Captain Wood

For repy

by air mail

Acknowledged

12/28/43

R Nixon
From: NAAP
To: War
No. R696/24

24 December 1943

To Arnold for President Roosevelt from Spaatz
ref nr AF 446.

All elements of the United States Army Air Forces in the Mediterranean join in sending best wishes to you for a joyous holiday season and a renewed determination to speed final victory during the new year.

No Sig.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION: SGS
GEN. ARNOLD

CM-IN-15316 (24 Dec 43) 1821Z cng

Acknowledged by mail
12/21/43

Presidential Ref.

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered  Filed: 26/1910 Z

To the President from Mary Churchill.

We have just had a party for the children at Chequers. On behalf of them all and for the grown-ups too, who so much enjoyed the lovely Christmas tree you sent, I would like to say thank you very, very much. We all send our greetings for a victorious and happy New Year to you and Mrs Roosevelt.

No Sig

Red 26/2825
Sent in white 17, 2032

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
22 December 1943

From: CHUNGKING CHINA
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Marshall from Stilwell.

The Officers and men of the China Burma India Theater extend to the Commander-in-Chief their best wishes for Christmas and pledge our whole hearted and continued support throughout the coming year.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
CLASSIFIED
NO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date: MAY 8 1972
Signature: [Signature]

Presidential Dispatch
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ROYAL:

Subject: Marshal Badoglio's message to the President.

Enclosures: (A) MAT 90, 13 November 1943, Copy No. 53.
(B) Memorandum from the Secretaries, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, dated 14 November 1943, transmitting draft of message for the President.

When MAT 90 was received the Combined Civil Affairs Committee were asked to prepare a draft of a message for the President from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, transmitting Marshal Badoglio's sentiments on the President's recent speech. The British agreed, as well as we, that this message should not be transmitted to the President while en route; therefore, I am passing the original enclosure all on to you for appropriate action.

C. R. PECK,
Colonel, GSC,
Executive Secretary.
PRIORITY

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War

No. W-5121/37, [MAT 90] 13th November 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff personal for the President repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FERGUS this is MAT 90.

Badoglio gave Joyce message which follows:

Para 1. "I have read with deep interest the inspiring speech delivered by President Roosevelt on the occasion of the signing of the assistance pact between the United Nations."

Para 2. It is a human, generous and constructive document. The establishment of an international body for mutual assistance foreseen in the agreement represents an initiative undoubtedly designed to smooth many unspeakable sufferings and heal many painful wounds.

Para 3. I will be very grateful, my dear General, if you will see your way to convey to the President my heartfelt and deep appreciation. The words spoken yesterday in Washington are amongst those that humanity most anxiously awaits.

ACTION: COAC
INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
ASF
CGS (CAPT ROYAL USN
ADM KING
Gen McCLOY
LOG

CM-IN-8165 (13 Nov 43) 1920Z

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo MAY 12 1972

COPY No. 53

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
(AGWAR 3277 to ALGIERS, 23 November 1943)

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

Referring to MAT 90, please inform Badoglio I am appreciative of his courteous message conveyed by reference.

Above sent from the President at Cairo, Egypt, to the Map Room for transmission to Eisenhower.
14 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Badoglio's message to the President of the United States.

Reference: MAT 90

In accordance with General Eisenhower's request contained in MAT 90, 13 November 1943, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee recommend that the attached draft cable be dispatched to the President of the United States.

T. E. H. RILLEY,
WARDE M. CAMERON (Acting),
Combined Secretariat.

Incl.
Draft cable to President Roosevelt.

Copy to Col. Pau.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 17 1974
DRAFT OF CABLE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT: Reference MAT 90

Sentiments of Badoglio that United Nations Assistance Pact is human, generous, constructive document creating international body for mutual assistance representing initiative undoubtedly designed to smooth away unspeakable sufferings and heal many painful wounds and his appreciation of your inspiring speech on occasion of signing are transmitted for your information at request of former.
URGENT

From: Fortaleza, Brazil
To: War

No. FOR 4398, 8 November 1943

Marshall from Hull for the President. Eye's Only.

Came here this afternoon, the schedule to Puerto Rico for tomorrow is 12 hours. General George has directed that we fly by Miami on the way to Washington on the 10th which will give little chance for conference with you on night of the 10th. Am hoping therefore, that Hull can be in Washington later on the 10th and ready for conference with you on the morning of the 11th. Please wire me immediately how this fits in to your plans. All well.

No Sig.

ACTION: White House

CN-IN-5247 (9 Nov 43) 01112 jb

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaufel Date

COPY No.
Marshall from Hull for the President.

Came here this afternoon, the schedule to Puerto Rico for to-morrow is 12 hours, General George has directed that we fly by Miami on the way to Washington on the 10th which will give little chance for conference with you on night of the 10th. Am hoping therefore, that Hull can be in Washington later on the 10th and ready for conference with you on the morning of the 11th. Please wire me immediately how this fits in to your plans. All well.

CM-IN-5047

Original to Pres.
was coded

Admiral Leahy has seen the above and is drafting a reply

[Signatures]
From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States
Number SD 3, Filed 26/0504Z

Personal and for the President only from the Secretary of State.

In accordance with your instructions contained in your Navy cable, I called on Marshal Stalin this afternoon, Monday, at three o'clock, accompanied by Ambassador Harriman. Mr. Molotov was also present.

After an exchange of amenities, I told the Marshal that my government and people attached the highest importance to the forthcoming meeting between himself, the Prime Minister, and you, and handed to him your communication. Stalin read our unofficial Russian translation and passed it on to Molotov. He, then, said that he would have to consider the proposal in regard to Basra as a place of meeting and consult with his associates. He made no mention of any of the other places suggested as possible alternatives in your communication.

Mr. Molotov, obviously expressing Mr. Stalin's thoughts, said that the question of any other place except Teheran was a most difficult one. That both civil and military authorities in the Soviet Union were loath to have the Marshal absent himself at all and that he could not go to a place where he could not maintain constant direction of the important military operations now in progress.

Stalin, then, said that he thought it might be possible to postpone the meeting until next spring when military operations would have to be suspended during the thaw, at which time Fairbanks might be an appropriate place.
From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States
Number SD 3
Filed 26/0504Z

I, then, endeavored orally to persuade the Marshal of the real importance for our common cause which such a meeting would have both in prosecution of the war and for the post war period. I told him that if, in addition to the announcement of such agreements as we might be able to reach at the present conference our three governments could announce a disposition on the part of the heads of state to meet and confer, the effect would electrify our peoples and Allies and be most disheartening to our enemies.

Stalin replied that he had in progress important military operations with the summer campaign merging into that of the winter; that there was now an opportunity which might only occur once in fifty years in warfare to inflict a decisive defeat on the Germans whose available reserves were very few while the Russians had sufficient reserves for an entire year. He added that he did not feel he could neglect this opportunity. He repeated that he would confer with his colleagues on this latest message from you.

I, then, dwelt on the possibility from a technical point of view establishing equally good communications between Teheran and Basra as exist between Teheran and Moscow, which would permit his constant direction of these operations. I made it clear to him that, while from every point of view we regarded this meeting of the highest importance, both you and I understood that military considerations came first.

Stalin said that his position was not based on stubbornness or on considerations of prestige but entirely on the circumstances which he had mentioned. He said he did not see why
a delay of two days in the transmission of any state papers could be so vitally important, whereas a false step in military matters was not a grammatical error which could be subsequently corrected but might cost thousands of lives.

The Ambassador at my request outlined in detail the technical arrangements which we considered could be made to insure absolutely reliable communications between Teheran and Moscow and referred to our willingness to do everything we could to assist on this point. The Ambassador mentioned the fact that the three heads of state would be able to stay in three camps in the hills under the protection of troops of their own nationality, to which Stalin replied that he was not a bit concerned about the question of protection but only communication.

Stalin pointed out in this connection that, in regard to the wire and other means of communication between Teheran and Moscow, everything was Russian but the territory which was Iranian.

At the close of the interview Stalin repeated his desire to consult with his colleagues before making an answer.

No Sig
This message will not be distributed outside British or U. S. Gov't Deps or Headquarters or retransmitted even in Cipher without being paraphased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphased.)

MESSAGE

From: Military Attaché China
To: British Army Staff, Washington (please pass).
No: 1516 Oct 20

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM MOUNTBATTEN.

SOMERVELL and I have had a series of most successful meetings with the GENERALISSIMO and MADAME at which practically all our proposals have been accepted. SOMERVELL will be reporting details on his return but I thought you would like to know how well things have gone.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RRF, NLR, Date APR 17 1974
T.O.O. 201148
T.O.R. 200800Q
Typed 200850Q
14 September, 1943

From: Military Attaché London
To: The President of the United States
No. 518 - Filed 14/1433 Z

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to President personal.

In the absence of the Prime Minister I am sending on to you the following message from Marshal Badoglio addressed jointly to you and the Prime Minister. This has been sent direct to the Prime Minister from here.

Message begins:

"From head Italian Government to Franklin D Roosevelt, President of United States, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain. I thank you most warmly for the message which who direct the destinies of such great nations, have been pleased to send me in these hours so tragic for my country. I place sure trust in your affirmation that the Anglo American Armed Forces who have already disembarked at various points on the Italian Continent will continue to pour in as numerously and as eagerly helpful as the situation so imperiously demands.

Our own Armed Forces already tested and scattered in Italy and still more outside Italy cannot possibly unite and validly oppose alone the German forces but everything that is possible is being done and will be done with that same spirit and with that same tenacity which we displayed together on the battlefields of Italy and France in the last great war. We assure you that Italian peoples closely united around their King and longing at (1 group undecodeable) any sacrifice whatsoever to achieve liberty and a peace with justice will not fail manfully to carry out on this occasion their duty-their whole duty. We are not lacking in faith and we will march with you our American and British friends. Signed Marshal Badoglio."

No Sig

COPY filed in "Surrender of Italy" folder.  
This CRITenal for file in "Pres-Pisc. Folder"  
JAN 22 1973
(FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM AMBASSADOR STANDLEY)

REFERRING TO THE STATEMENT IN YOUR RECENT MESSAGE TO
STALIN THAT YOU EXPECTED TO SEND HIM SHORTLY A PROPOSAL
AGENDA FOR THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN MOSCOW EARLY IN
OCTOBER I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THERE BE INCLUDED IN
THE AGENDA A GENERAL DIRECTIVE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION
OF IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.
THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION IN RESPECT TO COMMUNICA-
TIONS NOT ONLY HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE EFFICIENCY
OF OUR REPRESENTATION HERE BUT AND MORE IMPORTANT IS A
REAL OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND
FULLER COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS
AND PEOPLES. I FEEL THAT A FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSION
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

(See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OF THIS MATTER DURING THE FORTHCOMING MEETING MAY GO
A LONG WAY TOWARD LAYING A BASIS FOR FRUITFUL COLLABORA-
TION WHICH IS IMPORTANT NOW AND ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO
HAVE FULL POST WAR COLLABORATION.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schuble Date May 9 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1943.

Hear Admiral W. B. Young (SC), USN., telephoned at 12:15 p.m. that he had just returned from a tour of inspection of the entire Caribbean, Recife and Rio. With Admiral Ingram he called upon President Vargas and was received in a most friendly manner and President Vargas asked him to convey to President his most cordial greetings. President Vargas made many complimentary remarks about the United States Navy and Admiral Ingram.
(FOR ADMIRAL MCINTIRE (MC))

PAYMASTER GENERAL HAS A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM VARGAS TO THE PRESIDENT.

The Paymaster General returned to Washington September 13.

NAVAIDE (FOR ADMIRAL MCINTIRE) .... ACT.

FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date: MAY 9 1972

Signature: [Handwritten]

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
From: London England
To: The President of The United States

No. #    Filed: 08/1547 Z

For the President from the Ambassador. I have just received the following message for you from the King:

"President Roosevelt: Thank you for the kind message which your Ambassador has delivered to me. I am delighted to know that you were comfortable at the Citadel, and have happy recollections of your visit to Canada; I have no doubt that the Quebec conference will go down to history as a memorable and beneficial event. Please give my regards to Colonel Warden and tell him that I hope to see him as soon as he gets home.

I am so glad to hear that Mrs. Roosevelt is having such a successful trip in Australasia.

With best wishes from the Queen and myself.

George R I."

No Sig
From: Algiers  
For: The President of the United States  
Secretary Hull  

Number W 9412, 7 September 1943  

Please see NAF 364 from Murphy signed Eisenhower for the President and Secretary Hull eyes only.

If the statements which it is proposed to make in Algiers as indicated in the telegram under reference are approved, it is hoped that similar information will be given out in Washington and London as soon as may be deemed appropriate. If the statements indicated in NAF 364 are found inconsistent with your ideas, it is likewise hoped that you will so indicate urgently. We assume that you will issue the text of the armistice terms as soon as you consider such action desirable.

No Sig

(A copy of this message has not been delivered to Secretary Hull)

COPY filed in special "Italian Surrender" folder.  
This ORIGINAL for file in "President-Miscellaneous" file.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schakle Date MAY 9 1972
August 22, 1943.

Dear Bud:

The attached which has just been received from the State Department is for the President.

Many thanks.

George R.
Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received this afternoon a telegram from Dr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs for the Commonwealth of Australia, containing a message for the President.

I would be very grateful if you would be so good as to convey the message to the President. Its text is as follows –

"I regret that I have been prevented by severe illness from previously acknowledging your message in regard to the heavy bombers. I must express my deep satisfaction that you intend to make these available and that you are appointing Arnold, Walsh and Williams to go into the matter.

We are eagerly looking forward to the visit of Mrs. Roosevelt and you can be assured that the tour will be managed in accordance with the desires you expressed to me during my last call upon you. All details will be sent to you as soon as possible."

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

OD:KDO

(Sgd.) Owen Dixon

The Secretary of State of the United States,

Washington, D.C.
From: Algiers  
To: President of the United States  
Number W-7711  
19 August 1943  

I am deeply grateful for the thoughtfulness and generosity of your congratulations to me and to this Allied Force. Personal to President Roosevelt from Eisenhower. This feeling is shared by all Land, Air and Naval Forces under my command, to whom your message is being immediately published. We unanimously reaffirm our readiness and our desire to undertake any tasks that our Governments may choose to assign. Permit me to express my personal best wishes for your continued good health.

No Sig

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

Published in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years Vol II, P. 1348.
FROM: CONNAVEU  \#21114  NCR 7337  2 AUGUST 43
ACT: COMINCH  ROUTINE  DER

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STARK X ADMIRAL POUND\# HAS ASKED ME TO EXPRESS TO YOU HOW MUCH HE APPRECIATED YOUR VERY SYMPATHETIC AND GRACIOUS MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT HIM WHEN YOU LEARNED OF LADY POUND'S PASSING

\[signature\]

NAVADIE...ACT
FILE

\[handwritten\]

Copy sent to President via Nash
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

From the King to President Roosevelt personal and President Roosevelt.

I greatly hope that throughout your forthcoming meeting with my Prime Minister at Quebec, you and he will occupy the Governor-General's quarters in the Citadel.

Lord Athlone tells me he will be delighted to arrange for them to be put at your joint disposal. As he himself will be leaving Ottawa on August 8th for a long planned tour of the north-west, he regrets that it will not be possible for him to meet you in Quebec as he would otherwise have wished to do.

George R I

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of BRITISH
GOVT. TELEGRAM 116172
By [Redacted] Date MAY 9, 1972
and Personal. Would you please have the following message given to the President from me. Begins:

I received through Harry Hopkins and Donald Nelson the kind word that you were looking forward to seeing me and to having another talk. Unfortunately, as Parliament is still in session, I have thus far had no chance to get away. It looks, however, as if we may adjourn, if not Saturday, then some time early next week.

I understand you have been taking up with Leighton, plans for fishing trip you spoke of in our last conversation together. I am glad that possibility is now taking shape. Once Parliament adjourns, I should be able to meet your wishes as to visiting Washington to talk over any matters, or would be free to work out, from here, arrangements that may be necessary for whatever you would like to have arranged. If at all possible to spend a day in Ottawa on way to or on return from fishing trip, I am certain this would give tremendous pleasure to Canadian people. I am most anxious to have you as the first President to visit Canada's Capital. I would have members of Parliament return to Ottawa to meet you on Parliament Hill, where a few words addressed in the open in front of the Parliament Buildings would be all that would be expected.

The Governor General and Princess Alice have been most anxious to have you as their guest at Government House and would I know, greatly welcome a stay of whatever length you could spare. I, of course, would like to have you have at least a glimpse of Laurier House and, if possible, also of Kingmere. All would be most informal and
arranged entirely in accordance with your wishes.

May I avail myself of this message to tell you how very much I appreciated your sympathetic understanding and effective action in connection with announcement of participation of Canadian Troops at time of Sicilian invasion.

Warmest Regards.

MACKENZIE.

ENDS.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDE.

ACCORDING TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS IN BEHALF OF NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER VAN KLEFFENS, SIR LOUIS GREIG WILL HAVE LAND PLANE AT LOCK ORNE EARLY MORNING JULY FIVE INSTEAD OF JULY FOUR AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED. WARMEST REGARDS.

Forwarded to the President at White House.

(NOTE: DELAYED BY SERVICES)

NAVAIDE:... ACTION

FILE....

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Baker Date MAY 9 1972

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

19-0820-1 U.S. Government Printing Office
July 3, 1943

In accordance with your instructions with respect to
Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Kleefama, Sir Ernle Geddes
has arranged for a land plane at Leck Orne on morning of July
5 instead of July 4 as first planned. Warmest regards. For
the President from Ambassador Bildt.

Map Room Notes: Contents of this message have been transmitted
to Ambassador London.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>GC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-0110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-3A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG-00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCNO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victor Severe, French Deputy and President of the Martinique Committee requests that the following message be delivered to the President of the United States:

"Entire Martinique population enthusiastically salutes its integration into the free and fighting French Empire finally obtained. It is impatient to participate in the victorious effort of the Democracies and asks you if you will be so kind as to inform the French National Liberation Committee at Algiers to take immediate steps to change all local authorities. Respectful greetings."

Recommend no action on last sentence until preliminaries with us completed.

[Signature]

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVPERC)

Regrade unclassified.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-0115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-3A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCN0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Lieut.-Colonel Hammond.

Concerning ALJUSNOB Martinique despatch 011606, will you please inform the appropriate official of the State Department that the President looks to the State Department to submit a suggested answer to Victor Severe (Martinique) when, and if, they consider it appropriate.

WILSON BROWN.
July 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached is a paraphrased copy of a message from ALUSNOB, Martinique, O11606 July, transmitting a message from Victor Severe to the President.

The President desires that this copy be furnished the Secretary of State, and has stated that he wishes the Secretary of State to submit a suggested answer to Victor Severe, when and if the Secretary of State considers it appropriate.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 incl.
From: AUNSNOR, Martinique.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Date: 011606N, July.

PARAPHRASE

The following message is to be delivered to the President by request of Victor Severe, French Deputy and President of the Martinique Committees:

"The integration of Martinique into the Free and Fighting French Empire which has been finally obtained is enthusiastically saluted by the entire population of Martinique. The people are impatient to have a hand in the victorious effort of the democracies and request that you kindly tell the French National Liberation Committee at Algiers to take steps immediately to replace all local officials.

Respectful greetings."

Until preliminaries with us are finished we recommend that no action be taken on last sentence.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The contents of the attached message were telephoned to the Netherlands Ambassador by Colonel Hammond at 1910, EWT, June 30, as directed by the President.

[Signature]

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
Alusna, London, SO1441, NCR 5776.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
(FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDLE.)

REPLYING YOUR MESSAGE STATING NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER VAN KLEFFENS TRANSPORTATION DESIRES . I HAVE ARRANGED EVERYTHING ACCORDINGLY WITH SIR LOUIS GREIG . WARMEST REGARDS .

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

OFNAV-NORRTH

By J. Schaubie Date MAY 9 1972

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
PARAPHRASE

(SECTION ONE)

From: Ankara: Steinhardt
To: The President, The Secretary, and Undersecretary
Dated: June 18, 1943. Rec'd 2:45 a.m. 19th

The Embassy received a telegram yesterday afternoon sent through our Legation in Tehran from Rickenbacker which stated that he would appreciate arrangement by me for a crew of five and his party of four, all civilians, to fly in an unarmed Army transport plane to Ankara. Rickenbacker said that he hoped to make the flight early next week and that the passports of the party had already been issued.

This morning I received a visit from the British Ambassador who informed me that a report to London had been made by the British Minister at Tehran stating that Rickenbacker had called on the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran and, using the British Minister as an interpreter, had made known that President Roosevelt had given him the mission to fly to Ankara to request the Turkish Government to place at the disposal of the Allies airfields to be used against Balkan bases of the Axis.

Steinhardt

(SECTION TWO)

It was said by Rickenbacker that he would also make a visit to the Russian front in order that he might investigate aviation requirements of the Russians from the United States, and that Stalin would be asked by him to provide air bases in Siberia from which we could attack the Japs.

It was stated by Hugessen that the proposed intervention by Rickenbacker with the Turkish Government would have an effect of a disastrous
nature. He stated that the Casablanca Conference had placed on the
British Government the responsibility for approaching the Turks on
military matters. The British Government relied on him for advice in
turn. It was pointed out by the Ambassador that the timing and the
method of approach was of tremendous import and at this time a request,
especially by a casual visitor, might in addition to being turned down
also ruin our future chances of success at an appropriate time.

I would appreciate urgent instructions since the Turkish Amb-
assador in Tehran has no doubt reported Rickenbacker's statements
to him to his Government. I am withholding reply to Rickenbacker's
telegram pending the receipt of your instructions.

Steinhardt.
(PERSONAL AND OR THE PRESIDENT FROM BIDDLE)

MY NAVAL AND AIR ATTACHE CAPTAIN LANSING CALLAN USNR IS NOW IN WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

IN THE THOUGHT THAT YOU MAY WISH A FIRST HAND PICTURE OF CURRENT POSITION OF THIS MISSIONS CLIENTS I HAVE ASKED HIM TO CONTACT WHITE HOUSE. WARMEST REGARDS.

BIDDLE.

P4A ACTION
FILE.....

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVVREG.)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schleske Date MAY 9 1972
June 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McGARRITY

Subject: Proposed letter from the President to Dr. Evatt, dated 9 June 1943, re suggested program for the development of the Royal Australian Air Force to 71 Squadrons.

1. The President has not signed the above mentioned proposed letter because he feels that no decision on this matter should be made until after the meeting of the board on June 10, at which time this matter should be considered by the board. The President feels that, after the letter has been considered by the board, it should be rewritten with words to the effect "the board has met and as a result of its decisions . . . . . ."

2. The President further desires that every effort should be made to give an even greater number of airplanes to the Australians than outlined in the proposed letter, even if some of the additional aircraft are obsolete.

3. The President also did not particularly care for the use of the phrase "as soon as possible after the first of the year."

CHES HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 9 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9 June 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

Subject: Proposed letter from the President to
Dr. Evatt, dated 9 June, re RAAF.

The President indicated tonight that he is not satisfied with the subject letter for the following reasons:

In the discussions we had the other day with the Australians it was mentioned that no decision would be reached until a meeting of the Allocation Board on the 10th. From this letter it appears that a decision has been reached before the Board has met.

The President wishes that this letter be held until a meeting of the Board, and then be re-written with words to the effect that "The Board has met and as a result of its deliberations etc etc ..."

The President also objects to the phrase "as soon as possible after the first of the year." I tried to pin him down to his exact objection, as well as it is possible to pin a President down, but he did not elaborate.

Very respectfully,

W. C. Watt
William C. Watt
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.R.
From: Algiers  
To: President Roosevelt  
No. W-332  May 11, 1943

Je vous remercie chaleureusement au nom de l'Armée Francaise d'Afrique et de la France tout entiere pour les sentiments que vous avez bien voulu de primer a nos soldats qui luttent depuis six mois aux cotes des Allies en Tunisie. (Signed Eisenhower cite FHLIA). Leur vaillance qui s'est afirmée avec un materiel perime a ete decoupee par les armes nouvelles que vous nous avez deja envoyees. Je suis certain que lorsqelles auront recu tout l'arment qui leur est necessaire les troupes Francaises etonnent encore le monde dans les batailles qui aboutiront a la delivrance de notre patrie. Comptez sur nous Monsieur le President comptez sur la France et son armee retrouvee comme elles comptent sur vous et sur la grande nation Americaine. Signed Giraud.

Action: White House

CH-IN-7267 (12 May 43) 0050Z ce

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
May 7, 1943

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed 2025Z/7

This afternoon I found there had been further developments in the Russian-Polish situation and I suggested to Eden that he send you a message through this channel. The following is his message to you:

"From Mister Eden to the President personal

"I am sure that the Prime Minister would wish you to have the text of the reply from Marshal Stalin to the Prime Minister's last message of April 30, which follows in my immediately following telegram. I have also had conversations with Maisky and Sikorski in the last 24 hours, an account of which I am sending to Halifax for communication to Mister Hull. As regards Stalin's reference to prospects of return of Polish Government to Poland, I need hardly say that this is a Russian construction on a general observation of mine as to the likelihood of the return of governments now in London to their respective countries.

"It is clear that we still have a difficult task to bring these two together. Immediately following telegram referred to above begins: Following from Marshal Stalin to Premier Churchill begins:

"In sending to you my message of the 21st April on the interruption of relations with the Polish Government I was guided by the following considerations: the Poles started a notorious antiSoviet press campaign on the 15th April; this campaign was aggravated first by the statement of the Polish Defence Ministry and then by
the declaration of the Polish Government of the 17th April. Nobody in London opposed the campaign and nobody warned the Soviet Government about its coming although it was very difficult to think that the British Government had no inkling of the contemplated campaign. It seems to me that taking into account the spirit of our treaty it would be natural to prevent one Ally from delivering a blow against another, more particularly so when such blow renders a direct help to our common enemy. In any case this is my understanding of the Allied obligations. However, I deemed it my duty to convey to you the view point of the Soviet Government on the question of the Soviet-Polish relations. As the Poles continued to kindle their scandalous anti-Soviet campaign it could not be expected that the patience of the Soviet Government had no limit.

"You write that you will discipline the Polish press. Many thanks for that. I doubt however that it would be easy to bring to reason the present Polish Government, its entourage of pro-Hitler bowlers and its unrestrained press. In spite of your statement that the Polish Government is prepared to collaborate loyally with the Soviet Government I have little faith in its ability to keep its word. There are so many pro-Hitler elements in the entourage of the Polish Government and Sikorski is so helpless and so terrorised by these elements! Even assuming that Sikorski would like to be really loyal it is hardly conceivable that he would be in a position to do so.

"With regard to the rumours spread by the Hitlers concerning the formation of a new Polish Government in the USSR, all these canards must be refuted. Our Ambassador already told you about that. This however does not exclude the possibility for Great Britain the USSR and the USA to take measures in order to improve the composition of the present Polish Government. Such action would be desirable with a view to strengthen the United front of the Allies against Hitler. The sooner this would be done the better.

"Mister Eden after return from the USA intimated to Mister Maisky that among the supporters of President Roosevelt there are people who consider the prospects of the present Polish Government uncertain. They do not know whether it will be able to return to Poland and assume power although they would like to retain the services of Sikorski personally in a leading position. It
seems to me that in the estimate of the present Polish Government's prospects the Americans are very near to the mark.

"On the question of the Polish subjects in the USSR whose number is not very large as well as on the question of the families of the Polish soldiers evacuated to Iran it should be stated that the Soviet Government never put obstacles in the way of their exit from the USSR.

"I received your message on the recent events in Tunis. Many thanks for your communication. I am delighted at the success of the Anglo-American troops and I wish them still more successes. Stalin." End of Eden's message signed Winant.

Prime
From: Algiers
To: President of the United States
No 7531 April 28, 1943.

Du moment de la remise à l'armée française du matériel américain arrivé par votre premier convoi, je tiens en mon nom personnel et au nom de tous les soldats français à vous remercier de tout cœur de cette nouvelle preuve de votre amitié pour la France et de l'union EE nos deux pays, (personal for the Honorable Franklin D Roosevelt signed Eisenhower cite FHLIA from Giraud) le matériel est magnifique, tous ici nous sommes enthousiastes.

No Sig.
April 28, 1945

GREEN 69


At the moment of the reactivation of the French Army with American equipment which arrived by your first convoy, I take this opportunity in my own name and in the name of all French soldiers to thank you with all my heart for this new proof of your friendship for France and of the union of our two countries. The equipment is magnificent and all of us here are enthusiastic.
10 November 1943

From: Chungking
For: The President of the United States
Number 860       Filed 100820Z

For the President from Hurley signed
Stilwell.

I will be in Chungking till the 12th
unless otherwise directed by you.

No Sig
KEM
Cairo
Dated June 11, 1943
Rec'd 6:53 p.m., 14th

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1050, June 11, 5 p.m.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM

GENERAL HURLEY

"At the conclusion of an eighteen day trip to Saudi Arabia I was advised by physicians that I had contracted an infection which they suggested should be treated in the United States. I am assured that it is not a serious condition. I am accepting the advise of the army medical authorities and am leaving Friday for Johns Hopkins Hospital. I will be available for duty very soon. I hope to avoid publicity. My visit with Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, completes my tour of the Middle East as indicated in your directive with the exception of Karachi, India. I am preparing a report. Kind personal regards."

KIRK

NPL
May 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

The President has directed that copies
of the attached messages from General Hurley be
WAR
furnished the ARMY Department for information,
but not for distribution.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

2 Incis.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By F. J. Stewart Date MAY 9 1972
May 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that copies of the attached messages from General Murley be furnished the State Department for information, but not for distribution.

The President desires further to receive a recommendation from the State Department relative to the two messages.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls.
From: Cairo
To: AGNAR

Unnumbered May 13, 1943.

This for eyes alone President Roosevelt urgent and most secret from General Hurley signed Brereton.

Before going to Iran and since my return I have conferred at length with the Rt Hon Richard D Casey British Minister of State for the Middle East on conditions in Iran. In Iran I conferred with our Minister, Mr Dreyfus, and members of his staff, with the Commander of the United States Military Forces Major General Ronald G Connolly and members of his staff, with the British Minister Sir R Bullock and members of his staff. I then conferred with the American advisers Dr A C Mills-Moore (economics) Mr Joseph P Sheridan (food) Colonel Norman Schwartzkopf (national police) Mr Timmerman (municipal police) Major General Clarence S Ridley (Iranian Army) with Mr D Stansky and other officials of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and with Mr Erik Eriksen of the United States Commercial Corporation. After these meetings I conferred with the Shah Mohammad Reza, the Prime Minister, Ali Sobhi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saed Mareghel, and other Iranians. The situation in Iran is serious. The conditions and the methods employed by the British and the Russians in the military occupation of Iran have rendered the Iranian Government impotent. The aspirations of the British and the Russians in Iran are in conflict. The Iranians distrust the motives of both the British and the Russians and believe that the future existence of Iran as an independent nation is threatened. American prestige in Iran is being injured by the fact that Americans are in positions of responsibility without adequate authority. In conversations which I had with the Shah, the Prime Minister, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, matters both far reaching and specific were discussed. Chief among the subjects were (1) food, (2) transportation, (3) inflation, (4) possibility of an Iranian declaration of war against the Axis as a member of the United Nations and (5) future relationships between Iran, Britain, Russia and the United States.
From: Cairo
To: AGWAR
Unnumbered May 13, 1943.

The Russians have occupied the northern portion of Iran constituting roughly 1/3 of the country's area and a majority of its population. This portion of Iran is richest in production of food and in all natural resources except developed oil resources. The British occupy the less populous but larger geographical area of the south. The portion occupied by the British extends to the Persian Gulf and contains all of the developed oil areas of the country. For the most part the attitude of the Iranian officials and indeed of all the Iranian people who are in a position to appraise conditions, is one of intense bitterness toward Great Britain. This bitterness toward Britain is so emotional that it has almost completely wiped out the memory of 1300 years of uninterrupted Britain-Persian friendship. Toward Russia there is less bitterness but in my opinion there is a deep fear of the eventual objectives of Russia. However Russian administration of their zone of occupation is more acceptable to the Iranians than that of the British. The Iranians translate their bitterness toward the British and to a lesser extent toward the Russians in a series of specific charges against the policies of these two powers in Iran. Even under the most considerate planning by the occupation forces Iranian capacity to feed her own people would be severely strained by the presence of British, Russian and American Troops and their minimum requirements of local foods. Iranian spokesmen complain however that neither the British nor the Russians have displayed any considerate planning. The Iranians charge that in the south the British bought up great quantities of foodstuffs not only for their own consumption but for export. They charge that in the more abundant north the Russians have followed to some extent a like policy. The Iranians charge that the British forced inflation upon the country by insisting upon repeated government issuances of currency to be used to pay British forces of occupation and American supervised labor on the railroad track lines and road building projects. High wages paid by the British and Americans have contributed to the inflationary trend. Contributing to the inflation also it must be added is the weakness of the Iranian Government itself and the consequent lack of confidence in the national currency.
By reason of its disorganized condition the Government was unable to stabilize prices or to prevent speculation and hoarding. The combination of inflated food prices and actual food scarcity has lead to deaths by starvation. The Iranians charge that even when starvation became widespread in the south the British delayed taking steps to import grain. The Iranians and the British charge also that the Russians refused to permit shipments of foodstuffs to that portion of the country where there was a shortage. This food crisis was intensified the Iranians allege by the fact that the British deprived the country of effective use of its own transport system through commandeering or hiring at high prices great numbers of Iranian motor trucks and by taking over full control of the Iranian State Railroad. Additional Iranian trucks were pressed into Russian Service in the north. Most of this transportation was of course used for the purpose of transporting American Lend Lease materials to Russia, but the fact remains that lack of use of its own transportation facilities did prevent Iran from transporting food and thereby was an additional cause of food shortage. Iranian spokesmen accuse the British of deliberately bringing about food shortages and consequent bread riots in Tehran to provide an excuse for the British military occupation of the city. The British occupation of Tehran the Iranians and Iranians allege was in violation of the tripartite agreement between Iran, Russia and Great Britain. The Iranians make further grave accusation that the British attempted at the time of the food crisis to force concessions from the Iranian Government in return for wheat. They allege that the British Minister submitted various conditions to the Iranian Government which he specifically stated must be accepted before the British Government would make any concession in regard to food, bearing on this accusation a message from the American Minister at Tehran to the Secretary of State Washington D. C. dated February 21, 1943 and copy of the dispatch addressed to the Foreign Office in London repeated to Rubyshev and Washington dated November 6, 1942 and signed Bullard. The end of the food crisis seems to be in sight. Russia has agreed to furnish the Iranians 25,000 tons of wheat. The Americans and British have agreed to furnish a total of 52,500 tons of wheat and barley part of which has been delivered. There are prospects for a good crop if the American advisers Dr Millsap (economics) and Dr Sheridan (food) are able to procure the funds for the purchase of the wheat crop and the transportation to get it to the centers of population.
the most immediate cause of Iranian unrest would be removed. At another time of crisis the Iranians charge that typhus serum was ordered from the United States and that it was shipped but was impounded by the British at Cairo. The Iranians assert that if this serum had been delivered it would have prevented many deaths from typhus. Wherever the fault lies the fact is that the serum was not delivered and many Iranians died during the subsequent epidemic. The Iranians charge that the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, a British Government institution, which entered Iran for the purpose of preclusive purchasing of war materials has forced itself into a position of a complete monopoly of all Iranian foreign trade. The Iranian officials complain bitterly that after having stripped the Iranian Government of nearly all of its actual powers and having rendered that Government helpless in this period of crisis, the British now openly blame the Iranian Government for not taking strong action to procure proper transportation facilities to prevent inflation, to fix prices, and to prevent starvation of the population. There are other counts in the indictment but I think I have given you enough to create the impression that the British are not popular in Iran. The Iranians openly charge and believe that Britain has been guilty in Iran of conduct akin to that of the Nazis in Europe. If the Iranians had to decide today between the British and the Russians they would in my opinion unquestionably choose the Russians. American troops in Iran are in a peculiar position. In conversation with Russian Army officers and Iranian officials they have at times referred to the United States as an instrumentality of Great Britain. I have learned that this assertion is based on the allegation that American troops entered Iran on the invitation and under the direction of the British alone. It is alleged that neither the Iranians nor the Russians were consulted in advance of the arrival of American troops. The Russians still assert that they have not been officially apprised throughout the intervening months of the presence or the purposes of American Troops in Iran. This argument on the part of the Russians seems weak in face of the fact that American Troops entered Iran for the sole purpose of operating the state railway and military supply lines to transport American Lend Lease materials to Russia. The American Troops in Iran are not combat troops. They are service troops. It does appear to be true however that the Iranian Government was not notified of the coming of American troops or the purpose that the troops were to serve. American advisers to the Iranian Government are
From: Cairo
To: AGWAR
Unnumbered May 13, 1943.

charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing civilian food supplies, providing transportation, fixing prices, supervising national and municipal police forces, supervising the reorganization of the Iranian Army, preventing inflation, stabilizing the currency, providing funds for the ordinary needs of government, and in general restoring security and order to Iran. Up to the time I left Iran no adequate authority had been given to any of the American advisers to enable them to accomplish the tasks assigned. This left the American advisers among whom there are men of the highest character and ability in positions of responsibility without authority. More and more the American advisers are being criticized for not having brought order out of chaos when in fact they have been supplied with neither the means nor the authority that would enable them to achieve the purposes of their mission. The buck is usually passed from the British and Russians to the Iranians and by all three to the American advisers. The State Department is endeavoring to correct these situations by (1) procuring an agreement with the Iranian Government recognizing the presence of American Troops (2) procuring from Russian officials recognition of the presence of the units of the United States Army in their true status and (5) procuring from the Iranian Government adequate and proper authority for the American advisers. The ambitions of Russia and Great Britain are in conflict in Iran. In my opinion Britain and Russia aspire to control Iran after the war, not jointly but separately. Britain's control would be for the purpose of keeping the monopoly of the oil resources which her nationals now own and of establishing a trade monopoly. Russia's control would serve to secure her long desired access to a warm water port. At the peace table I believe Russia will insist on either a corridor to the Persian Gulf or to the Indian Ocean or as an alternative freedom of the straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. In the light of these conflicting ambitions it appears rather certain that if Germany were totally defeated today and Japan were still in the field there would be open conflict in the Middle East between the forces of the United Nations. As if to aggravate the relations between Russia and Britain in Iran there is a rumor being encouraged in Iran to the effect that the British in Washington are endeavoring to prevent further Lend Lease assistance from
From: Cairo
To: AGWAR
Unnumbered May 13, 1943.

the United States to Russia. It is alleged that the
British contend that American supplies are giving Russia
such strength as to make Russia a menace to the peace
of the world after the capitulation of Germany. Owing
to the gravity of the situation and to the complexity of
international relationships I think it essential that you
understand that in Iran both diplomatic officials and
military officers of the United States appear to be giving to
the weight of their influences to Russia as opposed to
Britain. As evidence that this is true I refer to (1) the
diplomatic correspondence between the United State Legation
in Tehran and the State Department and (2) the fact that
the United States Military Commander in Tehran has recently
dispensed with G-2 services on the ground that the United
States Army intelligence operations in that area while
favored by the British were objectionable to Russia. The
foregoing statement should not be considered as a charge
or as an implication against the character, the ability or
the patriotism of the American officials in Iran but as an
indication that the situation there demands an immediate
clarification of the policies of the United States. Russia
and the United States are traditionally friends and at the
peace table they must have and must be entitled to the con-
fidence of each other. The achievement of the purposes of
the Atlantic Charter and the peace and prosperity of the
world depend in great measure on the unity of the English
speaking people. If our present policy is continued in
Iran it must ultimately alienate from the United States
either the British or the Russians. What is taking place
at the present time in Iran promotes and, unless corrected,
ensures disunity among the three greatest forces of the
United Nations. During the past 1/4 of a century the
Middle East has been recognized as a British Sphere of
Influence. Britain was the dominant power in that area
notwithstanding the operations of the French in the Lebanon
and Syria and certain definite penetrations in the entire
area by the Germans. Great Britain no longer possesses within
herself the essentials of power needed to maintain her tradi-
tional role as the dominant influence in the Middle East
Area. The position of Britain in the Middle East was wanting
even before the outbreak of the present War. The antipathy
for Great Britain in the Middle East has caused a growth
first of pro Nazi and now of pro Soviet sentiment. Unless
it is the carefully considered intention of the United States
to play a strong independent role in the Middle East a
policy which has not thus far been indicated our course should be toward a reconciliation and integration of the British American influences in Iran. Such joint action by Britain and the United States should be directed toward developing strong enlightened native governments not only in Iran but in other nations of the Middle East with Russia sharing in a United Nations trusteeship for these local governments at present American Army and civilian personnel in Iran are being frustrated by lack of positive directions from our government as to whether they should support conquest and imperialism or the Atlantic Charter and the four Freedoms or as to what should be their attitude in the conflict between Russia and Britain. American prestige is decreasing without any parallel benefit to British prestige. There is a growing feeling among the British officials in the field that the United States has ambitions to become a colonial power. There is extensive Axis propaganda to the effect that the Americans intend to take over the British Empire. In my opinion the United States Government is so constituted that it could not become a colonial administrator without denying the fundamental principle of its own existence. In addition to that I am certain that the United States has no desire to become an imperialistic or colonial power. If you should move into the situation in the Middle East, however, with the precision and the force that conditions demand you may be accused at home of committing the United States to Imperialism, exploitation, violation of the fundamental principles of our own government, and opposition to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. In the face of all these negatives I am convinced that strong action by you in this situation would be justified as a war emergency and a step toward unity between Russia, Britain and the United States and toward the ultimate establishment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The proper results in Iran cannot be achieved by your support of British leadership alone. All of this leads to the conclusion that integration of the British American policies in Iran and maintenance of proper relations with the Russians there must have your leadership rather than British leadership. I believe you must assume at least that degree of leadership that will justify the confidence of the officials and the people of Iran in America's capacity to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter and to assure the continued existence of Iran as a
From: Cairo
To: AGMAR
Unnumbered May 13, 1943.

free nation under your leadership there must be found also a solution of the Russian British conflict. I recommend initially (1) that Iran be assured that America insists that the principles of the Atlantic Charter do apply to Iran (2) that Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis (3) that the American and British legations be raised immediately to the status of Embassies and (4) that American and British Ambassadors compatible to each other and able to understand and promote British American Russian cooperation be appointed to Iran. I have discussed in a general way my conclusions with the Rt Hon Richard D Casey.

No Sig.
JG
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.(SC)

Algiers
Dated May 17, 1943
Rec'd 8:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

898, May 17, 3 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MURPHY

John Boettiger arrived safe and well in Casablanca. He is at present attached to the Civil Affairs Office at the Atlantic base section.

WILEY

EMB

Miss Thompson has been notified at 0930 - May 18 - CTH.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Perks Date May 30, 1973
Printed in its entirety in

Foreign Relations of the United States:
1943, Vol. 4 - The Near East - Palestine;
Pages 776-780.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CAIRO, EGYPT,
May 5, 1943.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

PART I

In French Morocco, Egypt, Palestine, the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran, I have conferred with political, military, and religious leaders and with many individual citizens. I have visited all the Arab Nations except Saudi Arabia and Transjordania which I intend to visit soon.

The situation in the non-Arab State of Iran will be reported to you after I have had an opportunity to discuss it further with the Right Honorable Richard D. Casey, British Minister of State in Cairo.

REoggles
UNCLASSIFIED
In all of the areas visited, the local leaders have assumed that the war will be won by the United Nations. Consequently their discussions point toward the conditions of peace rather than the actions necessary to assure victory.

In the Middle East, American prestige is higher than that of any other nation. This is due primarily to the fact that America is believed to have no imperialistic designs.

American missionaries, especially the Presbyterians, have added materially to American prestige by establishing schools and hospitals. These institutions have had over a long period of years the services of men and women who exemplified the ideals of Americanism.

The benevolence of the American Lend-Lease Act is a significant factor in procuring good will for America.

Moslems, Jews, Christians--British, French and Arabs--have all discussed with me in detail: (1) the approaches to the actual creation of a structure of world-wide unity; (2) the form of the organization to be adopted initially by the United Nations; (3) the necessity for assistance and a form of trusteeship by the United Nations for dependent or backward peoples in undeveloped areas; and (4) regulations for production, transportation, trade, distribution and utilization of natural resources.
In Iraq and Iran there were prolonged discussions concerning a fair international petroleum policy. I am giving this problem further attention. Invariably the leaders in oil producing nations complain that their own people derive too little benefit from these resources while foreign exploiters take excessive profits.

In varying degrees our own allies are still devoted to the principles of imperialism, colonial exploitation or conquest. Manifestations of this attitude are found with the French in Syria and the Lebanon, the Russians in northern Iran, the British in southern Iran and other areas, and the Jews in Palestine and Transjordania. While it is true that conditions of war require continuance at this time of certain policies of conquest and imperialism, these must eventually be in complete conflict with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms. Native officials and individuals in many of the places visited have defined this fundamental conflict. The high principles of the Atlantic Charter and the practices of exploitation and imperialism cannot be reconciled.

Intelligent native leaders with whom I have conversed are aware of the fact that the United States Government is based on the principle that governments must derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. They
are familiar with our expressed conviction that no man is
good enough to rule another man without the other's consent.

They conclude this line of argument by saying that
if the United States is not to change its own fundamental
principles and if it is to participate in a world-wide union
for trusteeship for dependent peoples in undeveloped areas,
a new system must be evolved so that all people everywhere
may participate to the extent of their capacity in their own
government.

PART II

Running through all the discussions in the Middle
East, most definite emphasis is placed not on war and not on
peace but on the issue of establishing or not establishing
a Jewish Political State in Palestine.

It is unnecessary for me to discuss for you in this
report the arguments based on Scripture, on history, on the
Balfour Declaration, on the Palestine Mandate, on the Joint
Resolution of the United States Congress, on the British
White Paper, or on the speeches of leading nationals perta-
taining to the Jewish National Home and a Jewish Political
State in Palestine.

The debate on the issue of a Jewish Political State
in Palestine in many quarters has become acrimonious. Among
the Jews themselves there is a clear division of opinion on
this question.
For its part, the Zionist organization in Palestine has indicated its commitment to an enlarged program for (1) a sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and probably Transjordania, (2) an eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq, and (3) Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.

In Palestine itself there are considerable numbers of Jews who consider themselves primarily Europeans, and who would prefer to return to Europe if security of life can be assured there. There are others who would accept life in Palestine under advantageous conditions but who shrink from possible violence or the hard life of pioneers. Since the Zionist organization in Palestine exercises major control over the means of livelihood of the refugee Jews of that country, it is difficult to assess precisely the strength of actual or potential opposition to the organization program. Nevertheless it is clear that such opposition exists among the Palestine Jews themselves and that it will become more manifest when democratic regimes are reestablished in Europe.

Jewish communities in the Middle East, outside of Palestine, are long established and important, socially
and economically. Leaders, and I believe a majority of members of these communities, view the Zionist program with a degree of distrust and alarm based on (1) fear that it may imply forced migration to Palestine, (2) fear that any attempt to implement the program would lead to persecution, and (3) religious differences among the Jews themselves.

Among the Arabs, there is little or no anti-Jewish sentiment as we ordinarily use the term; nor is there serious opposition to the concept of a Jewish National Home. There are racial relationships between the Arab and the Jew. Notwithstanding these factors, there is deep-seated Arab hostility to any immigration program intended to create a Jewish majority in Palestine and to the establishment of a Jewish sovereign state.

There is hostility also toward the Jewish claim that they are the "chosen people" and hence entitled, even though they are a minority, to special privileges. One leading Arab spokesman described this "chosen people" concept as kindred to Nazi doctrine.

The basic fear of the Arab leaders seems to be that a Jewish Political State in the Middle East, due to the influence of world Jewry on the great powers, would become the means by which imperialism would continue to dominate the Middle East. Such a condition would, of course,
obstruct the establishment of really independent Arab
political states in an Arab union.

Nuri Pasha es-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq and one
of the longtime proponents of Arab Federation, has suggest-
ed a compromise solution. This solution is sufficiently
close to that set forth in the British White Paper of 1939
as to entitle it to the sympathetic consideration of the
British Government. The Nuri proposals differ from the
White Paper principally in that they would expedite the
assumption of independence by Palestine; they would not
recognize a continued British special interest in Palestine
based on strategic considerations; and they would establish
an Arab Federation embracing Palestine, Transjordania, the
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and such other Arab states as might
desire adherence. The Jewish population in Palestine, with
immigration limited by law so as to prevent such immigra-
tion from creating a Jewish majority, thus assuring an Arab
majority, would have autonomous rights within the districts
in which they constituted majorities. The Lebanese Chris-
tian community would have the same rights. These rights
are to be protected by international guarantees.

Some such solution very probably would meet with
acceptance by a majority of Moslem Arab leaders, of the
leaders of Jewish communities in the Middle East outside
of Palestine, and of significant numbers of the Jews with-
in Palestine.
Throughout the Arab nations I found a well defined opinion prevailing that the United States, and not Great Britain, is insisting on establishing a sovereign Jewish State in Palestine.

Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Zionist leader in Palestine, discussed at length and with unusual eloquence the Jewish claim to political control of Palestine. Throughout his argument, Mr. Ben-Gurion assumed and asserted that the Government of the United States is committed and obligated, repeat obligated, to establish a Jewish Political State in Palestine.

This alleged obligation was said to derive from:
(1) Scriptural promises and historical logic, (2) the investment in Palestine of Jewish American capital in reliance on the protection of the U.S. Government, (3) support accorded by the U.S. Government to the establishment of the Palestinian Mandate, and (4) support of the Zionist program implied in the Joint Resolution of Congress of 1922.

These Zionist arguments, intended to prove that the United States is obligated to establish a Jewish Political State in Palestine, do have an appeal and do encourage acceptance but they are in fact incorrect. It seemed wise, therefore, to point out to Mr. Ben-Gurion that none of the evidence offered revealed any obligation of the U.S. Government or the American people to support the present Zionist
demand for creation of a Jewish majority and establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine. The documents involved in (3) and (4) were produced and it was shown clearly that the U.S. Government merely consented to the British Mandate for Palestine and, in the Joint Resolution, favored only the establishment of a National Home for the Jews insofar as such a home would not trespass on the rights of Christian and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Speakers opposing the Zionist position emphasized to me that the handing over of the Government of Palestine to the Jewish minority would violate the fundamental principles of Americanism, the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms. They pointed out further that if it is admitted that a minority has a perpetual right to restitution of territory taken from it by conquest, the enforcement of that principle would destroy the British Empire and would require the United States to make restitution to Mexico of much of our West and Southwest.

Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, leader of the Arab Moslem majority in Palestine, presented to me the argument in opposition to the establishment of a Jewish State there. He asserted that Washington appears to be lending its strength to this plan of minority rule for the people of Palestine, and to be supporting a program of Jewish migration to Pal-
estine sufficient in extent to give the Jews an eventual majority over the Arabs. He considers such policy unjust and certain to provoke hostilities against the Jews not only in Palestine but in all other Arab nations.

I asked Auni Bey the basis for his assertion. He replied first that he was informed that the Jewish minority in the United States and in fact in many other nations controls the most powerful means of propaganda; that the Zionist organization has forced Washington to oppose the Balfour concept of a Jewish National Home and that Washington in turn has forced the British Government to acquiesce in the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine.

I suggested to Auni Bey that he was still speaking in generalities and asked him if he could state specifically the source of his information. He replied that Sir Ronald Storrs, former High Commissioner to Palestine, who recently revisited Palestine and other Arab States, had told him personally that His Britannic Majesty's Government is opposed to the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine and still adheres to the Balfour Declaration and British White Paper policy for establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine but that Washington is forcing British acquiescence in the establishment of a Jewish Political State. He said that many other British spokesmen
had expressed the same opinion.

The widespread circulation of this opinion was revealed to me, but not at other times attributed to Sir Ronald Storrs, during conversations in Damascus, in Beirut, in Baghdad and in Tehran--with Moslems, Christians, Arab leaders, American missionaries, and others.

This line of propaganda is distinctly helpful to British prestige with the Arabs. I am convinced, however, that the British officials and leaders with whom I have conferred in the Middle East are definitely opposed to the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine and are in favor of a settlement of the issue on the basis of the British White Paper.

There is another predominating rumor, which is so widely circulated and believed that it has assumed some of the definite attributes of a fact. It purports to be a quotation from a private conversation with Winston Churchill in Cairo, in which the Prime Minister allegedly said, "I am committed to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and the President will accept nothing less." If this statement was made, the Prime Minister unquestionably shares full responsibility with you for whatever decision is reached.
Without attempting to assess responsibility for the Arab-Jewish problem, even while recognizing that the Middle East has been and is a zone of British influence, I believe the British are no longer able by themselves to settle this and kindred problems in the Middle East. Specifically it is my opinion that the British and the Americans must come together and share equally in the final decision for or against the establishment of a Jewish Political State and must share also the responsibility for the consequences of such a decision.

I am, sir, yours respectfully.

PATRICK HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of March 29th in reply to mine of March 18th regarding aircraft for the Southwest Pacific Area.

2. I note that within the last few days General MacArthur has been informed of the aircraft to be allocated to the Southwest Pacific Area. I was about to cable you that Dr. Evatt will be leaving for Washington by air on April 5th and that he would be able to support our case in person and by reference to documents. I am anxious that Dr. Evatt should put to you personally some important aspects of our request and I should be very glad if you would be good enough to afford him an opportunity to do so.

3. I have just received a message from Mr. Churchill on this subject, and I am quoting for your information the main points of my reply to him:

(1) In regard to the statement that the agreed strategy puts the defeat of Germany as the first charge on the forces of the United Nations, we do not accept the view, which, I understand, is held in some quarters in London, that the Commonwealth has acquiesced in the agreed strategical policy. I therefore think it is desirable that I should repeat the Government's viewpoint, in advance of Dr. Evatt's consultations with the President and yourself.

(2) The Australian Government was not aware of the agreement reached on grand strategy between President Roosevelt
and yourself in January, 1942, until the text of the document was communicated to us by Dr. Evatt in May 1942, during his visit to London, immediately after a copy of the document became available to him. The strategy was determined without reference to the Commonwealth Government and the decisions were taken before Singapore fell.

(3) You will remember that the situation and needs of the Southwest Pacific Area and their relation to global strategy was the subject of messages which I sent to yourself and the President in August and September 1942. The answers to our representations were governed by decisions on the basic strategy, which had been taken in January 1942, and in my statement in the House of Representatives on December 10th, 1942, I outlined the position in the following terms: Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt were unable to accept fully the views of the Australian Government on Pacific strategy and the provision of forces and supplies sought. However, they gave certain assurances and practical support, for which the Government is deeply grateful, and it felt bound to accept their conclusions in a spirit of united comradeship.

(4) In the House of Representatives on March 24th, 1943, I reiterated the purport of my previous remarks in the following terms: This is not the first time that it has been declared that what is called the global strategy means the defeat of Hitler first. I have previously intimated to the House that that has become the accepted policy of the major Powers and I have said that, though this is not comforting to us, in the circumstances there is no other course for countries like China and Australia to take than to play their parts in the broad global strategy by fulfilling to the utmost of their capacities the role assigned to them.
(5) In my message to the President of 16th November 1942, which was repeated to you, I also made the following observation:

The decisions on global strategy have been taken by Mr. Churchill and yourself. The Commonwealth Government has shown a ready willingness to cooperate in other theatres at considerable risk to the security of Australia, facts demonstrated by the service overseas of our naval, land and air forces and our continued participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Government considers that the contributions it has made to the other theatres entitle it to the assurance that the fullest possible support will be given to the situation in the Pacific.

(6) The simple fact is that we had no voice in the decisions. We were confronted with a fait accompli and we had no alternative but to accept the decisions, much as we disliked them.

(7) In regard to aircraft, I understand the strength of the United States land-based aircraft in the Southwest Pacific area is approximately 750. The R.A.A.F. has some 700 modern and roughly 400 aircraft of obsolescent types such as Wirraways and Hudsons which are to be replaced.

(8) I am very disturbed at the delay in the delivery of aircraft from the United States. We were told last August that 397 aircraft were to be made available to the R.A.A.F. from the United States production under the plan approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for expansion to thirty squadrons. Deliveries were to be spread over a period of about eight months, so that we expected to have our quota of 397 aircraft by the end of March, 1943. The present position is that only 160 aircraft have been shipped. This delay is most disappointing and is seriously affecting the operational efficiency of the R.A.A.F. As a result it has been necessary completely to revise the development programme. Air crews which had been trained and supporting units which had been formed and equipped in
anticipation of receiving these aircraft allocations had to be absorbed in other directions and, as you will appreciate, this has acted to the detriment of the planned development programme.

(9) Of the total United States and R.A.A.F. strength in the Southwest Pacific Area there are at present only about 650 aircraft in a serviceable condition. The delivery of aircraft spares and equipment from the United States and also to a lesser extent from United Kingdom production is disappointing and an acute stage will shortly be reached in respect of the maintenance of certain other squadrons, notably Kittyhawks, unless something is done to remedy the situation. Dr. Evatt will be in a position to discuss these aspects also.

(10) In conclusion I would refer to the following observations by me in my most recent review to Parliament:

As to the prospects for the future and the duration of the struggle, I would remind every Australian of the basis on which Mr. Churchill reached his conclusion that there is nothing to justify an optimistic view that the end is in sight. He referred to an enslaved Europe with all its resources at Germany’s disposal. He pointed out that the Eighth Army in Africa had defeated only a few divisions of Germany’s great army. He mentioned that the U-boat menace is not diminishing but growing.

So much for the task of defeating Germany, but what about Japan? She too is master of vast territories with large populations and vital resources for the waging of war. Though she has suffered certain naval and air losses her strength is still great. Like Germany, Japan prepared for this war for years, and did not strike until she was ready to do so and considered the situation favourable for success. It should not be overlooked that we are fighting her at places vital to our own security and far removed from her own final ramparts of defence.
The minimum for which we ask is not the establishment of a bare air superiority over the Japanese, but provision of such air power as will enable forces in the Southwest Pacific Area to prevent the consolidation of the Japanese in their positions to the north of Australia and so render reasonably feasible the task of ultimately defeating them when the war in Europe ends. We still hope that the decisions of the Casablanca Conference and the reference to retaining the initiative against Japan contemplate this.

Yours sincerely,

    JOHN CURTIN.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"On the 19th of January I addressed to Washington for transmission to Mr. Churchill and yourself a cablegram urging, in view of the lessons of the use of air power in the New Guinea campaign, that 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport aircraft be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon as possible in 1943.

Mr. Sumner Welles undertook to transmit these messages to both of you immediately but I have had no reply from either Mr. Churchill or yourself.

Since I first approached you there has occurred the battle of the Bismarck Sea which resulted in the virtual annihilation of a Japanese convoy attempting to reinforce Lae and Salamaua. This victory was a further practical demonstration of the case urged by me on the 19th of January.

Intelligence Reports have recently indicated that the Japanese are intensively consolidating an arc of air bases extending through the Netherlands East Indies, Portuguese Timor, New Guinea, Rabaul and the Northern Solomons to the Marshall Islands.

It would appear from their air superiority in the operations in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies
that they under-rated the strength that could be brought against them. Since their bitter experiences in the Solomons, New Guinea and the Bismarck Sea they are apparently determined to secure air superiority in the area I have described and concentrations of land forces are taking place. There is no evidence of air concentrations so far but the air bases will be sufficient to enable a strength of 1500 to 2000 planes to be operated in these regions.

I shall be glad to be informed of the air strength that it is proposed to provide in the South West Pacific Area to ensure that the initiative in the air is retained by the United Nations and that the Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area is in a position to deter and if necessary severely repulse any attempts by the Japanese to raid heavily by air and naval forces territories in our possession.

It is noteworthy and also a tribute to the effectiveness of the forces engaged that in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea it was possible to concentrate only 136 aircraft for this attack. The renewal of attacks on Darwin and reconnaissance of the North West Coast indicate the paramount importance of sufficient strength being available to ensure air superiority along the whole line of contact with the enemy and at other vulnerable points on our coastline especially in the West. Of particular importance is the vital base of Fremantle where, owing to the depletion of the Eastern Fleet, a heavy attack of the hit and run variety might be carried out by naval bombardment and carrier-borne aircraft.
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM MR. JOHN CURTIN
TRANSMITTED THROUGH AUSTRALIAN LEGATION

19 January 1943

Dear Mr. President,

Having learnt that Mr. Churchill and yourself are meeting in Washington, I presume that discussions of great strategical importance are proceeding and that decisions of far-reaching effect on global strategy may be reached.

2. The following information was recently communicated to me by the Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, on the outstanding lessons learnt from the New Guinea campaign and I consider them to be of such transcending importance that we are forthwith communicating them for your urgent consideration, together with my observations and recommendations thereon:-

General MacArthur's statement begins:

The outstanding military lesson of this operation was the continuously calculated application of the air power inherent in the potentialities of every component of the air forces employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops. The effect of this modern instrumentality was sharply accentuated by the geographical limitations of this theatre. For months on end air transport with constant fighter coverage moved complete infantry regiments and artillery battalions across the almost impenetrable mountains and jungles of Papua and reaches of the sea transported field hospital and other base installations to the front; supplied troops and evacuated casualties. For hundreds of miles bombers provided all round reconnaissance, protecting the coast from hostile naval intervention and blasted the way for infantry as it drove forward. A new form of campaign was tested which points the way to the ultimate defeat of the enemy in the Pacific. The offensive and defensive power of air and the adaptability, the range and capacity of transport in effective combination with ground forces, represents tactical and strategical
elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit
the application of offensive power in swift massive strokes rather
than the dilatory and costly island to island advance that some have
assumed to be necessary in a theatre where the enemy's far flung strong-
holds are dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagoes. Air
forces and ground forces were welded together in Papua and with proper
naval support their indissoluble union points the way to victory
through new and broadened strategic and tactical conceptions.

General MacArthur's statement ends.

3. I am convinced that this campaign has demonstrated the
efficacy of certain principles of modern warfare - the results of which
are so important and encouraging as to warrant a review of the present
broad strategy of the United Nations and the allocation of additional
operational and transport aircraft to the South West Pacific area to
permit of the earliest possible extension of offensive action against
the Japanese.

4. These operations have been an extraordinary demonstration
of the manner in which air power, closely integrated with ground forces
and under central direction of one commander, can enable effective blows
to be struck at Japan's sprawling holds on the archipelagoes in the
Pacific. This technique is a substitute for a difficult amphibious
operation of an island to island nature under earlier conceptions of
warfare which would require vast resources in naval and merchant ships
and entail opposed landings against strongly defended positions with
costly losses in men. This closely co-ordinated use of land forces and
air power will therefore conserve both manpower and shipping necessary
to bring them and their equipment to this theatre of operations.

5. Whilst realizing the needs of other theatres I feel that
if 1500 repeat 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport
aircraft can be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon
as possible in 1943, and if naval disposition can be made to give
appropriate covering support, the blows that can be struck against Japan
are such that she can be driven from her island gains in the Pacific and forced to contract her lines. It is not improbable that a mortal blow might be dealt while she is still so extended and vulnerable. As you are aware Japan since the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna is concentrating her garrison strength on building up and holding an outer screen to her base at Rabaul which extends from Asdon to the Northern Solomon Islands.

6. The enemy is weakest in the air. He has been decisively outfought in this element in New Guinea and the Solomons. As the productive capacity of the United Nations now greatly exceeds that of the Axis powers, Japan cannot hope to gain air superiority if adequate allocations are made to the Pacific areas. This request for aircraft does not make any extensive demands on shipping resources, as most of the aircraft could be flown to the South West Pacific.

7. The naval support that the operations would call for does not entail any more risk than that which it is presumed Naval Headquarters of the United Nations are prepared to accept at the present time to meet the enemy under land-based air cover.

8. I am sure great credit would redound to Mr. Churchill and yourself by demonstrating that we lack nothing in comparison with our enemies and Russian allies in aggression, devising methods of warfare appropriate to the circumstances which confront us and with weapons that have been developed for hurt and discomfort of the enemy. I am also confident that such a step will allay the growing anxiety that the Japanese are to be left indefinitely to their own devices with the consequence that the war in the Pacific even after the defeat of Germany will be of the most prolonged duration.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN.
Dear Mr. Churchill,

Having learnt that the President and yourself are meeting in Washington, I presume that discussions of great strategical importance are proceeding and that decisions of far-reaching effect on global strategy may be reached.

2. The following information was recently communicated to me by the Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, on the outstanding lessons learnt from the New Guinea campaign and I consider them to be of such transcending importance that we are forthwith communicating them for your urgent consideration, together with my observations and recommendations thereon:

General MacArthur's statement begins:

The outstanding military lesson of this operation was the continuously calculated application of the air power inherent in the potentialities of every component of the air forces employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops. The effect of this modern instrumentality was sharply accentuated by the geographical limitations of this theatre. For months on end air transport with constant fighter coverage moved complete infantry regiments and artillery battalions across the almost impenetrable mountains and jungles of Papua and reaches of the sea transported field hospital and other base installations to the front; supplied troops and evacuated casualties. For hundreds of miles bombers provided all round reconnaissance, protecting the coast from hostile naval intervention and blasted the way for infantry as it drove forward. A new form of campaign was tested which points the way to the ultimate defeat of the enemy in the Pacific. The offensive and defensive power of air and the adaptability, the range and capacity of transport in effective combination with ground forces, represents tactical and strategical
elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit
the application of offensive power in swift massive strokes rather
than the dilatory and costly island to island advance that some have
assumed to be necessary in a theatre where the enemy's far flung strong-
holds are dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagoes. Air
forces and ground forces were welded together in Papua and with proper
naval support their indissoluble union points the way to victory
through new and broadened strategic and tactical conceptions.

General MacArthur's statement ends.

3. I am convinced that this campaign has demonstrated the
efficacy of certain principles of modern warfare - the results of which
are so important and encouraging as to warrant a review of the present
broad strategy of the United Nations and the allocation of additional
operational and transport aircraft to the South West Pacific area to
permit of the earliest possible extension of offensive action against
the Japanese.

4. These operations have been an extraordinary demonstration
of the manner in which air power, closely integrated with ground forces
and under central direction of one commander, can enable effective blows
to be struck at Japan's sprawling holds on the archipelagoes in the
Pacific. This technique is a substitute for a difficult amphibious
operation of an island to island nature under earlier conceptions of
warfare which would require vast resources in naval and merchant ships
and entail opposed landings against strongly defended positions with
costly losses in men. This closely co-ordinated use of land forces and
air power will therefore conserve both manpower and shipping necessary
to bring them and their equipment to this theatre of operations.

5. Whilst realizing the needs of other theatres I feel that
if 1500 repeat 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport
aircraft can be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon
as possible in 1943, and if naval disposition can be made to give
appropriate covering support, the blows that can be struck against Japan
are such that she can be driven from her island gains in the Pacific and forced to contract her lines. It is not improbable that a mortal blow might be dealt while she is still so extended and vulnerable. As you are aware Japan since the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna is concentrating her garrison strength on building up and holding an outer screen to her base at Rabaul which extends from Ambo to the Northern Solomon Islands.

6. The enemy is weakest in the air. He has been decisively outflown in this element in New Guinea and the Solomons. As the productive capacity of the United Nations now greatly exceeds that of the Axis powers, Japan cannot hope to gain air superiority if adequate allocations are made to the Pacific area. This request for aircraft does not make any extensive demands on shipping resources, as most of the aircraft could be flown to the South West Pacific.

7. The naval support that the operations would call for does not entail any more risk than that which it is presumed Naval Headquarters of the United Nations are prepared to accept at the present time to meet the enemy under land-based air cover.

8. I am sure great credit would redound to the President and yourself by demonstrating that we lack nothing in comparison with our enemies and Russian allies in aggression, devising methods of warfare appropriate to the circumstances which confront us and with weapons that have been developed for hurt and discomfiture of the enemy. I am also confident that such a step will allay the growing anxiety that the Japanese are to be left indefinitely to their own devices with the consequence that the war in the Pacific even after the defeat of Germany will be of the most prolonged duration.

9. In view of your great knowledge of history, the methods of war and recalling the outstanding contributions made by you in pre-war years to the development of machinery for the unified direction of the Navy, Army and Air force and the creation of a Joint Staff outlook on combined operations, I hope my proposal will make a special appeal to you and I would earnestly ask you to give it your support.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN.