INDEX SHEET

Date: 12 April 1945

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
To: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 121031

German surrender negotiations at Berne.

ORIGINAL: 370 GERMANY (2)
Aside from the major questions which are causing concern in our relations with the Soviet Union there has been an accumulation of minor incidents which started some six weeks ago. The following are only examples: On March 15 I personally requested a visa for General Eaker to come to Moscow to discuss the details of the establishment of air bases in the Budapest area in accordance with Marshal Stalin's agreement with you. Although I constantly pressed the Foreign Office this request was not even answered and on March 23 was withdrawn when General Eaker was transferred from Italy.

Little or no progress has been made in getting Soviet approval for our air teams to visit Soviet controlled territory for appraisal of bomb damage or for our naval team to Gdynia. Both proposals were agreed to at Yalta.
On March two General Deane and I requested a visa for Colonel Ames sent here in connection with bomb damage appraisal project. He has been sitting in Teheran for a month and no reply has been given to a number of my requests. Deane has reported to the War Department that all our planes are grounded in Soviet and Soviet controlled territory, affecting particularly the salvage of our combat planes coming down in these areas. 163 American combat flyers of stranded aircraft now in Poltava are thus held there.

General Deane has sent today recommendations to the War Department that drastic retaliatory measures be taken in the cases of Gdynia and our stranded aircraft. I earnestly recommend that these proposals be approved. I feel certain that unless we do take action in cases of this kind the Soviet Government will become convinced that they can force us to accept any of their decisions on all matters and it will be increasingly difficult to stop their aggressive policy. We get some temporary repercussions.
**DISPATCH**

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**RELEASED BY**

**DATE** | 3 APRIL 1945

**TOR CODEROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY** | CHECKED BY | DITTOED BY

**ROUTED BY** |           |           |

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**DECLASSIFIED**

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date MAR 9 1972

**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**PAGE 3 OF 4**

**0222042**

**NCR 1922**

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**ORIGINATOR fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP** (Use G. C. T.)

---

**BUT IF WE STAND FIRM, I AM SATISFIED IT IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN HOPE TO COME TO A REASONABLE BASIS OF GIVE AND TAKE WITH THESE PEOPLE.**

**I AM CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT WHATEVER WE DO WILL NOT AFFECT THEIR MAJOR DETERMINATION TO GO ALL OUT IN THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY NOR WHAT THEY MAY DO IN THE FAR EAST.**

**THE SOVIETS DECIDE TO DO THINGS NOT TO OBTAIN OUR GOOD WILL BUT BECAUSE THEY THINK THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEING SERVED. CONVERSELY, THE THINGS WE DO TO ASSIST OR PLEASE THEM DO NOT OBTAIN GOOD WILL FROM THEM. FAILURE TO STAND OUR GROUND IS INTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. WE WILL GET THEM TO RECOGNIZE OUR POINT OF VIEW ONLY IF WE SHOW THEM SPECIFICALLY THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEING AVERSELY AFFECTED, IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IF WE ADOPT FIRM MEASURES IN SEVERAL CASES SUCH AS THOSE DEAN HAS PROPOSED THE SOVIETS WILL PAY MORE ATTENTION TO OUR REQUESTS IN OTHER MATTERS OF A MORE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE SUCH AS THOSE THAT MAY ARISE**
AT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, IF WE DELAY ADOPTION OF THIS POLICY I AM CONVINCED THAT WE WILL HAVE GREATER DIFFICULTIES AS TIME GOES ON.

MAY I SUGGEST THAT A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE BE GIVEN TO THE SECY OF STATE.

DEC classed
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

Rec'd 03/07/52

By Date MAR 9 1972

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAV AIDE(#1-2) ......... ACTION
PERSONAL AND TOP-SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I TOOK DEANE AND HEAD OF BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO SEE STALIN SATURDAY NIGHT TO DELIVER GENERAL EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE. WE ALL AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO INSURE A QUICK AND SATISFACTORY ANSWER.

WE WERE MET AT THE OUTSET I FELT WITH A SOMewhat COLDER ATMOSPHERE THAN HAS BEEN THE CASE IN MY VARIOUS MEETINGS DURING THE LAST YEAR WITH STALIN BUT AFTER READING EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE AND AFTER DEANE AND ARCHER ANSWERED HIS QUESTIONS FREELY AS WAS POSSIBLE STALIN OPENED UP. HE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS WITH CANDOR INSOFAr AS HE WAS ABLE TO DO SO ON SUCH
SHORT NOTICE. HE HAS SINCE FULFILLED HIS PROMISE TO GIVE US HIS
REPLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. DEANE AND ARCHER HAVE SENT A FULL REPORT
OF THE CONVERSATION TO EISENHOWE R AND THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF. CLARK KERR AND I BOTH FEEL THAT THIS PERSONAL CONVERSATION
WITH STALIN WAS USEFUL AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

I REGRET THAT YOUR LAST MESSAGE REGARDING THE BERNE
MEETING, WHICH I HAVE SENT TO MARSHAL STALIN BY LETTER SUNDAY,
CAME AFTER OUR TALK. I FEEL THAT IF I HAD DELIVERED YOUR
MESSAGE TO HIM PERSONALLY I MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE STRANGE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH
THIS INCIDENT. IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT STALIN ALWAYS
REACTS IMMEDIATELY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER TO MATTERS THAT ARE PUT
UP TO HIM PERSONALLY AND WE ARE THUS ABLE TO OBTAIN MORE
UNDERSTANDING OF HIS ATTITUDE THAN IS POSSIBLE FROM HIS WRITTEN
REPLIES ALONE.
INDEX SHEET

Date: 24 March 1945

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

No: M-23408

American prisoners of war in Russia.

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 330 (2)" [Box 34]
I TOLD MOLTOV PERSONALLY AND LEFT IN WRITING THE SUBSTANCE
OF YOUR 00015 WHITE HOUSE NUMBER 207 ON THE SUBJECT OF TRANS-
FER OF NAVAL VESSELS. MOLTOV EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR YOUR
REPLY AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT TO MARSHAL STALIN. HE ARGUED
FOR THE NEED OF DESTROYERS AS WELL AS CRUISERS AND ASKED WHETHER
THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THESE MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED BEFORE
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. I EXPLAINED STICKING EXACTLY TO THE TEXT
OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT THIS COULD NOT BE FORESEEN NOW AND POINTED
OUT THE LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO TRAIN CREWS TO HAVE THE
SHIPS OPERATIONAL. DESTROYERS COULD NOT BE TAKEN OUT OF ACTIVE
SERVICE AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR FUTURE USE. I EXPLAINED AGAIN
THAT OUR PLANNING GROUP HERE WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSIDER
THE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO SUPPORT RUSSIAN
OPERATIONS.

FACT: [Action]

[Signature] Date MAR 9 1972

[Top Secret]

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" information contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

Copy No. 2
I TOLD KOLTOVO PERSONALLY AND LEFT IN WRITING THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR 250315 WHITE HOUSE NUMBER 207 ON THE SUBJECT OF TRANSFERR OF NAVAL VESSELS. KOLTOVO EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR YOUR REPLY AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT TO MARSHAL STALIN. HE ARGUED FOR THE NEED OF DESTROYERS AS WELL AS CRUISERS AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THESE MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. I EXPLAINED STICKING EXACTLY TO THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT THIS COULD NOT BE FORESEEN NOW AND POINTED OUT THE LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO TRAIN CREWS TO HAVE THE SHIPS OPERATIONAL. DESTROYERS COULD NOT BE TAKEN OUT OF ACTIVE SERVICE AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR FUTURE USE. I EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT OUR PLANNING GROUP HERE WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSIDER THE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO SUPPORT RUSSIAN OPERATIONS.

NAVAIDE(41-2)........ACTION
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

ED FLYNN LEFT MOSCOW FOR TEHERAN SATURDAY MORNING AFTER NEARLY FOUR WEEKS STAY IN RUSSIA. HE SAW EVERYBODY AND EVERYTHING HE ASKED FOR INCLUDING A VISIT TO LENINGRAD. WITH HIS FREE AND EASY WAY OF MEETING PEOPLE HE GOT ALONG WELL WITH ALL, AND I HAVE HAD GOOD REACTIONS FROM MANY OF THE CONTACTS HE MADE.

HE SAW MOLOTOV TWICE. ALTHOUGH HE DECLINED TO GIVE ED A MESSAGE TO THE VATICAN, MOLOTOV SHOWED UNDISGUISED INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT. THOUGH HIS ATTITUDE WAS PESSIMISTIC HE INDICATED WITHOUT SAYING SO DIRECTLY THAT HE WAS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS.
IT IS CLEAR HOWEVER, THAT THE FIRST STEP IS TO ATTEMPT TO END MUTUAL RECIMINATIONS WITH THE INITIATIVE COMING FROM ROME. ED INTERVIEWED THE TWO COMMISARS ON RELIGION AND STRUCK UP QUITE A FRIENDSHIP WITH THE MAYORS OF MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD. HE VISITED SCHOOLS, NURSERIES, HOSPITALS, FACTORIES, CLUBS, ETC. HE HAS BECOME AN EXPERT ON THE BALLET, SOVIET POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, AND RUSSIAN CULTURE. HE HAD A MOST INTERESTING TIME AND LEAVES WITH, I FEEL, AN EXTRAORDINARILY BALANCED GRASP OF SOVIET LIFE AND OUR PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS.

I ENJOYED HAVING HIM AS A GUEST AND AM SORRY TO SEE HIM LEAVE. ALL IN ALL I FEEL HIS VISIT WAS MOST USEFUL.
INDEX SHEET

Date: 12 March 1945

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIS

To: THE PRESIDENT

No: M-23174

American prisoners of war in Russia.

ORIGINAL: WR 330 (2)

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
10 July 1943

This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 30 May 1939, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

U. S. Army Service Forces
10-05200-1
INDEX SHEET

Date: 8 March 1945

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

No: 2-3119

American prisoners of war in Russia.

Original: NA 330 (2)

*W.D., A. O. O. Form No. 0622
15 July 1943

*This form supersedes W.D., A. O. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1943, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

MOLTOV ASKED ME TO CALL LAST NIGHT TO DISCUSS STETTINIUS REQUEST FOR THE TRANSFER OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS FROM THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO THE SOVIET NAVY. IN THIS DISCUSSION IT DEVELOPED THAT EITHER HE HAD NOT MADE CLEAR TO STETTINIUS MARSHAL STALIN'S REQUEST OR IN THE MEANTIME THE REQUEST HAD BEEN ALTERED. AT ALL EVENTS MOLTOV NOW STATES THAT MARSHAL STALIN DID NOT FIND OCCASION AT YALTA TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS OF YOU:

1. THAT 2 OR 3 UNITED STATES CRUISERS AND 10 TO 12 DESTROYERS BE SOLD PROMPTLY TO THE RED NAVY FOR FUTURE OPERATION AGAINST THE JAPANESE.

2. THAT AFTER THE WAR A SIMILAR NUMBER AND CHARACTER OF SHIPS BE SOLD BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

HE STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THESE REQUESTS WERE A MATTER WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND

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Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

PAGE ONE OF THREE 220833 NCR 8427 (Use G. C. T.)
SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: MR. HARRIMAN

RELEASED BY: 

DATE: 22 FEB. 1945.

TOR CODEROOM: 

DECIDED BY: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

TO: THE PRESIDENT

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE: 

PRIORITY: 

ROUTINE: 

DEFERRED: 

BASEGRAM: 

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW: 

INFORMATION FOR ACTION: 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

TO: ADMIRAL OLSEN

FROM: MR. HARRIMAN

DATE: 22 FEB. 1945

TOR CODEROOM: 

DECIDED BY: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

TO: THE PRESIDENT

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE: 

PRIORITY: 

ROUTINE: 

DEFERRED: 

BASEGRAM: 

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW: 

INFORMATION FOR ACTION:

THESE dispatches are to be treated as highly secret and transmitted only through channels indicated.

TH ExTECTION AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.) 

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

AUTHORIZE BY ADMIRAL KNG TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET NAVAL AUTHORITIES THE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY WITH SOVIET OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST AND THAT ADMIRAL OLSEN HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE FULLY ANY REQUESTS THAT THE SOVIET STAFF WISHED TO PUT FORWARD IN THIS CONNECTION. I EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT SHIPS OF THE TYPES REQUESTED ABOVE WERE CURRENTLY BEING USED TO FULL ADVANTAGE AGAINST THE JAPANESE OR IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY TAKING SHIPS OUT OF ACTION NOW TO TURN THEM OVER TO THE SOVIETS TO TRAIN THEIR CREWS FOR USE AT A LATER DATE. MOLOTOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT OF COURSE DESIRED THAT SHIPS SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY BUT IT HAD BEEN MARSHAL STALIN'S UNDERSTAND-ING THAT WE WERE BUILDING A GREAT MANY DESTROYERS AND IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT WE MIGHT FIND A SURPLUS OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS WHICH COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE RED NAVY IN ORDER TO

TOP SECRET

DECLASIFIED

Handed only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in the Department of State regulations. Copy No. 5

OFPV-19-78

OFPV-19-78

OFPV-19-78
Augment their weak naval forces in the East. He added that the question of cooperation on the part of the U.S. Navy with the Russian operations was a separate question which should of course be dealt with by the naval staffs. He commented further that military operations were not involved in the proposed post-war purchase of ships. All in all, I gained the impression from our conversation that the Russians are asking for these ships having in mind the building up of their post-war navy rather than considerations of their plans for operation against the Japanese. Admiral Olsen has reported to Admiral King that from his own observations and from those of other U.S. naval officers here of the Russian operations of our ships already turned over to the Red Navy the Russians are not competent to use effectively ships of the character requested within a reasonable time.
General Deane tells me that Marshal Stalin made a great point to Tedder that the early launching of the Russian offensive in Poland was a direct result of your communication asking him to see General Eisenhower's representative and a subsequent cable from the Prime Minister inquiring if the Russians were planning an offensive. Stalin interpreted these cables to indicate a desire of both of you for early action on his part. Therefore, in spite of the continued bad weather which reduced the value of the Russian mobility and air superiority the offensive had been launched before they would have otherwise done so. High-ranking Red Army ground and air officers also stressed this in other conversations.

I am emphasizing to you this part of the conversation as you may wish to recognize and express to Stalin your appreciation of...
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

SHEET TWO OF TWO SHEETS ALUSNA MOSCOW 191415Z NCR 1754

ORIGAMOR TASK IN THE COMMON INTEREST IN MESSAGE OR WHEN YOU SEE HIM.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:

DIALED(#1, #2)........ACTIONFOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT)

FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By R. Date MAR 9 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL.
No. 2 FILE.
No. 3 FILE OR CHARTROOM.
No. 4 SPECIAL.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 121735Z

Date: 12 Jan 45.

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIS

To: THE PRESIDENT

ARGONAUT MEETING.

FILED: 4R 210 ARGONAUT

*W. D., A. O. O. Form No. 0629
18 July 1945

*This form supersedes W. D., A. O. O. Form No. 0629, 10 May 1943, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

G. H. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—80588—1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 111615Z
From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
ARGONAUT MEETING.

DATE: 11 Jan 45
To: THE PRESIDENT

FILED: WR 210 ARGONAUT

INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 111625Z
From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
ARGONAUT MEETING.

DATE: 11 Jan 1945
To: THE PRESIDENT

FILED: WR 210 ARGONAUT
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 1115502

Date: 11 Jan 1945

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

ARGONAUT MEETING.

FILED: MR 210 ARGONAUT.

INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 1116002

Date: 11 Jan 1945

From: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

To: THE PRESIDENT

ARGONAUT MEETING.

FILED: MR 210 ARGONAUT.
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 111535Z

From: AMBASSADOR HARRISON

To: THE PRESIDENT

ARGONAUT

FILED: MR 210 ARGONAUT

Date: 11 January 1945

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 16 May 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

O. & B. RESEARCH RESEARCH OFFICE 16-2259-1
INDEX SHEET

Date: 12 April 1945

From: THE PRESIDENT

No: 230

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

German surrender negotiations at Berne.

ORIGINAL: 370 GERMANY (2)

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
18 July 1945

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0623, 10 May 1938, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.
INDEX SHEET

Date: 11 April 1945

From: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 228

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

German surrender negotiations at Berne.

ORIGINAL: MR 370 GERMANY (2)
INDEX SHEET

From: THE PRESIDENT
To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Date: 10 April 1945

NO: 227

POLAND

ORIGINAL: MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
INDEX SHEET

Date: 4 April 1945

From: The President

To: Ambassador Harriman

No: 223

German surrender negotiations at Belsen.

Original: MR 370 Germany

* W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
12 July 1942

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 10 May 1942, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

W. D., O. G. O., Printing Office 16-SER-2
INDEX SHEET

Date: 26 March 1945

From: THE PRESIDENT

No: 216

To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

American prisoners of war in Russia.

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 330 (2)"

*W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 0822
16 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 0822, 16 May 1943, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

G. H. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1943—0822—1
8 March 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMBASSADOR, MOSCOW

NUMBER 207, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBAS-

SADOR HARRISIAN.

Replying to your message of 22 February transmitting a request for a
transfer of cruisers and destroyers from the United States Navy to the Soviet
Navy, I have had the possibility of complying with the Soviet request thoroughly
investigated with the following result.

There is not at the present time any statutory authority for the sale
of vessels of the United States Navy.

We are prepared, as soon as detailed arrangements can be completed, to
assign to the Soviet Navy two light cruisers similar to the U.S.S. MILWAUKEE
under the same arrangement that was followed in the case of the MILWAUKEE.

In view of a renewal of the German submarine activity which may interfere
seriously with supply routes from the U. S. to Europe, it is not
practicable at the present time to take any of our destroyers away from the
service upon which they are engaged.

The later transfer of destroyers will depend upon the future course of
the war and upon events which cannot now be foreseen. At this time a careful
study shows that every destroyer that we have is now engaged in essential war
work.

This, with the proposal for the post war sale of American Naval vessels,
is a matter for future consideration; and the sale of American Naval vessels

DECLASIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
is contingent upon obtaining statutory authority from the Congress which we shall endeavor to obtain at a later more promising time.

In order that delivery of these two ships may be expedited, please inform me as to the earliest date when they can be accepted and the ports in which delivery is desired.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 09182 March 1945.

J. A. Tyrka, Jr.,
Commander, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. J. Stewart Date, MAR 9 1972
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

March 8, 1945

Replying to your message of 22 February transmitting a request for a transfer of cruisers and destroyers from the United States Navy to the Soviet Navy, I have had the possibility of complying with the Soviet request thoroughly investigated with the following result.

There is not at the present time any statutory authority for the sale of vessels of the United States Navy.

We are prepared, as soon as detailed arrangements can be completed, to assign to the Soviet Navy two light cruisers similar to the U.S.S. MILWAUKEE under the same arrangement that was followed in the case of the MILWAUKEE.

In view of a renewal of the German submarine activity which may interfere seriously with supply routes from the U.S. to Europe, it is not practicable at the present time to take any of our destroyers away from the service upon which they are engaged.

The later transfer of destroyers will depend upon the future course of the war and upon events which cannot now be foreseen. At this time a careful study shows that every destroyer that we have is now engaged in essential war work.

This, with the proposal for the post war sale of American Naval vessels, is a matter for future consideration; and the sale of American Naval vessels is contingent upon obtaining statutory authority from the Congress which we shall endeavor to obtain at a later more promising time.
In order that delivery of these two ships may be expedited, please inform me as to the earliest date when they can be accepted and the ports in which delivery is desired.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
27 February 1945

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 204. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your message 150850. Edwin died aboard ship on 20 February. I am sorry that security prevented earlier reply to your inquiry.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 271831Z, February 1945.

R. H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By N. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 156 (022112 MC 2768)  Date: 2 January 1944

From: THE PRESIDENT       To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Quotes FBI-FIU #689, re sending delegates from Eisenhower to
Moscow.

FIELD: 340 (1)

*W. D., A. O. Form No. 0622
16 July 1947

*This form supersedes W. D., A. O. Form No. 0622, 20 May 1925, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.

R. D. Armament Production Office 10-0622-1
INDEX SHEET

NUMBER: 155 (0221222 0CR 2769)  

Date: 2 January 1945

From: THE PRESIDENT

To: AMBASSADOR HARRELL

ARKONAUT meeting in Black Sea.

FILED: JR 210 ARKONAUT

*W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622  
20 July 1943

*This form supersedes W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622, 15 September 1923, which may be used until existing stocks are exhausted.