Box 11
Map Room
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2815352

Date: 28 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Tripartite meeting.

ORIGINAL:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 16 May 1935, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19—26539-1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2618552

Date: 26 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Tripartite meeting.

ORIGINAL:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1944—24698-1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2518302 NCR 4916
Date: 25 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
To: THE PRESIDENT

Eisenhower's sending officers to Moscow to exchange information.

FILED: WR 340 (1)
WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE 130 INTERNEED AMERICAN FLYERS WHO HAD LANDED ON SOVIET TERRITORY IN THE FAR EAST HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED BY THE SOVIETS AS HAD BEEN ARRANGED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED PLAN THEY WERE TAKEN BY TRAIN FROM TASHKENT REACHING ASHKABAD NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER ON DECEMBER SEVEN. THE UNITED STATES OFFICER FROM OUR MILITARY MISSION WHO WAS ACCOMPANYING THE PARTY WAS CALLED IN BY THE SOVIET GENERAL AND TOLD THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN RECEIVED TO RETURN THE INTERNEES TO TASHKENT BECAUSE "SOMEONE HAD BEEN TALKING".

IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TOOK THIS ACTION BECAUSE OF THE ARTICLE BY DREW PEARSON WHICH APPEARED ABOUT DECEMBER ONE AND WAS LATER SUBSTANTIATED BY HENRY CASSIDY.
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD RELEASED OUR INTERNEED FLYERS.

I AM NATURALLY MUCH DISTURBED NOT ONLY BECAUSE THESE INTERNEES ARE STILL BEING HELD BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THIS INCIDENT UPON THE SECRET DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE COMMENCED BETWEEN OUR MILITARY MISSION AND THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PLANNING FOR MILEPOST.

YOU WILL RECALL STALINS CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR SECURITY AND INDICATIONS OF HIS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN OURS.

WE WILL OF COURSE ATTEMPT TO INDUCE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE OUR INTERNEES. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD BE INFORMED OF ANY STEPS BEING TAKEN TO PREVENT IN THE FUTURE PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION OF THIS CHARACTER.

NAVAIDE(#18#2).......ACTION.

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Handle only in accordance with 'Top Secret' instructions contained in Article 75, Navy Regulations. NO.

OPNAV 19-78
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2522002 NCR 5041

From: Ambassador Harriman

To: The President

Date: 26 December 1944

Tripartite conference.

ORIGINAL:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
18 July 1943

This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1943, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
I transmitted the information in White House Cable NR 134 concerning Japanese naval losses to Marshal Stalin on Dec 16. I have now received a letter from Dekanosov acting Head of the Foreign Office stating that the Marshal was interested in receiving this information and requesting me to transmit his appreciation to you for sending it.

NCR Original Distribution:

NAVSAIDE(#1-2)...... ACTION
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2209452 NCR 1736

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Date: 22 December 1944

Tripartite meeting.

FILED:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1943—05399-1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2120402 NCR 1305

Date: 22 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Tripartite meeting—suggested meeting places.

FILED:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
18 July 1943

This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 19 May 1939, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 2108552 NCR 750

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Date: 21 December 1944

Delivery of President's #136 re Polish statement.

FILED:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 19 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
MEMORANDUM FOR

COMMANDER TYREE:

Our messages to Alusna, Moscow, are handled as follows: We send the message to NOC, which encodes the message and sends it to the Army Code Room. The code room transmits the encoded message in one of the following three ways:

a. A direct radio-teletype connection with Moscow, usually reliable, by which precedence traffic can be cleared under favorable circumstances within an hour. If there is some difficulty in this method, they try the second system,

b. File the encoded message with commercial stations (Makay Radio or RCA). If any difficulty is experienced, the final method is used, which is as follows,

c. Radio-teletype is used to send the encoded message to London, at which point the encoded message is turned over to commercial radio company to transmit to Moscow.

The Harriman message is still being checked on, and the watch officer at the Army Code Room says that the line (Method a) was out for three days, and commercial cable companies were unable to broadcast the message from United States (Plan b), so the message was sent to London and given to commercial broadcast, which had no more success from London than we had from United States.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR.
Stalin appeared pleased with the appointment of General Hurley as Ambassador to China and with General Wedemeyer's position. I asked him how he viewed political developments in China. He said that it was a good thing to get rid of General Ho Ying Chin, minister of war, and that he considered Soong "wise and a patriot" though without military experience. He always criticized the Generalissimo for not organizing his forces to fight the Japanese and explained in some detail the corruption in the Chinese army. He commented that Chiang has wanted too many troops unequipped for fighting. He has tried to organize 400 divisions. It would have been better if he had limited them to 40 well equipped divisions ready to fight. He made no comment regarding the negotiations between Chiang and the Communists.
I BELIEVE THAT IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT IF NO ARRANGE-
MENT IS MADE BEFORE THE RUSSIANS ATTACK THE JAPANESE THE

SOVIETS WILL BACK THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NORTH AND TURN OVER

TO THEM THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHINESE TERRITORY THE RED

ARMY LIBERATES. THE SITUATION THEN WILL BE INCREASINGLY

DIFFICULT FOR THE GENERALISSIMO.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAlDE(#1,2).......ACTION(FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT)

FILE.
AS REQUESTED BY GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL EISENHOWER
I EXPLAINED TO MARSHAL STALIN LAST NIGHT THE DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE WESTERN FRONT IN WHICH HE TOOK A KEEN INTEREST. I
ASKED HIM HOW HIS MILITARY PLANS WERE DEVELOPING SINCE THE
DISCUSSIONS IN THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT BEFORE
ANSWERING HE WISHED TO CONSULT HIS STAFF AND THAT HE WOULD
SEE ME AGAIN IN ABOUT A WEEK. HE EXPLAINED THE PROGRESS
THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN HUNGARY BUT THAT THE WEATHER HAD BEEN
WARM AND CLOUDY IN POLAND AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS HIS FIRM
INTENTION TO CONDUCT A WINTER CAMPAIGN IT COULD NOT BE
LAUNCHED UNTIL THE GROUND WAS FROZEN AND UNTIL THE WEATHER
HAD IMPROVED TO ALLOW HIM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS SUPER-
IORITY IN THE AIR. I WILL REPORT IN MORE DETAIL HIS FURTHER

ORIGINATOR IN DATE AND TIME GROUP
(USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

EXPLAINED TO MARSHAL STALIN LAST NIGHT THE DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE WESTERN FRONT IN WHICH HE TOOK A KEEN INTEREST. I
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ORIGINATOR IN DATE AND TIME GROUP
(USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

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IORITY IN THE AIR. I WILL REPORT IN MORE DETAIL HIS FURTHER

ORIGINATOR IN DATE AND TIME GROUP
(USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

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INTENTION TO CONDUCT A WINTER CAMPAIGN IT COULD NOT BE
LAUNCHED UNTIL THE GROUND WAS FROZEN AND UNTIL THE WEATHER
HAD IMPROVED TO ALLOW HIM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS SUPER-
IORITY IN THE AIR. I WILL REPORT IN MORE DETAIL HIS FURTHER
Specific Comments.

Declassified
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 1 4 1972

Original NCR distribution:
NAV AIDE (21, 22) ACTION (FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT)

FILE.
I EXPLAINED TO MARSHAL STALIN LAST NIGHT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE PACIFIC IN WHICH HE SHOWED A KEEN INTEREST. I ASKED HIM IF HE
WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR OF THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA. HE REPLIED: "I AM
INTERESTED IN ANY AREA WHERE JAPS ARE BEING KILLED". I DISCUSSED IN
SOME DETAIL THE LIST OF SUPPLIES HE HAD REQUESTED FOR THE BUILD-UP
IN SIBERIA. HE WAS GENERALLY WELL PLEASED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN
PROMISED SO FAR ALTHOUGH HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THOSE ITEMS OF
SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WHICH ARE NOT AT PRESENT AVAILABLE. I ASSURED
HIM THAT YOU AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE ANXIOUS TO DO
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BOTH AS TO SUPPLY AND SHIPPING. I EMPHASIZED
THE NEED FOR DETAILED PLANNING NOW AND THE SENDING OF AMERICAN
OFFICERS TO PETROPAVLovsk AND THE MARITIME PROVINCES.
HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD AUTHORIZE THE GENERAL STAFF TO
COMMENCE PROMPTLY DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL DEANE AND GENERAL ROBERTS
GROUP WHO HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECRET EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION ON MUTUAL REQUIREMENTS AND PLANS. HE ALSO AGREED
TO THE VISIT OF OUR OFFICERS TO AREAS MENTIONED AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
MAR 14 1972

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAIDE(#1-2) ..... ACTION

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1 ADMIRAL</th>
<th>No. 2 FILE</th>
<th>No. 37-1 OR CHARTROOM</th>
<th>No. 4 SPECIAL</th>
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Handwritten note: "DECLASSIFIED"

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Handwritten note: "DECLASSIFIED"

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Handwritten note: "MAR 14 1972"

Handwritten note: "NAVAIDE(#1-2) ..... ACTION"
In my talk with Stalin last night I said that you were anxious to know what political questions he had indicated in October should be clarified in connection with Russia's entry in the war against Japan. He went into the next room and brought out a map. He said that the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin should be returned to Russia. He explained that the Japanese now controlled the approaches to Vladivostok, that we considered that the Russians were entitled to protection for their communications to this important port and that "all outlets to the Pacific were now held or blocked by the enemy". He drew a line around the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dairen saying that the Russians wished...
Again to lease these ports and the surrounding area.

I said that I recalled that you and he had discussed this question at Teheran and that, if my memory was correct, you had in fact initiated yourself the question of the need for Russia to have access to a warm water port in the Pacific but that on the other hand I thought you had in mind an international free port rather than the lease of this area by the Russians; that this method, you felt, would give the Soviets the needed protection and was more in the line with present day concepts of how international questions of this kind could best be dealt with. He said "this can be discussed". Stalin said further that he wished to lease the Chinese-Eastern Railway. I asked him to define the exact...
LINES IN MANCHURIA IN WHICH HE WAS INTERESTED AND HE POINTED OUT THE LINE FROM DAIREN TO HARBIN THENCE NORTHWEST TO MANCHURI AND EAST TO VLADIVOSTOK. HE ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY WHEN I ASKED IF THESE WERE THE ONLY RAILROAD LINES IN MANCHURIA IN WHICH HE WAS INTERESTED. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SPECIFICALLY RE-AFFIRMED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF CHINA IN MANCHURIA. THERE IS OF COURSE NO DOUBT THAT WITH CONTROL OF THE RAILROAD OPERATIONS AND WITH THE PROBABILITY OF RUSSIAN TROOPS TO PROTECT THE RAILROAD SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL BE GREAT. HE SAID THE ONLY CONSIDERATION HE HAD NOT MENTIONED AT TEHERAN WAS THE RECOGNITION OF THE STATUS QUO IN OUTER MONGOLIA — THE MAINTENANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF OUTER MONGOLIA AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By R.G. Ento MAR 14 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE.
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.
THIS LATTER DID NOT SURPRISE ME AS I HAVE BEEN CONVINCED FOR MANY MONTHS THAT THIS WOULD BE THE SOVIET ATTITUDE BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE FOR PROTECTION FOR THEIR LONG SOUTHERN SIBERIAN BOUNDARY.

EXCEPT FOR MY REMARKS REGARDING THE PORTS I MADE NO COMMENT. I WILL NOT BRING THE SUBJECT UP AGAIN UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT ME TO DO SO. I FEEL THAT IF YOU WISH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO OBTAIN IT PRIOR TO YOUR MEETING.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAIDE(#1&#2)......ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-31-72
By RH Date MAR 1 4 1972
At Yalta on February 8, 1945 President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin discussed the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. Marshal Stalin said that he had already had a conversation with Ambassador Harriman on the subject, to which the President replied that he had received a report of this conversation from Mr. Harriman.

From our knowledge of events leading up to the Big Three meeting at Yalta, it seems probable that the Harriman-Stalin conversation took place in December 1944 or January 1945. It is Mr. Bohlen's recollection that this conversation took place in January 1945.

It is requested that the Department be furnished the full text of the report which Mr. Harriman cabled to the President following his conversation with Marshal Stalin, in which the Marshal indicated the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan.

The Department wishes to include this report in a classified Handbook of Far Eastern Conference Discussions covering the treatment of Far Eastern political questions at the various conferences among the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers from 1943 to 1947.

Carlisle H. Humelsine
Director, Executive Secretariat
1 April 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary Dean Acheson

By direction of the President, I am enclosing, herewith, a copy of the report from Ambassador Harriman to President Roosevelt dated 16 December 1944.

This copy is forwarded in response to a request by Mr. Carlisle H. Humelhine, Director, Executive Secretariat, dated 20 March 1949.

ROBERT L. BRYANSON
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 14 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
In my talk with Stalin last night I said that you were anxious to know what political questions he had discussed in October should be clarified in connection with Russia's entry in the war against Japan.

He went into the next room and brought out a map. He said that the Kurile Islands and the Lower Sakhalin should be returned to Russia. He explained that the Japanese now controlled the approaches to Vladivostok, that he considered that the Russians were entitled to protection for their communications to this important port and that "all outlets to the Pacific were now held or blocked by the enemy." He drew a line around the southern part of the Kamtchatka Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dalnii saying that the Russians wished again to lease these ports and the surrounding area.

I said that I recalled that you and I had discussed this question at Teheran and that, if my memory was correct, you had in fact initiated yourself the question of the need for Russia to have access to a warm water port in the Pacific but that on the other hand I thought you had in mind an international free port rather than the lease of this area by the Russians; that this method, you felt, would give the Soviets the needed protection and was lines in the line with present day concepts of how international questions of this kind could best be dealt with. I said "this can be discussed." Stalin said further that he wished to lease the Chemulpo-Sakhalin Railway. I asked him to define the exact lines in Chemulpo in which it was expected and appointed out this line from...
DAILO TO HABEN THE RIGI NORTHWEST TO MANCHUKU AND EAST TO VLADIVOSTOK. HE
ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY WHEN I ASKED IF THERE WERE THE ONLY RAILROAD LINES
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SOVEREIGNTY OF CHINA IN MANCHUKU. THERE IS OF COURSE NO DOUBT THAT WITH
CONTROL OF THE RAILROAD OPERATIONS AND WITH THE PROBABILITY OF RUSSIAN
TROOPS TO PROTECT THE RAILROAD, SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL BE GREAT. HE SAID THE
ONLY CONSIDERATION HE HAD NOT MENTIONED AT TEHRAN WAS THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
OF THE STATUS quo IN OUTER MONGOLIA— THE MAINTENANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
OUTER MONGOLIA AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY. THIS LATTER DID NOT SURPRISE ME
AS I HAVE BEEN CONVINCED FOR MANY MONTHS THAT THIS WOULD BE THE SOVIET
ATTITUDE REGARDING THEIR DESIGNS FOR PROTECTION FOR THEIR LONG SOUTHERN
SIBERIAN BORDERLINE.

EXCEPT FOR MY REMARKS REGARDING THE POINTS I MADE NO COMMENT. I WILL
NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT AGAIN UNLESS YOU DIRECT ME TO DO SO. I FEEL THAT
IF YOU WISH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO OBTAIN
IT PRIOR TO YOUR VISITING.

I EXPLAINED TO MARSHAL STALIN LAST NIGHT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE PACIFIC IN WHICH HE SHOWED A KEEN INTEREST. I ASKED HIM IF HE
INTERPLIED TO HEAR OF THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA. HE REPLIED, "I AM INTERESTED
IN ANY AREA WHERE JAPS ARE BEING KILLED." I DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL THE
LIST OF SUPPLIES HE HAD REQUESTED FOR THE BUILD-UP IN BURMA. HE WAS
GENERALY WELL PLEASED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN PROVIDED SO FAR ALTHOUGH HE
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THOSE ITEMS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WHICH ARE NOT
AT PRESENT AVAILABLE. I ASKED HIM THAT YOU AND THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF WERE MANDATED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BOTH AS TO SUPPLY AND SHIPMENT. I EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR DETAILED PLANNING NOW AND THE SENDING OF AMERICAN OFFICERS TO PETROPAVLIVKA AND THE MUKDEN PROVINCES.

HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD AUTHORIZE THE GENERAL STAFF TO COLLABORATE PROPELPLY DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL SHANG AND GENERAL BOSIBAYS GROUP WHO HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MUTUAL REQUIREMENTS AND PLANS. HE ALSO AGREED TO THE VISIT OF OUR OFFICERS TO AREAS MENTIONED AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

STALIN APPEARED PLEASED WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL HUKEY AS A MANDATED TO CHINA AND WITH GENERAL HEBERT'S POSITION. I ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA. HE SAID THAT IT WAS A GOOD THING TO GET RID OF GENERAL HO CHIH CHEN MINISTER OF WAR AND THAT HE CONSIDERED SHANG "WILL AND A PATRIOT" THOUGH WITHOUT MILITARY EXPERIENCE. HE AS ALWAYS CRITICIZED THE GENERALVISIONS FOR NOT ORGANIZING HIS FORCES TO FIGHT THE JAPANESE AND EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE CORRUPTION IN THE CHINESE ARMY.

HE CONCLUDED THAT CHANG HAS HAD TOO MANY TROOPS UN-EQUIPPED FOR FIGHTING. HE HAD TRIED TO ORGANIZE 40 DIVISIONS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF HE HAD LIMITED THEM TO 40 WELL-EQUIPPED DIVISIONS READY TO FIGHT. HE HAD NO CURRENT REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CHANG AND THE COMMUNISTS.

I BELIEVE THAT IT MUST BE ASURED THAT IF NO ARRANGEMENT IS MADE BEFORE THE MUKDEN ATTACK THE JAPANESE THE SOVIETS WILL BACK THE COMMUNISTS IN THE MUKDEN AND TURN OVER TO THEM THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHINESE TERRITORY TAKEN BY THE RED ARMY LIBERATION. THE SITUATION THEN WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE GENERALVISION.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date MAR 14 1972
As reported by General Marshall and General Eisenhower, I explained to Marshal Stalin last night the developments on the Western front in which he took a keen interest. I asked him how his military plans were developing since the discussions in the middle of October. He said that before answering he wished to consult his staff and that he would see me again in about a week. He explained the progress that had been made in Hungary but that the weather had been harsh and cloudy in Poland and although it was his firm intention to conduct a winter campaign it could not be launched until the ground was frozen and until the weather had improved to allow him to take advantage of his superiority in the air. I will report in more detail his further specific plans.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Handwritten] Date MAR 14 1972
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 1517552 NCR 5168

Date: 16 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Tripartite meeting.

FILED:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0822
16 July 1942

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0625, 26 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19230-0—0639-1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 142330Z NCR 3975

Date: 15 December 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Tripartite meeting—suggested places.

FILED:

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
26 July 1913

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0625, 10 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
For the President from Harriman.

At the Kremlin dinner last night Stalin told me that he had just received information that a Japanese battleship of 33,000 tons had recently been sunk in the Leyte area. He said that this information had been picked up as a result of "the Japanese chattering among themselves by radio and bemoaning the loss".

Received as 162358.

Navaide(#1&2)......Action

By DAP

Paul, 14 Jan 1972

See attached suggested reply: (Name, Adam Brown to Cod, 11 Dec 64)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I enclose two TOP SECRET despatches, one from Ambassador Harriman and the other from Lieutenant Commander Earle.

Admiral Leahy encloses a suggested reply to Harriman. His thought is that to give Stalin confidential information about Japanese losses may harden his attitude toward the Jap.

Unless otherwise instructed, I shall not answer Earle's message.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

Inclosures:
1. Harriman's TOEJO (Dec.) to the President.
2. Lt-Cdr. Earle's 051001 (Dec.) to the President.
3. Proposed message from the President to Ambassador Harriman.
INDEX SHEET

Number: 061272 KCR 5036

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

Date: 6 DECEMBER 1944

Tripartite meeting. Answers PRES-HARRIMAN #129, 27 November 1944.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
Washingto, D.C. 20402

* W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
30 July 1943

This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 30 May 1933, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
I DINED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND EDEN LAST NIGHT.

I SHOVED THEN YOUR LETTER TO MIKOLAJCZYK WHICH THEY BELIEVED WOULD ASSIST IN CLEARING THE ATMOSPHERE.

THE PRIME MINISTER INSISTED ON DISCUSSING THE ARGENTINE MEAT QUESTION AND INFORMED ME OF THE PAPER HE HAD SENT YOU QUOTING THE SERIES OF CABLES DURING THE LAST MONTH ON THE SUBJECT. AFTER EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE TO ENGLAND OF BEING ASSURED OF MEAT SUPPLY HE SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER VIEW YOU TOOK.

HE IS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE MEETING WITH STALIN HAS BEEN POSTPONED AS HE IS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAN. I EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHY YOU FELT IT WAS MORE DESIRABLE TO HAVE THE MEETING LATER AND HE
ADVANCED NO GOOD REASON FOR AN EARLIER DATE EXCEPT THAT HE
IS IMPATIENT AS ALWAYS TO GET THE OPEN QUESTIONS SETTLED,
INCLUDING THE DISPOSITION OF GERMANY.

I EXPLAINED THE TIGHTNESS OF THE SHIPPING SITUATION AND
THE NEED TO POSTPONE OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE BRITISH PROGRAM.
HE DID NOT TAKE TOO FAVORABLE A VIEW OF THIS BUT WHEN I TOLD
HIM I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED IT WITH LORD LEATHERS HE APPEARED
TO BE MORE SATISFIED. LEATHERS HAD INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH
IT WOULD BE A SACRIFICE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET ALONG WITH
SOME LESS ASSISTANCE FROM US FOR THREE OR FOUR MONTHS BY MAKING
PRACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS.

I DELIVERED YOUR LETTER TO MIKOLAJCZYK THIS MORNING. HE
IS GIVING THE SUBJECT CONSIDERATION AND I WILL MEET HIM AGAIN
TOMORROW.

[Handwritten note: NAVALEM & B ACTION]
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1521422, NCR 4893

Soviet position in the Far East.

FILED: 210-PRIME MINISTER-CRUECHILL CONFERENCE
310 JAPAN
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 152136Z, NCR 4987

Prime Minister's illness

FILED: 210-PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 151521Z, NCR 4844

Non-agreement to Polish Boundary question

FILED: 210-PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1515172, NCR 4622

Stalin's attendance at Opera House

FILED: 21O-PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRELL
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1513302, NCR 4846

Presentation of Military Situation

FILED: 210—PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
x: 310 яанам
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1417052, NCR 3699

Prime Minister meeting with Mikolajczyk and Associates.

FILED: 210--PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1416252, NCR 3713

Meeting with Polish Committee of National Liberation

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1310142, NCR 2791, 13 OCTOBER 1944

Stalin-Churchill talks.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRiman
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 1212592, NCR 1898, 12 October 1944

Stalin-Churchill talks.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARKIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 121225Z, NCR 2027, 12 OCTOBER 1944

Stalin-Churchill talks.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 111947Z, NCR 1336

Tito-Subasic meeting

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0028
May 20-21
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 111140Z, NCR 785

Objectives of talks about Balkan Countries

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 1109072, NCR 742, 11 OCTOBER 1944

Proposed Conversations regarding Far East.

FILED: 210 STALIN-PRIME MINISTER CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 101643Z, NCR 124, 10 OCTOBER 1944

Luncheon for the Prime Minister given by Stalin.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARKIMAN
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : NAVY 1011312, NCR 9876

Mikolajczyk and Associates to come to Moscow

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIDAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 101117Z, NCR 9892, 10 OCTOBER 1944
Stalin-Churchill talks.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 092352Z, NCR 9427, 10 OCTOBER 1944

Stalin-Churchill talks.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, Moscow
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 090915Z NR 8960 October 1944

"It would be most helpful if I could be advised urgently of Stalin's answer to your message regarding the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. He arrives this morning."

FILED: 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.
**DISPATCH**

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**PAGE 1 OF 2**

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**FROM HARRIMAN AND PERSONAL FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY.**

AS I RECEIVED YOUR CABLE 341815 AFTER MY TALK WITH STALIN LAST NIGHT I HAVE SENT YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM BY LETTER.

I CLEARLY UNDERSTAND YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. THERE IS ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH I HAD BEEN HOPING THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME TO A DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING WITH STALIN, NAMELY, THE POLISH SITUATION. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE LONGER THE SITUATION DRIFTS THE MORE DIFFICULT A SOLUTION BECOMES. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THE PRIME MINISTER CAN WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH STALIN PROVIDED YOU ARE NOT INVOLVED OR COMMITTED TO ANY LINE OF POLICY AT THIS TIME. I AM TOLD THAT GENERALS BROOKE AND ISHAY ARE ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER. THERE MAY THEREFORE BE TALKS BETWEEN THEM AND THE RED ARMY STAFF. I WILL REQUEST

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**DECLASSIFIED**

**STATE DEPT.**

**MAR 14 1942**

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PAGE 2 OF 2  515232  NCR 6188

That General Deane be invited to attend these talks as an observer and I anticipate no difficulty in this respect as when I was here two years ago the Army Officers who accompanied me were included at my request in similar discussions at that time.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By  Date

NAVAIDE(#1 & #2) ACTION

May 14, 1972

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78
In accordance with arrangements I had made with Molotov I presented to Stalin this evening one of the original replicas of Jo Davidson's bust of you as a momento of our original protocol discussions three years ago.

He took a real interest in it and told me that he thought it was a good likeness and a fine work of art. He gave me the impression that he was really pleased to have it as an indication of firm friendship with you.

Stalin looked very much better that when I saw him last week and seems to have recovered fully from his gripe.

He and Molotov made it very plain that they are looking forward to the talks with the distinguished visitor which they consider important and timely.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 0507222, NCR 5687
DATE

TO MAP ROOM 0516202 VIA Navy Courier
SUBJECT:
Presentation of Jo Davidson bust; Stalin's health.

ACTION:
1. To the President via ushers.
2. No further action taken by the President.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO STALIN LAST EVENING AND TOOK THE OCCASION TO TELL HIM OF YOUR COMMENT IN YOUR 21623 WHITE HOUSE NUMBER 73 THAT YOU HAD NEVER ENTERTAINED ANY DOUBTS REGARDING THE TEHERAN PACIFIC AGREEMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT SINCE OUR LAST TALK HE HAD ORDERED THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF HIS GROUND FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AND THE COMMANDER OF THE FAR EASTERN AIR FORCE TO COME TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE PACIFIC SITUATION. THEREAFTER A CONFERENCE WOULD BE ARRANGED BETWEEN THEM AND GENERAL DEANE.

I TOLD HIM THAT GENERAL DEANE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED AND WAS FULLY PREPARED FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS.
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL or FILE NO.: 050719Z, NCR 5847
DATE: 051620Z
TOR MAP ROOM VIA Navy courier
SUBJECT: Russian participation in the Pacific War

ACTION:
1. To President via the ushers.
2. Message is sequel to HARRIMAN 232021 and President's Number 73, 28 September 1944.
3. No action taken on this message.
AS PROMINENT PERSONAGE IS ARRIVING AT TIME I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE AM DELAYING MY DEPARTURE TILL AFTER HIS VISIT. I WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON WHAT HE EXPECTS TO DISCUSS HERE AND YOUR ATTITUDE REGARDING THESE MATTERS. I HOPE HE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A SETTLEMENT OF THE POLICY SITUATION WHICH IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY BITTER AND DIFFICULT OF SOLUTION.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAV’ve#1-2)......ACT

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By P R E S I D E N T  Date  M A R  1 4 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL.  No. 2 FILE.  No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.  No. 4 SPECIAL. 50 51 52

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**FILE or FILE NO.**
0314042 NAV 4529, 3 Oct 44.

**DATE**
0319222 VIA Navy Code Room

**SUBJECT:**
Forthcoming Churchill-Stalin Conference.

**ACTION:**

1. To President via Admiral Brown.

2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy at the direction of the President; draft approved by the President. Before its release from the map room, Mr. Hopkins read message; suggested change in message; telephoned President, who authorized Mr. Hopkins to hold up message.

3. Mr. Hopkins submitted another draft reply; approved without change by the President and released as FPA-authorized for St.20, 4 Oct 44.
IN MY CABLE 232021 I FIND I FAILED TO REPORT THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THE PROPOSED BRITISH LANDINGS IN GREECE.

STALIN COMMENTED "GOOD. ITS HIGH TIME."

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By BHR Date: MAR 14 1972

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAFE[21,22]......ACTION.

FILE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHART ROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

1. President
2. NAVY
3. OUT-441
4. 252030Z

COPY NO.

073
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 2514002 HCR 3691, 25 Sept 44.

DATE

TO or MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: QCTAGON decisions; proposed British landings in Greece.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park as MR-CUT-L441, 252030Z.
2. No further action taken by the President.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

310 Balkanen; 300 Greece; OSI Greece.
(PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVERSATION WITH STALIN THIS EVENING I THANKED HIM FOR THE COOPERATION OF THE RED ARMY IN THE EVACUATION OF OUR PRISONERS OF WAR FROM RUMANIA.

I MENTIONED TO HIM THAT THE BULGARIANS HAD SERIOUSLY ABUSED OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND THAT WE WOULD EXPECT FULL INVESTIGATION AND REPRIEVEMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE. STALIN READILY CONCURRED STATING THAT THE BULGARIANS WERE BRUTAL PEOPLE MANY OF WHOM HAD COME UNDER NAZI INFLUENCE. HE SAID THE RUMANIANS ON THE OTHER HAND HAD BEHAVED BETTER AND THEY WERE "MORE SIMPLE PEOPLE".

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

By BHP Date MAR 14 1972
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 2323192 /ACR 7553, 23 Sept 44.

DATE:

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Evacuation of war prisoners from Rumania. Conversations between Harriman and Stalin.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as UL--UT--432.
2. No further action by the President.

COPIES TO:                      DATE:                      BY DIRECTION OF:


330
THIS EVENING I EXPLAINED TO MARSHAL STALIN THAT YOU HAD ASKED GENERAL HURLEY TO CALL ON HIM TO EXPLAIN YOUR CONCERN OVER CHINA AND TO GIVE HIM PERSONALLY A MESSAGE REGARDING A FUTURE MEETING. STALIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN ILL WITH THE GRIPPE WHEN HURLEY WAS IN MOSCOW, THAT IN THE PAST HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SHARE IT IN A FEW DAYS BUT THAT THIS TIME HE HAD BEEN ILL FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, HE LOOKED MORE SICK THAN I HAVE EVER SEEN HIM AND NOT AS YET FULLY RECOVERED. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU HAD IN MIND A MEETING IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER AND THAT AS IT WAS TOO LATE FOR ALASKA THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGHT PROVIDE A SUITABLE PLACE. HE SAID THAT A MEETING WAS VERY DESIRABLE BUT THAT HE WAS AFRAID HIS DOCTORS WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO TRAVEL. IT HAD TAKEN HIM TWO WEEKS TO GET OVER AN EAR ATTACK HE HAD HAD FROM HIS FLIGHT FROM TEBERAN AND HIS RECENT ILLNESS.
HAD BEEN DUE TO A TRIP TO THE FRONT. I SUGGESTED THAT THE WARM WEATHER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WOULD DO HIM GOOD BUT HE SAID HIS DOCTORS CONSIDERED ANY CHANGE OF CLIMATE WOULD HAVE A BAD EFFECT. \* \* \* \* HOLLOTOV CLAIMED IN THAT HIS ASSOCIATES FELT STALIN MUST PROTECT HIS HEALTH AND THAT TRAVELLING WAS NOT GOOD FOR HIM. \* \* \* \* STALIN THEN SAID THAT HOLLOTOV WAS STRONG AND VIGOROUS AND THAT AS HIS DEPUTY A MAN IN WHOM HE HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE HE COULD MEET YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER ANY TIME YOU WISHED. I ASSURED STALIN THAT YOU LIKED HOLLOTOV AND WERE ALWAYS GLAD TO SEE HIM BUT SUGGESTED THAT HIS DOCTORS MIGHT LATER ON TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE DESIRABILITY OF A WARM CLIMATE PARTICULARLY IF THE TRIP COULD BE MADE BY SEA. JOINTLY I SUGGESTED ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS HAVING SOME NEW DOCTORS BY THAT TIME. HE AGREED THAT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA BUT GAVE NO FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT.

I AM SATISFIED THAT STALIN IS ANXIOUS TO MEET YOU BUT HE IS DEFINITELY WORRIED ABOUT HIS HEALTH. ALTHOUGH STALIN
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PAGE 2 OF 3

232338 NCR 7498

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

HAD BEEN DUE TO A TRIP TO THE FRONT. I SUGGESTED THAT THE WARM WEATHER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COULD DO

HIM GOOD BUT HE SAID HIS DOCTORS CONSIDERED ANY CHANGE OF CLIMATE WOULD HAVE A BAD EFFECT. \* MOLOTOV CLAIMED IN

THAT HIS ASSOCIATES FELT STALIN MUST PROTECT HIS HEALTH AND THAT TRAVELLING WAS NOT GOOD FOR HIM. \* STALIN THEN

SAID THAT MOLOTOV WAS STRONG AND VIGOROUS AND THAT AS HIS DEPUTY A MAN IN WHOM HE HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE HE COULD

MEET YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER ANY TIME YOU WISHED. I ASSURED STALIN THAT YOU LIKED MOLOTOV AND WERE ALWAYS

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HCR 7498

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**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP**

(Use G. C. T.)

**SHOWN THE EFFECTS OF HIS GRIPPE I DO NOT FEEL THAT YOU NEED HAVE ANY CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS ILLNESS.**

---

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By **RGF** Date MAR 14 1972

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NAVAIDE (31-2)...ACTION

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No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 232038, NCR 7498, 23 Sept 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Meeting with Stalin; Stalin's health.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park via pouch.
2. No reply to this cable by the President.
3. See PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN #76 for further on meeting.

4 Oct 44
The British Ambassador and I had a most satisfactory talk with Stalin this evening. We handed him your and the Prime Minister's message regarding the Quebec decisions. He indicated satisfaction with the plan to take the Ruhr and commented that when the Red Army took Katowice and Upper Silesia it would deprive Germany of her coal and much of her industry.

He said that he considered the operations in France as "most bold and daring." He said that "great risks had been taken but no success could be attained without risks" and that "there had been nothing to equal it here," referring to the Russian Front. In discussing the Pacific War, I explained that the plans referred to in your message covered the use of British and American resources. Stalin inquired whether we wished to bring Japan to her knees without Russian assistance or whether you...
STILL WISHED AS YOU SUGGESTED IN TEHERAN RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I BOTH ASSURED HIM THAT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION WAS DESIRED BUT THAT NO PLANS COULD BE MADE FOR THE USE OF SOVIET RESOURCES UNTIL MARSHAL STALIN WAS READY TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS. HE THEN STATED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE IN HIS ATTITUDE AS HE HAD EXPRESSED IT TO YOU AT TEHERAN.

IS RUSSIA AS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN AFTER GERMANY IS DEFEATED? HE ASKED WHAT WERE THE PLANS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN AND PARTICULARLY WHAT PART THE ALLIES DESIRED TO ASSIGN TO RUSSIA. I EXPLAINED THAT GENERAL DEANE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WITH THE RED ARMY STAFF PLANS FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE JAPANESE WAR. HE SAID THAT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND THE DISCUSSIONS COULD PROCEED IN A FEW DAYS. I REFERRED TO OUR PREVIOUS TALKS REGARDING THE USE OF AIR BASES IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES AND STALIN SAID "THAT IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION." HE STATED FURTHER THAT IT WOULD
BE NECESSARY FOR THE RED ARMY TO MOVE 25 TO 30 DIVISIONS TO THE FAR EAST. HE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THAT AFTER THE

ASSURANCES HE HAD GIVEN AT TEHERAN WE WERE NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PLANNING THE PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIA AND HE

APPEARED ANXIOUS TO KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT ROLE WE WOULD WANT RUSSIA TO PLAY. HE GAVE EVERY INDICATION OF BEING READY AND

WILLING TO COOPERATE BUT DID NOT WANT TO BE AN INVITED PARTICIPANT. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WE WILL GET GREATER COOPERATION

FROM HIM IF WE SUGGEST THE OPERATIONS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE RUSSIANS TO UNDERTAKE RATHER THAN WAIT THEIR PROPOSALS. BECAUSE

OF THIS NEW ASPECT GENERAL DEANE IS CABLED THE JOINT CHEERS OF STAFF FOR MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS THAN HE HAS PREVIOUSLY

RECEIVED. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE FOLLOW THE COURSE STALIN HAS INDICATED AND THAT GEN DEANE BE AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WITH

THE RED ARMY STAFF IN BROAD OUTLINE AT LEAST OUR PACIFIC STRATEGY AND TO PROPOSE THE FULL MEASURE OF RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION.
DISPATCH

RAFTIER
ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY
24 SEPT 1944

DATE

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CNO

DECIDED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By: DEC
Date: MAR 14 1972

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED BASEGRAM

DECIDED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By: DEC
Date: MAR 14 1972

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED BASEGRAM

DISCUSSIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME, I MENTIONED THE CONCERN THAT YOU HAD OVER THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA AND SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO SEND 500 TRUCKS THROUGH RUSSIA TO OUR AIR FORCE IN CHINA. HE READILY AGREED AND APPEARED NOT TO HAVE KNOWN ABOUT OUR REQUEST BEFORE. HE EVEN OFFERED TO SUPPLY TRUCKS FROM RUSSIA IF THEY WERE NEEDED QUICKLY TO BE REPLACED LATER. I TOOK UP WITH HIM ALSO THE PROPOSAL OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF TO SET UP A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATION ON STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN WAR. AFTER DISCUSSION THE PURPOSE IN SOME DETAIL HE AGREED THAT THE COMMITTEE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. HE ASKED WHO WOULD BE THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE AND WAS SATISFIED WHEN I TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE GENERAL DEANE, WHEN THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR STATED THAT GEN BURROWS WOULD BE APPOINTED.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.
No. 2 FILE.
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.
No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
HE SAID THAT BURROWS WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR DID HIS BEST TO DEFEND BURROWS BUT STALIN MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS THE OPINION OF MARSHAL VASILEVSKI AND OTHER SENIOR RED ARMY OFFICERS THAT BURROWS CONSIDERED THEM "SAVAGES" AND THAT THEY HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN HIM. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WILL OF COURSE REPORT THIS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE BRITISH WILL HAVE TO REPLACE HIM. IT IS OBVIOUS THE COMMITTEE WILL NOT FUNCTION UNTIL BURROWS REPLACEMENT ARRIVES UNLESS GEN DEANE COULD BE AUTHORIZED IN THE MEANTIME TO HAVE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS FROM BURROWS OWN ACCOUNT TO ME OF HIS TALK WITH MARSHAL VASILEVSKI WHEN HE WENT TO THE FRONT IN JULY AND VASILEVSKI COMMENTED TO DEANE THE MAIN DIFFICULTY APPEARS TO BE A PERSONAL MISUNDERSTANDING IN ALL PROBABILITY DUE TO GEN BURROWS MANNER OF APPROACH WHICH IS UNCONSCIOUSLY HIGH HAT AS IS TYPICAL OF SOME BRITISH OFFICERS BUT IS INTERPRETED BY THE RUSSIANS AS ARROGANCE. MAY I SUGGEST

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP-SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
THAT THIS CABLE BE REFERRED TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS IT WILL SUPPLEMENT GEN DEAN'S CABLE TO THEM. I WILL REPORT THE OTHER MATTERS THAT WERE DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE CABLES.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

At the direction of Admiral Leahy there is forwarded herewith two messages, one a paraphrased copy, from Ambassador Harriman to the President both dated 23 September 1944.

These are the messages about which Commander Smith phoned you this morning, and which I understand you are expecting.

Very respectfully,

Richard Park Jr.,
Colonel, GSC
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 232021Z NCR 7494

DATE 232021Z

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian participation in Japanese war; Tri-partite committee in Moscow.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park via pouch.
2. Answered by PRES-HARRIMAN #73, 23 Sept 44, written by Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:

Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 Sept 44

BY DIRECTION OF:

Adm Leahy (for information)

Extract: "JN 310 JAPAN (1)"

310 JAPAN; 210 (2); 210 TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 191210 NCR 3364, 10 September 1944

Further assistance to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

TO: THE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF STATE

NO: NAVY 132130/Z NCR 8302, 14 SEPT 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: MR. HARRY HOPKINS
NO: 091430Z, Sept 44.

EXTRACT

Ambassador Harriman feels that he should report to the President on Russian problems. Russians, now that end of war is in sight, is showing signs of indifference to our requests, and relations are becoming strained.

SEE "MR 100 HARRY HOPKINS."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 201610 NCR 720, 21 AUGUST 1944.

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
I HAVE TODAY TRANSMITTED TO STALIN MESSAGE CONTAINED IN YOUR ONE NINE ONE SEVEN TWO ZERO (191720).
FROM: Ambassador Harriman  
TO: The President  

DATE: 201502Z 21 Aug 44.  

SUBJECT: Delivery of President's message to Stalin re use of Far Eastern Soviet Bases.  

ACTION:  

1. Answers PRES-HARRIMAN #44, 19 Aug 44, to President as RED 339, HP.  
2. No reply to Harriman. (See PRES-HARRIMAN #54, 30 Aug 44).  
3. See Stalin's message to the President, 22 Aug 44, for Stalin's reply to message delivered in PRES #44.  
4. Stalin's message to President transmitted to Harriman for his information as #54, 30 Aug 44.  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

530 JAPAN
IN CLOSING THE CONVERSATION ABOUT AID TO THE POLES FIGHTING IN WARSAW REPORTED IN MY STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE TODAY MOLTOV SAID THAT HE WISHED TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO INFORM ME THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES NEEDED THE BASES WHICH OUR SHUTTLE BOMBERS WERE USING AND THAT AFTER THE SUMMER OPERATIONS WERE CONCLUDED THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US. THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE IN FRONT OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND AS PART OF OUR DISCUSSION.

I TOLD MOLTOV THAT IF THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IN OUR RELATIONS AND THAT I INSISTED ON AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM FULLY. I TOLD HIM FURTHER THAT WE HAD BEEN VERY PATIENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE DELAYS THAT HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PLANNING FOR COOPERATION BY OUR AIR FORCES IN OTHER DIRECTIONS AND THAT I WISHED TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO TELL HIM THAT WE FELT THE
TIME HAD COME FOR CONVERSATIONS TO TAKE A DEFINITE FORM.

ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY NAME THE SUBJECT AS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENT, MOLOTOV CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT I WAS REFERRING TO OUR USE OF SOVIET FAR EASTERN BASES. MY STATEMENT WAS INTENTIONALLY AGGRESSIVE AND I LEFT NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT WE WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS THE PLANNING WHICH STALIN HAD AGREED TO MONTHS AGO.

MOLOTOV ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THAT THERE WERE MANY CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAD TO BE WEIGHED BUT THAT I NEED HAVE NO CONCERN OVER THE OUTCOME.

(*) - NOTE: MISSING PORTION GARbled. HAS BEEN SERVICED.

NAVAlDE(1, 2) ACTION. (Service not received as yet)

FILE.
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 1802352, 18 Aug 44.

DATE 18 Aug 44.

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Shuttle bombing; far eastern bases.

ACTION:

1. To President via breakfast tray.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Aug 44; sent to Harriman as PRES #144, incorporating message to be delivered by Ambassador Harriman to Marshal Stalin.

530 SHUTTLE BOMBING; 530 JAPAN
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 011515Z, 1 AUGUST 1944

"In my talk with Nikolajczyk yesterday I gave him your message 282350 July. He expressed pleasure at hearing from you."

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

#2422302 NCR 769

Date: 25 July 1944

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW To: THE PRESIDENT

Meeting between Gen Deane and Gen Antonov to discuss plans for use of Siberian air bases and their supply.

FILED: 530 JAPAN (1)
INDEX SHEET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: NAVY 181650, 18 JULY 1944

Harriman recommends deletion of sentence in President's #27 to Stalin, 17 July 44, re Conference with Prime Minister in Scotland.

ORIGINAL of this message, together with answer (PRES-HARRIMAN #29, 18 July 44, approving deletion of sentence) filed with PRESIDENT-STALIN #27, 17 July 44, in PRESIDENT-STALIN folder.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY
DATE 8 JULY 1944
TOR CODEROOM 031448
DECODED BY GERMAN/GERMAN
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN/GERMAN

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

Ø311457 MCR 6822
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

(ALUSNA MOSCOW SENDS THIS PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO GENERAL BURROWS YOUR C31708 I HAVE LEARNED FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT MOLOTOV RAISED WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF GENERAL BURROWS AND AS A RESULT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MOLOTOV AND WITH GENERAL BURROWS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THAT THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN STRAIGHTENED OUT. GENERAL BURROWS IS NOW ON A TRIP TO THE FRONT AT THE INVITATION OF THE RED ARMY STAFF AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THAT CORDIAL RELATIONS WILL DEVELOP.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TELLS ME FURTHER THAT IF THE SITUATION IS NOT REPEATED NOT STRAIGHTENED OUT HE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT LET THE MATTER DROP.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By DATE MAR 14 1972

DISTRIBUTION:
DAVAIDE(#1, #2)......ACTION(FOR DELIVERY P1A)

No. 1 ADMIRAL  No. 2 FILE  No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM  No. 4 SPECIAL

SEAL ED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Printed 08/16/02 - To Approved Names Only
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

DATE: 08/14/52

FILE NO.: HCR 6822

SUBJECT: General Burrows relations with Soviets.

ACTION:
1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. No reply, per Admiral Leahy, 12 July 44.

100 BURROWS, GENERAL.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

FROM INDIRECT REMARKS MOLOTOV MADE AT LUNCH YESTERDAY AND FROM
WESTERN SOURCES I HAVE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RED ARMS IN WHITE RUSSIA ARE HEADED FOR KOENIGSPURG
AND THEN INTEND TO HIT WEST THROUGH EAST PRUSSIA AND NORTHERN POLAND BYPASSING WARSAW AND THAT IT IS CONTEMPLATED THE LIBERATION OF WARSAW WILL BE LEFT TO THE POLISH PARTISANS AND THE POLISH ARMY AFTER THE GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS TO THE WEST HAVE BEEN CUT. THESE INDICATIONS IN NO SENSE PRECLUDE AN ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN POLAND AS WELL.

Red 051206
To President at Hyde Park

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RCP Date

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
HAVAID (41-42) ..... ACTION

#1 ADMIRAL
#2 FILE
#3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM
#4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)

COPY NO. 2

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
RCP 14-1-72
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 051206 NCR 4506

DATE 05/2050Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Russian intentions re operations in Poland.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 123.
2. No reply, per Admiral Leahy, 12 July 44.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 153

From: THE PRESIDENT

Date: 31 December 1944

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Tripartite meeting. Answers Harriman's 261855, 271730, and 281535.

* W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623, 10 May 1935, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1935-59199-1
30 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 151, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 252210. I have directed the Director of Censorship to take steps to prevent the publication hereafter of any news regarding the escape of interned Americans from Neutral or Allied countries.

ROOSEVELT

Released 3016262 Dec 1944.
December 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

Your 252210. I have directed the Director of Censorship to take steps to prevent the publication hereafter of any news regarding the escape of interned Americans from Neutral or Allied countries.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 143

From: The President

Date: 23 December 1944

To: Ambassador Harriman

Tripartite meeting.

FILED:

* W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
14 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19–233–0–1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 137

Date: 19 December 1944

From: The President

To: Ambassador Harriman

Acknowledges Harriman's 151755, 151815, 151930, 152020 and 152035. Tripartite meeting.

FILED:

*W. D., A. O. Form No. 0623
15 July 1933

This form supersedes W. D., A. O. Form No. 0623, 10 May 1933, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
13 December 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 134. PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your 101910. Please thank the Marshal for me for his information about the loss of a Japanese battleship and inform him that we believe that Japanese Naval losses in October to have been at least three battleships, one large carrier, three small carriers, six large cruisers, two small cruisers and four destroyers. Most of his surviving units engaged were badly damaged. Our submarine and air attacks are making heavy inroads on his merchant marine and escort vessels.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 131929Z, December, 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I enclose two TOP SECRET despatches, one from Ambassador Harriman and the other from Lieutenant Commander Earle.

Admiral Leahy encloses a suggested reply to Harriman. His thought is that to give Stalin confidential information about Japanese losses may harden his attitude toward the Jap.

Unless otherwise instructed, I shall not answer Earle's message.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN

Enclosures:
1. Harriman's 101910 (Dec.) to the President.
2. Lt.-Comdr. Earle's 051601 (Dec.) to the President.
3. Proposed Message from the President to Ambassador Harriman.
PROPOSED MESSAGE

MR-113725

From: The President.
To: Ambassador Harriman.

Your 101910. Please thank me for the information about the loss of a Japanese battleship and inform him that we believe the Japanese naval losses in October to have been at least three battleships, one large carrier, three small carriers, six large cruisers, two small cruisers and four destroyers. Most of his surviving units were badly damaged. Our submarine and air attacks are making heavy inroads on his merchant marine and escort vessels.

ROOSEVELT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 4 1972
FOR THE URGENT AND PERSONAL ATTENTION
OF THE AMBASSADOR.

1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal Stalin
in order to deliver the following message from the
President to him:

QUOTE In view of the fact that prospects for an
early meeting between us are still unsettled and be-
cause of my conviction, with which I am sure you 'agree,
that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the
convening of a general conference of the United Nations
on the subject of international organization, I am ask-
ing Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message to you
and to discuss with you on my behalf the important
subject of voting procedure in the Security Council.
This and other questions will, of course, have to be
agreed between us before the general conference will
be possible. I am also taking up this matter with
Mr. Churchill.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Dated MAR 14 1972
After giving this whole subject further consideration, I now feel that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:

PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTER ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

You will note that this calls for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for
the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I can see, as a practical matter, that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character each permanent member would always have a vote.

At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members. But I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting.
I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations.

Neither the Soviet nor the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks contained specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature. Our representatives there were not, of course, in a position to reach a definite agreement on the subject. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have so well carried forward on our behalf.

If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council as I now suggest, would you be
willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Mr. Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference? UNQUOTE

2. We assume that you will wish to have a careful Russian translation made of the foregoing message so that you can hand to Marshal Stalin both the English and Russian texts of the President's message.

3. The contemplated meeting referred to in the last paragraph of the President's message would be an informal one in which only two or three representatives of each of the three countries would participate. In other words, we do not have in mind anything in the nature of a reconvening of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. We have no fixed idea at the present time as to just who these representatives would be or as to where they should meet, although perhaps London might prove to be appropriate and convenient.

4. You may wish to present orally, and perhaps in a separate memorandum, additional observations in support
of the President's views which necessarily are stated in restricted compass in the message itself. Among the additional considerations which impress us and some or all of which you should feel free to use as you see fit as representing the views of your Government are the following: Unanimity of thought and action on the part of the great powers in all decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security is of the greatest importance. With the great powers unanimous in thought and in action and equally and instantly ready to employ measures of enforcement in behalf of peace and security when and as necessary, there will be the greatest inducement for parties to disputes to arrive at peaceful settlements. Such an atmosphere of harmony among the great powers and general willingness to resort to measures of peaceful settlement should result in conditions of more assured stability in international relations than has ever before obtained in history. These realizable conditions will mean that all states will look first to the major powers themselves to abide by the obligations contained in the charter of
the organization to seek peaceful adjustment or settlement of any differences in which they may be concerned. We can conceive of no more effective justification of the special position of the great powers as principal guardians of the peace than the voluntary undertaking by each of them, along with all other members of the organization, to abstain in any controversy in which it may be engaged from voting on procedures which in the eyes of mankind will partake of an impartial examination of the controversy by the highest tribunal of the world society. This should further make evident that the leadership of the great powers is to be based not alone upon size, strength, and resources, but on those enduring qualifications of moral leadership which can raise the whole level of international relations the world over. The assurance and the enhancing of this leadership is in the interest of each of the great powers, as well as of all the world.

5. We have great confidence in your ability to convince Marshal Stalin of the reasonableness of our views which we feel are fully as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as in those of all other states.
We do not, of course, feel that we are in any sense asking simply for a yes or no answer, although we would naturally be highly gratified to ascertain that Marshal Stalin agrees with our views. We agree entirely with the view which you emphasized in Washington that, even if you are not entirely successful at this time in persuading the Marshal to adopt as his own the views expressed in the President's message, it is essential to keep the issue open and to avoid any crystallization of a negative attitude on the part of the Soviet Government on this vitally significant matter.

STETTINIUS
INDEX SHEET

Number: 129, 27 November 1944

Date: 27 November 1944

From: THE PRESIDENT

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Tripartite meeting.

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623, 10 May 1933, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
U. S. Government Printing Office 19—36330-1
19 October 1944

FROM: WAR

TO: CG, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, CASABLANCA

NUMBER 92. FOR GENERAL STOWELL. DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. HARRY HOPKINS TO
AMBASSADOR W. AVERELL HARRIMAN.

QUOTE. YOU SHOULD COME DIRECT TO WASHINGTON. I
WILL ARRANGE FOR MARIE TO BE HERE. SIGNED: HARRY. UNQUOTE.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1145, EWT, 19 October 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
INDEX SHEET

FROM:  THE PRESIDENT
TO:    AMBASSADOR HARRIMON, MOSCOW
NO:    87, 16 OCTOBER 1944.

Acknowledges receipt of 101131, 111140, 111947, 141625, 141705, 151330, 151517, 151521, 152136 and 152142.

FILED: 210 PRIME MINISTER-STALIN CONFERENCE.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: 34, 13 OCTOBER 1944

Acknowledges HARRIMAN's 121225, 121259 and 131014.

FILED: 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, Moscow

NO: 83, 11 October 1944.

Acknowledges HARRIMAN's 101643 and 110907. Balkans; Pacific campaign.

FILED: 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, Moscow

NO: 82, 11 OCTOBER 1944

Acknowledges Harriman's 92352 and 101117. Harriman's participation in conference between Churchill and Stalin; location of Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting.

FILED: 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIS, Moscow
NO: 80, 9 OCTOBER 1944.

Answers Harris's 090915Z. Quotes message received from Stalin, 8 October 1944, re meeting with Churchill in Moscow.

FILED: 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.
4 October 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 76. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your number 031404 received.

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

QUOTE. While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.

You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

MAR 14 1972

By W. J. Stewart
You will, by this time, have received from General Deane, the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours. UNQUOTE.

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bi-lateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that when this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the discussions are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1345, EWT, 4 October 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date, MAR 14, 1972

F. H. GRAHAM, Captain, AG

041880 NCR 8192
PERSONAL AND
TO W. AVERILL HARRIMAN FROM
THE
PRESIDENT

WILL YOU PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHURCHILL AT ONCE. WHILE I HAD HOPED THAT THE MEETING COULD HAVE BEEN EARLIER YOU, CHURCHILL AND HIMSELF, I APPRECIATE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WANTS TO HAVE AN EARLY CONFERENCE WITH YOU.

YOU, NATURALLY, UNDERSTAND THAT IN THIS GLOBAL WAR THERE IS LITERALLY NO QUESTION, POLITICAL OR MILITARY, IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS NOT INTERESTED. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE THREE OF US, AND ONLY THE THREE OF US, CAN FIND THE SOLUTION TO THE STILL UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS. IN THIS SENSE, WHILE APPRECIATING THE INVITATION FOR THE MEETING, I WISH TO REGARD YOUR FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH CHURCHILL AS PRELIMINARY TO A MEETING OF THE THREE OF US WHICH, SO FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, CAN TAKE PLACE ANY TIME AFTER THE ELECTIONS HERE.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM SUGGESTING, IF YOU AND MR. CHURCHILL APPROVE, THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON BE PRESENT AT YOUR COMING CONFERENCE AS AN OBSERVER FOR US. NATURALLY, MR. HALLETT WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO COACT HIS GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO THE IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WILL, NO DOUBT, NATURALLY, DISCUSS.

YOU WILL, BY THIS TIME, HAVE RECEIVED FROM GENERAL MILEN, THE STATEMENT OF OUR COMMON CHIEF OF STAFF POSITION RELATIVE TO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN AND I WANT TO REITERATE TO YOU HOW COMPLETELY I ACCEPT THE ASSURANCE WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN US ON THIS POINT. YOUR VIEW WILL SIMILARLY RING A SUGGESTIVE WAR AGAINST

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
Germans and we can firmly join together with no less success
in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great
an enemy of Russia as she is of ours unloved.

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to
participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to
be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the
Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next
conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I
have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bi-lateral
conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the
British and the Russians leading up to a full issue meeting
between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind
that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate
between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be
greatly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that when
this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of
action.

I will instruct you to come here immediately when the
discussions are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and
me fully and currently advised during the talks.

[Signature]
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 76, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 034404. Prime Minister informs me he expects to discuss Allied Far Eastern plans, Manchukuo, etc., and that the principal business will be about the Poles. Prime asks that you be available to take part in discussions. It is preferable that your part in discussions of both Far East and Poland be a listening one.

Deane may give Churchill the information in his possession regarding our Far Eastern military plans but should not join with the British in discussions with the Soviet regarding such plans.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1130, EST, 4 October 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By E. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman (for Stalin)

SERIAL or FILE NO. #76, 4 October 1944.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Churchill-Stalin Conference

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRILAN-PRES 0314044, 3 Oct 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President before its release from the Map Room, message read by Mr. Hopkins; Hopkins suggested change in message, telephoned President, who authorized Mr. Hopkins to hold up message.
3. Mr. Hopkins submitted another draft reply; approved by the President without change and dispatched.
4. Answered by HARRILAN-PRES 051523, 5 Oct 44; also answered by STALIN-PRES 8 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: "210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"

"MR PRESIDENT-STALIN FILE"

Extract: "MR 310 JAPAN"

210 (2); 310 JAPAN
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

WH NUMBER 73, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 232021 received. I have at no time entertained any doubts whatever in regard to the Teheran agreement about Pacific campaign.

See Joint Chiefs of Staff message of this date to Deane regarding details of participation.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1326, EWT, 28 September 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM
Captain, A. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

2818232 NR 7292
(transmitted 2821372)
Due to #22222

You on 23 20 21 received —

I recall no time entertained any doubts in regard to the
Tehran agreement about
Pacific campaign
Joint Chiefs of Staff
message dated this date to #3
regarding details of participation.
Roosevelt
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. #73, 28 Sept 44.

DATE 28 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian participation in Japanese War.

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN-PRES #232021 NCR 7494, 24 Sept 44.
2. Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 28 Sept 44.
3. For "Joint Chiefs of Staff message" mentioned in second paragraph, see WAR 38050, CH-OUT-38050, 28 Sept 44, filed "HR 310 JAPAN (1)".
4. Answered by HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT 050719 NCR 5847, 5 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

"HR 310 JAPAN (1)"

310 JAPAN
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: 69, 22 SEPTEMBER 1944

Answers HARRIMAN's 191210 September 44. Further assistance to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH- RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (FOR MARSHAL STALIN)
NO: 58, 8 September 1944

Message from President to Stalin, to be delivered by Ambassador Harriman, re Dumbarton Oaks talks and question of voting in the Council.

FILED: PRESIDENT-STALIN FILE.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (FOR MARSHAL STALIN)

NO: 55, 31 AUGUST 1944

Message from the President to Stalin, to be delivered by Harriman, re Dumbarton Oaks conference and Soviet Government desire to have the 16 constituent republics considered for individual membership in the new international organization.

FILED: PRESIDENT-STALIN FOLDER.
30 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 54, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

With reference to your No. 2015502 August, the following reply was received on August 22nd.

QUOTE. PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.
I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success at the present time by way of struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff. UNQUOTE.

Please inform General Deane.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1720, EWT, 30 August 1944.
August 30, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

With reference to your No. 201550Z August, the following reply was received on August 22nd.

QUOTE. PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.
I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.

I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success at the present time by way of struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff. UNQUOTE.

Please inform General Deane.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
FROM: The President  
TO: Ambassador Harriman  

SERIAL or FILE NO.  
DATE  

TOR MAP ROOM VIA  
SUBJECT: Use of Soviet far eastern bases.  

ACTION:  
1. See: HARRIMAN-PRES 180235, 18 Aug 44; PRES-HARRIMAN #44, 18 Aug 44; PRES-HARRIMAN 2015502, 20 Aug 44; STALIN-PRES, 22 Aug 44.  
2. Quotes STALIN-PRES, 22 Aug 44, to Ambassador Harriman for his information.  
3. No reply.  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

530 JAPAN.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)

NO: 47, 23 AUGUST 1944

Aid to Warsaw.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS."
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, Moscow  

NUMBER 44. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your message 180235Z received.

If in your discretion the following message will be helpful you may deliver it to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO STALIN. I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do now that would be of more assistance in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion.

Roosevelt. UNQUOTE.

Please inform me whether or not you deliver the above message.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 19 August 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

RICHARD PARK, JR., Colonel, General Staff.
August 19, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

Your message 180235Z received.

If in your discretion the following message will be helpful you may deliver it to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO STALIN. I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do now that would be of more assistance in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion.

Roosevelt. UNQUOTE.

Please inform me whether or not you deliver the above message.

PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 14 1972
August 19, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

180235 Z

Your message NCR 2586 of August 18 received.

If in your discretion the following message will be helpful you may deliver it to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO STALIN. I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. Am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning. I feel that
we now that would be of more assistance in

There is nothing could be more to bring the Pacific
preparing to bring the Pacific
war to a speedy conclusion.

Roosevelt. UNQUOTE.

Please inform me whether or not you
deliver the above message.
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. 44, 19 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Use of Soviet Far Eastern bases.

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN'S 180235Z.
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Aug 44.
3. In 201550Z, Harriman reported that message to Stalin contained in PRES #44 had been transmitted to Stalin.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

OOO.9 PRES; 530 JAPAN.
3 August 1944

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 34. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

I am sending you the following exchange of messages on the allocation of occupation zones for your information.

QUOTE. Personal and Secret to the President from Stettinius, Acting.

Winant has cabled State Department that Russians are insisting that allocation of occupation zones in Germany as between us and the British be settled at the earliest possible moment.

We believe that it is possible to come to an agreement on the following basis.

1. That Churchill agree unequivocally and by cable to you that the British will undertake, without use of any United States troops the occupation of France, Italy and the Balkans if and when that should be necessary, for any reason, in any of these countries.

2. That we have joint use or control of sufficient northwest ports either in Low countries or Germany for supply and evacuation of our troops when that becomes necessary thus avoiding any dependence on French routes.

3. That we occupy the southwest rather than the Northwest Hinterland of Germany.

The Army tells me that supplies can readily be moved to our troops through the northern ports and the divisions readily evacuated using the same United States lines of communication and transportation.

Believe that the northern area may have a good many headaches and
not a little shooting will have to be done in that area and that the British are in the mood to do it and will probably have substantial forces in Germany for a longer period of time than will we.

Hope you will agree to this because time is so urgent and we are in danger of developing a bad situation as between ourselves and the British of which the Russians and other countries will be aware.

Think the British will make every effort to get us to agree to the use of our forces in France, Italy and the Balkans, but feel we should stand pat on that under all circumstances.

Have consulted Stimson and Forrestal who approve foregoing plan.

Would appreciate it if we could have your advice as soon as possible in regard to this urgent matter. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. From the President to Acting Secretary Stettinius.

Replying to your message of August 2, inform Winant that I am awaiting an agreement by the Prime Minister that American troops will police northwest Germany and will not police southern Europe. It is essential that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there at earliest practicable date.

In view of agreement already made that Soviet may police all that part of Germany in which they have expressed a desire to exercise control, I am unable to understand that any further discussion with the Soviets is necessary at this time.

No possible difficulty with England is forseeable in regard to her Naval problems in northwestern Germany. They can march hand in hand with the supply of our troops but in consideration of our 3,000 miles of transport, I want to be able to carry this out through Holland and Hamburg and Bremen. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT
Released from the White House Map Room at 2230, EWT, 3 August 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A.C.

TD - 040259
NCR - 75745

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 14 1972
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)
NO: 33, 28 JULY 1944 (282350 NCR 6336)

Message to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk on his conference with Stalin.

FILED: "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS"
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)
NO: 29, 18 JULY 44.

Approves deletion of sentence from PRESIDENT-STALIN #27, 17 July 1944, re Conference with Prime Minister in Scotland. (Answers HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT, 181050 July 44).

ORIGINAL of this message, together with HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT 181050 July 44, filed with PRESIDENT-STALIN #27, 17 July 44, in PRESIDENT-STALIN folder.
6 July 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your message filed 28/1402 is received. The question of establishing liaison between Eisenhower and Soviet Army Staff will be considered when General Deane reaches Washington.

I consider it not repeat not advisable for you to discuss with Marshal Stalin status of General Burrows.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 6 July 1944

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 11 1972
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Your message filed 28/11402 is received. The question of establishing liaison between Eisenhower and Soviet Army Staff will be considered when General Deane reaches Washington.

I consider it not repeat not advisable for you to discuss with Marshal Stalin status of General Burrows.

Presekct