Map Room
Box 12
Folders 1(A) + 1(B)
Misc. Press. Messages
(1942)
From: Ft. Mills
To: Govt. WD Franklin D. Roosevelt

March 21, 1942
1:23 A.M.

No. 539 March 21, 1942

Read one one nine eight (1198). This radio
received at eleven forty five AM today and was appar-
etly delayed in transit. I appreciate deeply the
confidence you express in my leadership and shall to
the utmost of my ability endeavor to justify it. With
the aid that I am confident you will send me, the
invader will I trust, eventually be expelled from
these shores.

Wainwright
My dear Mr. President,

On my own behalf and on that of all British Officers and men serving in the United States I should like to send you our greetings with the wish that this coming year will bring you and Mrs. Roosevelt every happiness and the American Nation and their comrades in arms victory over our common enemies.

Yours very sincerely,

J. S. Dill

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
URGENT

From: New Delhi
To: AGRWAR

AHMED AG 257, December 26, 1942

Dear Echelon CBP sends seasonal greetings for President Roosevelt. From Ferris, your leadership inspiring and is reflected in determination and spirit of combat all our units in this globular area.

No Sig

ACTION COPY: WHITE HOUSE
INFO. COPIES: 8GS

CH-IN-11460 (12/27/42) 0239Z cen

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Chungking
To: AGWAR
No. Amnica 1651 December 26, 1942

The Officers and men of the China Burma India
Command extend to the Commander in Chief their
best wishes for Christmas and the New Year and
pledge their loyal support and best efforts in our
fight for American principles.

Stilwell

ACTION COPY: WHITE HOUSE
INFO. COPIES: 5GS

CH-IN-11459 (12/27/42) 0238Z cen

RESTRICTED
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: New Caledonia
To: WAR
No. 414, December 25, 1942.

Units and echelons of my command join me in extending Christmas greetings. Commander in Chief US Forces from Harmen. Be assured that our efforts will be unremitting until complete victory over our enemy has been attained.

No Sig

ACTION COPY: WHITE HOUSE
INFO. COPY: SGS

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOC DIR. 5200.9 (6/27/69)

Date- MAY 1 1972
Signature-

CH-IN-11312 (12/28/42) 20342 MS

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Urgent

From: ADC Ft Richardson Alaska
To: Chief of Staff
No # Dec 25, 1943

To the President of the United States. Under your inspired leadership the personnel of the Alaskan Defense Command officers, men and civilians will celebrate Christmas one nine four two with increasing confidence in their Commander in Chief and renewed assurance that victory will reward our efforts. It is our high resolve that through unremittting effort and devotion to duty we shall win through to lasting peace. Each of us pledges himself to serve you the people of the United States and our gallant allies to the limit of his strength. All good wishes to you for health and divine guidance in your tremendous task.

Buckner CG ADC

Action Copy: White House
Info. Copies: SGS

CH-IN-10988 (12/25/43) 2346Z ce

Signature by the President

White House
Urgent

From: Ft Shafter
To: Chief of Staff
No: 123 Dec 25, 1942

All officers and men of the Hawaiian Department join me in Christmas greetings to our Commander in Chief, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and request you convey to him our undivided loyalty and dedication to the task of winning the war.

Emphasis

Action Copy: White House
Info. Copies: SGO

CM-IN-10922 (12/26/42) 0011Z ce

RESTRICTED
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.
Urgent

From: Quarryheights CE
To: Chief of Staff

No: CDC 1297 Dec 25, 1942

Officers and enlisted men of Caribbean Defense Command send Christmas greeting to the President of the United States our Commander in Chief and take this opportunity to reaffirm our faith in your leadership and our unswerving loyalty to the cause for which we fight. Each one of us is prepared to fight on until our people can enjoy future Christmas days in peace.

Brett

ACTION COPY: White House
INFO COPIES: SGS

CM-IN-10938 (12-25-42) 2213Z wd

White House

RESTRICTED
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Greenland
To: WDCHA
No. 57 December 21, 1942

On behalf entire Command and Staff heartiest wishes for a Merry Xmas and successful New Year are extended to members of your office and all branches War Department. Desire express appreciation excellent cooperation afforded this command during past year with assurance mission will be accomplished by continued success and cooperation in the New Year.

Wimsatt

ACTION COPY: OPD
INFO COPIES: G-2, CG AAF, CGGN, SGS, SOS- TAG, BPR

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.3 (2/27/58)

CM-IN-10461 (12-24-42) 1313Z cob
Date: MAY 1 1972

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
ATTENTION

This is the action copy of an original transmission by dispatch mail. Deliver to Radio Room.

MAILED BY [Redacted]...TIME...[Redacted]...DATE...

Dec 16, 1942

THE HONOR OF YOUR PRESENCE IS REQUESTED AT A DINNER TO CELEBRATE THE COMMISSIONING OF PT SQUADRON MINE AND ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE TRADITIONS OF PT BOATS ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 22ND AT SEVEN AT THE NEW YORK YACHT CLUB.

REVERE ADMIRAL H.L. DRISCOLL (RET.) INSPECTOR NAVAL MINE TENDERS

THE HONORABLE FRANK KNOX NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
THE HONORABLE J.V. FORRESTAL NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
THE HONORABLE W.A. BARD NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
ADMIRAL J. KING COMMISSIONS FLEET
ADMIRAL THOMAS C. HART NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
ADMIRAL W.H. STANLEY NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
VICE ADM. R.S. EDWARDS CHIEF OF STAFF COMMISSIONS FLEET
Fleet Adm. W.S. FARRAR NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
CAPTAIN L. P. LOVETTE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
CAPTAIN R.G. ALEXANDER NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
CAPTAIN E.P. FORRESTEL ASST SECNAV OFFICE NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
LT. COMMANDER J.A. MORE BUREAU NAVAL PERSONNEL NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON
LT. COMMANDER D.J. WALSH MTS TRAINING CTR HELVELLE R.I. (HAF)
LT. COMMANDER B.E. SPEICHER MTS TRAINING CTR HELVELLE R.I. (HAF)
COMMANDER J.P. WADLEY COMMISSIONS FLEET

LT. COMMANDEER D.J. BUCKINGHAM NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON

HGS. NAVY HAN
HSG NAVY PI22 THIS
HGS. NAVY PI5 T.w2.

RADIO RELAY BY CK 35 GOVT NAVY 10/12/36

GOV'T NAVY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON D.C.
**Naval Message**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Alusna Wellington</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Released by</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>12 December 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tor Code Word</td>
<td>0939/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decoded by</td>
<td>Parsons</td>
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<td>Paraphrased by</td>
<td>German</td>
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</table>

**Naval Department**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>For Action</th>
<th>OPNAV</th>
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**Information**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Routine</th>
<th>Deferred</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Text**

(This is **AND PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.**)

"THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE. AS YOU KNOW OUR ONE OBJECT IS TO FURTHER THE COMMON CAUSE TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY AND RESOURCES. WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO ASSIST EFFECTIVELY IN DUE COURSE IN THE OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND THIS WAS OUR PRIMARY MOTIVE IN RAISING WITH CHURCHILL THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RETURN OF THIS AREA OF OUR DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE AGREED THAT THIS IS AT PRESENT IMPRACTICABLE AND THOUGH OUR CONTEMPLATED COOPERATION IN THE PACIFIC WILL NECESSARILY BE LESS POWERFUL WE WILL NEVERTHELESS DO ALL WE CAN."

**P. Fraser, Prime Minister.**

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- PIA...ACTION
- FILE

**Reggraded UNCLASSIFIED**

**SEALED**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Published in the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45 (The War History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1951), vol. 11, pp. 152-153.)
LE GOUVERNEUR GÉNÉRAL
DE L’ALGÉRIE

Monsieur le Président,

La lettre que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir, le 15 Novembre, m’annonçait l’arrivée sur le sol de l’Algérie des puissantes Armées américaines dans le noble dessein de libérer la France et son Empire, et de reconstruire demain une Europe véritable, restaurée sur le principe de la dignité de l’Homme et de la liberté des Nations.

Comme Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, à l’instant même où les Armées américaines, britanniques et françaises, sont unies dans un effort commun de libération du territoire africain, je forme des vœux pour que la victoire de nos armées rende, dans un très proche avenir, la liberté et la souveraineté à ma Patrie, et que la collaboration américaine et française qui se reforme sur les champs de bataille, trouve, dans l’avenir, pérennité et gloire.

Daignez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute amitié et de ma très haute estime.

[Signature]

Monsieur Franklin D. ROOSEVELT
Président des Etats-Unis d’Amérique
WASHINGTON
LE GOUVERNEUR GÉNÉRAL
DE L'ALGÉRIE.

Monsieur le Président,

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[Signature]

Monsieur Franklin D. ROOSEVELT
Président des États-Unis d'Amérique
WASHINGTON
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Dated November 12, 1942
Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1766, November 12, noon, (Section 1)

I have received from the Foreign Minister the following letter addressed to the President by General Franco on November 10th (Translation).

"My dear President: I have received from the hands of your Ambassador the letter in which, actuated by the relations of friendship which unite our peoples, and which in their benefit should be preserved, you explain to me the reasons which induced Your Excellency to send troops of the American Army to occupy the territories of the French possessions and protectorates in North Africa.

I accept with pleasure and I thank you for the assurances which Your Excellency offers the Government and the people of Spain to the effect that the measures adopted are not in any manner directed against their interests, or against their territories, metropolitan or overseas, or against the protectorate in Morocco, and I confidently hope that the relations among the Moroccan peoples of both zones likewise will in the future be maintained in the same spirit of peace and of reciprocal confidence which have characterized them up to now.

I can assure you that Spain knows the value of peace and sincerely desires peace for itself and for all other peoples.

On this occasion I am pleased to reciprocate the same friendly sentiments you expressed to me and to express my intention of avoiding anything which might disturb our relations in any of their aspects, and I reiterate with a salutation the expression of my personal esteem and sincere friendship.

Signed Francisco Franco.

Palace of El Pardo, November 10, 1942.

CB-IN-5505 (11/13/42)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To His Excellency, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America.

Hayes

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD

CM-IN-5505 (11/13/42) 0919Z cen
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM OLAF:
"TELEPHONE YOU TOMORROW AT SIX OCLOCK"
(SIGNED)
A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
P1A......ACTION

FILE:
SEALED  SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
FROM: ALUSNA LONDON
TO: OPNAV

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDLE.
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MRS. SMITH
"LEASE EXTENDED TO OCTOBER 12."

SIGNED

A J DREXEL BIDDLE JR.
338, Sept. 10, noon.

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM WILLKIE:

"Situation in Turkey: Prime Minister able, shrewd, popular leader. Greatly concerned about growing shortage of wheat for his people and consequences of this on stability of his government and on his own political future. Says he needs minimum of 150,000 tons wheat shipments during next twelve months. I believe if you could authorize Steinhardt at once to say United States will send 30,000 tons wheat in next three months in addition to that already on way this would build great good and strengthen present firm intention of Turks in every event to resist Axis invasion. Germans are working hard on Turkish Government. Premier also urged planes, tanks and motor trucks."

GWYNN
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM  FLORENA LONDON
RELEASED BY               
DATE  4 SEPT 42
TOR CODEROOM  1216

PARAPHRASED BY  HJUEN

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROBBSONC
041643 PGR 14517

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME       DATE       TIME       GMT

TEXT

ACTION

P-00
P-01
P-015
P-0015
P-05
P-07
P-1
P-11
P-2
P-3
P-30
P-31
P-32
P-33
P-34
P-35
P-37
10-00
VCNO

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDLE, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MISS SMITH:

"PLEASE END OCTOBER 11TH. CHRISTENING IS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THAT. ALL WELL"

SIGNED A J DREXEL BIDDLE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
1972

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
GOVT NAVY CAPTAIN JOHN MCCREA AIDE TO PRESIDENT WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

FOR THE PRESIDENT RESPONSIVE TO YOUR BEST WISHES VIA CAPTAIN MCCREA AND THE PRESENCE OF OUR FIRST LADY AND THE MOST ABLE CHRISTENING AND GOD SPEED OF THE SPONSOR X THE USS IOWA CLICKED OFF AS SCHEDULED AND EVERYTHING WENT OFF LIKE CLOCK WORK X THE GRAND SHIP TIED UP LIKE A VETERAN WITHIN FORTYFIVE MINUTES X WE MISSED ONE THING THE PRESENCE OF OUR COMMANDER IN CHIEF

REAR ADMIRAL MARQUART COMMANDANT NAVY YARD NEW YORK

TOD 272058AUG/JC

272058
From: Bluewest Seven

To: The President of the United States
Whitehouse Washington DC

July 5, 1942


Contractors' employees McWilliams Dredging Company and Nick F Helmers Inc, Contract D ten nine eight Engineering two, Bluewest Seven Greenland donating July Fourth pay. Use your own discretion allocating to any or one organization Federal or Private that in your opinion will best further our war efforts. Letter of transmittal to follow.

Clarke

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.2 (9/27/68)

Date: 12/21/67
Signature: [signature]

Copy made and referred to Mr. MacIntyre for action.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking China
To: Ag War for Amisca

No. 870 Amisca June 26, 1942

For the President of the United States. Your very kind rpt kind message of sympathy was duly received and highly appreciated.

Stilwell

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
BU# U# 5200.0 (9/27/58)

Date- 4/30/67
Signature- [Signature]

CH-IN-8582 (6/26/42) PM 1:42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
June 20, 1942

From: Juneau Alaska

To: The President of The United States

The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

#202300, June 20, 1942

As the enemy has already invaded Aleutians in force entrenching himself and moving his new bases of operation toward mainland invasion of which is imminent the Alaska War Council holding its first meeting in pursuance of your executive order of June 11th urges immediate unification of the Command in Alaska as has been done elsewhere (For President F. D. Roosevelt from Governor E. Grueffing Chairman Als War Council) unified command indispensable pre requisite as situation clearly calls for major offensive operations against enemy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 4/28/42
Signature: [handwritten]

Please return to War Room -
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDLE.

QUEEN WILHELMINA LEFT LAST NIGHT. ESTIMATED TIME ARRIVAL SHEDIAC ABOUT NOON LOCAL TIME THERE TODAY THURSDAY.

CANADIAN PREMIER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED.

ACTION...PRESIDENT.

SEALED SECRET FILE....
FROM: AMBASSADOR BIDDLE
FOR: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

June 16, 1942

170939 NCR 6624

GUEST'S DEPARTURE STILL HELD UP BY WEATHER.

Received in Map Room 170845; delivered to Ushers Office, 170852, by Ensign Elsey by direction of Captain McCrea.
FROM: BIDDLE
ACTION: PRESIDENT

160802     NCR 6028

(SECRET FROM BIDDLE TO THE PRESIDENT) GUEST HOPES TO TAKE OFF TONIGHT TUESDAY. HAS BEEN DELAYED BY WEATHER 24 HOURS. CANADIAN PREMIER INFORMED.

ORIGINAL GIVEN TO USHER, 0800, FOR THE PRESIDENT.
PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE;

GUEST EXPECTS TO LEAVE TONIGHT AND ARRIVE SHEDIAC TUESDAY
16 JUNE BETWEEN NOON AND THIRTEEN HOURS SHEDIAC TIME.

NOTIFICATION BEING GIVEN VIA CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
HERE TO CANADIAN PREMIER.

SIG; BIDDLE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

MAY 1 1972

NCR 5591
FOR THE PRESIDENT JUNE 14.
FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE

PLANE HAS BEEN HELD UP ON CANADIAN SIDE BY WEATHER.
HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE MORE DEFINITE REPORT TOMORROW MONDAY.
June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM

I telephoned this morning to Ambassador Biddle that the Pan American Airways representative in London had instructions to put the plane in any port in England which was warranted by the security of the trip and time of departure was to be arranged by Ambassador Biddle to suit the convenience of the passengers.

M.L.H.
PRINCE BERNHARD PROMISES TO PROVIDE TOMORROW EXACT LIST OF MEMBERS OF QUEEN WILHELMINA'S SUITE. IN ORDER THAT TRAIN TRANSPORTATION FROM LONDON MAY BE ARRANGED, HE INQUIRES AS TO APPROXIMATE TIME AND THE BRITISH PORT FROM WHICH PLANE ON JUNE 11TH WILL TAKE OFF.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDE

IN DISCUSSING HER PROGRAM, QUEEN WILHELMINA
Said:

(A) THAT INCLUDING HERSELF, THE PASSENGER LIST
WOULD CONSIST OF 4 PERSONS: JONKHEER TETS VAN GOUDRIAAN,
CHIEF OF THE CABINET OF THE QUEEN, 1 SECRETARY AND 1
MAID WHOSE NAMES SHE WOULD GIVE ME LATER. SHE INTENDS
TO APPOINT BARONESS BOETZELAAR, AMERICAN WIFE OF
COUNSELOR OF DUTCH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, AS HER LADY-IN-
WAITING DURING HER VISIT. SHE ALSO INTENDS TO APPOINT
GENERAL VAN OEVEREN NOW IN WASHINGTON AS HER MILITARY
AIDE.

(B) IN LINE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION TO PRINCE BERNHARD,
SHE WOULD APPRECIATE HER ARRIVAL BEING TREATED QUIETLY.

(C) AFTER HER ARRIVAL AT HER PLACE OF RESIDENCE, SHE
HOPES TO SEE YOU AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

(D) AS YOU PERHAPS KNOW, PRINCESS JULIANA IS ENDEAVORING
TO RENT A SMALL HOUSE WITHIN EASY MOTORING DISTANCE FROM
HYDE PARK. IF SHE SUCCEEDS, THE QUEEN WILL PROCEED
THERE DIRECTLY UPON ARRIVAL. OTHERWISE SHE WILL GO TO
SOME HOTEL WHICH YOU MIGHT DEEM APPROPRIATE WITHIN SIMILAR
DISTANCE OF HYDE PARK.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
MAY 1 1972
(E) The Queen is hopeful of leasing the house, where she plans to rest and work quietly between visits to Dutch communities and other centers of interest throughout the country. Her immediate household will be limited to Princess Juliana, the FBI officials and domestic help. The Queen's official staff will be quartered at some nearby hotel.

(F) The Queen prefers not to undertake any official schedule for five or six days.

(G) The Queen plans to remain about six weeks and is hopeful of having real talks with Secretary Hull and other members of the government whom you might indicate.

(H) The Queen wants you to know how deeply grateful she is to you for the Clipper.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated May 12, 1942
Read 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

36, May 12, 9 p.m.
FROM BIDDLE.
NETHERLANDS SERIES.
FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Prince Benhard states Queen Wilhelmina wishes me to convey an expression of her deep gratitude for your kind messages and your offer to arrange passage for her from here by same clipper which carried Harry Hopkins. She will be ready to leave here any day the weather permits after first week in June. She hopes it may be possible to arrange to fly on day which will not require high altitude. She will appreciate provision being made for oxygen in case during course of flight conditions suddenly require change to high altitude.

WINANT

LNS

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
By R. H. Parks Date 1972
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS: (The White House)

Subject: Visit of Queen Wilhelmina to United States.

In connection with the visit of Queen Wilhelmina to the United States, clippers leaving Foyles June 7th and June 11th have been assigned for her use. If she will designate the date and notify Ambassador Winant, he can make final arrangements for the use of the one she desires and release the other.

All arrangements for this can be made directly with Ambassador Winant and his office.

[Signature]

L. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
L\30 DIR. 5200.2 (9/27/59)
Date: 1/26/67
Signature: [Signature]
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"Dear President Roosevelt,

With reference to my message to you of December 8th regarding the return of the Ninth Division, I have been advised by Mr. Churchill that shipping will be arranged at the end of January for the return of the personnel of the Division and of the items of equipment which were stated in paragraph 9 of my previous message to be the minimum requirements to ensure its effective employment in the South West Pacific area.

I would express to you on behalf of my Government our thanks for your co-operation in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN."
MR. PRESIDENT:

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I would express to you on behalf of my Government our thanks for your co-operation in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN."
The Under Secretary of State
Washington
December 22, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

The Australian Minister has asked me to transmit to you the enclosed message which he has just received and which has been addressed to you by the Australian Prime Minister.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>PM Curtin, Australia</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>Unnumbered</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>22 Dec 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO MAP ROOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Return of Ninth Division from Mid-East to Australia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Further to Curtin's message 8 Dec 42 to the President.

2. Not answered. See PRES-CURTIN 23 Dec 42.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:—

"Dear President Roosevelt,

On December 10th Mr. Churchill expressed his thanks for the very full statement of our difficulties which, he said, viewed in conjunction with the fact that the New Zealand Division would remain longer in the Middle East, made it easier for our wishes to be met. In a cable to me the Prime Minister of New Zealand referred to the great difference in the present problems of New Zealand and Australia.

Mr. Churchill said shipping would be arranged at the end of January to repatriate our personnel and on agreed-on equipment, and later he advised of arrangements in regard to vehicles and material.

The decision to return the Ninth Division A.I.F. has been made and Australia and the British themselves have determined the equipment which will accompany it. My advisers are grateful for the co-operation assured us, as the return of the Division is regarded by them as essential to operations in this theatre.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN."
My dear Mr. President:

The Australian Minister has just left with me a message addressed to you by the Australian Prime Minister which I am transmitting herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
FROM: PM Curtin, Australia
TO: The President

SERIAL: Unnumbered
DATE: 28 Dec 42

SUBJECT: Return of 9th Australian Division from Mid East to Australia.

ACTION:
1. Answer PRS-CURTIN 23 Dec 42.
2. Not answered.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"Dear President Roosevelt,

I have received your communication of December 2nd regarding the return of the Ninth Division to Australia and I am grateful for your kind message of congratulations on the part played by the Ninth Division in the recent victory in the Middle East.

2. I am very glad you are agreeable to the return of the Ninth Division to Australia at the earliest date practicable and I note your observations as to the factors which you think should govern the fixation of this date.

3. After a magnificent advance through most difficult terrain of the Owen Stanley Range, the final stages of clearing the Japanese from this part of New Guinea have proved most difficult. Brigades that went over mountain track are now so depleted that they are being withdrawn and replaced by other Australian forces.

4. Experience has proved that wastage in tropical warfare in undeveloped areas is immense. For example at least one-third of our force at Milne Bay is already infected with malaria. Buna area is an equally evil one for this disease. Our battle wastage is fairly considerable. The two together may soon place us in what may be a very precarious position. The Japanese have shown a degree of stubbornness in the defence of Buna and Gona which would indicate that they are not going to take their reverses in this area without making the greatest effort to hold on and to come back later."
5. The Sixth and Seventh Australian Divisions after the Buna operations are completed must have a prolonged rest out of action. They both have a very large number of reinforcements to absorb and a great number of sick to return. There is a pressing need for the services of the Ninth Division in this area. It is also required for subsequent phases of the campaign to drive the Japanese from New Guinea and adjacent islands.

6. You will recall that in my message of October 17th to Mr. Churchill, which was repeated to you, it was explained that the manpower position necessitated the reduction of strength of the Australian Army by one Division. The Government has since been advised that the demands of warfare in the tropics have made it perfectly clear that we cannot maintain reduced strength in the field, and the reduction of another division, making two in all is proposed.

7. Speaking in terms of divisions, our present distribution is as follows, although we have reduced brigades in several cases from three to two battalions:

Three divisions in New Guinea (less one brigade)
One division North Queensland
One division Darwin
Two divisions (less one brigade) and one armoured in Western Australia
One greatly reduced division and one armoured division (now completing) in New South Wales
One reduced division and one armoured division (now completing) in South Queensland.

Practically all of these forces are distributed around our perimeter with a very small reserve force in Australia.

8. I feel that you should be aware of the foregoing considerations which show clearly the pressing need for the
services of the Ninth Division in the South West Pacific area. I note that the movement of the 25th United States Division to the Australian area will be completed before the first of the year.

I am very grateful for this. I wish you to know that we shall co-operate in the plan that you have outlined, which, as we see it, does not envisage the utilisation of the Ninth Division for any further operations in the Middle East or adjacent areas. We look forward to the fulfilment of the understanding that the Ninth Division shall be returned to Australia as early as possible in the New Year.

9. We regret that owing to other demands on shipping you are unable to arrange the return of the equipment of the Ninth Division. There are certain minimum requirements to ensure effective employment of the Ninth Division in the South West Pacific Area, and it is requested arrangements be made for the return of the following:

(a) All personal equipment.

(b) Weapons, rifles, pistols, anti-tank rifles, Bren guns, mortars two-inch, and associated stores.

(c) Engineer stores, hand tools, compressors, pumping sets, dynamo welding plant complete with trailer required. No bridging equipment required.

(d) Signal stores, generating sets and charging sets only.

(e) Workshop equipment 68, equipment including hand tools (major portion is included with technical vehicles referred to in (f))

(f) Vehicles: breakdown trucks 46, garage trucks 31, machinery trucks 29, workshop engineers trucks 2, trailer laundry 10, all complete with equipment.
I am informed all the above items except vehicles and equipment carried in them could be stowed in personnel ships. It is estimated that approximately 3500 tons of shipping space additional to that available in personnel ships will be necessary. My advisers suggest that 3500 tons could be lifted in shipping from the Middle East regularly proceeding to Australia and I should be glad if arrangements could be made for this to be done.

I have also forwarded a message to Mr. Churchill informing him of the substance of this message to you.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN.
FROM PM Curtin, Australia  TO The President

SERIAL Unnumbered  DATE 8 December 1942

TO RTOR MAP ROOM VIA Australian Legation

SUBJECT Return of Ninth Division from Mid East to Australia.

ACTION

Answers PRES-CURTIN, 2 Dec 42.

By direction of President, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. Admiral Leahy referred copy to General Deane, JCS, for preparation of draft reply by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Draft reply submitted to President by Joint Chiefs of Staff by memo, 22 Dec 42; approved by President; reply sent to Prime Minister Curtin via Australian Legation, 23 December 42.

(Also see CURTIN-PRES, 22 Dec 42.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
Text as transmitted by FDRT to Churchill (MAP Room Box 3) on FDRT to Churchill #221.
Declassified 10/14/71.
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CURTIN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
DATE: 18 NOVEMBER 1942

Dear President Roosevelt,

I have carefully considered the suggestion in your telegram of November 1st for the retention of the 9th Imperial Division in the Middle East and your proposal to send the United States Division to Australia from Hawaii conditional on the right to divert it elsewhere within the Southwest and South Pacific areas.

2. As explained to Mr. Churchill in my telegram of October 17th, which was repeated to you, it is impossible for Australia to despatch to the Middle East the reinforcements necessary for the maintenance of the 9th Division in view of the difficulties already being experienced in maintaining the Australian Army and meeting the heavy wastage from tropical warfare in New Guinea. Unless the Division returns to Australia it cannot be maintained, whereas it can be built up again in Australia by the allocation of personnel from other formations which are being disbanded owing to contraction in the number of our divisions.

3. The attitude of the Australian Government has all along been quite definite and clear regarding the future employment of this Division.

4. After the outbreak of war with Japan, and following a statement generously volunteered by Mr.
Churchill that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Australian troops returning to defend their homeland, the Government requested that all Australian troops overseas should return to Australia.

5. In March we allowed two brigade groups of the 6th Division to be used in Ceylon on the understanding that the 9th Division would return to Australia as soon as possible. Had these brigades returned directly to Australia we would have been able to strengthen the forces in New Guinea much earlier with battle trained troops.

6. In April the Government agreed to the postponement of the return of the 9th Division until it could be replaced in the Middle East.

7. When the Australian Government had every reason to expect the return of the Division in July it raised no objection to its transfer from Palestine to the Western Desert to help stem the Axis advance. Mr. Churchill was advised there would be difficulties in the despatch of further reinforcements from Australia and that when available reserves were exhausted the Division would have to be withdrawn from the line of battle.

8. On July 30th in a further personal telegram to Mr. Churchill I stated it was impossible for the Government to do more than agree to an extension of the period for the temporary retention of the 9th Division in
the Middle East. A limit was set to reinforcements that would be available and it was specifically stated ancillary units were not to be broken up for use as reinforcements. It was emphasized the Commander-in-Chief Middle East would therefore need to have these facts in mind in his use of the Division.

9. Mr. Churchill, the Australian Representative on the United Kingdom War Cabinet and the Commander of the Division have been informed:

(a) No further reinforcements for the 9th Division are being despatched from Australia.

(b) The Government is not agreeable to the 9th Division being broken up by the replacement of wastage from ancillary and other units.

(c) It is essential that the Commander-in-Chief Middle East should have regard to this position in his use of the 9th Division.

The Government views the present use of the Division as absolutely governed by the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by it some time ago and I have told Mr. Churchill that in our plans and dispositions we are relying on the Division being returned in good shape and strength. Now that the situation in the Middle East for which the 9th Division was retained has been cleared up satisfactorily, the Government expects early effect to be given the understanding reached in April.
10. You might be interested to know that on the entry of Italy into the war certain units of the 6th Division reinforcements and Corps troops were diverted to the United Kingdom, where they were organized into the 9th Division for the defence of Britain against invasion. This Division, which was later transferred to the Middle East and withstood the siege of Tobruk, therefore really became an additional overseas commitment. It was realized at the time that it would probably be beyond our capacity to maintain it and experience has proved this to be the case.

11. Decisions on global strategy have been taken by Mr. Churchill and yourself. The Commonwealth Government has shown a ready willingness to co-operate in other theatres at considerable risk to the security of Australia. This has been demonstrated by the service overseas of our naval, land and air forces and our continued participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Government considers the contributions it has made to other theatres entitle it to the assurance that the fullest possible support will be given to the situation in the Pacific. You will recall that the military advisers of the Commonwealth Government consider that three further divisions are necessary in the Southwest Pacific area. In view of its responsibilities for the local defence of Australia and in light of the views of its
advisers, the Government feels that the maximum strength of Australian forces should be concentrated in the Southwest Pacific area to meet all contingencies of the military situation in the Pacific.

12. We are grateful to learn that you are sending to the South or Southwest Pacific Area the Division from Hawaii. We would be delighted to welcome it to Australia where it would be an invaluable addition to the two splendid American Divisions already here.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CO-ORDINATED STAFFS, WASHINGTON

President 19 Nov 42

I enclose telegram from Prime Minister of Australia.

I hope you will consider this and let me have your judgment as to what reply should be made. Obviously the British Combined Staffs should be consulted and their opinion be given great weight, in view of the fact that while the African operation is largely American on the western end, it is preponderantly British on the eastern end.

It is my snap judgment that Mr. Curtin should be told:

(a) That it is essential that General Alexander’s and General Montgomery’s operation continue in full swing and that it cannot be interrupted by the removal of any division or unit until the whole African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in our favor and every German and every Italian is driven out of Africa.

(b) I think we should impress on Mr. Curtin that the opening of the Mediterranean to through shipping to the Far East via the Suez Canal is of major benefit to the safety of Australia, and that the work of the Ninth Division is a component part of the whole.
(c) As to the return of the Division to Australia after the completion of the African operation, I feel that this is a matter primarily for the decision of the Combined Staffs here and in London, and I am advising Mr. Churchill to that effect.

(d) If I felt sure that the return of the Ninth Division to Australia would result in its being reconstituted as an experienced fighting division available for use in New Guinea or some other Island, I would be inclined to let it go back to Australia for that purpose. The division is entitled to a rest period after its strenuous campaigns in the Egyptian area, but I think it should be kept intact, filled up with trained officers and made definitely available to take the offensive northward from Australia.

F. D. R.
FROM  Paul Curtin, Australia  

TO  The President  

SERIAL  Unnumbered  

DATE/TIME  18 Nov 1942  

OR FILE NUMBER  

SEND MAP ROOM  VIA  

SUBJECT  Return of 9th Australian Division to Australia from Mid East.  

ACTION  

1. Answers PRES-CURTIN 28 Oct 42.  

2. To Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 Nov 42, by memo signed "F.D.R." for preparation of reply. Draft reply forwarded to President by Admiral Leahy, 23 Nov 42. Slightly altered by Mr. Hopkins; para added by the President.  

3. Answer sent as PRES-CURTIN 2 Dec 42, via Australian Legation.  

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED:
November 17th, 1942

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the people and the Government of the Commonwealth, I convey to you the gratitude and appreciation we have for the magnificent services rendered to us by your gallant forces in the battles of the Solomon Islands.

The association of our fighting men has been complete and I value it not only for what has been achieved but as symbolic of the unity and determination our countries have in the great struggle we jointly and wholeheartedly wage to save ourselves and civilization.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN."

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
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MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Australian Prime Minister, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

I have not sent an earlier acknowledgment to your reply to my recent messages on the situation and needs of the Southwest Pacific, as the views of Mr. Churchill, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and yourself have been receiving the most careful consideration of the Government and its advisers. The Australian Chiefs of Staff were asked to submit a new appreciation of the Australian defence position in the light of these advices, and I am attaching hereto a copy of a cable that has been despatched to Mr. Churchill.

2. On behalf of the people and Government of Australia I would express to you our deep appreciation of the assurances that you have given for the fulfilment of commitments of forces, supplies and equipment for the Southwest Pacific area.

3. We are following with the most intense interest the gallant fight of the American forces in the Solomon Islands, and trust that their efforts will be crowned with victory. The Australian forces with their American comrades are, I am sure, equally resolved to defeat the Japanese in New Guinea. We hope that the operations in both theatres will result in the Japanese being thrown back and held, until final defeat can be inflicted on them.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN. "

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 18th, 1942
TELEGRAM FROM MR. CURTIN TO MR. CHURCHILL:

1. The Government and the Advisory War Council have given the most earnest and careful consideration to the replies of President Roosevelt and yourself in the recent series of cables on:
   (a) the concentration of superior naval strength in the Pacific;
   (b) the provision of aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force;
   (c) the need for an increase in the land forces in the South West Pacific area.

2. The Government has noted the views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the defence of Australia, communicated in the President's reply and is deeply appreciative of the assurances which the President has given for the fulfilment of the commitments of forces, supplies and equipment for the South West Pacific area.

3. The Australian Chiefs of Staff were asked to submit a new appreciation of the Australian defence position in the light of the answers received to the representations initiated on their advice. In the course of this review they have carefully examined the manpower position and our capacity to meet our vital needs. The following are their observations in regard to forces:

   (a) The number required for the present order of battle in Australia is 541,000. The present strength is 485,000 and it is estimated that a further 34,000 might be obtained from a further review of classes I to 4 and from women. Class 4 comprises married men from 35 to 45 years of age. Class 5, comprising men between the age of 45 to 60, has been made available for call up by the Allied Works Council. There is thus a deficiency in the war establishment of 22,000.

   (b) The Army's minimum need for replacement of wastage is 7,000 to 8,000 a month, against an estimated monthly intake in the coming year of 1,100 (youths turning 18). This does not enable
existing army formations to be maintained. Eight infantry battalions have already been disbanded and absorbed into other units. This has involved the disbandment of the 10th Division and the absorption of its units into other formations. A further decrease in the number of battalions up to a total decrease of eleven battalions is contemplated.

(c) The Army Forces in New Guinea are operating under extreme tropical conditions that will result in heavy wastage of personnel. The 9th Division A.I.F. is also engaged in active operations, and it will require considerable reinforcements to maintain it. The provision of these reinforcements will make a heavy drain upon the manpower resources. Furthermore, the Army is fulfilling increasing commitments in Australia for coast defence and anti-aircraft personnel for the protection of naval and air bases, such as Cockburn Sound, Albany, Townsville and Cairns.

(d) It is possible that an army force of a minimum strength of five divisions will be needed in New Guinea. There are at present the equivalent of three Australian divisions there. Two American divisions are available that could be sent there, and one of these is in process of moving to New Guinea. It is not possible to send to New Guinea any further Australian formations, owing to the dangerously depleted strength of the forces available for the defence of the mainland. The Army’s resources of manpower will be taxed to the utmost to maintain the formations in New Guinea.

(e) It follows that reinforcements for the 9th Division in the Middle East will not be available in the numbers required, and that unless the Division returns to Australia it cannot be maintained, and it will in a few months cease to be a fully effective fighting unit; whereas it can be built up again in Australia by the allocation of personnel of other formations being disbanded.

4. The Government has consulted the Advisory War Council, which as you are aware, comprises representatives of the Opposition Parties and Sir Earle Page as an additional co-opted member. The unanimous conclusion was that the Government should request the early
return to Australia of the 9th Division A.I.F., in accordance with the arrangement in cable No.245 of 14th April, when the Government agreed to the postponement of the return of this Division until it could be replaced in the Middle East and the necessary shipping and escort could be made available for its transportation to Australia. On 16th July in my telegram JOGCU No.37 I outlined the looming difficulties in regard to maintaining the flow of reinforcements to the Middle East, and on 30th July I stated in my telegram JOGCU No.38 the strategical reasons for the Australian viewpoint which made it impossible for us to do more than agree to an extension of the period for temporary retention of the 9th Division in the Middle East. The Government feels that these reasons have been fully confirmed by subsequent Japanese action in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and the outcome of these operations is of the most crucial importance to the future of Australia.

5. Finally the Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific area has expressed to the Government his apprehension at the growing shrinkage in Army combat troops consequent upon the reduction in number and organisation of Australian Divisions. As we cannot maintain the 9th Division in the Middle East, we are not agreeable to the Division being broken up by replacement of wastage from ancillary or other units.

6. I would add that in the manpower review the following position was noted in regard to overseas commitments for naval and air personnel:

(a) NAVY.

Of a total personnel strength of 25,520, approximately 3,000 are serving on Admiralty account outside Australian waters. The number required for the R.A.N. by June 30th 1943 is 29,500. There is no further commitment for manning R.N. ships.
(b) AIR FORCE.

The present strength of the R.A.A.F. is approximately 100,000, of whom 12,500 are serving overseas. The annual planned intake is 17,600, of whom 11,200 are for the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Government, after review of the matter in the light of the manpower situation and the requirements for the Army, has agreed to the continued participation by Australia in the Empire Air Training Scheme to the extent that this may be practicable, having regard to the total manpower position in Australia and subject to the maintenance of a regulated inward flow of Australian air crew with war experience, in order to provide an experienced nucleus of pilots and air crews in all R.A.A.F. units based on Australia.

7. A copy of this message has been forwarded to the President.
My dear Mr. President:

The Australian Minister has just sent to me this message addressed to you by Mr. Curtin, which I am enclosing herewith.

The Minister has asked to have the opportunity of talking with you regarding this message. I have told him that I would ask you to let me know if it would be convenient for you to see him about this matter on Wednesday immediately after the meeting of the Pacific War Council, which he expects to attend. Will you let me know if that is satisfactory for you so that I can inform the Minister accordingly?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
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| SUBJECT       | Return of 9th Australian Division from Mid East. (Forwards copy of message sent by PM Churchill.) |

| ACTION | |
|--------||
| 1. Acknowledges PRES-CURTIN 19 May 42, with explanation of delayed answer. | |
| 2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and preparation of reply. | |
| 3. Draft reply submitted by Adm Leahy, 27 Oct 42; approved by the President without change, 28 Oct 42. | |
| 4. Reply sent to Pm. Curtin as PRES-CURTIN 28 Oct 42. Copy also sent to Churchill as PASS-Pm #203, 28 Oct 42. | |

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ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
Sir,

On instructions from the Australian Prime Minister, the Honourable John Curtin, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for favour of transmission to the President, a personal message to President Roosevelt from Mr. Curtin.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

[Signature]

Chargé d'Affaires

The Honourable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been asked by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"In view of your interest in the military situation in our part of the world, as manifested by your thoughtful message of May 4th, I am repeating to you for your information a telegram which has been despatched to Dr. Evatt in London and which conveys the impressions of the Australian Government as it sees the position at the present time.

(Message to Dr. Evatt begins)

The further attempt of the Japanese to move southward has been frustrated in the recent engagement in the Coral Sea but it is of vital importance to build up and maintain adequate strength to repulse any further attacks of this nature. I hope there is a full realisation in London and Washington of the grave threat with which we were confronted last week. We knew the strength of the enemy concentration, we knew his intentions and we knew the prospective date of his attack, yet we were unable to marshal superior strength to deal him a heavy blow and the whole of his convoy of twenty-four transports fell back on Rabaul unscathed. Fortune will not continue to favour us with these opportunities if we do not grasp them."
Following is a restatement of the Australian Government's viewpoint on the situation:

(1) Japan by carefully prepared advances and methodical acquisition of the air bases to cover the next step has acquired extensive areas and established herself in French Indo-China, Hongkong, the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma and New Guinea. She has secured access to vital sources of supply. Her main naval strength is still intact. Her land-based aircraft in the Archipelago and narrow waters are a formidable deterrent to naval operations in these regions.

(2) Defeat and capture of forces in areas attacked, with the retreat of those in Burma, will free for further operations Japanese forces employed over a wide area. The indifference or in some cases co-operative attitude of the native populations to Japanese occupation has relieved Japan of the obligation of maintaining large garrisons to prevent insurrection or to combat guerilla activities. Japan is therefore in a position to regroup her forces and select her next objectives.

(3) There would appear to be no grounds for assuming that she will relax her offensive. She is a partner of the Axis and it is to her interest to co-operate in the defeat and destruction of the United Nations. The choices appear to be an attack on Russia, on India or in the Southwest Pacific area.

(4) As to the probable direction or directions in which Japan will move, the Mandated Islands, with their naval and air bases, afford a substantial measure of defence to her Eastern flank until they are captured by amphibious
operations. Within the area now controlled by her, Japan is able to follow her earlier practice of concentrating superior force at the point of contact and she is able to launch a powerful attack against the Southwest Pacific area.

(5) A similar scale of attack on India cannot be made from a comparably secure position insofar as bases are concerned as the lines of communication in the Indian Ocean are much more vulnerable to a flank attack. Also there would be a dispersion of naval strength west and east of Singapore which would handicap the concentration of a Japanese fleet to cope with a fleet action by the United States' fleet in the Pacific Ocean. The circumstances for an offensive against India are not so favourable for a successful outcome as those against the Southwest Pacific area.

(6) It would therefore appear from the Japanese point of view that the soundest course would be to move against the Southwest area first and leave India alone until the results of these operations are ascertained.

(7) In view of this probable course of action that is open to the enemy it is of vital importance to ensure that the forces in the Southwest Pacific area are sufficient to ensure its successful defence. As General Wavell said when Commander-in-Chief of the ABDA area, "The Japanese drive must be stopped by making a stand and fighting him somewhere." Australia with its man power resources is the last area in the Southwest Pacific where this is possible. If at the same time the Japanese home territory, overseas bases and lines of communication can be regularly raided the maximum defensive-offensive will be developed. The defensive position having been secured, an offensive strategy can be adopted as soon as the necessary forces are gathered.
(8) The advantages of this course of action are several. It would ensure the security of the Southwest Pacific area. It would be the best means of protecting India. It would provide a second front for assistance to the Russians by relieving pressure on Siberia and releasing forces for use on the European front or by enabling a cruiser-squadron to join with the United Nations in an early defeat of Japan, when the entire effort could be concentrated against Germany. Finally, a large scale offensive can be staged more easily and quickly in the Southwest Pacific area than in any other area.

(9) If Japan should move in force against Australia and obtain a foothold – as threatened to occur last week in the Coral Sea action – it may be too late to send assistance. It is possible that in the long run the territory might be recovered, but the country may have been ravished and the people largely decimated. History would gravely indict such a happening to a nation which sacrificed 60,000 of its men on overseas battlefields in the last war and, at its peril, has sent its naval, military and air forces to fight overseas in this one. In the defence of Britain, after the fall of France, there still remained the navy and air force to repel the invader and the air force did so. Australia is not so favourably placed. It is a vast territory with poor communications, a small naval squadron, a relatively small army, neither adequately equipped nor fully trained, and a small air force. With superior sea power the enemy can bring to bear superior force and can sever or seriously harass lines of communication for overseas supplies. It is imperative and vitally urgent to strengthen this place while time and circumstances permit.

(10) The defence of the Southwest Pacific area is the obligation of the United Nations who have approved the Directive
of the Commander-in-Chief and appointed him to Supreme Command. It devolves on them to provide the forces required. Australia is developing its maximum potentiality, but it is not sufficient, as the Commander-in-Chief has already stated. The deficiency must come from elsewhere and come quickly.

(Message to Dr. Evatt ends)

(Message to President ends)
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Potentialities of enemy attack on Australia by way of New Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. **Answers PRES-CURTIN, 4 May 42.**

2. Referred to UnderSec State Welles by President, 16 May 42, for preparation of reply in conjunction with Gen Marshall and Adm King. Msg referred by UnderSec Welles to Gen Marshall and Adm King by memo on 16 May 42. Letter, dated 17 May 42, signed by Adm King and countersigned by Gen Marshall, forwarded proposed reply to UnderSec Welles. This letter, with enclosed draft of reply, was forwarded to President by UnderSec Welles on 19 May 42.

3. (Additional para suggested by Adm King, but was not approved by the President.) President approved draft message. *Reply sent as PRES-CURTIN, 19 May 42.*
From: London
To: The President of The United States

Unnumbered December 19, 1942.

Personal and under General Eisenhower.

It is not what Eden told me the British wanted, namely to place both Murphy and MacMillan under General Eisenhower.
Leaving here today.

Winant
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

There is a real desire here and in England that a statement be issued by the appropriate authority indicating that civil restrictions imposed on the population in North Africa by the Vichy Government have been withdrawn, including the freeing of political prisoners, the abolition of the ban against labor unions and the lifting or restrictions against the Jews.

I think that such a statement, if it could be made, would be very helpful, but I hesitate to do this without Eisenhower knowing about it and getting his views. Would you be good enough to get an expression from Eisenhower on this point and an indication from him as to the effect of a statement such as I have indicated on the Moslems and the Arabs? I would like to have his views as to who should issue such a statement. It would, I think, be much better if it could come from Eisenhower, or he might prefer to have it done here. At any rate, I want his opinion.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 260, December 3, 1942

For the President. (Signed Winant) Eden, after I had given him your message in relation to questions in the House of Commons on Darlan, decided, after consultation with the Prime Minister, that questions relating to North Africa would be answered only in secret session. The Commons will go into secret session shortly, in order, as Eden stated on Tuesday, "to be informed at the earliest possible moment of developments in North Africa, both in the military and political sphere". Eden added, "This, of course, includes the position of Admiral Darlan."

Agitation continues here on this issue in Parliament, trade unions, Jewish organizations and other groups, in the British press and among members of our own press. Men like Daniell of the New York Times and Ed Murrow of Columbia Broadcasting are upset and difficult to reason with. I think the whole business would subside to reasonable proportions if we could get some control of Darlan's broadcasts. Today's papers carried a statement from him that he had assumed "the rights and responsibilities of a government", and had established under his authority a high commissioner and a French imperial council which together would "represent France in the world". This runs contrary to your statement that "the temporary arrangements made with Darlan apply without exception to the current local situation only".

This morning Eden, because of this news and because of continued pressure of questioning in Parliament, declared the British government "were in no way consulted about that statement and they do not consider themselves in any way bound by it."

No paper here carried any statement that you had invited De Gaulle to go to the United States. Only one paper stated that he was going to the United States at all until yesterday when all the papers carried your press conference statement that you did not know if General De Gaulle was coming but that you would see him if
he came. Admiral Stark had prepared him for this and he made no comment or protest. I had a long talk with General Catroux on Tuesday and got across to him that trust and generosity were part of a soldier's faith. He is very suspicious of Darlan, who is his wife's cousin, and he considers him an opportunist. He agrees, however, that as a military man Eisenhower took right action, and I think he has influenced De Gaulle to be patient and reasonable. Whether De Gaulle will break out again because of Darlan's statement is still problematical.

It would also be of help if we could get some pictures here of French soldiers fighting alongside our forces and a statement that those who are not engaged are anxious to join in the battle but are necessarily waiting for arms and ammunition to make their contribution effective. I realize as I said in my last message how difficult it is to carry on an active campaign and have the time to consider political reactions in other areas of concern to the United Nations.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of The United States
No Number, November 27, 1942

To the President from Washington. In the House debate on November twenty-sixth the following question was asked by Mr. Galloway: "Can the Leader of the House inform us whether it is the case that a protocol has been prepared, and will be signed within a very short time, making Darlan the High Commissioner of North Africa? Is it not desirable that there should be a discussion in this House before such a step is taken?"

Gallacher is the Communist member of the House. He is not the sort of man who would normally ask this type of question. Eden felt that it was not likely that he had put this question without outside suggestion and perhaps some knowledge that there was an agreement between General Eisenhower and Admiral Darlan. His informant might be he has no idea. Eden tells me that although he refused to answer the question yesterday he is bound to be pressed in debate on this point Tuesday or Wednesday of this coming week. General Eisenhower has urged that no announcement of any kind be made about the agreement. Eden asks that if the United States government share this view they authorize him to say that "The United States government do not wish any information given about the arrangements between General Eisenhower and the French authorities in North Africa during the present critical phase of military operations."

I have forwarded to the Department today (my six six nine seven of two seven November) Eden's statement in the House on the twenty-fifth and the exchange of questions on the twenty-sixth covering references to Darlan and DeGaulle.

This morning Admiral Stark forwarded a message through the Navy which I hoped you would see stating that General DeGaulle had paid a friendly call on him yesterday. There was no statement made in Parliament as to DeGaulle's trip to the United States. I thought if a reference was made to a possible journey the papers would misinterpret it as an invitation.
The use of Darlan has allowed the small minority who make a profession of attacking the government to do so. Eden tells me that this is not important but that the supporting members are also troubled and he feels that that is equally true of the British public. They have confidence in your statement, respect for Eisenhower and real appreciation for the North African campaign; but as he explained the situation it is a reaction of the non-conformist conscience which prompts some people to feel that using Darlan has detracted in some sense from a great operation. The large number of letters written in protest to the Times, Guardian and other newspapers and the weekly secret intelligence report on public opinion would seem to confirm Eden's estimate of public reaction. The Prime Minister feels that DeGaulle's visit will be helpful. He is less disturbed than Eden by opinion here. As I see it the issue in North Africa forced us to make a practical decision that saved life and time. The problem here is psychological and moral as it relates to public opinion. An already established propaganda affects values here. It would help if we could get more information on the freeing of political prisoners, cancellation of the anti-Jewish laws, recognition of the rights of labor unions and similar actions giving a sense of liberalization within the occupied area. I think these things are important. I know how difficult it must be to accomplish them within a battle area and immediately following occupation.

No Sig

Copy being sent by plane (by plane)
to President - Sat. Nov. 28th.
To the President from Winant, the White House, Washington.

Brendan Bracken, The Prime Minister, Eden and others delighted with your statement on Darlan. It will be in the British Press in the morning. I was trying to help here knowing our heavy investments but with mighty little capital to go on. Please thank Mrs. Roosevelt for her very thoughtful message which I was very happy to receive.

No Signature

Date November 17
Filed 1220A/18

WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FROM London
TO The President of the United States
NUMBER None, November 17

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1 1972
Personal and secret to the President from Winant.

Yesterday after receipt of your Naval communication number two zero nine regarding Ambassadors Hayes conversation with the Spanish foreign minister both the Prime Minister and Eden were disturbed. They felt that we appeared to be taking the initiative in the Spanish situation and it was their understanding that that was to be their primary responsibility. Their concern was accentuated by the fact that they had not heard of that time from Hoare. They wanted me to mention the apparent misunderstanding to you. I postponed doing so waiting Hoare's message which came in around seven o'clock last night which was favorable and added that after Franco had spoken to both Hayes and Hoare he had gone off for a days hunting. The Prime Minister and Eden both told me later in the evening that everything was all right and as Eden said, all was well that ended well.

I had dinner last night at Ten Downing Street with the Prime Minister. General W B Smith and Sir Charles Portal were there. Much good news came in on the African fronts during the evening and before we left Brendan and the "Brigadier"
dropped in with the news of Darlan's situation which I was told was being forwarded to you.

Later in the evening the Prime Minister began discussing future plans and said it would be most helpful if General Marshall could come over here at this time. General Smith acquiesced and suggested it might be well if Admiral King came also, in which the Prime Minister concurred. I believe myself it would be a very good thing if they both came as the success of our armies has made future planning an immediate problem. During the conversation the Prime Minister asked me if I thought you would like to come at this time. I told him that I rather doubted your wanting to come now. He had had Lord Portal call me earlier in the week to say that there was a house available for you. Lord Portal's object in calling me then was to ask Mrs. Roosevelt to have a look at it.

In the evenings conversation which I do not want to report officially as the Prime Minister was thinking out loud he stressed the present strategic position of Turkey in relation to Allied strategy. Sir Charles Portal had mentioned that the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington within the last couple of days. The Prime Minister felt that Turkey had not been sufficiently underlined in this plan. He said he would communicate his ideas to you on this subject.
The newspapers today carried very favorable reports on our operations in Africa. I thought that the press and radio stories were well handled by Bracken.

Last week I made an appointment to have lunch with General Smuts today. I have just returned from lunching with him. I wanted again to press his going to the United States. I postponed doing this because he has been confined to his rooms because of a severe cold and it made him further question the advisability of taking on this added journey. When I arrived he had just received Averell's cable which helped but began our interview by explaining why he could not come. I believe I convinced him that he should go. He told me he would give me an answer in the next two days.

Mrs. Roosevelt's postscript which she gave last night immediately following the news broadcast was very well received here. The Prime Minister, Eden, General Smuts and many others spoke of it with very genuine enthusiasm. She is spending this week in Northern England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. She and Elliott are both well. I heard from them both last night.

The winter transatlantic plane schedules are now in effect. I am very much against Mrs. Roosevelt using the Pan-American which would necessitate her going via Lisbon. Both Henry Morgenthau and I questioned her using the American Export Line because of the three long hops involved and the limited
experience in using this route which has just been inaugurated. The British Colonial Office is anxious to have her stop at Bermuda on her return, since Bermuda is a good example of collaboration between our two governments in defense of the Caribbean area, I know the British would be glad to have her as a guest on a British plane. She could then go on from Bermuda on a commercial plane or if you approve she might return from here direct on a stratoliner. She told me you had raised the question of her travelling as a private citizen. I would appreciate your advice in this matter. She has done a great public service here.

There is tremendous enthusiasm in Great Britain about what has been accomplished by our troops.

Prime
October 15, 1942

From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No: None
Date: October 15, 1942.

For the President... Secretary Morgenthau arrived this evening. We are all delighted to see him.

Thank you for your good message. Signed Winant.

Prime

Accepted in Rep. Room at 1445 Oct 15.
On Tuesday I had luncheon with Bracken and Eisenhower and Bracken told us he had been informed that the Chicago Tribune would apply for a license. I had already wired you this information the day before as Carroll had reported it to me as coming from Bracken. The Prime Minister replied yesterday to your message to him. I have talked with Bracken, Eisenhower and Carroll. Eisenhower told Bracken he did not want the Chicago Tribune. He asked me this morning to tell you that he had already gone to work on the problem of establishing a small daily newspaper for our forces here. We can turn the Stars and Stripes which is now a weekly into a daily paper, omitting a Sunday edition. Eisenhower feels that deficits could be met with army funds available for morale services. It will probably pay its own way, however Bracken told me he could make all necessary printing facilities available. Carroll is arranging to furnish through OWI spot news, including sports news, home town news and other material of interest to our troops. For the President from Winant.

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have investigated the suggestion that Army funds be used to subsidize the "Stars and Stripes" as a daily newspaper for troops in the United Kingdom and find that appropriated funds cannot be used for this purpose since the newspaper is to be sold.

The present weekly magazine, "Yank," is beginning to show a profit, and it is proposed that these funds may be used to assist the "Stars and Stripes." It is also suggested that subscriptions might be taken for "Yank," a weekly magazine, and the "Stars and Stripes," a daily paper, as a combined subscription at a price which would carry both.

If this suggestion meets with your approval I shall have it put into effect immediately.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

Original transmitted to President 10/9/42.

Copy for Captain McCrea
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have talked to Elmer Davis about a daily edition of the STARS AND STRIPES. He believes it should be a paper published by the United States Army and he will get at it at once.

H.L.H.
October 6, 1942

Dear Wings,

Thanks so much for your wire of the 3th.

I wired Churchill immediately asking him to hold up the license for the CHICAGO TRIBUNE. I am sure we need a daily paper of our own and have already talked to Elmer Davis about it.

I shall look forward to seeing Camrose and shall certainly find an opportunity of seeing Herschel Johnson.

I do hope you are well and will find it possible to get home before Christmas.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
John G. Winant,
American Ambassador,
American Embassy,
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

October 5, 1942

From Embassy London

To The President of the United States

October 5th, 1942

Personal and confidential to the President. This message was dictated last night but is forward today Oct fifth.

I thought you would like to know that the report of your journey in the United States heartened the British as well as those of home.

The War Cabinet as well as others here have been disturbed by adverse information on present American opinion of the British. The last to reach here was a very frank statement which Willkie made to Carr, British Ambassador in Moscow, and which the latter cabled here. The British are also troubled about the Indian situation and its reaction in the United States.

Today Wallace Carroll, the representative here of the OWI, tells me he had a talk with Brendan Bracken who said that he was expecting to get a request for a license from the Chicago Tribune to print and distribute an American newspaper for our troops in Great Britain. Bracken is much disturbed by the situation. It would be possible to refuse a permit on the ground of shortage of paper but it is a fact that there is a demand for an American Daily Newspaper by our forces. The Stars and Stripes might be made a daily instead of a weekly or some other newspaper Syndicate might make an application but if this were to be done, shortage of paper should not be used as an excuse for denying the request from The Chicago Tribune. I wish you would mention this to Elmer Davis and ask him to advise me on this question which involves both information and relationships. The question has not been officially brought to my attention.

Lord Caanrose, the publisher and owner of the Daily Telegraph, left for the United States Saturday. He is a strong supporter of Mr Churchill and has always been a friend of the United States. One of his daughters lives there and his wife went to college there. His brother is Lord Kemsley. They run separate newspaper enterprises, I hope very much Caanrose will be able to see you. He is a genuine friend.
A fortnight ago Maisky talked to half a dozen of our American reporters off the record urging the necessity of a Second Front. It bothered both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Maisky told Mr. Eden he was not acting under instructions from his Government. Friday he asked Eden, The Turkish Ambassador, myself and two or three others for lunch. I took it to be a peace gesture, although the day before he had complained to me about the removal of the Atrocities, about which Averell wired Harry, and he was also troubled about the possible postponement of the next convoy which you know about. The Turkish Ambassador has been most friendly. I hope the visit of the Turkish Newspapers will be a success. They seemed very satisfied with their stay here.

Herschel Johnson has come from Stockholm. He feels that a blockade of Sweden would be the greatest mistake. He tells me ninety percent of the people in Sweden are in sympathy with the United Nations cause, that they support a neutral policy as a matter of necessity because they do not want to be subjected to the fate of other small nations on the continent. Johnson said that they have a well trained Army of six hundred thousand and if invaded will fight. I hope you will see him when he is in Washington as it would greatly help his standing with the Swedish Government.

Myron Taylor arrived last night. He is tired but well. He tells me he had a successful trip. We are dining with the Prime Minister tomorrow night and with Eden the following night.

(Doc) Matthews is carrying out your instructions.

I have spent much time on problems relating to the United States Air Force in Great Britain. I wish it could be considered not only in its relation to other fronts but also as a major offensive and defensive operation striking directly against German industry and morale. Success is dependent upon the continuance and increasing weight of attack. Goering's acknowledgement today of the
serious damage done in Germany and also his statement in regard to the decrease of numbers of British Planes in night bombing operations I believe are both true statements. In spite of very considerable scepticism at the outset here we have already successfully developed daylight bombing raids. I have studied hundreds of photographs of damage accomplished. Tonight Sholto Douglas, who commands the British Fighter Forces, told me that the pictures of our last attack showed greater accuracy and concentration of hits on the target than anything either the English or the Germans have done since the War began. I do not believe there is any theatre of war in which greater damage can be done the enemy with less loss of life and equipment. The destruction of enemy aircraft in the air and in the making, including other armament plants and power plants, in both a major defensive and offensive operation. There is no other area under our control that approximates the advantage of the British Isles from the point of view of distance from Germany and once outside of the United States with supply depots, air fields, air field bases and available support to support a major air operation against Germany. The enormous increase in mine laying in Estuaries and Harbors since Harris took over the British Bomber Command is not always appreciated but it reaches out to German Submarine Operations off our Atlantic Coast. Harris himself invented the Aerial Mine. When he started on this phase of aerial attack only one mine could be carried by one plane. Now a plane can carry three mines on a single mission. Instead of three or four hundred mines having been planted, several thousand have been laid. Harris believes he gets one ship to twenty eight mines planted. The utilization of planes for this operation, however, takes planes from the British night land Bombing Forces. New techniques developed in the last six months through Air Reconnaissance Photography covering all German controlled Ports have enabled the British to cover the movement of ships by day and tonnage which has been of great assistance to Air Coastal Command and the British Navy. The ablest airmen here whether our own or British agree that night bombing and day bombing in its effect on enemy morale adds up to more than either day bombing or night bombing.
To The President of the United States

From: Embassy London

Page 4

I know the increasing demands and great pressures that must fall on those who have to do with the allocation of our present war production at this time but I feel so strongly that the program laid down for Air Operations in the British Isles was so wisely planned and the operations already so well begun that a diversion to other theatres would be a tragic mistake. I am further convinced that the Germans will attempt an all out attack on Great Britain by Air and Submarine. If we are limited to carrying on only a feeble bombing campaign and permit the Germans to rehabilitate their Air Force with little interference they may well turn the tactics we are teaching them against the British Isles. The battle of Britain was won by small margins. A German Air Force organized to cooperate with a Land Army was at a disadvantage in aerial attack alone and its unprotected bombers were an easy prey to superior British Fighter Planes. If their bombers are equipped with armaments and heavy gunfire which is the basis of our own daylight formation attacks and loaded with the latest type of incendiary bombs and heavy incendiary bombs which in weight and effectiveness are more destructive than anything used at the time of the battle of Britain, it would be possible to lose the second battle of Britain. I hope in this theatre we can carry through the Air Program originally agreed upon.

With a few changes that are practical and possible relating to gun fire and armaments, with tactics that we have ourselves developed, with planes that we have built and designed including the Mustang with the sixty one Merlin engine, with the known improvements which are in the process of development, and with the skill and courage of our pilots we have a chance to build here a great Air Force with extraordinary striking power. Eddie Rickenbacker knows the story. He knows the things that are wanted and the program essential to success. He has seen every kind of operation here and all the men in our Army and the British Air Force who through experience are equipped to know as well as the pilots flying our planes. He leaves for Washington Tuesday. I hope you will see him and give him time to tell you this story.

Signed: Winston
Urgent

Urgent III-G

From: LONDON ENGLAND

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

FOR THE PRESIDENT SIGNED WINANT. I KNOW THAT THE
RUSSIANS PUT GREAT WEIGHT ON BOMBING GERMANY. IF YOU
PLAN TO CARRY FORWARD THE HEAVY BOMBER EFFORT BASED
FROM ENGLAND I BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP TO INCLUDE THIS
IN A STATEMENT TO STALIN. MAISKY TOLD ME ONLY LAST
WEEK THAT THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED IN THE DECREASING NUMBER
OF PLANES RAIDING GERMANY. I HAVE NOT MADE THIS SUGGESTION
TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Prime

Received in Map Room
at 1455, EST, Oct. 6, 1942.

Declassified
State Dept. Letter
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 1 1972
No. 147, September 4th, 1942

Personal for The President.

I thought you might like to know that your speech to
The Youth Congress has had more space in more papers than
any address given in The United States since I came to
London. This is in part due to the fact that we had an
early transcript through the O. W. I. with release date.

From Winstant. This speech has also been translated and
broadcast to all European Countries.

Prime
To the President.

Sunday Constance and I went to the Coppins and had lunch with the Duke and Duchess of Kent. They wanted us to see the baby so that we could tell you about him as I had something to do with the messages which were sent to you. The baby is awfully sweet. They were so proud and happy about him and so genuinely appreciative of your being his God Father and that he was christened Franklin. Always my best to you. Gil.

Prime
To: POTUS

From: London

No. XXXC 135, August 24, 1942

For the President. Prime Minister safely home again. I have never seen him looking so well or in better spirits. Averell with him. Winant.

Prime
ANWAR 3
305PM
Aug. 11

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 341 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.
1415Z

Aug. 11

From London

To The President from Winant. Message
prepared August tenth.

Today I forwarded (Embassys four four five
six August tenth) an official text of Mr. Amery's
broadcast of last night on the Governments position
in relation to India.

His references to China were with full knowledge
of the cable you forwarded to the Prime Minister.

Just before leaving the Prime Minister stated to me
his disagreement with General Chiang Kai Cheks
estimate of Indian situation. I told him I did not
agree with his position in relation to India. He
did not agree with me and showed me his reply to
you.

I hope in reading Amery's broadcast that you
will have had an opportunity to read the summary of
my interview with him reported in Embassys four two
four eight of July thirtieth.

It is my understanding that it was the hope

MAY 1972
Page two

of the Congress leaders to forward their resolutions to the Viceroy accompanied by a conciliatory letter from Gandhi and that they had further prepared messages to you, to General Chiang Kai Chek and to Maisky, believing that the latter would report to Stalin with a supporting statement.

The object of this plan was to gain time and to permit outside intervention in the belief that some final compromise might be reached. Apparently the British did not want this and intervened with arrests before the program was completed. I asked Maisky today if he had received a message. He told me no. He understood that the three messages contemplated had been drafted but whether the Congress leaders had not had time to forward them or whether they had been stopped by the censor he did not know.

Maisky also told me that he had had a talk with Cripps about the Indian situation more than a
Page three of the Indian Council might be made up of the representatives of the interested parties rather than continue by appointment of the Viceroy. It was on this issue that Cripps broke with the Congress.

Cripps said that he would like to consider these suggestions but after two days he wrote Kaisby rejecting the proposal. My guess is that in rejecting the proposal he would like to have been considered the United States or by India, China.

Kaisby who might be an Englishman but appointed by the United States or by India, China.

He further said that by agreement there should be appointed the United States or by India, China.

Cripps agreed to pledge the man power and the productive capacity of the nation to the war effort. He further suggested that the authority now exercised by the Viceroy might then be transferred to the council leading the Viceroy in his relation to the Parliament.

Mainly further suggested that the authority might be exercised by the Viceroy in his relation to the Parliament.
consulted the Prime Minister or other colleagues.

I am quite certain that these suggestions of Maiskys came from Krishna Menon who is an old and devoted friend of Nehru. They both came to see me many times when I was in Geneva. Menon is a poor Indian lawyer who lives in London. Some months ago Anery warned me against him because he had found through his secret service that Menon had called on me. Some weeks ago he encouraged me to see him because he knew that Menon was supporting Nehru as against Gandhi. I personally like Menon. I have found him over the years both honest and intelligent.

There may be something in these suggestions if you felt action is possible. The Congress might agree to accept equal representation with the Mohammedans in the council. That to a considerable extent would answer the Prime Ministers insistence that the interests of the latter, from which a
large part of the British Indian Army is recruited, are protected. The British would want to leave the veto power with the Viceroy if they agreed at all. I have not mentioned the position of the Indian principalities to each of which the Viceroy appoints a resident advisor, as you know, who exercises powerful influence within the individual state. The authority to make these appointments is also a matter of controversy.

There are two things that I am certain of. One, that the present situation is not the result of wise statesmanship and two, that the Indian situation reaches beyond the sole concern of the British Empire. It surely would be to the interests united of the United Nations to have the support of ¼ India in our world wide battle for freedom.

Prime
To POTUS

From London

August 3, 1942

15:39 Z.M.

No. XXXC 121, August 3rd, 1942.

To The President personal and arrived safely Cairo sgd. Winant.

PRIME

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 2 1972
To: The President of the United States
White House - Map Room

No. XXXC 102, July 9, 1942

I was not pleased with the Prime Minister (his number one zero seven) deeply disturbed me. I am disgusted with Brookes ability to influence the Staff here to accept a do nothing policy. I believe the decisions to be made are serious but that there is considerable support here for a courageous offensive military policy. I hope very much that you will ask Harry and General Marshall to come on to discuss problems of military strategy. This is in no way a criticism of General Eisenhower or Generals Clark and Lee who have done a grand job in the brief time they have been here. Sgd Winant.

Prime
No. 95, July 4, 1942

Personal to the President.

Awfully nice letter came in this morning from Franklin dated June 26th. He asked me if I were communicating with you to send you his best. When he comes this way again he plans to stay with me. Gil Winant.

Prime

MAY 2 1972
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT HAVE KEPT ME FULLY INFORMED OF THE PLANS FOR INDEPENDENT SAILINGS TO NORTH RUSSIA. THE PLAN NOW CALLS FOR 10 SHIPS IN THE FAVORABLE CYCLE OF THE MOON FROM OCTOBER 26 TO NOVEMBER 9. THE MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT TELLS ME THAT 10 IS THE MAXIMUM THAT CAN BE HANDLED IN THIS PERIOD. IF, HOWEVER, THE OPERATION IS SUCCESSFUL THEY WOULD TRY IT AGAIN AT THE NEXT FAVORABLE MOON PERIOD.

THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY THE 10 SHIPS FOR THE FIRST OPERATION THEMSELVES, BUT WOULD WELCOME OUR PARTICIPATION ON A 50-50 BASIS. ADMIRAL STARK AND I RECOMMEND THAT WE PARTICIPATE TO THE EXTENT OF 5 SHIPS IN THE FIRST PERIOD AND MORE LATER IF FEASIBLE.

ACTION: PIA.... FILE

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (6) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By E. H. Fuchs Date

MAY 2 1972

IF YOU APPROVE, ADMIRAL STARK AND I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATION. WE WILL KEEP ADMIRAL LAND AND THE NAVY INFORMED OF THE ARRANGEMENTS. AS SHIPS MUST LEAVE HERE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, A QUICK DECISION IS NECESSARY.

ADMIRAL STARK APPROVES THIS CABLE.

ACTION: P1A....FILE

SECRET

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREC.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By R.H. Parker Date MAY 2 1972
Paraphrase of message from Mr. Harriman to the Presidents.

Mr. Harriman states that Churchill and the War Transport Minister have kept him fully informed of the plans for independent sailings to North Russia. The present plan contemplates the sailing of ten ships during the favorable cycle of the moon from October 26th to November 9th. According to the Minister of War Transport, ten is the maximum number of ships that can be handled during this period. If the operation succeeds, the British will try it again during the next favorable moon cycle.

For the initial operation the British are ready to supply the ten ships themselves, but participation on our part on a 50-50 basis would be welcomed. Harriman says that he and Admiral Stark recommend that we participate in the first period to the extent of 5 ships and, if possible, more later.

From our 26 ships now in the United Kingdom and Iceland with cargoes for Russia, we can select these 5 ships. Basis of selection would be the speed and condition of the ships, the character of the crews and masters, and the priority of the cargoes. With the British, we would arrange for the best armament possible and other safety equipment. In connection with the operation, there are many details which can be best worked out in Great Britain. This includes the problem of the crews.

If the President approves, Harriman and Admiral Stark recommend that they be authorized by the President to carry out the
operation. They will keep the Navy Department and Admiral Land informed of all arrangements.

A quick decision is necessary as the ships must leave England within the next few days.

This cable is approved by Admiral Stark.
To the President of the United States, Whitehouse

No. 155 September 14th, 1942.

Personal and for The President from Harriman. I spent last night with the Prime Minister.

He fully understands and agrees that he is to play second fiddle in all the scores and then only as you direct.

He is anxious to have your reaction to his cable regarding sending United States dash British Air Forces to the Caucasus. He places great emphasis on the importance of this step and hopes that something can be worked out promptly for execution before the end of the year.

He was much interested to learn of the recommendation of our Chiefs of Staff regarding the Persian railway and hopes you will cable him your decision as soon as possible. He is disturbed by the reports of the heavy losses to the convoy now proceeding to North Russia and hopes that the Persian route will be pressed not only in the development of the capacity of the railway but in shipment of the maximum number of trucks as requested by Stalin.
He reports that our tanks have been received with enthusiasm by the British brigades in the Middle East and these brigades will be ready for active service very soon in accordance with plans made while he was in Cairo.

He still is as optimistic as when I left about the outlook in the Western Desert and feels his optimism has been confirmed by the results so far.

He has a touch of laryngitis but is in good spirits and minimizes it. Perhaps it would be better, therefore, if you did not comment on it to him.

PRIME
MESSAGE NO. 155 FROM HARRIMAN
FOR THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED
AND SHOWN TO THE PRESIDENT.
ONE COPY WAS MADE FOR ADM.
LEAHY AND ONE COPY FOR MR.
HOPKINS.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Cairo
To: AWH

No. AMSHE 858, August 22, 1942
(Personal for the President from Harriman).

Reference the Prime Minister's cable to you requesting that the responsibility for the development and operation of that part of the Persian Railroad now under British control be taken over by the United States Army and also the ports serving it.

This request has resulted from protracted discussions between us all here and expresses the considered judgment of the British Officers involved both in Iran and Cairo.

Generals Maxwell Spalding and other United States Officers who have been studying the situation agree (A) that with proper management and personnel and with additional equipment the capacity of the railroad to Teheran can be increased to six thousand long tons a day (B) that the British have not the resources of personnel to carry out this program even if we should supply the equipment (C) that unless the United States Army undertakes the task the flow of supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the British Forces in the theatre increase (D) that the importance of the development of this railroad to its maximum cannot be over emphasized (E) that the condition in the Prime Minister's cable of the British retaining control of traffic to be moved is reasonable offers no practical difficulty and should be accepted.

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
We therefore recommend that the task be undertaken.

Although the mileage of the railroad is not great its operation presents difficult problems due to heavy grades long tunnels and climatic conditions as well as those of a political nature in dealing with the Iranians and the Russians and the task should not be undertaken unless it is accepted as one of great importance and be given the necessary priority for both the full personnel and equipment needed.

It is therefore recommended (A) that a top calibre railroad man with the position of operating Vice President or General Manager of a Western Railroad be drafted and commissioned in the army with rank of Brigadier General who should be vigorous and young not much over fifty with experience on mountain and desert operations ability to handle relations with different nationalities is an essential quality (B) this man should organize a party of about twenty to twenty five key men and proceed by air to Iran at the earliest moment possible (C) two railroad operating and one engineer shop battalions should be despatched by sea promptly (D) the method of gradually taking over control should be worked out on the ground with the British (E) Colonel J. P. Johnson formerly mechanical engineer of the Sante Fe who has spent several months in the railroad and who is now with us in Cairo should be ordered to Washington at once to assist in shaping the program.
The turn around of ships in the ports referred to is deplorably slow. Three port battalions will be needed to operate efficiently all of the ports servicing the railroad. There is one port battalion now in Karachi which has not been allowed to function due to labor union restrictions. This battalion should be transferred to Khurramshahr promptly and the two others despatched from the United States when possible. The resulting saving of ships' time will pay a good dividend.

The British are also asking for help with trucks and personnel to increase the road transports. Details of this request General Spaulding is cabling to Somervell and Burns. I join in recommending favorable action. This is an important proposal but of second priority to the railroad and ports.

Maxwell

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
Personal for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

Prumy, traveling companion, asks me to describe to you his inspection of four armored brigades training for the US tanks soon to arrive. One brigade is to have Grants and the other three Shermans. In speaking to a number of selected group of officers and enlisted men he explained your personal interest in arranging for the dispatch of the Shermans and in his vivid way he has brought you personally to these men over with the tanks. I was much impressed with the keenness of the men in their training on the few battle scarred tanks at their disposal by the confidence expressed in our equipment and by the determination they showed in the reaction to my companions remarks. They are fit tough men and with effective leadership will use the equipment you are sending to good advantage.

New subject. Smuts expressed to me his complete approval of the changes in command and confidence in the offensive potentialities here, also enthusiasm for our other operational plans. However he emphasized the need for determination and particularly speed.

Odrick
NAVEMESS

NAVY DEPARTM

FROM ALUSNA LONDON

RELEASED BY

DATE 5 AUGUST 42

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DECODED BY CANNING

PARAPHRASED BY HILL

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INFORMATION

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

LT KELLY 51831 NCR 7344

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN.

THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. WILL PROBABLY BE OFF TOMORROW.

BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I WERE ADVISED OF YOUR IDEAS REGARDING AIR ASSISTANCE AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE ANY OFFERS WHICH YOU MAY DESIRE ME TO CONVEY.

STRENGTH... ACTION

SEALED SECRET FILE.

SEALLED

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter MAY 2 1972

By H. H. Parks Date

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL ARNOLD

For your confidential information, Mr. Harriman is going to Moscow.

The President would like proposed draft of reply to the attached despatch, with particular reference to bombers that can go all the way on their own — and fighters that can go in from the Middle East. Also -- the draft reply should include a sentence to the effect that the next northbound convoy that goes will of course carry the usual fighter shipments, but that losses in this regard must be regarded as a possibility.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 2, 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY

264, August 18, noon

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN

'The last meeting of the Prime Minister with Stalin when they met alone made deep and favorable impression on Prime Minister. He is cabling you today from Cairo.

I have stopped off at Tehran to see something of the railroad and Persian Gulf ports. There will be a discussion later this week in Cairo to decide what should be done. I am urging that capacity of railroad be substantially increased which both British and American engineers agree is entirely feasible providing more and better operating personnel and somewhat more equipment are made available.

There are two matters of supply to Russia that deserve immediate attention: Stalin emphasized to both Prime Minister and myself that trucks were of equally critical need as even tanks.
264, August 18, noon from Teheran

He says he can make good use of 20,000 a month, although shipment of that total is impossible. The Prime Minister hopes that every effort will be made to ship maximum possible. Supply through Persian route is now much less than facilities can handle--partly, but only partly, due to sinkings.

Second matter relates to Siberian airplane ferry service. If decision is to start it as soon as possible, Soviets should be supplied with requisite number of transport planes to return crews, depending on traffic contemplated, perhaps about 15 to start with. General Bradley told me all other arrangements have been made and the operation can commence as soon as transports are available. For many reasons it seems clear Russians should operate them rather than our attempting to do it at this time. If we want to become familiar with the route our officers could travel route as frequently as might be desired. Then I left Moscow (and做出了? ) War Department was insisting on United States operation.

I find Teheran a delightful spot and wish I had an excuse to stay longer. The Dreyfuses are most hospitable."

DREYFUS

NPL
FOR PRESIDENT FROM Harriman

WE DINED IN FORCE AT KREMLIN LAST NIGHT. ALL MEMBERS
OF SOVIET DEFENCE COMMITTEE AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF MEMBERS
OF GENERAL STAFF WERE PRESENT.

STALIN WAS IN BEST OF SPIRITS AND WAS MOST CORDIAL TO
PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF. HE SEEMED TO BE ENTIRELY
OBLIVIOUS OF THE UNPLEASANT DISCUSSIONS OF NIGHT BEFORE,
PRIME MINISTER HOWEVER ARRIVED STILL SOMETIME ANNOYED FROM
ROUGH TREATMENT HE HAD RECEIVED BUT AS EVENING PROGRESSED
HE BECAME MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN HIS TALKS WITH STALIN
WHICH RANGED FROM THEORIES OF MILITARY TACTICS TO POST WAR
POLICIES. HE SPOKE IN SOME DETAIL OF SENDING AN AIR
SQUADRON TO SOUTHERN FRONT AND INDICATED THAT IT WAS A
SUBJECT YOU HAD IN MIND TOO IF IT WERE FEASIBLE. I EXPECT
YOU WILL HEAR FROM PRIME MINISTER ON THIS SUBJECT.

PIA......ACTION
FILE.

SEALLED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
Personal for the President from Harriman.

The Prime Minister has shown me the cable he is sending you regarding the rough sledding he had in his talk with Stalin last night. He is transmitting also Stalin's memorandum which he handed us both simultaneously and his aide memoire in reply. I have written Stalin a letter as follows:

"I have had an opportunity to study the memorandum of August 13 you handed me last night an identical copy of which you simultaneously gave to the Prime Minister. I have also had an opportunity to read the Prime Minister's aide memoire of August 14 replying to your memorandum.

I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served in comments by me additional to what the Prime Minister has said. I feel however that I must reaffirm his statement that no promise has been broken regarding the second front."

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By R. M. Parks Date May 2 1972
THE TECHNIQUE USED BY STALIN LAST NIGHT RESEMBLED CLOSELY THAT USED WITH BEAVERBROOK AND MYSELF IN OUR SECOND MEETING LAST YEAR. I CANNOT BELIEVE THERE IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN AND I CONFIDENTIALLY EXPECT A CLEARCUT UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER LEAVES.

ACTION..... NAVAID
SEALRED SECRET FILE NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 2 1972

142915

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 16 (4) NAVRECS.)
The Prime Minister had an extended meeting with Stalin last night. Molotov, Voroshilov, British Ambassador and myself were present. The discussion centered on British and American military strategic plans for 1942 and 1943 and their effect on the Russian front. Under all the circumstances I believe the discussion could not have been developed better nor the conclusion more satisfactory. The Prime Minister explained in full detail the various possibilities of sledge hammer and the reasons for its postponement. He told of the plans and strength of round-up.

Stalin took issue at every point with bluntness almost to the point of insult with such remarks as you can't win wars if you aren't willing to take risks and you mustn't be so afraid of the Germans. This phase of the discussion ended by stating abruptly but with dignity that he could not force action but he did not agree with the arguments. He expressed the opinion too that grave difficulties confronted round-up and showed little

**SEALED**

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(See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter  
By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY 2 1972
THE PRIME MINISTER THEN DESCRIBED THE BOMBING ACTIVITY OVER GERMANY AND HIS HOPES FOR SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE WITH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION. HERE CAME THE FIRST AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO MEN. STALIN TOOK OVER THE ARGUMENT HIMSELF AND SAID THAT

HOMES AS WELL AS FACTORIES SHOULD BE DESTROYED. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT CIVIL MORALE WAS A MILITARY OBJECTIVE BUT THE BOMBING OF WORKMEN'S HOUSES CAME AS THE BY-PRODUCT OF NEAR MISSES ON FACTORIES. THE TENSION BEGAN TO EASE AND A CERTAIN UNDERSTANDING OF COMMON PURPOSE BEGAN TO GROW, BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM THEY SOON DESTROYED MOST OF THE IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL CITIES OF GERMANY.

THE PRIME MINISTER WITH GREAT ADROITNESS TOOK THE OCCASION OF THE MORE FRIENDLY INTERCHANGE TO BRING THE DISCUSSION BACK TO THE SECOND FRONT. HE EXPLAINED THE DECISION REGARDING TORCH AND ITS TACTICS EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR SECRECY. THIS GAVE AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER SEIZED, TO RELIEVE FURTHER THE TENSION BY SAYING HE WISHED HE HAD THE POWER OVER THE PRESS WHICH STALIN EXPLAINED HE EXERCISED. STALIN HOWEVER EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS.

SEALEO
FROM THE OPERATION AND OPINIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL
SITUATION IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES WERE EXCHANGED.

ABOUT THIS TIME THE PRIME MINISTER DREW A PICTURE OF
A CROCODILE AND POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS AS WELL TO STRIKE
THE BELLY AS THE SNOT. THE PLANS FOR THE OFFENSIVE IN EGYPT
WERE DESCRIBED AS WELL AS THE BATTLE FOR MALTA WITH DETAILS
OF THE PRESENT NAVAL ENGAGEMENT ALL OF WHICH INTERESTED STALIN
GREATLY.

AT THIS POINT THE PRIME MINISTER BROUGHT THE DISCUSSION
BACK TO THE RUSSIAN FRONT STATING THAT YOU AND HE WERE
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING AN AIR FORCE TO THE
SOUTH RUSSIA FRONT BUT ONLY AFTER ROMMEL WAS DEFEATED. HE
ASKED HOW SUCH A SUGGESTION IF IT WERE FOUND POSSIBLE WOULD
BE RECEIVED BY STALIN. STALIN'S ANSWER WAS BRIEF AND SIMPLE
QUOTE I WOULD GREATFULLY ACCEPT IT.

THE CONVERSATION THEN CAME BACK TO TORCH AND STALIN
SUMMED UP ITS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES WITH MASTERFUL GRASP OF
ITS IMPLICATIONS. HE SHOWED REAL ENTHUSIASM FOR THE OPERA-
TION BUT HE SPECIFICALLY ASKS THAT THE POLITICAL ANGLE BE
HANDED WITH THE GREATEST DELICACY AND THAT IT BE STARTED
AT THE VERY EARLIEST MOMENT EVEN EARLIER THAN YOU HAVE IN
MIND.

THE MEETING BROKE UP EARLY AFTER SOME FOUR HOURS AND
IN SPITE OF THE EARLY DIFFICULTIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE TWO MEN HAD REACHED A MOST FRIENDLY BASIS.

SEALEO

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
I came away with the conviction that although Stalin has been much disappointed in our inability to be of greater military assistance to him and although he was critical of us particularly the British he gave me the feeling throughout the evening that he considered he was dealing with two nations with whom he had binding ties and that with you and the Prime Minister he could personally interchange views in the frankest of manner without fear of breaking the personal relationship, at no time did he show any indication that to me action or lack of action on either of our parts might fundamentally affect this understanding. The Prime Minister was at his best and could not have handled the discussion with greater brilliance.

On several occasions the Prime Minister turned to me for collaboration and I believe he would tell you that my presence was of value to him and justified your sending me.

One of our planes carrying the British military staff had to turn back to Teheran and therefore they will not arrive until tonight. This will probably extend our stay a day or two longer than was expected.

I expect further discussions on the military situation here which Stalin indicated was extremely difficult. He had not realized he told us that the Germans could assemble the strength they had thrown at him.

DISTRIBUTION: P1A (PERSONALLY)..............
SEALED SECRET FILE..............
PART ONE NOT RECD UNTIL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGs.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter
MAY
By R. M. Perks Date
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Leahy

The President directed that I give you the attached two papers with the request that you look them over and bring them with you to the conference this afternoon at 3:30.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachments—2

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 2 1972
Personal for the President only from Harriman:

You will perhaps recall that on several occasions it was suggested that the time might come when you would want to send me again to Moscow if there was a special job to be done. It did not occur to me, however, until yesterday that this might be the moment. I discussed it informally with Eden this morning. He reacted favorably and is recommending it by cable to Cairo.

It seems to Eden and myself that among other advantages your sending me along would indicate to our host our agreement on military and political matters and show your extreme personal interest at this critical moment. Also my personal report to you might be of particular value. My presence should not, however, interfere with the intimate and personal nature of the talks between the two men.

If the decision is made in the next two or perhaps three days it will still be possible for me to catch up. I am fully occupied here but things are in such shape at the moment that my staff can carry on without loss for the short absence.

Prime
FOR SOME TIME IT HAS BEEN APPARENT THAT BOTH WASHINGTON AND LONDON HAVE BEEN EXPECTING ASSISTANCE IN SHIPPING FROM WHAT EACH THOUGHT WERE THE SURPLUS RESOURCES OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. IN OTHER WORDS IN WASHINGTON IT HAS BEEN HOPED THAT WE COULD DRAW UPON THE BRITISH SHIPPING RESOURCES TO TAKE CARE OF OUR PRESSING MILITARY NEEDS, WHEREAS HERE, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS, IT HAS BEEN EXPECTED THAT THE SHIP-BUILDING PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD THROW OFF ENOUGH SHIPS TO TAKE CARE OF THEIR NEEDS AND TO MAKE UP FOR THE DWINDLING RESOURCES OF THE BRITISH. THE FACT IS THAT THERE IS A SHORTAGE ON BOTH SIDES.

FOR THAT REASON WE HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SOME WEEKS TO DEVELOP A RELIABLE PICTURE OF THE SITUATION, COMBINING THE PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS OF THE WAR EFFORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RESOURCES AT OUR DISPOSAL.

SEALEOSECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREES.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-43

By R.T. Dated JAN 22, 1973
A FEW DAYS AGO THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED US FOR THIS PICTURE AND A REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR YOU AND FOR HIM BY THE TWO COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARDS WORKING TOGETHER IN LONDON NAMELY: DOUGLAS AND SALTER OF THE WASHINGTON BOARD AND LEATHERS AND HARRIMAN OF THE LONDON BOARD.

UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE NOT HAD AVAILABLE THE ESTIMATES OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF BOLERO AND ROUND UP IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO TYPE AND CHARACTER OF CARGO TO ESTIMATE ACCURATELY THE SHIPS REQUIRED FOR THIS MOVEMENT IN COMBINATION WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT IMPORTS.

WITH THIS LIMITATION WE HAVE PREPARED THE ACCOMPANYING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WE HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY TRANSMITTING TO YOU. (END PART 1)

THE ANALYSIS HOWEVER CLEARLY SHOWS A SUBSTANTIAL DEFICIENCY IN THE SUPPLY OF SHIPPER EVEN IF THE BOLERO REQUIREMENTS ARE CALCULATED ON THE MOST FAVORABLE BASIS. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT BY DRIVING THROUGH THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PART THREE OF THE REPORT, THIS DEFICIENCY CAN BE MET SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT THE MOVEMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL MILITARY AND OTHER CARGO. WE ON THE AMERICAN SIDE CAN MAKE SOME FEW SAVINGS BY DIVERTING FROM

SEALEO SECERT

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art 76 (4) NAVBREG)-

By D. Dated Jan 22 1973
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**Sheet Three Alusna London**

**Orientation fill in date and time**: Date Time Oct

Their present employment such boats as the New England coal boats and a few other scattered vessels, but the major economies in shipping and additions to the combined merchant fleets are to be effected through the recommendations.

We recognize that these recommendations tread squarely on the toes of several agencies both in Washington and London but we are convinced that they are reasonable and should be put into effect to the fullest extent practicable. We recognize too that this can only be done under direct instructions from you. One of them has to do with closer cooperation than now exists between the Army and Navy and the Shipping authorities in Washington. (End Part 2)

Full cooperation has been developed here as a result of necessity between the War Office the Admiralty and the Ministry of War Transport making possible in many essential respects more effective use of the ships. We are deeply impressed by the close integration of these three agencies and believe that a similar procedure adapted to the peculiarities of our own organizations will make our supply of shipping go further and carry more than under present procedures.

You will note the report indicates that the British will sealed secret.
OF COURSE THE U.K. IMPORT PROGRAM.

THIS HAS BEEN FIXED AT A MINIMUM OF 25,000,000 TONS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1942 AND 27,000,000 FOR 1943. HARRIMAN HAS BEEN STUDYING THE BRITISH IMPORT PROGRAM FOR A YEAR AND A HALF. HE HAS WATCHED IT SHRINK AND EXERTED PRESSURE IN VARIOUS QUARTERS TO SPEED THE REDUCTION OF CONSUMPTION UNNECESSARY TO THE WAR EFFORT. HARRIMAN IS NOW CONVINCED THAT THIS OVER ALL TONNAGE IS THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THE WAR EFFORT, WILL REDUCE SOME STOCKS TO A DANGER POINT, AND IF THE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED IS NOT FORTHCOMING THE BRITISH WILL DIVERT SHIPS NOW EMPLOYED IN OTHER WAR SERVICES TO FULFILL THE PROGRAM. DOUGLAS AGREES TO THE EXTENT OF HIS MORE LIMITED INFORMATION. IN THE REPORT THE TERM BOLERO-ROUND UP IS USED TO INCLUDE THOSE OPERATIONS AND ANY THAT MIGHT IMPINGE ON THEM. (END PART 3)

THE REPORT OF THE TWO COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD FOLLOWS: SECTION ONE.

THE COMBINED SHIPPING BOARDS (LONDON AND WASHINGTON) PRESENT THE FOLLOWING JOINT REPORT AS TO THE AMOUNT OF SHIPPING

SEALED
AVAILABLE OVER THE NINE MONTHS ENDING 31ST MARCH 1943 (FOOTNOTE COMES HERE) TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BOLERO OR SIMILAR MOVEMENT, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY SUSTAINING THE EXISTING ALLIED WAR EFFORT.

INCLUDED IN THE LATTER IS THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MINIMUM FOOD SUPPLIES AND RAW MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR THE WAR PRODUCTION PROGRAMME OF THE U.K.

IN PREPARING THIS REPORT THE BOARDS HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT:

(1) THEY HAVE ASSUMED THAT, WHILE THERE WILL BE MANY NEW CONTINGENCIES TO MEET AND WHILE MANY ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE Effected BETWEEN EXISTING PROGRAMMES, THE NET DEMAND OF ALL OTHER SERVICES (INCLUDING ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER THEATRES OF WAR ABROAD), WILL IN THE AGGREGATE REMAIN DURING THE PERIOD AS A WHOLE AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL.

(2) THE MINIMUM U.K. DRY IMPORTS ESSENTIAL TO THE UNIMPAIRED CONDUCT OF THE WAR EFFORT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT 25,000,000 TONS FOR THE YEAR 1942 AND 27,000,000 TONS FOR 1943.

(3) ON THIS BASIS AN AVERAGE OF 570,000 GROSS TONS OF SEALED SECRETS

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVREGS.)
AMERICAN SHIPPING ADDITIONAL TO THE PRESENT PROGRAMMED ALLOCATION WILL BE REQUIRED DURING THE NINE MONTHS ENDING 31ST MARCH 1943 TO SUPPLEMENT BRITISH-CONTROLLED Tonnage in order to repeat to maintain without impairment the British war effort in its totality.

(4) They have taken the loss of American controlled shipping in this period at 1.8 million gross tons. This is at a rate of 1% less than that experienced during the first six months of this year. While because of protective measures that have been taken it might appear reasonable to allow for a larger reduction in the rate of loss of American tonnage it must be borne in mind that diversion to other areas of the enemy effort may lead to an increased rate of loss of other shipping for which no allowance has been made. It does not therefore seem prudent to scale down the recent American experience by a greater percentage. (End Part 4)

(5) The boards have calculated that approximately 500,000 tons gross of shipping can be made available for bolero or similar movement from the existing U.S. fleet as distinct from new construction.

(6) On the best estimate that can bow be framed it

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-43
By RJ Date JAN 22 1973
APPEARS THAT NEW BUILDING IN THE UNITED STATES WILL PRODUCE DURING THE NINE MONTHS JULY 1942 - MARCH 1943 4.7 MILLION GROSS TONS OF OCEAN GOING TONNAGE EXCLUDING THE TODD CONTRACT (FOR WHICH ALLOWANCE IS MADE IN THE CALCULATION OF BRITISH REQUIREMENTS) AND TANKERS.

(7) IT WILL BE SEEN THAT ON THE ASSUMPTIONS TAKEN ABOVE THE AMOUNT OF SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR SUPPLEMENTING THE BRITISH WAR EFFORT AND MEETING THE BOLERO - ROUND UP REQUIREMENTS IS 1.95 MILLION GROSS TONS.

(8) THE INFORMATION AT PRESENT FURNISHED BY THE U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS TO THE TYPE AND CHARACTER OF THE CARGO FOR THE BOLERO MOVEMENT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED TO PERMIT A REASONABLE ACCURATE ESTIMATE TO BE MADE OF THE AMOUNT OF SHIPPING NECESSARY TO PROVIDE EITHER FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF TROOPS OR THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL, ROLLING STOCK, LOCOMOTIVES, LANDING CRAFT AND SOFORTH NEEDED TO MOUNT AND SUSTAIN AN OFFENSIVE.

THE GLOBAL ESTIMATES GIVEN BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOW HOWEVER THAT, EVEN ON THE MOST FAVORABLE ASSUMPTIONS AS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEIGHT AND MEASUREMENT CARGO, THERE MUST BE A SERIOUS DEFICIENCY IN THE SHIPPING AVAILABLE.
SEALED

Since no provision has been made for any expansion in the demands of other theatres of war this deficit will increase to the extent they increase. Footnote which comes in at indicated position in para 1 of section 1 follows "as regards the second nine months period carrying up to the end of 1943, we find after consultation, that there are too many uncertainties to enable a useful forecast to be made at this moment." (End Part 5)

SECTION 2.

It may be convenient to summarize the above calculations in tabular form. Table headed Bolero-Round up and U.K. Import programme. Subheaded Non Tanker Shipping Position 1st July 1942 to 31st March 1943. Table is in three columns and two sections. Column one gives number column two gives subject column three gives tonnage in millions of gross tons. Section one is headed subjects supply and consists of subjects numbered one to six. Section two is headed requirements and consists of subjects numbered seven to nine. Begins: One. Approximate tonnage available from U.S. Fleet as it existed at 1st July 1942. Zero point five. Two. U.S. New Building (Ex Tanker and Ex Todd). Four point seven. Three. Estimated losses (Ex British Controlled Ships).
ONE POINT EIGHT, FOUR. NET GAIN IN TONNAGE. TWO POINT NINE, FIVE. AVERAGE NET GAIN IN PERIOD. ONE POINT FOUR FIVE. SIX. TOTAL SHIPPING AVAILABLE ON AVERAGE IN PERIOD (ONE PLUS FIVE) ONE POINT NINE FIVE. SEVEN. ADDITIONAL SHIPPING ASSISTANCE REQUIRED BY U.K. FROM U.S.A. ZERO POINT FIVE, EIGHT. BOLERO (INITIAL MOVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE). INFORMATION INSUFFICIENT SEE (1) PARA (8) ABOVE. NINE. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF BOLERO-ROUND UP. SAME AS FOR EIGHT. (END PART 6)

SECTION 3.

THE BOARDS SUGGEST THAT EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING TO MEET THE ABOVE DEFICIENCY:

(1) ANY PRACTICABLE REDUCTION IN THE SCALES OF EQUIPMENT RESERVES AND MAINTENANCE OF THE U.S. FORCES.

(2) PACKING OF ALL VEHICLES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT SO AS TO SECURE THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE ECONOMY OF SHIPPING, SUCH FOR EXAMPLE AS THE SHIPMENT OF TRUCKS IN THE TWIN UNIT PACK OR CKD, INSTEAD OF IN SINGLE UNIT PACK OR FULLY ASSEMBLED.

(3) FULLEST COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE SHIPPING AUTHORITIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN THE EXCHANGE OF

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
INFORMATION AND IN THE COMBINATION OF BOLERO AND BRITISH CARGO
AND IN THE USE OF TERMINAL FACILITIES.

(4) THE USE OF EQUIPMENT AND SOFORTH MADE IN THE U.K.
INSTEAD OF U.S.A., U.S.A. PRODUCTION BEING IN TURN USED FOR THE
SUPPLY TO OTHER THEATRES OF WAR, EG THE MIDDLE EAST AND AUSTRALIA,
TO WHICH THE BRITISH EQUIPMENT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN SENT.

THIS WILL INVOLVE SOME CHANGES IN POLICY AS REGARDS BOTH ASSIGN-
MENT OF EQUIPMENT NOW PRODUCED OR IN COURSE OF PRODUCTION, AND
ALSO IN THE PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT WILL
HOWEVER GIVE AN IMPORTANT ECONOMY IN SHIPPING.

(5) THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING
PROGRAMME WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE ATTAINABLE IF FURTHER STEEL
CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. THIS INCREASE IS THE MORE IMPORTANT AS
IN THE SECOND PERIOD, COVERING THE LAST NINE MONTHS OF 1943, THERE
WILL BE AN INCREASE BOTH IN THE BOLERO REQUIREMENTS AND IN THE
BRITISH DEFICIT. THE ABOVE ESTIMATE OF AMERICAN SHIPBUILDING IN
SECTION ONE (6) ALLOWS FOR THE REDUCTION THAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN
IMPOSED BY INSUFFICIENCY OF STEEL ALLOCATION.

(6) IF MORE BEEF AND OTHER FOODSTUFFS COULD BE MADE
AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENT TO THE U.K. FROM THE U.S.A. WHETHER BY
DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPLIES OR RESTRICTION OF CONSUMPTION, IMPORTANT

SEALED SECRET
ECONOMIES IN SHIPPING COULD BE SECURED BY FURTHER DIVERSIONS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ROUTE.

END OF SECTION THREE OF REPORT.

THE TWO BOARDS ARE EXAMINING ALL POSSIBLE MEANS OF IMPROVING THE TURN-ROUND, AVOIDING CONGESTION IN PORTS, INCLUDING THE DISTANT THEATRES OF WAR AND GENERALLY SUCH MEASURES AS ARE WITHIN THEIR OWN SPECIAL COMPETENCE.

END OF REPORT.

DISTRIBUTION:
PJA......ACTION.
ADM. LAND(PERS)......
FILE.

SEALED SECRET
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
### NON TANKER SHIPPING POSITION
1st JULY 1942 to 31st MARCH 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>APPROX. TONNAGE AVAILABLE FROM US FLEET AS IT EXISTED AT 1st JULY, 1942</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>US NEW BUILDING (EX TANKER AND EX TODD)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>ESTIMATED LOSSES (EX BRITISH CONTROLLED SHIPS)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>NET GAIN IN TONNAGE</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>AVERAGE NET GAIN IN PERIOD</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>TOTAL SHIPPING AVAILABLE ON AVERAGE IN PERIOD (1 PLUS 5)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Supply**

7. ADDITIONAL SHIPPING ASSISTANCE REQUIRED BY UK FROM USA | 0.5 |

**Requirements**

8. ROLERO (INITIAL MOVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE) | INFO. INSUFFICIENT SEE PARA. 8 |

9. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF ROLERO ROUNDED UP | SAME AS FOR PREVIOUS |

* Tonnage in millions of gross tons.
August 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LAND

HAVE YOU ANSWERED CABLE NO. HCR 4726
OF AUGUST 2 FROM HARRIMAN AND DOUGLAS TO
THE PRESIDENT? IF SO MAY I SEE A COPY?

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Admiral Land's office advises that any answer would be sent by the President, not by the Maritime Commission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTED</th>
<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALISHA LONDON</td>
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<td>OPNAV</td>
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<td>RELEASED</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>26 JULY 1942</td>
<td></td>
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<td>WHIGHANT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED</td>
<td>LEAND</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Routed by LT Fulton

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

TEXT

PERSONAL FOR CAPTAIN JOHN MCCREA, THE WHITE HOUSE, FROM HARRIMAN.

PLEASE INFORM THE PRESIDENT I SAW THE VISITING FIREMEN TAKE OFF, ALL WELL AND IN GOOD SPIRITS. ONE OF THEM ASKS YOU TO ARRANGE "TO KEEP LOUISE CURRENTLY INFORMED".

Left Iceland 300pm Our Time

ACTION: NAVAIDE......

FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By E.H. Parks Date MAY 2 1972

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREDS.)

261106 020 Other
FROM: ALUSHA, LONDON.
(FEB 7, 1942)
TO: OPHAY

(S81042 CR 1339)

(FEB 7, 1942)

(Robinson)

"PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN"

The Prime Minister is in good health and spirits. I told him, as you
requested, of your concern for Burma. He is alive to the need for re-
enforcements to Burma, but can send now, as I understand, only a brigade
and several battalions, being all that are available. He is still hopeful
of holding this area for the present. Gill and I are spending the week-
end with him and I will obtain further information Monday.

Much time and effort of the Cabinet has been spent this last week on
ministerial changes, which has been a game of "musical chairs". One
chair was made vacant by Beaverbrook's advancement. Col. Llewellyn, the
new Minister, finally ended up with the Board of Trade although many
hoped that he would get the more important posts of Minister of Aircraft
production or supply. He is the strongest, most energetic and best
balanced of the younger men. There can be no doubt he will play a more
important role at a later time.

Labor gets two new Under-Secretarial positions to the chagrin of the
Conservatives, but Andrew Duncan returns to Supply to satisfy them and
the industrialists who have been a bit bruised by Beaverbrook's energetic
methods. Duncan is a bit too complacent. There is even less enthusiasm
for Moore-Brabazon, though long a loyal supporter of the Prime Minster,
because he lacks "drive." The Prime Minister undoubtedly expects Beaver-
brook in his new position to instill the necessary energy in all produc-
tion activities.

The public, in my opinion, is disappointed that a real production
ministry was not formed with complete responsibility in Beaverbrook.
It is obvious that his health could not have stood this tremendous burden.
It is not yet clear (even in Beaverbrooks' mind) how he will function
but I am hopeful that his general management of all production, including
the Admiralty, will lead to a more balanced output which can better be
coordinated with our own program. In this latter field there is much
to be done in which my office can be of use.

Both within and without the Government there is privately expressed
view that the changes are inadequate and that other changes will be
forced. The public wants some "heads rolling in the sand" and expected
from the Prime Minister's speech that they would have this satisfaction.
Greenwood, Kingsley-Rood and Moore-Brabazon are those for which one
hears the most clamor.

Cripps is the man that the public is most disappointed was not
included in the Government, as he is unwarrantedly credited with a part
in Russia's fine performance. He was offered Minister of Supply, but
turned it down as it did not carry War Cabinet membership. He is shrewd.

(Continued on page 2)
AMBITION, AND WILL BE A "THORN IN THE SIDE" OF THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL HE IS INCLUDED, EVENTUALLY, I BELIEVE, IN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION THAN IF HE HAD BEEN TAKEN IN NOW.

THUS ON MY RETURN I FIND THE SITUATION MORE SERIOUS THAN I HAD EXPECTED AND, ALTHOUGH NOTHING CAN HAPPEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION, HE MAY WELL BE FORCED TO MORE RADICAL CHANGES AT A LATER DATE, DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR.

ACTION: PRESUS

PERSONAL FILE