AMERICAN
LONDON
POLES
FOR SCHOFIELD

Please deliver the following message from the President to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk:

QUOTE In view of recent developments Prime Minister Churchill has suggested that he believes it might be advisable for you to postpone your trip to Washington until you have had an opportunity to talk with him.

As I feel that you too will wish to have such an opportunity for a personal discussion with Mr. Churchill I have informed him that I am agreeable to a postponement, I am sure that you will concur in this decision, and I am looking forward to the pleasure of seeing you as soon as your talks with him are finished.

UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt

EU:EID1:US
12/28/43

[Note: Signature and additional handwriting on the bottom of the page.]

[Written note: Message at 4:29 PM, attached.]
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your approval a reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram no. 523 regarding his suggestion that it might be advisable to postpone the Polish Prime Minister's visit as well as a message to the Polish Prime Minister explaining the reasons for the postponement.

The copy of Mr. Churchill's telegram to you is returned herewith and if you approve of the telegram to Premier Mikolajczyk, please return it to the Department and I will see that it is dispatched.

Enclosures:

1. To Mr. Churchill.
2. To Premier Mikolajczyk.
3. From Mr. Churchill,
   27 December, 1943.
(Send thru Map Room)  

December 28, 1943  

FOR: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL  

I agree absolutely with your 523, in regard to the postponement of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to Washington until after you have had an opportunity to see him. I am sending him a message accordingly.

ROOSEVELT
27 December 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 523, filed 2718372

Prime Minister to President. Personal and Number 523.

1. I understand you have invited Polish Prime Minister to visit Washington, arriving January 15. Would you very kindly consider whether this visit could not be postponed for a month or six weeks? This would enable me to see the Poles before they leave. If they come over to you with no sort of agreement, is there not a danger of their becoming the centre of Polish enthusiasm, much of which is likely to be anti-Russian and may this not cost them dear? I am sure you will not mind my making this suggestion.

No Sig
From: OPNAV
To: Almune, London

From the President to Mr. Churchill.

Thank you for your message. Best wishes to you all for
a very happy New Year from Mrs. Roosevelt and myself.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2015, E.T., 26 December 1943

Boyer P. Price

BOYER P. PRICE
Captain, C. S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 3-0 1973
9 DECEMBER 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: THE WAR DEPARTMENT

TO: ALCOTT

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

BECAUSE I CANNOT BE IN TOUCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL

AFTER I GET HOME, I WISH YOU WOULD TELL HIM THAT I BELIEVE THE

ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BETTER WAIT UNTIL AFTER I AM BACK. PLEASE ADVISE

ME, FOR MY OWN PRIVATE INFORMATION, WHETHER YOU THINK YOU SHOULD

GET TO ROME BEFORE THE TRANSFER IS MADE OR WHETHER IT SHOULD COME

EARLIER THAN THAT. I ENJOYED OUR DAY TOGETHER EVER SO MUCH. GOOD

LUCK.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date

Released from the White House Map Room,
1045 HWT, 9 December 1943,

Robert W. Boggs
Lt(jg) USNR
23 November 1943

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT
TO: ALOTERS #3477

PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

REFERRING TO MAT NINETT PLEASE INFORM RADOLIO I AM APPRECIATIVE
OF HIS COURTOUS MESSAGE CONVEYED BY REFERENCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1650, EWT, 23 November 1943

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 4, 1972
9 November 1943

URGENT

FROM: WAR

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, ANTILLES DEPARTMENT, SAN JUAN PUERTO RICO

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO SECRETARY HULL. PERSONAL, AND URGENT FROM THE PRESIDENT.

CONFERENCE HERE IN MORNING OF 11 NOVEMBER FITS IN VERY WELL WITH MY PLANS.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1140 E.W.T. 9 November 1943

L. Mathewson
Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. May 4, 1983

Red Puerto Rico 2040 Z
Conference here in morning of 11 November fits in very well with my plans.

[Signature]

9 November 1943
September 4, 1943.

From:  Opanav  
To:  Aluana London  

Personal to Winant for the King from the President.

The visit of the Churchill family at the White House not only affords me a great deal of pleasure but gives us an opportunity to evaluate the work of the conference at Quebec. I know that you will be well pleased with the results when you receive a full report from your Prime Minister. Quebec, Ottawa, and all of Canada could not have been more hospitable. You could not have found more helpful and agreeable representatives to receive us than the Governor-General and Princess Alice. I send you my personal thanks for providing such delightful quarters at the Citadel.

ROOSEVELT.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

September 2, 1943

From AGWAR

To "MOGADOR" CG FREEDOM ALGIERS #6704

From President Roosevelt and The Prime Minister to General Eisenhower, personal and

Your NAFl 346, 347 and 348.

We highly approve your decision to go on with AVALANCHE and to
land an airborne division near Rome on the conditions indicated.

We fully recognize that military consideration must be dominant
at this juncture.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0100 September 2, 1943 by

CHESTER HAMMOND, Lt Colonel, G. S. C.

REGRADOED UNCLASSIFIED
MAY 15 1972
I

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear President and Prime Minister of

Your 346, 347, and 348,

We highly approve your decision to

Go on with AVALANCHE and to land

an airborne division near Rome

on the conditions indicated. We fully

recognize that military considerations

must be your sole guide dominant

at this juncture.

[Signature]

[Signature]
The lines at 3.46, 3.47, and 3.48 seem to be...
PRIORITY

August 18, 1943

To: Freedom, Algiers, 55404

Hereewith is a message from the President of the United States to General Eisenhower:

"The Sicily campaign now successfully concluded in accordance with the timing and planning of the Allies has thrilled all of us. This is especially true when we realize that the enemy forces in Sicily amounted to 405,000 men. The events of the past thirty-eight days show what can be done by team work based on preparation. Training, timing, and above all on Gallantry on land, on sea, and in the air. From the ancient Citadel of Quebec I send to you my warm congratulations; and to the officers and men under your command, British, Canadian, French and American, my thanks and enthusiastic approbation. Tell them "Well done."

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

Released from the White House Map Room at 1920, EWT, 18 August 1943.

R. Bogue,
Lt (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. May 4, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For Eisenhower:

The Sicily campaign was successfully concluded in accordance with the timing and planning of the Allies. This has thrilled all of us. This is especially true when we realize that the enemy forces amounted to 405,000 men.

The events of the last 38 days show what can be done by teamwork based on preplanned training, timing and attack all on ground, by land, by sea and by the air.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From the ancient citadel of Quebec I send to you my warm congratulations; and to the officers and men, some of whom I command, British, Canadian, French and American, my thanks and enthusiastic approbation.
August 16, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and from the President to Winant for the King.

Thank you very much for your telegram of congratulations on the long range bombing of the Ploesti oil refineries. Later information leads us to believe that the damage to the refineries was greater than we had anticipated and that a large number of them have been put out of commission. This attack seems to have been well worthwhile.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1:40, EWT, August 16, 1943.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (Jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
CABLEGRAM

August 16, 1943.

His Majesty
George VI

Thank you very much for your telegram of congratulations on the long range bombing of the Ploesti oil refineries. Later information leads us to believe that the damage to the refineries was greater than we had anticipated and that a large number of them have been put out of commission. This attack seems to have been well worthwhile.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Routine

From: Opnav
To: ComNavEu

For delivery to Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound,
Admiralty, London.

I have only just heard the sad news of Lady Pound's passing
and do want you to know that I am deeply sorry and am thinking of
you.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1825, EST, July 30, 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

Declassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By M. J. Stewart Date: May 5, 1972
Telegram

The White House
Washington

July 30, 1943.

Admiral of the Fleet,
Sir Dudley Pound,
c/o The American Embassy,

(THROUGH MAP ROOM WHITE HOUSE)

I have only just heard the sad news of Lady Pound’s passing and do want you to know that I am deeply sorry and am thinking of you.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Enacted from the White House Map Room

Mr. H. G. Truman
2d Lt., Army

TO THE PRESIDENT AND PERSONAL

Furinly asks for him (second) no press should be made public.

Until Italy asks for him (second) important news is the only one to be

allowed to be taken to Germany.

Roosevelt

by Capt. John J. Stewart date May 5 1912

Declassified Airift of the U.S.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Eisenhowen from the President.

Prime Minister and I agree (first) no
terms should be made public until Italy asks
for them. (Second) important when the time
comes
to stress release of Allied prisoners and none
of them to be allowed to be taken to Germany.

By direction
W. Brown

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 5 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
July 29, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Attached is a copy of a message sent by the President to General Eisenhower at 1945, 1111, July 28, 1945.

The President has directed that this copy be furnished General Marshall for his information.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

1 Inc.
Pres-Eisenhower #8648, 28 July 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart Date, May 5, 1972
TO EISENHOWER:

Replying to your N.A.F. 266, the following announcement by you to the Italian people is approved by the President:

"Message from Allied Headquarters to the Italian people.

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately and peace under the honourable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficial. Your men will return to their normal life and to their productive avocations and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
JULY 14, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: WAR

TO: ALGIERS

THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

FULLY CONVIR IN YOUR SUGGESTION FOR RELEASE OF JOINT
ANNOUNCEMENT.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1445, EWT, July 14, 1943.

CHESTER HALLOCK
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Brown

Will you send a flash to Eisenhower over my signature saying "Fully agree in your suggestion for release of joint announcement"?

F. D. R.
U R G E N T

FROM: WAR
TO: ALGIERS
No.: 2393

THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

PRIME MINISTER AND I DO NOT WANT IOSE PSYCHOLOGIC EFFECT OF

JOINT STATEMENT. CAN YOU GIVE US SUGGESTED TIME FOR ITS

SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE BY YOU AND BY US.

ROOSEVELT

JULY 15, 1945.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1006, EWT, July 15, 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
Prime Minister, and I do not want loss psychological effect of joint statement can you give us suggested time for its announcement release by you and by WSC.

Russoch
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

July 9, 1943.

Please send the following to General Eisenhower.

Be prepared to issue the following joint message to the Italian people at a time to be decided later by the Prime Minister and the President. We should like to have your advice as to the best time to issue the statement.

QUOTE: This is a message to the Italian people from the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

INNERQUOTE: At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada under the command of General Eisenhower and his Deputy General Alexander are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties.

Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world.

This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture—traditions...
to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bond.

Today Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany—power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race.

The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations.

If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position.

Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations—every drop of blood that you sacrifice—can serve only one purpose: to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes.
All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European Nations.

The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler—or live for Italy, and for civilization. END INHERQUOTE.
Signed Roosevelt, Churchill. END QUOTE.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
be prepared to issue the following joint message to the Italian people at a time to be decided later by the Prime Minister and the President. We should like to have your advice as to the best time to issue the statement.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL:

Please send the following to General Eisenhower:

At such time and by such means as you may consider ap-
propriate, send the following joint message to the Italian
people:

"Send prior information to Washington and
London as to date and hour of release."

QUOTE. This is a message to the Italian people from the
President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister
of Great Britain.

INNERQUOTE. At this moment the combined armed forces of
the United States, and Great Britain under the command of General
Eisenhower and his Deputy General Alexander are carrying the war
deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct
consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been
subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a
brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties.

Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler
had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to
attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your
ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany
in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world.
This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture - traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon.

Today Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany - power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race.

The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations.

If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the
Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position.

Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations - every drop of blood that you sacrifice - can serve only one purpose; to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes.

All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European Nations.

The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler - or live for Italy, and for civilization. END INNERQUOTE. Signed Roosevelt, Churchill. END QUOTE.
This is in reply to your query concerning time of issue of joint Roosevelt Churchill message. It is my opinion, shared by Alexander, that it should go out if possible before the Italian people have recovered from the shock of invasion in force but not before we can be sure of our position in Sicily (from Eisenhower to General Marshall for his eyes only reur 2105 cite FHCIC). I consider that this position will be assured directly we have secured a solid line including a workable major port and Catania and its surrounding air fields. We will then, in the words of the message, actually be firmly situated "deep into the territory of your country."

I therefore recommend that we immediately make all necessary preparations to issue the message locally both by radio and leaflet, with its exact timing to be determined by the President and the Prime Minister as soon as I can report the existence of a sufficiently favorable military situation. We feel that from the present outlook the situation described above should be attained at a reasonably early date and such attainment will add weight to the words of the message and so insure its best effect. To issue while there is still a chance that this operation will develop into a bitterly contested struggle for a solid bridgehead, would be inopportune and might even open us to ridicule.

It is my further recommendation that the message be broadcast from Washington and London simultaneously with our issue here.

No Sig

REGRAD

Published in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The War Years Vol II, pp. 1250 - 1251
IN REPLY TO YOUR 041719 TO COMINC X THE PRESIDENT DESIRES THAT YOU INFORM ADMIRAL ROBERT THAT ONE THE UNITED STATES IS AGREEABLE TO HIS RELINQUISHING HIS AUTHORITY IN THE FRENCH ANTILLES TO A FRENCHMAN APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TWO THE UNITED STATES WILL PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR ADMIRAL ROBERT AND HIS ENTOURAGE TO A UNITED STATES PORT AFTER WHICH THEY WILL BE GIVEN ASYLUM THERE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WHATSOEVER TO ROBERT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOUR THE UNITED STATES INSISTS THAT THE FRENCH GOLD NOW IN MARTINIQUE SHALL BE SAFEGUARDED FIVE THE UNITED STATES INSISTS THAT THERE SHALL BE NO TRANSFERS OF BANK CREDITS TO PLACES OUTSIDE THE ISLANDS SIX HENRI HOPPENOT X NOW CHIEF OF THE CIVILIAN SERVICES OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION HERE X HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY ALGIERS AS TEMPORARY SUCCESSOR TO ROBERT AND WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US X HE IS PREPARED TO TAKE OVER DIRECTLY FROM ROBERT OR FROM WHOEVER ROBERT DESIRES TO PLACE IN CHARGE PENDING HIS ARRIVAL SEVEN ALL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS X INCLUDING QUESTIONS INVOLVING FOOD SUPPLIES X MERCHANT AND NAVAL SHIPS X WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH THE NEW FRENCH AUTHORITIES AND NOT WITH ROBERT

SEALED

[Redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. 5/1972

By W. J. Stewart Date May
July 7, 1943.

By direction of Admiral Brown this message was sent to Captain Struble, Navy Department, to obtain a release from Coninoch.
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

July 7, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: ComCaribSeaPren

In reply to your 041719 to Cominch, the President desires that you inform Admiral Robert that:

(1) The United States is agreeable to his relinquishing his authority in the French Antilles to a Frenchman approved by the Government of the United States.

(2) The United States will provide transportation for Admiral Robert and his entourage to a United States port after which they will be given asylum.

(3) We are not prepared to make any commitments whatever to Robert prior to his departure.

(4) The United States insists that the French sold now in Martinique shall be safeguarded.

(5) The United States insists that there shall be no transfers of bank credits to places outside the islands.

(6) Henri Hoppenot, now Chief of the Civilian Services of the French Military Mission here, has been suggested by Algiers as temporary successor to Robert and would be acceptable to us. He is prepared to take over directly from Robert or from whoever Robert desires to place in charge pending his arrival.

(7) All questions concerning the future administration of the islands, including questions involving food supplies, merchant and naval ships, will be discussed by the United States with the new French authorities and not with Robert.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1145, E.T., July 7, 1943.

GEORGE M. ELY
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date: MAY 5 572
VICE ADMIRAL HOOVER.

In reply to your #41719 to Cominich, the President desires that you inform Admiral Robert that

(1) The United States is agreeable to his relinquishing his authority in the French Antilles to a Frenchman approved by the Government of the United States.

(2) The United States will provide transportation for Admiral Robert and his entourage to a United States port after which they will be given asylum.

(3) We are not prepared to make any commitments whatever to Robert prior to his departure.

(4) The United States insists that the French gold now in Martinique shall be safeguarded.

(5) The United States insists that there shall be no transfers of bank credits to places outside the islands.

(6) Henri Hoppenot, now Chief of the Civilian Services of the French Military Mission here, has been suggested by Algiers as temporary successor to Robert and would be acceptable to us. He is prepared to take over directly from Robert or from whoever Robert desires to place in charge pending his arrival.

(7) All questions concerning the future administration of the islands, including questions involving food supplies, merchant and naval ships, will be discussed by the United States with the new French authorities and not with Robert.
June 15, 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav.
To: Alusana, Moscow

Personal and secret to Admiral Standley from the President.

Secretary Hull and I are very anxious to have a representative of the O.W.I. as a special assistant to you in Moscow. His duties would be to provide information about America's part in the war effort to all Russian agencies of communication and to serve in every way possible as a channel for information about the United States to such Russian agencies.

A man of superior qualities would be selected. The O.W.I., with the approval of the State Department, have similar trained men attached to all the major embassies throughout the world.

We do not know at this time whether additional people might be required for this responsibility but a decision on that can await the arrival of your special assistant.

Will you see Mr. Molotov and ask him whether or not such a person would be acceptable to the Soviet Government?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House
Map Room at 1900 June 15, 1943.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
JUNE 15, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO ADMIRAL STANLEY FROM THE PRESIDENT

SECRETARY MUIR AND I ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE O.W.I. AS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO YOU IN MOSCOW. HIS DUTIES WOULD BE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR EFFORT TO ALL RUSSIAN AGENCIES OF COMMUNICATION AND TO SERVE IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE AS A CHANNEL FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES TO SUCH RUSSIAN AGENCIES.

A MAN OF SUPERIOR QUALITIES WOULD BE SELECTED. THE O.W.I., WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, HAVE SIMILAR TRAINED MEN ATTACHED TO ALL THE MAJOR EMBASSIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE DO NOT KNOW AT THIS TIME WHETHER ADDITIONAL PEOPLE MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR THIS RESPONSIBILITY BUT A DECISION ON THAT CAN AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

WILL YOU SEE MR. MOLOTOV AND ASK HIM WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A PERSON WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT?

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
June 1, 1943.

To: U. S. Military Attache, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Message as follows has been received from General Eisenhower for transmittal to President Vargas signed Marshal:

"Your generous message of congratulations on the Tunisian victory has been transmitted to me by President Roosevelt. In the name of all fighting men under my command who made this victory possible I thank you. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity of commending to you the high professional and personal qualities of General Gomes and the other officers of the Brazilian armed forces whom it has been our great pleasure to receive in the African Theater."

Acknowledge receipt of this message, advise Ambassador Caffery and communicate to President Vargas as indicated.

[Signature]

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN:

The President asks if this message has been sent.

Grace Tully

sent 705 PM, June 1st to MA, Rio to relay, by Army
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943

Draft of Press Release regarding the President's invitation to
General Giraud to visit the United States.

President Roosevelt on May 27, 1943, sent an invitation to
General Giraud through General Eisenhower at Allied Force Headquarters,
Algeria, to visit the United States as soon as the burden of his
heavy responsibilities made it possible for him to leave North Africa
temporarily.

On May 28, 1943, General Giraud replied to this invitation
through General Eisenhower, in which he thanked the President en-
thusiastically for the invitation and concluded by saying: "For
the kind invitation of the American Government you have my deepest
thanks. It would please me greatly to have you accept the assurances
of my very high consideration and my most sincere esteem."

No date has as yet been set for the visit of General Giraud,
but it will be in the near future when events make it possible.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE
EYES ONLY
Executive, Operations Division
May 27, 1943

COMMANDER GENERAL
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
FREEDOM, ALGERIA

Number 8773

For General Eisenhower's eyes alone from the President.

Please transmit immediately the following textual message from me to General Giraud:

"I hope very much that as soon as the existing situation in North Africa permits and as soon as the burden of your heavy responsibilities makes it possible, you will come to Washington as the guest of this government. I feel there are many problems of common interest to our two countries which it would be most helpful to me to have this opportunity of discussing with you. Will you let me know how soon you think it would be possible for you to make the trip to this country. I remember with the greatest satisfaction my meetings with you at Casablanca and I send you my warm personal regards and the assurances of my highest consideration. Roosevelt."

Please transmit to me the reply which General Giraud may make. As soon as I receive an indication from General Giraud of the approximate date when he can make this visit, I shall make it public.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: GF
RETURN: SGO
ADM Leary

CM-OUT-11597 (27 May 43) 2355 Z, May

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date May 5 1972

COPY No. 8

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
UBNAVCON OP PRIORITY 280130° AND 280217°

*PART 1 280130° NCR 894
**PART 2 280217 NCR 893

NOTE: PHONED TO MAP-ROOM AT 1755/28TH EWT.

P1A.....AGT
FILE......

SEALED

[Handwritten note: Date - MAY 5 1972]

[Handwritten note: Signature]
From: GHNA
To: ALUSNA MOSCO

Personal and private from the President for Davies

Re your telegram 518 dated May 24.

1. Present plans call for equipment for oil refining plants number one and number two being on docks for shipping by August 1.

   All but 300 tons of the equipment which totals over 100,000 tons in weight for the entire four refining plants repeat entire four refining plants should be on docks by August 30.

   Auxiliary equipment such as instruments, valves and tank cars for all of these plants will be available for shipment in October and November.

2. Present plans call for shipping approximately 35,000 tons of isocane in June. In addition large quantities of aviation gasoline will also be shipped.

   Every effort will be made to meet USSR requirements for components for aviation gasoline during second half of year. We are facing certain production difficulties which have made it difficult for us to meet other operational needs. Will notify USSR authorities just as soon as we can definitely state the quantities of components for aviation gasoline that can be made available after the month of June.

3. Every effort is being made to complete factory deliveries of June assignments of pursuit planes by the tenth of June. These planes as well as those already enroute will be expedited in every possible way. Both supply routes will be used.

   All planes promised under existing agreements will be sent as quickly as possible. We are looking into the possibility of increasing the allotment of pursuit planes. Please assure Marshall Stalin that I shall personally follow up this matter as expeditiously as possible.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House
Map Room at 2020 EWT May 24, 1943

William A. Burns, Jr.
Lieutenant, UNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date May 5, 1988
DRAFT OF CABLE FOR DAVIES

RE: YOUR TELEGRAM SLB DATED MAY 24.

1) PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR EQUIPMENT FOR OIL REFINING PLANTS

NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER TWO BEING ON DOCKS FOR SHIPPING BY AUGUST 1. ALL BUT 3 90 TONS OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR THE ENTIRE FOUR PLANTS (REPEAT ENTIRE FOUR PLANTS) SHOULD BE ON DOCKS BY AUGUST 30.

AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS INSTRUMENTS, VALVES AND TANK CARS FOR ALL OF THESE PLANTS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENT IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

2) PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR SHIPING APPROXIMATELY 37,000 TONS OF ISOCOTANE IN JUNE. IN ADDITION LARGE QUANTITIES OF AVIATION GASOLINE WILL ALSO BE SHIPPED.

EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO MEET USSR REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPONENTS FOR AVIATION GASOLINE DURING SECOND HALF OF YEAR.

WE ARE FACING CERTAIN PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO MEET OTHER OPERATIONAL NEEDS. WILL NOTIFY...
USSR Authorities just as soon as we can definitely state the quantities of components for aviation gasoline that can be made available after the month of June.

Every effort is being made to complete factory deliveries with the exception of 250 tons of the equipment which totals 1500 tons. Assignments of pursuit planes by the tenth of June. These planes as well as those already enroute will be expedited in every possible way. Both supply routes will be used.

All planes promised under existing agreements will be sent as quickly as possible. We are looking into the possibility of meeting other operational needs. We will let the F.D.R. know.

Increasing the allotment of pursuit planes. Please assure Stalin that I shall personally follow up this matter as expeditiously as possible.

We will send all planes required under agreements already in existence as quickly as possible. The allotment of increasing the allotment of pursuit planes is in hand.

Marshall states that I will send all possible expediency.

[Signature]
May 27, 1943.

Text of message sent to Davies from the President:

Please refer to your telegram 518 of the 24th May.

One. It is planned now to have the equipment for oil refining plants one and two on the docks for shipment by the first of August.

With the exception of 350 tons of the equipment which totals over 100,000 tons all necessary equipment for the entire four repeat four refining plants should be on the docks by August 30.

Instruments, valves and tank cars, and like auxiliary equipment for all of these plants will be ready for shipment in October and November.

Two. In June approximately 37,000 tons of isocetane, as well as large quantities of aviation gasoline, will be shipped according to present plans.

We will make every effort to meet USSR requirements for components for aviation gasoline during the last half of the year. We are facing some production difficulties which add to the difficulty of meeting other operational needs. We will let the USSR authorities know as soon as we can definitely say the quantities of components for aviation gasoline that can be made available after June.

Three. We are making every effort to complete factory deliveries of June assignments of pursuit planes before the eleventh of June. These planes together with those already on their way will be expedited by every possible means. Both supply routes will be used.

We will send all planes promised under agreements already in existence as quickly as possible. The possibility of increasing the allotment of pursuit planes is being examined. Please assure Marshal Stalin that I shall personally follow up this problem with all possible expediency.

ROOSEVELT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
One. Oil refining plants numbers one and two are expected to be at shipside by August 1, and all but 390 tons of all four plants, which total about 110,000 tons in weight, should be at shipside by August 30. Instruments, valves, and tank cars, will be available in October and November. The production and shipment of this material will be followed up in every practicable way.

Two. Present indications are that for the month of June shipments will amount to some 37,000 tons of isoctane, in addition to large quantities of aviation gasoline. Every effort will be made to meet your requirements for the months after June. However, production difficulties and other urgent operational needs make it impossible to state definitely at this time the quantities that can be made available.

Three. Steps are being taken to complete factory deliveries of all June assignments of pursuit airplanes by June 10th. Forwarding of these planes and all those already enroute will be expedited in every way possible. The possibility of increasing the assignment of pursuit planes will be thoroughly examined.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Colonel W. E. Sexton
Attention: Major Stiebel, Duty Officer.

Attached are copies, as approved, of the messages from the President to General Eisenhower and General Giraud.

The President desires that these messages be sent as soon as possible.

Copies of these messages have been furnished Secretary Early for release to the press with the exception of the last paragraph in the message to General Eisenhower.

Chester Hammond,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
May 9, 1943

To General Giraud:

I express the admiration of the people of America in saluting the brilliant contributions of the French Forces under your command which culminated yesterday in the capture of Tunis and Bizerte. Soldiers of France have demonstrated that they waited only the opportunity to spring back at their Nazi oppressors. This precedent, so victoriously established, is the beginning of the day when the United Nations, working in concert, will restore France to its people.

(Signed)

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House Map Room 1321 (EWT), May 9, 1943.

Chester Hammond,
Lieutenant Colonel, S.S.C.
To General Eisenhower:

May 9, 1943.

My warm personal congratulations to you on the great success of the recent operations in North Africa. The power and coordination with which the Allied forces are crushing our enemies in Tunisia is a tribute to your leadership. The unprecedented degree of Allied cooperation makes a pattern for the ultimate defeat of the Axis.

Convey to General Alexander my appreciation of the splendid manner in which he directed the Ground Armies of three nations in a series of devastating blows against the enemy. My congratulations to Air Marshal Tedder on his overwhelming air victory; to Admiral Cunningham on the destruction of the Axis shipping by his naval craft; to General Montgomery on the culmination of his Odyssey; and to General Anderson for his perfect teamwork.

Personally, and without publicity, convey my thanks to Patton for his fine work early in the campaign, to Spaatz and Doolittle on the superb job they have done, and to Bradley for his remarkable leadership in initiating the breakthrough.

(Signed)

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House Map Room
1220 (ET), May 9, 1943.

Chester Hammond,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.
May 9, 1943.

To General Eisenhower

My warm personal congratulations to you on the great success of the recent operations in North Africa. The power and coordination with which the Allied Forces are crushing our enemies in Tunisia is a tribute to your leadership. The unprecedented degree of Allied cooperation makes a pattern for the ultimate defeat of the Axis.

Convey to General Alexander my appreciation of the splendid manner in which he directed the Ground Armies of three nations in a series of devastating blows against the enemy. My congratulations to Air Marshal Tedder on his overwhelming air victory; to Admiral Cunningham on the destruction of the Axis shipping by his naval craft; to General Montgomery on the culmination of his Odyssey and to General Anderson for his perfect team-play.

Signed

ROOSEVELT

copy of message as furnished Secretary Early.
May 9, 1943,

To General Giraud:

I express the admiration of the people of America in saluting the brilliant contributions of the French Forces under your command which culminated yesterday in the capture of Tunis and Bizerte. Soldiers of France have demonstrated that they waited only the opportunity to spring back at their Nazi oppressors. This precedent, so victoriously established, is the beginning of the day when the United Nations, working in concert, will restore France to its people.

(signed)

ROOSEVELT.

COPY OF MESSAGE FURNISHED SECRETARY EARLY.
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAMMOND:

In accordance with instructions from General Marshall, attached is a redraft of a message for the President to General Eisenhower. Also attached is a draft of a message to General Giraud. I understand that the President desired these drafts at the earliest possible moment.

W. T. SEXTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
To General Eisenhower

My warm personal congratulations to you on the great success of the recent operations in North Africa. The power and coordination with which the Allied Forces are crushing our enemies in Tunisia is a profound tribute to your leadership. The unprecedented degree of Allied cooperation makes a pattern for the ultimate defeat of the Axis.

Convey to General Alexander my appreciation of the splendid manner in which he directed the Ground Armies of three nations in a series of devastating blows against the enemy. My congratulations to Air Marshal Tedder on his overwhelming air victory, and to Admiral Cunningham on the destruction of the Axis shipping by his naval craft.

Personally, and without publicity, convey my thanks to General Montgomery on the culmination of his Odyssey.

Patton for his fine work early in the campaign, to Speatz and Doolittle on the superb job they have done, and to Bradley for his remarkable leadership in initiating the breakthrough.

and to General Anders for his perfect team play.

Roosevelt
To General Giraud

I express the admiration of the people of America in saluting the brilliant contributions of the French Forces under your command which culminated yesterday in the capture of Tunis and Bizerte. Soldiers of France have demonstrated that they waited only the opportunity to spring back at their Nazi oppressors. This precedent, so victoriously established, is the beginning of the day when the United Nations, working in concert, will restore France to its people.

[Signature]

Roosevelt
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

White House  
May 9, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
FREEDOM ALIENS

Number 7697

My warm personal congratulations (to Eisenhower and Roosevelt) to you on the great success of the recent operations in North Africa. The power and coordination with which the Allied Forces are crushing our enemies in Tunisia is a tribute to your leadership. The unprecedented degree of Allied cooperation makes a pattern for the ultimate defeat of the Axis.

Convey to General Alexander my appreciation of the splendid manner in which he directed the Ground Armies of three nations in a series of devastating blows against the enemy. My congratulations to Air Marshal Tedder on his overwhelming air victory; to Admiral Cunningham on the destruction of the Axis shipping by his Naval craft; to General Montgomery on the culmination of his odyssey; and to General Anderson for his perfect team-play.

Personally, and without publicity, convey my thanks to Patton for his fine work early in the campaign, to Speers and Doolittle on the superb job they have done, and to Bradley for his remarkable leadership in initiating the breakthrough.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972

CM-OUT-1044 (9 May 43) 2342Z  mos

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

White House
May 9, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL,
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 7698

I express the admiration (to Eisenhower pass to General Giraud from Roosevelt) of the people of America in saluting the brilliant contributions of the French Forces under your command which culminated yesterday in the capture of Tunis and Bizerte. Soldiers of France have demonstrated that they waited only the opportunity to spring back at their Nazi oppressors. This precedent, so victoriously established, is the beginning of the day when the United Nations, working in concert, will restore France to its people.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: White House

CH-OUT-4045 (9 May 43) 23422 msh

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date, May 5, 1972

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
INCOMING MESSAGE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF MESSAGES

May 11, 1943

FROM YQV FREDOM ALGIERS

DATE May 10, 1943

MESSAGE NUMBER 7698 TO FREEDOM SIGNED ROOSEVELT

7697

HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND DELIVERED TO ADDRESSEE AT 100250Z

THIS MESSAGE IS CM-OUT-4045 9 May 43 WHITEHOUSE

4044

ACTION: WHITEHOUSE

CM-IN-6535 (11 May 43) 00312 mjc
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF MESSAGE

From: YQV, Algiers
Date: May 10, 1943

Message number 7697 to Eisenhower signed Roosevelt has been received and delivered to addressee at 0250Z on May 10, 1943; this message is CH-OUT-4044, 9 May 1943, White House.

ACTION: White House

CM-IX-6196 (10 May 43) 1100Z cws

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT.

Mr. President:
I have noted both
of these cables.

There is attached
a draft of a cable from you to
Biddle. I don't know quite how
that stands but I would think it
would be far better if Tony
remained where he is.

Harry L. Hopkins
encl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date May 3, 1977
April 12, 1943

PROPOSED CABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ANTHONY BIDDLE

DEAR TONY: I THINK, EVERYTHING CONSIDERED, IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER IF YOU COULD REMAIN AT YOUR POST IN LONDON. YOU HAVE DONE A GRAND JOB THERE AND I KNOW OF NO ONE WHO COULD POSSIBLY REPLACE YOU.

GIVE MY LOVE TO MARGARET.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 30 1973
APRIL 12, 1943

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] TO ANTHONY RIDDLE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

DEAR TONY: I THINK, EVERYTHING CONSIDERED, IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER IF YOU COULD REMAIN AT YOUR POST IN LONDON. YOU HAVE DONE A GRAND JOB THERE AND I KNOW OF NO ONE WHO COULD POSSIBLY REPLACE YOU.

GIVE MY LOVE TO MARGARET.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EWT, April 12, 1943.

CHESTER HAMILTON,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1943

From the President to Mr. Anthony Eden (through British Embassy)

Notes from Press Conference 3888 held 3-30-43.

The President:

"Mr. Eden has left, and we decided that it was probably better not
to give out one of those formal statements by the two of us. And he
asked me to just talk to you all informally about it.

We are in entire agreement. We have had series--and he has had
series of conferences with a lot of people--the Secretary of State, and
his advisers, and the Members of the Senate and the House, and so forth;
and he took a little trip to see some of the camps.

We talked about everything--which might be put down as current
military and political affairs, and other questions arising out of the
war relating to the present and the future. I think I can say for both
of us that they disclose very close similarity of outlook on the part of
the two governments, and a very fruitful meeting of the minds on all
the matters that are under discussion.

We talked about the practical problems that will arise on the
surrender of the enemy--problems that will face the governments of
the United States, and United Kingdom, and China and Russia, and all
of the other United Nations, primarily in safeguarding the world from
future aggression.
And I think I ought to make it clear—I think you should all make it clear—that these conversations are exploratory. The object of them was not to reach final decisions, which are of course impossible at this stage; but to reach a large measure of general agreement on objectives. So as to take time by the forelock, and as a result of these conferences, they will be of great aid in further conferences between all of the United Nations.

I also want to make it very clear that these conferences are by no means confined to the United Kingdom and the United States. They are merely one small part of the long series of conferences between the other United Nations.

We have talked, for example, rather intimately about these various subjects with China and with one or two of the South American Republics. Mr. Eden himself has been to Russia and talked in regard to many of these problems with Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and other members of the Russian government.

I hope and expect that we will be continuing discussions along these lines with the Russian government in the very near future, and with other members of the United Nations. And therefore, these are—you might put it this way—these conversations constitute one method of working toward the unity of the United Nations, which is going along extremely well.

Some people ought to take note of that.
And the other method, of course, is through the more formal gathering, such as we will have next month with the United Nations, in regard to the subject of food, to be followed a little later by a similar one in regard to relief; and possibly a little later by another exploratory conference in regard to finances; and possibly another one in regard to things out of the ground. The food thing will probably include things that grow out of the ground, and the other conference would refer to things that come out from under the surface—minerals, metals, oil, and so forth.

So you see, the thing is progressing in a very satisfactory way.

If some of you go back—some of you can, like myself go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, between Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things.

And the similar I used to Mr. Eden the other day was that—the tempo then seemed to be that of the lady who is told at five o'clock that she is to accompany her husband on a month's trip on the three o'clock train that afternoon. Well, I have seen ladies trying to pack for a month's trip in three hours. That was a little bit the situation over here, and everywhere else, in making preparations for the Versailles
conference. Everybody was rushing around grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases. Some were not needed at all, and some needed things were left behind.

I have forgotten how many experts we took to Versailles at that time, but everybody who had a "happy thought," or who thought he was an expert, got a free ride. (Laughter)

And that is why I think that this whole method that is going on now is a very valuable thing, in an exploratory way; and incidentally, as I remarked the other day, in the process of getting to know each other.

I would put it—if you want to be didactic and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far in all of the conferences that we have held with other members of the United Nations—this is not just the British—they come into it too—that we are about 55 percent together.

Well, that's an amazing statement. It happens to be true. I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it. (Laughter)

So it was a very good conference."
Mr. Eden has left, and we decided that it is probably better not to give out one of those formal statements by the two of us. And he asked me to just talk to you all informally about it.

We are in entire agreement. We have had these series of conferences with a lot of people -- the Secretary of State, and his advisers, and the Members of the Senate and the House, and so forth; and he took a little trip to see some of the camps.

We talked about everything -- might be put down as current military and political affairs, and other questions arising out of the war relating to the present and the future. I think I can say for both of us that they disclose very close similarity of outlook on the part of the two governments, and a very fruitful meeting of the minds on all the matters that came under discussion.

We talked about the practical problems that will arise on the surrender of the enemy -- problems that will face the governments of the United States, and United Kingdom, and China and Russia, and all of the other United Nations, primarily in safeguarding the world from future aggression.

And I think I ought to make it clear -- that these conversations are exploratory. The object of them was not to reach final decisions, which are of course impossible at this stage; but to reach a large measure of
general agreement on objectives. So as to take time by the fore-
look, and as a result of these conferences, they will be of great
aid in further conferences between all of the United Nations.

I also want to make it very clear that these conferences
are by no means confined to the United Kingdom and the United
States. They are merely one small part of the long series of
conferences between the other United Nations.

We have talked, for example, to a great extent, rather intimately
about these various subjects with China and with one or two of the
South American Republics. Mr. Eden himself has been to Russia
and talked in regard to many of these problems with Mr. Stalin,
Mr. Molotov and other members of the Russian government.

I hope and expect that we will be continuing discussions
along these lines with the Russian government in the very near
future, and with other members of the United Nations. And there-
fore, these are -- you might put it this way -- what these
conversations constitute one method of working toward the unity
of the United Nations, which is going along extremely well.

Some people ought to take note of that.

And the other method, of course, is through the more
formal gathering, such as we will have next month with the United
Nations, in regard to the subject of food, to be followed a
little later by a similar one in regard to relief; and possibly a
little later by another exploratory conference in regard to
finances; and possibly another one in regard to things out of the
ground. The food thing will probably include things that grow out of the ground, and the other one would refer to things that come out from under the surface -- minerals, metals, oil, and so forth.

So you see, the thing is progressing in a very satisfactory way.

If some of you go back -- some of you can, like myself -- go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, around Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things.

And the simile I used to Mr. Eden the other day was that -- I was here at the time -- and the tempo seemed to be that of the lady who is told at noon that she is to accompany her husband on a month's trip on the three o'clock train that afternoon. Well, I have seen ladies trying to pack for a month's trip in three hours, and that was a little bit the situation over here, and everywhere else, in making preparations for the Versailles conference. Everybody was rushing around grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases. Some of the needed large portions of things out of the cupboards were not needed at all, and some needed things were left behind.

I have forgotten how many experts we took to Versailles
at that time, but everybody who had a "happy thought," or who thought he was an expert, got a free ride. [laughter]

And that is why I think that this whole method that is going on now is a very valuable thing, in an exploratory way; and incidentally, as I remarked the other day, in the process of getting to know each other.

I would say -- I would put it -- if you want to be didactic and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far in all of the conferences that we have held with other members of the United Nations -- this is not just the British -- they come into it too -- but we are about 95 percent together. Well, that's an amazing statement. It happens to be true. I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it. [laughter]

So it was a very good conference.
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOMERNMENT RATES

ARCHBISHOP SPELLMAN
C/O GENERAL EISENHOWER
ALGIERS, NORTH AFRICA

Your trip has received universal acclaim from this end and I know how useful it must have been across the water. David Gray wants you to stay with him in Dublin but I told him I wanted you to use your discretion. Matthews in London will see you when you get there. My very warm regards and thanks for your telegram.

ROOSEVELT
From: After

To: General Eisenhower, Aiers, North Africa.

From the President to General Eisenhower for delivery to
Archbishop Spellman.

Your trip has received universal acclaim from this end and
I know how useful it must have been across the water. David Gray
wants you to stay with him in Dublin but I told him I wanted you
to use your discretion. A Matthews in London will see you when you
get there. My very warm regards and thanks for your telegram.
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Algiers

To: WAR

In Reply Cite: 7770, March 20, 1943.

Archbishop Spellman received the President's personal message (for Marshall from Eisenhower near 1073) on March 18.

No Sig

Footnote: 4076 is CH-OUT-6933 (17 Mar 43) White House.

Action: White House

Information: Sec. Gen. Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSS letter, May 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 30 1973

CH-IN-10338 (20 Mar 43) 1441Z vc

White House

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
TO GENERAL MacARThUR FROM GENERAL MARSHALL.

The President directs me to transmit the following message to you:

"The extremely efficient bombardments launched by your air forces during the past few weeks and especially in the last few days in support of the situation in the Solomons and in furtherance of your own operations command our enthusiastic admiration. The arduous and difficult land campaign along the Papuan coast which has decimated the enemy and now threatens him at Salamau has made a great impression on our people and must have a demoralizing effect on Japanese confidence in the fighting efficiency of their ground troops.

My thanks go to you and your leaders and to the officers and men of the Australian and United States forces who carried the fight to the enemy on all levels and over great distances and even greater difficulties."

Roosevelt

Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General MacArthur transmits the following:

"Through Sir Ronald Cross, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to Australia, I have received the following message from Prime Minister Churchill:

"The rapid movements I have been making and pressure upon me made me delay till my return sending you my most cordial congratulations upon the capture of Buna by American and Australian forces command and important and resolute operations under your distinguished command which have resulted in the destruction of the Japanese invaders in Papua.

"I have watched with particular admiration your masterly employment of transport aircraft to solve vast complicated and diverse logistical problems.

"I should like to let you know how grateful we all feel throughout the British Empire that you stand on guard over all these vital interests.

"Pray also accept my own personal good wishes. I look forward indeed to the day when we may meet!""

I believe that it would be helpful if some message from you went to General MacArthur, but I also have felt that it should have a definite and evident basis, as to timing, other than the possible thought that the message from the Prime Minister had suggested such action. I am quite sure that his reference to the Southwest Pacific and MacArthur before the House of Commons, and the above quoted message are part of a definite British move to convince us of their appreciation of the situation in the Pacific which was such a bitter bone of contention at the Casablanca Conference.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 6-3-78
DEC 30 1972
In view of the fact that during the last few days MacArthur has reported truly remarkable bombing operations against Rabaul and other points in the Solomons, I think there is justification for a message from you and I am taking the liberty of attaching a draft of such a message for your consideration.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-78

DEC 30 1972
From: A.H.
To: Algiers, 2/22/43

From the President to General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy.

About three weeks ago General Giraud asked Monnet to come to see him. When I learned of this I encouraged the visit; first, because Monnet knows a great deal about the whole problem of supply throughout the world and can, as well as anyone I know, tell Giraud about how the whole business works throughout the world. I am sure also he can be helpful to Murphy and MacMillan as well as Giraud in understanding the whole North African situation as viewed from here.

I have discussed all of these matters freely with him and he carries a personal letter from me to you. You know that Monnet was the Allied Chairman of the Anglo-French co-ordinating Committee until the fall of France. Since then he has been working with the British Supply Mission here in Washington and has been in close touch with the activities of all of our combined boards. He is thoroughly familiar with the whole problem of military supply and has gone over the whole matter with Somervell. The British know of his impending visit to Africa and have approved. I realize how busy you are, but you can be sure that Monnet will cover his business with you in a brief manner so far as you personally are concerned. No announcement should be made by you of this visit, but inasmuch as it may become public, I think it best that the reasons for his being in Africa be confined to two points.
first, that General Giraud has asked him to come to see him and,
second, that we have asked him in behalf of the Combined Munitions
Assignments Board to look into the problem of supply in Africa.

I think the French here have undoubtedly informed Giraud of
Monnet's visit. You better tell him that you know he is coming.

Good luck to you.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map
Room at 1720, ENT, February 22, 1943.

Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.
February 22, 1943.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL EISENHOWER and Mr. Murphy

About three weeks ago General Giraud asked Monnet to come to see him. When I learned of this I encouraged the visit; first, because Monnet knows a great deal about the whole problem of supply throughout the world and can, as well as anyone I know, tell Giraud about how the whole business works throughout the world. I am sure also he can be helpful to Murphy and Macmillan as well as Giraud in understanding the whole North African situation as viewed from here.

I have discussed all of these matters fully with him and he carries a personal letter from me to you. You know that Monnet was the Allied Chairman of the Anglo-French co-ordinating Committee until the fall of France. Since then he has been working with the British Supply Mission here in Washington and has been in close touch with the activities of all of our combined boards. He is thoroughly familiar with the whole problem of military supply and has gone over the whole matter with Somervell. The British know of his impending visit to Africa and have approved. I realize how busy you are, but you can be sure that Monnet will cover his business with you in a brief manner so far as you
personally are concerned. No announcement should be made by you of this visit, but inasmuch as it may become public, I think it best that the reasons for his being in Africa be confined to two points: first, that General Giraud has asked him to come to see him and, second, that we have asked him in behalf of the Combined Munitions Assignments Board to look into the problem of supply in Africa.

Show this message to Murphy. I think the French here have undoubtedly informed Giraud of Monnet's visit. You better tell him that you know he is coming.

Good luck to you.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
February 6, 1943.

HIS EXCELLENCY
Ismael Inonu
President of the Republic of Turkey
Ankara.

I deeply appreciate Your Excellency's courteous message to me following your conversations with the British Prime Minister at Ankara, and am most happy at the results of this historic meeting.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
1RCA 94 Turk Gov't. 1:15 p.m.

ANKARA, February 2, 1943
(1404)

THE PRESIDENT

Monsieur Winston Churchill a bien voulu me transmettre Monsieur le President le message personnel d'amitie que vous avez eu la delicate pensee de lui confier a mon adresse le grand plaisir que j'ai eu a m'entretenir avec le Premier Britannique a ete accru par la participation morale que vous avez ainsi tenu a y apporter je vous prie de recevoir mes remerciements les plus chaleureux et de croire en retour aux assurances sinceres de toute mon amitie.

Ismet Inonu
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 704

Following is a paraphrase of the President's personal and #1 message number 250 to the former Naval person. It is quoted herewith in order to reply to your 3670 of December 31st. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers from The Joint Chiefs of Staff. President's message begins:

"Repying to your message number 249 I feel very strongly that, in view of the fact in North Africa we have a military occupation, our Commanding General has complete control of all affairs, both civil and military. Our French friends must not be permitted to forget this for a moment. In the same way they must not be led to believe that we are going to recognize any one group or committee as representing the French Empire or the French Government. The French people will be able to settle their own affairs when the war ends with victory for us. Until that time, wherever our armies are in occupation of former French territory we will deal on a local basis with local Frenchmen, and if these local officials will not cooperate, they will have to be replaced. (Passage intentionally omitted)

"With another Frenchman running the civil affairs, I am not yet certain whether Eisenhower can hold Giraud in line, but I shall soon find out. (Passage intentionally omitted)".

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE (JCS)
(Copy for Adm. Leahy)

INFO. COPIES: OPD
ADM. KING
GEN. ARNOLD
LOG

CM-OUT-768 (1/2/43) 2145Z law

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By RT
Date JAN 9 1973

COPY No.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Opnav
To: ComNavBu

In handling Opnav __________ which follows immediately
follow procedure outlined in Opnav December two one one eight zero
five.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 11:06, EWT, January 4, 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant, (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
White House Map Room

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
CLASSIFIED
LDD DIR. 5220.9 (9/27/53)
Date: May 5 1972
Signature: RABE
OPNAV ZERO TWO TWO TWO FORTY WHICH FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY
18 TO BE HANDLED MOST SECRET ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURE
SET UP IN OPNAV TWO ONE EIGHTEEN ZERO FIVE

Classified

Date: MAY 5 1972
Signature: [Redacted]
URGENT - PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: ComNavBu,

My immediately following despatch from the President to the Prime Minister personal and secret No. 249 is to be handled exactly as outlined in my 211805 December.

January 1, 1943

Released from the White House Map Room at 1855, EWT, January 1, 1943.

CHESTER HAILCOURT
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
April 6, 1943,

Sir Owen Dixon,  
Minister from Australia,  
Australian Legation,  
Washington, D. C.,  

Dear Mr. Minister:

Your note of March 31st conveying to me a note from the Prime Minister of Australia is received and it is requested that you transmit the following reply to the Prime Minister:

"Dear Mr. Curtin:

Your message informing me of Dr. Evatt's visit to Washington is received and I shall be very glad to see him again as soon as he gets here.

It is regretted that an immediate necessity for the provision of forces, airplanes and other military equipment, in other theaters of war, together with an acute shortage of transportation facilities, makes it impossible to accomplish at the present time any increase in troops or airplanes in addition to those now allocated to the Southwest Pacific. I suppose that you have full information in regard to the latest increases.

It is my opinion that with the additional troops and planes now enroute from America to the Southwestern Pacific, it should be possible by a determined aggressive use of all available Australian and American forces against the Japanese in those areas which they now occupy in the Southwest Pacific, to preclude any serious attack on the Continent of Australia."

Very sincerely yours,

Copy for President's files
Sir Owen Dixon,  
Minister from Australia,  
Australian Legation.

Dear Mr. Minister:

Your note of March 31st conveying to me a note from the  
Prime Minister of Australia is received and it is requested that  
you transmit the following reply to the Prime Minister:

"Dear Mr. Curtin:

Your message informing me of Dr. Evatt's visit to  
Washington is received and I shall be pleased to accord to him  
the personal interview so requested by you.

It is regretted that an immediate necessity for  
the provision of forces, airplanes and other military equipment,  
in other theaters of war, together with an acute shortage of  
transportation facilities, makes it impossible to accomplish  
at the present time any increase in troops or airplanes in  
addition to those now allocated to the Southwest Pacific.

It is understood that you have full information in regard to the  
latest increases.

It is my opinion that with the additional troops and  
planes now enroute from America to the Southwestern Pacific, it  
should be possible by a determined aggressive use of all available  
Australian and American forces against the Japanese in those areas  
which they now occupy in the Southwest Pacific, to preclude any  
serious attack on the Continent of Australia."

[Signature]
March 28, 1943

The Right Honorable
John Curtin,
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra, Australia

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have your message regarding additional aircraft for the Southwest Pacific, which was submitted to me by Sir Owen Dixon on March 18th.

Within the last few days General MacArthur has been informed of the aircraft to be allocated to the Southwest Pacific Theater in 1943. They represent the maximum that could be made after weighing the needs of all theaters in which our forces are employed. Actually there has recently been an upward revision of the number of aircraft allocated to the Southwest Pacific over what had previously been considered possible. A very considerable increase has been made in the number of transport planes.

In your message you point out the Japanese capability of massing 1500 to 2000 aircraft in the Southwest Pacific Theater. I feel that the United Nations have even greater capabilities. Past experience has indicated the feasibility of the Southwest Pacific and the South Pacific Areas being mutually supporting in the use of their available aircraft. For some months past we have held the initiative. This forces the Japanese to meet our concentrations and reduces the likelihood of their being able to create sizeable concentrations of their own.

The strategic importance of the gallant battle the forces of our two countries are waging in the Southwest Pacific is fully appreciated by me and every effort will be made to provide the necessary aircraft. However, the necessity for balancing our resources throughout all theaters, in line with our strategy, and the limitations imposed by a shortage of shipping prevent our allocating to any one theater the total force we should like it to have.

ROOSEVELT

 Released from the Map Room at 2245 EWT March 28, 1943

George W. Elsey
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By R. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
The Right Honorable
John Curtin,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra, Australia.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have your message regarding additional aircraft for the Southwest Pacific, which was submitted to me by Sir Owen Dixon on March 18th.

Within the last few days General MacArthur has been informed of the aircraft to be allocated to the Southwest Pacific Theater in 1943. The increases are not as large as I should like to see them, but they represent the maximum that could be made after weighing the needs of all theaters in which our forces are employed. Actually there has recently been an upward revision of the number of aircraft allocated to the Southwest Pacific over what had previously been considered possible. A very considerable increase has been made in the number of transport planes.

In your message you point out the Japanese capability of massing 1500 to 2000 aircraft in the Southwest Pacific Theater. I feel that the United Nations have even greater capabilities. Past experience has indicated the feasibility of the Southwest Pacific and the South Pacific Areas being mutually supporting in the use of their available aircraft. For some months past we have held the initiative. This forces the Japanese to meet our concentrations and reduces the likelihood of their being able to create sizeable concentrations of their own.

It is a matter of keen regret to me that we cannot meet your requests in full. The gallant battle the forces of our two countries are waging in the Southwest Pacific is deserving of superhuman efforts. Beyond these additional means, however, the necessity for balancing our resources throughout all theaters and the limitations imposed by a shortage of shipping prevent our allocating to any one theater the total force we should like it to have.

The strategic importance of the lines of our strategy, and every effort necessary will be made to provide the aircraft.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy
                General Marshall
                Admiral King
                General Arnold

Subject: Allocation of additional aircraft to Australia.

Enclosures: (A) Memorandum from the Prime Minister of Australia to the President, dated March 18, 1943.

(B) Proposed message to The Right Honorable John Curtin.

Attached hereto is a memorandum which the President has received from the Prime Minister of Australia and which has been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a draft of reply. I have prepared a rather noncommittal reply which is attached hereto.

Will you kindly indicate below whether you approve the draft or desire any changes made in it.

DEANE

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-73
By BMP, NLB, Date NOV 30 1973
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 18th, 1943

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been requested by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Right Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following message:

"On the 19th of January I addressed to Washington for transmission to Mr. Churchill and yourself a cablegram urging, in view of the lessons of the use of air power in the New Guinea campaign, that 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport aircraft be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon as possible in 1943. Mr. Sumner Welles undertook to transmit these messages to both of you immediately but I have had no reply from either Mr. Churchill or yourself.

Since I first approached you there has occurred the battle of the Bismarck Sea which resulted in the virtual annihilation of a Japanese convoy attempting to reinforce Lae and Salamaua. This victory was a further practical demonstration of the case urged by me on the 19th of January.

Intelligence Reports have recently indicated that the Japanese are intensively consolidating an arc of air bases extending through the Netherlands East Indies, Portuguese Timor, New Guinea, Rabaul and the Northern Solomons to the Marshall Islands. It would appear from their air superiority in the operations in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies that they under-rated the strength that could be brought against them. Since their bitter experiences in the Solomons, New Guinea and the Bismarck Sea they are apparently determined to secure air superiority in the arc I have described and concentrations of land forces are taking place. There is no
evidence of air concentrations so far but the air bases will be sufficient to enable a strength of 1500 to 2000 planes to be operated in these regions.

I shall be glad to be informed of the air strength that it is proposed to provide in the South West Pacific Area to ensure that the initiative in the air is retained by the United Nations and that the Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area is in a position to deter and if necessary severely repulse any attempts by the Japanese to raid heavily by air and naval forces territories in our possession.

It is noteworthy and also a tribute to the effectiveness of the forces engaged that in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea it was possible to concentrate only 136 aircraft for this attack. The renewal of attacks on Darwin and reconnaissance of the North West Coast indicate the paramount importance of sufficient strength being available to ensure air superiority along the whole line of contact with the enemy and at other vulnerable points on our coastline especially in the West. Of particular importance is the vital base of Fremantle where, owing to the depletion of the Eastern Fleet, a heavy attack of the hit and run variety might be carried out by naval bombardment and carrier-borne aircraft."
The Right Honorable
John Curtin,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra, Australia.

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I have your message regarding additional aircraft for the Southwest Pacific, which was submitted to me by Sir Owen Dixon on March 18th.

Within the last few days General MacArthur has been informed of the aircraft to be allocated to the Southwest Pacific Theater in 1943. The increases are not as large as I should like to see them but they represent the maximum that could be made after weighing the needs of all theaters in which our forces are employed. Actually there has recently been an upward revision of the number of aircraft allocated to the Southwest Pacific over what had previously been considered possible. A very considerable increase has been made in the number of transport planes.

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the use of their available aircraft. For some months past we have held the initiative. This forces the Japanese to meet our concentrations and reduces the likelihood of their being able to create sizeable concentrations of their own.

It is a matter of keen regret to me that we can not meet your requests in full. The gallant battle the forces of our two countries are waging in the Southwest Pacific is deserving of superhuman efforts to send them additional means. However, the necessity for balancing our resources throughout all theaters and the limitations imposed by a shortage of shipping prevent our allocating to any one theater the total force we should like it to have.