President - Harriman January 1 -
June 30, 1944 MR 11

Map Room
Box 11
28 June 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIDMAN.

Thank you for your message No. 757 of 27 June. I released the same information to the press at my conference on Tuesday afternoon.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 28 June 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
28 June 1944

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Thank you for your message No. 757 of 27 June. I released the same information to the press at my conference on Tuesday afternoon.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
<table>
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Ambassador Harriman</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>281632 NCR 1067</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>28 June 1944</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Presenting of scrolls to Leningrad and Stalingrad.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers Harriman's #757, 27 Jun 44.
2. By memo signed "F.D.R." referred to Admiral Leahy 28 Jun 44 for preparation of reply. Since Admiral Leahy was ill, Admiral Brown prepared draft reply.
3. Draft reply approved by the President 28 Jun 44.

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<th>FILED:</th>
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</table>
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW
DATE: 23 JUNE 1944

Replying to your 2225, June 22, 10 a.m., I have not rpt not received an answer to my message regarding the visit to Washington of the Polish Prime Minister.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
12 JUNE 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Receipt is acknowledged of your six interesting messages dated 11 June, 110523, 110529, 110549, 112325, 112335, and 112359. We will take every precaution to preserve secrecy of these messages and assume you are doing same.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1145, EWT, 12 June 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD, Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Receipt is acknowledged of your four interesting messages dated 11 June, 110523, 110529, 110549, and 112325. We will take every precaution to preserve secrecy of these messages and assume you are doing same.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 13 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
Pres & Herrman
Receipt is acknowledged of your
three interesting messages dated 11
June, NCR 3950, NCR 3921
110523 command
110527 command 110549, and
112325
We will take every precaution
to preserve secrecy of these
messages and assume you
are doing
the same.
FROM The President

TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL 121711 NCR 8233

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Acknowledgment of seven messages from Harriman re conversation with Stalin.

ACTION

1. Acknowledges Harriman's 110523, 110529, 110549, 112325, 112335, 112340, and 112359.

2. Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 12 June 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
530 Shuttle bombing; 530 JAPAN.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

COPY

Tell Deane in Moscow I am delighted that the shuttling has gone through with such fine cooperation. It has made an excellent impression over here also.

ROOSEVELT

092313 NCR 7848

ORIGINAL filed "AR 530 UK-USSR-ITALY SHUTTLE BOMBING"
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 18782 and 18783 received.

I have received from Stalin an expression of his opinion that a statement by me to the German people would not be helpful at the present time and I have informed him of my acceptance of his advice.

Your report of conversation with Benes is an encouraging indication of a possibility that the Russian Polish impasse may be broken.

There does not seem to be any prospect of my visiting U.K. in the near future.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1330, EWT, 30 May 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR 13 1972
May 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIET:

Your 18782 and 19783 received.

I have received from Stalin an expression of his opinion that a statement by me to the German people would not be helpful at the present time and I have informed him of my acceptance of his advice.

Your report of conversation with Benes is an encouraging indication of a possibility that the Russian Polish impasse may be broken.

There does not seem to be any prospect of my visiting U. K. in the near future.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 13 1972
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL 301813 NCR 5658 DATE 30 May 44

TOP MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT Statement to German people; conversations with Bones; visit to U.K.

ACTION
1. Answers Harriman's #18782 and 18783.
2. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President.

ACTION COMPLETED: 000.7 OVERLORD; 052 Russian-British relations; 210 PRES.-PM.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: Unno, 18 April 1944

Announcement of transfer of MILWAUKEE.

ORIGINAL filed "AMR 450 Italy (2)."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR BARRILLAN

4 APRIL 1944

Press announcement of loan of MILWAUKEE to Russia.

ORIGINAL filed "MK 450 ITALY (2)"

*Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.
30 March 1944

From:  OPNAV

To:   Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Referring to your 180435. When the matter of exchanging missions between O.S.S. and N.K.V.D. was being discussed here, full and sympathetic consideration was given to the circumstances described in your message of March 18. The predominant factor in my decision was the domestic political situation. As expressed in my message to you of March 15, I am confident that the Marshal will completely understand our position in this matter and that my problem of the moment will not interfere with the splendid cooperation which has characterized our united effort to certain victory. It may be helpful, however, to emphasize again that the exchange of missions had to be deferred because of timing. I know too that you will understand.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1145, EWT, 30 March 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff
March 29, 1944

From: The President
To: Ambassador Harriman

Referring to your 180435. When the matter of exchanging missions between O.S.S. and N.K.V.D. was being discussed here, full and sympathetic consideration was given to the circumstances described in your message of March 18. The predominant factor in my decision was the domestic political situation. As expressed in my message to you of March 15, I am confident that the Marshal will completely understand our position in this matter and that it will not interfere with the splendid cooperation which has characterized our united effort to certain victory. It may be helpful, however, to emphasize again that the exchange of missions had to be deferred because of timing.

I have too that you will understand.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>301625 NCR 3975</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>18 March 1944</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Exchange of O.S.S. and N.A.V.D. personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Answers by Admiral Leahy; approved with modifications by the President 30 Mar 44.</td>
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</table>
30 March 1944

From: Oppav
To: Alusma, Moscow

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

With reference to radio communications between the USSR and the United States, your message dated 19 March 1944 requesting that your message of 18 March be held in abeyance has been received and noted. I understand that this matter is still under negotiation and is proceeding toward a mutually satisfactory conclusion.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1145, EST, 30 March 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By U. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
30 March 1944.

From: The President.

To: Ambassador Harriman.

With reference to radio communications between the USSR and the United States, your message dated 19 March 1944 requesting that your message of 18 March be held in abeyance has been received and noted. I understand that this matter is still under negotiation and is proceeding toward a mutually satisfactory conclusion.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
FROM | The President | TO | Ambassador Harriman
---|---|---|---
SERIAL | 301620 NCR 3976 | DATE | 30 Mar 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Radio communication between USSR and United States.

ACTION Answers Harriman's 180417 and 182337.

Draft of this message prepared by Col MacFarland, Sec CCS; modified by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 30 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 201 RUSSIA FILED:
FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

29 MARCH 1944

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRISON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Alusna, Moscow, 290855. Copy has been furnished Secretary
Hull. Will be grateful if you keep me informed of situation.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1850, EWT, 29 March 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. E.
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Ambassador Harriman</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>292319 NCR 3894</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 March 1944</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Finnish peace proposals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Answers Harriman's 272335 and 290855.</td>
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<td>This reply dictated by Captain Wood in the Map Room after evening news presentation.</td>
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</table>

**FROM**
- The President

**TO**
- Ambassador Harriman

**SERIAL**
- 292319 NCR 3894

**DATE**
- 29 March 1944

**ACTION**
- Answers Harriman's 272335 and 290855.
- This reply dictated by Captain Wood in the Map Room after evening news presentation.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT 19 MARCH 1944
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: 191727 NCR 2151

Answers HARRIMAN'S 142215: Delivery of MILWAUKEE to North Russian Port.

ORIGINAL filed "MK 450 ITALY (1)"

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.
15 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring to General Donovan's proposal that arrangements for an exchange of representatives of O.S.S. personnel in Russia for N.A.V.D personnel in the United States, which Donovan says has your and Deane's approval, the question presented has been carefully examined here and has been found to be impracticable at this time.

Please inform the Marshal when you have an opportunity that for purely domestic political reasons which he will understand it is not appropriate just now to exchange these missions. The timing is not good.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 15 March 1944.

ROBERT W. LOGUE,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 3 1972
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Referring to General Donovan's proposal that arrangements for an exchange of representatives of O.S.S. personnel in Russia for N.K.V.D. personnel in the United States, which Donovan says has your and Deane's approval, the question presented has been carefully examined here and has been found to be impracticable at this time.

Please inform Stalin when you have an opportunity that for purely domestic political reasons, it is not appropriate to exchange these missions at the present time and that I am sure he will understand. The timing is not ideal.

P.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 13 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL: Unnumbered
DATE: 15 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 151742 NCR 1365

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Exchange of OSS and NKVD personnel.

ACTION:

Previous correspondence on this subject conducted by OSS and War Department. This message written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO:                DATE:                BY DIRECTION OF:

                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         
                                         

ACTION COMPLETED:            FILED:

2/11 0.S.S.
15 March 1944

SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Repeating to your 304 the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the establishment of an American radio station in Moscow and a Soviet station in Washington is not necessary at the present time. Please therefore make other arrangements for essential communications for shuttle bombing and take no further action toward the establishment of a Soviet radio station in Washington.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1220, EWT, 15 March 1944.

Robert H. Myers
Lieut. (jg) USNR

DECLASIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 13 1973
By W. J. Stewart Date.
March 14, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Repyling to your 304 the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the establishment of an American radio station in Moscow and a Soviet station in Washington is not necessary at the present time. Please therefore make other arrangements for essential communications for shuttle bombing and take no further action toward the establishment of a Soviet radio station in Washington.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
FROM: The President  
TO: Ambassador Harriman  
SERIAL: Unnumbered  
DATE: 15 March 1944  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER:  

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA  
SUBJECT: Radio communications between Moscow and Washington.  

ACTION:  

Answers Harriman-POTUS #304, 13 Mar 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action.  

Draft of this message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 15 Mar 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW, FROM THE PRESIDENT.

We saw the film "Rainbow" Sunday night. Bohlen was present but the film is so beautifully and dramatically presented that we needed little translation. I hope the film can be shown to the public in this country with occasional comment by someone like Quentin Reynolds or Lowell Thomas.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1315, EWT, 14 March 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. F.
March 14, 1944.

TO: HARRIMAN
MOSCOW

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

We saw the film "Rainbow" Sunday night. Bohlen was present but the film is so beautifully and dramatically presented that we needed little translation. I hope the film can be shown to the public in this country with occasional comment by someone like Quentin Reynolds or Lowell Thomas.

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Russian film &quot;Rainbow.&quot;</td>
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**ACTION**

No previous correspondence on this subject in the Map Room.

This dispatch was written by the President.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 000.81

**FILED:**
INDEX SHEET

COPY

FROM: ADMIRAL LEAHY
TO : AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW
NO : NCR, 26 FEBRUARY 1944

The receipt is acknowledged of your 21093L reporting Soviet reaction to Bulgarian approach to conversations.

The matter therein contained is now under consideration by the President and the Prime Minister.

LEAHY

ORIGINAL filed "370 BULGARIA (1) - Peace Feelers"

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 10-23 3-408
INDEX SHEET

COPY

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW
NO: 231517 NCR 7945, 23 FEBRUARY 1944

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.
Receipt is acknowledged of your 230721.
Your action in postponing delivery is approved.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "MR 370 POLISH-RUSSIAN AFFAIRS (1)"

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623
May 19-33
INDEX SHEET

FROM:  THE PRESIDENT
TO:  AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO:  161641 NCR 6790, 16 FEBRUARY 1944.

Bulgaria's joining Allies in combatant status; meeting with
Bulgarian mission; bombing of Bulgarian targets.

ORIGINAL filed "MR 370 BULGARIA (1)"

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
INDEX SHEET

Date: 8 February 1944

From: THE PRESIDENT

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Acknowledges HARRIMAN-PRES 022120 NCR 8052, 3 Feb 44. Use of Soviet Far Eastern bases.

ORIGINAL: "WAR 530 JAPAN (1)"

*W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 0623
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623, 10 May 1973, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman

DATE: 17 January 1944

COPY

Replying to your message 160711 matter of Italian ships is still under consideration with the British. I hope to have something on this subject within the next few days.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec. 1"
FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman; (Alusna, Moscow)
NO: O81642 NCR 363, 8 January 1944.

Referring to your message 301823 the matter of delivery of Italian ships to the Soviet is under discussion with the Prime Minister. Please take no action in the matter until you receive further advice.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "450 ITALY (2) Sec. 1 - Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET."
June 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from Ambassador Harriman to the President, dated 23 June 1944, is forwarded to you, by direction of the President, for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that distribution be held to the minimum necessary as this is an exact copy.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAR 1972
29 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

In compliance with the request made by Mr. Brown of your office, there is attached hereto a paraphrase copy of a message from Ambassador Harriman to the President, Navy No. 110541.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE
Lieut. (Jg), USNR

Enc (Hw)
1. Maj. Harriman to President, 11 Jun 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
11 June 1944

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Yesterday evening in my talk with Stalin he emphasized the need that something be done with respect to the cooperation of the Chinese, whom he said were not fighting, pointing out that 13 Japanese divisions in Loyang had defeated 40 Chinese divisions. That the Generalissimo was the only one who could hold China together, and that he must be supported, Stalin agreed. But he asserted that the Chinese fought better five years ago and that anything discussed in Chungking got to the Japanese quickly as the result of the dishonest entourage of the Generalissimo.

Stalin laughingly called the so-called Communists in the north "Margerine Communists" in commenting that Chiang was eyeing them with suspicion. He said that the Generalissimo was committing an error in disputing over ideological questions rather than employing them against the Japanese because those people were real patriots who wanted to join the fight against the Japanese.

In answer to my question of what he thought should be our combined policy with respect to the Generalissimo, he said that the United States must necessarily take the lead and that it was impossible for the British or Russians to do it. Stalin said that we should insist that Chiang eliminate his dishonest aides and permit to take authority the younger men who wanted to fight. The Generalissimo's present entourage, he said, were accusing the Soviets of having a
secret treaty against China with the Japanese.

The border incidents between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia were explained in some detail by Stalin who added that although things were peaceful, a continuation of such incidents would require support with Soviet Armed Forces for Outer Mongolia.
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered  
Filed: 28/1140Z

For the President from Harriman signed Deane.

After the presentation of the scrolls, Marshal Stalin expressed with great enthusiasm his admiration for the manner in which the invasion had been carried out. He described the crossing of the Channel and the Normandy landing as "an unheard of achievement", the magnitude of which had never been undertaken in the history of warfare. He seemed well informed of the details of the operation and was especially impressed with the fact that 650,000 men had been landed in so short a time. This, he characterized as an unbelievable accomplishment.

He asked me whether I recalled the discussions at Teheran. When I congratulated him on the success of the Red Army offensive, he commented in good humor that doubts
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: The President of the United States

had existed in some quarters that he would live up to his commitments. I told him that, as a result of my talks with you, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold and General Eisenhower, I could assure him there was never the slightest doubt in your minds, not only that he would carry out his commitment to start the offensive, but that it would be successful, in fact, all of our plans were based on this confidence. He was obviously pleased to hear this. He added, however, that others had not had such confidence.

I continued that General Marshall and General Eisenhower had not even considered it necessary to inquire as to the place and character of the offensive as they had such confidence in Marshal Stalin and the Red Army Staff carrying out what would be most effective.

I said I believed, however, that after we were well established in northern France they would wish to establish close liaison for the coordination of plans between the
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered
Filed: 28/11402

Anglo-American forces and the Red Army. He agreed that this was necessary. He told me of his message to you and the Prime Minister of June 21 regarding the opening of the Soviet offensive and the number of divisions involved, adding that he had not included the exact location of the offensive as he feared a possible leak. Newspapermen might have gotten hold of the information and published it for personal profit which would have been damaging to our mutual cause.

He explained further in detail the leak that had occurred in the British press over his exchange of cables with the Prime Minister with regard to treating the German Army as prisoners of war. I said that I could not discuss this matter as it was between him and the Prime Minister. On the other hand, I could assure him that both we and the British had established the closest of security on military

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By Date MAR 13 1972
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: The President of the United States

plan; that our operations, as he knew in North Africa, and
the time and place of our landings in northern France had
been kept completely secret, and the same had been true of
our operations in the Pacific. The matter he had referred
to was of a political nature and not military.

He argued that an American officer had been indiscreete
in England. I told him that if I understood the case that
he had in mind, the officer was severely disciplined, demoted
and returned to the United States. He seemed satisfied and
said that he had the same type of discipline.

He went on to explain that he thought a military
staff should be set up for the exchange of this information.
I told him General Deane would probably be leaving in about
two weeks to consult with General Eisenhower and General
Marshall on this subject and it would, of course, be on a
combined basis, Anglo-American. I emphasized the complete
CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES AND THAT NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY HAD TWO NATIONS Fought TOGETHER SO CLOSELY AS ONE FORCE.

AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION, I AM SATISFIED THAT MARSHAL STALIN IS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH LIAISON BETWEEN GENERAL EISENHOWER AND THE RED ARMY STAFF, BUT BECAUSE OF HIS DOUBTS ABOUT OUR SECURITY, THE MATTER SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT. I RECOMMEND THAT GENERAL DEANE BE CONSULTED BEFORE DECISION IS REACHED AND THAT, BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENCE THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN IN HIM, HE BE USED AS THE AMERICAN OFFICER.

I AM CONCERNED OVER MARSHAL STALIN'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL BURROWS, HEAD OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION IN MOSCOW, WHICH I HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO YOU, IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH WISHING TO USE HIM IN THIS CONNECTION. I HAVE NOT PURSUED THIS MATTER FURTHER BUT

DECLASSIFIED
STATE DEPT. LETTER, 1-11-72

By [signature] Date MAR 13 1972
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered
Filed: 28/11402

could readily do so with Marshal Stalin if it is considered advisable.

May I suggest that this cable be shown to our Chiefs of Staff.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By: MAR 1 3 1972
(FOR THE PRESIDENT. SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN)

MR. MOLOTOV HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM PREMIER STALIN READING IN TRANSLATION AS FOLLOWS:

SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER STALIN FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE SCROLLS OF HONOR FOR STALINGRAD AND LENINGRAD. THE SCROLLS WILL BE SENT TO THE ADDRESSEES. I MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN RECEIVING THE SCROLLS (STATEMENT QUOTED IN MY STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE NO.2386 JUNE TWENTY SEVEN AND RELEASED TO PRESS OMITTED HERE FOR CODE SECURITY).

PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE APPRECIATION OF YOUR HIGH ESTIMATION OF THE EFFORTS OF STALINGRAD AND LENINGRAD IN THE STRUGGLE WITH THE GERMAN INVADERS.

NAVAL (FOR THE PRESIDENT) ..... ACTION (COPY #1 AND #2)

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
27 June 1944

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
For: The President of the United States
Number 757

Personal for the President from Harriman egd Deane.

I presented the Leningrad and Stalingrad scrolls to Marshal Stalin this evening. Motion pictures and stills were taken of the presentation. Marshal Stalin made a brief well-worded statement of acceptance and appreciation, the exact text of which I will cable you tomorrow after checking with his office. It was arranged that the release would be published in the Soviet Press Wednesday morning. Your personal letter and the texts of the scrolls will be included. I will give the story Tuesday afternoon to the American correspondents for release Wednesday morning papers which will supplement whatever is released from the White House.

No Sig
<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ambassador Harriman</td>
<td>The President</td>
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**SERIAL**  #757  
**DATE**  27 June 44  
**DATE/TIME**  2700372  
**OR FILE NUMBER**  
**TOR MAP ROOM**  270445  
**VIA**  Army Code Room  
**SUBJECT**  Presenting of scrolls to Leningrad and Stalingrad

**ACTION**

1. To President via usher.
2. By memo signed "F.D.R." referred to Admiral Leahy 28 Jun 44 for preparation of reply. Since Admiral Leahy was ill, Admiral Brown prepared draft reply.
3. Draft reply approved by the President 28 Jun 44; to Ambassador Harriman as 231632 NCR 1067.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
I HAD A TWO HOUR TALK WITH MARSHAL STALIN THIS EVENING AND WILL COVER THE DIFFERENT SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE CABLES. FIRST I GAVE HIM A MAP SHOWING WHERE THE ALLIED TROOPS HAD LANDED IN NORTHERN FRANCE AND THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. HE SAID "THE HISTORY OF WAR HAS NEVER WITNESSED SUCH A GRANDIOSE OPERATION. AN OPERATION NAPOLEON HIMSELF HAD NEVER EVEN ATTEMPTED." HE TOLD ME THAT HIS OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN DELAYED 10 DAYS TO 2 WEEKS BECAUSE IT HAD TAKEN LONGER THAN EXPECTED TO CLEAR THE CRIMEA AND MOVE HIS TROOPS. AN OFFENSIVE HOWEVER HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TODAY AGAINST THE FINNS NORTH OF LENINGRAD IN ORDER TO GIVE GREATER PROTECTION TO LENINGRAD SINCE THE FINNISH LINE WAS WITHIN 20 KILOMETERS OF THE CITY AND IN ORDER TO IMPRESS ON THE FINNS THE STUPIDITY OF THEIR CONTINUING THE WAR. HE TOLD ME THAT THE RED ARMY HAD BROKEN THROUGH THE FINNISH DEFENSES AND HAD ADVANCED. HE SAID THAT WITHIN 10 TO 15 DAYS ANOTHER IMPORTANT OFFENSIVE WOULD BE STARTED AND IN JULY THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE WOULD BE AT ITS FULL FORCE. I TOLD mortal 118022 - TO LOTUS W/ Uncert Mkt

End

118022 - TO LOTUS W/ Uncert Mkt
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Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

PAGE TWO OF TWO 11/223 NCR 3939

[Handwritten text:]

HIM THAT YOU WERE READY TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE REGARDING ACTION BY YOU TOWARD THE FINNS. HE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR BREAKING RELATIONS WITH FINLAND BUT AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT DESIRABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT HAVE ANY OTHER ACTION BY YOU TO SUGGEST AT THE MOMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By [Signature] Date MAR 13 1972

PIA ACTION (COPIES #1 AND #2)

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET COPY

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
<table>
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<th>FROM</th>
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<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>110523 NCR 3939</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>11 June 44</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>111802Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Navy Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Conversation with Stalin.</td>
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<td>OVERLORD and Russian offensive.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by President's 121711 NCR 8233, written by Admiral Leahy.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**
310 OVERLORD; 300 RUSSIA

**FILED:**
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL 110529 NCR 3900 DATE 11 June 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 111915Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT Conversations with Stalin. Basing bombers in Far East.

ACTION

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by President’s 121711 NCR 8233 June 44, written by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

530 JAPAN
PART 1 IS 115527 NCR 4904

PERSONAL, SEQUENT FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN.

IN MY TALK WITH STALIN YESTERDAY EVENING WE DISCUSSED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE JAPANESE WAR AND IN THAT CONNECTION CHINA. I BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE BASING OF OUR BOMBERS IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND STATED THAT YOU AND OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF BELIEVED NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST IN COMING TO AN AGREEMENT AND IN WORKING OUT THE NECESSARY PLANS FOR SUPPLIES. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS DESIRABLE AND STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR THE UTMOST SECRECY. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF THE AIR FORCE BUT THAT THE GROUND OPERATIONS AND NAVAL OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WELL. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE NOW 12 AIR FIELDS SOME OF THEM NEW IN THE AREA BETWEEN VLADIVOSTOK AND SOVIETSKAYA GAVAN SUITABLE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE THE USE OF 6 OR 7 OF THEM. MORE WITH METALLED STRIPS COULD BE PROVIDED IF NECESSARY. IT IS EVIDENT THAT SINCE MY TALK WITH STALIN IN FEBRUARY THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEAVY BOMBER BASES IN THE FAR EAST USING I BELIEVE THE EXPERIENCE GAINED
From: Alusha Mogollon

Date: 11 June 1944

To: The President

Declassified

Information: State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

Date: MAR 13, 1972

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

ROUTED BY:

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

113529 NCR 3920

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.

From us in preparation of the fields for shuttle bombing. Stalin agreed that it would be desirable to start promptly in building up reserves of gasoline and other supplies using the Pacific route as the Japanese no longer interfered. I explained that it was hoped that the northern convoys could be resumed again at a later date so that this stocking could be done without interference with the protocol commitments. Stalin asked whether the British would have to participate in these discussions and stated bluntly that his military did not trust General Burrows the present head of the British military mission. He explained that this was personal in respect to General Burrows and he was not speaking of the British in general. In reply to my direct inquiry he stated that they had full confidence in General Deane. I said that these discussions could be carried on between General Deane his air officer General Walsh and naval officer Admiral Olsen with the appropriate Soviet officers and that it was not necessary to involve the British at this time as they did not have day bombers. At a later stage when the entire strategy of the Pacific war was considered the British of course

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 19, Navy Regulations.
WILL BE INVOLVED. HE AGREED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START PROMPTLY. I COULD NOT PIN HIM DOWN ON A DATE BUT HE ASSURED ME THAT

IT WOULD NOT BE LONG DELAYED SAYING "THE SOONER THE BETTER." STALIN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLYING US OF HEAVY BOMBERS FOR
THE RED AIR FORCE. I EXPLAINED THAT GENERAL ARNOLD WAS READY TO BEGIN TO DELIVER THEM BEGINNING IN THE AUTUMN AFTER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED REGARDING OUR OPERATION FROM SOVIET FAR EASTERN BASES.
WE WOULD NOT ONLY GIVE THEM THE PLANES BUT WOULD HELP TRAIN THE

SOVIET CREWS IN THE FLYING OF THE BOMBERS AND IN THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS EITHER IN THE UNITED STATES OR BY SENDING INSTRUCTORS TO THE

SOVIET UNION. HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE INSTRUCTORS COME TO THE SOVIET UNION AS ONLY TRAINED PILOTS AND NAVIGATORS WOULD BE USED.

THESE ARE OF COURSE DETAILS THAT CAN BE WORKED OUT LATER.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date MAR 1 3 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE
11 JUNE 1944

TOR CODEROOM
1639/11

DECODED BY
REEGAN

PARAPHRASED BY
REEGAN

ROUTED BY
REEGAN

ADDRESSSEE
THE PRESIDENT

PRECEDENCE
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

PRIORITY
WAX

MORSE CODE

PART 1 110549 NCR 3975
PART 2 110549 NCR 3951

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 110549 NCR 3975

PERSONAL AND FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN.

MY TALK WITH STALIN YESTERDAY EVENING ABOUT JOINT PLANNING FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN HE INTERRUPTED AND ASKED ABOUT THE COOPERATION OF CHINA.emphasizing the need that something be done in this connection. He said that the Chinese were not fighting. That 48 CHINESE DIVISIONS HAD BEEN BEATEN BY 13 JAPANESE IN LOYANG. HE AGREED THAT THE GENERALISM MUST BE SUPPORTED AND THAT HE WAS THE ONLY MAN WHO COULD HOLD CHINA TOGETHER BUT THAT THE CHINESE WERE NOT FIGHTING AS WELL AS THEY HAD DONE 5 YEARS AGO AND THE GENERALISSIMOS ENTOURAGE WERE DISHONEST AND ANYTHING DISCUSSED IN CHUNGKING GOT TO THE JAPANESE QUICKLY. HE SAID CHIANG WAS EYES WITH SUGGESTION THE SO-CALLED COMMUNISTS IN THE NORTH WHO STALIN CALLED LAUGHINGLY "MARGARINE COMMUNISTS" WHICH I ASSUME MEANT NOT REAL COMMUNISTS. HE SAID THESE PEOPLE WERE REAL PATRIOTS WHO WANTED TO FIGHT THE JAPANESE AND THAT CHIANG WAS MAKING A MISTAKE IN HAVING A DISPUTE WITH THEM ON IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS RATHER THAN EMPLOYING THEM AGAINST THE ENEMY. I ASKED HIM THAT HE THOUGHT SHOULD BE OUR COMBINED POLICY TOWARD THE

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.) COPY #2

Received 1915/11 2. To A.D. via Vlady.
GENERALISSIMO. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH OR RUSSIANS TO DO SO. HE SAID WE SHOULD INSIST ON THE GENERALISSIMO ELIMINATING HIS HONEST ENTOURAGE AND GIVING THE YOUNGER MEN WHO WANTED TO FIGHT AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE AUTHORITY. HE CONTINUED THAT THE GENERALISSIMO'S PRESENT ENTOURAGE WERE ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF HAVING A SECRET TREATY WITH JAPAN ARMED AGAINST CHINA. HE EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN SINKiang AND OUTER MONGOLIA BUT ADDED THAT THINGS WERE QUIET NOW. IF THIS SORT OF THING CONTINUED HOWEVER HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT OUTER MONGOLIA WITH SOVIET ARMED FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By RAP Date MAR 13 1972

P1A ACTION
FROM: Ambassador Harriman  
TO: The President  
SERIAL: 110549 NCR 3901  
DATE: 11 June 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER:

TOR MAP ROOM 111915Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Conversations with Stalin; discussion on Chinese participation in the war.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by President's 121711 NCR 8233 June 44, written by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

DATE: 30 Jun 44

ACTION COMPLETED: 300 CHINA

FILED:
I thanked Stalin for the bases he had made available to us for shuttle bombing and the cooperation given by the Red Air Force. He said "this is the least we can do to assist," and appeared well satisfied with the operation and the relationships thereby established. He then expressed his thanks for the USS Milwaukee and its delivery at Murmansk. He said that the Soviet crew had learned to operate the ship and that it would be of great value in the operations in the North.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By WP Data MAR 13 1972

Naval (Copies #1 & 2). . . . . . . . Action (for delivery P1A)
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**ACTION**

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by President's 121711 NCR 8233 June, written by Admiral Leahy.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**
530 SHUTTLE BOMBING; 450 ITALY.
I TOLD STALIN LAST NIGHT THAT YOU WERE READY TO MEET HIM SHOULD EVENTS DEVELOP TO MAKE IT DESIRABLE AND MENTIONED THE PLACE YOU HAVE IN MIND. HE AGREED THAT A MEETING WAS NOT NECESSARY AT THE PRESENT TIME BUT HE WAS READY TO COME TO THE NAMED PLACE ON QUICK NOTICE IF EVENTS SHOULD MAKE IT DESIRABLE. I EXPLAINED THAT IF THE MEETING WAS NOT HELD BEFORE THE DATE YOU GAVE ME YOU WOULD SUGGEST ANOTHER PLACE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By

MAR 1 3 1972

NAVANCE(COPIES #1 & 2).....ACTION (FOR DELIVERY TO PIA).
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1. To President via Miss Tully.</td>
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<td>2. Answered by PRESIDENT'S 121711 NCR 8233 June, written by Admiral Leahy.</td>
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**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

210 PRESIDENT.

**FILED:**
I TOLD STALIN LAST NIGHT THAT YOU WERE CONTINUING TO CONSIDER ALL MATTERS BETWEEN US IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF TEHERAN AND WENT OVER BRIEFLY THE GROUND IN MY TALK WITH KOLTOV ABOUT THE POLES AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, EXPLAINING THAT YOU HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE THAT STALIN WOULD CARRY OUT THE POLICIES TOWARD THE POLISH PEOPLE HE HAD OUTLINED THEN TO YOU. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT YOU WERE PUZZLED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF Lwow AND HOPED HE WOULD GIVE SYMPATHETIC STUDY TO THE MATTER IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE POLES. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS AND THE OTHER BOUNDARY QUESTIONS COULD BEST BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN HIM AND THE POLES IF THEY WERE DEALT WITH IN AN
UNDERSTANDING MANNER. HE APPEARED PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR ATTITUDE AND SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED YOUR POSITION AT THE PRESENT TIME AND WOULD KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET POLISH RELATIONS.

HE HAD BEEN MUCH INTERESTED TO MEET WITH THE FOUR POLISH LEADERS WHO HAD COME OUT OF POLAND. HE SAID THEY WERE "LIVING MEN NOT EMIGREES". HE TOLD ME THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO SEE ME AND I INDICATED THAT IF THEY APPROACHED ME I WOULD SEE THEM ENTIRELY UNOFFICIALLY.

HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL AS THEY HAD MUCH INFORMATION OF INTEREST. THE DEPARTMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED ME TO SEE THEM UNOFFICIALLY IF APPROACHED.

IF THEY DO I WILL OF COURSE INSIST ON NO PUBLICITY
UNLESS I AM INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE.

THIS WAS THE FIRST FRIENDLY TALK I HAVE HAD WITH
STALIN ABOUT THE POLES AND I GOT THE FEELING THAT HE
SAW A SOLUTION IN THE MAKING WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE
ALL AROUND.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date MAR 13 1972

NAV A I D E (C O P Y #1 & 2 ) ...... A C T I O N ( F O R D E L I V E R Y T O P I A )
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Conversations with Stalin; Policy towards Poles.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. Answered by President's 121711 NCR 8233 June 44, written by Admiral Leahy.
I forgot to mention last night in my cable discussing Finland that Stalin said military pressure had to be put on the Finns to bring them to their senses but regardless of developments he was committed to the policy of independence for Finland. The Finnish people however must be encouraged to choose a new government.

Stalin looked well but appeared tired before the talk was over. In leaving I said that you were gratified by the good progress in our relations. Stalin replied that he too was gratified and added "we are going along a good road."
THIS IS THE SEVENTH AND LAST CABLE REPORTING MY MEETING WITH MARSHAL STALIN LAST NIGHT, JUNE 10.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By Date MAR 13 1972

RAVAIDE (COPIES #1 & 2)....ACTION (FOR DELIVERY P1A)

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
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**ACTION**

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. Answered by President's 121711 NCR 8233 June 44, written by Admiral Leahy.

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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX SHEET

No: 110529 NCR 3900

Date: 11 June 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW

To: THE PRESIDENT

Basing of bombers in Soviet Far East; Russian participation in Japanese war.

ORIGINAL filed: "MR 520 JAPAN"

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1933, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1943—304392—1
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 658, 9 June 44.

EXTRACT

Reception of shuttle bombing forces in Russia.

ORIGINAL filed "UR 530 UK-USSR-ITALY SHUTTLE BOMBING"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 148, 3 June 44.

EXTRACT

All of us were thrilled to see General Eaker and bomber force land on Soviet bases.

ORIGINAL filed "MR 530 UK-USSR-ITALY SHUTTLE BOMBING"
From: CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo Egypt
To: The President of the United States
No. Unnumbered
Filed: 301650Z

Personal and F/or the President from Harriman.

Spent Monday night at MAAF Headquarters near Naples to discuss final details regarding FRANTIC. Saw Generals Wilson, Devers, Eaker etc. From what I learned it seems clear that General Devers has played a major role and has given the drive to follow through and to take advantage of the opportunities as they developed. Our divisions have shown greater persistence and endurance in following up their successes than have the British. This was partially due to reserves planned to be readily available to each division and partly because British divisional commanders have been more cautious, particularly in waiting for their tanks to keep up.

Greatest admiration is expressed for the French under the command of General Juin whose resourcefulness...
and determination are considered outstanding among the
corps commanders. Generals Wilson and Devers want to
use him as the French commander for the next operation
whereas, because of his association with Veygand, DeGaulle
has so far refused to allow him to enter France. They
intend to make an issue of this as they consider no other
French general is equal to the tasks.

Our combined Air Force is working as a single force
under General Eaker's leadership carrying out with
promptness and accuracy the tasks called for by the Army
as well as strategic bombing.

All are confident and hope for Rome in about a week
and that the German Army will be shattered, even though
the Germans may succeed in extricating some of their forces.

An interesting incident was a personal message from
Tito to Eaker appealing for help in his present predicament.
Eaker has answered with bombing attacks on the German troop
concentrations supported by fighters strafing enemy road
transport. This latter was not previously feasible as
until Tito was driven to the hills it was impossible to
distinguish between his transport and that of the Germans.
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
For: The President of the United States
Number M 18783

To [GWAR personal and top secret] for the eyes of the President only from Harriman. Ref nr. M 18783.

1. On arrival, Kathleen and I lunched alone with the Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill and on Saturday went to Checkers for 24 hours. The Prime Minister was much better physically and in spirit than when I saw him three or four weeks ago. He is elated by the success of the present battle and full of the other plans. He is throwing the full strength of his energies back of those and although conscious of the risks, is confident and determined. He speaks with enthusiasm and respect for Eisenhower and the other United States officers on the team.

2. The sun is shining again on the Soviet horizon due largely to U. J.'s recent civil messages. Also he feels that his agreement to give the Soviets a free hand in Roumania in return for their hands off in Greece is
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserte, Italy

Number M 18783  
Filed 291841B

leading to support by the E.A.M. of a united front among the Greek factions. He is more hopeful that a satisfactory settlement can be evolved eventually regarding Poland without seeing as yet clearly how it will work out.

3. The sooner the Prime Minister can see you the more it will please him.

4. The Prime Minister promises he will faithfully follow your line regarding De Gaulle but warns that the Foreign Office and some members of his Cabinet are insistent on going further, in fact so is the House and the British public. He really feels the need of help in coping with him and his own associates and hopes you will send Stottinius over or someone else of equal position in Washington.

5. He was much pleased by your cordial message agreeing to postpone consideration of the proposed statement to the German people. He still feels that perhaps a three cornered statement at an opportune time would be
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
Caserta, Italy

Number M 18783

Filed 291841B

of real value. I find all our senior officers in London believe that something should be said to the German people at some time to offset the Goebbels's interpretation of the terror that surrender will mean to the civilian population. I believe our Soviet friends feel that steps should be taken at some time along the same lines, but they will advise that any statement offering hope for the future must be tough in tone to be believed by the German people who are fully conscious of what they have done to others.

No Sig.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
Br. B38P Date: MAR 1 3 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Ambassador Harriman</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>18783</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 May 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>291841</td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>292247Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP ROOM</td>
<td>292247Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUBJECT**

Soviet-British relations; joint conference; De Gaulle conferences; statement to German people on D-day.

**ACTION**

1. To President at Shangri-La as RED 44, 292247Z.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President, sent to Ambassador Harriman via Alusma London as 301813 NCR 5658.
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
To: The President of the United States
Number: M 18782  
Filed 291840B

To AGWAR personal and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman. M 18782.

On Saturday I lunched alone with Benes. He talked for two hours about his own affairs, the Soviets and the Poles. I will report the conversation to you and Mister Hull later. In the meantime, I believe you will want to know of one matter about which I had not previously heard. This he asked me to tell you only and not to discuss it with either the Soviets or the British until it was learned from other sources.

Last week a secret meeting was held in London between the Soviet Ambassador and the Polish Prime Minister Mikjolaichek accompanied by General Modelski under Minister of Defense (previously Sokorski's Chief of Staff). Benes explained that the majority of the Polish Government would not go along with Mikjolaichek in trying to reach a settlement now with the Soviets. Certain Poles, however, recently
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

Number M 18782 Filed 291840B

returning from Poland have reported a strong sentiment among the Polish People for close relations with the Soviet Union and criticism of the London Government for not reaching a settlement even though there was grave apprehension over the prospect of the loss of Lwov and Vilna. Mikjolaichek therefore foreseeing the possibility of his government becoming completely discredited in Poland, undertook without consultation with his government as a whole to encourage certain intermediaries in arranging this meeting with the Soviet Ambassador. Moscow gave its approval before it took place. Benes was not informed in detail of the conversation but believes that it took the line of exploring ways and means by which all Polish factions might be consolidated into a government. The possibility was discussed of Mikjolaichek with some of his ministers returning to Poland when possible and forming a government which might include Polish leaders now in Poland, a few from the Moscow Polish Committee, or even from the United States.
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

Number M 18732       Filed 291840B

Benes does not believe that anything will develop quickly from this talk but hopes that if the matter can be kept secret for a time, something constructive might eventually develop.

Needless to say, Benes is convinced the Soviet intentions towards the independence of Poland are sincere and honorable.

No Sig
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

To: The President of the United States

To AGWAR personal and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman. M 18782.

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From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

To: The President of the United States

Number M 18782

To AGWAR personal and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman. M 18782.

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From:    Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
         Caserta, Italy
Number M 18782            Filed 291840B

returning from Poland have reported a strong sentiment among the Polish People for close relations with the
Soviet Union and criticism of the London Government for not reaching a settlement even though there was grave
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forming a government which might include Polish leaders now in Poland, a few from the Moscow Polish Committee, or
even from the United States.
From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
Number M 19722

Benes does not believe that anything will develop quickly from this talk but hopes that if the matter can be kept secret for a time, something constructive might eventually develop.

Needless to say, Benes is convinced the Soviet intentions towards the independence of Poland are sincere and honorable.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Date MAR 1, 1972
FROM  Ambassador Harriman  (Caserta, Italy)  TO  The President
SERIAL    #18782  DATE  29 May 1944
DATE/TIME  291840Z  OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM  291135Z  VIA  Army Code Room
SUBJECT  Harriman reports conversation with Benes re Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION

To President at Shangri-La as RED 43.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 30 May 44; sent to Harriman via Alusna London as 301813 NCR 5658, 30 May 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

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ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

052 RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS.
IN MY TALK WITH MOLTOV LAST EVENING HE TOLD ME THAT
THE RED ARMY HAD MET WITH STUBBORN RESISTANCE IN THE
TARNOPOL AREA AND THAT ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY RESERVES
HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND THE RED ARMY'S
ATTACKS THE FIGHTING IN THAT SECTOR CONTINUED TO BE
TOUGH. HE DID NOT VOLUNTEER CONFIRMATION OF A REPORT
I HAVE RECENTLY HEARD THAT THE RED ARMY'S NEXT ATTACK
IS TO BE AGAINST KOWEL IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF
BREST LITOVSK.

NAVAIDE (FOR THE PRESIDENT). ... ACTION.
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL 180900 NCR 1212 DATE 18 Apr 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 18/1705Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT Red Army activity in Tarnopol area.

ACTION

To President at Waccamaw as WITE 63, 18/1725Z.

In black 44, 20/0220Z, President stated: "No acknowledgment or reply will be made to WITE 63."

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR Harriman
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 180915 NCR 1211, 18 April 1944

COPY

I asked Molotov again last night how soon the chief of the Far Eastern Air Force would be in Moscow for conferences with General Deane. He readily agreed to find out and indicated he did not know why there had been delay.

ORIGINAL filed "MR 530 JAPAN (1)"

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 10-23
INDEX SHEET

FROM:  AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO:   THE PRESIDENT
NO:   172350  NCR 1094

Announcement of transfer of MILWAUKEE.

ORIGINAL filed "AR 450 Italy (2)
AS I RETURNED LAST NIGHT FROM MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL I HAVE NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILWAUKEE LOAN. I AM SATISFIED SOVIETS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS WILL WISH TO POSTPONE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LONG AS YOU ARE WILLING. FOR MY GUIDANCE I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF YOUR WISHES AS TO DATE. AT MURMANSK ADMIRAL OLSEN AND I FOUND ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURNING OVER MILWAUKEE PROGRESSING MOST SATISFACTORILY.

SOME 350 SOVIET OFFICERS AND MEN ARE LIVING ON BOARD WITH OUR OFFICERS AND CREW WHICH HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ABOUT 400. THE AMERICAN OFFICERS AND RATINGS I TALKED
TO TOLD ME THAT THEIR RUSSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBERS WERE WELL TRAINED, KEEN AND WERE LEARNING FAST THE NEW EQUIPMENT. ACTUAL TURNOVER WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE ABOUT APRIL 26.

MOST OF OUR MEN WILL RETURN ON THE NEXT CONVOY APRIL 25. ABOUT 5¢ TO 6¢ WILL REMAIN FOR SOME WEEKS TO ASSIST FURTHER THE SOVIET ADM COMMANDING THE NORTHERN FLEET TOLD ME THAT HE INTENDED TO PUT THE SHIP IN OPERATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT USING HER WITH DESTROYERS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPPING SUPPLYING GERMAN FORCES AND EXPORTING NICKEL FROM PETSAMO ALSO TO ASSIST THE ARMY IF THE NORTHERN FRONT GETS ACTIVE. THE MILWAUKEE WILL BE THEIR ONLY SHIP HEAVIER THAN A
DESTROYER AVAILABLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE SOVIET ADM. PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE THEREFORE ON THE ADDITION OF THE SHIP TO HIS COMMAND. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTANTLY ATTACKING ENEMY SHIPPING WITH GOOD RESULTS BY SUBMARINE U.S. BUILT MTB AND AIR LARGELY BOSTONS AND AIRCOBRAS.

WHILE I WAS AT MURMANSK A CONVOY OF 3 CARGO SHIPS LOADED WITH NICKEL WAS SUNK WITH MOST OF THE ESCORTS. GREAT SATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED WITH THE RESULTS OBTAINED FROM AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. THE DELIVERY OF THE MILWAUKEE AT MURMANSK AND THE MANNER IN WHICH CAPT. FIELDING IS HANDLING THE TURNOVER WILL, I AM SURE, CREATE LASTING GOODWILL AMONG ALL CONCERNED IN THE NORTH. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THE MILWAUKEE WILL BE HANDLED AND
PUT TO GOOD USE.

THE 46 AMERICAN AND BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPS WHICH ARRIVED WITH THE LAST CONVOY WERE BEING UNLOADED AT MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL WITH UNUSUAL COMPETENCE. WHILE I WAS IN MURMANSK OVER 1200 TONS A DAY WERE BEING DISCHARGED FROM SOME INDIVIDUAL SHIPS AND ABOUT 12000 TONS DAILY IN THE PORT AS A WHOLE. THE SOVIET OFFICIALS PROMISED ME THAT EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO DISCHARGE ALL OF OUR SHIPS IN TIME TO MAKE THE NEXT RETURNING CONVOY. A LARGE PART OF THE WORK IS BEING DONE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL ALTHOUGH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS INCLUDING WOMEN WERE WORKING ALONGSIDE THEM. AFTER SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE EARLY PART OF THE WINTER
DUE TO INEXPERIENCE THE CARGOES ARE NOW BEING HANDLED
CAREFULLY AND EFFICIENTLY AND THE PORTS ARE BEING
CLEARED RAPIDLY. I WAS RECEIVED WITH ALMOST EMBARRASSING
Cordiality and was shown everything I wanted to see, at the
Naval Base of Polyarone and the Air Base at Murmansk.
Admiral Papan in the Arctic Explorer took us for a trip on
the Icebreaker Lenin at Archangel.

These people in the North have seen the volume of
American supplies delivered and have had effective use
of American built ships, minesweepers and MTB's turned
over to them. All military and civilian alike showed a deep
seated gratitude for our assistance. The part that you
personally have played in this was constantly referred to.
ALL EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF CONVOYS.
LASTLY, I AM GLAD TO REPORT THAT OUR 4 SEAMEN SENTENCED TO
FROM 1 TO 3 YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR MISDEMEANORS ASHORE HAVE
BEEN RELEASED. ONE CAN'T HELP BUT BE IMPRESSED BY THE
COMPETENCE AND ENERGY OF THE SOVIETS IN THE NORTH AND IN
SPITE OF THE DESTRUCTION FROM BOMBING IN MURMANSK WHICH
INCLUDES ABOUT HALF THE TOWN BY THEIR ABILITY IN OVERCOMING
DIFFICULTIES. THE PEOPLE IN MURMANSK ARE GIVEN EXTRA
RATIONS AS A FRONT LINE CITY AND SEEMED HEALTHY AND STRONG
WHEREAS AT ARCHANGEL THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT
AND RESULTING LISTLESSNESS.

NAVRAIDE (FOR THE PRESIDENT).....ACTION.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Ambassador Harriman</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>141430 NCR 8358</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>15 Apr 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>(VIA)</td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJET</td>
<td>Transfer of 'MILWAUKEE' conditions in north Russia.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 35, 15/0400Z. Answered by BLAIC 24, 15/2225Z. Reply sent to Harriman as 16/0106 NCR 6950. (See &quot;UN 150 IIAHI&quot; file for answer)</td>
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**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
Molotov has given me the following information in writing marked exceptionally secret.

The Finnish delegation composed of Paasikivi, King Engel, and Secretary George Enkel arrived in Moscow March 26. The first meeting took place March 27. The Finns declared they had no powers except to receive from the Soviet government an interpretation of the Soviet armistice terms. The Finns inquired whether the Soviet government was prepared to conclude a treaty of peace or only an agreement on an armistice. The Soviets explained that they had transmitted the Soviet armistice terms and not a treaty of peace but that if the Finnish government desired at the present time to make a proposal for the conclusion of a treaty of peace it could do so. The Soviet government was prepared to carry on negotiations either for an armistice or a treaty of peace with Finland. In reply to the Finnish delegations attempts to ascertain the Soviet position regarding the possibility of marking various changes in the six Soviet conditions the Soviet
SIDE CONFIRMED AS UNALTERABLE THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THESE POINTS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT IF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT SO DESIRED THE SECOND MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE 28 OR 29. MOLOTOV STATES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE INFORMED OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS.

MAY I ASK THAT MR. HULL BE INFORMED.

DISTRIBUTION:
PIA......ACTION.
FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date MAR 13 1972

Read: 291902. Rs
To Pres via Under - 291902.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copy of a message from Ambassador Harriman to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, USN,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc: Msg. Harriman to
President, 29 Mar 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

The information which follows was given to me by Molotov in writing marked exceptionally secret. May I ask that Mr. Hull be informed.

On March 26 the Finnish delegation, composed of Paasikivi, King Engel and Secretary George Enkel, arrived in Moscow. On March 27 the first meeting was held. It was stated by the Finns that their only power was to receive an interpretation of the Soviet armistice terms from the Soviet Government. It was asked by the Finns whether the Soviet Government was prepared to execute a peace treaty or only an agreement on an armistice. It was explained by the Soviet representatives that if the Finnish Government desired to make a proposal for concluding a treaty of peace it could do so, but that they had transmitted the Soviet armistice terms and not a treaty of peace. The Soviet Government was prepared to negotiate with Finland for either a treaty of peace or an armistice. The Soviets confirmed as unalterable the position of the Soviet Government on the six Soviet conditions in reply to attempts by the Finnish delegation to ascertain the Soviet position in the possibility of making various changes.

It was agreed by the Soviet Government that the second meeting would be held on the 28th or 29th, if the Finnish Government so desired.

It was said by Molotov that the United States Government will be advised of later developments.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you take this up with
Cordell?

F. D. R.

Message to the President from
Ambassador Harriman, dated March 29,
1944, re Finnish Delegation's arrival
in Moscow to carry on negotiations
either for an Armistice or a Treaty
of Peace.

Answered by President 29.2319
Mar. to Harriman.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Ambassador Harriman</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>290855 NCR 6705</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 March 1944</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>29/1900</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Navy Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Finnish peace proposals.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>(See also Harriman's 272235)</td>
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<td>Taken to President via usher, 291910Z.</td>
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<td>At evening news presentation, The President directed copy be given State for information. Reply to Harriman dictated in Map Room by Captain Wood, sent to Harriman as 292319 NCR 389Z.</td>
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<th>ACTION COMPLETED:</th>
<th>FILED:</th>
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<td>370 Finland.</td>
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(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN).

IN REPLY TO MY INQUIRY VYSHINSKI TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT THE FINNS HAD ARRIVED IN MOSCOW. HE OFFERED NO FURTHER INFORMATION EXCEPT TO EMPHASIZE THE SECRECY, FOR WHICH REASON I AM USING THE NAVY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO YOU. MAY I SUGGEST THAT YOU INFORM MR. HULL.

DISTRIBUTION:
P.I.A.-----ACTION.
FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By APP Date MAR 13 1972

Sealed 2/14/72

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copy of a message from Ambassador Harriman to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, USN,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President

Enc: Msg. Harriman to
President, 28 Mar 44.

28 March 1944
28 March 1944

From: Ambassador Harriman
To : The President

Vyshinski told me this evening in reply to my inquiry that the Finns had arrived in Moscow. May I suggest that you inform Mr. Hull? Except for emphasizing the secrecy, he offered no further information. It is because of the secrecy that I am using the Naval channels of communications to you.
FROM Ambassador Harriman | TO The President  
SERIAL Unnumbered | DATE 28 March 1944  
DATE/TIME 272235 NCR 5704 | OR FILE NUMBER  
TOR MAP ROOM 281410Z | VIA Navy Code Room  
SUBJECT "Finns have arrived in Moscow."

ACTION

Taken to the President by Admiral Brown with morning news. President directed copy be given to Department of State for information.

See further Harriman's 290855, 29 Mar 44, which was answered by Pres' 292319, 29 Mar 44.

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ACTION COMPLETED: MR 370 FINLAND  
FILED:
SECRET \ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN

SINCE DISPATCHING MY CABLE 187441 REGARDING RADIO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR I HAVE

RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MOLOTOV WHICH AT LEAST OPENS THE DOOR TO FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENTS PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY GENERAL DEANE TO THE RED ARMY STAFF SOME WEEKS AGO FOR USE OF A RADIO RELAY THROUGH ALGIERS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. AFTER MANY DISCUSSIONS MOLOTOV ON MARCH 11 WROTE ME A FORMAL LETTER STATING CATEGORICALLY THAT AS WE COULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THE PRIVILEGE OF ESTABLISHING A RADIO STATION IN THE UNITED STATES THE QUESTION OF IMPROVING COMMUNICATION WITH THE UNITED STATES "SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS DROPPED". EVIDENTLY THE RED ARMY STAFF HAS AT LAST PREVAILED ON THE HIGHER SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE UNITED STATES ARMS PROPOSAL WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS. IF AN ARRANGEMENT CAN BE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

NCR 18

SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREVS.)
WORKED OUT ALONG THE LINES OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY GENERAL DEANE THIS WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION AT THE PRESENT TIME OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH RADIO COMMUNICATION. GENERAL DEANE WILL PURSUE THE MATTER, PROMPTLY WITH THE RED ARMY STAFF AND PENDING THE OUTCOME OF HIS DISCUSSIONS I ASK THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION ON THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED IN MY CABLE ABOVE MENTIONED BE HELD IN ABEYANCE.
March 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colone McFarland

The attached paraphrase of a telegram from Ambassador Harriman to the President, dated 13 March 1944, requesting reconsideration of the establishment of a Russian radio station in Washington, and a paraphrased copy of a telegram from Mr. Harriman to the President, dated March 19, 1944, requesting that this matter be held in abeyance, are forwarded for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 4/23/1972
20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copies of messages from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished to the Department of State for their information.

It is requested that a copy of any action taken by the Department of State on these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

3 Incls.
Mesg, Harriman to the President, 19 Mar 44.
Mesg, Harriman to the President, 18 Mar 44.
Mesg, Harriman to the President, 18 Mar 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Since sending my earlier message regarding radio communications between the USSR and the United States, I have received a letter from Mr. Molotov which opens the door at least to further consideration of the proposal of the War Department for use of a radio relay through Algiers on a reciprocal basis which was submitted to the Red Army Staff some weeks ago by General Deane. On March 11, after many discussions, Mr. Molotov wrote me a formal letter stating categorically that the question of improvement of communications with the United States "should be considered as dropped" since we did not give the Soviets the privilege of establishing a radio station in the United States. It appears evident now that the Red Army Staff has finally prevailed on higher Russian authorities to at least consider the U. S. Army's proposal with some modifications. At the present time it would be a satisfactory solution to our difficulties with radio communications if an arrangement can be worked out along the lines of the War Department's proposal as submitted by General Deane. This matter will be promptly followed up with the Red Army Staff by General Deane and pending the outcome of his discussions, I ask that you hold in abeyance consideration of the recommendation on this subject contained in my earlier cable as mentioned above.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION

F. D. R.

Message to the President from Ambassador Harriman, dated March 19, 1944, re radio communication between the U. S. and the USSR.

Answered by President, 3/16/44,
March, to Harriman.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL 182337 NCR 9905 DATE 19 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 19/1630Z VIA 19 March 1944

TOR MAP ROOM

SUBJECT Radio communication between Russia and Washington.

ACTION

Further to HARRIMAN's 180417 NCR 9221.

To President via Usher, 19/1700Z.

By direction of the President, to Admiral Leahy for action; to State Department for information, 20 March 44.

Draft reply prepared by Col MacFarland, Sec CCS; modified by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 30 Mar 44; sent to Harriman as 301620 NCR 3976.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
201 Russia
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

Referring to my next previous cable. No doubt Gen Donovan has informed you fully of his negotiations while in Moscow. On the other hand I believe that I should explain to you perhaps with somewhat different emphasis how the question appears to me. On Nov 14 Deane and I received information from the War Dept. that you had approved Donovan's suggestion that representation of OSS be established in Russia. Based on this information we welcomed a proposal made by Donovan when we met in Cairo that he himself come to Moscow to explore the possibilities of an OSS mission here.
WHEN DONOVAN ARRIVED JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS I ARRANGED FOR AN INTERVIEW FOR HIM WITH MOLOTOV. GEN DONOVAN EXPLAINED HIS ACTIVITIES AND PROPOSED THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN ENEMY COUNTRIES INFORMATION ON SPECIAL EQUIPMENT USED IN SABOTAGE AND WHERE DESIRED BY BOTH SIDES COOPERATION BETWEEN AGENTS. TO ACCOMPLISH THESE PURPOSES DONOVAN PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF A SMALL MISSION BETWEEN THE OSS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE OPPOSITE SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS. IT DID NOT OCCUR TO ME NOR TO BEANE THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY OBJECTION TO DONOVAN'S OPPOSITE NUMBERS TO ESTABLISH A MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. IN FACT WE WELCOMED THE IDEA. PERHAPS THE MORE SO BECAUSE THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA WAS THE FIRST TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION VOICED AT THE MOSCOW AND
TENETT CONFERENCES. MOLOTOV RECEIVED DONOVAN CORDIALLY AND ARRANGED FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIM AND THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET SECRET INTELLIGENCE ABROAD AND THE SOVIET SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THESE MEN ARE REALLY DONOVANS OPPOSITE NUMBERS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE LARGE NKVD ORGANIZATION. AFTER CONSIDERATION WE WERE INFORMED THAT DONOVANS PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MISSIONS WAS ACCEPTED. AN INDIVIDUAL COL GRAUER WITH WHOM I WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WAS SELECTED TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES WITH A SMALL STAFF AND GEN DONOVAN EXPLAINED THAT COL HASKELL THEN IN MOSCOW WOULD BE SELECTED ON HIS SIDE. COL HASKELL WAS TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES TO COLLECT HIS STAFF AND MATERIAL AND RETURN TO MOSCOW WITHIN A RELATIVELY FEW WEEKS. I AM ADVISED THAT THE SOVIET MISSION CONSISTING OF COLONEL GRAUER...
AND ABOUT SIX ASSISTANTS PLUS THE USUAL WIVES ARE READY TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON. GENERAL DEANE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING UP ON OBTAINING THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY GEN DONOVAN PARTICULARLY REGARDING BULGARIA. HE HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A LONG INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON BULGARIA PREPARED WITH THE GREATEST CARE AND DETAIL. OUTLINE OF THE SUBJECTS COVERED HAS BEEN CABLED TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON AND REPORT IS BEING FORWARDED BY SPECIAL OFFICER. GEN DEANE TELLS ME THIS REPORT EVIDENCES CONSIDERABLE EFFORT AND A FULL COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AND CONTAINS MOST IMPORTANT INFORMATION. WE HAVE UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED FOR THE LAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS TO PENETRATE SOURCES OF SOVIET INFORMATION AND TO GET ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND EXCHANGE. HERE FOR THE
FIRST TIME WE HAVE PENETRATED ONE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND IF PURSUED I AM SURE THIS WILL BE THE
OPENING DOOR TO FAR GREATER INTIMACY IN OTHER BRANCHES. IF
WE NOW CLOSE THE DOOR ON THIS BRANCH OF THE SOVIET GOVERN-
MENT AFTER THEY HAVE SHOWN A COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AND GOOD
FAITH I CANNOT EXPRESS TOO STRONGLY MY CONVICTION THAT OUR
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN OTHER DIRECTIONS
WILL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. WE ARE MAKING VERY SATISFACTORY
PROGRESS WITH THE RED AIR STAFF WITH REGARD TO SHUTTLE BOMB-
ING AND IN SPITE OF OUR DIFFICULTIES IN POLITICAL MATTERS
IMPORTANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN OTHER DIRECTIONS ON THE
MILITARY MATTERS WITH PART OF WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR FROM MY
REPORT OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN. I SHOULD ADD THAT
I BELIEVE THIS EXCHANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD RESULT IN

No. 1 ADMIRAL.  No. 2 FILE.  No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.  No. 4 SPECIAL.

• SEALED  SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18
OBTAINING BY THE OSS IMPORTANT INFORMATION NOT ONLY FOR THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES BUT ALSO FOR THOSE OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AT HOME. I AM AT A LOSS AS TO HOW I CAN SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN TO MARSHAL STALIN OR MOLOTOV WHY THESE FEW SOVIET OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE ASKING THAT OVER A THOUSAND MEN BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH OUR AIR OPERATIONS. I FEAR THAT IT WILL ALSO HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE EFFORTS TO HAVE VERY MUCH LARGER FORCES PERMITTED TO OPERATE IN THIS COUNTRY. I BELIEVE THIS MATTER IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT I AM PREPARED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AT ONCE WITH YOUR PERMISSION IN ORDER TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. GEN DEANE CONCURS IN

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

**FROM** ALUGNA MOSCOW

**RELEASED BY**

**DATE** 13 MARCH 1944

**TOR CODEROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**ROUTED BY**

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**ADDRESS**

**FOR ACTION**

**CHNO**

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**PRECEDENCE**

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(PAGE 7 OF 7) 180435 NCR 9295

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**GCT**

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

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THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS CABLE.

SIGNED HARRIMAN

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date MAR 13 1972

NAVAIDE (P1A) ACTION

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"SEALED SECRET"

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

NCR 18
From: US MM Moscow
To: War Department
No: 318 17th March 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

The Ambassador has received 2 messages from the President, one directing that no further efforts be made in attempting to improve communications on a reciprocal basis, and the other disapproving an exchange of an OSD mission with a similar Soviet mission.

Mr Harriman has sent two cables to the President setting forth additional data on both subjects and asking for reconsideration. I fully concur in the Ambassador's views and in the event that the cables are referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend that they be given favorable consideration.

No Sig

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff
INFO: OPD
General Arnold
J of S
Admiral King
General Stoker

CM-IN-12990 (18 Mar 44) 0514Z med
20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copies of messages from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished to the Department of State for their information.

It is requested that a copy of any action taken by the Department of State on these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

3 Incls.
Msg, Harriman to the President, 19 Mar 44.
Msg, Harriman to the President, 18 Mar 44.
Msg, Harriman to the President, 18 Mar 44.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 13 1972

-1-
March 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland

The attached paraphrase of a telegram from Ambassador Harriman to the President dated 18 March, relating to the establishment of an O.S.S. Mission to Moscow, is forwarded to you for preparation of a reply.

Respectfully,

[Signature]
Undoubtedly you have been informed by General Donovan of his negotiations while in Moscow. I feel however, that I should explain to you how the question appears to me with perhaps somewhat different emphasis. General Deane and I received information from the War Department on November 14 that Donovan's suggestion regarding establishment of OSS representatives in Russia had your approval. With this information as a basis, when we met General Donovan in Cairo we welcomed his proposal that he go to Moscow to explore the possibility of an OSS Mission. I arranged an interview with Mr. Molotov for General Donovan when he arrived just prior to Christmas. General Donovan provided an explanation of his activities and proposed the exchange of information on special equipment used in sabotage, exchange of intelligence information in enemy countries and cooperation between agents when desired by both Governments. In order to accomplish these purposes, General Donovan proposed an exchange of a small mission between the OSS and representatives from the corresponding Soviet organization. Neither Deane nor I had any idea that there would be any objection to establishing a mission of General Donovan's opposite numbers in the United States on a reciprocal basis. We even welcomed the idea. More so perhaps because the Soviet acceptance of the idea was the first tangible evidence of the spirit of cooperation voiced at the conferences in Moscow and Teheran. General Donovan was received cordially by Molotov and arrangements were made for discussion between him and the Chiefs of the Soviet
subversive activities and the Soviet secret intelligence abroad. Although these men are included in the large N.K.V.D. organization, they are in effect General Donovan's opposites. After due consideration, we were informed that they had accepted General Donovan's proposal for an exchange of Missions. General Donovan indicated that Colonel Haskell, then in Moscow, would be selected as the American representative and Colonel Grauer, who impressed me favorably, would be selected to go to the United States with a small staff. Colonel Haskell was to return to Moscow within a few weeks after having assembled his staff and material in the United States. I am informed that the Soviet Mission consisting of Colonel Grauer and approximately six assistants, plus the usual wives, are ready to depart for Washington. General Deane has been busy trying to obtain the information requested by General Donovan, particularly that regarding Bulgaria. Recently he received a long intelligence report on Bulgaria which had been prepared with the greatest detail and care. The report is being forwarded by special officer and an outline of the subjects covered has been cabled to military authorities in Washington. General Deane tells me that this report contains most important information and is evidence of considerable effort and a full cooperative spirit. For the past two and a half years, we have been unsuccessfully trying to penetrate sources of Soviet information and to get on a basis of mutual exchange and confidence. We have penetrated here for the first time one intelligence branch of the Soviet Government and I am certain this will be the opening wedge to far greater intimacy in other branches, if pursued. I cannot express too strongly my conviction that our relations with the Soviet Government in other directions will be adversely affected if we now close the door on this branch of the
Soviet Government after they have shown cooperative spirit and good faith.

In regard to shuttle bombing, we are making very satisfactory progress with the Soviet Air Staff and despite our troubles in political matters, important progress has been made in other directions, part of which you are familiar with from my report on conversations with Marshal Stalin. I think that this exchange of representatives would result in the obtaining of important information by the OSS not only for their own activities but also for those of other American Intelligence Agencies. Since we are now asking that over 1,000 men be permitted to enter the Soviet Union in connection with our air operations, I do not know how I can explain satisfactorily to Molotov or Stalin why these few Soviet officials should not be allowed to enter the United States. There will also be an adverse affect, I fear, on our efforts in the future to have much larger forces permitted to operate in this country. General Deane concurs in the views expressed in this cable. This matter is of such importance I believe, that with your permission I am prepared to return to Washington at once in order to discuss it with you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Redacted] Date Mar 13 1972