THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL.

The President directed that I forward the attached to you with the request that it be brought up to date as of 9 January for use in connection with "Symbol".

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASIFIED

by Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Attachment

J. J. Stewart
January 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The inclosed books include pertinent data which will be of interest to the President in connection with "Symbol."

Please call his attention to the fact that an index is contained at the beginning of Book I.

R. N. YOUNG
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Incls.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Thursday, December 10th, you informed them that you would like to have copies of some of the studies now being made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their agencies.

Included in this book are some memoranda of current interest. Many of them have been prepared as matters of information, while others are studies made by subordinate agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which recommend that certain action be taken. None of the latter type included in this book have as yet received final approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As additional studies are prepared, they will be forwarded to you for your information.

JOHN R. DEANE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Secretary

Note: Revised and brought up to date as of Jan. 9, 1943.
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* Addition, January 9, 1943.
** Substitution, January 9, 1943, to replace earlier study on same subject.
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

January 8, 1943.

From: Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Subject: Strategic Concept for 1943.

References: (a) C.C.S. 135.
(b) C.C.S. 135/1; 135/2.
(c) J.C.S. 167/3.
(d) J.C.S. 49th Meeting, Item 10.

1. This paper is submitted in accordance with reference (d) in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to make a further study of reference (b) and to submit more detailed comment thereon.

GENERAL

2. The British proposals for the conduct of the war in 1943 are: (par. 17, C.C.S. 135/2)

"(a) The defeat of the U-boat menace to remain a first charge on our resources.
(b) The expansion of the Anglo-American bomber offensive against Germany and Italy.
(c) The exploitation of our position in the Mediterranean with a view to
   (1) knocking Italy out of the war,
   (2) bringing Turkey into the war, and
   (3) giving the Axis no respite for recuperation.
(d) The maintenance of supplies to Russia.
(e) Limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk of Japanese Forces in that area.
(f) Operations to reopen the Burma Road to be undertaken as soon as resources permit.
(g) Subject to the claims of the above, the greatest possible concentration of forces in the United Kingdom with a view to reentry on to the Continent in August or September 1943 should conditions hold out a good prospect of success, or anyhow a "SLEDGEHAMMER" to wear down the enemy Air Forces."

3. Comment on each item follows:
   (a) Full agreement
   (b) In general agreement, but our concept is stronger as including an "integrated air offensive" on the largest practicable scale preliminary and preparatory to land operations from the U.K.
   (c) Discussed later
   (d) Full agreement
   (e) A fundamental difference in concept which has been previously discussed in paragraph 2 of reference (a). It would seem that the U.S. is in a strong position to gain British agreement to the U.S. concept.
   (f) In general agreement, but with more emphasis on the urgency of this operation.
   (g) In general agreement, as worded, but it should be noted that this concept is materially affected by the different U.S. concepts for items (c) and (e).

EUROPE.

4. Item (c) with its implications as regard items (b) and (g) is the concept on which there is the most clear-cut difference of opinion between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The British state this difference in C.O.S. 135/1, as follows:

"We advocate a policy of following up "TORCH" vigorously accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" buildup as possible, while the U.S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting their main effort into "ROUNDUP", while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean other than air."
In the Committee's opinion, the above statement is not sufficiently accurate for a basis of discussion. We should state it as follows:

"The British advocate a policy of putting the main effort into following up "TORCH" vigorously with air and amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" build-up as possible; while the U.S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting their main effort into an integrated air offensive against Germany from the U.K. and North Africa, accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" build-up as possible for a land offensive against Germany in 1943."

5. The ends sought by both the British and the United States in the European theater are approximately the same. The difference is largely in the methods and means to be employed and in the timing. Both agree:

(a) that the Axis must be expelled from North Africa,
(b) that Italy must be eliminated from the war,
(c) that the elimination of Italy should be accomplished by the application of pressure rather than by occupation of the Italian peninsula.
(d) that no large scale operations should be conducted against Southern Europe with the ultimate view of invading Germany therefrom.
(e) that invasion of the Continent from the British Isles is essential in order to obtain decisive results, and that the invasion is to be undertaken.

6. The principal differences in concept of operations in the Mediterranean are:

(a) That the United States proposes to accomplish the elimination of Italy as a potential factor in the war through an air offensive integrated with a similar air offensive directly against Germany, whereas the British are of the opinion that an essential step in the elimination of Italy is the seizure of Sardinia and/or Sicily.
(b) That the United States believes

(1) that a major percentage of the desired effect on Italy can be accomplished by conducting a large scale air offensive against her from bases in North Africa.

(2) that the build-up for an air offensive designed to force the capitulation of Italy can be undertaken during and as part of the operations for clearing North Africa.

(3) that undertaking to seize Sardinia and/or Sicily and subsequently operating therefrom would be an unwarranted, uneconomical and possibly a disastrous venture, which might cause Germany to invade Spain, cut our communications and commit so much of our resources to the Mediterranean as to interfere with the major air effort against Germany and prevent invading Western Europe during 1943.

7. The other essential difference concerns the timing for "ROUNDUP". It is possible that this difference may be due, in part, to a misunderstanding of the U.S. paper - and it is quite possible that we may misinterpret somewhat the British position. C.O.S. 135/1 indicates that the U.S. concept of the air offensive against Germany is not fully appreciated. Paragraph 5 states that the assembly of the forces (for "BOLERO") would force us "to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy". In our C.O.S. 135, paragraph 4(b) the air offensive is placed first, and the build-up for a land offensive from the U.K. is "as rapidly as possible" and "in preparation for" an offensive in 1943. It is the Committee's concept that the air offensive at first will of necessity hold precedence over the build-up for the land offensive - and continue to do so until the results of the air operations and the deterioration of the Axis situation in general, can be better estimated in relation to prospective land operations. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully
explain their concept for operations in the European theater, it is believed that the British will want to revise much of their comment in C.C.S. 135/1, and that satisfactory adjustments can be made without setting a definite date for mounting "ROUNDUP".

TURKEY AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

8. The British place considerable emphasis on the favorable effect on Turkey, if the main effort is made in the Mediterranean. We believe that the greater part of that effort would be attained without costly amphibious operations. In our opinion the time has passed when Turkey might cast her lot with the Axis. The line of action proposed by the U.S. of intensively bombing an already weakened Italy should have sufficient effect on Turkey, under conditions as they can be foreseen.

9. Turkey can be further bolstered by establishing a heavy air bombardment force in Syria or in the Derna-Tobruk area for attack against the Floesti oil fields and Axis communication without regard to Turkish neutrality. Their action might well secure much of the advantages that the British mention as accruing from possible Balkan operations.

10. The U.S. concept for the Middle East is as follows:

(C.C.S. 135)

(e) Middle East.

(1) Maintain Turkey in a state of neutrality favorable to the United Nations until such time as she can, aided by supplies and minimum specialized forces, insure the integrity of her territory and make it available for our use.

(2) If Turkey can then be brought into the war, conduct offensive air operations from bases on her northern coast, in aid of Russia and against German controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans.

It is our idea that Turkey should not be brought into the war prematurely - that to do so would involve commitments which at the least would be embarrassing. War Department studies indicate that if Turkey entered the war under the present condition of her forces she would become a liability rather than an asset.
11. The British position as to Turkey is not entirely clear. The British stated that under either the British or U.S. concept there would be divisions and aircraft available to help Turkey. They point out a difference, however, in that under the U.S. proposal there would be inadequate shipping and assault craft, for amphibious operations, while under the British concept such operation would be practicable. In our opinion this difference is open to serious doubt. No mention is made of the effect on the Turkish (or other Mediterranean) operations, should the Spanish or Germans cut our communications at Gibraltar, yet to become involved in supporting indecisive Turkish operations, via South Africa, would strike us in our weakest spot - shipping, and might well interfere with the basic concept of direct action against Germany.

OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH.

12. The Committee offers the following suggestion as a brief outline of the more important points which should be covered in the discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff:

(a) It is first necessary to obtain British acceptance of the American concept for the Pacific, then

(b) Correct any British misunderstanding as to our basic concept, particularly for Western Europe as given in paragraph 4 (b) of C.O.S. 135.

(c) Point out that a serious defect in the British plan for Europe is that the major effort proposed is not made directly against Germany, but against its satellites. In general, their proposals tend to repeat the unsuccessful efforts to win the last war from the south and southeast of Europe. On the other hand, the U.S. proposals carry the main effort directly to Germany by the only immediately available means - air, while building up for direct action on land as soon as possible.

(d) Indicate that the deterioration of the Axis position in Russia and Italy has strengthened our position in the Middle East, particularly as regards Turkey, and offers hope for a weakening within Germany which we should be prepared to exploit by direct and timely effort.
(e) Point out that many of the advantages, which the British claim for their concept may be obtained with relative economy of forces, by establishing a heavy bombardment force in Syria or the Derna-Tobruk area, to operate against the Floesti oil fields and Axis communication.

(f) Call attention to the delays in North Africa, which should warn us against over optimism concerning other mid-Mediterranean operations. We estimate that "BRIMSTONE" could not be launched before June, 1943, at the earliest.

(g) Emphasize that the proposed main effort in the Mediterranean involves threefold risks, first in the amphibious operations themselves, secondly, in getting our forces involved more deeply than expected without being able to "let go", and thirdly, in the grave danger of a German move through Spain, cutting our vital lines of communication through Gibraltar. The security of the lines of communication are precarious at best, and an attrition of at least 20% of shipping must be expected in such operations.

(h) Point out that the U.S. concept for intensive air effort against Italy would accomplish almost as much against that already tottering nation as would the more costly and more dangerous amphibious operations proposed under the British concept, and indicate that the gain to an air offensive against Italy, in having bases in Sardinia, is more than over-balanced by the diversion of forces and probable losses involved.

(i) Indicate that the British proposals would require U.S. naval support in the Mediterranean and for escort of Russian convoys, which is not available.

(j) In general, emphasize that the turning point of the war in Europe is at hand, and we should forego indirect or eccentric concepts and strike hard and straight at Germany.

RUSSELL MILLSON
V. Adm., U.S.N. (ret.)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, XLR, Date APR 24 1974 for Joint Strategic Survey Committee.
NOTE:

(1) All statements of substance in C.C.S. 135/1, J.C.S. 167/3, and J.P.S. 106 have been integrated in the attached paper, which uses as a framework the U.S. concept, C.C.S. 135.

(2) The basic paper, C.C.S. 135, is lined in Blue along the left margin.
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed, in the light of current developments, covering the evolution of United Nations strategy, for the purpose of determining what adjustments, if any, are necessary or desirable at this time, in the basic strategic concept.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

2. The present basic strategic concept of the United Nations, reduced to its simplest form, has been stated,

"To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European Theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces."

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this concept, while basically sound, should be restated with a view to setting forth more exactly the strategic concept as regards the Pacific Theater. The following statement is proposed:

"Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European Theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

"It is well understood that the strategic concept contained herein is based on the strategic situation as it exists and can be foreseen at this time, and that it is subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation."

3. It is recommended that the following (see paragraph 4) be approved as the strategic objectives of the United Nations in support of the basic strategic concept as stated above. In arriving at its recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken note:

(a) That Germany is our primary enemy;

(b) That Russia is exerting great pressure on Germany and is absorbing the major part of her war effort;

(c) That Russia's continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance;

(d) That timely and substantial support of Russia, directly by supplies and indirectly by offensive operations against Germany, must be a basic factor in our strategic policy.

(e) That until such time as major offensive operations can be undertaken against Japan, we must prevent her from consolidating and exploiting her conquests by rendering all practicable support to China and by inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese naval, shipping, and air resources.
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE ANALYSES BRITISH ATTITUDE RE JAPAN; NOTES CONFLICT

C.C.S. 135/2 (British concept) in paragraph 17, in its seven proposals for the conduct of the war, covers the Pacific as follows:

"Limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk of the Japanese Forces in that area."

Paragraph 5 states:

"The best way of holding Japan is to continue limited offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of the Japanese forces in the Pacific."

Paragraph 2 lists as one of the main factors bearing on the conduct of the war:

"The Japanese war effort is incapable of much expansion provided communications with Germany are kept severed."

No mention is made of the capabilities of the Japanese to consolidate their conquests.

Paragraph 3 (a) reads:

"If Germany were allowed a breathing space to recuperate, she might well become unbeatable. Provided we maintain limited pressure on Japan, she can never become unbeatable."

The British concept for the Pacific as indicated in the above extracts, is different from the U. S. concept as stated in paragraphs 2, 3 (e), and 3 (f) of C.C.S. 135. The Committee recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff adhere to the U. S. concept. (J.C.S. 167/3, page 1-2)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS URGE THAT BRITISH HAVE UNDERESTIMATED JAPAN

The statement by the British (C.C.S. 135/2, paragraph 2 - quoted above) underestimates Japan and is in conflict with the following recent estimate made by the Office of Strategic Services.

"In the last analysis, Japan's only urgent need is time. The present production of 'Greater East Asia' is adequate to sustain Japanese military action on its present scale and, in addition, to support Japan's recent high rate of capital formation. But 'Greater East Asia's' as yet undeveloped resources and as yet untrained manpower are sufficient for the creation and maintenance of a far greater and more dangerous military and industrial power . . . During 1943 Japan cannot hope to grow in strength as we will grow, but she may well entrench herself so that effective action against her will become very much more difficult and costly. She will beyond all doubt do so, unless the rate of attrition imposed upon her is sufficient to absorb in current operations all her industrial capacity."

Furthermore, it appears from the statement that the British do not take cognizance of the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Siberia. (JPS 106, page 6)
(f) That a prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of the strategic concept for 1943 is an improvement in the present critical shipping situation by intensified and more effective anti-submarine warfare.

4. Strategic objectives:

(a) Western Hemisphere and United Kingdom.

Maintain the security, the productive capacity, and the essential communications of the Western Hemisphere and of the British Isles.

(b) Western Europe.

Insure that the primary effort of the United Nations is directed against Germany rather than against her satellite states by:

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF URGE MAXIMUM AIR OFFENSIVE

(1) Conducting from bases in United Kingdom, Northern Africa, and as practicable from the Middle East, an integrated air offensive on the largest practicable scale against German production and resources, designed to achieve a progressive deterioration of her war effort.

BRITISH CONCUR, RECOMMENDING

Increased bombing of Germany. (C.C.S. 135/1, page 5)

BUT ARGUE, IF WE UNDERTAKE MAXIMUM BOLERO . . .

We should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to giving a higher priority to the passage of United States soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing over a larger proportion of Army cooperation type United States aircraft, i.e., fighters and light bombers. (C.C.S. 135/1 page 2)

AND CONVERSELY, IF WE ACCEPT TORCH EXPLOITATION

We can greatly increase the number of bombers arriving in the United Kingdom for offensive action against the Axis. (C.C.S. 135/1 page 3)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE QUERIES FACTS

They (the British) point out that the air offensive against Germany will be substantially reduced from its planned scale if these additional divisions are shipped to the U.K., yet apparently the air offensive from the U.K. will proceed according to schedule if the major effort is made in the Mediterranean area. This reasoning apparently fails to take full cognizance of the air requirements for proposed operations in the Mediterranean area and is in conflict with paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 135/1. (J.C.S. 167/3, page 3)
JOINT STAFF PLANNERS BELIEVE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT BRITISH ARGUMENT

The data which support the statement that "we should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards," cannot be factually examined. However, a study of the shipping figures reveals that there will be little difference in the bomber effort whether the first or second British alternative is adopted.

It must be noted that there is no pool of American combat aircraft to be sent to particular theaters as required. Air force units are sent overseas as they are trained and therefore available. The total American air forces sent to the U.K. and North Africa will be the same whether we continue "TORCH" or implement "ROUNDUP." The decision as to where the total available air forces are needed (i.e., either in North Africa or U.K.) will remain with the theater commander (J.P.S. 106, page 3).

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF URGE MAXIMUM BOLERO

(2) Building up as rapidly as possible adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943.

BRITISH DO NOT CONCUR. BRITISH ARGUE SINCE (1) ONLY 25 DIVISIONS CAN BE ASSEMBLED

If we go for the maximum "BOLERO" we calculate that the strongest land force, which we can assemble in the United Kingdom in August for an attack upon Northern France, will be - British 15 Divisions, United States - 12 Divisions (at the very most). (C.O.S. 135/1, page 2).

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS' COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE

It is assumed that the British have full information on their own troops and that 13 British divisions is an accurate figure.

It is estimated that 12 U.S. divisions can be assembled in U.K. by July 1, 1943, provided shipment of additional troops to North Africa is discontinued after U.G.F. 4. The continuing lag in cargo shipments and limitations on distribution within U.K. will, however, prevent the complete equipment for combat of any unit until about 2 months after its arrival in U.K. It is assumed, therefore, that of the 12 divisions in U.K. on July 1, 1943, two and possibly three will not be completely equipped until about September 1, 1943. The same condition will apply to lately arrived non-divisional troops. The time lag is assumed to be greater than normal because of the shipping lag resulting from the switch-over from "TORCH," and because late in the period the greater amount of shipping which will be available will put an increased load on the already congested British ports.

The availability of shipping and escorts was considered in making the above estimate.

The above statement does not permit any increased shipping commitments for U.K. economy or the Russian protocol. The probable extent of such additional commitments can not be determined at the present time. Any additional allocations of shipping for these purposes, however, will adversely affect the build-up of U.S. Forces in U.K. by the reduction of available cargo tonnage. (J.P.S. 106, page 2)
AND (2) ONLY 6 DIVISIONS CAN BE ORGANIZED IN ASSAULT FORCE

Of the above, 5 divisions (4 British and 2 United States) is the maximum which could be organized as assault forces with the shipping and landing craft which can be made available, assuming that the highest priority is given to combined operational planning, training and repair requirements—possibly at the expense of the fleet. (CCS 135/1, page 2).

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS’ COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE

The absence of a detailed tactical plan and corresponding troop basis make it impossible to arrive at a firm estimate of the numbers of the several categories of landing craft required to float six divisions. The "BOLERO" landing craft target for April, 1943, as contained in C.C.S. 105/2, states the landing craft requirements for six divisions. Comparison of these target requirements with projected production for 1943 reveals that production in the United States until June, 1943, when added to the craft available and to be manufactured in U.K., will be sufficient to float 6 divisions. The time required to transport craft from U.S. to U.K. to equip them, and to train the necessary crews will probably require about two months. This will fix September, 1943, as the earliest time at which the operation could be launched.

In order to provide the necessary landing craft from U.S. production, it will be necessary to curtail sharply the shipment of landing craft to the Southwest Pacific. The shipment of LST's to the Pacific must be virtually cancelled. The operation on a six division scale will, therefore, be possible only at the expense of offensive operations in the latter theater.

The shipment of the required landing craft from the United States to the United Kingdom will not conflict appreciably with the cargo requirements for ground troops since these craft are shipped as deck loads. The shipment of aircraft will, however, be interfered with since aircraft also are shipped as deck loads (JPS 106, page 2-3).

THEREFORE, BRITISH BELIEVE LAND OFFENSIVE FROM U.K. NOT PRACTICABLE IN 1943

We emphasize that even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in other theaters, we should still be unable to stage an expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance. The scale of "Round-Up" as originally planned was a total of 48 British and American Divisions. In the meanwhile the defenses on the French coast have been greatly strengthened. It is also to be noted that we cannot carry out even this reduced "Round-Up" until August. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS' COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE

"ROUNDUP" as originally planned required 48 British and American divisions. Assuming that troop movements to "TORCH" cease with U.G.F. 4, the earliest date of implementing a reduced "ROUNDUP" with 25 divisions would be early September (JPS 106, page 4)
BRITISH RECOMMEND RATHER (1) A 21 DIVISION REDUCED "BOLERO"

We calculate that if we adopt the above policy it would still be possible to assemble in the United Kingdom a force of some 21 British and United States Divisions by the late summer to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur for reentering France. To do this it would be necessary to decide by the 1st of May at the expense of further amphibious operations. (CCS 135/1, page 4)

[British recommend] The build-up of "Bolero" on the greatest scale that the above operations /"Torch" exploitation/ permit in order that we may be ready to reenter the Continent with about 21 Divisions in August or September 1943, if the conditions are such that there is a good prospect of success. We believe that this policy will afford earlier and greater relief both direct and indirect to Russia than if we were to concentrate on "Bolero" to the exclusion of all other operations, observing that at the best we could not put a force of more than 25 Divisions on to the Continent in late summer of 1943. (CCS 135/1, page 5)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE NOTES BRITISH WOULD RESERVE ONLY 4 DIVISIONS FOR "TORCH" EXPLOITATION

They [The British] point out in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 135/1 that only 25 divisions can be raised in the U.K. by August, 1943, and in paragraph 5 (a) that the rate of shipment of bombardment aircraft to the U.K. will be materially curtailed, if "Bolero" is given priority; however, they later state in paragraph 8 that 21 divisions can be raised in the U.K. if the effort is only incidental, thereby inferring that only 4 additional divisions will be needed for operations in the Mediterranean area. (JCS 167/3, page 2)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS SAY BRITISH FIGURES ARE CORRECT, BUT...

The statement that 21 divisions (9 U.S. and 12 British) would be available in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the Continent by September 1943 is substantially correct. This is based on reducing the 25 divisions which it is estimated can be in the United Kingdom if "Torch" troop shipments are discontinued in January, 1943, by the 4 divisions (2 U.S. and 2 British) required by the "BRIMSTONE" operation. The 4 divisions and supporting troops required for "BRIMSTONE" are those estimated to be required for seizing and holding Sardinia only, and do not contemplate any subsequent offensive operations from Sardinia except air and Commando raids. (JPS 106, page 4-5)

AND BRITISH RECOMMEND (2) THAT TORCH BE VIGOROUSLY EXPLOITED, IN ORDER THAT...

We should have a good chance of knocking out Italy by a combination of amphibious operations (such as "Brimstone" and "Husky" and consequental assaults on the mainland of Italy), and an air offensive on the largest scale. (CCS 135/1, page 3)
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS . . .

Subjecting Italy to a large scale air offensive and to the threat of invasion would accomplish much. It is believed that the added effect of actual invasion would not be worth the vast increase of effort and resources involved. (JCS 167/3, page 3)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS EXPLAIN . . .

The question of an air offensive from North Africa "on the largest scale" was investigated. According to the Army Air Forces, the logistic situation in North Africa and the Middle East will limit the scale of the U.S. air offensive against Italy to the operation of a force of about 756 heavy and medium bombers. This force can not be employed at its maximum potential effectiveness before mid-1943. (JPS 106, page 4)

(BRITISH CONTINUE)

We can ensure bringing the Axis air force to battle in the Mediterranean but, without surface operations, this cannot be guaranteed. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

German forces will be pinned in Northwest Europe by the build-up of the reduced "Bolero." Even though this build-up would be at a slower rate owing to other activities the enemy will not dare to relax their state of readiness to meet invasion. (CCS 135/1, page 5)

(c) North Africa.

Expel the Axis forces from North Africa, and thereafter:

1. Consolidate and hold that area with the forces adequate for its security, including the forces necessary to maintain our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar against an Axis or Spanish effort;

2. Exploit the success of the North African operations by establishing large scale air installations in North Africa and by conducting intensive air operations against Germany and against Italy with a view to destroying Italian resources and morale, and eliminating her from the war;

3. Transfer any excess forces from North Africa to the U.K. for employment there as part of the build-up for the invasion of Western Europe in 1943.

BRITISH RECOMMEND, RATHER

To exploit "Torch" as vigorously as possible with a view to

1. Knocking Italy out of the war.
2. Bringing Turkey into the war, and
3. Giving the Axis no respite for recuperation. (CCS 135/1, page 5)

AND NOTE THAT MAXIMUM BOLERO WOULD CAUSE . . .

The abandonment of "Brimstone" and "Husky" and any amphibious operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. (CCS 135/1, page 2)
WHICH WOULD MAKE SPAIN MORE LIKELY TO YIELD TO GERMAN PRESSURE (COS 135/2, paragraph 16 (f)).

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE DISAGREES

If the United Nations main effort should be made in the Mediterranean, one of the most probable courses of reaction by Germany would be to invade Spain for the purpose of cutting our line of communications through the Straits. In other words, an invasion of Sardinia would tend to bring Spain into the war—the converse of the British observation. (JSSC 167/3, page 4)

(d) Russia.

Support Russia to the utmost, by supplying munitions, by rendering all practicable air assistance from the Middle East and by making the principal offensive effort of 1943 directly against Germany in Western Europe.

BRITISH CONCUR IN PART, RECOMMENDING

Maintenance of supplies to Russia. (COS 135/1, page 5)

BRITISH NOTE

Whether we adopt a maximum "Bolero" or concentrate on the "Torch" follow-up, we should be able to run a limited number of convoys to Russia. (COS 135/1, page 5)

BUT BRITISH ARGUE THAT IF WE ADOPT MAXIMUM "BOLERO"

Russia would get no relief for another 7 or 8 months and the Axis would have a similar period to recuperate. (COS 135/1, page 3)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS:

They (the British) fear the results of inactivity or relaxation of pressure because of the possibility of Germany being able to recuperate particularly as to its oil supplies, and because of the adverse effect which such relaxation of pressure may have on Turkish attitude. The current trend on the Russian Front indicates that Germany will have little opportunity to recuperate in that Area. The Axis has not yet been driven out of North Africa and recuperation there by either side for the next two or three months appears unlikely. The ultimate consolidation of North Africa, a large scale air offensive conducted therefrom and the threat of invasion from Southern Europe, coupled with a large scale air offensive and the impending invasion of Europe from the British Isles, should certainly offer equal if not more relief to Russia and equally preclude the possibility of German recuperation. (JCS 167/3, page 3)
(e) Middle East.

(1) Maintain Turkey in a state of neutrality favorable to the United Nations until such time as she can, aided by supplies and minimum specialized forces, insure the integrity of her territory and make it available for our use.

(2) If Turkey can then be brought into the war, conduct offensive air operations from bases on her northern coast, in aid of Russia and against German controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans.

BRITISH CONCUR, BUT ARGUE THAT WITH MAXIMUM BOLERO ...

There would be enough divisions left over in the Mediterranean and Middle East area to support Turkey but these could not be used for offensive amphibious operations owing to lack of shipping and assault craft. Turkey could not fail to notice an easement of the pressure on Italy.

(7.C.C. 135/1, page 2)

WHEREAS, ACCEPTING TORCH EXPLOITATION, BRITISH ARGUE

We shall have some divisions, air squadrons and aircraft to spare to help Turkey. Turkey is much more likely to come into the war on our side if she sees us putting Italy out as we should hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive operations against Crete and the Dodecanese, and possibly also the Balkans. (7.C.C. 135/1, page 4)

(f) Pacific.

Conduct such offensive and defensive operations as are necessary to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and our lines of communications thereto, and to maintain the initiative in the Solomon-Bismarck-East New Guinea Area with a view to controlling that area as a base for further offensive operations and involving Japan in costly counter operations.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE NOTES

7.C.C. 135/1 mentions Europe, Turkey, Russia, and China, but does not mention the Pacific or Japan. (7.C.C. 167/3, page 1)

(g) Far East.

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper.
BRITISH CONCUR, BUT ARGUE THAT WITH MAXIMUM BOLERO . . .

We could not do "Anakim" in 1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United Kingdom. (C.C.S. 135/1, page 3)

AND CONVERSELY, IF WE ACCEPT TORCH EXPLOITATION, BRITISH ARGUE

We can probably do "Anakim" in the winter of 1943. (C.C.S. 135/1, page 4)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE BELIEVES THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE IF BRIMSTONE WERE MOUNTED

The papers state that "Anakim" would be impossible in 1943 if "Roundup" is mounted, although that operation is probable during the winter of 1943 if the major effort is made in the Mediterranean. It is believed that the scope of operations which are likely to ensue if the "center of gravity" is shifted to the Mediterranean area, will not only jeopardize the United Nations effort in Western European Theater, but also preclude the possibility of mounting "Anakim". (J.C.S. 167/3, page 4)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS CONCUR WITH JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

The British believe "ANAKIM" can probably be undertaken in the winter of 1943 and use this as an argument in support of "TORCH" exploitation; but are definite in their opinion that "ANAKIM" is not capable of accomplishment in 1943 if "ROUNDUP" is undertaken. From a study of the transports and landing craft available and an estimate of the time necessary to assure a successful "BRIMSTONE" operation, we believe that the amphibious portion of "ANAKIM" can not be undertaken in 1943, if amphibious operations are conducted in the Mediterranean. (J.F.S. 106, page 4)

GENERAL FACTORS

1. THE AXIS OIL SITUATION.

BRITISH ARGUE

The strongest argument against allowing Germany any respite in the near future is that during the next five months her oil situation will be critical. Any measures, therefore, that force her to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war. (C.C.S. 135/1, page 5)
The Joint Intelligence Committee does not agree that "any measures that force Germany to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war". The European Axis oil position is critical in the sense that current stocks are low (5,000,000 tons) and that oil production (16,000,000 tons) is just about sufficient to balance consumption (16,039,000 tons). If withdrawals were to reduce stocks to less than 4,000,000 tons, the Axis would be faced with serious difficulties in distributing petroleum products to essential uses. However, even if the Axis were forced, during the next five months, to maintain a scale of military effort equivalent to that of the summer of 1942, stocks would be reduced only 500,000 tons, to 3,500,000. (JPS 106, page 5-6)

2. EFFECT OF FORCING ITALY OUT OF THE WAR

BRITISH ARGUE

Our Intelligence Staffs have made an assessment which brings out the relief to Russia which an offensive Mediterranean policy might achieve. This shows that if we force Italy out of the war and the Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length, they will be some 54 divisions and 2,200 aircraft short of what they need on all fronts. This forecast is of course highly speculative but if the defection of Italy were to be followed by that of the other satellite nations the German deficiency would be still further increased. (CCS 135/1, page 4-5)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS COMMENT ON THE ABOVE

The Joint Intelligence Committee estimates that with Italy out of the war, Germany can meet the minimum requirements for a strategic reserve and maintain all fronts, including a front approximating the present line in Russia, and still have a surplus of 20 divisions. The British deficit of 54 divisions was based on (1) a German offensive in the Caucasus, and (2) an estimate that 240 German combat divisions will be available in 1943. The comparable U. S. figure is 262.

With regard to aircraft, the British estimate of available German strength was accepted. The deficit of 2,200 aircraft indicated by the British, however, assumed a German offensive in the Caucasus. Paragraph 9 assumes a defensive attitude along the entire front. The estimated deficit should be adjusted accordingly. (JPS 106, page 5)
ANALYSIS OF U. S.-BRITISH DIFFERENCES

1. IN EUROPE

BRITISH SAY ...

On most issues we are in agreement with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The main point of difference between us is that we advocate a policy of following up "Torch" vigorously, accompanied by as large a "Bolero" build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting our main effort into "Round-Up" while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean, other than in the air. (JCS 135/1, page 1)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS

If the expression "A holding policy other than air" is an adequate brief of the U. S. concept, it should be pointed out that the British propose a "holding policy, other than air" for the U. K. The Committee agrees that there is an important difference in the British and U. S. concepts as regard the European theater. It is recommended that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in the discussion of this difference take a strong stand against any essential change in their approved concept. (JCS 167/3, page 2)

2. IN THE PACIFIC

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS

In our opinion, there is a more fundamental difference in the two concepts, as to the relation of the war in the Pacific to the war as a whole. (JCS 167/3, page 1)

(See further, comment of Joint Strategic Survey Committee quoted on page 2 of this paper)
(1) All statements of substance in CCS 135, CCS 135/1, CCS 135/2, JSSC 1/1, JSSC 1/3, and JPS 106 have been integrated in the attached paper which uses as a framework the British concept, CCS 135/2.

(2) The basic paper, CCS 135/2, is lined in red along the left margin.
AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY IN 1942

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. Our combined resources have increased to the point where we have been able to wrest the initiative from Germany and Italy, and to pin down the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. The days of plugging holes are over. We must now agree on a plan that will lead to victory, quickly and decisively.

2. The main factors bearing on the conduct of the war are:

   (a) The fighting power of Germany is on the wane and her oil situation is at the moment critical. What she needs above all, is a period for recuperation.

IN CCS 135/1, THE BRITISH ADDED

   Any measures, therefore, that force her to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war. (CCS 135/1, page 5)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS DO NOT CONCUR

   The Joint Intelligence Committee does not agree that "any measures that force Germany to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war". The European Axis oil position is critical in the sense that current stocks are low (5,000,000 tons) and that oil production (16,000,000 tons) is just about sufficient to balance consumption (16,059,000 tons). If withdrawals were to reduce stocks to less than 4,000,000 tons, the Axis would be faced with serious difficulties in distributing petroleum products to essential uses. However, even if the Axis were forced, during the next five months, to maintain a scale of military effort equivalent to that of the summer of 1942, stocks would be reduced only 500,000 tons, to 4,500,000. (JPS 106, page 5-6)
(b) All that stands between Germany and the opportunity for recuperation with an abundant oil supply, is Russia. The Russian war effort is also the greatest single drain on the power and hope of Germany and must be sustained and assisted at all costs.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCUR, STATING

That Russia is exerting great pressure on Germany and is absorbing the major part of her war effort;

That Russia's continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance;

That timely and substantial support of Russia, directly by supplies and indirectly by offensive operations against Germany, must be a basic factor in our strategic policy. (CCS 135, page 2)

AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF URGE THAT WE SHOULD

Support Russia to the utmost, by supplying munitions, by rendering all practicable air assistance from the Middle East and by making the principal offensive effort of 1943 directly against Germany in Western Europe. (CCS 135, page 3)

(c) The Japanese war effort is incapable of much expansion provided communications with Germany are kept severed.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE NOTES A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN U. S. CONCEPT. THE LATTER IS STATED AS FOLLOWS:

Until such time as major offensive operations can be undertaken against Japan, we must prevent her from consolidating and exploiting her conquests by rendering all practicable support to China and by inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese naval, shipping, and air resources. (CCS 135, page 2)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS URGE THAT BRITISH HAVE UNDERESTIMATED JAPAN

The statement by the British underestimates Japan and is in conflict with the following recent estimate made by the Office of Strategic Services.
"In the last analysis, Japan's only urgent need is time. The present production of 'Greater East Asia' is adequate to sustain Japanese military action on its present scale and, in addition, to support Japan's recent high rate of capital formation. But 'Greater East Asia's' as yet undeveloped resources and as yet untrained manpower are sufficient for the creation and maintenance of a far greater and more dangerous military and industrial power . . . During 1943 Japan cannot hope to grow in strength as we will grow, but she may well entrench herself so that effective action against her will become very much more difficult and costly. She will beyond all doubt do so, unless the rate of attrition imposed upon her is sufficient to absorb in current operations all her industrial capacity."

Furthermore, it appears from the statement that the British do not take cognizance of the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Siberia. (JPS 106, page 6)

(d) The offensive power of the United States is growing. The main problem is to decide how her armed forces can best be deployed against the enemy.

(e) The war potential of the British Empire is not capable of much more overall expansion. The bulk of the British armed forces are already directed against Germany. As long as Germany is in the field, a considerable proportion of these forces must continue to be located in the United Kingdom and Home Waters.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ADD AS A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE . . .

Maintain the security, the productive capacity, and the essential communications of the Western Hemisphere and of the British Isles. (CCS 135, page 2)

(f) Shipping is vital—not only to maintain the British war effort but to deploy the forces of the United Nations against the enemy.

(g) Submarine warfare is now the only means whereby Germany could cripple our offensive action.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCUR, STATING

That a prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of the strategic concept for 1943 is an improvement in the present critical shipping situation by intensified and more effective anti-submarine warfare. (CCS 135, page 2)
3. The resources of the United Nations are insufficient to defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously. We must therefore either concentrate on defeating Germany while holding Japan, or vice versa. The arguments may be summarized as follows:

(a) If Germany were allowed breathing space to recover, she might well become unbeatable. Provided we maintain limited pressure on Japan, she can never become unbeatable.

(b) By concentrating on Germany we uphold Russia. By concentrating on Japan we should cause little, if any, relief to the Russians. Moreover, after a given amount of shipping more United States forces can be deployed against Germany than against Japan.

(c) In order to defeat Japan, we should need to concentrate against her so large a naval force that the security of the United Kingdom and of Atlantic Sea communications would be seriously jeopardized.

(d) If we do not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Japan there is a risk of China dropping out of the fight. We must therefore continue to give China such support as will ensure that she will not give up the struggle.

(e) Important though China is as an ally against Japan, Russia is far more important as an ally against Germany. Moreover, after the defeat of Germany, Russia might be a decisive factor in the war against Japan, whereas China could never help us in the war against Germany.

4. It is clear from the above that we should persist in the strategic policy adopted at the first Washington Conference, namely, that we should bend all our efforts to the early and decisive defeat of Germany, diverting only the minimum force necessary to hold Japan.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BELIEVE . . .

That Germany is our primary enemy. (CCS 135, page 2)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STATE THE PRESENT CONCEPT:

The present basic strategic concept of the United Nations, reduced to its simplest form, has been stated,

"To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European Theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces." (CCS 135, page 1)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND RESTATEMENT OF THE PRESENT CONCEPT

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this concept, while basically sound, should be restated with a view to setting forth more exactly the strategic concept as regards the Pacific Theater. The following statement is proposed:
"Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European Theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

"It is well understood that the strategic concept contained herein is based on the strategic situation as it exists and can be foreseen at this time, and that it is subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation." (COS 135, pages 1-2)

HOLDING JAPAN

5. The operations in the Southwest Pacific during the last few months have forced the Japanese to make this area their principal theater of operations. These have directly relieved the threat to Australasia, India and the Indian Ocean, and have indirectly assisted Russia by staving off a Japanese attack on the Maritime provinces. The best way of holding Japan is to continue limited offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of the Japanese forces in the Pacific. It is necessary to define the broad action required to implement this strategy.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND MORE ACTIVE POLICY RE JAPAN, AS FOLLOWS:

Conduct such offensive and defensive operations as are necessary to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and our lines of communications thereto, and to maintain the initiative in the Solomon-Bismarck-East New Guinea Area with a view to controlling that area as a base for further offensive operations and involving Japan in costly counter operations. (COS 135, page 4)

6. The only way of bringing material help to China is to open the Burma Road. The reconquest of Burma should therefore be undertaken as soon as resources permit.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCUR, WITH MORE EMPHASIS ON URGENCY OF THE BURMA OPERATION, URGING THAT WE SHOULD

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper. (COS 135, page 4)
BRITISH ARGUE THAT WITH MAXIMUM BOLERO...

We could not do "Anakim" in 1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United Kingdom. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

WHEREAS IF WE ACCEPT TORCH EXPLOITATION...

We can probably do "Anakim" in the winter of 1943. (CCS 135/1, page 4)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE CONTINUES

It is believed that the scope of operations which are likely to ensue if the "center of gravity" is shifted to the Mediterranean area, will not only jeopardize the United Nations effort in Western European Theater, but also preclude the possibility of mounting "Anakim". (JCS 167/3, page 4)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS CONCUR WITH JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

The British believe "ANAKIM" can probably be undertaken in the winter of 1943 and use this as an argument in support of "TORCH" exploitation; but are definite in their opinion that "ANAKIM" is not capable of accomplishment in 1943 if "ROUNDUP" is undertaken. From a study of the transports and landing craft available and an estimate of the time necessary to assure a successful "BRIMSTONE" operation, we believe that the amphibious portion of "ANAKIM" can not be undertaken in 1943, if amphibious operations are conducted in the Mediterranean. (JPS 106, page 4)

DEFEAT OF GERMANY

7. The occupation of Germany will ultimately be necessary. For the present, however, Northwest Europe may be likened to a powerful fortress which can be assaulted only after adequate preparation. To make a fruitless assault before the time is ripe would be disastrous for ourselves, of no assistance to Russia and devastating to the morale of occupied Europe. We cannot yet bring to bear sufficient forces to overcome the German garrison of France and the low countries, which can rapidly concentrate against us in superior strength and behind powerful coast defenses.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BELIEVE OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO:

Insure that the primary effort of the United Nations is directed against Germany rather than against her satellite states. (CCS 135, page 3)
THEREFORE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND:

Building up as rapidly as possible adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943.

(COS 135, page 3)

8. The alternatives which lie before us are:

(a) To devote our main effort towards building up in the United Kingdom a force of sufficient size to invade the Continent, or

(b) To devote our main effort towards undermining the foundations of German military power, simultaneously building up in the United Kingdom the maximum United States and British forces which our remaining resources allow in order to return to the Continent as soon as German powers of resistance have been sufficiently weakened. The effect of each of these courses of action is discussed in the following paragraphs.

INVASION OF THE CONTINENT

9. If we go for the maximum "Bolero" with the intention of assaulting the Continent in 1943 we must be ready to strike by September. Thereafter weather conditions will progressively deteriorate. The strongest Anglo-American force which we could assemble in the United Kingdom by that date for an attack upon Northern France would be some 13 British and 9 United States divisions with perhaps a further 3 United States divisions collecting in the United Kingdom.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS' COMMENT ON THE ABOVE

It is assumed that the British have full information on their own troops and that 13 British divisions is an accurate figure.

It is estimated that 12 U. S. divisions can be assembled in U.K. by July 1, 1943, provided shipment of additional troops to North Africa is discontinued after U.S.F. 4. The continuing lag in cargo shipments and limitations on distribution within U.K. will, however, prevent the complete equipment for combat of any unit until about 2 months after its arrival in U.K. It is assumed, therefore, that of the 12 divisions in U.K. on July 1, 1943, two and possibly three will not be completely equipped until about September 1, 1943.
The same condition will apply to lately arrived non-
divisional troops. The time lag is assumed to be
greater than normal because of the shipping lag resulting
from the switch-over from "TORCH," and because late in
the period the greater amount of shipping which will be
available will put an increased load on the already con-
gested British ports.

The availability of shipping and escorts was con-
sidered in making the above estimate.

The above statement does not permit any increased
shipping commitments for U.K. economy or the Russian
Protocol. The probable extent of such additional com-
mittments can not be determined at the present time.
Any additional allocations of shipping for these pur-
poses, however, will adversely affect the build-up of
U.S. Forces in U.K. by the reduction of available cargo
tonnage. (JPS 106, page 2)

6 divisions are probably the maximum which could be
organized as assault forces.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS' COMMENT ON THE ABOVE

The absence of a detailed tactical plan and cor-
responding troop basis make it impossible to arrive at
a firm estimate of the numbers of the several categories
of landing craft required to float six divisions. The
"BOLERO" landing craft target for April, 1943, as con-
tained in CCS 105/2, states the landing craft requirements
for six divisions. Comparison of these target requirements
with projected production for 1943 reveals that production
in the United States until June, 1943, when added to the
craft available and to be manufactured in U.K., will be
sufficient to float 6 divisions. The time required to
transport craft from U.S. to U.K., to equip them, end to
train the necessary crews will probably require about two
months. This will fix September, 1943, as the earliest
time at which the operation could be launched.

In order to provide the necessary landing craft
from U.S. production, it will be necessary to curtail
sharply the shipment of landing craft to the Southwest
Pacific. The shipment of LST's to the Pacific must be
virtually cancelled. The operation on a six division
scale will, therefore, be possible only at the expense
of offensive operations in the latter theater.

The shipment of the required landing craft from
the United States to the United Kingdom will not con-
flict appreciably with the cargo requirements for
ground troops since these craft are shipped as dock
loads. The shipment of aircraft will, however, be
interfered with since aircraft also are shipped as dock
loads. (JPS 106, page 2-3)
10. The assembly of the above forces would have the following effects:

On the Axis

(a) We should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to giving a higher priority to the passage of United States soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing over larger proportion of army support types of United States aircraft.

BRITISH ARGUE, IF WE ACCEPT TORCH EXPLOITATION . . .

We can greatly increase the number of bombers arriving in the United Kingdom for offensive action against the Axis. (COS 135/1, page 3)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE QUERIES FACTS

They (the British) point out that the air offensive against Germany will be substantially reduced from its planned scale if these additional divisions are shipped to the U.K., yet apparently the air offensive from the U.K. will proceed according to schedule if the major effort is made in the Mediterranean area. This reasoning apparently fails to take full cognizance of the air requirements for proposed operations in the Mediterranean area and is in conflict with paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 135/1. (JCS 167/3, page 3)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS BELIEVE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT BRITISH ARGUMENT

The data which support the statement that "we should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards," cannot be factually examined. However, a study of the shipping figures reveals that there will be little difference in the bomber effort whether the first or second British alternative is adopted.

It must be noted that there is no pool of American combat aircraft to be sent to particular theaters as required. Air force units are sent overseas as they are trained and therefore available. The total American air forces sent to the U.K. and North Africa will be the same whether we continue "TORCH" or implement "ROUNDUP." The decision as to where the total available air forces are needed (i.e., either in North Africa or U.K.) will remain with the theater commander. (JPS 106, page 3)
C.C.S. 135/1 indicates that the U.S. concept of the air offensive against Germany is not fully appreciated. Par. 5 states that the assembly of the forces (for "Bolero") would force us "to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy." In our C.C.S. 135, Para. 4 (b) the air offensive is placed first, and the build-up for a land offensive from the U.K. is "as rapidly as possible" and "in preparation for" an offensive in 1943. It is the Committee's concept that the air offensive at first will of necessity hold precedence over the build-up for the land offensive - and continue to do so until the results of the air operations and the deterioration of the Axis situation in general, can be better estimated in relation to prospective land operations. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully explain their concept for operations in the European theater, it is believed that the British will want to revise much of their comment in C.C.S. 135/1, and that satisfactory adjustments can be made without setting a definite date for mounting "Roundup." (JSSC 1/3, pages 4-5)

(b) We should have to abandon all amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, thereby giving Germany the opportunity she so desperately needs for rest and recuperation, and Italy a chance to steady her morale.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE DOES NOT CONCUR AS TO THE CONSEQUENCES, STATING...

That the United States believes

(1) that a major percentage of the desired effect on Italy can be accomplished by conducting a large scale air offensive against her from bases in North Africa.

(2) that the build-up for an air offensive designed to force the capitulation of Italy can be undertaken during and as part of the operations for clearing North Africa.

(3) that undertaking to seize Sardinia and/or Sicily and subsequently operating therefrom would be an unwarranted, un-economical and possibly a disastrous venture, which might cause Germany to invade Spain, cut our communications, and commit so much of our resources to the Mediterranean as to interfere with the major air effort against Germany and prevent our invading Western Europe during 1943. (JSSC 1/3, pages 3-4)

On Russia

(c) We could run a limited number of convoys to North Russia.

(d) The Axis might well make advantage of the relaxation of pressure to transfer forces from the Mediterranean to Russia.
BRITISH ARGUE FURTHER . . .

Russia would get no relief for another 7 or 8 months and the Axis would have a similar period to recuperate. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

AND CONVERSELY, BRITISH ARGUE

We believe that /TORCH exploitation/ will afford earlier and greater relief both direct and indirect to Russia than if we were to concentrate on "Bolero" to the exclusion of all other operations, observing that at the best we could not put a force of more than 25 Divisions on to the Continent in late summer of 1943. (CCS 135/1, page 5)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS:

They (the British) fear the results of inactivity or relaxation of pressure because of the possibility of Germany being able to recuperate particularly as to its oil supplies, and because of the adverse effect which such relaxation of pressure may have on Turkish attitude. The current trend on the Russian Front indicates that Germany will have little opportunity to recuperate in that Area. The Axis has not yet been driven out of North Africa and recuperation there by other side for the next two or three months appears unlikely. The ultimate consolidation of North Africa, a large scale air offensive conducted therefrom and the threat of invasion from Southern Europe, coupled with a large scale air offensive and the impending invasion of Europe from the British Isles, should certainly offer equal if not more relief to Russia and equally preclude the possibility of German recuperation. (JCS 167/3, page 3)

On Turkey

(e) There would be sufficient Allied Forces left over in the Mediterranean to support Turkey but these could not be used for offensive operations owing to lack of shipping and assault craft. The reduction of our offensive in the Mediterranean would make Turkey all the more reluctant to joint in the war on our side.

WHEREAS, ACCEPTING TORCH EXPLOITATION, BRITISH ARGUE

We shall have some divisions, air squadrons and aircraft to spare to help Turkey. Turkey is much more likely to come into the war on our side if she sees us putting Italy out as we should hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive operations against Crete and the Dodecanese, and possibly also the Balkans. (CCS 135/1, page 4)
The British place considerable emphasis on the favorable effect on Turkey, if the main effort is made in the Mediterranean. We believe that the greater part of that effort would be attained without costly amphibious operations. In our opinion the time has passed when Turkey might cast her lot with the Axis. The line of action proposed by the U. S. of intensively bombing an already weakened Italy should have sufficient effect on Turkey, under conditions as they can be foreseen.

Turkey can be further bolstered by establishing a heavy air bombardment force in Syria or in the Derna-Tobruk area for attack against the Ploesti oil fields and Axis communication without regard to Turkish neutrality. Their action might well secure much of the advantages that the British mention as accruing from possible Balkan operations.

The U. S. concept for the Middle East is as follows:

(CCS 135, page 4)

Middle East.

(1) Maintain Turkey in a state of neutrality favorable to the United Nations until such time as she can, aided by supplies and minimum specialized forces, insure the integrity of her territory and make it available for our use.

(2) If Turkey can then be brought into the war, conduct offensive air operations from bases on her northern coast, in aid of Russia and against German controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans.

It is our idea that Turkey should not be brought into the war prematurely - that to do so would involve commitments which at the least would be embarrassing. War Department studies indicate that if Turkey entered the war under the present condition of her forces she would become a liability rather than an asset.

The British position as to Turkey is not entirely clear. The British stated that under either the British or U. S. concept there would be divisions and aircraft available to help Turkey. They point out a difference, however, in that under the U. S. proposal there would be inadequate shipping and assault craft, for amphibious operations, while under the British concept such operation would be practicable. In our opinion this difference is open to serious doubt. No mention is made of the effect on the Turkish (or other Mediterranean) operations, should the Spanish or Germans cut our communications at Gibraltar, yet to become involved in supporting indecisive Turkish operations, via South Africa, would strike us in our weakest spot - shipping, and might well interfere with the basic concept of direct action against Germany. (JSSC 1/3, pages 5-6)
(f) Relaxation of Allied pressure in the Mediterranean would make Spain more inclined to yield to German pressure.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE "DOES NOT CONCUR

If the United Nations' main effort should be made in the Mediterranean, one of the most probable courses of reaction by Germany would be to invade Spain for the purpose of cutting our line of communications through the Straits. In other words, an invasion of Sardinia would tend to bring Spain into the war—the converse of the British observation. (JCS 167/3, page 4)

11. Even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in other theaters, we should probably find that the expedition which we had prepared was inadequate to overcome the scale of German resistance existing when the time came for the assault. The scale of "Roundup" as originally planned was a total of 48 British and United States divisions; since then the defenses of the French Coast and the German garrison in France have been increased to some 40 divisions. In short the adoption of this strategy would mean a relaxation of pressure on the Axis for 8 or 9 months with incalculable consequences to the Russian Front and at the end of the period no certainty that the assault on France could, in fact, be carried out. Or even if it were carried out, that it would draw out land forces from the Russian Front.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS' COMMENT ON THE ABOVE

"ROUNDUP" as originally planned required 48 British and American divisions. Assuming that troop movements to "TORCH" cease with U.S.F. 4, the earliest date of implementing a reduced "ROUNDUP" with 25 divisions would be early September (JPS 106, page 4).

The Joint Intelligence Committee agrees that the defenses of the French Coast and the German garrison in France total 40 divisions (JPS 106, page 6).

ATTRITION OF GERMANY

12. Apart from operations to clear the enemy out of North Africa, our attrition of Germany has hitherto comprised bombing, blockade, raids and subversive action. All these methods strike at the enemy's industrial and economic system, submarine construction, sources of air power and, last but not least, at the morale of the German people—and all can be intensified.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCUR AND URGE A MAXIMUM AIR OFFENSIVE

Conducting from bases in United Kingdom, Northern Africa, and as practicable from the Middle East, an integrated air offensive on the largest practicable scale against German production and resources, designed to achieve a progressive deterioration of her war effort.

(JCS 135, page 3)

13. The bomber offensive is susceptible of great development and holds out most promising prospects. For this purpose we should aim at an Anglo-American bomber force of 3,000 heavy and medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the end of 1943.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS COMMENT ON THE ABOVE

The bomber force which the British and United States Air Forces are planning to base in the United Kingdom at the end of 1943 totals 4,000 airplanes. Apparently, the British discounted this figure by the number of units which would not be fully prepared for combat and arrived at 3,000 airplanes as a reasonable expectancy for units which are fully operational. (JPS 106, page 7)

14. Our success in North Africa opens up wide possibilities of offensive operations against the Southern flank of the Axis. In particular we may be able to detach Italy from the Axis and induce Turkey to join the Allies. If we force Italy out of the war and the Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length, we estimate that they will be some 54 divisions and 2,000 aircraft short of what they need on all fronts. If the defection of Italy were followed by that of other satellite powers, these deficiencies would be still larger.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS COMMENT

The Joint Intelligence Committee estimates that, with Italy out of the war, Germany can meet the minimum requirements for a strategic reserve and maintain all fronts, including a front approximating the present line in Russia, and still have a surplus of 20 divisions. The British deficit of 54 divisions was based on (1) a German offensive in the Caucasus, and (2) an estimate that 240 German combat divisions will be available in 1943. The comparable U. S. figure is 263.
With regard to aircraft, the British estimate of available German strength was accepted. The deficit of 2,200 aircraft indicated by the British, however, assumed a German offensive in the Caucasus. Paragraph 9 assumes a defensive attitude along the entire front. The estimated deficit should be adjusted accordingly. (JPS 106, page 5)

**SPECIFICALLY, BRITISH URGE THAT TORCH BE VIGOROUSLY EXPLOITED, IN ORDER THAT . . .**

We should have a good chance of knocking out Italy by a combination of amphibious operations (such as "Brimstone" and "Husky" and consequential assaults on the mainland of Italy), and an air offensive on the largest scale. (JCS 135/1, page 3)

**JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS . . .**

Subjecting Italy to a large scale air offensive and to the threat of invasion would accomplish much. It is believed that the added effect of actual invasion would not be worth the vast increase of effort and resources involved. (JCS 167/3, page 3)

(See also Joint Strategic Survey Committee comments quoted on page 10 of this paper.)

**JOINT STAFF PLANNERS EXPLAIN . . .**

The question of an air offensive from North Africa "on the largest scale" was investigated. According to the Army Air Forces, the logistic situation in North Africa and the Middle East will limit the scale of the U.S. air offensive against Italy to the operation of a force of about 736 heavy and medium bombers. This force can not be employed at its maximum potential effectiveness before mid-1943. (JPS 106, page 4)

(BRITISH CONTINUE)

We can ensure bringing the Axis air force to battle in the Mediterranean but, without surface operations, this cannot be guaranteed. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

German forces will be pinned in Northwest Europe by the build-up of the reduced "Bolero." Even though this build-up would be at a slower rate owing to other activities the enemy will not dare to relax their state of readiness to meet invasion. (CCS 135/1, page 3)

**JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE RECOMMEND THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OPPOSE PROPOSAL FOR AN ASSAULT ON SARDINIA OR SICILY DURING 1943, BECAUSE . . .**

The occupation of Sardinia offers small return for the effort involved, would interfere seriously with the major strategic effort against Germany, and is in itself a highly dangerous operation, with elements of possible disaster. (JSSC 4/1, page 1)
From the standpoint of global war, the advantages that would be gained by an Allied occupation of Sardinia would be relatively so small as to contribute little toward a successful termination of the war. On the other hand, the operations involved would absorb so large a part of the means available to us during the early part of 1943 as to preclude any material augmentation of our forces in other theaters, or to meet possible reverses in the Pacific. The subsequent maintenance of our forces of occupation would be a continuing and serious drain without corresponding compensating advantages. (JSSC 4/1, page 1)

There are most serious objections from the logistical standpoint. It is not merely that the Axis communications to Sardinia will be, in contrast with ours, short and relatively secure. The gravest objection lies in the fact that with our holding only Gibraltar, a combined German and Spanish effort could cut our line of communication at that point and we would then find our forces in Sardinia and North Africa in an extremely difficult position. (JSSC 4/1, page 2)

The above observations apply, but with even greater weight, to an operation for the seizure of Sicily. Such an operation would involve a greater effort, in fact one of major magnitude, with a consequent absorption of all available means throughout a large part of 1943. The theater is geographically so favorable to the Axis that the success of even a major effort is open to doubt if opposed by any considerable proportion of the German forces not committed on the Russian Front. (JSSC 4/1, page 2)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF URGE THAT OUR POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA SHOULD BE:

Expel the Axis forces from North Africa, and thereafter:

(1) Consolidate and hold that area with the forces adequate for its security, including the forces necessary to maintain our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar against an Axis or Spanish effort;

(2) Exploit the success of the North African operations by establishing large scale air installations in North Africa and by conducting intensive air operations against Germany and against Italy with a view to destroying Italian resources and morale, and eliminating her from the war;

(3) Transfer any excess forces from North Africa to the U. K. for employment there as part of the build-up for the invasion of Western Europe in 1943. (CCS 135, page 3)
15. While we follow this policy of bombing and amphibious operations in the Mediterranean our surplus resources can be devoted to the build-up of Anglo-American forces in the United Kingdom to take advantage of any deterioration in German military power. Any decision to re-enter the Continent would have to allow 3 months for the collection of landing craft and other preparations. We estimate that under favorable conditions a force of 12 British and 6 United States divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by September with a further 3 United States divisions collecting in the United Kingdom.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE NOTES BRITISH WOULD RESERVE ONLY 4 DIVISIONS FOR "TORCH" EXPLOITATION

They [The British] point out in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 135/1 that only 25 divisions can be raised in the U.K. by August, 1943, and in paragraph 5 (a) that the rate of shipment of bombardment aircraft to the U.K. will be materially curtailed, if "Beloro" is given priority; however, they later state in paragraph 8 that 21 divisions can be raised in the U.K. if the effort is only incidental, thereby inferring that only 4 additional divisions will be needed for operations in the Mediterranean area. (JCS 167/3, page 2)

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS SAY BRITISH FIGURES ARE CORRECT, BUT . . .

The statement that 21 divisions (9 U.S. and 12 British) would be available in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the Continent by September 1943 is substantially correct. This is based on reducing the 25 divisions which it is estimated can be in the United Kingdom if "TORCH" troop shipments are discontinued in January, 1943, by the 4 divisions (2 U.S. and 2 British) required by the "BRIMSTONE" operation. The 4 divisions and supporting troops required for "BRIMSTONE" are those estimated to be required for seizing and holding Sardinia only, and do not contemplate any subsequent offensive operations from Sardinia except air and Commando raids. (JPS 106, pages 4-5)

16. The effects of devoting our main effort initially to this undermining of German military power will be:

On the Axis

(a) We can substantially increase the weight of the bomber offensive.

(b) By amphibious operations in the Mediterranean aimed at bringing about the collapse of Italy we can give the maximum relief to Russia, wear out the German Air Force and ultimately threaten Axis economic resources in the Balkans.

(c) The build-up of forces in the United Kingdom, though below the maximum rate, would still be sufficient to pin down substantial German Forces in Northwest Europe, and would permit us to take advantage in the autumn of a pronounced decline in German fighting power.
On Russia

(d) During the period of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean convoys to North Russia will be limited to the extent that the United States can provide escort vessels.

On Turkey

(e) We should have forces available in the Mediterranean which we could use to support Turkey. Turkey is more likely to come into the war on our side if we succeed in eliminating Italy—as we hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive action against the Balkans.

On Spain

(f) Germany will have no forces to spare to invade Spain. Spain is less likely to yield to German pressure if we keep the German forces fully extended by a vigorous offensive in the Mediterranean.

CONCLUSION

17. Our proposals for the conduct of the war throughout 1943 are these:

(a) The defeat of the U-boat menace to remain a first charge on our resources.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - full agreement.
(JSSC 1/3, Page 2)

(b) The expansion of the Anglo-American bomber offensive against Germany and Italy.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - in general agreement, but our concept is stronger as including an "integrated air offensive" on the largest practicable scale preliminary and preparatory to land operations from the U. K. (JSSC 1/3, page 2)

(c) The exploitation of our position in the Mediterranean with a view to—

(1) knocking Italy out of the war,
(2) bringing Turkey into the war, and
(3) giving the Axis no respite for recuperation.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - see comment quoted on page 10, above.
(d) The maintenance of supplies to Russia.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - full agreement. (JSSC 1/3, Page 2)

(e) Limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk of Japanese Forces in that area.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - a fundamental difference in concept (see pages 5-6, above). It would seem that the U. S. is in a strong position to gain British agreement to the U. S. concept. (JSSC 1/3, Page 2)

(f) Operations to reopen the Burma Road to be undertaken as soon as resources permit.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - in general agreement, but with more emphasis on the urgency of this operation. (JSSC 1/3, Page 2)

(g) Subject to the claims of the above, the greatest possible concentration of forces in the United Kingdom with a view to re-entry on to the Continent in August or September 1943 should conditions hold out a good prospect of success, or anyhow a "Sledgehammer" to wear down the enemy Air Forces.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS - in general agreement, as worded, but it should be noted that this concept is materially affected by the different U. S. concepts for items (c) and (e). (JSSC 1/3, Page 2)

ANALYSIS OF U. S. - BRITISH DIFFERENCES

1. IN EUROPE

BRITISH SAY . . .

On most issues we are in agreement with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The main point of difference between us is that we advocate a policy of following up "Torch" vigorously, accompanied by as large a "Bolero" build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting our main effort into "Round-Up" while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean, other than in the air. (CCS 135/1, page 1)

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS

In the Committee's opinion, the above statement is not sufficiently accurate for a basis of discussion. We should state it as follows:

"The British advocate a policy of putting the main effort into following up "TORCH" vigorously with air and amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" build-up as possible; while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting their main effort into an integrated air offensive against Germany from the U. K. and North Africa, accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" build-up as possible for a land offensive against Germany in 1943." (JSSC 1/3 pages 2-3)
The ends sought by both the British and the United States in the European theater are approximately the same. The difference is largely in the methods and means to be employed and in the timing. Both agree:

(a) that the Axis must be expelled from North Africa;

(b) that Italy must be eliminated from the war;

(c) that the elimination of Italy should be accomplished by the application of pressure rather than by occupation of the Italian peninsula;

(d) that no large scale operations should be conducted against Southern Europe with the ultimate view of invading Germany therefrom;

(e) that invasion of the Continent from the British Isles is essential in order to obtain decisive results, and that the invasion is to be undertaken. (JSSC 1/3, page 3)

The principal difference in concept of operations in the Mediterranean is that the United States proposes to accomplish the elimination of Italy as a potential factor in the war through an air offensive integrated with a similar air offensive directly against Germany, whereas the British are of the opinion that an essential step in the elimination of Italy is the seizure of Sardinia and/or Sicily.

The other essential difference concerns the timing for "ROUNDUP". It is possible that this difference may be due in part to a misunderstanding of the U. S. paper - and it is quite possible that we may misinterpret somewhat the British position. (JSSC 1/3, page 2)

2. IN THE PACIFIC

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE COMMENTS

In our opinion, there is a fundamental difference in the two concepts, as to the relation of the war in the Pacific to the war as a whole. (JCS 167/3, page 1)
J.I.C. 69
December 10, 1942

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Note by the Secretary

Attached hereto is a London J.I.C. paper on the subject, dated December 7, 1942

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
PART I GERMANY'S STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS

1. Germany's greatest weakness is her shortage of man-power. Germany needs:
   (a) Large army and air force to fight her battles and to garrison conquered territories, and
   (b) Enormous industrial and agricultural force to produce and move munitions, equipment and food required for armed forces, and to feed, clothe and house workers themselves.

There are no longer enough men for both, and it seems inevitable that the strength of the German Army, at present some six and a half million men, must fall by at least a million by the end of 1943. This reduction is equivalent to some 40 divisions, including proportion of Corps and Army troops. To maintain an Army, even at this level, will involve considerable economic risks, and may be impossible.

2. Germany's transport difficulties will not prevent her from carrying out large-scale movements of forces by land, but will restrict their speed and must deter the High Command from engaging in new campaigns in areas inadequately provided with transport facilities.

3. Germany's oil situation is critical. She cannot hope to obtain any substantial additional supplies from present resources before mid-1943 even if Malкоп is retained. Despite ruthless economies there are already distributional breakdowns which begin to affect military operations. During the next six months at least her oil situation will continue to embarrass her operations and restrict her plans. It will prevent her from providing oil necessary for the 1943 Ukranian harvest, without which
her food position will remain precarious, and it will continue to depress her industrial capacity. If in these circumstances she is forced this winter to consume oil for military purposes at the same rate as in the winter of 1941-42 she will be increasingly handicapped in holding her present position and will be unable to undertake an offensive against south or even north Caucasus in the summer of 1943. In these circumstances she may shorten her line. On the other hand, if she is allowed to remain inactive during the winter, the resultant saving in oil plus a new source of domestic supply that will become available in the middle of 1943, should enable her to undertake any military effort necessary at least to complete occupation of North Caucasus.

4. If Germany is given the opportunity to complete next year the occupation of North Caucasus, and if she secures sea passage across the Black Sea, she should command enough oil (including increased domestic supplies expected in mid-1943) to meet future military commitments, ensure substantial grain surplus from Ukraine in the 1944 harvest, and to provide her industry with minimum requirements for the war effort. If, however, she has shortened the line and abandoned hope of Caucasian oil and is heavily engaged by the Allies, supplies will be so limited as to deprive her of all power of undertaking major offensive operations.

5. There are other raw materials and industrial products in which she is deficient and which she already imports from European neutrals. The extent by which Germany could, by further aggression, increase supplies of these is insufficient to provide a substantial motive for an attack upon any of them. Even if a changed attitude of any or all neutrals reduced or denied her present supplies, it is unlikely that on this ground alone she
would attack them. Most important for her are Swedish iron ore, Turkish chrome, Portuguese tungsten and industrial products from Switzerland and Sweden. On the other hand, it will be increasingly important, as stocks decline, for her to defend mineral resources in Yugoslavia. Greece and Norway, and indeed Italy, and parts of Russia are the only territories which Germany could evacuate without increasing rather than reducing economic strain.

**NAVY**

6. German surface fleet has not been much in action but there is no evidence that its efficiency has declined since the beginning of the war. The submarine fleet has been increasing in size and potency, the only sign of weakness being a slight decline in efficiency due to shortened period of training.

**ARMY**

7. During the first two years of the war the German Army expanded rapidly. Now, after 18 months of the Russian campaign, expansion has ceased. It is estimated the Army suffered some 4,000,000 casualties, dead and permanently disabled. The casualties comprise the flower of the German Army and must inevitably reduce the size and quality of the German Army in 1943.

8. Failure to defeat Russian main armies, failure to complete conquest of Caucasus, major reverses at Stalingrad, and yet another winter in Russia—all, coupled with the defeat of the Africa Corps, will induce doubts as to the invincibility of the Army and will lead to a decline in morale. There is evidence that the High Command is dissatisfied with Hitler's strategic conduct of the war. There are signs of friction between Army and Party. High placed generals have been dismissed, and in some instances, more loyal Party men have taken their places.
9. The picture we have of the German Army today is that of a formidable, well-disciplined force of high fighting value. But with such extensive commitments, and in relation to those commitments such inadequate reserves, so that if pressure by the Russians and by the Allies were vigorously maintained, a sharp decline must be expected and the German Army will be unable to meet the combination of threats which will face it.

AIR FORCE

10. During the past few months evidence has accumulated that the stamina of the German Air Force crews has been deteriorating owing to severity of calls made upon them and that, to stem decline, the High Command has been forced to adopt the policy of economy in employment of bulk of Air Force. There are also signs of deterioration in training pilots and crews.

11. First-line strength of the German Air Force had only been maintained up to October at expense of depth. Initial establishment strength, stored reserves, operational types used in training and reserve training units (particularly single engine fighter units) have declined. Consequently the ability of the German Air Force to meet casualties and reverses is seriously impaired. Evidence since October shows that even the initial establishment strength has not been maintained. On the Russian front and in the Mediterranean the decline is believed as high as 20 per cent.

12. The situation further deteriorated owing to Germany's increased defensive commitments and to shortage of man-power. Bomber strength which is today less than it was at the time of the Battle of Britain will probably be further curtailed so that the defensive arm can be expanded. German Air Force personnel have been drawn upon, not only to fulfill duties connected with the air force hitherto performed by the Army, but even to fight on the ground with the Army itself.
13. To sum up, the German Air Force today is inadequate to meet the commitments facing it, and has reached the stage where it can only be strong on one front at the cost of weakness on others. Weakness of the Air Force is probably the most serious limiting factor in the German military machine today. No increase in the initial establishment strength is to be expected. Provided the Germans are given no respite in the air on any of the three fronts, a serious decline is probable.

14. It is becoming an increasing strain to hold down the peoples of German-occupied Europe. In Yugoslavia garrisons even now are barely sufficient to retain control. In Norway sabotage is becoming increasingly skillful and effective. Recent events in France have added to German commitments.

15. Germany's European Allies are no longer convinced of her ability to win the war. They are less and less prepared to accept heavy sacrifices involved in the attachment to Germany's war effort. Germany cannot, however, do without satellite troops, and must, therefore, devote part of her effort to support her Allies, particularly Italy. Italy's increasingly low morale is one of Germany's greatest concerns. Hatred of Germany, coupled with military reverses, air raids and the threat to Italy herself, have produced a situation in which, for the first time, Italians are beginning to seriously think of an alternative regime. The movement may not yet have gone very far, but Germany must reckon with the possibility of a complete Italian collapse. As Italy's determination to stay in the war disappears, Germany will have to undertake additional commitments to replace Italian forces in Russia and the Balkans.

16. European neutrals are also losing faith in Germany's victory and correspondingly feel encouraged to stand up to her. Even Spain is showing increasing independence. More pressure has to be applied to get results. With Germany's diminishing strength her chances of getting any results progressively recede.
17. Increasing drabness, discomfort and hopelessness of life in Germany, combined with fatigue, air raid damage and immense Army casualties, induce a serious condition in physical and nervous strain on the German people at home. Already the state of public feeling is causing concern, and precautions have been taken against demonstrations in cities subject to or threatened with air bombardment. The state of morale on home front affects military strategy in two ways:

(a) The need for strengthening police and defensive measures causes drain on military strength;

(b) The need to bolster up morale may impel Germany to persist in strategically unsound operations.

18. While many of the symptoms preceding Germany's collapse in 1918 are already observable in Germany today, fear of the consequences of defeat is an incentive to continue the struggle. Power of the Gestapo will probably prevent any internal collapse until the people and rank and file of the Army realize that Germany is losing the war. The possibility, however, of collapse in 1945 cannot be entirely excluded. If it came, it might be with startling rapidity.
PART II COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY

19. Allied occupation of French North Africa and defeat of Rommel present Germany with a new and apparently unexpected situation. She has probably not yet decided how she will adapt long-term strategy to meet it and will be unable to do so until the course of events in the Mediterranean becomes clear. She must in any event realize that hopes of winning the war by establishing herself in a strategically impregnable position are fast disappearing.

20. If the Allies complete the occupation of the whole southern shores of the Mediterranean all Germany's southern flank becomes vulnerable. This must directly affect her plans for the Russian war for she must realize that she may not be able to even capture Caucasia, still less defeat Russia, except at the cost of jeopardizing her position in the Mediterranean and Balkans.

21. Faced with this situation Germany has the following courses open:

(A) Attempt to make peace with Russia while continuing the war against the remaining United Nations;
(B) Attempt to make peace with English-speaking powers while continuing the war against Russia;
(C) Seek general Armistice;
(D) Continue war against all enemies.

(A) Russo-German Peace. As it becomes obvious to Hitler that he cannot defeat Russia, Britain and the United States, separate peace with Russia may seem the only alternative to complete disaster, even though it involves evacuation of all Russian territory now occupied. Stalin, however, at any rate while his operations continue successfully, will remain determined to eliminate forever the German threat.
So long as this prospect and the hope that Allied operations in the Mediterranean will develop into an effective second front remain, Stalin is unlikely to consider any terms of separate peace offered by Hitler. If, however, by next spring Allied success in the Mediterranean had not in Stalin's opinion been followed up with such vigor as to promise effective second front, and Russian offensive had not achieved the success Stalin hoped, we cannot forecast what might happen. Stalin might then make a separate peace with Hitler, though it is difficult to see how terms acceptable to both sides could be found.

(B) Peace with English-speaking Powers. Peace feelers towards Britain and United States through neutral countries have undoubtedly been made. But it seems clear that the Germans realize neither Britain nor the United States will entertain an idea of a separate peace.

(C) General Armistice. Hitler probably realizes that in no circumstances would we make peace with him. It is conceivable that at later stage leaders in Army convinced of the hopelessness of continuing the struggle might impose their will on Hitler and make peace despite him. So long as the principal Nazi and S.S. Leaders remain loyal to Hitler it is improbable that Army Leaders would succeed in imposing their will upon him.

PART III GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY

22. Whatever her land or air strategy may be Germany will develop U-boat warfare to the utmost extent.

23. The German surface fleet is likely to be maintained in Norway for three roles:

(a) Pinning down of a large Allied fleet;
(b) As a threat to convoys to North Russia;

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RFP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
(c) Strengthening defenses against Allied attack on Norway. At some stage it might be used to support U-boat campaign if Hitler thought decisive results could be attained.

24. Germany's Army, although still a formidable fighting machine, is numerically and qualitatively declining. The decline may be rapid if Russian successes continue and if Allied pressure in the Mediterranean is maintained.

25. She is engaged on a war on three fronts in the air. The Air Force is also declining, while that of the Allies is mounting steadily.

26. In the fact of dwindling resources Germany has to resist Russian offensive already started on a large scale, to meet the Allied threat in North Africa, to bolster up Italy to reinforce Balkans and Crete, to meet our growing air offensive, to provide garrisons for the whole of France, and by next spring to be prepared to meet the threat of large scale raids on, if not invasion of, the Western Front from the British Isles.

27. Faced with the above situation Germany's strategy during the winter is likely to be essentially defensive and governed by the need to economize land and air forces. Germany's strategy next summer is entirely dependant upon the ability of Britain and the United States during the winter to exploit success in the Mediterranean and to maintain air offensive against Germany from the British Isles, and upon the ability of the Russians to maintain pressure upon the enemy.

28. For the time being the campaign against Russia is likely to remain Hitler's chief preoccupation. The Germans cannot afford to go on using military manpower and air forces indefinitely on an extended front in the East without securing and developing Caucasian oil. If they withdrew to a shorter line,
say Leningrad to Rostov, they would achieve some economy of effort and a position where they could still defend the resources of the Ukraine. They would not, however, possess oil with which to exploit them and to meet these other commitments. Hitler, therefore, is not likely to abandon the campaign in Caucasus unless and until compelled to do so:

(a) By Russian action, or
(b) Because demands from Mediterranean and Western Front make it inevitable and urgent that he should shorten the Russian front, or
(c) By shortage of oil, or
(d) By a combination of the three.

29. If through an Italian collapse and resultant trouble in the Balkans, the Germans were compelled to assume the whole military commitment for defense of southern European front, Germany would, in order to provide the necessary troops, almost certainly be compelled to shorten her line in Russia, first abandoning North Caucasus.

30. Axis commanders responsible for operations in the Mediterranean and Western theatres are likely to be compelled to meet Allied threats as they arise with such forces as they now possess reinforced inadequately with land and air forces released mainly from France, and, if possible, from the Russian Front. This strategy will impose upon commanders continuation of the policy of improvisation such as has been apparent in recent months. This means German strategy in the Mediterranean and Western theatres must be fundamentally defensive, and employment of forces available will be dictated throughout by Allied action.

31. The Germans and Italians will be unable for long to maintain a bridgehead in North Africa and will probably be able to evacuate only a negligible proportion of their forces still there. Shock of such a disaster may not be sufficient to bring
about immediate collapse of Italy, although this is possible particularly if heavy air attacks are maintained. If, however, Italy is to be kept in the war, Germany will be compelled to reinforce her air forces in Sardinia, Sicily and Crete which will form the next line of defense. Germany will probably also have to reinforce these islands and possibly Italy itself with land forces.

32. At the same time Italy will probably demand the return to her of part of the Italian forces fighting on the Russian front and possibly also some of the divisions garrisoning the Balkans. Departure of any of the Italian divisions from the Balkans, plus intensive guerilla activities which will result from Allied successes in the Mediterranean and the Allied threat to the Balkans will compel the Germans to increase their garrison in that area.

33. Loss of Rumanian oil supplies would make it impossible for Germany to continue the war and the loss of mineral resources of Yugoslavia would be serious. Allied landing in the Balkans would threaten Germany's communications with Russia and with Turkey. Whatever dispositions, therefore, she makes elsewhere in the Mediterranean, Germany cannot afford to allow the Allies to obtain a footing in the Balkans.

34. If Italy collapsed either as a result of the North African campaign or as a result of Allied capture of Sardinia or Sicily, Germany would be faced with the problem of deciding whether to assume full liability of holding Italy as if it were occupied territory, or cutting losses and shortening line by retiring behind the Alps. Consequences of abandoning Italy, both from point of view of prestige and strategy, would be so serious that we believe only lack of forces could compel Germany to take this step. So long as Russia continues to fight Germany will be
unable to withdraw sufficient troops from the Russian Front and from France both to garrison Italy and to garrison the Balkans. We believe she would, in these circumstances, concentrate her forces on the defense of the Balkans, leaving Italy to her fate.

35. The best counter to Allied offensive in the Mediterranean area would be for the Germans to move into Southern Spain and deny to the Allies free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar. Every day that passes, however, will increase Spanish will to resist. It seems most improbable that Germany would attempt such a move against Spanish resistance during the winter even if she had the forces available to do so next spring unless unexpectedly Russia collapses.

36. Allied successes in the Mediterranean have similarly strengthened Turkey's will to resist and have diminished the threat to her since, even if Germany were able to withdraw troops from Russia, they will be required for the defense of Italy and the Balkans. Indeed, the only circumstances in which we foresee any German operation against Turkey would be if Germany believed Turkey was about to join the Allies, in which case she might endeavor to embroil Bulgaria with Turkey and render assistance to the former. Such action would only be taken in part of her plan for the defense of the Balkans.

THE WESTERN FRONT

37. Germany throughout the winter of 1942/43 will remain strictly on the defensive on land in the West. The Air Forces maintained there will be essentially for defensive purposes. Bombing raids against the British Isles are likely to be of negligible proportions. Air attacks on shipping to further the U-boat campaign are likely to be the only substantial offensive operations.

38. Germany will probably appreciate that the Allies will be unable to mount large-scale invasion of the continent from the
British Isles before the summer of 1943. She would hope that any attack on a smaller scale could be repulsed by existing garrison.

**PART IV  SUMMARY**

39. The conclusion to be drawn from the factors considered above is that the present is the critical moment when the duration, if not the final outcome of the war may depend on vigor of Allied action during the winter. Following is our forecast of German strategy:

(A) The Russian Front will remain Hitler's chief preoccupation. He will continue his attempt to gain control of the whole of Caucasia until compelled to abandon it by Russian action, by demands of the Mediterranean and Western fronts, or both.

(B) In the Mediterranean and Western theaters Hitler's strategy will be fundamentally defensive. Employment of forces he can make available will be dictated throughout by action taken by the Allies.

(C) Hitler will do his best to retain a foothold in Africa and to keep Italy in the war. If, nevertheless, Italy collapses he will concentrate on the defense of the Balkans and leave Italy to her fate.

(D) Intense air and submarine attacks on our shipping, in any event, will be carried out.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Note by the Secretary

Attached hereto is a note received from the British J.I.C. in Washington which sets forth in parallel columns the texts of that Committee's message to London, 18 December, and the reply of the London J.I.C., 22 December.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Secretary.
ENVELOPE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Note by British J.I.C. in Washington

The preliminary comments of U.S. J.I.C. dated 14 December on the London paper 462, were conveyed to London after the informal discussion held on 16 December. A reply has now been received from London which, for convenience of reference, is shown below correlated with the points made in the message to London.

26th December, 1942

C. M. BERKELEY

*** *** *** *** ***

Washington, 18 December

London, 22 December

A. ECONOMIC POSITION

4. Americans consider that we have been over-optimistic in painting picture of Germany's weak economic position and hold in particular that neither is her food situation precarious nor can her oil position be termed critical. They hold that oil resources are adequate for any operations other than an all-out major offensive on the Russian Front.

2. We consider that with reserves of grain virtually exhausted security of Germany's food situation next year depends on 3 principal factors:

(a) Good (i.e. above average) harvest.

(b) Substantial supplies of grain and oil seeds from Occupied Russia.

(c) Substantial quantities of edible oil from Japan.

3. Hitherto, with reserves of grain and edible oil, Germany has had a cushion of supplies upon which to rest. Now with cushion removed, precarious seems right word to describe situation in which Germany's success in securing food she needs depends at least as much on acts of God and of Germany's enemies as on her own efforts. We have not seen any United States appreciation of German food situation since before the last harvest.

4. Similarly, we consider state of Germany's oil supplies as described in latest Axis oil committee's report, justifies use of epithet "critical" in context of our paper. Please also look at para. 2 of preamble to C.I.C. 13 dated December 12th. What is
B. MANPOWER SITUATION

5. We agree that shortage of combat planes sets immediate limit to German activities (see para. 13 below) but this does not affect our opinion that manpower is greatest weakness affecting Germany's strategy as a whole.

6. War Office have arrived at their conclusions regarding casualties as result of reliable data received from German and other sources and cross-checked with all the estimates mentioned in your para. 8. We do not accept obituary notices as in themselves contributing sufficient data from which to assess proportion of killed, because these notices are incomplete and at periods German Government as a matter of policy have definitely restricted their insertion.

7. At conversations held here with representatives of American Military Intelligence and O.S.S. in October 1942 it emerged that chief divergence between British and American estimates was figure for permanent medical casualties. We then made a further investigation into medical casualty figure. Basis of calculation was re-examined by Army Medical Directorate Staff here, with result we have written down our figure for medical casualties by 33% net. Result is our estimate for permanent casualties (both battle and medical) today is 4,000,000 of which 1,000,000 are medical. War Office figure quoted in your para. 8 as 4,512,000 therefore out of date.

8. We consider American figure in your para. 7 of 2,447,198 is far too low even assuming that it excludes medical casualties. If estimate has been calculated on basis explained by American representatives in October you should note that we do not accept that basis.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, KLH, Date

APR 24 1974
10. U.S. J.I.C. do not consider that Russia will necessarily remain Hitler's chief preoccupation.

They admit that Germans are unable to undertake more than one main offensive effort at a time, and that therefore the Germans may decide to hold a purely defensive front on a shortened line, possibly Rostov-Leningrad.

War Department estimate 120 divisions required to hold this line by concentrating defences on important cities and communication centres, thus releasing some 68 divisions for possible use elsewhere.

11. Americans naturally have in mind the possibility of advances through Spain and Turkey. We would like your views on:

(a) Possibility of Germans holding a shorter line on their own volition.

(b) Troops required for it.

(c) Number of divisions which could thus be released for other purposes, in what state they would be and at what periods they would be available for operations.

9. Recent events Russian Front prove German inability to hold present extended line indefinitely without grave risk. Following also shows Russia must remain Germany's chief preoccupation at least until she can establish purely defensive front. Agree she may attempt to do this voluntarily if only to economise in divisions.

10. Germans will wish to retain agricultural and industrial areas in the Ukraine and might hold line as at present - Leningrad to Boguchar on Don thence Rivers Kalitva, Donets and Don to Rostov. Admittedly this will shorten frontage held but mere length of front provides no reliable guide to number of divisions required to hold it as so much depends on tactical possibilities of ground in each sector in relation to possible scale of attack. Only sound analysis is that this shortened line approximates to front held winter 1941/42 excluding Crimea. No reason to suppose substantially fewer German divisions required than last winter (176) except that Crimea would require fewer (say 8) and that some divisions in the Central and Northern fronts not so heavily engaged this year as 1941 and defences there now better.

11. Taking these factors into account we have taken 162 Divisions as bare minimum to hold shortened front plus 6 in Finland. Total 168 Divisions, or 16 Divisions less than present 184 German Divisions in Russia even assuming German Divisions now surrounding Stalingrad escape. Germans may be forced by allied action elsewhere to release up to maximum total of 30 Divisions but cannot do so without leaving Russian Front dangerously weak. Furthermore, if satellite formations become ineffective after withdrawal, the Germans will be unable to release even 16 Divisions without serious risk. U.S. picture of releasing 68 Divisions and holding Russia with 120 Divisions seems to us strategically impossible.
12. In any event no Divisions can be released until situation stabilized on new line. Thereafter impossible to forecast condition of those Divisions released, but fair to assume it would take at least two months from withdrawal until again fit for battle.

D. GENERAL

1. We have had combined discussion with Americans and paper appears to be generally acceptable except that Americans consider that an atmosphere of over-optimism pervades it.

13. Our paper was prepared after exhaustive study of best evidence available here, and the most searching and detailed discussion. We are satisfied that the evidence was fairly considered and that deductions to which it led are reasonable.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943
FORCES REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE

Note by the Secretary

Attached hereto is a London J.I.C. estimate supplementary to that distributed as J.I.C. 69.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Secretary.
GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

1. We have been instructed to make an estimate of the requirements of German and satellite land and air forces next Spring, together with an estimate of the forces that will in fact be available and their probable distribution. We report as follows:

2. The military problem is affected by four sets of largely unknown and unassessable factors, namely:-

(a) the operations, and threats of operations, mounted by the Allies in the period under review;

(b) the effect of such Allied actions on German strategy and plans, especially in Russia; on Italian resistance; on Italian assistance to the Axis effort in the Balkans; and on Axis satellite assistance in Russia;

(c) the results of the present Russian offensive, especially the losses which the Sixth German and the Roumanian Armies may incur on the STALINGRAD front; and

(d) the available strength of the German Army in the Spring of 1943, as affected by the following two factors, namely:-

(i) if hard pressed during 1943, the Germans will, owing to casualties which can only be partially replaced, be faced with a reduction in their armed forces of about a million men, which is the equivalent of some 40 divisions;

(ii) against this there exist in Germany a large number of schools and other establishments which, if broken up, could be incorporated to produce the equivalent of some 20 divisions.
For the purpose of this report we have, however, assumed that Germany will not break up any of her schools, but will be forced to "cannibalise" about 10 divisions by the opening of the spring of 1943.

3. For the purpose of this report we have assessed the number of German divisions at a total of about 300 divisions. From this should be deducted 45 training and administrative divisions (i.e. unsuitable for operations) and the 5 German Divisions at present in North Africa.

Leaving available for operations

The losses from cannibalisation should be deducted and are estimated at

Thus the German Divisions "available for operations" in the Spring of 1943 are assessed at

4. It will be seen that we have dealt with round figures, which are submitted with every reserve in view of the indeterminate conditions already referred to.

5. Balance sheets for land and air forces are attached as Appendices "A" and "B" respectively.
### APPENDIX "A"

**AXIS DIVISIONS (OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE) IN THE SPRING OF 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case &quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>Finland &amp; Russia</th>
<th>Low Countries &amp; France</th>
<th>Homeland, Poland &amp; Protectorate</th>
<th>Strategic Reserve &amp; Germany</th>
<th>Scandinavia &amp; Denmark</th>
<th>Crete, Dodecanese &amp; Balkans</th>
<th>Italy, Sicily &amp; Sardinia</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Total Available</th>
<th>Debit or Credit</th>
<th>Germans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line in Russia remains as at present; the Germans continue on the offensive in Caucasus, and on the defensive on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean area; Italy is still fighting.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case &quot;B&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>As for Case &quot;A&quot; but Italy is out of the war, and is left undefended by Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case &quot;C&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Line in Russia is shortened by withdrawal to Rostov; the Germans remain on the defensive on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean area; Italy is still fighting.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line in Russia remains as at present; the Germans continue on the offensive in Caucasus, and on the defensive on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean area; Italy is still fighting.</td>
<td>193(a)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7(d)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case &quot;B&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As for Case &quot;A&quot; but Italy is out of the war, and is left undefended by Germany.</td>
<td>192(c)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case &quot;C&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line in Russia is shortened by withdrawal to Rostov; the Germans remain on the defensive on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean area; Italy is still fighting.</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7(d)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
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APPENDIX "A" (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Low Countries &amp; Russia</th>
<th>Poland &amp; France</th>
<th>Homelands, Protectorate &amp; Germany</th>
<th>Strategic Reserve &amp; Denmark</th>
<th>Scandinavia</th>
<th>Crete, Dodecanese &amp; Balkans</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Total Available</th>
<th>Debit or Credit</th>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>20(e)</td>
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<td>-30(g)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roumanian</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Increase of 10 on present German total to allow for offensive in Caucasus.
(b) Does NOT allow for recent losses in STALINGRAD sector.
(c) Increase owing to withdrawal of Italians.
(d) 6 Divisions from the strategic reserve of 15 are absorbed in bolstering up Italy.
(e) Italian garrisons in Balkans replaced but strategic reserve will be used in event of Allied invasion.
(f) A further 4 Divisions might be mobilized if Germany provided the equipment.
(g) If as a result of Italian defection, the Hungarian, Roumanian and Bulgarian Forces, or any of them, ceased effectively to collaborate with the Germans, the deficit would be increased.
## Appendix "B"

**Forecast of C.A.F. Requirements in the Spring 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE &quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WESTERN FRONT</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDITERRANEAN AREA</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CASE "B"**

As for Case "A" but Italy is out of the war, and is left undefended by Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE &quot;C&quot;</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WESTERN FRONT</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDITERRANEAN AREA</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CASE "D"**

As for Case "C" but Italy is out of the war, and is left undefended by Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE &quot;D&quot;</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WESTERN FRONT</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDITERRANEAN AREA</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

1. The above figures represent I.E. strength. They do not include some 450 aircraft refitting in Central Germany.

2. In Case "B" and Case "D" the figures take into account the effect of Italy dropping out of the war. If, however, as a result of Italian defection, Roumanian, Hungarian and possibly also the Bulgarian Air Forces ceased effectively to collaborate with the Germans, the aggregate deficit in Cases "B" and "D" would, it is estimated, increase by some 150 aircraft.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 75

AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a study on Axis capabilities in the Mediterranean Area, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee on its own initiative, is submitted for information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,
L. R. McDOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.
CONCLUSIONS

1. Germany must react offensively to the Allied operation in French North Africa, if practicable. Her objective would be to destroy the Allied force in French North Africa and to seize that territory in order to deny it to the United Nations as a base of operations against Europe.

2. Germany could most effectively accomplish that objective by simultaneous attack from bridgeheads in Spanish Morocco and Tunisia. This operation is improbable, however, unless Spain cooperates.

3. It is improbable that Spain would cooperate.

4. An attack from Tunisia, Spain remaining neutral, is unlikely to succeed.

5. Should an offensive against French North Africa prove to be impracticable, Germany's most likely course would be to attempt to seize and hold a strong defensive bridgehead in Tunisia.

6. Germany is unlikely to attempt an offensive against the Middle East pending stabilization of the situation in French North Africa.

ARGUMENT

1. Reasoned assumptions. For psychological as well as strategic reasons, the Axis must react offensively to the Allied operation in French North Africa, if practicable. An Axis decision to defend will be taken only if an offensive proves to be impracticable, and a decision to evacuate only if defense of an African bridgehead also proves to be impracticable.
If the Axis is unable to destroy the Allied force in French North Africa and to deny the entire area to the United Nations, it might still attempt to seize and hold a bridgehead in Tunisia. Its objective would be control of the air over the Strait of Sicily, which would protect Sardinia, Sicily, and Italy, and would prevent free passage by sea between United Nations forces in the western and eastern Mediterranean. Possession of a Tunisian bridgehead would facilitate such control, but is not essential to its establishment. A bridgehead in Tunisia-Tripolitania would also threaten from the flank any United Nations offensive against Europe from either Morocco-Algeria or Cyrenaica-Egypt. The risk of exposing Axis forces in Africa to concerted attack from Algeria and Cyrenaica would be acceptable. The remaining alternative, to evacuate Africa, would be to play into the hand of the United Nations and is therefore probably not acceptable.

2. **Axis forces.** Axis ground forces now available in western Europe are ample for an immediate counteroffensive in North Africa. Shipping at present available is sufficient to permit their transfer to Africa at a rate of four divisions a month, but the restrictions imposed by lack of port facilities in Africa would probably reduce this rate to not to exceed two divisions a month.

The Italian air forces, reinforced by 250 German planes (150 bombers and 100 fighters) must be held in the Central Mediterranean, but 600 other German planes (350 bombers and 250 fighters) are probably available for service anywhere in the theater.

The Italian surface fleet, still respectable in numbers, has not distinguished itself in action. German and Italian submarines, however, are effective. It is estimated that the scale of Axis submarine attack on shipping bound to and from North Africa could be doubled. (The attitude of the French naval forces at Toulon and Alexandria is enigmatic, but their immediate capabilities as Axis forces would be very limited, in any event.)
Possible courses of offensive action. Three general courses of offensive action are open to the Axis, as follows:

(a) Attack through Spain and Spanish Morocco.
(b) Attack from the Tunisia-Tripolitania bridgehead.
(c) Attack through Turkey.

Course (b) may be combined with either (a) or (c) for pincer effect. Coincident with any offensive action, or with a strategic defensive, there would presumably be an intensification of submarine activity against United Nations seaborne communications with French North Africa.

4. Attack through Spain and Spanish Morocco. This course would be the most suitable. It might quickly cut off from the Atlantic all Allied forces in Algeria-Tunisia and would impose on them immense logistical difficulties even if they were able to gain contact with Allied forces from the Middle East. If Tunisia-Tripolitania were held and made the base of simultaneous attack, annihilation of the Allied force in French North Africa might be achieved.

If Spain were to cooperate, this course would also be the most feasible. An excellent transportation net connects Germany with the Spanish frontier. Communications within Spain are adequate to permit advanced ground units to reach the south coast in two days and 15 divisions in 30 days. It is estimated that, at most, 200 German planes could be in limited operation from Spanish airfields in ten days and in full operation in fifteen days, provided that preparations on the ground had been made in advance. Neutralization of Gibraltar and domination of the narrow seas might be effected. A month might be required, however, to transfer any large ground force to Africa. Under present conditions, Spanish forces in Spanish Morocco (130,000 men) are adequate to hold that bridgehead during that period and
to act offensively in French Morocco, given German air support and some armored reinforcement.

Spanish cooperation with a German offensive through Spanish territory is possible, but improbable. Spain's professed desire to avoid war is genuine and can be overcome only by more compelling considerations than are apparent at this time. Even if Franco were to give his consent, that would probably result in a disintegration of his regime, which would impede the German advance and afford the United Nations opportunity for counteraction. See Appendix for further elaboration.

The consent of the Spanish government and the cooperation of at least the Spanish Army are essential to a rapid and successful operation through Spain and Spanish Morocco against North Africa. If Spanish cooperation is refused, Germany will probably avoid an attack on North Africa through Spain and instead will try to preserve Spanish neutrality. As a neutral, Spain has present value as a buffer and remains a potential ally in the event of an Allied attack through the Peninsula. If Germany provokes Spanish resistance, the Moroccan bridgehead and the logistical advantage of operating through Spain will be lost and the Allies will be provided with a bridgehead on the continent.

5. **Attack from Tunisia-Sardinia.** This course would be effective in conjunction with an attack through Spain and Spanish Morocco, but it would not be effective if Spain remained neutral. Its adoption would entail a frontal attack on Allied forces the communications of which would be secure, except for submarine activity, while the attacking force would be dependent on over- seas communications vulnerable to air and naval attack from nearby bases. Depending on the effectiveness of such attacks, the Axis rate of build-up in Tunisia is estimated as not in excess of two divisions per month. There are in Tunisia-Tripolitania ample landing fields for the entire available Axis air force, but their supply would be at the expense of ground force build-up. Attack from Tunisia-Sardinia alone would thus pit small, slowly increasing, and precariously supplied Axis forces against larger
Allied forces with relatively secure lines of communication. It would seem to be impracticable to achieve more than the establishment of a defensive bridgehead.

6. Attack from Sicily. Spain being neutral, Tunisia lost, and Sardinia too vulnerable to serve as a base. This course is subject to all the disadvantages indicated in (5) above, with the additional hazard of requiring a landing on a hostile shore.

7. Attack from Tripolitania, eastward. This is conceivable only as a holding attack in conjunction with a major effort through Turkey. The rate of build-up indicated in (5) above applies also to Tripolitania and would not permit the creation of a sufficient force to act offensively in any other circumstances. It is, moreover, unlikely that a decision would be sought in the Middle East while the more immediate Allied threat in French North Africa remained in being.

8. Attack through Turkey. This is the front on which forces diverted from Russia could be made most quickly effective. It has little else to commend it. The Turkish frontier is more distant from Germany than is that of Spain; Balkan and Turkish communications are markedly inferior to those of France and Spain. Like Spain, Turkey is anxious to avoid war, but, in view of the changed situation in the Mediterranean and in the Caucasus, the Turks would almost certainly resist German passage through their territory, and would presumably receive effective aid before the Germans could reach the frontier of Syria. Thus the Germans would find that they had strengthened their enemies and increased the dispersion of their own forces without affecting materially the situation in North Africa. It is unlikely that Germany would adopt such a course in the face of the Allied threat from North Africa.

9. Supporting data. The data supporting this argument are available in the Committee, and will be presented in subsequent papers under this number.
APPENDIX

PROBABLE ATTITUDE OF SPAIN

1. Spain has hitherto classified herself as a non-belligerent member of the Axis rather than as a neutral and has cooperated with the Axis in various measures "short of war". The Spanish desire to avoid involvement in actual warfare, however, can be overcome by only the most compelling considerations. The country has never recovered from the Civil War; its economic condition is deplorable, its political situation unstable, and its public morale low. In these circumstances Spain is unlikely to take voluntarily any aggressive initiative. A more probable course would be adoption of an attitude of watchful waiting, with a disposition to adjust policy to changing circumstances in order to avoid war and emerge in friendly relations with the winning side.

2. The ruling group in Spain is an unstable coalition of discordant elements, of which the most significant are the Church, the Army, and the Falange. Franco presides over this coalition, but does not dominate it. Only the Falange is pro-Axis. The Army and Church are united in hostility toward the Falange and are disposed to favor the eventual establishment of a conservative regime in the form of a constitutional monarchy.

3. The motives which might induce Franco to consent to a German offensive against North Africa through Spain and Spanish Morocco are:

   (a) Fear of the consequences of a United Nations victory. Even without outside interference, this would stimulate a resurgence of Republican, Socialist, and Communist groups in Spain. Moreover, Communist Russia might presumably exercise considerable influence in the post-war settlement. This fear preserves the atmosphere of the Spanish Civil War and tends to create a sense of dependence upon the Axis powers which aided Franco then.
(b) Promise of territorial aggrandizement, particularly at Gibraltar in Morocco. Nothing of this nature is to be expected of the United Nations, but Germany can still hint with such an inducement.

c) Conviction that Germany would attack through Spain anyhow, so that war would be inevitable in any case, and that Germany's attack would be invincible.

The first consideration exists; the second is speculative. Germany may not be able to establish the third.

4. The considerations which might restrain Franco from belligerent cooperation with the Axis are:

(a) Genuine desire to avoid war, which Spain is in no condition to wage. Even assuming that the Axis were able to defend Spain successfully, it is certain that Germany has no present remedy for Spain's economic distress, in particular for the shortage of foodstuffs, and that this distress would be intensified by loss of Trans-Atlantic commerce.

(b) Fear that German operations would result in a German occupation and domination of Spain destructive to his own position as well as to Spanish independence.

(c) Fear that counter-operations by the United Nations would result in a renewal of domestic disorder, precipitating at once the consequences to be feared of a United Nations victory (paragraph 3 (a)).

(d) Fear that, to avoid the conditions indicated in (a), (b), and (c), the Generals, with the support of the Church, might overthrow the regime.

(e) Hope that the conservative elements in Spain might, by avoiding irrevocable commitment, avoid war and adjust Spanish policy according to circumstances so as to emerge in friendly relations with the winning side, even in the event of a United Nations victory.
In addition to these considerations, the inertia of indecision is on the side of inaction.

5. If Franco should decide in favor of belligerent cooperation with the Axis at this time, it is conceivable that the Generals might refuse to execute his policy, as indicated in 4 (d). A violent popular reaction, similar to that of May 2, 1808, when Spain repudiated a similar deal made by its government with Napoleon, is also conceivable. That occurrence is deeply impressed on Spanish national consciousness. In either event, the progress of the German offensive would be impeded and the United Nations might obtain entry into Spanish Morocco and Spain.

6. If Franco, with the support of the Army, should adhere strictly to his announced policy of resisting the entrance into Spanish territory of the forces of either party, a German attempt to secure passage through Spain by force would most probably be impeded by desperate popular as well as military resistance. Spain would thus become united internally, and the regime would gain a good character among the United Nations, which would, presumably, furnish effective aid. Those considerations would encourage Franco to adhere to his announced policy.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ADDENDUM TO
MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 35

AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, which consists merely of tabulations of Axis and neutral ground, air, and naval forces in or adjacent to the Mediterranean area, is offered by the Joint Intelligence Committee for information and in support of the argument presented in J.C.S. Memorandum for Information No. 35 (paragraph 9).

J. R. DEANE,
L. R. McDOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.
AXIS AND NEUTRAL GROUND FORCES

I. GERMAN (as of 3 December)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Italy - Sicily</th>
<th>France - Lowlands</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panzer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorized</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>1#</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total offensive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of these, one, the 164th, has been virtually annihilated.

# This figure indicates strength equivalent to one reinforced division, but composed of elements drawn from several divisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defensive divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defensive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. ITALIAN (as of 3 December)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorized</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calere</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. AXIS BALKAN SATELLITES (as of 16 November)

Exclusive of units in Russia, the Axis Balkan satellites have 39 divisions under arms, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. VICHY FRANCE.

Such elements of the French Metropolitan Army as may still be in existence are considered to be of no combat value.
V. SPAIN.

As of 1 August Spanish ground forces were disposed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combatant</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>265,300</td>
<td>26,400</td>
<td>291,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearics</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>19,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaries</td>
<td>47,700</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>50,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Oro</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>454,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>498,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principal concentrations in metropolitan Spain are in the Madrid and Seville areas.

VI. PORTUGAL.

As of 29 July, Portuguese ground forces were disposed as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>26,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>3,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdes</td>
<td>6,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other colonies</td>
<td>19,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116,300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VII. TURKEY.

As of 18 November, Turkey had 42 infantry, 3 cavalry, and 1 motorized divisions, disposed as follows:

- In the Straits area - 17-19 divisions.
- In the northeast - 7 divisions.
- Elsewhere - 20-22 divisions.
I. GERMAN (as of 14 November).

There were approximately 10,000 combat planes in the German Air Force, of which 5,796 were in operating squadrons disposed as indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>LRP</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>COOP</th>
<th>Coastal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sicily-Sardinia</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece-Crete</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>660</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Front</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Front</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>2,136</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>5,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. ITALIAN (as of 14 November).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>TB</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>COOP</th>
<th>Coastal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sicily-Sardinia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy proper</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. VICHY FRENCH.

On 30 October the French metropolitan air force consisted of 309 combat planes (78 bombers, 169 fighters, 39 reconnaissance, 23 naval). It is reported that this force has been dissolved.

IV. SPAIN (as of 2 October).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Recce.</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaries, etc.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>160</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. PORTUGAL (as of 2 October).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. AXIS BAIXAN SATELLITES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Recce.</th>
<th>Naval</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This account is of modern planes only. In addition Hungary has 262 obsolescent combat planes; Bulgaria, 152.

VII. TURKEY (as of 1 July).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Recce.</th>
<th>Naval</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsolescent</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: These figures indicate total numbers of planes rather than the numbers serviceable. Conclusive data on serviceability is lacking.
ENCLOSURE "C"

AXIS AND NEUTRAL NAVAL FORCES

In the table below the first column under each country represents the number of vessels believed to be available for immediate service, as of 16 November. The second column indicates, in parentheses, the numbers of additional vessels not fit for service because damaged, under overhaul, incomplete, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB (35,000+)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (27,000-)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-XCY</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>- (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS-XCVS</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>7 (10)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCL</td>
<td>29 (22)</td>
<td>72 (7)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>287 (360)#</td>
<td>70 (4)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All in the northern Atlantic, North Sea, or Baltic, except about 35 submarines and except one ex-Greek destroyer in the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean also are about 50 E-boats.

# The 360 submarines not fit for service consist of 106 running trials, 62 fitting out, and 192 building.

Of the French fleet at TOULON only two light cruisers, three destroyer leaders, and three destroyers remained apparently undamaged 1 December.

The Portuguese, Bulgarian, and Roumanian navies are considered negligible.
JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 29

Axis Capabilities and Intentions in the Middle East

Note by the Secretaries

The Joint Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, directed the preparation of a study of this subject taking account of political, psychological and economic, as well as military and geographic, factors as they would exist in the event of a United Nations' victory in Egypt, an Axis victory in Egypt, or a stalemate in Egypt.

The study as finally approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee is circulated for information of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. Deane,
L. R. McDowell,
Joint Secretariat.

Note - This study was prepared in September.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 22-73.
By [Signature], Date [10/10/73]
JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 29

AXIS CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Note by the Secretaries

The Joint Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, directed the preparation of a study of this subject taking account of political, psychological and economic, as well as military and geographic, factors as they would exist in the event of a United Nations' victory in Egypt, an Axis victory in Egypt, or a stalemate in Egypt.

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J. R. DEANE,
L. R. McDOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.

Note - This study was prepared in September.
NOTE: As used in this paper, the term "Middle East" is intended to include the entire British position in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, the Levant States, Iraq, and Iran.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Axis has been and is capable of conquering and occupying the Middle East at the price of diverting to that area an adequate proportion of its ground forces, but an important proportion of its air forces now committed to other areas.

2. All routes into the Middle East present logistical and tactical difficulties which limit the scale of attack. Therefore, the Germans would presumably prefer to attack by more than one route. Conquest of either Egypt or Transcaucasia might open an additional route through Turkey; otherwise the Turks would probably resist. It is estimated that an advance through Transcaucasia could not threaten the Iraq-Iran oil area before May, 1943. Therefore, if the Axis were to seek a decision in the Middle East before the spring of 1943, it would probably be through Egypt primarily. A decisive Axis victory in Egypt would render the entire Middle Eastern position precarious.

3. An Axis conquest of the Middle East would:

   (a) Most effectively deny to the United Nations a base in that region for operations against Europe, and cut the southern supply routes to Russia.

   (b) Deprive the United Nations of Middle Eastern sources of oil, lack of which would affect severely all activity in the entire Indian Ocean area and would in particular, compel virtual cessation of naval activity in that Ocean. It would also threaten directly the air-ferry route to India. The difficulty of holding India would be greatly increased, and the route to China would thereby be threatened. The psychological effect on India and China would be marked. (These effects on India and China would redound to the benefit of Japan rather than of Germany and might, for that reason, not be desired by Germany).
(c) Be economically beneficial to Germany by giving the Axis access to materials produced in the Middle East, and by giving it freer access to materials produced in Turkey and freer use of the Mediterranean and Black Seas for shipping.

(d) Have a world-wide psychological effect favorable to Germany by increasing the strength of collaborationist and anti-war elements in Europe and elsewhere and by discouraging anti-German and pro-war elements.

4. The Axis, however, has thus far pursued in the Middle East an essentially defensive policy designed to prevent the United Nations from developing an effective base for operations against Europe. This policy has, no doubt, been influenced, if not determined, by the following considerations:

(a) The Middle East is not a theater which is comparable in importance to Russia or to western Europe. The Axis cannot "win the war" in the Middle East though its conquest would bring considerable gains and, more important, would involve considerable losses to the United Nations.

(b) Preparation for and the maintaining of the Russian front have to date involved Axis commitments of such magnitude as to preclude a conquest of the Middle East.

(c) The forces of the United Nations have been and are engaged in the Middle East under conditions which handicap them and are very favorable to the Axis. The former are fighting in this theater at the end of a 15,000-mile supply line, the latter at the end of a 2,000-mile supply line, an advantage which is by no means dissipated by the sinking of Axis supplies in the Mediterranean. Logistical considerations favor a continuance by the Axis of the policy of maintaining forces in North Africa just sufficient to hold in
check the increasing forces of the United Nations.

5. Conclusions.

(a) Capabilities. Germany is capable of conquering the Middle East, at some expense to other fronts, but probably not of obtaining a decision there prior to the spring of 1943 without having first destroyed United Nations forces in Egypt. There is no present indication of the preparation of sufficient force for that purpose.

(b) Intentions. Axis conquest of the Middle East is unlikely to be undertaken for the present because of existing commitments in Russia, the necessity of preserving freedom of action to meet anticipated operations in the West in the spring of 1943, and the advantage of diverting United Nations strength from the West to the Middle East. Diver-

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ARGUMENT

A. The Axis stake in the Middle East.

1. The most important Axis objective is negative; the denial to the United Nations of an effective invasion base for operations against Europe. This requires the maintenance of sufficient forces in North Africa to hold at least a secure bridgehead in Tripolitania. To date this purpose has been accomplished by an essentially defensive policy. Any serious threat to the Axis position in North Africa either from the east or the west would, however, lead to a heavy commitment of Axis forces in this area. Even without such a threat the Axis may, if sufficient strength can be diverted from other theaters, attempt a liquidation of the United Nations position in the Middle East as the most effective means of denying a base against Europe.

2. The psychological effect of the loss of the Middle East would be world wide in its repercussions. India and China, the areas in which the position of the United Nations would be most adversely affected, are not, however, areas in which the European Axis has an immediate primary interest. The loss of the Middle East would:

(a) Greatly complicate the problem of holding India and, if India were lost, would cut United Nations supply routes to China.

(b) In Russia, tend to discourage support of the war effort and to encourage opposition to it believed to be latent among certain elements of the population.

(c) Weaken throughout Europe opposition to German rule or control.

(d) Strengthen collaborationist elements in France, Spain and Portugal, and pave the way for a possible Axis conquest of the Western Mediterranean.

- 4 -
(e) Produce less serious repercussions in more remote areas, notably in South Africa and South America, and in certain groups in the United States and the British Empire.

3. Economic. While a conquest of the Middle East would supply certain Axis deficiencies in foodstuffs and industrial materials, the denial to the United Nations of Middle Eastern supplies is an economic objective of more immediate importance. (See Appendix A.)

(a) Axis gains. Axis occupation of Egypt would make available useful quantities of cotton, vegetable oils, sugar and phosphates. The cutting of the Suez route would throw Turkey into the economic orbit of the Axis with the result that Turkish chrome, manganese, copper, wool, tobacco, and dried and citrus fruits would be shipped to Axis Europe. The oil of Egypt, Iraq and, ultimately, of the Persian Gulf area would become available after a period of rehabilitation but this gain would be of less importance after the exploitation of the North Caucasus fields (If the Trans-Caucasus should be occupied, the exploitation of the Baku fields would satisfy all important Axis oil requirements). Conquest of the Middle East would also give the Axis freer use of the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and would thereby materially lessen the strain on European transport facilities. If it permitted the importation of substantial tonnages from eastern Asia, remaining Axis deficiencies in foodstuffs and industrial materials could be supplied.

(b) United Nations losses. The loss of Middle Eastern oil would be very serious to the United Nations. The principal oil requirements of India, East and South Africa and Australia would then have to be met exclusively from the Western Hemisphere. The loss of the oil itself would be less important than the increased tanker requirements which would
be imposed. As a consequence of this loss, United Nations naval activity in the Indian Ocean would virtually cease. (See paragraph 5 below.) The loss of the chromium and other strategic materials obtained from Turkey would be inconvenient, but not serious.

4. The loss of the Middle East would eliminate the southern supply routes to Russia and would threaten air and sea transport to India.

(a) The southern supply routes to Russia have a proven capacity of 50,000 tons a month and this capacity could, in the absence of enemy interference, be increased to 100,000 tons within the next half year. The routes to central Russia and the Urals are already threatened, however, from Axis positions near the Caspian. It seems probable that the chief importance of the southern routes in the near future may be in supporting Russian resistance in the Trans-Caucasus. Axis occupation of the Middle East would, of course, eliminate this possibility.

(b) In the event of Axis occupation of the Persian Gulf area, the air-ferry route across the Arabian peninsula would be seriously threatened and sea communications to India endangered.

5. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above present the case for Axis offensive action in the Middle East. An offsetting consideration of great importance favorable to the maintenance of a policy of defensive action lies in the relative length of Axis and United Nations supply lines to this area. The approximate distance from New York and from London to Suez and to the Persian Gulf ports via the Cape of Good Hope is 15,000 miles. The approximate distance from Berlin to the Egyptian border by way of Benghazi is 2,000 miles. If a "second front" has to be maintained, the Axis has strong reasons for maintaining it in this area.
There are at present about two million gross tons of shipping engaged in supplying the Middle East; to this may be added another half million tons for the supply of Russia via the Persian Gulf ports. The loss of the Middle East would probably involve the diversion of certain United Nations forces to India and Eritrea. The whole of the tonnage now devoted to the Middle East could not, therefore, be diverted to other theaters. It is probable, however, that a substantial proportion of this tonnage could be so diverted. Since the average turn-around of ships from New York to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ports is between five and six months while the turn-around from New York to British ports is about half this time, it follows that the tonnage released could carry twice the cargo on the latter run which is possible on the former.

It should be emphasized, however, that while the loss of the Middle East would relieve the United Nations shipping position in other theaters, it would substantially increase tanker requirements. India and the East African ports can be more economically supplied from the Persian Gulf than from the Western Hemisphere.

B. The Vulnerability of the Middle East to Axis Attack.

6. Routes of invasion. The Germans could invade the Middle East by four general routes: through Transcaucasia and northern Iran, through Turkey, by the Mediterranean, or through Egypt. All four present tactical and logistical difficulties which limit the scale of attack.

(a) Via Transcaucasia and Iran. An advance from the North Caucasus on Iraq entails the passage of extremely difficult terrain, and is hindered by a paucity of routes and transportation facilities in certain areas. It appears that the Germans, should they undertake it, could not be
ready to enter Iran in force before February, 1943, or to attack the line Kirkuk-Hamadan-Sultanabad before April, 1943. Both dates assume a collapse of Russian resistance when the Germans reach Baku and an absence of any resistance in northern Iran. Modification of those "worst case" assumptions would indicate later dates. No more than five divisions could be deployed to attack the Kirkuk-Sultanabad line unless there were further delay to improve transportation facilities in northern Iran.

The only route feasible for an advance in strength from the North Caucasus into Transcaucasia is that along the Caspian shore from Makhach Kala to Baku. It is a defile over 200 miles long and 2-1/2 to 15 miles wide between the sea and the mountains. The terrain is generally favorable to defense. The three routes across the Caucasus Mountains are not practicable for an advance in force. The highway along the Black Sea coast is subject to easy defense or demolition. A landing on the coast of Transcaucasia is considered impracticable as long as the Black Sea Fleet remains in being.

For seven weeks the Russians have maintained a generally successful resistance at the line of the Terek River, north and west of Grozny. Should Grozny be taken, it is believed that the Germans would require at least five weeks to reach Baku. Before advancing into Iran they would then have to complete and consolidate the conquest of Transcaucasia, open communications through Batum, build up supplies, and concentrate the necessary force in the Julfa area. It is estimated that these tasks would require at least three months even if Russian resistance were to collapse in Transcaucasia, and five or more months if the Russians continued to resist. Hence, assuming the conquest of Transcaucasia, it is unlikely that the Germans would be ready to enter Iran in force before February 1943 at the earliest. A later date would be more probable.
A German force advancing on Iraq through Iran would be hindered by paucity of routes and facilities. Assuming a complete absence of resistance, four or five divisions might be deployed to attack the line Kirkuk-Hamadan-Sultanabad some 11-13 weeks after the advance from Julfa. Any increase in the scale of attack would entail delay to improve transportation facilities. Continued Russian resistance in northern Iran or effective Russian demolitions prior to withdrawal eastward would also impose delay. Hence the earliest date for such an attack would be May, 1943, with a later date more probable.

(b) Via Turkey. It is estimated that maximum use of Turkish transportation facilities would permit the Germans to support not more than 10 divisions on the northern frontier of Syria. The time required to concentrate such a force in that area would depend on the resistance encountered and upon the effect of demolitions and withdrawal of rolling stock. With Turkey acquiescing, the first German division would probably reach the Syrian frontier two weeks after entering Turkish Thrace, the tenth division six weeks after that. The time interval would be increased in proportion to Turkish resistance. In that case, fifteen weeks might be required to put five divisions on the Syrian frontier, with a further eighteen weeks required to raise the number to ten.

(c) Via the Mediterranean. As long as any considerable United Nations air force is available for operations from Cyprus, a seaborne invasion of Syria must be preceded by the occupation or neutralization of that island. In such circumstances, a successful attack on Cyprus might require the use of Anatolian airfields. If Anatolian airfields were available, through Turkish acquiescence or defeat, a land advance to the Syrian frontier would be possible and the risks of a seaborne invasion would be unnecessary.
It is estimated that five months would be required to reduce Cyprus, invade Syria by sea and air, and prepare six divisions to advance on Iraq from secure Syrian bases.

(d) Via Egypt. In spite of logistical difficulties, it is believed that it is feasible for the Axis to maintain in Egypt forces adequate for a coordinated attack on a scale of at least five full divisions in the first line. An invasion of Syria and Iraq from this direction presupposes the destruction of most of the United Nations forces in Egypt at the time of the attack.

Assuming such a defeat, it is unlikely that effective resistance could be organized in Palestine and Transjordan in time to prevent Axis entry into those areas. There would then be no terrain obstacle to further advance, since the Lebanon Mountains would be outflanked and the desert between Syria and Iraq would be no barrier to motor vehicles. A preliminary advance northward would progressively open Mediterranean ports and permit direct supply by sea. Thus, assuming defeat of the British in Egypt, that route would be tactically and logistically the most favorable for an invasion of Syria and Iraq.

(e) Conclusions. Egypt and Transcaucasia are the keys to the situation. If both are held, the Turks would probably refuse passage through their territory, without use of which a seaborne invasion probably could not succeed. If Axis forces were defeated in Egypt, this tendency would be strengthened. The force required to overcome Turkish resistance could be employed more profitably in Egypt or Transcaucasia.

If Egypt were held, but Transcaucasia were lost, Turkish resolution would be badly shaken. It might be partially restored by evidence that effective resistance would be offered in northern Iran. If it appeared that German
troops would reach the line Ruwandiz-Hamadan-Sultanabad in effective strength, there would be grave danger that Turkey would acquiesce to the passage of German troops to the northern frontier of Syria also.

If Egypt were lost, the United Nations position in the entire Middle East would be precarious, regardless of what happened in Transcaucasia, northern Iran, or Turkey.

Because of the difficulty of deploying decisive forces by any one of the routes considered, the Germans would presumably prefer to attack, if at all, by more than one of them. The most favorable combination would seem to be a holding attack in Egypt coupled with a thrust through Transcaucasia and northern Iran, which, perhaps, would open a passage for other German troops through Turkey to the northern frontier of Syria. This operation, however, could not be effected before the spring of 1943. Consequently an Axis attack on the Middle East this winter, if made, would probably be through Egypt primarily, although diversions might be attempted elsewhere.

7. Local unrest in the area. (See Appendix B) The internal situation in the countries included in this area may be expected to handicap the operations of the United Nations and, in case an Axis attack is initially successful, may be exploited by the Axis to its considerable advantage.

(a) If the present position of the opposing forces is maintained, the prestige of the United Nations will continue to deteriorate. There will be constant minor friction between Moslems and British, but probably no outright revolt.
(b) If the Axis breaks through in Egypt or elsewhere the attitude of the local population will make the advance increasingly easy. The small Egyptian army would continue to do internal police duty without reference to who is the occupying power. In Palestine the anti-Jewish elements would give the Axis moderate aid. The population in the Levant States would be divided: in Lebanon, opinion mainly favorable to the United Nations; in Syria, to the Axis. In Iraq and Iran the local armies would go over promptly to the Axis. Only Turkey, of the countries included in this area, might possibly offer opposition to Axis attack, provided that Russian resistance continues, and decisive Axis victories in Egypt and the Caucasus might well lead to a change in Turkish policy.

(c) Only a decisive victory by the United Nations on the Egyptian front can help materially the Allied cause in the Middle East. Such a victory, followed by the continued assertion of United Nations power in the area, together with assurances of some type of post-war consideration for nationalistic claims, might lead the Arab-Moslems to support the United Nations war effort.
APPENDIX A

ECONOMIC GAINS AND LOSSES RESULTING FROM AXIS CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE EAST

A. AXIS GAINS.

1. General.

The principal economic gains of an Axis victory in the Middle East would be, in order of importance, oil, cotton, and chromite.

In addition, Germany would gain useful amounts of vegetable oil, tobacco, phosphates, manganese, copper, wool, and citrus fruits.

Furthermore, Axis control of the Persian Gulf would facilitate Germany's trade with Japan and might permit Germany to obtain important amounts of such strategic materials as rubber, tungsten, tin, chromite, rope fibers, rice, silk, and rayon.

2. Oil.

Germany's gain in oil from a conquest of the Mediterranean area would be very small in the near future unless the Iraq pipe lines or the Mediterranean refineries or the Egyptian installations were incompletely destroyed. Destruction of the pipe lines would be a serious engineering task. The few pumping stations could easily be destroyed but they could be restored after a short time. Effective denial of Iraq oil to the Axis would require the most thorough-going destruction of pipes all along the line. Wells in Egypt might be redrilled within a comparatively short time, and Egyptian production could be brought close to its pre-destruction level of 1,200,000 tons per annum in less than a year, but it is likely that the Germans would use their drilling equipment and pipe line construction facilities in Russian fields rather than in those of Iraq.
The difficulties of transportation from the Iran fields to Axis Europe would be even more serious than from Iraq unless Germany should control the entire Red Sea, including Eritrea and Aden. So long as the United Nations control the mouth of the Red Sea then Iran oil is likely to be of little use to the European Axis.

3. Cotton.

Normal Egyptian cotton production is about 400,000 tons of high quality cotton per annum. This exceeds Germany's (Altreich) normal net cotton consumption of 335,000 tons. This fall's cotton production in Egypt is only about 125,000 tons, but since there are 200,000 tons now in storage in Egypt, Germany could expect to gain almost a full year's supply of cotton. Other areas in the Middle East could make available to Germany an additional 50,000 tons of cotton.


Turkey could, with existing facilities produce about 160,000 metric tons of chromite per annum of which about 90,000 tons would be of metallurgical grade. This would more than double Germany's annual supply of metallurgical chromite, and would permit her to increase consumption by about 20%. Current German chromite consumption draws heavily on stock piles. Turkish stock piles are large, probably 135,000 tons all grades.

5. Other Materials.

The other mineral and agricultural resources of the Middle East would be a welcome addition to the German economy but are of great quantitative importance. The cotton seed oil of Egypt (normally 50,000 tons exportable surplus) and the olive oil of the eastern shore of the Mediterranean (30,000 tons) would furnish less than 5% of German requirements. Turkish copper and Egyptian phosphates also represent small contributions where Germany's needs are great.
6. **Japanese products.**

Transportation from the head of the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and Black Seas is limited, but if Axis Europe could obtain Japanese goods to the limit of these transportation facilities, the German economy would be immensely benefited. The rubber, tungsten, and tin which Japan could spare would very much relieve German deficiencies in these materials.

**B. UNITED NATIONS' LOSS.**

7. **General.**

The oil production of the Middle East would be the principal economic loss to the United Nations from an Axis conquest. The loss of Turkish chromite would be an inconvenience but it would not seriously hamper the Allied war effort. Of course, the oil of the Middle East could be replaced from the abundant supply of the Western Hemisphere but only at the expense of a serious strain on the already tight tanker position.

8. **Oil.**

The 1942 rate of production and the refining capacity in the Middle East are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Mediterranean Area</th>
<th>Crude Production (in thousands of metric tons)</th>
<th>Straight refining capacity</th>
<th>Cracking capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,500(^1/)</td>
<td>2,000(^2/) 1,000(^2/)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persian Gulf Area</th>
<th>Crude Production (in thousands of metric tons)</th>
<th>Straight refining capacity</th>
<th>Cracking capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrein Islands and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>8,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1/\) Prewar production close to 4,000,000 tons.

\(^2/\) Haifa.
The petroleum production of Egypt and Iraq is at present balanced by the military, naval, and industrial requirements of the Eastern Mediterranean area. Only small quantities are supplied to the Red Sea territories south of Suez. Lubricants have to be imported into the Mediterranean area from outside sources. Consequently, the loss of oil supplies of the Eastern Mediterranean would not seriously affect United Nations position elsewhere, since the area is not at present a source of supply to other territories.

The oil of the Persian Gulf is the principal source of supply for United Nations territories, eastward to India and westward to South Africa. In addition, the entire naval and commercial bunker requirements of the United Nations in this area are supplied from Persian Gulf sources. Only a small quantity, about 350,000 tons, is sent to Australia and the distance to Australia from the western hemisphere oil ports is no greater than that from the Persian Gulf. Even South Africa is only 500 miles farther from Curacao than from Abadan.

The loss of the Persian Gulf would, therefore, increase the strain on tanker facilities because of the necessity of supplying India and East Africa from more distant sources. From Curacao to Aden or Colombo via South Africa is about 10,000 miles as compared with 1,941 miles from Abadan to Aden, or 2,507 miles from Abadan to Colombo. Furthermore, with Axis control of the Persian Gulf area tanker routes to India and East Africa would be subject to serious enemy attacks.

For every million tons of oil per annum required at Aden or India about 26 more 10,000-ton tankers would be required if oil is supplied from the Western Hemisphere rather than from the Middle East.
APPENDIX B

LOCAL SENTIMENTS

1. General.

The Middle East contains a large number of strongly differentiated ethnic groups, most of which have a strong dislike for one another, with the result that the ethnic grouping is likely to have an important and immediate bearing upon political and military developments in this area.

These ethnic groups are differentiated to a limited extent by racial differences, to a much greater extent by linguistic and religious differences.

Although the Middle East is predominantly a Muslim region, Pan-Islamism is not a significant movement or bond. Neither is Pan-Arabism notably active in the Arabic-speaking countries (which do not include Turkey and Iran). However, the Arabic lands have one factor in common: objection to domination by the French or the English, and this is a factor of advantage to the Axis. The Iranians share the sentiments of their neighbors to the west and southwest in this respect. Another factor is that the powers in control must bear the onus of economic dislocations due to the war. This is most marked in the matter of food supplies, the hoarding of which has gotten out of hand. These countries are not pro-Axis, but they are anti-French and anti-British.

2. Egypt. The pro-Italian King, who to his people is a powerful symbol of resistance to the British, is believed committed to remain in Egypt even if the Axis gains control. Nahas Pasha has stated his determination to remain loyal to and in the company of the British, but there are enough of anti-British men with experience in Cabinet and Parliament to insure the continuance of Faruk's regime under German protection, presumably without the appointment of a Gauleiter. The transition would be marked by a minimum of confusion.
3. **Palestine.** Panic would prevail among the Jews, who are completely surrounded by peoples whom they have antagonized or whose reactions have come to be dominated by anti-Jewish sentiments. The economic life, which they dominated, would be entirely disrupted. Probably they have been kept so defenseless that some pogroms, instigated by Axis agents, might ensue, although such behavior is not characteristically Arab. The small number of Arab intellectuals who have been tolerant of or collaborationist with the British would be impotent in any desire to maintain order and the rule of reason. The masses are so responsive to emotional appeals that their rebellion against the status quo would be accomplished in short order after the Axis troops reached Suez. The country would be practically wide-open to Axis advance.

4. **Transjordan** need not be reckoned with as a political factor different from Palestine except that its population is entirely Arab.

5. **Lebanon.** This state is predominantly Maronite - that is, Roman Catholic - and hence traditionally oriented toward Latin Europe. However, Arab nationalist movements have had considerable currency, and a strong sympathy with independence-seeking neighbors is noted. There also have been many fascist secret societies, the strength of which it is impossible to estimate. The situation is complicated further by the strife between Fighting French and British administrations, the former being supported by many Francophile citizens and particularly by civil servants. The British are regarded more generally as French allies than as emancipators from the former French mandate regime. Pro-American sentiments may be of more effect here than anywhere else.

The approach of Axis invaders would find many with a will but little power to resist. Some of the fascist secret
Societies may have received tutelage and equipment from Axis agents which they would use in support of the invasion of their supposed liberators. The Lebanon, of all Arab lands, would be the least hospitable to the conquerors.

6. **Syria.** This state differs from Lebanon in being almost entirely Muslim Arab. While similarly somewhat progressive, particularly in the urban centers, the adoption of Western material culture has not been accompanied by a corresponding affiliation with European establishments. Syria remains Arab, but strongly nationalistic. Apparently the Germans can find plenty of collaborators, men with nation-wide influence and the delusion that their national programs will be granted by the Germans, if and when they gain control.

7. **Iraq.** Dissidence in this country has been spurred by the way in which the Ali Rashid al-Gaylani revolt was crushed, and the "protective occupation" of the country by the British. There is a considerable background of anti-Jewish feeling and strong sympathy with the reactionary Arabs of Palestine. One must count on the existence of underground movements ready to burst into action whenever Axis forces drive close enough to give promise of early visible support. The Iraqis have made progress during their brief independence, but it is more important that they have gotten the feel of freedom and are exceedingly restive under current restraints. Minorities, such as the Kurds in the north, also have been a fertile field for Axis advance agents. Their strong tribal organization and isolation make them especially difficult to suppress.

8. **Iran.** This is a country where anti-Russian sentiments reinforce a historic distaste for British interference. Despite the malignance alleged of the deposed Shah, his people regard him as a maker of Iran-for-the-Irans, and admire his military
proves. They believe German promises to restore their national integrity and admire the Germans for their military successes. Here, too, the Kurdish, and also the Qashqai, tribesmen are in smoldering revolt against the Russians and British in occupation.

Both British and Russians have been too busy to maintain civil and economic order. There is almost certain to be revolt when the Germans come within a fortnight's fighting distance of the borders, and trouble might break out at almost any time sooner. The only hope seems to be in the administration of the country by American experts whose intentions are not suspect and whose labors succeed in abating somewhat current disorder and economic confusion.

9. Arabia. King Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia is the strongest figure in the entire Peninsula. He is pro-British and pro-United States both through conviction and the enjoyment of subsidies from the former and royalties from business concerns of the latter.

The Imam Yahya of Yemen is the only political force in his country. He is pro-Italian because the Italians first cultivated his good will with gifts.

Throughout Arabia the chief, if not the only, loyalties are to tribes. The allegiance or friendship of rulers is the significant factor to us. Herein the United Nations are not in an unfavorable position but they must win the campaigns to hold their advantage.

10. Turkey. All classes are generally inclined toward the United Nations in sentiment, but Turkish policy is based primarily on a desire to avoid direct involvement in the war. If assured of prompt and effective assistance, Turkey would probably resist an Axis invasion. If, however, Egypt or Transcaucasia were lost, the Turks would have reason to doubt the ability of the United Nations to render such assistance and might well choose the part of discretion in their relations with the Axis.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

AXIS ACTION THROUGH SPAIN

Note by the Secretary

Attached hereto are two London J.I.C. estimates, the first in general reference, the second in particular reference to the Balearic Islands.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
LONDON, 11TH DECEMBER, 1942

AXIS ACTION THROUGH SPAIN

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

1. In this report we review the likelihood of Axis action through Spain under the circumstances existing at present and up to April 1943, and report as follows.

2. We see no reason to alter the opinion expressed in Copy No. 462(42)W 1/6 on the likelihood of a German move through Spain, which was: "It is most improbable that Germany would attempt such a move against Spanish resistance during the Winter, even if she had the forces. She is unlikely to have the forces available to do so next Spring, unless unexpectedly Russia collapses."

3. All the evidence which we possess indicates an increasing determination on the part of the Spanish Government to resist any attempt at invasion of their country.

4. There is no evidence whatever of any build up of German land or air forces which would suggest an intention to move into Spain.

* Distributed as J.I.C. 69
LONDON, 12TH DECEMBER, 1942

BALEARIC ISLANDS - OCCUPATION BY THE ENEMY

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

1. We have been instructed to report on the possibility of an Axis occupation of the Balearic Islands, and report as follows:

IN CONJUNCTION WITH A MOVE THROUGH SPAIN

2. In the event of the Germans deciding to invade Spain, they would probably at the same time attempt to occupy the Balearic Islands. We see no reason to alter our opinion on the possibility of a German move into Spain expressed in Copy No. 462(42)W 1/6* and Copy No. 484(42)W 1/6** as follows:

"It is most improbable that Germany would attempt such a move against Spanish resistance during the winter, even if she had the forces. She is unlikely to have the forces available to do so next Spring unless unexpectedly Russia collapses."

3. It is increasingly improbable that Spain would acquiesce in a German move through Spain.

WITHOUT A MOVE THROUGH SPAIN

4. If the Axis had been driven out of North Africa, Spain's will to resist Axis attempts would have increased. When "TORCH" was launched the Germans approached the Spanish Government with a request for certain air facilities in the Balearic Islands;

* Distributed as J.I.O. 69.
** The preceding enclosure.
but that this request was refused. With the Allies established in the whole of North Africa the Spanish Government would be even more likely to refuse the request if repeated. Accordingly, occupation of the Balearic Islands would, in our opinion, have to be made in face of local Spanish resistance assisted by Spanish naval and air units from bases elsewhere.

5. In the circumstances, although German-Spanish diplomatic relations might be broken off, the Spaniards would not necessarily declare war in the first instance. We are unable to predict whether they would do so at a later stage. The extent of Allied assistance or pressure would, no doubt, be an important factor.

6. The following is a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of an occupation of the Balearic Islands as they might appear to the Germans:-

Advantages
(a) The Islands would provide an additional base for attacks on Allied supplies in the Western Mediterranean, and an additional outpost for the defence of Southern Europe. The possession of these Islands, however, would be of relatively small strategic value.

(b) By occupying the Balearic Islands the Germans would forestall any Allied attempt to establish themselves there. They would not, however, assess the likelihood of such a move very high, since the strategic gain to the Allies would be small in proportion to the risk of forcing Spain into the war on the side of the Axis.

Disadvantages
(c) The seizure of the Balearic Islands would be a difficult operation, requiring a large amount of shipping and landing craft, and would have to be heavily escorted.
The operations would be against strong coast defences, beyond the range of German fighter cover and subjected to interference from Allied air bases in Algeria and by Allied naval forces.

(d) The seizure and subsequent defence of the Balearics would require up to 2 divisions and air forces, which could ill be spared.

(e) Once established in the Balearics the supply and maintenance of forces there would constitute an additional overseas commitment.

(f) The Germans would be faced with political, economic and military consequences which could not be assessed beforehand.

7. So long as fighting continues in North Africa it is most unlikely that the Germans could make available the forces, particularly air forces, required for the occupation of the Balearic Islands. If the Germans were driven out of North Africa they could make the forces available but only by drawing on their garrisons elsewhere. They would wish to avoid extending their military commitments and jeopardizing their relations with Spain at a time when they would be faced with an Allied threat to Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Crete and the Balkans.

8. If the Germans attempted to seize the Balearics, they would, it is estimated, employ up to 2 divisions and some 120 long-range bombers, of which half might be operated from Southern France and half from Sicily and Sardinia, and some 200-250 transport aircraft. They would require up to 250,000 tons of shipping and a large number of assault craft. This shipping would have to be escorted by units of the Italian Navy.
CONCLUSION

9. Spain would not agree to a German occupation of the Balearics. The advantages which the Germans would gain by an occupation of the Balearic Islands would be outweighed by the disadvantages. So long as fighting continues in North Africa, the Germans would not attempt the occupation of the Balearic Islands. It is unlikely that they would attempt it even if they were driven out of North Africa.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY
FROM THE BRITISH ISLES

Note by the Secretary

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee has requested the Joint Intelligence Committee to furnish information pertinent to an evaluation of a certain study relating to the subject, copies of which were provided.

The attached paper is a preliminary report prepared in response to that request. As indicated within, further development of the premises is prerequisite a further development of the requested J.I.C. study.

The paper incorporates amendments made at the Committee's 44th Meeting, December 10, 1942, at which time it was adopted.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Secretary.
ENVELOPE

CONCLUSIONS

1. The conclusions and argument which follow are predicated upon the fundamental assumption that the forces required under the terms of the paper under reference can be made available and can be maintained despite the requirements of other theaters. That assumption is open to question, but is beyond the competence of this Committee.

2. Assuming the scale of attack indicated, it is believed that the subject paper is over-optimistic in its estimates of volume and accuracy of bombardment, U.S.A.A.F. bomber attrition, and German fighter losses in combat.

3. Subjecting the targets selected in the plan to the proposed scale of bombing would "soften up" Germany and seriously reduce her military and naval effectiveness, but it is doubted whether this objective could be attained within the time contemplated, because:

   (a) Aircraft. The destruction of all the aircraft assembly plants in Germany would be difficult; plants where prefabricated materials are assembled are peculiarly recuperative. Nor would the destruction of all alumina plants immediately affect output of planes, since Germany has on hand 2/3 of her annual aluminum requirements, of which only 25% is intended for aircraft.

   (b) Submarines. The destruction of all submarine building yards would not materially affect the number of submarines in operation until four to six months after the date on which effective bombing began. The number of submarines now running trials or shaking down is sufficient to replace losses over a period of twelve months, at the present rate of attrition.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
4. Further study may reveal better targets than those selected in the plan. Examples are:

(a) **Submarine operating bases.** Effective sea-mining and bombing of the operating bases would have a more immediate effect on submarine warfare than would the bombing of submarine building yards.

(b) **Submarine component plants.** Effective bombing of plants manufacturing storage batteries, engines and other submarine parts would, in a few months, begin to interfere with the maintenance of operating submarines as well as the construction of new ones, and might be combined with the bombing of other important industrial targets.

(c) **Aircraft component plants.** Plants producing the component parts of planes cannot be so quickly restored or replaced as can assembly plants.

(d) **Synthetic oil plants and refineries.** Targets of this nature should be given a high priority. They are well concentrated. Since Germany's petroleum supply barely meets her military and naval requirements, the destruction or damaging of these facilities should reduce her war potential almost immediately.

(e) **Transportation facilities.** Repeated attacks on such targets is an effective means of tying up German industrial operations.
ARGUMENT

I. GENERAL REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS

A. Outline of proposed plan
   1. The detailed plan set forth in the subject paper for air operations in 1943 by U.S.A.A.F. bombers based on England is designed as an integral part of a general strategic plan for defeat of the Axis powers. Its main features are as follows:

   (a) The plan for air operations is specifically designed as preparation for land attack on Europe by invasion across the Channel late in 1943.

   (b) To permit such preparatory air operations on the scale called for, heavy concentration of U.S.A.A.F. bomber strength in England is scheduled under the plan. The allocated flow of heavy bombers to the United Kingdom theater in the 13 months beginning December 1, 1942 is stated as 4,122 planes, or 57 percent of the total allocated flow to all theaters of operation; the allocated flow of medium bombers is 1,688 planes, or 43 percent of the total to all theaters. This concentration of U.S.A.A.F. bomber strength at bases in England, in combination with R.A.F. bomber operations on area targets and a more limited scale of air attack on Southern Europe from North African bases, furnishes a marked concentration of offensive air power against the European Continent.

   (c) The guiding principles in selection of objectives for attack by U.S.A.A.F. bombers based on England are (1) concentration of attack on a small number of key targets directly affecting German capacity to resist invasion, and (2) feasibility of daylight, precision bombing.
(d) In fulfillment of these principles, the detailed plan of operations set forth in the subject paper calls for destruction of German fighter plane strength, and of the means for making good German bomber and submarine losses. Fighter strength is to be attacked in three ways: (1) by shooting down fighters in the course of bombing missions, (2) by destroying assembly plants, and (3) by wiping out the production of the most important raw material for aircraft manufacture, namely alumina. Bomber strength is to be attacked by the second and third of these means and submarine strength by the second.

2. The basic principle underlying the proposed plan is that of heavy concentration of offensive air operations against a small number of key targets selected in definite relationship to a general strategic plan. Information bearing on certain specific operating assumptions contained in the detailed plan of air attack is presented below, and information bearing upon the target systems selected is given in Part II.

B. Volume and accuracy of bombardment

3. The estimate of the number of bomber sorties required to achieve destruction of the target systems selected for attack appears to be built up from estimates of the number of hits required to destroy each target and from certain assumptions regarding accuracy in navigation as well as in bombing.

(a) Volume. In estimating the number of sorties required, an upward adjustment of 15 percent is made to allow for planes not reaching their targets. This assumes that 87 percent of bombers dispatched reach their targets. In U.S. A.A.F. 8th Bomber Command raids through November 18, only 65 percent of planes dispatched are reported to have reached
their targets, even after leaving out of account planes turning back through failure to make rendezvous with fighter escort and planes bombing secondary targets. In view of the greater difficulty of reaching targets in Germany, insufficient allowance appears to have been made in the subject paper for failure to reach targets.

(b) Accuracy. The proposed plan assumes that in bombing Germany circular error will average 1,000 feet (radius) from 20,000 feet altitude and that no sources of systematic error will operate to prevent maximum concentration around the aiming point. It is stated that the 1,000-foot circular error is based on actual experience in combat operations. Effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire is stated to be negligible above 20,000 feet. In evaluating these estimates, the following comments are pertinent:

(1) The density of pattern obtained in a circle of 1,000 foot radius from altitudes of 25,000 to 27,000 feet is substantially less than that obtained from altitudes of 20,000 feet (the altitude upon which the estimates in the subject paper are based). U.S. A.A.F. bombing operations over Northern France in August through November have been at 23,000 to 24,000 feet.

(2) Present German anti-aircraft guns are reported to have effective ceilings of at least 32,000 feet. Highest priority has been given in Germany to production of anti-aircraft guns, and guns of 105 mm. and 150 mm. are reported in production. Concentrations of anti-aircraft fire around major German targets are heavier than around most targets in Northern France. For these reasons, bombing altitudes of 25,000 to 27,000 feet do not seem unreasonable; bombing accuracy would be seriously reduced in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire during runs over the target. The more valuable and concentrated the target, the more concentrated the anti-aircraft fire may be expected to be.
(3) Aerial reconnaissance photographs show that, as a result of common error in ballistics data, systematic error is generally present.

4. For these reasons, the estimates regarding volume and accuracy of bombardment are over-optimistic.

5. Scale of attack *

5. On the basis of the allocated flow of aircraft to the United Kingdom as shown in Tab "J" of the subject paper, and of certain assumptions regarding reserves, losses, and frequency of sorties, the number of sorties available for attacks on selected target systems is presented in Tab "C". The chief assumptions or estimates are (1) that 25 percent of bomber strength will be held in reserve, (2) that 25 percent of planes dispatched will be sent on diversionary missions, (3) that planes will average 5 sorties a month, and (4) that losses will average 4 percent of sorties. The last assumption is not stated but is implicit in the comparison of allocated flow and available strength shown in Tab "J". Incidentally, an attempt to reconcile the estimates of available sorties shown in Tab "C" with estimates of strength shown in Tab "J" discloses that sorties available during a given month have been erroneously computed from strength available in the subsequent month. This results in some overstatement of sorties, even under the above assumptions.

6. The most uncertain of these assumptions concerns losses. The overall loss rate of 4 percent compares with a combat loss ratio in 922 Flying Fortress and Liberator sorties to November 18 of 1.5 percent. This percentage refers, however, only to losses during actual combat, while the allowance of 4 percent must cover all losses plus the inventory of damaged planes temporarily immobilized in repair shops. Moreover, when

* References to tabs refer to those in the basic paper.
allowance is made for the heavier anti-aircraft fire to be expected over German targets, for the probable increase in German fighter opposition through transfer from other theaters and for the greater distances involved in attacks over Germany, the 4 percent loss ratio appears low.

D. German fighter losses.

7. Much emphasis is placed in the subject paper on the reduction of German fighter strength in the course of the bombing missions. The plan assumes that the ratio of German fighters shot down to U.S.A.A.F. bomber sorties will remain throughout 1943 at about the level which has prevailed in recent operations. This relationship is assumed to persist despite (1) initially increased fighter strength by transfer of German fighter strength to the Western Front, (2) longer time over enemy territory required in bomber missions over Germany. If U.S.A.A.F. bombers must initially meet a greatly increased German fighter opposition, and if ammunition expenditure must be increased because of the longer duration of flight over enemy territory, it is questionable whether past ratio will apply to future operations.

8. Tab "C" part 2 contains a number of detailed inconsistencies, as follows:

(a) It is stated that the figures of this chart are based on 50 percent of available sorties. Comparison with the figures shown in Tab "C" part 1 indicates that the estimates of German fighters destroyed are based on 100 percent of available sorties.

(b) The estimates of fighter strength shown on the chart are not in conformity with the estimates of production and losses. It is assumed in the subject paper that production of German fighters during January 1943 will remain constant at 720 planes, 200 more than the present...
overall monthly loss rate, and it is estimated that 75 percent of total fighter strength will, by January, have been transferred to the Western Theater. The chart then indicates that the destruction, on the Western Front, of 150 German fighters by the U.S.A.A.F. during January will result in increasing German overall losses to a point where production and losses are in balance. This would seem to imply that losses in theaters other than the Western Theater would be substantially higher than at present. In actuality the transfer of planes to the Western Front would reduce fighter strength in other theaters and would thereby reduce the numbers of losses in those theaters. It would appear, therefore, that production during January, unless accompanied by a higher destruction rate than indicated, would exceed losses rather than being in balance with them.

(c) The curve showing German fighters destroyed during 1943 fails to take into consideration the assumed refusal of German fighters to engage our bombers after June 1943. It is questioned, however, whether a point will be reached in the summer of 1943 at which German fighter opposition will cease.

II SELECTED TARGET SYSTEMS.

9. The plan put forward in the subject paper calls for air attack upon aircraft assembly plants, submarine yards and alumina plants. Its effectiveness depends upon (a) whether the industrial systems selected are those most vital to the German military capabilities, (b) whether the most critical type of installation and the principal units of each type have been selected, and (c) whether Germany could substantially mitigate the damage by relocation of facilities or other measures.
10. Aircraft. In view of the importance of aircraft, there can be no doubt but that the aircraft industry justifies the high priority given in the plan. It appears that most of the important fighter and bomber assembly plants have been selected as targets, but it is questionable whether assembly plants provide the best type of aircraft installation for attack. While their destruction would undoubtedly impair aircraft output, it may be questioned whether it would do so to the extent indicated in the plan, for the following reasons:

(a) In general, recuperation from even very serious damage to assembly plants is rapid relative to the recuperation from damage to prime manufacturing establishments and component plants.

(b) The time spent on the assembly line by the aircraft types which are in large-scale production is believed to be fairly short. Consequently, even if substantial damage were effected to planes in process of assembly, this loss could scarcely be equivalent to more than one month's output.

11. Submarine building yards. The importance of curtailing German submarine operations is evident, but the most effective bombing of building yards could not have that effect within the period contemplated in the plan. A period of two to six months intervenes between the completion of a submarine at the yard and the date on which it joins the operating forces. That time is spent in running trials and shaking down. At present 114 newly constructed or extensively overhauled submarines are so engaged. At the present rate of attrition (8 to 10 per month), they are sufficient to replace submarine losses over a twelve-month period. Moreover, of the 254 submarines now under construction, 62 have already been launched and are fitting out at the yards. Should a particular yard be
put out of operation without actual destruction of the submarines
launched and fitting out, it would be relatively simple to tow
them elsewhere for completion.

More specific data on submarine building yards,
the numbers of submarines in various stages of construction,
usual construction periods, etc., are given in Appendix "A."

12. Aluminum. The fourteen alumina plants selected as
targets produce 94% of the alumina output of German Europe.
Alumina plants appear to be better targets than aluminum plants.
Although fifteen aluminum reduction plants account for 80% of
the European aluminum production, the remaining 20% is scattered
over 26 plants in eight countries. Alumina plants are larger
in area than aluminum reduction plants, and their equipment
contains elements which are more susceptible to bomb damage
and more difficult to replace. At least six months would be
required to restore production in a 100,000-ton alumina plant
which was completely destroyed, even if equipment were trans-
ferred from other industries.

Consequently, eventual destruction of aluminum out-
put can probably best be achieved by attack upon alumina plants.
However, in spite of the fact that aluminum is the most impor-
tant non-ferrous metal from the standpoint of Germany's war-time
requirements, it is doubtful whether it is of sufficient impor-
tance to rank third in the priority of industrial targets. Al-
though total German military requirements absorb from 60%-70%
of current production, only 25% of Germany's aluminum goes into
aircraft. Further, stocks of material on hand at any one time
in Germany's alumina and aluminum plants are adequate to supply
2/3 of her annual requirements. Even if a substantial amount of
Germany's aluminum capacity were destroyed, it is unlikely that
her output would be reduced to the point where she would not
have aluminum available for her aircraft industry. While complete
destruction of the alumina plants selected as targets would eventually have an important effect on German military capabilities, it is doubtful that this result would be achieved during the period contemplated by the plan.

13. **Other Industrial Systems Recommended for Consideration.**

The following aspects of Germany's activity are vital to her military effort:

(a) Operation of an effective number of aircraft
(b) Operation of the maximum possible number of submarines
(c) Maintenance of adequate rail transport
(d) Production of petroleum products, particularly aviation gasoline and high-grade lubricating oils
(e) Production of explosives.

Substantial impairment of any of these activities would promptly reduce German military effectiveness. Two of the three systems proposed in the subject paper as targets -- namely, aircraft factories and submarine yards -- fall within this group. Denial to the enemy of explosives or petroleum products would not only make planes and submarines, but also guns, tanks, and trucks useless. This suggests that the possibilities of attacking manufacture of these necessities deserves most searching scrutiny. Nevertheless, the aircraft and submarine industries should receive highest priority until the superiority of other targets has been clearly demonstrated.

14. Dispersion, protection, and concealment of plants making explosives or components thereof, and as to most installations, easy replaceability, seems to rule out successful attack on explosives manufacture.

15. At the present time, based upon the 1942 scale of activity, the petroleum requirements for the Western Axis and the production are roughly in balance at an estimated 15,000,000 tons for the year 1942. The estimated stocks on hand of all
petroleum products as of November 1, 1942, is approximately 2,400,000 tons, of which amount 1,500,000 tons represents oil being processed and oil in transit.

Approximately 37% of the oil supply available to the Western Axis is produced in the Floesti area in Roumania. Almost all of the aviation gasoline and over 25% of all liquid fuel products come from 15 multi-unit Bergius hydrogenation plants. Five of these plants are believed to account for all the premium-grade gasoline used in fighter planes. These plants are difficult to destroy. British experience in attacking synthetic plants and refineries has been poor, but the greater precision and concentration contemplated in the subject paper might nevertheless produce success.

16. The present strained condition of German transportation facilities suggests that systematic attack upon them would have far reaching effect. Attack on rolling stock, especially on locomotives in roundhouses, might be particularly remunerative. If such points prove to be well defended, the possibilities and results of bombing tracks in the open country at many different points removed from repair facilities and anti-aircraft defenses may merit study. Experience in France and Belgium in 1940 showed that this is the most effective way of interrupting traffic. While individual breaks can be repaired in a few hours, a series of breaks over a stretch of miles in the open country would tie up the line attacked for a considerable period, particularly if similar attack on other lines had already burdened general repair facilities.

17. It is suggested that before decisions are taken regarding the classes of targets proposed in the subject paper, the following systems be carefully investigated:

(a) Aircraft component plants
(b) Submarine component plant and operating bases
(c) Synthetic oil plants and refineries
(d) Transportation facilities.

(See Appendix "B" of this paper)
III TIMING OF EFFECT

10. If it is assumed that manufacture of bomber and fighter aircraft, submarine construction and alumina output are completely halted during the course of 1943, as a result of air bombardment of the target systems recommended in the subject paper, only in the case of aircraft would the effects on German military capabilities become evident before the end of that year.

(a) Bomber and fighter aircraft. Cessation, or even substantial restriction, of the flow of replacement aircraft from factories to operational units would result immediately in a sharp reduction in the effectiveness of the German Air Force. In view of the smallness of German reserves of combat aircraft and the high attrition rates which characterize air operations, any substantial curtailment of the present flow of aircraft from factories to combat units would promptly result in (1) rapid attrition of strength, and (2) reduced air activity in an effort to hold down losses. This attrition would be intensified by such destruction of German fighters as was effected in the course of U.S.A.A.F. bombing missions.

(b) Submarines. As indicated in paragraph 11, the complete destruction of all submarine building yards could not affect the expansion of German submarine operating forces for a period of from four to six months from the date on which effective bombing began, and could not affect a decline below present operating strength for a period of twelve months, at the present rate of attrition.

(c) Alumina. Existing stocks of alumina and aluminium are equivalent to a full year's total military requirements. Consequently, destruction of alumina plants, although important over a longer term, would have little or no immediate effect on German military capabilities.
19. Since the objective of the proposed air attack is to produce immediately significant impairment of German military capabilities, investigation of other industrial fields should be undertaken.

In particular, serious damage to a small number of key oil installations would almost immediately reduce Germany's possible scale of military effort. Estimated stocks of oil in Axis Europe are equivalent to only 1-1/2 months production. Even though non-military consumption of petroleum could be compressed somewhat further, this margin would not be enough to absorb any substantial loss of current production.
APPENDIX "A"

SUBMARINES

1. Construction, Trials, Training, and Shaking Down Period. The numbers of months believed usually to be required for the construction of different types of German submarines and for the subsequent trials, training, and shaking down carried out before beginning war operations are shown or indicated below. Also shown below is the approximate percentage division by types (considering both the number of vessels of each type and their aggregate tonnage) of the estimated submarine completions during the year ending August 31, 1942.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>500 ton Type</th>
<th>750 ton Type A</th>
<th>1,000 ton Type</th>
<th>1,600 ton Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blohm &amp; Voss</td>
<td>Other Yards</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>division by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>types of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>estimated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>completions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months on</td>
<td>7 - 8</td>
<td>8 - 9</td>
<td>7 1/2 - 8 1/2</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building ways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months fitting</td>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>2 3/4 - 3 1/2</td>
<td>3 - 3 1/2</td>
<td>4 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out at building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total construc-</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
<td>10 1/2 - 12</td>
<td>10 3/4 - 12</td>
<td>12 - 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for trials,</td>
<td>All types, 2 to 6 months, average probably 3 to 4 months.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shaking down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

a Includes 4 to 5% of "broad-beamed" type - probably minelayers.

b Usual minima, which are in frequent instances materially exceeded.
2. Numbers of submarines. The estimated numbers of German and Italian submarines built or building less losses to date, the estimated rate at which new submarines will join the operating forces during the year ending August 31, 1942, and the rate of attrition suffered by German and Italian submarines during recent months are shown in the tabulation which follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated number of submarines:</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In service with operating forces</td>
<td>235 a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used as training vessels</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>70 to 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running trials, training, or shaking down preparatory to joining the operating forces</td>
<td>114 b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under construction -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting out (at building yards)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the ways</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>94 to 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Completed, or to be completed, during the year ending August 31 -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joining the operating forces monthly during the year ending August 31, 1943 (average)</td>
<td>20 to 25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost monthly during the past six months (Average)</td>
<td>8 to 10</td>
<td>nearly 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

a Excludes submarines used as training vessels or undergoing major overhaul or repair at yards in Germany, but includes others under overhaul or repair; includes three in Black Sea but no others in waters between which and the Atlantic reasonably free passage is at present denied to submarines.

b May include submarines undergoing overhaul at naval establishments in Germany or undergoing post-repair trials in the Baltic.
3. Building Yards. The locations of the principal German submarine building yards and the approximate percentage of total submarine output at each location, based on estimated completions during the year ending August 31, 1943 (with due regard both to numbers of units involved and to their aggregate tonnages) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number of SS Building Yards</th>
<th>Percent of Total SS Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegesack</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danzig</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flensburg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubeck</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremerhaven</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelmshaven</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stettin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the places listed above except Danzig and Stettin (which together account for about 14% of the total output) are within 500 statute miles of air bases in England; the distance to Danzig is about 750 statute miles. At Gdynia and Elbing near Danzig and at Konigsberg to the eastward are important yards used for the repair of various types of naval vessels, including in some instances submarines, but apparently not for the construction of submarines. It is believed that not more than a few submarines, and probably none, are being built outside Germany for use by the German Navy.
Alternative Targets Related to Submarine Campaign.

Alternative bombing targets closely related to the submarine campaign which appear to deserve especial consideration are the submarine operating bases (as regards both direct bombing attack and seamsining of the approaches) and the plants manufacturing certain parts, machinery, or equipment for submarines, notably storage batteries and engines.

Attacks on the operating bases, if successful, would have a much more immediate effect on the operating forces than attacks on building yards. They would have the further advantage of interfering with the availability of seasoned submarines already in operation, which from a combatant standpoint should be more valuable to the enemy than the unseasoned submarines fresh from the building yards which would be choked off by successful bombing of the yards. Such attacks, especially seamsining, might have some adverse effect on the morale of the submarine operating personnel. That would be a particularly desirable feature of any form of attack intended to reduce the effectiveness of the submarine campaign.

The engines, storage batteries, and most of the other machinery and instruments are installed in a submarine after launching or near the end of the period spent on the building ways. While no information is immediately available as to the stocks of different items of those natures which are on hand, it is possible that attacks on the plants manufacturing certain parts or equipment for submarines would be just as quick and effective in reducing the output of operable submarines as direct attacks on the building yards and would be easier to carry out. Such bombing might fit in particularly well with other bombing in industrial areas. If the result was a sufficiently acute shortage of parts or equipment of a kind needing frequent replacement the effect would not be limited to submarines under construction but would extend first to submarines in the trial, training, and shaking down period and then to submarines in the operating forces.
December 12, 1942

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OIL TARGETS IN AXIS OCCUPIED EUROPE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure was prepared by the Committee on its own initiative.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
C. M. BERKELEY,
Combined Secretariat.
The total petroleum consumption of Axis occupied Europe for the year 1942, including essential civilian, industrial, and military consumption, is estimated to be roughly equivalent to the total production from all sources, the amount involved being approximately 15,000,000 metric tons. Stocks of petroleum products have been reduced to such an extent that any withdrawals to supply major military operations during the next four or five months would practically exhaust estimated stocks on hand.

In view of this critical situation, it would appear desirable to give further serious consideration to petroleum installations within Axis occupied Europe as objectives for bombing attack. The German oil position has been examined from this point of view, and the following conclusions have been reached:

1. The seven Roumanian Refinery Targets and the twelve Bergius Targets are vital to the present Axis oil economy. The destruction of either group would seriously jeopardize the Axis war effort, but the destruction of both groups, more or less simultaneously, would result in chaotic conditions which might be decisive.

2. The Ploesti group of Refineries comprise far the most important single target area.

3. In our opinion the order of priority for attack of targets in each group is as follows:

**RUMANIAN REFINERIES**

(a) (Astra Romana) Ploesti
   (Phoenix Unirea Orion) "
   (Lumina (Petrolmina)) "
   (Noris) "

(b) Steauna Romana Campina

(c) Concordia Ploesti

(d) Romano Americana Ploesti
(e) (Standard Petrol Block
(Unirea Sperantza
(f) Creditual Minier
(g) Colombia (Aquila)

BERGIUS HYDROGENATION
1
(a) I. G. Farbenindustrie 2
(b) Hydrierverke Poelitz A.G. 2
(c) Gelsenberg Benzin A.G.
(d) Brabag IV (Braunkohle
Benzin A.G.)
(e) Hibernia A.G.
(f) Brabag I (Braunkohle
Benzin A.G.)
(g) Union Rhein Braunkohlen 3
(h) Brabag II (Braunkohle
Benzin A.G.)
(i) 
(j) Brabag V (Braunkohle
Benzin A.G.)
(k) wintershàll A.G.
(l) Ruhroel A.G. (Matthias
Stinnes)

NOTES:
1 - Of the plants listed above, those located at
Poelitz (b), Ruhr (l), Gelsenkirchen Ruhr (c),
Scholven Buer (e), and Blechhammer (i) are par-
ticularly important since it is believed that
these plants are the primary source of green
aviation gasoline (fighting grade). It should
be noted, however, that the plant at Blechhammer
is not as yet in operation.
2 - Of outstanding and probably equal importance.
3 - Probably of equal importance.
4. The Roumanian Refinery tankage and the Bergius Tankage
is included under 3, but tankage depots by themselves are not re-
garded as economic primary Targets, except possibly the main
storage points in Roumania.
5. The next most important group of targets for volume of output are the Fischer Tropsch plants, which, being smaller than the Bergius plants, provide less satisfactory targets. Their importance lies in the fact that they produce a high proportion of high-grade diesel oil which is believed to be one of the products in somewhat short supply.

6. Another important group of targets are the solvent extraction plants, since they are necessary to the manufacture of high grade lubricants; such plants, as for example, the one located at Kalan (near Prague). Current information would indicate that the Axis is particularly short of this category of lubricants.

7. Apart from these major targets, it is suggested that special attention might be given to the Voltol Plant at Ghent, which is of great importance in the manufacture of high-grade lubricants; and, if reconnaissance shows that it is now working, to the Tetr Ethyl lead plant at Paimbeuf, France.
SECRET

December 11, 1942

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN BURMA, MARCH 1943
(Reference: J.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 6)

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM.

1. J.C.S. 162 was referred to the Joint Staff Planners, as a matter of great urgency, for study of its implications and for appropriate recommendations.

2. The Joint Staff Planners considered the problem from the viewpoint of:

   (a) The implications of the operation itself with respect to other operations, current and projected, and the results to be expected, and

   (b) The implications involved in supplying General Stilwell's requirements, including the shipping requirements.

II. DISCUSSION.

1. Assumptions.

   (a) That no major land operation is to be undertaken in the African - European theater before the summer of 1943, with the exception of the present operations against Tunisia and Tripoli.

   (b) That operations in the South and Southwest Pacific are being vigorously conducted with a view to the capture of Rabaul, and the elimination of the Japanese from the New Guinea - Bismarck - Solomons area.

2. Results to be expected.

   (a) Favorable.

       If successful, this operation will result in:
(1) Facilitating the opening of routes into Burma for use in a projected major effort during the dry season of 1943 - 1944.

(2) Facilitating the opening of a land route from Assam into China, which in turn will
   a. Permit the ultimate expansion and increase the effectiveness and radius of action of the China Air Task Force to a point where it can operate with tremendous effect on Japanese supply lines and installations to include Japan proper.
   b. Permit the increased flow of Lend-Lease supplies into China considerably in advance of the time required to reopen the line of the whole Burma Road.

(3) Assisting to relieve pressure on our forces in the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

(b) Unfavorable.
   If this operation should for any reason, especially because of lack of adequate support, not be launched or fail of successful completion, the effect on Chinese morale and resistance will be extremely adverse.

3. Requirements.
   a) According to information from the Asiatic Theater of the Operations Division, the troops and supplies requested by General Stilwell, as referred to in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff, are being made available. The requirements problem, therefore, is one of providing the necessary shipping. In view of the critical requirements for cargo vessels in support of operations in the South and Southwest Pacific and in North Africa, it appears that the necessary cargo vessels must come from Lend-Lease or similar commitments.
(b) An informal memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated December 10, 1942, states that Mr. Lewis Douglas of the War Shipping Administration has told General Marshall that five ships would be made available between January 1 and 15, 1943, which could be utilized to carry 1200 men each plus approximately 5,000 measurement tons of cargo each. Of the five ships mentioned by Mr. Douglas, three have already been committed by action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Army and Navy use as refrigerator ships on missions assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, these five ships are not now fitted out as troop transports and the time necessary for their completion and conversion makes uncertain their availability in time to meet the requirement of arrival of troops at destination by March 1. It should be noted that these ships do not have the necessary speed to proceed alone, and therefore would require escort. The two ships which are not fitted for refrigerator service should be considered for assignment to this operation as cargo carriers provided they have not already been committed to Army or Navy missions.

4. The troopship situation is also extremely tight in view of present commitments to North Africa and the Pacific. The required troop shipment cannot be made to India without delaying the dispatch of troops needed in other theaters. The only practicable solution appears to be in the use of the U.S.S. Monticello, a Navy transport, which is now tentatively allocated for "TORCH" in U.G.F. 4. This ship has a troop capacity of 5,000 which will practically satisfy the present requirement. It is also a fast ship and can travel without escort with the possible exception of the run from New York to the Panama Canal. Use of the Monticello would delay shipment of troops to North Africa. The number of these troops would be approximately 4,000 instead
of 6,000 since a smaller troopship with a capacity of about 2,000 could be substituted for the Monticello in U.G.F. 4. In view of the fact that because of the current shortage of unloading facilities in North African ports, troops already in that area are now short of equipment and motor transport, and that their combat effectiveness cannot be fully realized until at least a part of these shortages are made up, it is believed that General Eisenhower might prefer to have a fast freighter substituted for the Monticello. The Committee is of the opinion that under the circumstances the delay in the shipment of some 4,000 troops to the European Theater of Operations would be of less serious consequence than the diversion of any other troop shipping. A further favorable point in the use of the Monticello is that after the proposed trip to North Africa in U.G.F. 4, this vessel is scheduled to proceed to the Pacific for Army - Navy use in the Pacific area. The Committee, therefore, considers that her diversion to carrying troops to India would facilitate her movement to the Pacific. It is also the only available ship which can deliver the troops to destination by the required date.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

The Committee, therefore, concludes:

(a) That the contemplated operation is most desirable, from the standpoint of expected results as follows:

(1) In conjunction with current and projected operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas, it will be in effect a pincers movement against the Japanese.

(2) It will open a land route to China, by which the ultimate effectiveness of the China Air Task Force can be greatly increased, and

(3) It will open routes which will greatly facilitate the projected campaign to recover all of Burma in the fall of 1943.
(b) That every effort should be made to provide adequate support for this operation.

(c) That General Stilwell's requirements should be met by providing the necessary cargo vessels from Lend-Lease or similar commitments and by the employment of the U.S.S. Monticello as a troopship.

(d) That unless the Monticello be made available so that troops can arrive in Bombay by March 1, and cargo ships so that cargo can arrive in Calcutta by March 15 to April 1, 1943, there is a strong possibility that personnel and equipment will arrive too late to be of use before the rainy season begins about May 15.

(e) That in view of the circumstances, the Monticello cannot make another "TORCH" run and be available in January, 1943, for another operation.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Joint Staff Planners, therefore, recommend:

(a) That movement to staging areas of troops and equipment required by General Stilwell be accelerated.

(b) That the U.S.S. Monticello, now tentatively allocated for "TORCH" in U.G.F. 4, be utilized for movement of the troops to India from the West Coast in mid-January, 1943.

(c) That cargo shipping be obtained from the War Shipping Administration as additional allocations to the Army on either the East or the West Coast; that these cargo ships be made available for loading as follows:

4 in mid-January, 1943, and
2 in early February, 1943

and that the W.S.A. indicate immediately on which coast the ships will be made available.
J.C.S. 162/2

December 11, 1942

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN BURMA, MARCH, 1943
(Reference: J.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 6)

Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

In accordance with the above reference the Joint Strategic Survey Committee has considered the proposed operation from the point of view of over-all strategy; finds that it is strictly in accord with the basic strategic concept of the Committee; and is of the opinion that its initiation should be undertaken at the earliest practicable date.

The means needed to permit this operation to be undertaken are so limited in amount that there would appear to be sound grounds for the belief that the results attained should be far more than commensurate with the effort expended.

/s/ S. D. Embick, /s/ Russell W. Willson, /s/ Muir S. Fairchild,
BRIEF

C.C.S. 104/3 - PLAN FOR RETAKING OF BURMA

BACKGROUND

After considering the report (C.C.S. 104/2) by the Combined Staff Planners on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's plan for the recapture of Burma (C.C.S. 104/1) and Gen. Marshall's memorandum (C.C.S. 104), the Combined Chiefs of Staff concluded that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare an estimate of the Air, Ground, and Naval forces necessary to recapture Burma and reopen the Burma Road at the earliest possible date and prior to the next monsoon season, the estimates to include the effects of such an operation on other operations, current or projected. Such an estimate has been made by the Combined Staff Planners and is presented herewith as C.C.S. 104/3. Attention is invited to the fact that, at the same C.C.S. meeting mentioned above, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff should inform the Generalissimo (through Gen. Stilwell) that a study was in progress. This was done in a message dated September 19, 1942. It was also agreed that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff should prepare a message for the President to send to the Generalissimo (through Gen. Stilwell) acknowledging receipt of his Plan and informing him that a study was in progress. This message was signed and sent by the President on October 10, 1942.

C.C.S. 104/3

The Combined Staff Planners submit a plan consisting of three Phases. Phase I (a map is attached to the paper): an amphibious attack on the Akyab area and establishment of air forces there; advance into Upper Burma from Assam, with an offensive from Yunnan on Lashio; an air offensive against Rangoon and Mandalay areas; an assault on Rangoon and Mandalay areas and Jap communications; Naval attack on Jap sea communications with Rangoon; and capture or neutralization of Andaman Islands if necessary. Phase II: assault on Rangoon from Gulf of Martaban and capture of Rangoon-Pagu-Sittang area; or further establishment of air forces down the Burma coast, followed by an assault on Rangoon; or beach landings from Moulmein to Amherst, advancing overland on Rangoon and blocking routes from Thailand. (Choice of Phase II would be made by Theater Commander.) Phase III: advance on Mandalay from north and south; mopping up and consolidation.

The forces required for the above plan are itemized on page 4 of C.C.S. 104/3.
The favorable and unfavorable effects on other operations, current and projected, are briefly summarized on pages 5 and 6 of C.C.S. 104/3.

The Combined Staff Planners state that the execution of the above proposed operation is impracticable before the fall of 1943.

Attention is invited to the following statement in C.C.S. 104/2: "The British will have appropriate forces and sufficient resources to launch a limited land offensive by December, 1942, as a first phase in their operations to recapture Burma and to bolstering Chinese morale."

TWH: GPW
11/2/42
C.C.S. 104/3

October 30, 1942

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PLAN FOR RETAKING OF BURMA

(Previous References: (a) C.C.S. 101
(b) C.C.S. 104
(c) C.C.S. 104/1
(d) C.C.S. 104/2
(e) C.C.S. 38th Mtg., Item 4
(f) C.C.S. 40th Mtg., Item 2)

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

1. Pursuant to reference (f) the Combined Staff Planners were directed to prepare an estimate of the forces necessary for the recapture of Burma and the re-opening of the Burma Road at the earliest possible date and prior to the next monsoon season. A précis of our study, which is attached hereto as the enclosure, makes it clear that it is not possible to collect the necessary forces, especially landing craft and troops trained in amphibious operations, in time for the operation to be mounted prior to the next monsoon season. This means that the execution of this operation is impracticable before the fall of 1943.

2. A copy of the basic detailed study which is too voluminous for circulation may be obtained upon request to the Secretariat.

Distribution:
Gen. Marshall Copy No. 1
Adm. King Copy No. 2
Gen. Arnold Copy No. 3
Gen. Wedemeyer Copy No. 4
Exec. OPD War Dept. Copy No. 5-6
Adm. Cooke Copy No. 7
Gen. Deane Copy No. 8
Cdr. McDowell Copy No. 9
Adm. Leahy Copy No. 10
British Mission Copy No. 11-16
ENVELOPE

PLAN FOR RETAKING OF BURMA

1. Assumptions.

The Combined Staff Planners have established the following assumptions as a basis for the study:

(a) The Japanese (1) have stabilized their front on the general line of the India-Burma frontier, and have penetrated into China along the Burma Road as far as the Mekong River; (2) are operating in the Yangtze Valley, in the Canton area, and northwest of Haiphong with the object of forcing the Chinese to make peace; (3) are operating in the Southwest Pacific area with the object of neutralizing the United Nations threat from that direction; (4) have no major commitments elsewhere such as a war with Russia, except that they will not materially reduce their Manchurian forces vis-a-vis the Russians in Siberia.

(b) There are no indications of either a German or a Russian collapse.

(c) The Germans have not penetrated south of the Caucasus.

(d) Operations in the Middle East and Africa are progressing favorably to the United Nations.

(e) The United Nations are conducting operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of the Japanese forces now deployed in that area.

2. Essential Points of the Problem.

(a) The limited overland supply routes available for the conduct of this operation dictate that it should be an amphibious operation. In order that it may be completed before the onset of the next monsoon it should be initiated not later than February 1, 1943.
(b) The essential points of the problem of recapturing Burma and reopening the Burma Road may be defined as follows:

(1) Naval control of the Bay of Bengal and the interruption of Japanese sea communications with Rangoon.

(2) The capture of Akyab for use as an air base for subsequent operations in Burma.

(3) The capture of Rangoon, and the securing of an eastern flank in the Moulmein area, so as to cut Japanese overland communications from Thailand, and a subsequent advance northwards.

(4) An offensive from Assam into Upper Burma on as large a scale as can be sustained.

(5) A drive from Yunnan to the southwest by the Chinese on a scale as large as can be sustained.

3. Enemy Forces.

(a) Ground.

During the initial stages of the operation Japan will probably have six divisions in Burma, which could later be reinforced to a total of eleven or more divisions, the size of the force being limited by the availability of her shipping and the security of her supply routes.

(b) Air.

It is probable that not more than 500 land based aircraft plus about 198 ship based aircraft would be available to Japan to oppose the initial phase of the attack.

(c) Naval.

It is estimated that Japan could deploy in the Bay of Bengal a maximum naval force as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BB</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DD</th>
<th>SS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Plan.

After careful consideration of the various courses of action open to the Allied forces, the committee bases its estimate of the forces required on the following outline plan:

(a) **Phase I:**

An amphibious attack on the Akyab area, and establishment of air forces there.

An advance into Upper Burma from Assam, combined with an offensive from Yunnan directed on Lashio.

A heavy and sustained air offensive directed primarily against the Rangoon and Mandalay areas and Japanese communications.

Attack by naval forces on Japanese sea communications with Rangoon. The capture or neutralization of the Andaman Islands if considered necessary.

(b) **Phase II:**

Direct assault on Rangoon from the Gulf of Martaban and capture of the Rangoon-Pegu-Sittang area; or, the further establishment of air forces step by step down the coast of Burma to Bassein, followed by an assault on Rangoon and capture of the Rangoon-Pegu-Sittang area; or, landings on the beaches from Moulmein to Amherst, advance overland on Rangoon, at the same time blocking routes from Thailand.

The choice of plan in Phase II to be left to the Commander in Chief of the theater.

(c) **Phase III:**

Advance on Mandalay from north and south; mopping up and consolidation.
5. **Forces Required.**

(a) Ground.

In addition to any Chinese troops that may be used in holding attacks against Laokay and against Canton, the total force should consist of:

- **From India:**
  - 10 Inf. Divs.
  - 1 Armd. Div.
  - 1 Parachute Bde.

- **From Yunnan:**
  - 6 Chinese Divs.

(b) Air.

The total number of aircraft estimated to be required for the whole operation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>3sqns</th>
<th>Planes</th>
<th>1st month's attrition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter S.E.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter T.E.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Bomber</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dive Bomber</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Photo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance T.E.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (minimum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Naval Aircraft**

Such aircraft as are based on carriers deployed in the area.

(c) Naval.

Appreciating Japanese capabilities, and in view of the above, the strength of the Eastern Fleet should not be less than the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BB/CRBB</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>DD</th>
<th>SS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional naval forces required for the support of the operation will depend upon the courses of action selected by the Commander in Chief. At a maximum the additional forces required would be as follows:

- Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers 9
- Destroyers 55
- Minesweepers 8

(d) **Transport.**

Assault shipping and landing craft will be required to lift 2 infantry divisions and 1 armored brigade.

6. **Effects on Other Operations Current and Projected.**

**Favorable**

(a) Increase Chinese effectiveness by:

(1) Increased supplies via air and by the Burma Road.

(2) Boost to morale.

(b) Increase striking power of U. S. China Air Task Force.

(1) Against Japanese in China.

(2) Against Japanese shipping.

(3) Against Japanese homeland.

(c) Relieve pressure in south and southwest Pacific area.

(d) Increase strain on Japanese logistic capabilities.

(e) Retard or prevent economic consolidation of occupied areas.

(f) Restore in a marked degree the prestige of the United Nations in the Far East and India.

(g) Relieve threat to Siberia.

(h) Further reduce Japan's reserve of air forces and increase the strain on her limited aircraft industry.

(i) Gain a base for further operations against Japan’s occupied territory.
Unfavorable.

(a) Reduce for a considerable period our ability to reinforce effectively forces in Egypt and the Middle East from India (if current operations are successful the need for such reinforcements may not exist).

(b) Reduce air forces now committed to other operations.

(c) Withdraw transports and landing craft from present essential commitments although there is a possibility that necessary water transport and landing craft might be made available.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

Memorandum by the Combined Intelligence Committee

The Combined Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, has prepared the enclosed study which combines views expressed in a London J.I.C. appreciation of the subject and subsequent comment thereon by the Joint U. S. Intelligence Committee.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the point of view of purely material factors, it would appear that, although cut off from the outside world, the Chinese could, if they have the will, continue resistance on a limited scale. But material factors are intimately connected with psychological possibilities. There exist shortages and needs which, if not relieved, will adversely affect morale and thus tend to contribute toward possible collapse of the national war effort.

There is, therefore, danger that a psychological change unfavorable to the United Nations, may take place which will be too strong for Chiang to control. The quality and duration of Chinese resistance will depend upon four factors: (1) internal economic situation; (2) general political situation; (3) United Nations' support of China; (4) military successes of the United Nations in other theaters. Failure by the United Nations to provide limited economic or military support to China and the absence of military successes in other theaters might cause morale to deteriorate to such a point that Chinese organized resistance would cease.
ARGUMENT

1. China's morale is low. The Chinese suffer naturally from the weariness of five years of war, but they also feel bitter disappointment that the Pacific War has brought them no relief. At the end of eight months of this war, they find themselves more at the mercy of the Japanese than ever. The severance of practically all forms of useful communication has accentuated their feeling of isolation. As a result they question the present capacity of the United Nations, and harbor considerable suspicions that the Allies do not intend, or may find themselves unable, to continue the war against Japan once Germany is beaten. They seriously question the wisdom of concentrating all efforts on the defeat of Germany before attempting to strike at Japan.

2. In this atmosphere, it may be difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain the morale necessary for a continuance of active national resistance. It is probably true that he and his entourage are personally determined to fight on, but there is evidence that even this "last ditch" party is approaching a dangerous point of disillusionment.

3. There is reason to believe that the Chinese will not be convinced of our good intentions unless they receive military supplies and technical assistance or guidance in greater amounts than in recent months. Economic and military assistance provided by the United Nations should impose some conditions towards ensuring its effective use. The most effective form of help, however, would be that of providing and supplying self-contained formations of American and/or British forces, such as the present U.S. Army air force in China. This force has been notably effective in its operations and its activities have raised Chinese morale significantly. The maintenance and possible augmentation of this force is of first importance in sending supplies and personnel into China.
4. Although non-military supplies are of greater psychological than immediate economic importance, there are certain needs which, if not met by imports, will tend to encourage a feeling of defeatism. China's approximate self-sufficiency up to date is not solidly assured. There is definite immediate need for finished small arms ammunition. China's own production of such ammunition, though primarily based on local resources, calls for some essential materials and some machinery for replacements. Motor fuel supplies are inadequate.

5. Most of the bare necessities of economic life are available in Free China. There is probably a sufficiency of food, but the problem of distribution, aggravated by the currency crisis and transportation problems, has become increasingly difficult. Technical guidance is urgently needed. Petroleum is desperately needed. Importation of medical supplies is of great importance for psychological as well as physical reasons. Generally speaking, and despite China's willingness to accept a low standard of living, the economic shortages, which have already adversely affected morale, will, if not relieved in some degree, contribute further toward deterioration of morale.

6. Pending further detailed investigation in China, the following order of priority for assistance other than military support is probably correct:

(a) Small arms ammunition and supplies for arsenals, petroleum, special materials and non-bulky machinery parts;
(b) Technical guidance;
(c) Medical supplies.

7. The principal danger in the China situation at the present time is lack of confidence due to mistrust of the Allies and mistrust of the home Government -- especially its finances.

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The Government, with the aid of Allied Loans, is struggling with the difficult task of checking inflation. The cost of living, which most adversely affects the Government officials and professional classes, has risen seriously.

8. Some of the high military officers appear to be engaged in collecting as much war materials as they can while expending as little as possible. The familiar figure of the independent war-lord is showing some signs of reemergence. This development, which is possibly a consequence, rather than a cause, of the present difficulties of the Central Government, is likely to be fostered by the Japanese. So long, however, as Chiang Kai-shek can maintain financial control and provide his armies with indispensable supplies this trend need not be expected to become serious.

9. The Kuomintang, though on the whole supporting Chiang Kai-shek, has never been unanimous on the subject of resistance to the Japanese. An offer from the latter of easy terms on the basis of elimination of the Communists would be extremely tempting to some members of the present Government. The likelihood of Chiang's group being forced to accept Japanese terms will decrease or increase in accordance with the military showing made by the United Nations and the betterment or deterioration of the condition of Chiang's armies.

10. The Communists are doubtless as determined as ever to continue resistance to Japan. Also, there are other substantial groups in the Chinese armed forces fully determined to carry on, but the effectiveness of the armed forces in general depends on Chiang Kai-shek. If Chiang were eliminated, the Communists would continue the fight. But other elements of the armed forces probably would at most carry on guerrilla warfare. Yunnan already shows a tendency toward independent action, which
might develop into a break with Chiang if the situation should further deteriorate.

11. It is believed that one aim of present Japanese operations is to gain control of the area east of Canton-Hankow railway by occupying strategic points in Chekiang and along the coast of Fukien, in order to deny air bases to the United Nations and to establish overland communications between North and South. Recent air operations seem to be directed especially towards the U. S. air force in China.

12. It is probable that in her current operation Japan has seized the opportunity afforded by the decline of China's resistance to attempt to control the above area with a relatively small force, which would not affect her ability to act elsewhere.

13. There are no indications that the Japanese intend at present to extend their operations into the Yunnan Province further east than the Salween River nor of impending Japanese land operations from Indo-China.
SEPTEMBER 3, 1942

JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 24

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION - OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

Previous References: (a) C.C.S. 83/1. (b) C.C.S. 30th Meeting, Item 3.

The Joint U.S. Staff Planners forward the enclosure, prepared pursuant to reference (b), for information of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

W. B. SMITH, L. R. McDOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.

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By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

1. The Joint U. S. Strategic Committee has prepared an estimate of the situation to determine whether or not offensive operations should be undertaken in the Iberian Peninsula in 1942 and early 1943. The purpose of this estimate was to determine whether a directive for such operations should be prepared.

II. SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

A. Discussion of Course of Action.

1. The following course of action will be considered:

   TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA.

2. Application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

   (a) Suitability.

      (1) General.

      Operations confined to the Iberian Peninsula alone would be unacceptable because the gains are not commensurate with the effort. Therefore, the operations should be for the purpose of opening a new front against the Axis and engaging in a decisive campaign. The operation would be executed by predominantly American ground and air forces, with U. S. and British naval forces according to the availability of each.

      (2) Essential characteristics of the operation.

      This course involves landing on a neutral shore; the necessity of obtaining permission for the landing and movement overland, or fighting for the same; crossing a difficult mountain barrier; and

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enemy opposition which would expand into large scale operations. Any scale of magnitude less than that required for a major effort is inadvisable and dangerous.

(3) **Contribution toward the defeat of Germany.**

Possession of air bases in the Iberian Peninsula would permit air operations against objectives in France, Southwest Germany, Italy, the islands of the Western Mediterranean, and North and West Africa. The control of the Western Mediterranean and of the Atlantic Ocean areas adjacent to Spain and Portugal would be facilitated by the air and naval bases in the peninsula. Ferrying of aircraft between England and the Middle East would also be more easily accomplished.

Seizing the Iberian Peninsula would isolate and to a large extent neutralize the strong military forces in Spanish Morocco. These forces as they now exist are a potential threat to future Allied operations in North Africa.

The ultimate objective of the United Nations, however, should be to force the Pyrenees and engage the Axis in France. An objective of opening a new front is not sufficient. The operation must relieve Axis pressure on the Russian front; must contribute to attainment of the United Nations strategic objective of preventing the Western Axis from overrunning the Middle East; or must assist in the defense of the British Isles. This course of action will not accomplish decisively any of these. Its contribution to the defeat of the Axis would be limited.
The time element.

Planning for this operation has established the autumn of 1942 as the earliest practicable date.

This course of action is of doubtful suitability.

(b) Feasibility.

(1) Comparative resources and prospects of success.

It is estimated that it will take about twenty divisions, with the necessary supporting air and naval forces, to seize the Iberian Peninsula. It is estimated that the Axis can reinforce the Spanish and Portuguese troops with about twenty divisions a month. There are estimated to be ninety-three Axis divisions now in Occupied France and Germany. The relative position of ground and air forces of the United Nations and the Axis is such that the Axis can build up a superior force in the theater faster than the United Nations. German submarine bases in the Bay of Biscay afford the Axis favorable positions from which sea lines of communication could be interrupted to a degree sufficient to endanger the success of the operation.

(2) Physical conditions prevailing in the area, and facility of execution.

Assuming that a successful lodgement has been secured, the forces would have to traverse the difficult terrain of the peninsula and cross the Pyrenees. Further operations must then be continued across Occupied and Unoccupied France before objectives vital to the Axis are threatened. This will require a force of many divisions.
The size of the force would be limited by the port facilities available. These are not adequate for a large force and large construction projects to enlarge these facilities would have to be undertaken.

The road and railroad net of the peninsula would not support large scale operations.

The Pyrenees provide suitable terrain on which the Axis could make a determined effort to confine the campaign to the peninsula and nullify it except for air operations.

This course of action does not appear feasible.

(c) Acceptability.

(1) Results of success and of failure.

If the Iberian Peninsula were seized by the United Nations, they would gain additional air and naval bases for operations against the Axis. On the other hand, the Axis would be able to block with comparative ease a ground advance through the Pyrenees into France. The Peninsula, moreover, is not as good a defensive area for the United Nations as North Africa.

If the operations were unsuccessful, the losses of the United Nations would probably be heavy and the morale of their armed forces and civilians decreased thereby. At the same time, it is quite certain that Spain and Portugal will resist the invasion and be drawn actively into the war on the side of the Axis.
It is estimated that it will take a minimum of twenty divisions, with supporting air and naval forces, to seize and hold the peninsula against Spanish and Portuguese resistance. To this must be added whatever additional strength is required to defeat Axis reinforcements which may be sent to this area. In addition, the invasion would have repercussions in South America which would be unfavorable to the United States. It is not believed that the objectives which would be gained by this operation are of sufficient value to warrant the employment of the forces required.

(2) **Comparison of gains and costs.**

The gains to be obtained from this operation would be small and the costs would probably be high. In short, the course adds up to a long operation in a theater which would not be decisive.

The course is not acceptable and is rejected.

B. **Decision.**

To recommend that no operations be undertaken on the Iberian Peninsula.

III. **CONCLUSION.**

In the above brief estimate, it has been determined that no operations in the Iberian Peninsula should be undertaken. It is concluded, therefore, that a directive for operations in this area need not be written.

If the conditions which justified the above conclusion are changed, the study should be reopened and reconsidered in the light of the changed situation.