAS GOING TO DEPART AND THE GREATER RISK OF DELAY ON HIS RETURN JOURNEY WOULD BE HIS, NOT YOURS.

(CONTINUED ON SHEET 3)

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 16

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA, MOSCOW	OPNAV	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____		ROUTINE
DATE _____		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____		
DECODED BY _____		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY ROBINSON		ROUTINE
		DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

071641

(SHEET 3) NCR 8895

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT
 TEXT (PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN; SHEET 3)

GENERALS DEANE AND VANDERBERG HAVE MADE THE STUDY OF PAST WEATHER EXPERIENCE ON WHICH THE ABOVE IS BASED.

(3) I FEEL SATISFIED THAT U.J. WOULD AGREE TO THIS PLAN FOR A MEETING. IF FOR ANY UNUSUAL REASON, THE WEATHER SHOULD DELAY HIS DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW BEYOND YOUR ABILITY TO WAIT, A PUBLIC STATEMENT COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ISSUED EXPLAINING THAT THE WEATHER AND NOT ANY OTHER REASON HAD PREVENTED YOUR GETTING TOGETHER.

ACTION: P-1-A.....
 WHITE HOUSE FILE....

DECLASSIFIED
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
 By RAP Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPHAV	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____			PRIORITY
DATE <u>7 NOV 1943</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>1424</u>	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>HATCH</u>			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>			ROUTINE
	INFORMATION		DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

06100° NCR 8400

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

I DELIVERED PERSONALLY YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING TURKEY TO MOLOTOV IN THE FORM OF A LETTER. MOLOTOV EXPRESSED THE HIGHEST SATISFACTION AT ITS CONTENTS AND OFFERED NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER TO THE PROVISION WHICH IT CONTAINED. HE PROPOSED THAT YOUR AGREEMENT AS EXPRESSED IN MY LETTER BE ATTACHED TO THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING TURKEY WHICH HE AND EDEN HAD SIGNED, THE TEXT OF WHICH I HAVE ALREADY CABLED YOU, AND THAT THESE TWO DOCUMENTS BE MADE A PART OF THE MOST SECRET SEPARATE MILITARY RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE. HIS ANXIETY TO HAVE THIS AGREEMENT PART OF THE ACTION OF THE CONFERENCE IS I BELIEVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE IS PERSONALLY UNDER SOME CRITICISM BY THE SOVIET MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR NOT OBTAINING ACTION ON THIS MATTER AT THE CONFERENCE. I SEE NO OBJECTION TO HIS PROPOSAL AND ASK THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT. HE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO IS CABLEING EDEN FOR SIMILAR AUTHORIZATION.

(*) TIME/DATE GROUP AS RECEIVED.

DECLASSIFIED
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-78
 By RHP Date MAR 13 1972

NAVAIDE.....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

2nd copy
 NCR 84
 Russia folder

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>7 NOV 1943</u>			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM <u>1457</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>HATCH</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

Ø61529 NCR 8413

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.
 YESTERDAY IN MY TALK WITH MOLOTOV I HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE UP A NUMBER OF MATTERS WITH HIM IN WHICH WE ARE INTERESTED INCLUDING THE SUBJECT OF OUR INTERNED AVIATORS. I THANKED HIM FOR THE CONSIDERATE HOSPITALITY WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN THEM BUT SUGGESTED LAUGHINGLY THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ON THEIR HOSPITALITY TOO LONG. HE RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BECOME "APPARENT IN THE FUTURE" AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DESIRED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION AND "FATE" OF THESE AVIATORS. I THEN SAID "PERHAPS THE LESS SAID THE BETTER BUT IT IS CLOSE TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS". HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS.

NAVAIDE.....ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
 By RHP Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR:15

2 *mini* copy

16-90220-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV ROUTINE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>7 NOV 1943</u>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1457</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>HATCH</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HATCH</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

Ø61529 NCR 8413

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

YESTERDAY IN MY TALK WITH MOLOTOV I HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE UP A NUMBER OF MATTERS WITH HIM IN WHICH WE ARE INTERESTED

INCLUDING THE SUBJECT OF OUR INTERNED AVIATORS. I THANKED HIM FOR THE CONSIDERATE HOSPITALITY WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN THEM BUT SUGGESTED LAUGHINGLY THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ON THEIR HOSPITALITY TOO LONG. HE RE-

SPONDED IMMEDIATELY IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BECOME "APPARENT IN THE FUTURE" AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DESIRED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION AND "FATE" OF THESE AVIATORS. I THEN SAID

"PERHAPS THE LESS SAID THE BETTER BUT IT IS CLOSE TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS". HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS.

NAVADE.....ACTION

Paraphrased copy to state 11/8

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By *CHS* date **MAR 13 1972**

No. 1 ADMIRAL

By *CHS*

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-80030-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASE

7 November 1943

From: Ambassador Harriman
To : The President.

No. : 061529

In my discussion with Molotov yesterday I was able to bring up the question of our interned aviators, along with a number of other matters which interest us. I expressed our gratitude for the considerate hospitality shown by the Soviet Government to our aviators, but laughingly suggested that we did not wish to impose too long on their hospitality. In the same spirit, he replied at once that the Soviet Government wished to take all steps to improve the condition and "fate" of the flyers and that this matter would become "apparent in the future".

My response was "Perhaps the less said the better, but it is close to the hearts of our soldiers". He then said that this was not confined to the soldiers' hearts.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RCB Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

*Paraphrase in State
Department.*

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		URGENT OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>6 NOVEMBER, 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>HATCH-GERMAN</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HATCH-ROBINSON</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438 NCR 7489 (PAGE 1)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT

PART ONE: 041410 NCR 7538
 PART TWO: 051413 NCR 7243
 PART THREE: 051417 NCR 7373
 PART FOUR:
 PART FIVE: 051425 NCR 7470
 PART SIX: 051438 NCR 7489

DECLASSIFIED
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
 By RMH Date MAR 13 1972

(PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

NOW THAT I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE A LONG BREATH I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT FROM ME A REVIEW OF THE MORE IMPORTANT IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WE GOT IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE CONFERENCE ROOM. CERTAIN OF THE DOUBTS WHICH SOME PEOPLE HAVE HAD REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE NOW LAID TO REST. ON THE OTHER HAND THE CHARACTER OF CERTAIN REAL DIFFICULTIES THAT EXIST HAS BEEN MORE SHARPLY DEFINED.

(1) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEFORE THEY AGREED TO THE CONFERENCE HAD EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A SHOT AT WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN DEALING WITH WAR AND POSTWAR PROBLEMS. ON THE WHOLE THE SOVIETS ARE DELIGHTED

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

2nd copy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE TWO 051438 NCR 7489 (PAGE 2)
 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT
 TEXT

WITH THE WAY THE CONFERENCE WENT AND IT HAS STRENGTHENED THEIR TENTATIVE DECISION. IT WAS INTERESTING TO WATCH HOW MOLOTOV EXPANDED AS THE DAYS PASSED. AS HE BEGAN TO REALIZE MORE AND MORE THAT WE HAD NOT COME WITH A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HIM AND WERE READY TO EXPOSE FRANKLY OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS, HE SHOWED INCREASING ENJOYMENT IN BEING ADMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO THE COUNCILS AS A FULL MEMBER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. BEFORE THE CONFERENCE I DOUBT IF THEY HAD ANY INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE INCLUSION OF CHINA AS AN ORIGINAL SIGNATORY OF THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION. THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THINGS WENT AND ARE READY TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO FURTHER THE NEW INTIMACY. ON THE OTHER HAND IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THIS POLICY IS ALREADY SO SET THAT WE CAN TAKE LIBERTIES WITH THEM.

(2) THEY WERE UNQUESTIONABLY CHAGRINED BY THE BRITISH AND OUR ATTITUDE RE TURKEY AND TO A LESSER EXTENT REGARDING SWEDEN.

DECLASSIFIED
 State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
 MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE By APD Data No. 3 FILE OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>RMP</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE THREE

051438

NCR 7489

(PAGE 3)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

EDEN'S FINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM ON TURKEY HELPED TO OFFSET THEIR EARLY DISAPPOINTMENT BUT THEY ARE EXPECTANTLY HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL JOIN IN THIS AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. I AM CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR WILL SATISFY THEM. WITHOUT COMING TO MOSCOW IT IS HARD TO APPRECIATE HOW DIFFERENTLY THEY VIEW THE WAR FROM THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. THE RUSSIANS HAVE THE PRIMITIVE VIEW THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND BLED TO DESTROY HITLER AND SEE NO REASON WHY THE TURKS SHOULD NOT DO THE SAME IF IT CAN HELP SHORTEN THE WAR. THEY HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THE ENTRY OF TURKEY WILL FORCE THE GERMANS TO MOVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE EASTERN FRONT. IN POSING THIS DEMAND THEY ARE ENTIRELY INDIFFERENT TO ANY MORAL OR ACTUAL OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE TURKS IN FIGHTING THE GERMANS. OUR ATTITUDE IN THIS REGARD IS INEXPLICABLE TO THEM. THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT ONLY IF THE TURKS ACTIVELY FIGHT AGAINST GERMANY NOW ARE THEY ENTITLED TO ANY CONSIDERATION IN THE POST-WAR SCHEME OF THINGS. TO A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED DEGREE THEY FEEL THE SAME WAY ABOUT THE SWEDES. IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE ENTRY OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE WAR, THEY BELIEVE THAT CLOSING IN ON GERMANY FROM ALL SIDES WILL HASTEN THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

PAGE 3.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA, MOSCOW.</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>RAH</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438

NCR 7439

(PAGE 4)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT

THE EARLY MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE SHIPS WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT. THEY FEEL ALL RIGHT ABOUT IT NOW, PROVIDED SOME DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE ABOVE WERE THE ONLY TWO MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE NOT CONCLUDED IN PRINCIPLE TO THEIR SATISFACTION. (YOUR CABLE ACCEPTING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL REGARDING TURKEY HAS ARRIVED JUST AS I WAS DISPATCHING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU, AND WILL, I KNOW, BE TREMENDOUSLY WELL RECEIVED.

(3) THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION OF OUR MILITARY PLANS BUT OUR WHOLE PERMANENT RELATIONS DEPEND IN A LARGE MEASURE ON THEIR SATISFACTION IN THE FUTURE WITH OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THEY PLACE STRATEGICALLY ON THE INITIATION OF THE SO-CALLED "SECOND FRONT" NEXT SPRING. AN INVITATION TO THE NEXT MILITARY CONFERENCE IS, I BELIEVE, ESSENTIAL IF THE SEEDS SOWN AT THIS CONFERENCE ARE TO GERMINATE. IT IS CLEAR THEY NEVER LIKE TO BE FACED WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. IF THEY ARE ASKED TO THE CONFERENCE THEY WILL EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE DURING THE CONSULTATIVE STAGE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS WILL BE TO SOME EXTENT A NUISANCE AND TIME CONSUMING, BUT FROM THE LONG VIEW IT WILL BE, IN MY

JUDGEMENT, WELL WORTHWHILE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO INVITE MOLOTOV AS WELL AS THE MILITARY STAFF.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.) (PAGE 4.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA, MOSCOW.	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE	
PARAPHRASED BY	ROBINSON		DEFERRED	

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438 (PAGE 5) (NCR 7489)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	QCT

TEXT HIS POSITION AS SECOND TO STALIN IS MORE APPARENT THAN ON MY PREVIOUS VISITS. A SUBSEQUENT BRIEF MEETING WITH STALIN HIMSELF IS STILL OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, AND I FEEL THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO FIND A WAY TO BRING THIS ABOUT. I EXPECT TO CABLE YOU FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION IF YOU COULD INFORM ME OF YOUR DECISION REGARDING THE INVITATION TO THE MILITARY CONFERENCE.

..... (NOTE:- ONE OF THE PARTS OF THIS DISPATCH, APPARENTLY DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION, HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT THE TIME THIS IS BEING WRITTEN.

WHEN RECEIVED, IT'S PROPER SEQUENCE WILL BE BETWEEN PAGE 5 AND PAGE 6.

IT WILL BE WRITTEN-UP AS SOON AS RECEIVED, AND THE PAGES WILL BE NUMBERED 5-A, 5-B, ETC.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RCIP Date MAR 18 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA, MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE RR
DATE _____	FOR INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>RCMP</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438 (PAGE 6)

NCR 7489

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
----------------------------------	------	------	-----

TEXT (6) ALTHOUGH SOVIET TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS WERE NEVER RAISED AT THE CONFERENCE, IT CAN ONLY BE INFERRED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPECTS TO STAND FIRMLY ON THE POSITION THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN IN REGARD TO THEIR 1941 FRONTIERS. I BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS HAS BEEN TACITLY ACCEPTED BY THE BRITISH, AND THE FACT THAT WE DID NOT BRING UP THE ISSUE MAY HAVE GIVEN THEM THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WOULD NOT RAISE SERIOUS OBJECTION IN THE FUTURE.

(7) THE PROBLEM OF POLAND IS EVEN TOUGHER THAN WE BELIEVED. THEY REGARD THE PRESENT POLISH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE AS HOSTILE, AND THEREFORE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THEY ARE DETERMINED TO RECOGNIZE ONLY A POLISH GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BE A WHOLE-HEARTEDLY FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOLOTOV TOLD ME DEFINITELY THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO HAVE A STRONG INDEPENDENT POLAND, GIVING EXPRESSION TO WHATEVER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM THE POLISH PEOPLE WANTED. THEY GAVE US NO INDICATION DURING THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THE EXTENSION OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I TAKE THIS WITH SOME RESERVATION, PARTICULARLY IF IT PROVES TO BE THE ONLY WAY THEY CAN GET THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIPS THEY DEMAND FROM THEIR WESTERN BORDER STATES.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50530-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA, MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By <u>RGP</u> Date <u>MAR 13 1972</u>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY	ROBINSON			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438

(PAGE 7)

NCR 7489

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT THEY ARE DETERMINED TO HAVE NO SEMBLANCE OF THE OLD "CORDON SANITAIRE" CONCEPT IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOLOTOV TOLD ME THAT THE RELATIONS THEY EXPECT TO ESTABLISH WITH THE BORDER COUNTRIES DID NOT PRECLUDE EQUALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. IN THE CONFERENCE HOWEVER, IT WAS INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD KEEP US INFORMED THEY WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION IN RESPECT TO THESE COUNTRIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS SATISFACTORY TO THEMSELVES. IT IS MY FEELING THAT THIS RIGID ATTITUDE MAY WELL BE TEMPERED IN PROPORTION TO THEIR INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERALL WORLD SECURITY. ALTHOUGH FINLAND CAME UP ONLY INDIRECTLY IN OUR DISCUSSIONS, WE SENSED A BITTER AND UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE TOWARD HER. AS TO THE STATES WEST OF THE AREAS BORDERING ON THE SOVIET UNION, THEY APPEAR FULLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN WORKING OUT PROBLEMS INVOLVED, PROVIDED THEY ARE GIVEN FULL PARTNERSHIP IN THE DECISIONS.

(8) THE DISCUSSIONS ON IRAN WERE ONLY ON A STAFF LEVEL. ONE NEVER GETS VERY FAR ON THIS LEVEL IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS.

ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPTED AN UNPUBLISHED RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING THEIR

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 15

16-60220-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALISNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

051438 (PAGE 8)

NCR 7489

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT FIDELITY TO THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TOWARD IRAN, WE GOT NO CLARIFICATION OF THEIR REAL ATTITUDE. BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT WAS LEFT TO THE END, EDEN DECIDED NOT TO INSIST THAT IT BE THRASHED OUT IN THE MAIN CONFERENCE.

(9) I WILL LEAVE A REPORT ABOUT THE FAR EAST TILL I SEE YOU. AS FAR AS IT WENT, IT WAS ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.

(10) I CANNOT LEAVE THIS REVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE WITHOUT SPEAKING OF THE SECRETARY. HIS DIGNITY AND DETERMINATION AND SINCERITY IN PRESENTING OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE AND WORLD CONDITIONS COMPATIBLE WITH IT PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSED THE SOVIET OFFICIALS. I CANNOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION HIS PRESENCE MADE TOWARD THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.

(11) ANTHONY DID A FIRST CLASS JOB. HE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY FAITHFULLY WHENEVER OCCASION REQUIRED. ISMAY AND DEANE WORKED AS A TEAM AND SO DID THE REST OF OUR DELEGATIONS.

(THE END)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72By RWP Date MAR 13 1972

ACTION: P1A.....

WHITE HOUSE FILE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 16

16-50250-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

Len

26 October 1943

From: Moscow

To: The President of the United States

Number: SD 2 Filed: 26/0502Z

Personal ~~secret~~ for the President only from Harriman.

1. After the conference this afternoon, Monday, I had an opportunity to talk with Molotov privately again about the place of meeting. I asked him bluntly whether communications was the only inhibition to Basra as against Teheran. He assured me that it was and explained that they had direct telegraph and telephone wires to Teheran under their complete control policed by Soviet troops, amplifying what Stalin had said.
2. I told him that since this was the case we should make a detailed study of whether similarly satisfactory arrangements could not be made through to Basra, offering the assistance of our military establishment in Iran and assuring him that we could get full cooperation from the British.
3. I am afraid they are worrying that they will not be able to exercise directly the same degree of control and security against Iranians, German spies known to be in the area, and possibly ourselves, as they do in North Persia. I offered to send General Deans down with a Russian officer to investigate the problem on the spot.
4. Molotov did not bring the matter up but they may be concerned over sending too large a force into southern Iran which would be a violation of their treaty. I would appreciate being advised what arrangements, if any, you contemplate should be made with the Iranian and Iraqi governments regarding entry of the substantial number of Soviet guard forces which might be required if the Soviets should wish to police the communications and the camp.
5. I emphasized the importance to the war effort that the discussions would have in establishing closer military collaboration and said that we were so close together on the place of meeting that a way must be found to solve the remaining difficulties.
6. Molotov raised the question if you went to Teheran why the railroad or road could not be used between Basra and Teheran if the air delivery and dispatch of your documents was interfered with by weather.

DECLASSIFIED

By: Capt. Jeter, 1-11-72

DATE: MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

(1)

~~SECRET~~

From: Moscow

To: The President of the United States

Number: SD 2 Filed: 26/0502Z

(continued)

I explained that the ten days available to you were taxed to the utmost by continuous air delivery and that the extra time the seven hundred miles of ground travel would require would make the return of your documents within the legal limit impossible of accomplishment.

7. I asked Molotov to accept your decision that Teheran was impossible but to concentrate with me on finding a way to solve the communication difficulties to Basra. He indicated a willingness to do so but did not show any optimism as to results.

8. I saw Eden this evening regarding this subject. He of course agreed to cooperate fully and volunteered to take the first opportunity to emphasize to Molotov the importance of the meeting to concerting the war effort.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78
By WLP Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

LCR 2
Filed 2/1045Z
rlw

CCWD
2 August 1943
1151 Z

From: Military Attache London, England
To: President of the United States

Unnumbered 2 August 1943

Harriman to the President. Personal. Am
arranging to travel with the Colonel.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By BWC Date MAR 12 1972

30th July 1943

From: M. A. London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 30/1816Z

To the President from Harriman personal and **Secret.**

I have delivered to the Prime Minister your message of July 27th approving his use of phrases and sentences of your letter to him. Now that Admiral Land has made his statement to the Congressional Committees covering all the points in your letter the Prime Minister has come back to me with the request that I open up again with you the question of whether it would not be appropriate for him to quote you letter in full with or without the date and probably omitting the sentences giving tonnage figures of British war shipping losses. He is so pleased with the spirit of friendly and close cooperation indicated by it that he believes it would be very stimulating to public opinion here to quote it in full. He considers it one of the fine communications he has had from you and wants to share it with the British public. Also he is afraid limited quotation would be subject to misunderstanding and at all events

PROCESSED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By DHP Date MAR 12 1972

~~SECRET~~

-2-

would not convey the over all concept.

He discussed it with Lord Leathers who has also talked with me. Cutting back of British merchant ship building has been one of the political problems the Prime Minister has had to contend with here. Moreover we may well come to the time when we will want to ask the British to cut back their ship building still further in order to provide labor for current repairs to the increasing number of our ships coming to British ports as well as repairs to increased numbers of military vessels in these waters such as landing craft. Therefore we have an interest in the allaying of this political pressure.

The Prime Minister, however, is most anxious to carry out your wishes and will be content with whatever you decide. As this subject may come up in the House on Tuesday the Prime Minister has asked me to obtain from you a final decision before then.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

By Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

W

29 June 1943

P R I O R I T Y

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 5135

Filed 29/1703Z

Harriman to the President ~~secret~~ and personal: Eden explains the Prime Minister's and his own first reaction to the idea of Myron's trip is that unless the moment were carefully selected it might well start rumors which would not be helpful. They are not unmindful of the effective work Myron did before and would be glad if he were there now. On the other hand they ask whether your present representative on the spot cannot carry on effectively for the time being and thus avoid the danger of adverse rumors being started as a result of a man of such prominence as Myron going at this moment. Eden suggests also that if you decide to send him, it would be of real importance to inform the Soviet government fully in advance to prevent possible misunderstanding.

No Sig

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RWP Date MAR 13 1972

See by Mr Hopkins
3/10/75

SECRET

June 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed the attached paraphrased copy of a message from Mr. Harriman to the President, dated June 29, 1943, be furnished the Secretary of State, and also requests a suggested reply.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl.

SECRET

PARAPHRASE

From: American Embassy, London.
To : The President
No. 5135. Dated: June 29th, 1943

To the President from Harriman personal and ~~secret~~ We have been informed by Eden that his own first reaction and that of the Prime Minister to the suggestion of Myron's trip is that unless the moment were chosen carefully, it might well give rise to undesirable rumors. They would be glad if Myron were there now, and they are not overlooking the effective work he did before. However, they ask whether, for the time being, your present representative there cannot act effectively and thereby avoid the risk of unfavorable rumors being initiated because of a man of Myron's prominence making the trip at this time. If you decide to send him, Eden also suggests to prevent possible misunderstanding, it would be most important to inform the Soviet government fully in advance.

No sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RUP Date MAR 13 1972

SECRET

File WR

~~SECRET~~

25 June 1943

PRIORITY

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed 25/1321Z

Personal and ~~secret~~ for the President from
Harriman:

Supplementing my 5110 today our friend has asked me to spend the night Saturday which is a good opportunity to pursue the matter if you have further thoughts you wish me to follow up.

I have discussed with him both alone and together with Eden the other subjects you asked me to take up. He is ready whole heartedly and energetically to do whatever you feel would be helpful regarding the Frenchman either privately or publicly. He asked me to talk with Eden in more detail about Myron and Brazil. Gil and I will see Eden on the first occasion and cable you.

Had a long talk with Devers whom I knew well many years ago in our polo days. Am greatly impressed by his grasp of the problems here including Air and the energetic action he is taking.

Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By MLP Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

INDEX SHEET

FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow.
NO: 291729, 29 December 1942

Please send me by telegraph Mr. Bohlen's minutes bearing on agreement made in Teheran by Churchill and me to turn over Italian ships to Soviet.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
NO: 211720 NCR 7416, 21 December 1943.

Answers HARRIMAN-POTUS 201719 December 1943.

Informs Harriman that a total of 1/3rd of the surrendered Italian ships will be turned over to the Soviets.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

280700 USNAVCOM PR IOR LT 211720 N USA 1952

White House m/p Rm

NCR

RC14 SVC DN PRINTER =
MOSCOW DN/WASHINGTONDC =

YR MSGE DN14/21 PC PRIORITY USNAVAL ATTACHE READING 211720 BQKDD
BQKDD EIC DELIVERED 22/DEC 1000 MOSCOW TIME.

ICFN DN14/21 211720 BQKDD 22DEC 1000.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

22 November 1943

From: Opanav

To : Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO GENERAL S. P. SPALDING FROM HARRIMAN.

Please deliver the following message to Molotov and suggest his reply be sent through you to me.

QUOTE. The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Teheran tomorrow, November 23 to make the physical arrangements for the Conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Teheran, General Conolly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.

I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad for which I am very grateful.

I look forward to seeing you. Regards. UNQUOTE

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1735, EWT, 22 November 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RLLP Date MAR 13 1972

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff

~~SECRET~~

222700 ACR 2733

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		OPNAV	OPERATIONAL PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE	
DATE 25 NOVEMBER 1943		FOR ACTION	DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM 1823/25			INFORMATION	PRIORITY
DECODED BY ALLENSWORTH				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY ALLENSWORTH				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

241345 NCR 2163

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

THIS PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR HARRIMAN FROM GENERAL SPALDING.

Blocks 20/21
MESSAGES DELIVERED ²⁴ 1300 TO VICE COMMISSAR LOUVSKY ON HIS REQUEST FOR TRANSMITTAL AS MR MOLOTOV NOT AVAILABLE.

NAVAIZE.....ACTION
FILE.....

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RC 11
062353Z
MM

1100
November
1943

U R G E N T

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

Number 47, 6 November 1943

For General Marshall from Deane.

This afternoon Mr. Harriman had a conference with Molotov. At its conclusion Molotov said in a friendly but serious manner that Stalin and the Soviet General Staff had indications of the Germans transferring divisions from Italy and the Balkans to the Russian front. He said they were dissatisfied that the pressure of the Anglo-American forces in Italy was not sufficient to prevent such withdrawal. Molotov quoted a letter that Mr. Eden had given him, prepared by Ismay, which indicated that the Germans had six armored divisions included in a total of ten divisions in Southern and Central Italy. The letter stated, however, that there were only 200 German tanks in the area. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by the fact that German Panzer divisions have large infantry elements and that their tanks have been left in the north. Martel has information from home that two German divisions have been sent to the eastern front from Italy but that they are being replaced by divisions from Northern France.

The two ambassadors, Martel, and I talked the matter over and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff send us as soon as possible an estimate of the Italian situation, including the latest intelligence estimate of German strength and a summary of what operations are planned in order that we might present an authentic picture to Molotov and the Soviet General Staff.

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FEB 20 1973

2/10

CM-IN-5170 (9 Nov 43)

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

13

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: .AGWAR
Number 47, 6 November 1943

Page 2

Mr. Harriman is reporting his conversation
briefly to the President.

No Sig

Note: Delay due to servicing.

WDCC

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
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FEB 20 1973

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
LOG

CM-IN-5170 (9 Nov 43) 0518Z cng

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

fm

PRIORITY

November 14, 1943

From: Opnev
To : Alutna, Moscow

Personal and ~~_____~~ from Stettinius for Harriman.

Your 120001, 120910 and 131242.

No reply feasible for time being since addressees are on a trip.

Released from White House Map Room
at 1430, EDT, November 14, 1943

Ogden S. Collins Jr.
Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By *PMP* Date MAR 13 1972

SECRET

July 30, 1943


~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opanav
To : Alusna, London.

From the President for Harriman personal and ~~SECRET~~
Tell the Prime Minister I am wholly willing he use
any part of the letter or all of it. I have not the
letter before me but I have a recollection that the last
sentence might be omitted.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1750, EWT, July 30, 1943


CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WAT

Harrison
from the President

Tell the Prime Minister I
am wholly willing he use any
part of the letter or all of
it. I have not the letter
before me but I have a
recollection that the last
sentence might be omitted

Roosevelt

302239 July, NCR 3843

~~SECRET~~

July 30, 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY


From: Opanv

To : Alusna, London.

For Harriman from the President ~~SECRET~~ and personal.
I hope much that you can come with the Colonel.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1750, EWT, July 30, 1943


CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WAT

For Harriman
From the President

I hope much that you
can come with the Colonel.

Roosevelt

July
302238 NCR 3044

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
PRIORITY

July 26, 1943


From: Conav
To: Alusna, London

Honorable Averell Harriman from the President.

Please tell the Former Naval Person it is wholly agreeable for him to use whatever phrases and sentences he wishes from my letter to him. I think this is better than putting the whole letter into the record.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1740, EDT, July 26, 1943.



CHESTER HARBORD,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the
President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

. July 26, 1943.

HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN

LONDON

Please tell the Former Naval Person it is wholly agreeable for him to use whatever phrases and sentences he wishes from my letter to him. I think this is better than putting the whole letter into the record.

ROOSEVELT

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

July 24, 1943.

From: Cpnv
To : Alusna, London

For Ambassador Winant from Admiral Leahy.

Replying to your message of 24 July, the President's number
321 is in reply to Prime Minister's number 373 of 20 July.

Leahy

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1255, EMT, July 24, 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSBY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

To Winani:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Replying to your message of
24 July the Presidents Number
321 is in reply to
Prime Ministers number 373
of 20 July
Leahy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

January 4, 1943.

From the President for Mr. Harriman.

Will you see Prime Minister at once. He has message from

me.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1110, EST, January 4, 1943.

W. A. Burns, Jr.
W. A. BURNS, Jr.
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.,
White House Map Room.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To
Hariman

Will you see Prime
Minister at once he
has money from me

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~