Folder 5. 000.9 (15): December 9-13, 1944 (Warm Springs) Section 2.

As above but for the period indicated. Among the messages directed to FDR is one from Henry Stimson.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM - TO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NO. PAGES</th>
<th>MESSAGE NO.</th>
<th>BOX and FOLDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telegram for the President from the Secretary</td>
<td>Dec. 16 1944</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>Box 20 folder 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MR-IN-240

17 December 1944

FROM CAPTAIN GRAHAM TO THE MAP ROOM

Re Your MR-OUT-676. PRIME's Number 855. In this message PM refers to "My Number 755 and your reply." The President asks that these two messages be broken out and ready for his sometime after he reaches Washington.

Five messages received by pouch were, as directed, delivered to the President personally, as directed by Admiral Brown. The President has them in his possession.

RECD 171626Z

*Messages referred to are Harriman's five messages, 16 Dec 44.
MR-IN-239

FROM THE PRESIDENT, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Your MR-OUT-673 approved.

RECD 1703112

Reference is made to your statement as printed in the Security of State, transmitted through the White House to the President's office on 20-06-673 for the approval.

The following message has just been received from the President:

FROM THE PRESIDENT, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Your MR-OUT-673 approved.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Press Statement on Poland.

Reference is made to proposed statement on Poland by the Secretary of State, transmitted through the Map Room to the President yesterday as MR-OUT-673 for his approval.

The following message has just been received from the President:

"FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

"Your MR-OUT-673 approved.

"Roosevelt."

J. A. TYRRE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your MR-OUT-672. Approved. Please notify the PM in my name.

RECD 162355Z

16 December 1944

[Signature]

 Secretary, U.S.A.,

Trust Naval Aid to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The message relating to U.S. statement on the Polish controversy, drafted by the State Department for transmission to Marshal Stalin, was approved by the President and sent last night. A copy was also sent to the Prime Minister.

J. A. TMREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.
MR-IN-227

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

December 1944

Delighted with Berle's acceptance. I will see him Tuesday or Wednesday. Re your MR-OUT-671.

[Signature]

SECRET

RECD 1623552

[Handwritten note: "Delighted with Berle's acceptance. I will see him Tuesday or Wednesday."]

[Handwritten note: "ROOSEVELT"]

[Handwritten note: "SIGNED"]

[Handwritten note: "[Signature]"

[Handwritten note: "[Day and date]

[Handwritten note: "[City]

[Handwritten note: "[Signature]"

[Handwritten note: "[Day and date]

[Handwritten note: "[City]"
17 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message has been received in the Map Room in answer to the telegram sent by the Secretary of State to the President, 16 December 1944, concerning Dr. Berle's return to Washington and acceptance of Brazilian post:

"FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

"Delighted with Berle's acceptance. I will see him Tuesday or Wednesday.

"ROOSEVELT"

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C.E.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I suggest in view of the Prime Minister's Number 853, a copy of which is being sent to you by the Map Room, that I send something along the following line to Stalin. The Prime Minister seems to be in great haste.

"TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

"I think that I can get off soon after Inauguration Day, which is January 20th, proceeding by ship into the Mediterranean, and I am sure that military events before then will provide a mutually agreeable meeting place.

"I hope you will consider the possibility of Taormina in eastern Sicily. Perhaps by that time the Germans will be out of the Balkans and Aegean Islands. If you could come by rail to the Dalmatian coast, it would be simple to come by plane or ship to Taormina.

"In the meantime, perhaps we should postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together. The Prime Minister has wired me hoping that can be done. Signed Roosevelt."

If this is sent, I should also send the Prime Minister the following:

"I have wired U.J. suggesting any positive action on the Polish question be deferred until the three of us can meet. Also, that I will be able to leave soon after Inauguration Day.

"It is possible that he can come by rail to the Dalmatian coast and that we could meet at Taormina. I still do not greatly enjoy the idea of the Black Sea. U.J. still presses for Odessa, but Harriman is looking into the possibility of Batum which has a much better climate. Signed Roosevelt."

RECD 1620442 - amc
15 December 1944

MR-IN 235

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Re MR-OUT 663. Approved.

RECD 1602002
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The following message has been received this date by the White House Map Room:

"From the President for the Secretary of State.

"Your message of 15 December with respect to delivery of French currency. Approved."

OGDEN KNIFFIN
Major, C.E.
15 December 1944

MR-IN 234

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Re MR-OUT 662. Please ask Jerry Land to contact Joint Staff which is already at work on shipping situation.
I will talk with you about it Tuesday.

RECD 1602002
15 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State

The following message has been received this date by the White House Map Room:

"From the President for the Secretary of State.

"Your message of 15 December with respect to shipping. Please ask Jerry Land to contact Joint Staff which is already at work on shipping situation. I will talk with you about it Tuesday."

OGDEN KNIFFIN
Major, C.E.
MR-IN-233

15 December 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ADMIRAL LEAHY.

Your 659 approved. Please send.

RECD 152320Z - hap
16 December 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: ADMIRAL LEAHY
NO: MR-IN-233

Your proposed message to Governor Lehman approved. Please send.

RECD: 1523202
15 December 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Your MR-OUT-661 approved. Send message to the Prime Minister.

NOTE TO MAP ROOM. President stated he would like a paraphrased copy of this message (661) for his use when he returns.

152320Z - hap
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

This memorandum is to confirm telephone conversation this evening with Mr. Bohlen.

The State Department’s proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister on the Polish question has been approved by the President. The message was transmitted to the Prime Minister by the White House Map Room as #674, 15 December 1944.

OGDEN KNIPPIN
Major, C.E.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

You have undoubtedly seen the press reports on Mr. Churchill’s statement in the House of Commons regarding the Polish problem in which he emphasized his general agreement with the Soviet proposals on Polish frontiers and apparently he implied that it was difficult to reach a solution to the problem since the United States Government has not clearly defined its attitude. Since I have seen only the early newspaper reports I have declined to comment on the statement.

You will recall that on November 15 you sent by Ambassador Harriman a letter to Nikolajczyk outlining our policy in regard to Poland. This letter was shown to Mr. Churchill before Ambassador Harriman delivered it to Nikolajczyk. The following is a summary of the United States position on the Polish question laid down in that letter:

1. We stand unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Poland with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. Regarding the future frontiers of Poland, this Government would offer no objection if a mutual agreement on this subject including proposed compensation for Poland from Germany was reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments. As regards a United States guarantee of any specific frontier, it was stated that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, did not give guarantees for any specific frontier. But it was pointed out that the United States Government is working for
the establishment of a world security organization through which we with other members of the United Nations will assume responsibility for general security which of course includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.

3. If the Polish Government and the people desire in connection with the new frontiers to bring about a transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. It was indicated that we were prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the postwar economic reconstruction of Poland.

I am sending a full summary of these four points so that you will have them before you, since you will undoubtedly be questioned at your first press conference on your return. I hope to talk over with you the possible necessity of some public statement making clear our position along the lines of the four points.

It is not clear from the reports we have so far received on Churchill's statement whether he is endeavoring to force a change in the present Polish cabinet and bring Wielopolski back or whether he may plan to follow a Soviet lead and recognize the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland. In this connection there are definite indications that the Lublin Committee is planning to declare itself as the provisional government of Poland, and other indications point to the probability that it will be recognized as such by Stalin, possibly at an early date.

In view of the uncertainty as to Churchill's plans, it is suggested you might care to send the attached telegram to him.
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 674

Your speech in the House of Parliament on the Polish question was printed in full by our papers and I have read the account. To insure complete cooperation in this matter, I should like to have your ideas as to steps we can take now. I should especially like to receive your evaluation of the possibility of Mikolajczyk returning to power with authority needed to carry out his plans, and your opinion as to what action we should take in case the Lublin Committee should declare itself to be, and receive the recognition from the U.S.S.R., as the provisional government of Poland. Do you believe it would be helpful for me to suggest to Marshal Stalin that he defer any positive step on the Polish matter until we three can meet?

You will remember the letter outlining our policy in regard to Poland which I sent to Mikolajczyk by Ambassador Harriman. Because of pressure here to clarify our position, I may have to make public in some form the four points outlining our position contained in that letter.

I want to be sure to coordinate my action in the matter with you because I know we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to Poland.
MR-IN-231

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Re your MR-OUT-654. For preparation of reply if such is advisable.

RECD: 151625Z

Admiral Leahy requested copy of both Prime Minister's H 851, and H52. Called Mr. Bohlen to get some from that office.
15 December 1944

TOP SECRET

Constitutional violence will be entailed if we finally decide upon this course. I know nothing to the credit of the Archbishop except that our people on the spot think he might stop a gap or bridge a gully.

FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: The President

NO: 851

Your number 673.

I will send you a considered answer to your telegram, for the kindly tone of which I thank you, over the weekend. I hope that the British reinforcements now coming steadily into Attica may make a more healthy situation in Athens. You will realize how very serious it would be if we withdrew, as we easily could, and the result was a frightful massacre, and an extreme left wing regime under Communist inspiration installed itself, as it would, in Athens. My cabinet colleagues here of all parties are not prepared to act in a manner so dishonourable to our record and name. Ernest Bevin's speech to labour Conference won universal respect. Stern fighting lies ahead, and even danger to our troops in the centre of Athens. The fact that you are supposed to be against us, in accordance with the last sentence of Stettinius press release, as I feared has added to our difficulties and burdens. I think it probable that I shall broadcast to the world on Sunday night and make manifest the purity and disinterestedness of our motives throughout and also of our resolves.

Meanwhile I send you a letter I have received from the King of Greece, to whom we have suggested the policy of making the Archbishop of Athens Regent. The King refuses to allow this. Therefore
an act of constitutional violence will be entailed if we finally decide upon this course. I know nothing to the credit of the Archbishop except that our people on the spot think he might stop a gap or bridge a gully.
TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET
COPY

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
NO: 852

15 December 1944

Following is text of letter, dated December 14th, mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram.

"My dear Prime Minister,

"I feel I must convey to you the deep sorrow produced in me by yesterday's discussions. After a common effort of so many years, during which I did not spare myself or my people, I never expected that the time would ever come when I should hear what I heard yesterday.

"I have pondered with all possible detachment on the arguments you advanced in support of the immediate establishment of a Regency, and I have studied anew Mr. MacMillan's views, to which you seemed to subscribe.

"What you demand of me really amounts to this: that I should entrust the regency to the Archbishop, with all the consequences implicit in such an action, without my being told what precisely are the obligations the Rebels would undertake against this concession. You have not assured me that the disarming of the Guerillas would necessarily follow or that General Scobies terms would be accepted, not even do you inform me of the terms of the agreement now being sought with Rebels. What would be the position if, after the announcement of the Regency, the Guerillas were to persist in their refusal to disarm or were to put forward new terms? And what would be my own responsibility if I were now to surrender my authority to a Regent who would be able to take decisions in my name, without my being sure that the large but unarmed majority

- 1 -
of my people would not be handed over tomorrow to the tender mercies of an armed minority?

"I do not know whose views Mr. MacMillan is referring to when he says that the demand for the Archbishop's appointment as Regent constitutes "a general hope and wish of the people." What I can tell you, from my own information and on the strength of ten years experience at the head of my people, is that such a course of action would be regarded as an abandonment of the struggle, would bring confusion to the front of resistance to the extreme left, would disgust the Royalists and the Conservatives, and would immediately give birth to innumerable intrigues around the person of the Archbishop, who does not by any means enjoy the general confidence of the political world. We have had many similar disappointments in the past over the choice of persons.

"Yet you expect me to take such a momentous decision simply on the strength of Mr. MacMillan's recommendation, without even my government being consulted — indeed, against the views of my own Prime Minister and many other political leaders. In considering such a grave matter concerning the future of the crown and bound also with a vital political problem on the settlement of which will depend the future of my country, I think it would constitute no excessive caution on my part if I wished to ascertain the views of all the representatives of the political parties, who should first be made cognisant of all the advantages that would accrue to the people from such a sacrifice on the part of their King.

"From my attitude so far you have no reason to believe that I have ever thought of my own self when it came to a question of serving my country. You will no doubt have in mind all the declarations by which I specifically and irrevocably undertook to submit myself to the will of my people. I left the government entirely in the hands of persons known for their anti-dynastic sent-
TOP-SECRET

ments, without once pressing for the appointment of any minister faithful to
the crown. I agreed not to proceed to Greece without the previous consent of
my government, and I accepted without demur your own counsel not to raise this
issue at a time when the liberation was being joyfully celebrated throughout
Greece. Surely you are in a position to know whether there was ever in my
heart the disposition to insist on anything that concerned my person. I am
ready for any sacrifice; but this sacrifice must be for my people's benefit and
at my people's demand. I have never solicited anyone's help to safeguard my
throne, and you know — you more than anybody else, my dear Prime Minister —
how wronged I am by those who think I would wish to rely on anything other than
the will of my people. But is it a "self-defense policy" that I should wish to
retain intact all my rights and duties towards my people until such time as they
can freely express their will?

"What hurt me most of all during these discussions was your remarks about
the sacrifices the British troops are undergoing in Greece today to impose order.
I can assure you that a feeling of horror goes through me when I think of this
unbelievable tragedy. What purpose would it serve now to examine how this has
come about, and how so many arms are found in the hands of people who, after
using them to seize power, have no compunction now in turning them against
Greece's best friend? What I would like to say to you once again, after mature
reflection during the night, is that in my desire to help the position of your
government and yourself, to whose assistance Greece owes so much, I would not
ask your troops to remain in Greece one minute longer than is absolutely necessary
for the liberation of the capital and its environs and for the arming of the
population so that it can defend itself. Beyond this, it is purely a matter for
the occupation authorities, and will depend exclusively on the general policy
which your government intends to follow with regard to countries liberated by
British arms. But until the arming of the government forces is effected and
the safety of the people is ensured, I cannot believe that there is any man in
this country who would be willing to abandon the Greek government and that part
of the population loyal to it to the mercy of armed bands equipped by the British
authorities. Because quite apart from all considerations of fair play in a
situation where British initiative is so deeply committed, quite apart also from
the most elementary sense of humanity towards an unarmed mass of human being,
the government which you recognize today is your ally: it was formed at your
recommendation; and it derives its legal status from me, who did not grudge you
any sacrifice when my contribution to the allied cause was still of some weight.
I did not stop to consider the Greek soldiers would die by the side of your wo-
men in Macedonia and Crete in a military enterprise doomed in advance, nor that
Greece would have to suffer the tragedy of occupation. And when, after the
German attack, the political leaders faltered and none came forward to assume
responsibility, I took that responsibility on my shoulders, acting as my own
prime minister for some time.

"This country, where you have so hospitably given me shelter and which I
have come to love as my own native land, cannot forget these things quickly, and
I feel sure that if it were to see my government being abandoned to this fate,
a shock would go through it much stronger than that produced by the present
anxiety over the fact that British troops are implicated in Greece. More than
that: the whole of Europe would soon appreciate that full significance of such
a failure.

"With most cordial feelings,

Yours very sincerely,
George II"
MR-IN-230

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

No objection to announcement of plan December 15th or as soon thereafter as possible.

MAP ROOM NOTE: This refers to MR-OUT-645.

RECD: 141815Z

Forwarded to Col. H.A. Gerhardt, GSC as per memo attached.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

14 December 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Colonel H. A. Gerhardt

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am forwarding the following message which was received this afternoon by the White House Map Room:

"From the President for the Secretary of War.

"No objection to announcement of plan December 15th or as soon thereafter as possible."

Respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR
TO THE MAP ROOM FROM CAPTAIN GRAHAM

Re MR-OUT-645. Miss Tully has not received memorandum mentioned in above message. Please call Secretary of War's office (Mr. McCloy, who is handling this) and find out if a courier has been dispatched with subject memorandum. MR-OUT-645 will not be shown to the President until Miss Tully receives the memo referred to.

146412
13 December 1944

MR-IN-228.

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Re your MR-OUT-644. I also much disturbed by column. Heartily approve your plan. Let us try to clean this situation up.

Very respectfully,

Reed 1323532 RWB
Memo delivered to Miss Willis of SECSTATE'S office at 140025Z
13 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The following message has been received this date by the White House Map Room:

"From the President to the Secretary of State.

"Your message of 13 December with respect to security violations. I also much disturbed by column. Heartily approve your plan. Let us try to clean this situation up."

Very respectfully,

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM CAPTAIN GRAHAM TO ADMIRAL BROWN.

Reference Lt. Comdr. Earle's 091652, NCR 8694. The President asked that this be referred to Admiral Leahy and Joint Staff for information. No answer necessary.

RECD 132153 - amc

COMPLIED WITH
14 December 1944

FROM: CAPTAIN GRAHAM
TO: ADMIRAL BROWN
NO: MR-IN-227

Reference Lieutenant Commander Earle's 091632, NCR 8694. The President asked that this be referred to Admiral Leahy and Joint Staff for information. No answer necessary.

RECD: 1321532

[Signature]

1st Endorsement
14 December 1944

FROM: ADMIRAL BROWN
TO: ADMIRAL LEAHY

Forwarded. Copy of reference message attached.

WILSON BROWN

Regraded Unclassified
1st Endorsement
14 December 1944

FROM: ADMIRAL BROWN
TO: ADMIRAL LEAHY

Forwarded. Copy of reference message attached.

WILSON BROWN
PASS TO PRESIDENT REQUESTED BY LT COMDR EARLE.

STUDY FOR SOMETIME OF INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES LEADS TO CONCLUSION THAT NAZI REGIME IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES AND PROBABLY IN GERMANY ITSELF HAS RESULTED IN THE FORMATION OF ANTI-NAZI ORGANIZATIONS HAVING SAME DICTATORIAL TENDENCIES AS THE NAZIS. THESE MILITANT MINORITY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH NOW REFUSE DISARM AND ARE ATTEMPTING SEIZURE CONTROL IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES ARE AS DANGEROUS AS NAZIS TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND SHOULD BE BRANDED WITH SAME STAMP. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT A DEFINITE STAND ON THIS LINE WITH GENERAL PUBLICITY OF THE IDEA WOULD HAVE STRONG SUPPORT BOTH AT HOME AND THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND WOULD HAVE STABILIZING INFLUENCE.

16....ACT

COMINCH...CNO...200P...NAVAIDE...13....

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-66

091652
MR-IN-226

13 December 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think your proposed message to Churchill (MR-OUT-643) is all right at this time. Please send it.

132151Z - smc

Sec State's office notified. Sent to the PM as PRES #673, 13 Dec 44.

Deception memo notifying State Department (Churchill).
13 December 1944

MR-IN-225

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ADMIRAL BROWN.

Admiral Leahy's suggested reply to Ambassador Harriman is approved with the following changes. Complete message follows:

"QUOTE. Your 101910. Please thank the Marshal for me for his information about the loss of a Japanese battleship and inform him that we believe the Japanese Naval losses in October to have been at least three battleships, one large carrier, three small carriers, six large cruisers, two small cruisers and four destroyers. Most of his surviving units engaged were badly damaged. Our submarine and air attacks are making heavy inroads on his merchant marine and escort vessels. Signed: ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE."

RECEIVED: 1316372

Released to Ambassador Harriman as #134.
13 December 1944

MR-IN-UNNO

FOR COLONEL PARK FROM MAJOR GRIFER.


RECD: 131640Z
12 December 1944

MR-IN-224

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

638

MR-OUT-Approved.

Dear Secretary,

Your message with respect to the statement of a statement on the Palestine resolutions, dated 12 December, is approved.

Very respectfully,

Robert M. Morgenthau
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

Recc: 122350Z RBW

Miss McDonnell in SECSTATE's office informed.
Confirming memo to the Secretary delivered: 13/500Z.
12 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The following message has been received by the White House Map Room:

"From the President to the Secretary of State.
Your message with respect to the issuance of a statement on the Palestine resolutions, dated 12 December, is approved."

Very respectfully,

Robert W. Bogue
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
MR-IN-223

FOR ADMIRAL BROWN FROM CAPTAIN GRAHAM.

Expect to leave Warm Springs Sunday afternoon. Will visit Camp La Jeune (a Marine Installation in North Carolina) and Camp Davis (also in North Carolina). These visits will take place the afternoon of 18th December. Expect to arrive Washington early morning of the 19th.

RECD: 122245Z
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY.

Your MR-OUT-634. For preparation of reply "if necessary."

1121482

Original to Adm Leahy with copy of MR-OUT-634.
MR-IN-221

FROM THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHEY.

Please send paraphrase copy of MR-OUT-628 to State Department. Do not feel that an answer is necessary.

RECD: 102030Z ELN4
10 December 1944

FROM:    THE PRESIDENT
TO:      ADMIRAL LEAHY
NO:      MR-IN-221

Please send paraphrase copy of the Prime Minister's
Number 850 to State Department. Do not feel that an answer
is necessary.

RECD:    102030Z
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Your message re Marshal Badoglio. Approved.

Map Room Notes:
1. Received as "MR-OUT-625 Approved."

2. Notified Mr. Flood, Duty Officer in Secretary’s Office that message had been approved. He stated that written confirmation in morning would be adequate.

3. Copy of memorandum attached.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State.

The following message has just been received by the White House Map Room:

"From the President to the Secretary of State:

Request contained in your message re Marshall Badoglio is approved."

Receipt of this approval was communicated to Mr. Flood, Duty Officer, at 8:10 P.M., E.W.T., this date.

Very respectfully,

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.
FROM: MAJOR GHEER

TO : COLONEL PARK

Minor power failures interrupted our teletype service approximately two hours today. Emergency power equipment on hand but in use elsewhere. Additional emergency equipment being procured today. This will prevent any interruption due to power failures in the future.

RECD: 091914Z

9 December 1944
9 December 1944

MR-IN-219

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY.

Re your MR-OUT-624. Approved. Please send.

RECD: 0918542

NOTE:—Admiral Leahy's Office informed of above message by phone. Message sent as Number 672.
VIR-1005
This telegram just be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London
Dated December 9, 1944
Rec'd 4:12 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

10939, December 9, 3 p.m.

Governor Lehman has asked me to transmit through the State Department the following message from him for the President:

"On the basis of my discussions and observations here and on the continent, I am deeply concerned about the inadequacy of the shipping available for essential civilian relief supplies. If this policy continues the plight of the civilian population in areas liberated by our armies will be desperate. You will recall, before leaving Washington I several times discussed with you and Harry Hopkins the necessity of UNRR, being assured of adequate shipping to carry its supplies to different countries when required. Obviously without such shipping we cannot meet our responsibilities and our work will be greatly handicapped if not entirely prevented. As one specific instance I am addressing you urgently on the question of the UNRR, programme of supplemental relief for Italy

Regraded Unclassified
-2-, 10939, December 9, 3 p.m., from London

for Italy. After careful study in the field my representatives, who are now organized and prepared to commence the UNRRA relief programme, have requested, and the Allied Commission and AFHQ have approved, the shipment of UNRRA supplies to Italy in the following quantities:

January 5,000 tons, February 14,000 tons, March 23,000 tons, April 25,000 tons, May 18,000 tons, June 13,000 tons.

AFHQ requested that additional shipping be allotted to permit this programme, when putting forward this request to the CCS. I am now informed that additional shipping has not been allowed for the UNRRA programme and SACMED has been advised that if these supplies are desired they must be included within the existing allotment of shipping to the theatre. I am advised that SACMED will not be able to include this programme within his allocation, in light of the fact that during December the approved request for 245,000 tons of cereals from the United States for civilian relief purposes within the entire theatre was cut by 86,000 tons, due to the reduction of shipping allotted to the theatre, and an equally large
large cut seems imminent for January and February. You will recall that the UNRRA programme for Italy, which was most urgently recommended by yourself and Mr. Churchill, was clearly understood to be a supplementary programme and not a substitute for the basic programme of civilian relief supplies which was to be carried on by the American and British Governments. Unless extra shipping is allotted, as requested above, UNRRA will not be able to undertake this programme of assistance to Italy, and, in addition, the administration will be placed in the invidious position of not being able to proceed with an undertaking which was highly publicized at the time of the Montreal Conference and supported by all 44 nations.

Urgently and respectfully I request that you issue instructions allotting the additional tonnage that will be necessary for the movement to Italy of UNRRA supplies. If you would advise me of the action taken I would be deeply appreciative.

It is my expectation to communicate with Mr. Churchill in terms similar to the foregoing."

WINANT

WJP