INDEX SHEET

FROM: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
TO: The President
NO: 301823 NCR 6699, 1 January 1944

Answers POTUS-HARRIMAN 291729 December. Quotes minutes prepared by Bohlen of Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill conference with reference to transfer of Italian ships to the Soviet Union.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."
From: Moscow
To: WAR

Unnumbered

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc, paraphrase of which follows:

"There is no objection in principal, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airdromes for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military
representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.

With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943.

Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations. Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:

"Under point A of the President's memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow."
With reference to weather information referred to in the President's memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.

Regard to the other questions contained in the President's memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time."

In making this statement Mr Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words "at the present time".

I thereupon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to being the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date. Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin
had made this quite clear.

I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin's objectives.

Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.

Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.

No Sig
INDEX SHEET

FROM: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow
TO: The President
NO: 232019 NCR 1812, 24 December 1943

Answers POTUS-HARRIMAN 211720, December 1943.

Informs President that request made by Stalin at Teheran was for a specific number of Italian ships (1 BB, 1 CL, 8 DD, 4 SS) and not for 1/3 of the Italian ships.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."
INDEX SHEET

FROM:  Ambassador Harriman, Moscow

TO:   The President

NO:   201719 NCR 9929, 21 Dec

Requests information on action taken to carry out commitment
made to Stalin at Teheran by Roosevelt and Churchill to transfer
Italian ships requested by the Soviets.

ORIGINAL filed 450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN
ships to SOVIET.
**Naval Message**

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<td><strong>From</strong></td>
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**Indicate by Asterisk Addresses for Which Mail Delivery is Satisfactory.**

**Lt. Comdr. Carlson 261540 NCR 3610**

**Unless Otherwise Indicated This Dispatch Will Be Transmitted With Deferred Precedence.**

**Originator Fill In Date And Time**

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<td>Personal and [REDACTED] FROM SPALDING TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AT CAIRO.</td>
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**Today Dekanoxov Delivered The Following Answer To Your Message Quote:**

Personal and [REDACTED] FROM THE PEOPLES COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VM MOLOTOV TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR MR. HARRIMAN.

I thank you for your message from Cairo. General Connolly may address himself through the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Teheran to General Arkadiev with respect to questions which interest him regarding coordination of measures. I hope to meet with you soon. Most Cordial Greetings. 25 Nov.

**Naval Intel:**

**File**

**Declassified**

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By W. J. Stewart Date: **MAR 13 1972**

**No. 1 Admiral**

**No. 2 File**

**No. 3 F-I or Chartroom**

**No. 4 Special**

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (f) NAVREGS.)

**NCR 16**
I delivered to Molotov this evening your personal cable to Stalin advising him of the selection of General Eisenhower to command the Cross Channel operation. Molotov inquired whether Eisenhower would be relieved of his present command or whether this would be in addition to it. I assured him that the former was the case and that General Eisenhower would command the Cross Channel and Southern France operations. I understood the Mediterranean command would be given to a British general. Molotov had occasion to give the substance of your cable to Stalin on the telephone and told me that Stalin reacted favorably stating that Eisenhower was experienced in amphibious warfare and in directing forces in combat. I also delivered to Molotov the large combined cable from the Prime Minister and yourself to Stalin regarding the supplementary decisions reached in Cairo. Molotov military asked whether I had any information regarding the conference with the Turks. I told him I had not but assumed that we would hear.

Declassified
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
MAR 13 1972

Sealed (SECRET)
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
FROM YOU IN DUE COURSE. STALIN AND HIS PARTY FINALLY REACHED MOSCOW YESTERDAY BY TRAIN. MOLOTOV REPORTS THAT STALIN IS WELL BUT TIRED. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS GONE ALL OUT IN ENTHUSIASTIC COMMENTS ON THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE.

NAVAIDE........ACTION

FILE........
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

UNLESS YOU MEET US SOME PLACE EARLIER, I PLAN TO BE IN CAIRO BY THE 22ND WITH DEANE, BOHLEN, LT MEIY/JOHN AND AN ARMY INTERPRETER CAPT WARE. NONE OF US HERE HAVE HEARD OF ANY SENIOR SOVIET STAFF OFFICER WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH AND MOLOTOV COULD NOT THINK OF ONE WHEN I ASKED HIM. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW MANY SOVIET STAFF OFFICERS YOU EXPECT IN CAIRO AS YOUR CABLE SPEAKS OF A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SINGULAR AND CHURCHILLS CABLE TO STALIN EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT MOLOTOV WILL BRING A STRONG STAFF. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU WOULD CABLE ME URGENTLY SO THAT I CAN CLARIFY THIS POINT TO MOLOTOV.
From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States
No. SD 1 Filed: 2255Z/10

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

A problem which is almost certain to arise at the coming conference is Soviet insistence on the importance of Sweden cooperation in the war. Molotov has made their attitude plain on several occasions since the conference ended.

Yesterday I had a talk with the Swedish Minister in which he described his talk with Molotov at the reception, indicating that although he considered Molotov's attitude toward him friendly he considered very significant Molotov's statement criticizing Sweden's neutrality. He explained further that this subject was intimately connected with Finland's dropping out of the war also he told me of his talk with Secretary Hull in which the Secretary said that the United States had expressed to Finland our views on the
The advisability of her dropping out of the war and that this was as far as the United States was prepared to go. The Swedish Minister stated that he considered it probable Finland would withdraw from the war promptly if she could be given assurance that Soviet troops would not occupy Finland under the guise of protecting her from the Germans. Finland would prefer to fight it out with the Germans on her own even though it would mean a difficult period of German occupation. In this connection he said that he considered the United States would be the only effective means of preventing Russian occupation of Finland but that this effectiveness would be considerably reduced if not exercised at once.

Explained to him of course that I could add nothing to what the Secretary had told him. As Sweden was so much interested in the Finnish withdrawal from the war before it was too late, I asked whether he considered Sweden could do anything about it on their own. He said the Swedes would be ready to supply Finland with food for the next six months which would be necessary when shipments from Germany stopped, and perhaps take other steps which would risk German retaliation, but he was not optimistic about Sweden being able to influence the Soviet Governments present determination to occupy Finland. He said he considered
that the next few weeks was the critical time and that they were certainly ready to advise the Finns, if they had the opportunity, to accept harsh terms from the Soviet Government now rather than very much harsher terms if they continued in the war, but he was not optimistic that this would move the Finnish Government in time.

It was his opinion that the Finnish Government were placing too much reliance upon the goodwill of the United States in its effect on their future status and that they did not realize it was their responsibility to work their problems out with the Soviet Government on their own.

As to Sweden's participation in the War, the Swedish Minister indicated that the Swedes he thought were ready to take certain risks. He himself would be ready to go further than the Swedish Government. He pointed out that it was the ambition of the King to lead his people through the war without the suffering that would come from participation. He talked quite frankly about the difficulties that neutrality to the end would present in their permanent relations with the Soviet Government and indicate that he considered the Swedish Government should weigh this seriously as against the policy pursued up to now by the King and his advisors.

I have the feeling that the Swedish Minister was
anxious to get advice from me. As I have no instructions I avoided expressing any opinion.

No Sig
AS STALIN IS LAID UP WITH THE GRIPPE FOR A FEW DAYS I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 8 TO MOLOTOV. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY IT AT ONCE TO STALIN. WE WENT OVER THE CABLE IN DETAIL AND HE ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO BE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD THE SUGGESTED ARRANGEMENTS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT WHAT MILITARY SUBJECTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN CAIRO SO THAT THE SOVIET STAFF COULD BE ADEQUATELY PREPARED. ALSO HOW LARGE A STAFF YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TAKING. I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE ME SOME INFORMATION ON THESE SUBJECTS TO PASS ON TO MOLOTOV.

HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT YOU HAD NOTICED IN STALIN'S CABLE OF NOVEMBER 5 THAT STALIN HAD SAID HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN RESISTING HIS LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF THE GREAT COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED STALIN'S OFFER TO MEET YOU AT TEHRAN STILL STOOD.

MOLOTOV MADE IT CLEAR HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK FOR STALIN. NEVERTHELESS I EMPHASIZED TO MOLOTOV THE...
URGENCY OF YOUR RECEIVING A FAVORABLE REPLY BEFORE YOU LEFT.

STALIN'S ILLNESS IS GENUINE BUT NOT SERIOUS. MOLOTOV ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD BE UP AND ABOUT AGAIN IN TWO OR THREE DAYS.

I SHALL CERTAINLY INSIST ON SEEING HIM IF ANY DIFFICULTY ARISES.

DISTRIBUTION:
P1A....ACTION.
FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 13 1972
NOVEMBER SEVENTH HAS COME AND GONE.

YOUR TELEGRAM WAS QUOTED IN FULL IN THE MORNING PAPERS. THE MORE IMPORTANT STREETS HAD BEEN MODESTLY DECORATED WITH RED FLAGS, SLOGANS AND HUGE PICTURES OF PAST AND PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS. THERE WERE NO FORMAL PARADES BUT HOLIDAY CROWDS STROLLED THE STREETS WHERE LOUDSPEAKERS RE-BROADCAST STALIN'S SPEECH AND PATRIOTIC MUSICAL PROGRAMS. EARLY IN THE EVENING GUNS AND FIREWORKS CELEBRATED THE RED ARMY'S RAPID ADVANCE TO FASTOV.

SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED THE CELEBRATION STARTED AT 8:30 P.M. WHEN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WAS INVITED TO AN ENORMOUS RECEPTION AT SPRIDONOVKA, A LARGE ORNATE FORMER PRIVATE HOUSE. THE WIVES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE THEIR LARGEST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE THE WAR AND THEY AND LEADING SOVIET WRITERS, ARTISTS AND MUSICIANS MINGLED FREELY WITH FOREIGNERS.
Molotov and the Soviet foreign office officials were resplendent in their new dress uniforms cut in military style.

The diplomatic corps were invited to wear white ties and I regret to say that I was among the great majority unable to comply.

Entertainment started with a concert lasting about an hour. The most distinguished Soviet artists were produced one after another. The four chairs in the front row were occupied by Kathleen, the British ambassador, Molotov and myself.

We then went in to a buffet supper. Mikoyan and Col. Gen. Shcherbakov were detailed to take charge of me while Molotov did his rounds with the other ambassadors. Molotov greeted the Japanese ambassador Sato briefly and formally. During the evening Sato was well surrounded by members of the Soviet foreign office. A heated conversation between Molotov, Vyshinsky and the Swedish minister was overheard during which Vyshinsky said "we don't like neutrals" which Molotov supported.

Our table in the room set aside for ambassadors gradually expanded to include the British ambassador, Kathleen and most of the...
VICE COMISSARS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND SOME OF THEIR WIVES INCLUDING WANDA WASSI HWSKA. CLARK KERR AND I WERE OBVIOUSLY SINGLED OUT FOR ATTENTION AND HAD PRETTY TOUGH GOING WITH THE TOASTS WE WERE EXPECTED TO DRINK INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY.

WHEN MOLOTOV JOINED US I CONGRATULATED HIM ON STALIN'S SPEECH. HE ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO ASSURE HIMSELF THAT MY COMMENT WAS NOT MERELY PERFUNCTORY AND THAT WE WERE REALLY SATISFIED WITH THE PARTS OF THE SPEECH RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE AND OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

IT HAS BECOME MY HABIT TO TALK ABOUT NEWS OF THE PACIFIC WAR WHENEVER I GET THE CHANCE AND I HAVE YET TO FIND ANYONE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHO DOES NOT SHOW GREAT INTEREST AS A MATTER OF VITAL CONCERN TO THEM. VICE COMISSAR KORNECHUK SAID "DON'T WORRY, WE WILL BE SLAUGHTERING JAPS TOO."

SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT THE PARTY WAS GETTING SOMEWHAT HILARIOUS. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WEAKENING. KATHLEEN WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED A GREAT DEAL TO THE INTEREST AND ENTERTAINMENT OF OUR SOVIET FRIENDS, HAD THE GOOD SENSE TO SUGGEST LEAVING BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE.
I propose a farewell toast to Marshal Stalin and the Red Army he led, and Molotov immediately added to it your name and that of the Prime Minister.

NOTE: This is a complete write-up. Part three was received earlier and distribution made since there was no indication on the part of the originator that this was a three part message.
7 November 1943

From: Moscow
For: The President of the United States

Number SD 8    0721272

For the President from Harriman.

I saw Molotov again today. He told me that Stalin and the Soviet General Staff had expressed dissatisfaction that our Italian effort is not sufficient to prevent withdrawal of German divisions from Italy and the Balkans to the eastern front. Molotov himself shared their dissatisfaction because of the political significance.

The conversation was earnest but friendly and deserves a full reply. Deane has recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they send a comprehensive estimate of the Italian situation which may be conveyed to the Soviet authorities.

No Sig

Note: Delay caused by error in enciphering.

WDCC
Molotov has informed me of U.J.'s cable to you 5 November regarding the meeting. Although I am not at all sure that you want any suggestions from me on this subject, I cannot help but offer them as I place such supreme importance on this meeting.

(1) The following might appeal to you as a possible plan.

(a) That U.J. be invited to send Molotov and representatives of the Red Army Staff to the military conference with you and the Prime Minister and your respective Staffs.

(b) That if the place of this meeting is selected, say, in the Cairo area the question of a meeting between the three of you be held open. If at some time during this meeting the weather appears to be propitious, U.J. could fly down from Moscow and you and the Prime Minister could leave your place for Tehran the same morning. The flying time from Cairo to Tehran is about 6 hours. From Moscow to Tehran about 8 hours. You might plan to remain in Tehran 36 hours, which would give

(continued on sheet 2)
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR TWO 3-CORNERED MEETINGS AND FOR YOU TO SEE U.J. ALONE AS WELL.

(2) I HAVE CHECKED THE WEATHER EXPERIENCE IN AND OUT OF TEHERAN AND FIND THAT DURING NOVEMBER '41 AND '42, REGULAR SCHEDULED FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN CAIRO AND TEHERAN WITH ONLY TWO FLIGHTS DELAYED AND NEITHER OF THESE MORE THAN 24 HOURS. IN OUR OWN EXPERIENCE LAST YEAR WITH DELIVERY OF PLANES TO RUSSIA FROM ABADAN TO TEHERAN, 3 FLIGHTS WEEKLY WERE MAINTAINED DURING NOVEMBER LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER IN DECEMBER BECOMES PROGRESSIVELY LESS FAVORABLE, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY ARE THE REALLY BAD WEATHER MONTHS OF THE YEAR. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE, AT LEAST DURING THE END OF NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER, OF MAKING FORWARD PREDICTIONS OF THE WEATHER FOR THREE DAYS. THE RISK OF DELAY FROM WEATHER IS GREATER TO U.J.; ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE UNTIL YOU WERE SURE THAT HE WAS GOING TO DEPART AND THE GREATER RISK OF DELAY ON HIS RETURN JOURNEY WOULD BE HIS, NOT YOURS.

(CONTINUED ON SHEET 3)
## Text:

Generals Deane and Vanderberg have made the study of past weather experience on which the above is based.

(3) I feel satisfied that U.J. would agree to this plan for a meeting. If for any unusual reason, the weather should delay his departure from Moscow beyond your ability to wait, a public statement could subsequently be issued explaining that the weather and not any other reason had prevented your getting together.

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### Action:

**P-1-A**

### White House File:

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### Declassified:

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [ Signature ]  

Date **MAR 13 1972**

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**No. 1 Admiral.**  
**No. 2 File.**  
**No. 3 F-1 or Chartroom.**  
**No. 4 Special.**

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**Sealed Secret**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREDS.)

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**NCR 18**

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**U.S. Government Printing Office**
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN,

I DELIVERED PERSONALLY YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING TURKEY TO MOLOTOV IN THE FORM OF A LETTER. MOLOTOV EXPRESSED THE HIGHEST SATISFACTION AT ITS CONTENTS AND OFFERED NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER TO THE PROVISO WHICH IT CONTAINED. HE PROPOSED THAT YOUR AGREEMENT AS EXPRESSED IN MY LETTER BE ATTACHED TO THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING TURKEY WHICH HE AND EDEN HAD SIGNED, THE TEXT OF WHICH I HAVE ALREADY CABLED YOU, AND THAT THESE TWO DOCUMENTS BE MADE A PART OF THE MOST SECRET SEPARATE MILITARY RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE.

HIS ANXIETY TO HAVE THIS AGREEMENT PART OF THE ACTION OF THE CONFERENCE IS I BELIEVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE IS PERSONALLY UNDER SOME CRITICISM BY THE SOVIET MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR NOT OBTAINING ACTION ON THIS MATTER AT THE CONFERENCE. I SEE NO OBJECTION TO HIS PROPOSAL AND ASK THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT. HE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO IS CABLING EDEN FOR SIMILAR AUTHORIZATION.

(×) TIME/DATE GROUP AS RECEIVED.
Yesterday in my talk with Molotov I had a chance to take up a number of matters with him in which we are interested including the subject of our interned aviators. I thanked him for the considerate hospitality which the Soviet government had shown them but suggested laughingly that we did not wish to impose on their hospitality too long. He responded immediately in the same spirit that this matter would become "apparent in the future" and that the Soviet government desired to do everything possible to improve the condition and "fate" of these aviators. I then said "perhaps the less said the better but it is close to the hearts of our soldiers." He replied that this was not limited to the hearts of our soldiers.

[Naval message with sender, receiver, and date details]
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

YESTERDAY IN MY TALK WITH MOLOTOV I HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE UP A NUMBER OF MATTERS WITH HIM IN WHICH WE ARE INTERESTED INCLUDING THE SUBJECT OF OUR INTERNED AVIATORS. I THANKED HIM FOR THE CONSIDERATE HOSPITALITY WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN THEM BUT SUGGESTED LAUGHINGLY THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ON THEIR HOSPITALITY TOO LONG. HE RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BECOME "APPARENT IN THE FUTURE" AND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DESIRED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION AND "FATE" OF THESE AVIATORS. I THEN SAID "PERHAPS THE LESS SAID THE BETTER BUT IT IS CLOSE TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS". HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE HEARTS OF OUR SOLDIERS.

Paraphrased copy to State 1/8
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President.

No. 1: 061529

In my discussion with Molotov yesterday I was able to bring up the question of our interned aviators, along with a number of other matters which interest us. I expressed our gratitude for the considerate hospitality shown by the Soviet Government to our aviators, but laughingly suggested that we did not wish to impose too long on their hospitality. In the same spirit, he replied at once that the Soviet Government wished to take all steps to improve the condition and "fate" of the flyers and that this matter would become "apparent in the future".

My response was "Perhaps the less said the better, but it is close to the hearts of our soldiers". He then said that this was not confined to the soldiers' hearts.

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By REP Date MAR 1 3 1972
(PERSONAL AND SEC.) FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

NOW THAT I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE A LONG BREATH I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT FROM ME A REVIEW OF THE MORE IMPORTANT IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WE GOT IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE CONFERENCE ROOM. CERTAIN OF THE DOUBTS WHICH SOME PEOPLE HAVE HAD REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE NOW LAID TO REST. ON THE OTHER HAND THE CHARACTER OF CERTAIN REAL DIFFICULTIES THAT EXIST HAS BEEN MORE SHARPLY DEFINED.

(1) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEFORE THEY AGREED TO THE CONFERENCE HAD EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A SHOT AT WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN DEALING WITH WAR AND POSTWAR PROBLEMS. ON THE WHOLE THE SOVIETS ARE DELIGHTED
WITH THE WAY THE CONFERENCE WENT AND IT HAS STRENGTHENED THEIR TENTATIVE DECISION. IT WAS INTERESTING TO WATCH HOW MOLOTOV EXPANDED AS THE DAYS PASSED. AS HE BEGAN TO REALIZE MORE AND MORE THAT WE HAD NOT COME WITH A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HIM AND WERE READY TO EXPOSE FRANKLY OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS, HE SHOWED INCREASING ENJOYMENT IN BEING ADMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO THE COUNCILS AS A FULL MEMBER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. BEFORE THE CONFERENCE I DOUBT IF THEY HAD ANY INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE INCLUSION OF CHINA AS AN ORIGINAL SIGNATORY OF THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION. THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THINGS WENT AND ARE READY TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO FURTHER THE NEW INTIMACY. ON THE OTHER HAND IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THIS POLICY IS ALREADY SO SET THAT WE CAN TAKE LIBERTIES WITH THEM.

(2) THEY WERE UNQUESTIONABLY CHAGRNED BY THE BRITISH AND OUR ATTITUDE RE TURKEY AND TO A LESSER EXTENT REGARDING SWEDEN.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
MAR 13 1972
EDEN'S FINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM ON TURKEY HELPED TO OFFSET THEIR EARLY DISAPPROVAL BUT THEY ARE EXPECTANTLY HOPEFUL

THAT WE WILL JOIN IN THIS AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. I AM CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR WILL SATISFY THEM. WITHOUT COMING TO MOSCOW IT IS HARD TO APPRECIATE HOW DIFFERENTLY THEY VIEW THE WAR FROM THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE THE PRIMITIVE VIEW THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND BLED TO DESTROY HITLER AND SEE NO REASON WHY THE TURKS SHOULD NOT DO THE SAME IF IT CAN HELP SHORTEN THE WAR. THEY HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THE ENTRY OF TURKEY WILL FORCE THE GERMANS TO MOVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE EASTERN FRONT. IN POSING THIS DEMAND THEY ARE ENTIRELY INDIFFERENT TO ANY MORAL OR ACTUAL OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE TURKS IN FIGHTING THE GERMANS. OUR ATTITUDE IN THIS REGARD IS INEXPlicable TO THEM. THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT ONLY IF THE TURKS ACTIVELY FIGHT AGAINST GERMANY NOW ARE THEY ENTITLED TO ANY CONSIDERATION IN THE POST-WAR SCHEME OF THINGS. TO A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED DEGREE THEY FEEL THE SAME WAY ABOUT THE SWEDES. IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE ENTRY OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE WAR, THEY BELIEVE THAT CLOSING IN ON GERMANY FROM ALL SIDES WILL HASTEN THE DESTRUCTION OF...
THE EARLY MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE SHIPS WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT.
THEY FEEL ALL RIGHT ABOUT IT NOW, PROVIDED SOME DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE ABOVE WERE THE ONLY TWO MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE NOT CONCLUDED IN PRINCIPLE TO THEIR SATISFACTION. (YOUR CABLE ACCEPTING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL REGARDING TURKEY HAS ARRIVED JUST AS I WAS DISPATCHING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU, AND WILL, I KNOW, BE TREMENDOUSLY WELL RECEIVED.

REGARDING THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION OF OUR MILITARY PLANS BUT OUR WHOLE PERMANENT RELATIONS DEPEND IN A LARGE MEASURE ON THEIR SATISFACTION IN THE FUTURE WITH OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THEY PLACE STRATEGICALLY ON THE INITIATION OF THE SO-CALLED "SECOND FRONT" NEXT SPRING. AN INVITATION TO THE NEXT MILITARY CONFERENCE IS.

I BELIEVE, ESSENTIAL IF THE SEEDS SOWN AT THIS CONFERENCE ARE TO GERMINATE. IT IS CLEAR THEY NEVER LIKE TO BE FACED WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. IF THEY ARE ASKED TO THE CONFERENCE THEY WILL EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE DURING THE CONSULTATIVE STAGE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS WILL BE TO SOME EXTENT A NUISANCE AND TIME CONSUMING, BUT FROM THE LONG VIEW IT WILL BE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, WELL WORTHWHILE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO INVITE MOLOTOV AS WELL AS THE MILITARY STAFF.
HIS POSITION AS SECOND TO STALIN IS MORE APPARENT THAN ON MY PREVIOUS VISITS. A SUBSEQUENT BRIEF MEETING WITH STALIN HIMSELF IS STILL OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, AND I FEEL THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO FIND A WAY TO BRING THIS ABOUT. I EXPECT TO CABLE YOU FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION IF YOU COULD INFORM ME OF YOUR DECISION REGARDING THE INVITATION TO THE MILITARY CONFERENCE.

(Note: One of the parts of this dispatch, apparently delayed in transmission, has not been received at the time this is being written.

When received, it's proper sequence will be between page 5 and page 6.

It will be written-up as soon as received, and the pages will be numbered 5-A, 5-B, etc.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>TEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the conference, it can only be inferred that the Soviet government expects to stand firmly on the position they have already taken in regard to their 1941 frontiers. I believe they have the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue may have given them the impression that we would not raise serious objection in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(7) The problem of Poland is even tougher than we believed. They regard the present Polish government-in-exile as hostile, and therefore completely unacceptable to them. They are determined to recognize only a Polish government that will be a wholeheartedly friendly neighbor. On the other hand, Molotov told me definitely that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland, giving expression to whatever social and political system the Polish people wanted. They gave us no indication during the conference that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if it proves to be the only way they can get the kind of relationships they demand from their western border states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The discussions on Iran were only on a staff level. One never gets very far on this level in dealing with the Soviets.

Although they accepted an unpublished resolution reaffirming their
FIDELITY TO THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TOWARD IRAN, WE GOT NO CLARIFICATION OF THEIR REAL ATTITUDE. BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT WAS LEFT TO THE END, EDEN DECIDED NOT TO INSIST THAT IT BE THRASHED OUT IN THE MAIN CONFERENCE.

(9) I WILL LEAVE A REPORT ABOUT THE FAR EAST TILL I SEE YOU. AS FAR AS IT WENT, IT WAS ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.

(10) I CANNOT LEAVE THIS REVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE WITHOUT SPEAKING OF THE SECRETARY. HIS DIGNITY AND DETERMINATION AND SINCERITY IN PRESENTING OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE AND WORLD CONDITIONS COMPATIBLE WITH IT PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSED THE SOVIET OFFICIALS. I CANNOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION HIS PRESENCE MADE TOWARD THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.

(11) ANTHONY DID A FIRST CLASS JOB. HE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY FAITHFULLY WHENEVER OCCASION REQUIRED. ISHAY AND DEANE WORKED AS A TEAM AND SO DID THE REST OF OUR DELEGATIONS.

(The End)
26 October 1943

From: Moscow

To: The President of the United States

Number: SD 2    Filed: 26/0502Z

Personal Secret For the President only from Harriman.

1. After the conference this afternoon, Monday, I had an opportunity to talk with Molotov privately again about the place of meeting. I asked him bluntly whether communications was the only inhibition to Basra as against Teheran. He assured me that it was and explained that they had direct telegraph and telephone wires to Teheran under their complete control policed by Soviet troops, amplifying what Stalin had said.

2. I told him that since this was the case we should make a detailed study of whether similar satisfactory arrangements could not be made through to Basra, offering the assistance of our military establishment in Iran and assuring him that we could get full cooperation from the British.

3. I am afraid they are worrying that they will not be able to exercise directly the same degree of control and security against Iranians, German spies known to be in the area, and possibly ourselves, as they do in North Persia. I offered to send General Deane down with a Russian officer to investigate the problem on the spot.

4. Molotov did not bring the matter up but they may be concerned over sending too large a force into southern Iran which would be a violation of their treaty. I would appreciate being advised what arrangements, if any, you contemplate should be made with the Iranian and Iraqi governments regarding entry of the substantial number of Soviet guard forces which might be required if the Soviets should wish to police the communications and the camp.

5. I emphasized the importance to the war effort that the discussions would have in establishing closer military collaboration and said that we were so close together on the place of meeting that a way must be found to solve the remaining difficulties.

6. Molotov raised the question if you went to Teheran why the railroad or road could not be used between Basra and Teheran if the air delivery and dispatch of your documents was interfered with by weather.
From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States
Number: SD 2 Filed: 26/05022
(continued)

I explained that the ten days available to you were taxed to the utmost by continuous delivery and that the extra time from the hundred miles of ground travel would require would make the return of your documents within the legal limit impossible of accomplishment.

7. I asked Molotov to accept your decision that Teheran was impossible but to concentrate with me on finding a way to solve the communication difficulties to Basra. He indicated a willingness to do so but did not show any optimism as to results.

8. I saw Eden this evening regarding this subject. He of course agreed to cooperate fully and volunteered to take the first opportunity to emphasize to Molotov the importance of the meeting to concerting the war effort.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By: Date MAR 13 1972
From: Military Attache London, England  
To: President of the United States  
Unnumbered 2 August 1943  

Harriman to the President. Personal. Am arranging to travel with the Colonel.  

No Sig
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States

To the President from Harriman personal and secret.

I have delivered to the Prime Minister your message of July 27th approving his use of phrases and sentences of your letter to him. Now that Admiral Land has made his statement to the Congressional Committees covering all the points in your letter the Prime Minister has come back to me with the request that I open up again with you the question of whether it would not be appropriate for him to quote your letter in full with or without the date and probably omitting the sentences giving tonnage figures of British war shipping losses. He is so pleased with the spirit of friendly and close cooperation indicated by it that he believes it would be very stimulating to public opinion here to quote it in full. He considers it one of the fine communications he has had from you and wants to share it with the British public. Also he is afraid limited quotation would be subject to misunderstanding and at all events
would not convey the overall concept.

He discussed it with Lord Leathers who has also talked with me. Cutting back of British merchant ship building has been one of the political problems the Prime Minister has had to contend with here. Moreover we may well come to the time when we will want to ask the British to cut back their ship building still further in order to provide labor for current repairs to the increasing number of our ships coming to British ports as well as repairs to increased numbers of military vessels in these waters such as landing craft. Therefore we have an interest in the allaying of this political pressure.

The Prime Minister, however, is most anxious to carry out your wishes and will be content with whatever you decide. As this subject may come up in the House on Tuesday the Prime Minister has asked me to obtain from you a final decision before then.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. lotton, 1-11-73
by Date Mar 13 1972
29 June 1943

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 5135

Harriman to the President secret and personal: Eden explains the Prime Minister's and his own first reaction to the idea of Myron's trip is that unless the moment were carefully selected it might well start rumors which would not be helpful. They are not unmindful of the effective work Myron did before and would be glad if he were there now. On the other hand they ask whether your present representative on the spot cannot carry on effectively for the time being and thus avoid the danger of adverse rumors being started as a result of a man of such prominence as Myron going at this moment. Eden suggests also that if you decide to send him, it would be of real importance to inform the Soviet government fully in advance to prevent possible misunderstanding.

No Sig
June 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed the attached paraphrased copy of a message from Mr. Harriman to the President, dated June 29, 1943, be furnished the Secretary of State, and also requests a suggested reply.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMLIN,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Inc.
PARAPHRASE

To: The President
No. 5135. Dated: June 29th, 1943

To the President from Harriman personal and confidential. We have been informed by Eden that his own first reaction and that of the Prime Minister to the suggestion of Myron's trip is that unless the moment were chosen carefully, it might well give rise to undesirable rumors. They would be glad if Myron were there now, and they are not overlooking the effective work he did before. However, they ask whether, for the time being, your present representative there cannot act effectively and thereby avoid the risk of unfavorable rumors being initiated because of a man of Myron's prominence making the trip at this time. If you decide to send him, Eden also suggests to prevent possible misunderstanding, it would be most important to inform the Soviet government fully in advance.

No sig
25 June 1943

SECRET

PRIORITY

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed 25/1321Z

Personal and Secret for the President from Harriman:

Supplementing my 5110 today our friend has asked me to spend the night Saturday which is a good opportunity to pursue the matter if you have further thoughts you wish me to follow up.

I have discussed with him both alone and together with Eden the other subjects you asked me to take up. He is ready whole heartedly and energetically to do whatever you feel would be helpful regarding the Frenchman either privately or publicly. He asked me to talk with Eden in more detail about Myron and Brazil. Gil and I will see Eden on the first occasion and cable you.

Had a long talk with Devers whom I knew well many years ago in our polo days. He greatly impressed by his grasp of the problems here including Air and the energetic action he is taking.

Harriman

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date MAR 1972
INDEX SHEET

FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow.
NO: 291729, 29 December 1942.

Please send me by telegraph Mr. Bohlen's minutes bearing on agreement made in Teheran by Churchill and me to turn over Italian ships to Soviet.

ROOSEVELT

ORIG. filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: The President

TO: Ambassador Harriman, Moscow

NO: 211720 NCR 7416, 21 December 1943.

Answers HARRIMAN-POTUS 201719 December 1943.

Informs Harriman that a total of 1/3rd of the surrendered Italian ships will be turned over to the Soviets.

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."
From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO GENERAL S. P. SPALDING FROM HAPPTIAN.

Please deliver the following message to Molotov and suggest his reply be sent through you to me.

QUOTE. The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Teheran tomorrow, November 23 to make the physical arrangements for the conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Teheran, General Conolly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.

I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad for which I am very grateful.

I look forward to seeing you. Regards. UNQUOTE

Released from the White House Map Room at 1735, EST, 22 November 1943.

L. MATHERSON,
Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 11-11-74
By Date MAR 1, 1972
THIS PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR HARRIMAN FROM GENERAL SPALDING.

MESSAGES DELIVERED AT 1300 TO VICE COMMISSAR LOUVOSKY ON HIS REQUEST FOR TRANSMITTAL AS MR. MOLOTOY NOT AVAILABLE.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 3 1972
URGENT

From: Moscow
To: AFMAR

Number 47, 6 November 1943

For General Marshall from Deane.

This afternoon Mr. Harriman had a conference with Molotov. At its conclusion Molotov said in a friendly but serious manner that Stalin and the Soviet General Staff had indications of the Germans transferring divisions from Italy and the Balkans to the Russian front. He said they were dissatisfied that the pressure of the Anglo-American forces in Italy was not sufficient to prevent such withdrawal. Molotov quoted a letter that Mr. Eden had given him, prepared by Ismay, which indicated that the Germans had six armored divisions included in a total of ten divisions in Southern and Central Italy. The letter stated, however, that there were only 200 German tanks in the area. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by the fact that German Panzer divisions have large infantry elements and that their tanks have been left in the north. Martel has information from home that two German divisions have been sent to the eastern front from Italy but that they are being replaced by divisions from Northern France.

The two ambassadors, Martel, and I talked the matter over and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff send us as soon as possible an estimate of the Italian situation, including the latest intelligence estimate of German strength and a summary of what operations are planned in order that we might present an authentic picture to Molotov and the Soviet General Staff.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
FEB 20 1973

CH-IN-5170. (9 Nov 43) SECRET COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Mr. Harriman is reporting his conversation briefly to the President.

No Sig

Note: Delay due to servicing.

WDCC
November 14, 1943

From: Opnav
To: ALAMA, Moscow

Personal and . . . from Stettinius for Harriman.
Your 120001, 120910 and 131242.
No reply feasible for time being since addressees are on a trip.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
LIEUTENANT (JG) USNR

Released from White House Map Room
at 1430, E.T., November 14, 1943

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R&P Date MAR 13 1972
July 30, 1943

From: Ornav
To: Alusna, London.

From the President for Harriman personal and Tell the Prime Minister I am wholly willing he use any part of the letter or all of it. I have not the letter before me but I have a recollection that the last sentence might be omitted.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1750, EWT, July 30, 1943

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff
The White House  
Washington

Mr. Prime Minister,

Tell the Prime Minister I am wholly willing he see any part of the letter or all of it. I have not the letter before me but I have a recollection that the last sentence might be modified.

[Signature]

302239 July, NCR 3843
July 30, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

For Harriman from the President and personal.
I hope much that you can come with the Colonel.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1750, EWT, July 30, 1942

Chester Hammond
Lt. Colonel, General Staff
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For Harriman
From the President

I hope much that you

can come with the Colonel.

Reverend

July
302238
WR 3044
SECRET
SECRET PRIORITY

July 26, 1943

From: Conav
To: Alusna, London

Honorable Averell Harriman from the President.

Please tell the Former Naval Person it is wholly agreeable for him to use whatever phrases and sentences he wishes from my letter to him. I think this is better than putting the whole letter into the record.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1740, EWT, July 26, 1943.

C. F. Kinnaman
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant Military Aide to the President.

DECASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
July 26, 1943.

HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN
LONDON

Please tell the Former Naval Person it is wholly agreeable for him to use whatever phrases and sentences he wishes from my letter to him. I think this is better than putting the whole letter into the record.

ROOSEVELT
From: Cnav  
To: Alusna, London  

For Ambassador Winant from Admiral Leahy.  

Replying to your message of 24 July, the President's number 321 is in reply to Prime Minister's number 373 of 20 July.  

Leahy
To Mr. Winant:

Replying to your message of 24 July, the President's letter No. 321 is in reply to Prime Minister's letter No. 373 of 20 July.

Sincerely,
January 4, 1943.

From the President for Mr. Harriman.

Will you see Prime Minister at once. He has message from me.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1110, E.T., January 4, 1943.

W. A. BURNS, Jr.
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.,
White House Map Room.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
To Harrison

Will you see Prime Minister at once he has message from me.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972