THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-15-45
MEMO FOR MAJOR KIFFIN —

These are the two papers about which I phoned.

They were in Gen. Watson's safe and I was going to return them to the War Department but Col. Davenport said he thought they should go to the Map Room.

OK—
for files in National

Archives, Harry
ANPA CONFERENCE
Volume II
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TAB 4 - COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF PAPERS

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 33-71
By __ Date APR 24 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec 1.1 D. 1234
## Combined Chiefs of Staff

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October 24, 1942

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COMBINED U.S. - BRITISH OPERATIONS
(Previous reference: (a) C.C.S. 38th Meeting, Item 3) Report by Combined Staff Planners

1. The enclosure, prepared by the Combined Staff Planners in accordance with reference (a), is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Annex "A", attached thereto, presents graphically the principles of unified command as contained in the report.

2. The U.S. Navy members of the Combined Staff Planners state that while this paper does not in its entirety accord with their views, it is believed that it presents the best agreement which can be reached at this time. The U.S. Navy members believe that the status of the assistants to Supreme Commander, because of the possible interpretation of their functions, may result in actually interposing an additional element in the chain of command which would limit the authority of the Supreme Commander.
ENCLOSURE

SYSTEM OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

DEFINITIONS:

1. Unified command is the control, exercised by a designated commander, over a force integrated from combined and joint forces allocated to him for the accomplishment of a mission or task. This force will include all the means considered necessary for the mission's successful execution. Unified command vests in the designated commander, the responsibility and authority to control the operations of all arms and services composing his force, by the organization of task forces, assignment of missions, designation of objectives, and the exercise of such control as he deems necessary to insure the success of his mission. Unified command does not authorize the commander exercising it, to control the administration and discipline of any forces of the United Nations composing his command, beyond those necessary for effective control.

2. The term "joint" refers to participation of forces from two or more of the arms (U.S.) or services (British) of one nation.

3. The term "combined" refers to the participation of forces of two or more of the United Nations.

SUPREME COMMANDER:

4. In cases where the governments concerned so decide, a Supreme Commander will be appointed for operations when
forces of more than one of the United Nations are to be employed on a specific mission or task.

5. He will be appointed by agreement between the governments concerned at the earliest possible moment after the decision to undertake an operation has been made.

6. He will exercise unified command over all forces of the United Nations allocated to his operation.

7. He will be the recipient of all major directives pertaining to the arms and services of his force.

8. Out of the means allocated to him, he will organize task forces as necessary, designate their commanders, and assign the major tasks to be performed by each.

9. He will be assisted by a small composite staff which will include in principle a Chief of Staff, a Planning Division, an Operations Division, an Intelligence Division, a Logistical Division, and a Communications Center. Each nation involved and each of the several component arms or services of the force will be represented on the Staff in order to insure an understanding of the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of each component.

LAND, NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDERS:

10. The officer appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the Senior Officer of each combined arm or service not specifically allocated to task forces by the Supreme Commander, and will advise the Supreme Commander on the best use of his
11. These Commanders will carry out their duties at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander unless specifically ordered otherwise by him.

TASK FORCE COMMANDERS:

12. Task Force Commanders will organize their commands as may be necessary for the execution of the tasks assigned. Sub-Task Force Commanders will be designated as may be necessary for the execution of the subordinate tasks assigned. The principle of unified command will apply throughout.

13. The organization of task forces will be governed by the nature of the operations to be performed. The task forces will include all the elements land, air and naval -- necessary for the accomplishment of the task. The appointment of the task force commanders, subordinate as well as major, will be governed by the nature of the task assigned, and the major arm or service involved in its performance, i.e., whether preponderantly land, air or naval.

INTEGRITY OF NATIONAL UNITS:

14. Insofar as conditions will permit, task forces will be composed of units of the same nationality. When organizations of one nation serve under the command of an officer of another, the principle will be maintained that such organizations shall be kept intact and not scattered among other units.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATRE (PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943

Note by the Secretaries

At their 56th meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners "to report, on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theatre (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943 and what forces will be necessary to establish that situation."

Enclosure "A" is a partial report on the above directive prepared by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners which has been discussed at a meeting of the Combined Staff Planners.

Enclosure "B" is a continuation of the partial report given in Enclosure "A" prepared by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane
SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATRE (NAMELY PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The combined planners assume
   that the ultimate objective of the basic
global strategy is to bring the war to a successful
conclusion at the earliest practicable date,
   that in gaining this objective efforts
must be made toward the destruction of the economic
and military power of all our adversaries at a rate
exceeding their power of replacement,
   that Germany is recognized as the pri-
mary, or most powerful and pressing enemy,
   and that the major portion of the forces
of the United Nations are to be directed against
Germany insofar as it is consistent with the over-
all objective of bringing the war to an early con-
clusion at the earliest possible date.

2. Tentative assumptions are made
   that the present situation as between
Russia and Japan will continue,
   and that the Chinese will continue in the
war if sufficient support is furnished by Great
Britain and the United States in the way of supplies
and equipment.

SITUATION TO BE CREATED

3. We consider that the accomplishment of the overall
objective, as well as the maintenance of the security of our
position in the Pacific, require that the Japanese be kept
under continual pressure sufficient in power and extent to
absorb the disposable Japanese military effort.

4. The United Nations' positions in the Pacific are
extended over a line roughly 16,000 miles long, -- from the
Bering Sea, through the Hawaiian Islands, Samoas, Fiji, New
Guinea and North-West Australia, to Singapore. The Japanese,
strongly established, occupy interior lines which permit
offensive action by their mobile forces against any of the
Allied positions, -- unless these mobile forces are denied
freedom of action.

5. The United Nations' positions have depth at certain
points, as in Alaska, Hawaii, and New Caledonia, New Guinea.
The positions between Hawaii and New Caledonia have little depth and are susceptible to successful enemy attack, if these attacking forces are free to move. Some of the United Nations' positions, (i.e., on the larger islands), are capable of strong defensive establishments. Other positions such as the smaller islands, like Canton, cannot be strongly defended. Economy in defensive strength of the larger islands, and security of the smaller islands, require that we maintain the initiative by offensive action. This offensive action must be directed against Japanese objectives of sufficient importance to the Japanese as to cause Japanese counter-action; they must be sufficient in power to combat successfully this Japanese counter-action.

6. By this process we intend to prevent the Japanese the opportunity for consolidating (digging in), thus strengthening their positions, to an extent that would permit them to initiate offensive action at times and places of their choosing.

7. We consider that Japanese power in respect to shipping and aircraft has been getting progressively weaker; that our attacks against shipping, particularly by submarines, should be pushed to the maximum extent possible; and that our offensive action should be designed to effect a continuing decrease in Japanese naval and air power.

8. To maintain the security of our possessions in the Pacific and to contain in the Pacific area the Japanese Fleet, it is necessary to continue in that area the major portion of the United States Fleet. To give full implementation to this naval force, it is necessary that sufficient mobile ground forces, air forces, and shipping be available in that area to undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese possessions. The character of these offensive actions envisaged for 1943 are set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

9. In planning these offensive operations in the Pacific, we take note that the ability of the United Nations to project military actions against the enemy in all areas is limited by shipping. In the Atlantic there is a further serious limitation caused by the lack of adequate numbers of escorts. Until the escort problem is improved, the amount of shipping which can be moved in the Atlantic is definitely limited. This same consideration of limitation of escort capacity does not at present apply to the Pacific, because of comparative absence of submarine menace in that area at this time.

10. The adverse situation in regard to the number of escorts available in comparison to the number of submarine packs operating in the Atlantic, and to the convoy needs in the Atlantic, will not begin to show relative improvement before October.

OPERATIONS

11. The prospective operations to create and maintain
The situation in 1943 set forth above are:

(a) Seizure and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomon Islands, Eastern New Guinea up to Lee Salmé peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area.

(b) Seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians).

(c) Seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, up to and including Truk. It is planned that these operations will be undertaken subsequent to Rabaul.

(d) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign for the second part.
ENVELOPE B

(c) Burma campaign. Limited operations during present favorable weather conditions such as to permit improvement of communications from India to China, to be followed by more extended operations towards the end of the year with the objective of re-establishing the communications along the lower Burma Road. The objective of this campaign is to strengthen forces in China with the view to keeping China in the war, keeping pressure on the Japanese in this area, and to the establishment and operation of air strength on Japanese shipping in Chinese and Indo-China ports as well as on the flank of Japanese sea communications along the China coast.

12. The increase of forces in the Pacific-Burma area in 1943 for the operations listed above will depend largely on the strength of Japanese dispositions. They will be of this general order:

- Ground Forces, including air personnel - 250,000 troops
- U. S. and U. K. - 500 airplanes

Navy - The major portion of additions (by new construction) to the U. S. Fleet, while maintaining in the Atlantic present large ship strength and increasing destroyer and anti-submarine escort in the Atlantic.

Increase in strength of the British Eastern fleet sufficient to support operations against Burma.

Shipping 1,250,000 tons
Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff

We have been instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to comment on the paper by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners on the situation to be created in the Eastern Theatre (Pacific and Burma) in 1943 (C.C.S. 153).

2. Our comments are as follows:-

ASSUMPTIONS.

(a) Para. 1:

We feel that this should be rephrased as follows:-

"The Combined Planners assume that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date. The quickest way of achieving this will be to concentrate on defeating Germany first and then to concentrate our combined resources against Japan. Meanwhile such pressure must be maintained in Japan as will prevent her from damaging interests vital to the allies, and will hinder her from consolidating her conquests."

(b) Para. 2: We concur.

SITUATION TO BE CREATED.

(c) Paras. 3 - 20: We agree in principle with this expression of the strategy required, provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

OPERATIONS.

(d) Paras. 11 - 12:

We suggest the following alternative:-

The operations which are certainly required in 1943 to create and maintain the situation set forth above are:-

(a) Seizure of, and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomons, Eastern New
Guinea up to the Lae-Salamau peninsula, New Britain - New Ireland (Kabaul) area.

(b) Burma - Limited operations during the present favourable weather period:

(i) To recapture and establish air forces at Akyab (Cannibal)

(ii) To establish a bridgehead in the Chindwin Valley so that, when an attack on Rangoon is made, simultaneous pressure can be exerted on Mandalay (Mannishous).

(iii) To construct the Hukawng Valley road from Ledo to Wijitkyima and Lungling.

The additions to present forces in the Pacific theatre required for these operations must depend upon the strength of Japanese dispositions but will be of the following general order:

Ground forces............
Aircraft....................
Navy.........................
Amphibious forces...........
Shipping....................

No forces additional to those now present will be required in Burma.

12. With the successful completion of the operations outlined in the preceding paragraph, a new offensive will be necessary if we are to retain the initiative and thereby contain disposable Japanese strength.

Detailed plans for undertaking the following further operations, though not necessarily in the order given, should therefore be made; but, since the timing must depend upon the speed with which the earlier operations in the Kabaul - New Guinea area are concluded, a decision whether or not to launch these further operations should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff later in the year.

(a) The seizure and occupation of Kiska - Agarthu (Western Aleutians)

(b) The seizure and occupation of the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk.

(c) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign.
For these operations the additional forces required will be of the order of:

- Ground forces
- Aircraft
- Navy
- Amphibious forces
- Shipping

13. Detailed plans for operations to reopen the Burma Road (ANAKIM) during the winter of 1943-44 will also be made. It is not possible at this stage to say by when the forces required for this operation could be provided without detracting seriously from the defeat of Germany. Orders for the completion of full administrative preparations by 1st October, 1943, have, however, already been given and planning is proceeding in India.

The forces additional to those now in the theatre required for this operation must depend upon enemy strength and dispositions at the time but will be of the following order:

- Ground Forces..... nil
- Aircraft............. 18 squadrons
- Naval Forces........ Covering forces as may be found necessary in the light of the naval situation at the time. As much as practicable would be found from British resources.
- Amphibious Forces.... Assault shipping and landing craft sufficient to lift 4 inf. brigade Groups and one Armoured brigade.
- Shipping............. 60 mT ships
- 20 Personnel ships

14. It is certain that the provision of the naval and amphibious forces required for simultaneous Truk and Anakim operations cannot but react adversely on the early defeat of Germany. It may be possible to carry out one of these operations without such a violation of our agreed strategy. The decision as to the right course of action should be taken later in the light of the development of the war.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN BURMA, 1943.

Report by British Joint Planning Staff.

THE BURMA ROAD

1. The reconquest of Burma should be undertaken as soon as resources within the existing strategic priorities permit.

2. The outstanding topographical feature governing operations in Burma is that all main communications run north from Rangoon.

Prior to the Japanese occupation, supplies reached China by the so-called "Burma Road":

(a) Rangoon - Mandalay - Lashio (river, rail and road),

(b) Lashio - Lungling - Yunnanyi - Kunming - Chungking (road).

It is the only trans-Burma route by which China can receive substantial supplies. The capture of Rangoon and Mandalay must be effected before it can be reopened.

JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS

3. The Japanese rely on sea communications to Rangoon to maintain the 4 to 5 divisions they now have in Burma. They are, however, developing overland routes - rail and road - from Thailand and these are already sufficient to enable them to maintain 3 divisions operating in Burma.

Communications in Burma allow the Japanese to maintain larger forces in the Mandalay area than the British can maintain across the Assam frontier.

OPERATIONS JANUARY/APRIL 1943.

4. Field Marshal Wavell is now carrying out certain operations which are necessary preliminaries to the re-conquest of Burma. These are:

(a) Operation CANADIAN for the recapture of, and establishment of air forces at, AYAH. This operation has started.

(b) Operation RAJAHOO for the establishment by IV Corps (two divisions) of a bridgehead in the Chindwin
valley so that when an attack on Hangoon is made, simultaneous pressure can be exerted on Mandalay. (The routes from Assam south to the Chindwin River will not support more than two divisions). Certain Chinese forces were to have co-operated in this operation, but their co-operation now appears uncertain. The operation by XV Corps will start in February 1943.

Both these operations should be completed before the monsoon breaks in May 1943. It is hoped that R.A.V.O.U.S will draw off some Japanese pressure from the south-west Pacific.

OVERLAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHINA.

5. Neither of these preliminary operations will however re-establish land communication with China, whose retention in the war is agreed to be of great importance.

Apart from the Burma Road proper, the only methods by which supplies might reach China appear to be:-

(a) The Hukawng Valley route from Ledo via Shingbwiyang and myitkina to Langlei - thence north eastwards by the "Burma Road" proper.

This all-weather, one-way road has been started and the intention is to improve it to two-way as help from U.S. technicians and equipment become available.

Latest advice is that the all-weather route - one or two-way - will not reach Shingbwiyang until the winter of 1943/44; although it may be possible to push through a dry-weather track as far as myitkina after the monsoon of 1943.

During construction it will not be possible to maintain more than one brigade group (or two Chinese divisions) on this road in addition to labour. There will therefore be great difficulty in arranging its protection, especially in the myitkina area where Japanese forces can be maintained by rail and all-weather road.

(b) Air transport.

It is recommended that the air transport route should be maintained since it is the most immediate means of bringing aid to China.

RE-CONQUEST OF BURMA (Operation ANAKID).

6. The re-conquest of Burma will not be possible before the winter of 1943/44 at the earliest. It involves:-
(a) The re-capture of Rangoon.

(b) The capture of the Mandalay area with a view to blocking Japanese overland reinforcements from Thailand.

(c) Concurrently with (a) and (b) above, pressure by British forces from Chindwin River bridge-heads, and if possible by Chinese forces from Yunnan, against Mandalay.

(d) The defeat of the Japanese forces in Lower Burma, i.e., the Rangoon - Mandalay area.

Plans for this re-conquest are known as Operation ANAKIN.

7. The forces required for ANAKIN are approximately:

(a) Naval
   6 - 8 Escort Carriers,
   40 destroyers and escorts,
   8 submarines
   6 Fleet mine-sweepers
   in addition to such cover by heavy forces as is required by the situation at the time.

(b) Army
   8 Infantry Divisions
   1 Armoured Division

(c) Air
   28 Bomber Squadrons
   17 Fighter Squadrons
   4 Coastal Squadrons

(d) Assault shipping to lift (4 inf. bde. groups) and landing craft to load.

The assault shipping and landing craft for these assaults amount to:

- 3 -
(e) **Shipping** 60 MT ships
20 Personnel ships

**POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT "JADE" IN MARCH OF 1943/44.**

**Weather**

8. Operations cannot start before about 1 November 1943 and must be concluded by 30 April 1944 on account of the monsoon. To take Rangoon and Moulmein, clear the whole of southern Burma up to Mandalay, and re-open the Burma road from Mandalay to Lashio, it is estimated that the assault must take place at the latest in early December 1943.

To seize and consolidate the Rangoon-Moulmein area only, the initial assault might be postponed until the end of January 1944.

**availability of British Forces.**

9. (a) **Naval.**

The British might be able to find the capital ships and carriers required for this operation, provided no other amphibious operations were being carried out concurrently in the European or Mediterranean theatres.

They would however require, under all circumstances, considerable help from American light naval forces.

Subsequently, it will be necessary to keep open the sea communications to Rangoon.

(b) **Army.**

These will be available in India by October 1943 - including the brigades required to be trained for the initial assaults.

(c) **Air.**

The air forces required could be made available in the Indian theatre by November 1943.

(d) **Assault Shipping and Landing Craft.**

(i) If no major amphibious operations are carried out elsewhere in 1943, the assault shipping and landing craft could be found by the British by 1st October 1943.

(ii) If Operation BRIDGIT is carried out not later than the end of June 1943, and no other amphibious operation takes place, the assault shipping and landing craft could be found by the British by 1st
December 1943 in Indian waters. This would permit of an assault on Rangoon about 30th December 1943.

(iii) If HUSKY is carried out after June 1943 - or any other operation, such as the Dodecanese, in addition to BRIGHTON - it will not be possible to provide the assault shipping and landing craft for RHAKL from British sources until about February 1944.

(iv) If Operation RHAKL is carried out with British assault shipping and landing craft at any time during the winter 1943/44, it would seriously curtail the British share of any cross-channel operations in the early spring of 1944.

(e) Shipping.

The availability of shipping cannot be forecast now, but the U.S.A. will have to provide a part.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943

Note by the Secretaries

In accordance with the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 60th meeting, a draft memorandum setting out the tentative agreements already reached has been prepared and is circulated herewith for consideration at the next meeting.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane

X Enclosure
DRAFT MEMORANDUM

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. SECURITY

The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

2. OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE

Operations in the European Theatre will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

3. The four main lines of offensive action will be:

   In the Mediterranean
   (a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:
       (i) Making the Mediterranean line of communications more secure.
       (ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front.
       (iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.
   (b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.

   In the U.K.
   (c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against Germany.
   (d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the forces available.
   (e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 5 below) to re-enter the continent as soon as German resistance is
weakened to the required extent.

4. In order to ensure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.

5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST.

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:

   (1) The re-capture of Burma (AAMF) beginning in 1943.

   (11) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to AAMF.

6. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.

   The resistance of the Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia, without prohibitive cost in shipping.

ANFA CAMP

18th January 1943.
Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. SECURITY

   The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

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      (ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front,
      (iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.
   (b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.

   In the U.K.
   (c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.
(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below) in constant readiness to re-enter the continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

5. In order to ensure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theatres.

6. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST.

(a) Operations in these theatres shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:

(i) The re-capture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943.

(ii) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to ANAKIM.

ANFA CAMP
19th January 1943
January 18, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA
OF THE CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Staffs, at an informal meeting on 18th January
1943, prepared the attached note suggesting the procedure to be
followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed
Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.G.S. 140).

They suggest that it should be considered by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane

X Enclosure
1. The next stage of the discussions should be to examine each of the operations set out in the (C.C.S. 155), draft proposals for the conduct of the war in 1943, with a view to determining:-
   (a) the resources of all kinds required for each.
   (b) how they are to be made available.
   (c) target dates, where practicable.
2. U-Boat Warfare.
   The naval and air forces required to defeat the U-boat are already under examination by the Combined Staff Planners whose report should form the agenda for an early meeting.
3. MEDITERRANEAN
   (a) Organisation of Command, and establishment of spheres of responsibility in the Mediterranean.
   (b) HUSKY. (Reference Para. 3(a) C.C.S. 155). The resources required for HUSKY have been assessed by the British Joint Planning Staff. A summary of this and of the outline plan will be circulated for discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement should be reached as to the resources to be provided by U.S. and U.K. respectively and on the arrangements for planning and command.
   (c) Air offensive from North Africa against Italy, Balkan objectives and Axis shipping.
4. TURKEY. (Reference Para. 3(b) C.C.S. 155)
   A draft paper by the British Joint Planning Staff on Allied Plans relating to TURKEY which has not yet been considered by the British Chiefs of Staff will be circulated as a basis for discussion. British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a note on the Axis oil position for discussion in connection with this item.
5. The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom.
   (Reference Para. 3(c) C.C.S. 155). British Chiefs of Staff to indicate the present and projected build-up of the R.A.F. Bomber Command and the British conception of the general plan for its employment in 1943. Agreement should be reached on the programme for the build-up of U.S. Bomber forces in the United Kingdom and on the general lines of the employment of Allied Bomber forces from the U.K. against GERMANY.
6. Limited Offensive Operations from the U.K. (Reference Para. 3(d) C.C.S. 155)
British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper outlining their conception of the limited offensive operations possible in 1943 under the terms of C.C.S. 155 and the resources available.

7. **BOLERO Build-up.** (Reference Para.3(e) C.C.S. 155)

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper showing the forces which in their view could be made available for a return to the continent in 1943 under the terms of C.C.S. 155. Agreement should be reached on the general concept of the circumstances which would make such an operation feasible.

8. **ANAKEM.** (Reference Para.5(c)(1) C.C.S. 155)

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad concept for operation ANAKEM, with an indication of the forces considered necessary. Agreement should be reached as to the resources to be provided by U.S. and U.K. respectively.

9. **OPERATIONS in the S.W. PACIFIC.** (Ref. Para.5(c)(11) C.C.S.155)

U.S. Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad concept for operations in the South-West Pacific with indications of the forces involved.

10. **ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.** (Reference Para.6 C.C.S. 155)

Agreement should be reached on the probable effect of the operations agreed at the conference upon supplies to RUSSIA in 1943.

11. The following items which appear in the agreed Agenda of the conference have not been dealt with above:-

   (a) Strategic Responsibility and Command Set-up for Dakar - French West African Area require to be settled as early as possible. Admiral King to be invited to make proposals.

   (b) Increased efficiency in the case of Shipping.

   Lord Leathers and General Somervell to be invited to discuss and make appropriate recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

12. A tentative programme for future discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached as an ANNEX.

18th January, 1943
**ANNEX**

**TENTATIVE PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **TUESDAY 19th** | Discussion of future procedure  
                | System of command in French West Africa  
                | Turkey and Axis oil |
| **WEDNESDAY 20th** | Organisation of command and allocation  
                        | of spheres of responsibility in the  
                        | Mediterranean |
|              | **HUSKY**  
              | Bomber offensive from North Africa |
| **THURSDAY 21st** | U-Boat War |
| **FRIDAY 22nd** | Bomber offensive from U.K. |
|              | **BOLERO Build-up**  
              | 1943 Limited Operations from U.K. |
| **SATURDAY 23rd** | **ANAKIM** |
C.O.S. 137

January 18, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLIED PLANS RELATING TO TURKEY

Memorandum by British Joint Planning Staff

PART I

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The following extract from C.C.S. 135/2 has been taken as the basis for our further examination of the problem of inducing Turkey to join the Allies and of using that country for the development of offensive operations against the Axis.

"Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would be:-

(a) To use Turkey as a base for air attacks on important objectives, such as the Romanian oilfields and Black Sea communications.

(b) To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to the United Nations.

(c) To force an increased dispersal of German forces by using Turkey as a base for potential threats in the Balkans and South Russia.

(d) To deny Turkish chrome to Germany."

INDOUCEMENTS TO TURKEY

2. The two main factors upon which Turkey's entry into the war depend are:-

(a) Her fear of Germany now,

(b) Her fear of Russia after the war.

In order to make Turkey enter actively into the war at an early date, we must convince her that (a) is unfounded, and that the same time exploit her fear of (b).

FEAR OF RENDEZVOUS

3. Turkey's anxieties under (a) will only be assuaged when she is satisfied either that the Allies have so stretched the Axis as to restrict the latter's ability to hurt her, or that material provision of the Allies to defend her against
Axis air or land attack is forthcoming in time. The former may result from a development of our existing strategy in the Mediterranean and from continued Russian successes. The latter is examined in Part II.

PART OF RUSSIA

4. With regard to (b), Turkey must now appreciate that her hopes of a weak Russia are not likely to be realised. Consequently her best chance of post-war security lies in obtaining for herself a place and support at the peace Conference. She is particularly afraid that Russia may spread her influence through Rumania and Bulgaria and confront her with the fact of being the power in control at Turkey's western door into Europe as well as at her back door into Asia. She also fears that Russia, having secured complete control of the Black Sea, will demand unrestricted rights of passage through the Dardanelles. She would look to the Allies, and especially to the British Empire, to support her in resisting exaggerated Russian claims in regard to passage of the Straits.

5. Whether it would be wise for His Majesty's Government to oppose Russian desires regarding passage of the Straits seems a matter for urgent consideration, for if we thwarted Russia in that respect we should probably be confronted with a claim for rights of transit through Persia to a port on the Persian Gulf. This, from our point of view, would be most undesirable.

6. British and American diplomacy should be directed to exploit Turkish fears of Russia. It should be made clear that public opinion will have little sympathy, when peace comes, for a country which remained aloof when we needed her aid.

ECOLOGIC AND TERRITORIAL INTRUSIONS

7. Guarantees of continued financial and economic assistance, of which details are given in Appendix A, might be a useful weapon, particularly in view of the deterioration of the Turkish position.

8. There are certain territorial adjustments by which Turkey sets store. Firstly, she is determined to have complete control of the railway which at present runs out in Syrian territory at Altoppe. Secondly, she requires some material facilities in, and some guarantees for, the Turkish population of the Dodecanese Islands. Thirdly, she desires a rectification of her frontier with Bulgaria. We can see no strategical objection to their realisation after the war provided we can retain certain rights to use the Altoppe railway, but we must not lose sight of the fact that there is a strong French interest in this railway. We have also guaranteed the future integrity and
INDEPENDENCE OF SYRIAN TERRITORY.

Greek interest would be directly affected by the realisation of the second aim and it would be difficult for the Allies to encourage the appetite of an allied but still neutral country at the expense of a fighting ally.

We doubt whether these three aspects would materially affect Turkey's decision on the main issue.

SUMMARY OF DIPLOMATIC POLICY

We should exploit Turkish fears that she stands to lose if she remains out until the eleventh hour, making it clear through diplomatic channels that the extent of Allied support for Turkey at the Peace Conference will be conditioned by her entry into the war without delay.

PART II

INITIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

10. An undertaking to assist Turkey against Axis aggression has already been given. This includes a plan for establishing certain forces in Turkey (Sprawl Plan) and the provision of equipment and supplies to augment Turkish resources. A summary of these measures is given at Appendices B, C and D, from which it will be seen that a substantial quantity of material together with some aircraft have already reached Turkey.

11. The roles of the force earmarked under the Sprawl plan were:

(a) To gain and maintain air superiority.
(b) Assist Turkish land and air forces in the defence of Thrace and Western Anatolia.
(c) Provide support for Turkish forces against seaborne attack in the Izmir area.
(d) Assist in the defence of Ankara.
(e) Attack strategic objectives in South-East Europe.
(f) Protect base ports.

CHANGED CONDITIONS

12. Existing plans assume that Turkey had already been attacked. The conditions under review are somewhat different. In the first place the threat we are now considering is potential rather than actual, although there is still a possibility that if the Gurkans believed that Turkey was about to enter the war they would try to overrun Thrace and at the same time bomb vital areas. In the second place Turkey is not compelled to fight but must be induced to come in of her own free will. As already
stated, this is unlikely to do unless she is satisfied that
the general situation severely restricts German offensive po-
tentialities in the Balkans.

THE AIR THREAT

13. The ability of the Axis to deliver a heavy air offen-
sive against Turkish vital areas cannot be forecast. It is cer-
tain, however, that Turkey will require the provision of air and
ground defences. The extent to which she will regard those as
an inducement to fight will depend upon the rapidity with which
they can be rendered effective. Should Turkey be prepared to
take the plunge it would be to her advantage to augment her de-
defences with Allied help before she actually declares war. We
can, however, undertake - provided ground equipment is installed
and preparations made in Turkey beforehand - to have operational
about 6 Fighter squadrons with limited anti-aircraft defences
within three days of the Turkish invitation. To achieve this,
approximately 100 transport aircraft would have to be made avail-
able.

THE THREAT THROUGH THRACE

14. The Turks at present intend, if attacked in Thrace,
to hold a forward line near the frontier until a "scorched
earth" policy has been effected, and then to withdraw to the
Catalja and Balair lines. These are sound defensive positions,
and we may object in persuading the Turks to establish a main
position forward, as this would be weak in defence. If, on the
other hand, the attack does not develop, the forward area will
remain available for the subsequent concentration of our offen-
sive forces. The Turks will have, in any case, to rely initially
on their own resources, since communications prevent any sub-
stantial Allied military assistance reaching Thrace quickly.

ALLIED MILITARY POLICY

15. The force which we should establish in Turkey, in the
first place, should comprise the minimum defensive element to
satisfy the Turks, and the maximum offensive element, within
the limits of communications, to meet our own future requirements.

16. We consider that the following constitute a suitable
defensive offer to the Turks:-

AIR

26 squadrons. Of this force, 6 Fighter squadrons
would constitute the immediate air defence contingent referred
to in para. 13 above. The types of the remaining squadrons
proposed in the original plan may require adjustment in the light
of changed conditions, but since a total of 26 squadrons has
been offered to Turkey and the arrangements for the installation
of this force are in hand, we consider that the total figure of
26 squadrons should stand. Additional aircraft for use by the
Turks can be supplied from resources in the Middle East if
priority over other commitments is considered to justify such a course.

LAND

72 H.A.A. guns for defence of Istanbul, etc.
96 H.A.A. guns for airfield defence.
4 Battalions for defence of the L. of C.

It is possible that the Turks will regard the provision of armoured fighting vehicles as an added inducement. In view of the Turks inability to use or maintain armoured fighting vehicles we should prefer to supply complete armoured formations with our own personnel, and this we should be prepared to do.

NAVAL

A striking force of submarines, H.F.Bs. and possibly destroyers.

17. The next step is to build up forces to undertake offensive operations and to secure air bases in Turkey. This is considered in Part III.
PART III - DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE

16. Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for air rather than land operations. Owing to the initial defensive needs of the Turks it will be impossible to include in the first air contingent a striking force adequate for a widespread heavy and sustained offensive. Since, however, trans-Anatolian communications will be stretched to the limit of their capacity, the first step must be to open up the Aegean sufficiently to make use of Turkish ports. For our use Smyrna is of primary importance.

19. Any land offensive we may wish to mount from Turkey must be based on Thrace, but the Turks themselves will be making great demands on the limited Thracian ports and communications for their own maintenance.

PHASE I - OPENING THE AEGEAN

20. It is considered that the opening of the Aegean could be achieved by the capture of the Dodecanese. With air protection based on Turkey and the Dodecanese it should then be possible to pass sufficient shipping through to make full use of Turkish port capacities in spite of the Axis threat from Crete and Greece.

21. The capture of the Dodecanese is at present being studied by the Middle East. We estimate that a force of some three divisions will be required, supported by 15 squadrons of aircraft operating from S.W. Anatolia. These squadrons will have to be included in the initial force sent to Turkey. Airfields in the coastal area opposite Rhodes will have to be constructed in advance and stocked with supplies so that operations can begin as early as possible. The subsequent garrisons might be found by our Balkan allies.

PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

22. As soon as the Dodecanese have been captured it will be necessary to provide for the protection of our shipping through the Aegean. The estimated forces required for this purpose are given below.

NAVAL

23. With Crete still in enemy hands, shipping must be

* Mideast telegram CC/166 dated 29/12/42

- 6 -
It is not likely that the threat in the Aegean will exceed that of submarines, E-boats and aircraft. It is estimated that 6-knot convoys of 20 ships running every 14 days between Alexandria and Istanbul will meet requirements and would need an escort group of about 8 ships.

AIR.

24. A re-grouping of the squadrons already in Turkey should suffice both for protection of shipping and general defensive requirements. The necessary airfields exist but must be developed and supplied in advance.

LAND.

25. No additional land forces will be required other than a few L. of C. battalions and anti-aircraft protection for the new ports and airfields brought into use, for which about 48 Heavy and 84 Light A.A. guns will be needed.

PHASE II - SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS

THE TASK OF OFFENSIVE FORCES

26. Air forces operating from Turkey will be required for -

(a) Attacks on Romanian oil refineries and their communications. This is the primary task.

(b) Attacks on Balkan chrome mines and communications generally, both of which are difficult targets.

(c) Attacks against Axis shipping in the Black Sea and the Aegean.

(d) Support of any Allied land operations.

(e) Assistance to the Russians in the Ukraine.

For these purposes a force of 15 - 20 Heavy Bomber squadrons will be required and could be maintained through Smyrna. Existing airfields in North-West Turkey will require development.

NAVAL.

27. While the Black Sea should become a Russo-Turkish sphere of responsibility, British light naval forces will be required for the attack, in conjunction with the Turks, on Axis communications in the Aegean.
LAND.

28. The object of a land offensive from Thrace would be to stretch Axis forces and to support Balkan patriots. The mounting of any offensive is dependent on the Turks holding an adequate bridgehead in Europe.

29. There are two alternative lines of advance from Thrace into the Balkans:

- North into Bulgaria; or
- West into Macedonia.

(a) North into Bulgaria.

30. The objectives for a northward drive would be Axis communications in the Danube basin and the oilfields of Ploesti, which are so vital to Germany that she would defend them if necessary at the expense of other areas. The line of advance would be through a hostile country, where communications, which always strongly favour the enemy, are initially so bad as probably to prevent much progress being made. This course might contain some Axis forces, but would have little effect on the Balkans generally.

(b) West into Macedonia.

31. The objective for a westward drive would be Salonika. Once established there, further forces could be landed and armed for patriot forces of Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia imported. It should then be possible, in conjunction with the patriots, to sever Axis communications with Southern Greece and to gain control of the whole area.

32. This should result in the abandonment of Crete by the Axis. Alternatively, it might be desirable to capture Crete at an earlier stage to assist in operations on the Greek mainland. Such an operation would be best mounted in Africa, though some air support could be given from the Dodecanese and S.W. Anatolia.

33. The capture of Salonika from Thrace will, however, be a formidable and lengthy operation if the enemy puts up much resistance. Communications are bad, but not so greatly in the German's favour as those into Bulgaria. By supplementing road communications with coastwise shipping it should be possible to maintain 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) divisions, but in winter conditions this would be very difficult. A further 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) divisions could be maintained by rail as far forward as railroad, but the line is an easy one for the enemy to disrupt and repairs might take a very long time.

34. A further adverse factor is that while the line of advance itself is badly served with airfields, it is flanked by a limited number of indifferent airfields in enemy hands within...
S. E. fighter range. Therefore airfields will have to be provided in Turkish Thrace before operations can start, and others constructed as the advance progresses. This will take time.

35. It is impossible to assess the chances of success of land operations through Macedonia without making a detailed study, and without a firmer forecast than is now possible of the Axis military position as it will then be. The price is great but the prospects are poor.

**SUMMARY**

**COURSE OF OPERATIONS.**

36. Offensive operations might take the following course:

(a) The capture of the Dodecanese and the establishment of naval and air forces for the protection of shipping to Istanbul, in order to open the Eastern Aegean.

(b) The assembly of air forces in Anatolia for offensive operations against the Balkans and sea communications.

(c) A possible land offensive from Thrace directed against Salonika.

(d) After reinforcement through Salonika, the severance of Axis communications with Southern Greece and assistance to guerrilla forces in Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia.

(e) The elimination of the Axis from Greece and Crete.

**PART IV - SUMMARY OF FORCES REQUIRED**

**AIR.**

37. Immediate Air Defense

6 Squadrons

Balance of Defensive Requirements

20 Squadrons

Opening of the Aegean and Support of Land Offensive

12 Squadrons (additional to those above)

Bomber Offensive

15 - 20 Heavy Bomber Squadrons
LAND.

38. Defensive Requirements.

4 battalions for local defence.
16 Heavy A.A. guns } For ports, airfields and
215 Light A.A. guns } vital areas.

Opening the Aegean
3 divisions
3 battalions for local defence
48 Heavy A.A. guns } For ports and airfields.
84 Light A.A. guns

Operations in Greece
2 to 6 divisions, including } With possible subsequent
at least 1 Armoured division } reinforcement of up to
4 divisions (to include
Crete.)

NAVAL.

39. Forces as necessary to assist in the capture of the
Dodecanese.
A striking force of destroyers, submarines, M.T.Bs. and
M.G.Bs.
A commitment of about 8 escort vessels for shipping
in the Aegean.

PART V - CONCLUSIONS

40. (a) We do not consider that Turkey will enter the
war unless the general situation is such that
she is satisfied that she can initially hold
Thrace without Allied assistance and that im-
mediate air defence is forthcoming.

(b) Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an
offensive base for air rather than land
operations.

POLICY TO HASTEN TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

(a) Political.

41. We should make clear to Turkey that our good offices
at the Peace Conference will depend upon her entry into the war
without delay.
(b) Financial and Economic

Turkey should be assured of the continuance of our present economic and financial assistance. This might be extended to the provisions of wheat and sugar in the near future but our commitments elsewhere in the Middle East may prevent this.

(c) Military

We should offer:

(i) An "immediate air defence" contingent for the protection of vital centres in Western Turkey (paragraph 16)

(ii) The balance of forces up to the limit of tran Anatolian communications (paragraph 16)

(iii) Military equipment to bring all Turkish infantry formations in Thrace up to a satisfactory scale of weapons.

(iv) Armoured fighting vehicles only if these are considered necessary from the psychological point of view. We should prefer to send armoured formations since the Turks cannot be relied upon to operate or maintain armoured fighting vehicles efficiently.

ALLIED MILITARY POLICY.

42. (a) The provision of assistance to Turkey as in paragraph 41 (c) above.

(b) Opening of the Aegean by the capture of the Dodecanese.

(c) Development of the air offensive from Turkey.

(d) If practicable, to open up and rearm the Balkans by an advance westwards from Thrace with limited forces directed on Salonika.

PREPARATORY MEASURES IN TURKEY.

(a) Airfield Development.

43. Certain airfield developments are already included in the Sprawl Plan. We should press for further development of airfields and supplies in the following areas:-

(i) In the Istanbul and Ankara areas to operate fighters for the defence of those sites.

(ii) In the S. W. of Turkey to assist our capture of the Dodecanese.
(iii) In Anatolia and Armenia to operate bombers against Romanian oil, Balkan communications and in support of the Russian southern front.

We must ensure that the air defence equipment, including A.A. guns, ammunition and R.D.F., necessary for the defence of at least those airfields which will be used by our initial air contingent, is ready in Turkey for immediate operation.

(b) Personnel

We should send in to Turkey under cover the following personnel:

(i) Such specialists as are acceptable by the Turks to ensure proper instruction in the maintenance and use of the Allied military equipment.

(ii) Reconnaissance parties for preparing the layout of airfield defences and for studying the administrative and transportation problems.

A number of Turkish-speaking liaison officers should be collected in the Middle East.

(c) Communications

We should continue and, where necessary, augment supplies of locomotives, rolling-stock and port facilities. The provision of coal dumps at strategic centres is important for the operation of communications.

RECOMMENDATIONS

44. WE RECOMMEND THAT -

(a) THE FOREIGN OFFICE BE INVITED TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS PAPER. WE PARTICULARLY URGE THAT A FIRM POLICY SHOULD BE DECIDED WITH REGARD TO OUR POST-WAR ATTITUDE ON THE DARDANELLES QUESTION AND OTHER MATTERS OF A PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE TURKS.

(b) A COPY OF THIS PAPER SHOULD BE SENT TO THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST, IN REPLY TO THEIR TELEGRAM (C.C./166 DATED THE 28TH DECEMBER, 1942) AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE INVITED TO CONSIDER ON THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED HEREIN.
APPENDIX A.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY.

FINANCIAL.

1. Under the Agreements made after the collapse of France in 1940 the United Kingdom assumed liability for the unutilized French share of the £5 million Pound credit for the purchase of war material, which was agreed under the Special Agreement of 1939. Under this credit we are now supplying Turkey with all the arms, &c., which are available.

2. As regards non-military supplies, we have offered to lend Turkey sterling to enable her to pay for her essential needs from the sterling area. She is at present availing herself of these facilities to the extent of approximately 2 million Pounds.

3. Turkey's existing financial difficulties are those of internal finance. In regard to this we can give no real help.

ECONOMIC.

4. Our economic assistance is as great as our shipping resources and the limitations of available points of entry into Turkey will permit. There is, however, one form of assistance which is now under active consideration, namely, the supply of wheat, of which Turkey is in urgent need to the extent of 150,000-200,000 tons for 1943. Sugar is also a vital necessity and she has asked for about 20,000 tons. Success in providing these two essentials would do much to bind Turkey to us.

5. A form of assistance which would prove of great value in the future would be the supply of locomotives and rolling-stock, of which the Turks are in great need. We are doing the best we can to supply Turkey's needs, but our own demands for military purposes are naturally making this difficult. (See Appendix D, paragraphs 3 and 4).
APPENDIX B.

OUR MILITARY COMMITMENT TO TURKEY.

1. As a result of the staff conversations in Jekre in October 1941, we have promised to assist the Turks with the following force should Turkey be attacked:--

- 2 Armoured Divisions.
- 2 Army Tank Brigades.
- 4 Infantry Divisions.
- 26 Squadrons R.A.F.

With the exception of four squadrons R.A.F., which are to be detached to Western Turkey immediately the Turkish frontier is crossed, this offer was made subject to our operational requirements elsewhere and the provision of adequate maintenance facilities.

2. An plan (General Plan) has already been worked out for the move of this air contingent of 26 squadrons to airfields in Turkey south of a line Ssc of Mersere-Alexandrette (see map "C"), recommended by an Army component of four brigade groups for the protection of airfields. The maintenance of this force is equivalent to that of two divisions. The air force consists of:

- 18 Short-range Fighter Squadrons.
- 1 Long-range Fighter Squadron.
- 6 Light Bomber Squadrons.
- 2 Medium Bomber Squadrons.
- 2 Army Co-operation Squadrons.
- 1 General Reconnaissance Squadron.
- 1 Tornado Bomber Squadron.

3. It is estimated that moving by road and rail in summer the whole described force could be established in about 45 days, while the first group of 6 fighter squadrons with accompanying units would be in position at Hendaye and Belkisair in about twelve days.

4. This plan was designed to assist in the Turkish defence of Thrace and Eastern Anatolia. It was not intended to be a prelude for offensive operations which we ourselves might wish to undertake in the Balkans.
APPENDIX C

R.A.F. and Army Stores already dumped in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R.A.F. (in tons)</th>
<th>Army (in tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balikesir Area</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutahya Area</td>
<td>1,785.1</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afyon Area</td>
<td>5,466.7</td>
<td>772.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana Area</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulukisil Area</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,322.8</td>
<td>954.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total R.A.F. ... ... 13,674.3 tons.
Total Army ... ... 13,241 tons.

27,115.3 tons.
# Appendix B

Supply of Equipment

1. The following table shows the number of certain main items of equipment which had been shipped to Turkey up to the 20th November, 1942 (column (b)), and the number allocated or ordered to be sent to Turkey up to date (column (c)). Column (d) gives an indication of the quantities which might be allocated to Turkey if her priority vis-a-vis other theaters remains unchanged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shipped (a)</th>
<th>Allocated up to end of 1942 but not yet shipped (b)</th>
<th>Possible future allocation (d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stuart light tanks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>50 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentines</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-mm. A.Tk. guns</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>48 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7-in. A.A. guns</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm A.A. guns</td>
<td></td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlights</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field guns</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium hows</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium machine guns</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>50 per month. Middle East told to supply 150 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine guns</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>60 per month Order completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank rifles</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortars</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.D.F. light warning sets</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This additional allocation (in column (c) above) includes the following special offer made by the Prime Minister in September:-

- Stuart light tanks 40
- Infantry tanks 200
- 37-mm. anti-tank guns 136
- 40-mm. Bofors 25
3. The following items have been promised to Turkey by United Kingdom:

(1) Aircraft.
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Promises</th>
<th>Fulfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tomahawks</td>
<td>36 + Waste</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blenheim IV's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominie</td>
<td>4 by end of March 1943</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurricane IID or IIC</td>
<td>10 November</td>
<td>10 December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) R.D.F. Sets.
   Twelve mobile sets are now being packed in United Kingdom for despatch to Turkey by sea via Middle East, and a further 12 have been promised.

(iii) Petrol.
   Middle East have undertaken to maintain six months' supply for the Turkish Air Force. To implement this about 3,000 tons are sent each quarter.

4. The following locomotives and rolling-stock have been ordered and shipped, as shown, for Turkey:

   (a) Locomotives--
       Shipped 25

   (b) Wagons--
       Ordered 1,318 of which 723 have been shipped.

5. If full benefit is to be gained by the entry of Turkey into the war, the supply of locomotives and rolling-stock must keep pace with the development of railways. The commitment would be considerable and might have to be at the expense of other theaters.
January 19, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

AXIS OIL POSITION

Note by Assistant Chief of the British Air Staff (Intelligence)

1. Reproduced below are statements from:
   (1) "The Axis Oil Position in Europe, November 1942", by
       the Hartley Committee.
   (11) "German Strategy in 1943", by the Joint Intelligence
        Sub-Committee in London, December 3rd, 1942.

Extracts from the Hartley Committee's Report
Statistical Review of the Position from May 1st to October 1st,
1942.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production during period:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption by armed Forces:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance available for civilian consumption:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to previous estimates, the non-military requirements for the period should have amounted to 4,334,000 tons, if industrial efficiency was to be maintained. To this should be added, say, 150,000 tons for Occupied Russia making an apparent total deficiency of about 1,150,000 tons.
This deficiency might have been met by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of consumption in Germany and Occupied Territories</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal from stocks</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,150,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidence confirms that stocks have already been so reduced that distribution is becoming difficult and that the danger level has been reached. A reduction by 500,000 below this level would impose a great strain on the distribution system which consequently is likely to be exceptionally sensitive to dislocation.

**Future Trend of Oil Position**

During the six months November 1942 to May 1943 the situation may improve by:

(a) Increased production:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase from Synthetic Plants</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of Weikop oil-field</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Reduced consumption:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military - by reduced activity in Russia</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil - by use of producer gas</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>680,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Balance Sheet November 1942 - May 1943**

The approximate balance sheet for the next six months on the basis of the above figures would therefore be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>8,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Service consumption</td>
<td>4,040,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving balance for civilian consumption</td>
<td>4,060,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
estimated minimum civilian requirements (assuming restrictions continued and producer gas further exploited) 3,656,600

SURPLUS: 406,000

Assuming, therefore, reduced activity on the eastern Front, exploitation of kaikop, continuity of present restrictions and increased use of producer gas, Germany might be able to replenish her stocks by some 400,000 tons during the next six months. She would be unlikely, however, to be in a position to restore the cuts in civilian consumption or to undertake the mechanized exploitation of Russia for the 1943 harvest. In the meantime, the kumian oil fields, which contribute 33 per cent of total Axis supplies, would remain of vital importance to her.

The production trend is increasing. By the middle of 1943, additional production at the rate of one million tons per year may be expected from synthetic oil plants now in course of erection. This will possibly be increased by a further 500,000 tons annual capacity by the end of 1943.

3. EXTRACTS FROM JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S REPORT

Germany's oil situation is critical. She cannot hope to obtain any substantial additional supplies from her present resources before the middle of 1943, even if she retains kaikop. Despite ruthless economies in service and civilian use, there are already distributional breakdowns which are beginning to affect military operations. During the next six months at least her oil situation will continue to embarrass her operations and restrict her plans. It
will prevent her from providing the oil necessary for the 1943
Ukrainian harvest, without which her food position will remain precarious, and will continue to depress her industrial capacity. If, in
these circumstances, she is forced this winter to consume oil for
military purposes at the same rate as in the winter of 1941-42, she
will be increasingly handicapped in holding her present position and
will be unable to undertake an offensive against South or even North
Caucasia in the summer of 1943. In these circumstances, she may be
forced or may decide to shorten her line. On the other hand, if she
is allowed to remain inactive during the winter, the resultant saving
in oil, plus the new source of domestic supply that will become available to her in the middle of 1943, should enable her to undertake the
military effort necessary at least to complete the occupation of North
Caucasia.

If Germany is given the opportunity to complete next year
the occupation of North Caucasus and secures the sea passage across
the Black Sea, she should command enough oil (including increased
domestic supplies, which are expected in mid-1943), to meet her future
military commitments, to ensure a substantial grain surplus from the
Ukraine in the 1944 harvest and to provide her industry with the min-
imum requirements for her war effort. If, on the other hand, she has
shortened her line and abandoned hope of Caucasian oil and is heavily
engaged by the Allies, her supplies will be so limited as to deprive her of all power of undertaking major offensive operations.

4. Since the two above papers were written, there have been the fol-
lowing developments:

The Russian counter-offensive is forcing the Germans to
retreat on almost every section of the Eastern Front, including the Caucasus. Not only, therefore, are the chances of Germany obtaining oil from Maikop during 1943 remote, but it now appears unlikely that any respite will be given to the Germans this winter to remain inactive in order to conserve their oil supplies for a new offensive in the north Caucasus during the summer of the year. Even a withdrawal to a shorter line will result in a heavy expenditure of oil resources. Germany in her campaigns in 1943 will, therefore, have to rely on:

(1) The Russian Oil Fields
(2) Synthetic Production
(3) Producer Gas

She will be unable to lay 1943 to make the saving of 500,000 tons by a reduced activity on the Russian Front, nor will she have available the 100,000 tons from the Caucasus. Her assets during this period will, therefore, be 600,000 tons less than those estimated in the Hartley Report.

5. It is of interest that instances have already occurred of flying training being disorganized and curtailed by shortage of fuel.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA

Recommendation by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff are as follows:-

1. The objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa will be, in order of time:
   (a) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.
   (b) When (a) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for "Husky".
   (c) The direct furtherance of operation "Husky".
   (d) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

2. So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (a) (b) and (c) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. The objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa will be, in order to time:

   (a) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.

   (b) When (a) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for "HUSKY", including bombing required by cover plans.

   (c) The direct furtherance of operation "HUSKY".

   (d) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

2. So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (a), (b) and (c) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINIMUM ESCORT REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

PART I - ATLANTIC

U.K. Dry Cargo Import Situation

The minimum import requirements for the United Kingdom during 1943 are 87 million tons. It is estimated that with U.S. assistance on the scale envisaged it should be possible to import 12 million tons during the first six months leaving a balance of 15 million tons to be imported in the second half of the year.

2. It is of primary importance that U.K. imports in the first half of the year should not fall short of the target figure of 12 million tons, since any deficit will be carried over into the second half of the year, and will thus impose an even more severe strain on United Nations resources, which will be severely taxed in order to achieve the balance of 15 million tons. An additional reason for maintaining the rate of imports is that a decision to mount LONDON would involve the movement of an additional 100 - 200 ships a month in the latter half of the year, which will still further increase our escort requirements.

3. If, by the provision of improved protection, the average rate of loss in the N. Atlantic were reduced by 25%, from February it is estimated that by the end of June the gain in U.K. imports would be 400,000 tons. A further gain could be obtained by closing the trans-Atlantic convoy cycle in February from 10 to 8 days. This would amount to 150,000 tons, making a total of 550,000 tons. Further, the 25% reduction referred to above would preserve 3/4 million d.w.t. of shipping in the whole N. Atlantic which will otherwise be lost.

U.K. and N. African Oil Import Situation

4. The measures recently agreed to remedy the serious oil position in the U.K. include the running of (a) a direct tanker convoy from the Dutch West Indies to U.K. on a

- 1 -
80 day cycle, (b) a direct fast tanker convoy from the Dutch West Indies to the TORCH area. These commitments will continue throughout the year since they do not suffice to build up stocks but merely to meet consumption.

Convoys to N. Russia

5. With the increasing hours of daylight and the more southerly limit reached by the ice in the spring, it is essential to increase the scale of escort to convoys to N. Russia, in order to deal with the threat of attack from German surface and air forces. It is considered that in the circumstances prevailing, a minimum striking force of 15 Fleet destroyers is required in addition to the convoy escort.

U.S. East Coast

6. Although U-boat activity on the East coast of the United States and Canada has recently been much reduced, the volume of shipping in this area presents such a vulnerable target that it is essential to provide for its protection against a renewal of heavy attack.

Caribbean Area and Gulf of Mexico

7. The protection of shipping employed in the transport of vital oil supplies from the oil ports to the Eastern seaboard is one for which adequate provision must be made.

Trinidad - S. Atlantic Shipping

9. We have suffered heavy loss in this area through which a large volume of shipping to and from the United States, S. America and South Africa must pass. Adequate provision must be made to safeguard this vital route, which carries among others the important bauxite supplies.

United Kingdom - West African Convoys

9. These convoys were temporarily suspended in order to provide escorts for TORCH. It was not, however, practicable to suspend the flow of shipping to and from West and South Africa and South America since this shipping carries military supplies to the Middle East and brings back about one-third of the United Kingdom imports. The experiment of diverting such outward-bound shipping in southerly routed trans-Atlantic convoys and breaking it off in mid-Atlantic has proved too costly and has been discontinued. Similarly the necessity for homeward bound shipping to return via the East coast of the United States, has resulted in a most uneconomical use of tonnage and heavy losses in the Cape
Sec 10. It is therefore necessary to reconstitute these convoy on a minimum cycle of 20 days.

Re-opening the Mediterranean

10. The shipping running to the Middle East has already been reduced considerably.

It is proposed, when the Mediterranean route is re-opened, to run a convoy of thirty cargo ships every ten days to supply and replenish the Middle East and India. The escort commitments involved can be met by the forces available locally supplemented by small savings which will be available from the reduced scale of escort required on the Freetown route when the Mediterranean is opened to cargo ships.

PART II - THE PACIFIC

11. Although the protection of shipping in the Pacific has not yet become a problem of great magnitude, it may be expected to develop. The expanding campaign will require increased shipping to sustain it. The submarine and air threat against this increased shipping will grow in intensity in proportion to the progress of the campaign. Escort requirements for protection will increase correspondingly.

PART III - THE U-BOAT THREAT

12. The scale of U-boat threat against which North Atlantic convoys require to be protected is steadily increasing. U-boats are now operating in groups of 12 - 18, hence the scale of attack against any convoy may be taken as about 15 U-boats.

13. The scale of surface escort required to secure convoys against attack of this intensity is greater than we can hope to meet by the provision of surface escorts alone. Further, it has been proved that a combination of air and surface escort is more economical and efficient than surface escort alone. It is, therefore, necessary to make provision for air cover to all ocean convoys. Since neither shore base nor carrier borne aircraft can be relied upon to be always operable, both forms of air cover are required.

A programme of construction of escort carriers to meet our needs is already in hand and cannot be greatly accelerated. For the immediate future therefore air escort can only be ensured by the provision of shore based aircraft.

14. In assessing the scale of escort required for
the various convoys account must be taken of:-

(c) The distance of the convoy route from the U-boat bases.
(b) The availability of shore based air cover.
(c) The availability of escort carriers.

The following scales of ocean going escort vessels (over 200 feet in length) are considered to be the minimum acceptable.

A. For convoys operating in areas where pecks of U-boats are likely to be encountered and assuming adequate air cover the minimum escort is assessed as 3 plus 1 for every 10 ships in the convoy.

B. For convoys operating in areas where peck tactics are unlikely and assuming adequate air escort is available minimum escort 1 plus 1 for every 10 ships in the convoy.

C. For convoys operating in areas where peck tactics are unlikely, strong air support is normally available and escorts can be strengthened by vessels under 200 feet in length. Minimum escort 1 plus 1 for every 20 ships in convoy.

D. The tables have been arranged on the basis that adequate air cover is available. The minimum escort given above should be doubled. In other words, escort strength (with particular regard to A) is dependent upon visibility and weather conditions in which air cover can be considered effective. During the winter months in North Atlantic, with long nights and unfavorable weather conditions it is to be anticipated that the effective use of escort carriers will be very much restricted, and that shore based Air will not fully provide for air escort in the Middle Atlantic. Under such conditions escort strength as calculated under A must be increased.

15. The above assumptions in regard to escort strength contemplate, as stated, the minimum acceptable. Operating with this minimum it is not felt that measures can be taken to accomplish destruction of submarines at the desired rate (i.e. in excess of the production rate).

16. If convoys are operated with escorts in strengths
less than that given in para. 14, increased losses are to be expected. The acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of other activities that necessitate the interference.

17. Taking into account all the points discussed, the scale of escorts required for the major convoys has been calculated in Appendix I.

In Appendix II we have presented these same assessments as part of a world-wide estimate of the Fleet Destroyers and ocean-going escort vessels required to operate with the major naval forces, secure important focal points outside the general convoy system and conduct coastal traffic.

In Appendix III the forces available are compared with the requirements calculated from Appendix II.

In Appendix IV the requirements and availability of escort carriers is considered.

In Appendix V consideration is given to the world-wide requirements of shore based aircraft for the protection of trade communications.

18. CONCLUSION.

On the basis of the tables included in the appendices it will be seen that minimum acceptable requirements as to escort craft will be met approximately in August and September. We will not be in a position however to give fully adequate protection to ocean-going convoys to the extent of sinking attacking submarines at a rate even comparable to their production output before the end of the year.
## APPENDIX I

**DETAILED ESTIMATE OF CONVOY ESCORT REQUIREMENTS**

(Vessels over 200 feet in length)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Average No. of Ships</th>
<th>Days Mainly</th>
<th>No. of Days</th>
<th>Mainly:</th>
<th>Escort + R.S. *</th>
<th>Strength of Escort in Battle Post,</th>
<th>Strength of Escort in Extraordinary Service,</th>
<th>No. of Groups Required</th>
<th>Total Escorts Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Russian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C. &amp; H.X. Mid-Ocean</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C. &amp; H.X. Western Local</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Local Convoys</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.W.I. - U.K. Tanker</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.W.I. - TORCH Tanker</td>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>24 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. - Gibraltar (OG/HG)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. TORCH (KMS)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. - Freetown</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - TORCH (Troop)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - TORCH (Cargo)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York - Key West</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - New York</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Key West</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Trinidad</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Panama</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key West - Galveston &amp; Pilottown</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad - Bona</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - Iceland Shuttle Service</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>Special</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Convoys</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Russian convoys are supported by fleet destroyer striking forces.*
APPENDIX II

World-wide estimate of Requirements of Fleet Destroyers and
Ocean-going Escort Vessels (over 200 feet in length)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fleet Destoyers</th>
<th>Escort Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Present British Responsibilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Fleet</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Russian Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-ocean escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Local escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Local Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMW - UK Tanker Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK - Gibraltar Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK - Torch and W.S. Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK - Local escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coast Convoys</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Home Commands</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minelaying Squadron</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean Squadron</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar Local Escorts &amp; Inshore Sq.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown local escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic Local escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Fleet</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Indies Local escorts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Mediterranean</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Present U.S. Responsibilities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Convoys</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - Torch Troop Convoys</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - Torch Cargo Convoys</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWH - Torch Tanker Convoys</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York - Key West</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - New York</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Key West</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Trinidad</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo - Panama</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key West - Galveston and Pelottown</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad - Baca</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - Iceland Shuttle Service</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
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</table>
APENDIX III

FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN GOING ESCORT VESSELS
(over 200 feet in length)

COMPARISON OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY

The sum of minimum requirements shown in Appendix II is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fleet Destroyers</th>
<th>Ocean Going Escort Vessels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presently under British responsibility</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presently under U.S. responsibility</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>369</strong></td>
<td><strong>613</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forces available during each month of 1943 have been estimated in the table hereunder.

1. Allowance is made for a period of one month's working up between completion and ready for service.
2. Allowance is made for a number of vessels being withdrawn from operational commands for extensive repairs or modernization (U.S.-39, BR-21).
3. Attrition rates are based on previous experience, namely:
   - Fleet Destroyers - 5 per month
   - Escort Vessels - 5 per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>65</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>72</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-Jan-43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<table>
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<th>January</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Us</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtras</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>From service 1-Jan-43</th>
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<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Us</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtras</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forces available in the table above have been estimated in the table above.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NI-R-191
Requirements for convoy escort

It is considered that every ocean convoy escort should include an escort carrier in areas where attacks by packs of U-boats may be expected. On this basis the following is the estimated number required.

North Atlantic:
- Transatlantic convoys ... 10
- Freetown convoys ... 3
- DWI - UK Tanker convoys ... 3
- DWI - Torch Tanker convoys ... 3

The North Russian convoys have to be fought through a heavy scale of air attack during the months when hours of daylight are long. It can be assumed that such attack will be concentrated largely on the escort carrier. The probable loss of all fighter protection if only one escort carrier were sent with each convoy would have such consequences that it is considered that two escort carriers should be provided for each convoy. The requirement is therefore:

North Russian convoys ... 6

Total Requirements of
Convoy escort ... 25

Availability

After allowance is made for working up and attrition it is estimated that the following number of escort carriers will be available for service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>BR.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End January</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End February</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End March</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End April</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End May</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End June</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End July</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End August</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from offensive operations allowance must be made for a number of these carriers being employed on training, anti-raider duties and aircraft transporting, while 20% will be undergoing refit at any one time.
APPENDIX V

UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT FOR THE DEFENCE OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION 1 - THE NORTH ATLANTIC

1. The V.L.R. Area

Very long range aircraft are required to escort convoys and operate against U-boats in the North Atlantic at ranges greater than 500 miles from aerodromes in Great Britain, Iceland (C) and Newfoundland. This area is known as the V.L.R. Area.

They are also required to escort convoys as far south as 55° N. so that flexibility may be given to routing.

It must be assumed that any convoy passing through this area is liable to be picked up and shadowed by a U-boat. It is essential to make the shadower dive. We should therefore be able to escort every convoy during daylight hours. Within the V.L.R. area this probably means about three convoys daily.

The operation of three strong packs of U-boats simultaneously in the North Atlantic is well within the enemy's resources. We must be prepared for two convoys to be attacked simultaneously and should be able to reinforce each of them with long range aircraft to harass and sink the U-boats. These aircraft would also be used for sweeps for the same purpose.

For these tasks it is estimated that 60 V.L.R. aircraft are required, of which 40 might be based in the United Kingdom and 20 in North America.

2. The Bay of Biscay Area

The requirements in the Bay area are based on the development of a strong offensive against U-boats on passage to and from their bases, the escort of convoys passing in that area and fleet reconnaissance duty.

3. Northern Approaches.

It is necessary to have enough air activity to the approaches to the Minch and St. George's Channel to ensure that U-boats cannot close in and operate in our focal points with impunity. The passage of new U-boats around the North of the Feroes provides opportunities for interception. Fleet operations in the Northern area require reconnaissance and escort aircraft. An aircraft striking force for the North Sea and Northern waters is also necessary.
4. East Coast

One M.R. Squadron is required in the East Coast to assist in the protection of our convoys against U-boat attack.

5. Gibraltar

The defence of the focal points in the approaches to the Mediterranean requires the allocation of suitable reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft able to undertake day and night operations.

SECTION 2 - EAST COAST of U.S. and CANADA

The focal points of trade routes on the U.S. Atlantic seaboard require a large scale of air protection. Practically all Atlantic convoy routes converge in this area.

SECTION 3 - THE CARIBBEAN

The shipping routes to the oil fields of Venezuela and Trinidado and to the Panama Canal cross this area. These same routes converge in the various passages through the West Indies, producing many focal points which require air coverage.

SECTION 4 - NORTHWEST and WEST AFRICA

Shore based aircraft are required to secure the focal areas off the N.W. and W. African ports, to escort the convoys moving in the Atlantic in these latitudes and to maintain control of the narrows.

SECTION 5 - SOUTH AMERICAN EAST COAST and ASCENSION ISLAND

Due to distances, the submarine menace here is considerably reduced. However, surface raiders operate continuously in this area and air patrols are required to guard against them.

SECTION 6 - The MEDITERRANEAN (excluding Gibraltar)

In the Mediterranean the sea communications are controlled to a major degree by shore based aircraft. Requirements for all types of aircraft for co-operation over the sea are considerable.

SECTION 7 - INDIAN OCEAN

The situation in the Indian Ocean has generally improved. We are however faced with:

(e) a surface and submarine threat in the Bay of Bengal,
(b) a submarine threat in the Indian Ocean generally but particularly in the Mozam-
ique Channel and in the oil route from
the Persian Gulf.

SECTION 9 - The SOUTH PACIFIC - No figures available.

SECTION 9 - The SOUTHWEST PACIFIC - No figures available.

SECTION 10 - The WEST COAST of NORTH AMERICA

The submarine menace off the three major ports in
this area has been relieved by active operations in the Far
East. However, these areas must be patrolled particularly
against surface raids on large convoys.

SECTION 11 - ALASKA - No figures available.

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS - The shore based aircraft required
to meet the commitments stated in the above sections are
set out in the following schedule:

SCHEDULE V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>FB</th>
<th>VLR</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>MR</th>
<th>MS/TB</th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>T/F</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; European (incl. Gib)</td>
<td>108, 140</td>
<td>- 180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flying Boats
Very Long Range Estimated for convoy coverages at Long Range

All other planes required for coverage of harbors, streets and focal points of trade routes.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NIK-1234
Outline Plan.

1. The main features of the plan are:

   (a) British assaults:

   1. On the south-east corner of the island by three divisions on D day to secure the airfields in that area and the ports of Syracuse and Augusta. These airfields are required to enable the assault on Catania to be protected.

   2. On Catania by one division on D 3 to secure the port and airfields.

   (b) American assaults:

   1. On the south-west short by one division on D day to secure the airfields in that area. These airfields are required to cover the assaults on Palermo.

   2. On the Palermo area by two divisions on D 2 to capture the port of Palermo and adjacent ports and airfields. Escort carriers will provide additional support for the assault.

   (c) Follow-up:

   One British division will be landed through Catania and one American division through Palermo.

Forces Required.

2. The forces required are shown in Annex subdivided into American and British commitments.

Mounting of British Portion.

3. It is assumed that the U.S.A. will require
French North African ports for the mounting of their share of the operation. Such part of the British expedition as is mounted inside the Mediterranean must therefore be mounted from Middle East ports, e.g. Haifa, Alexandria, Port Said, Malta. Limitations of port capacity make it impossible to mount the whole of the British share from the Middle East under any conditions.

4. In order to use battle-experienced troops of the Eighth Army, they would have to be moved back to Egypt for training and loading after the conclusion of operations in Tunisia. If the expedition is to be mounted within reasonable time, it will not be possible to employ more than about one battle-experienced division in HUSKY.

Provision of Army Forces.

5. There are two alternative methods:

A. To find the three division assault from the U.K. and the Catania assault (one division) and the follow-up (one division) from the Middle East.

B. To find the three division assault and the follow-up (one division) from the Middle East and the Catania assault (one division) from the U.K.

ALTERNATIVE A.

6. (a) Advantages:

(i) Provided North Africa is cleared of the enemy by the 30th April, it enables the British assaults to be carried out in late July.

(ii) It is more economical in shipping.

(b) Disadvantages:

(i) It does not use forces in the Middle East which are available over and above security commitments.

(ii) It involves the passage of a large assault convoy through the Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air attack. This is an unacceptable risk to the spearhead of the attack.
ALTERNATIVE B.

7. (a) Advantages:
   (i) It permits a slight reduction in escort.
   (ii) It obviates the disadvantages of A. and, therefore, gives the operation greater chances of tactical success.

   (b) Disadvantages:
   (i) Provided North Africa is clearer of the enemy on the 30th April, the British assaults could take place at the end of September. This is near the time when the weather breaks.
   (ii) It involves the despatch of 16 personnel ships to the Middle East which are not otherwise required in that area.
   (iii) It is wasteful of shipping and will prevent us making any appreciable British cargo shipping contribution to Bolo.
   (iv) Without reference to the Middle East we cannot state whether the port and transportation facilities in the Middle East are capable of mounting an assault of this size.

Provision of Naval Forces.

8. The British Naval forces can be provided.

9. In the case of escorts, by the end of August the United Nations expect to be at least 46 escorts below our minimum escort requirements. Thus they can only provide the escort required if the increased risk involved in taking them off convoy protection for the period of the operation can be accepted.

10. Even if it were possible, the mounting of all assaults from North Africa would not result in any further reduction of escorts, as the limiting factor is the number required for the protection of shipping and craft off beaches.

Provision of Air Forces.

11. The British air forces required will be available in North Africa and the Middle East.
Provision of Landing Craft.

12. British landing craft requirements can be made available provided expected deliveries from the U.S. are punctual. There may, however, be difficulty in getting the required number shipped to the Middle East in time. This will require detailed examination.

13. Any large increase in the use of L.C.I. and L.S.T. for the American assault will probably have to be at the expense of the present British allotment. This would prevent our assaults being undertaken as proposed.

Provision of Shipping.

14. The shipping can be provided.

American Share of the Operation.

15. The American share of the operation is shown in the Annex. We have not attempted to estimate whether this can be met but must point out that if the Italian Fleet is not driven up the Adriatic, the United States will have to provide a heavy naval covering force in addition to the forces shown.

(Signed) C.E. LAMBE.

G.M. STEWART.

W. ELLIOT.

Anfa Camp,
19th January, 1943.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES REQUIRED.</th>
<th>ANNEX.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL.</strong></td>
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<td>Battleships</td>
<td>British</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet Carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
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<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers &amp; small craft</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY.</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Assault.</td>
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<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armoured Regiments</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Brigades</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Follow-Up.</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
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<td><strong>AIR FORCES.</strong></td>
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<td>S.E.F. (day)</td>
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<td>T.E.F. (P.38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.E.F. (Night)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light/Medium Bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torpedo Bombers</td>
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<td><strong>SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT.</strong></td>
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<td>L.S.I. (L)</td>
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<tr>
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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
CoMBINAD CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATION "HUSKY".

Report by British Joint Planning Staff.

Earliest date for the Assault.

1. After further examination we have concluded* that the earliest safe date on which we can rely for the British assaults is 30th August and do not consider that this date can be advanced unless operations in Tunisia conclude considerably earlier than anticipated.

The use of air transport to move the leading brigade of the division from Tunisia to Egypt for training might enable us to advance the assault date from 30th August to about 15th August. This is, however, the date of full moon.

2. If the British could use Algiers and a sector of the east coast of Tunisia for the training and loading of one of their divisions, the earliest date by which the British could assault could be advanced by one month. Further examination by the U.S. Planning Staffs may however show that Tunisia is essential for the Americans to mount their two shore to shore assaults. In this event the ship-borne portion of the British assault (about 40 ships) would have to pass the Sicilian Narrows on D. day.

3. The U.S. Planning Staff have not had time to assess in detail how their portion of the operation will be carried out and in consequence the types and numbers of landing craft they will use, or the date on which they can mount the operation. The limiting factors are the provision of training establishments and organisation and early provision of landing craft, and not the availability of army forces. Landing craft must in any case be delivered in North Africa in advance of present scheduled dates.

Provision of Resources

4. The U. S. Planners consider from preliminary examination that the first flight of the American assaults should be in armoured craft other than L.C.I. (L) supported by L.C.S. No craft of this type exist except British L.C.A. and L.C.S., but sufficient could probably be made available for the British and American assaults at the cost of cross-Channel operations.
Immediate Action

5. Beach reconnaissance, expansion of training facilities in North Africa and Middle East, and a comprehensive programme of airfield construction must be put in hand at once.

Organisation of Command

6. We consider that a Supreme Commander must at once be appointed for Operation HUSKY.

7. Navy, Army and Air Commanders should also be appointed subordinate to the Supreme Commander. Under these Commanders will be two Task Forces - a western and an eastern. The appointments of these Commanders and their staffs should be made at once.

8. The operation should in the main be planned from North Africa.

9. The U. S. Joint staff Planners have informed us that they agree with paras. 6 to 8 above.

(Signed) C.R. LAEBE
C.R. STEWART
W. ELLIOT

* Vide Annex

Anfa Camp,
21st January, 1943
OPERATION "HUSKY"

Outline Plan

1. The main features of the plan are:
   
   (a) British assaults:
      
      i. On the south-east corner of the island by three divisions on D day to secure the airfields in that area and the ports of Syracuse and Augusta. These airfields are required to enable the assault on Catenia to be protected.
      
      ii. On Catenia by one division on D 3 to secure the port and airfields.

   (b) American assaults:
      
      i. On the south-west shore by one division on D day to secure the airfields in that area. These airfields are required to cover the assaults on Palermo.
      
      ii. On the Palermo area by two divisions on D 2 to capture the port of Palermo and adjacent ports and airfields. Escort carriers will provide additional support for the assault.

   (c) Follow up:
      
      One British division will be landed through Catenia and one American division through Palermo.

FORCES REQUIRED

The forces required are shown in annex A subdivided into American and British commitments.
MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION:

3. It is assumed that the U.S.A. will require French North African ports for the mounting of their share of the operation. Such part of the British expedition as is mounted inside the Mediterranean must therefore be mounted from Middle East ports, e.g. Haifa, Alexandria, Port Said, Tripoli and Malta. Limitations of port capacity make it impossible to mount the whole of the British share from the Middle East under any conditions.

PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES:

4. The risk involved in passing a large convoy (some 50 ships) from the U.K. through Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air attack is unacceptable for the initial assault. The three division assault on D day can be mounted from the U.K. corner of the island must therefore be mounted in the Middle East. The follow up must be mounted from Tripoli or nearby ports if landing craft are to be used and economy of shipping is to be effected.

Thus the Catania D + 3 assault (one division) can only be mounted from the U.K., and we must accept the risk of passing this assault convoy through the Sicilian narrows on about D + 2.

It might be possible to train and mount one of the above British divisions in Algeria and Tunisia, but this will seriously curtail the American facilities for mounting their share of the operations, and will complicate the organisation of the assault.

This alternative of mounting two divisions from the Middle East and four divisions from North Africa would result in the British share of the assault being ready by 1st August. It may, however, well result in the American share of the assault being delayed beyond 31st August. No advantage in data would therefore be gained, and considerable complications would be added.

The mounting of the British share must therefore take the following form:

- 3 divisions (initial assault) from Middle East
- 1 division (D + 3 assault) from U.K.
- 1 division (follow up) from Tripolitania

PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES FOR INITIAL ASSAULT:

5. There are four possibilities:

(A) Use 5th and 56th from Persia/Iraq and N.Z. division or 78th division from Tunisia.

(B) Use 5th division from Persia/Iraq, N.Z. division) from Tunisia

78th division)
(C) Use 5th Division from Persia/Iraq
   1 Division from U.K. shipped round Cape
   4 Division to Egypt

(D) Use 5th Division from Persia/Iraq
   1 Division or 4 Division from U.K. shipped
   round Cape to Egypt. 56, N.Z. or 78
   division.

ESTIMATED TIME TABLE

6. The limiting factors in deciding the earliest
date of the assault are the time required for
training and in the case of alternatives C and D
the time needed to move the formations to the
Middle East. These are examined in annex B
from which we conclude that the earliest dates
of assault are:

   A 30th August
   B 30th August
   C 25th September
   D 10th September.

7. There is no advantage in moving formations from
   U.K. to Middle East via the Cape. Thus, we
   must adopt case A or B. Although Case B employs
twoseasoned formations we recommend Case A because:

(a) Only one instead of two brigades must be back
    from Tunisia in time to start training on 1st
    June. It may be possible to withdraw one
    brigade in time to do this.

(b) Only one instead of two divisions will have
    to be refitted in Egypt after return from Tunisia.

(c) Two out of three instead of one division will be
    available for planning from March onwards. With
    Case B two division staffs could not arrive in
    Egypt more than about one month before the
detailed plan must be completed.

We therefore, recommend Case A be adopted and the
target date for the assault be fixed at 30th
August. This will mean the three division D-day
assault should be mounted with:
5th and 56th Divisions from Persia/Iraq
54th and 78th Division from Tunisia.

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES

9. The British Naval forces can be provided.
10. In the case of escorts, by the end of August the United Nations expect to be at least 60 escorts below our minimum escort requirements. Thus they can only provide the escort required if the increased risk involved in taking them off convoy protection for the period of the operation can be accepted.
11. Even if it were possible, the mounting of all assaults from North Africa would not result in any further reduction of escorts, as the limiting factor is the number required for the protection of shipping and craft off beaches.

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES

12. The British air forces required will be available in North Africa and the Middle East.

PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT

13. British landing craft requirements can be made available provided expected deliveries from the U.S. are punctual. There may, however, be difficulty in getting the required number shipped to the Middle East in time. This will require detailed examination.
14. Any large increase in the use of L.C.I.(L) and L.C.T. for the American assault will probably have to be at the expense of the present British allotment. This would prevent our assaults being undertaken as proposed.

PROVISION OF SHIPPING

15. The shipping can be provided.
AMERICAN SHARE OF THE OPERATION

16. The American share of the operation is shown in Annex A. We have not attempted to estimate whether this can be met but must point out that if the Italian Fleet is not driven up the Adriatic, the United States will have to provide a heavy naval covering force in addition to the forces shown.

(Signed) C.S. LAMBE.

G.R. STEWART.

W. ELLIOT.

Anfa Camp, 20th January, 1943.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; small craft.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Regiments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Brigade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.E.F.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.M.F. day</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.M.F. night</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Excluding defence of N. Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bombers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Bombers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.R. (V.P.B.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures are for all allied aircraft concentrated in the Central Mediterranean for offensive operations, proprietary to and during the South. They exclude aircraft for defence, protection of shipping, or offensives elsewhere in the Mediterranean.
### SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.Q. Ship</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.S.I. (L)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.S.I. (M)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.S.D.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.S.T.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.S.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.P.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.S.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.H.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.I. (L)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.T.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Ships</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.T. Ships</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*American figures are given in terms of British types of landing craft.
ANNEX B

EXPLANATION OF EARLIEST DATE OF ASSAULT

ALTERNATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions from:</th>
<th>Persia/Iraq</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>U.K. via Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 (N.Z. or 78)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (N.Z. &amp; 78)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (a) The Overseas Assault Force cannot arrive in the Middle East before 15th May.

(b) Training facilities in the Middle East can if necessary be expanded by 1st May to deal with the basic training of two brigade groups at a time.

(c) Final rehearsal can if necessary be carried out by two brigade groups at a time in the Overseas Assault Force.

(d) Priority must be given for the shipment of landing craft to the Middle East from both U.K. and U.S.A.

(e) We have assumed that the New Zealand and 78 divisions in Tunisia can be released in time to start training in Egypt by 1st June.

(f) We have assumed that none of the shipping saved as a result of the recent cut on Middle East and Indian Doanance can be used for transporting the U.K. divisions round the Cape. In consequence, the sailing date of those divisions is dependent upon the completion of the Torch build up.

CASE A

1 March - 30 April (a) Basic training first division from P...I.C.

1 May - 31 June (b) Basic training second division from P...I.C.
1 June - 30 June (c) Refresher training one division from Tunisia.
1 June - 30 June Rehearsals two Brigade groups from (a).
1 July - 15 July Rehearsals of two brigades, one each from (b) and (c).
1 July - 20 August Move to embarkation ports and load in echelon.
30 August Assault.

CASE B
1 March - 30 April (a) Basic training division from F.A.I.C.
1 May - 1 June Gap - no formations available.
1 June - 30 June (b)(c) Refresher training two divisions from Tunisia.
1 June - 30 June Rehearsals two brigades from (a)
1 July - 15 July Rehearsals of two brigades one each from (b) & (c).
1 July - 20 August Move to embarkation ports and load.
30 August Assault.

CASE C
1 March - 30 April (a) Basic training division from F.A.I.C.
Mid April (b) & (c) Two divisions from U.K. sail via Cape.
1 June - 30 June Rehearsals two brigades from (a)
15 July (b) and (c) complete unloading.
15 July - 30 July (b) and (c) overhaul vehicles, replace breakdowns, etc.
1 Aug. - 15 Aug. Rehearsals one brigade from each (b) and (c).
1 Aug. - 15 Sept. Move to embarkation ports and reload.
25 September Assault.
CASE D

1 March - 30 April (a) Basic training division from E.S., I.C.
1st April (b) One division from U.K. sail via Copa.
1 June - 30 June (c) Refresher training one division from Tunisia.
     Rehearsal two brigades from (a).
1 July (b) Complete unloading.
1 - 15 July Overhaul vehicles, replace breakdowns, etc.
     Rehearsals one brigade (c).
15 July - 1 Aug. Rehearsals one brigade (b)
15 July - 1 Sept. Move to embarkation ports and load.
10 September Assault.
U.S. SECRET
COPY NO. 1
C.C.S. 162
January 19, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

U.S. AID TO RUSSIA

Joint Memorandum agreed by Lord Leathers and Lieutenant General Somervell

1. Existing U.S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies and equipment during 1943 allow for the following U.S. sailings for Russian aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) To North Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) To Persian Gulf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) In Pacific (Average from U.S. and Russian Pool)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shipment by June are estimated at the same rate.

2. Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the discontinuance of the North Atlantic route, U.S. commitments under the existing protocol have been only about 50% of requirements for the last six months, necessitating the shipment of 3/4 of the year's total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a total of 435 sailings from the U.S. to Russia prior to July 1, 1943. If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the year prior to that time, 2/3 this number, or 298 sailings, will be required.

3. As the route through the Pacific is subject to interruption by the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the present sailings.

- 1 -
4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be expanded to handle a total of 26 ships per month by June 1943.

5. For the northern route on the basis of 12 British cargo ships and two tankers, there would remain available 16 sailings from the U.S. every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that the convoy interval will not be reduced below 43 days. With ice hazards and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that total sailings will exceed this rate.

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order:

**TABLE II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Russia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Route</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>222</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Route</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**

63 65 51 69 71 57 63 63 47 63 63 47 722

Sailings on this order would fail to meet Protocol requirements in July by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the calendar year.

7. It will be noted from Tables I and II that the following additional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the necessity for the use of additional cargo ships for the period of a year.

**TABLE III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional Sailings Required</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of U.S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the following order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr.</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qtr.</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Qtr.</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qtr.</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>192,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. As requirements for other theatres are more or less fixed, the blow would fall on movements to the U.K. Some adjustment might be necessary in timing of Russian ships to avoid interference with special requirements.

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine losses below the 2.6% assumed in these calculations; (b) by eliminating conversion of 100 EC 2's into transports; (c) by saving through the use of the Mediterranean route; (d) release of U.S. from obligations to replace British losses in like amount.

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 2.6% per month to only 2.0% per month would increase the troop-carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. From a third of this, or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4%, would make these shipments to Russia possible, without loosenmg troop movements. With the measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is a possibility.

12. If conversion of EC 2's were stopped at the end of February, a gain in transport capacity of 150,000 would be possible. If losses are not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can be obtained, such a course would be desirable.

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in the Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports.

14. Supplement British assistance, as previously agreed, up to 300,000 tons per month, cumulative. Even on this basis, with a reduction in sinkings, there may be some relief on this score.
15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists that movements to the U.K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard should be accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should be a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements should be assigned to U.S. troop movements.
January 20, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

U.S. AID TO RUSSIA

Memorandum prepared by Lieutenant General Somervell

1. Existing U.S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies, and equipment during 1943 allow for the following U.S. sailings for Russian aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) To North Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) To Persian Gulf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) In Pacific</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shipments beyond June are estimated at the same rate.

2. Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the discontinuance of the North Atlantic route, U.S. commitments under the existing Protocol have been only about 50% of requirements for the last six months, necessitating the shipment of 3/4 of the year's total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a total of 452 sailings from the U.S. to Russia prior to July 1, 1943. If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the year prior to that time, 2/3 this number, or 288 sailings, will be required.

3. As the route through the Pacific is subject to interruption by the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the present sailings.
4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be expended to handle a total of 56 ships per month by June 1943.

5. For the northern route on the basis of 16 British cargo ships and two tankers there would remain available 16 sailings from the U.S. every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that the convoy intervals will not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that total sailings will exceed this rate.

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Persian Route |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Pacific Route |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sailings on this order would fail to meet Protocol requirements in July by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the calendar year.

7. It will be noted from Tables I and II that the following additional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the necessity for the use of additional cargo ships for the period of a year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional Sailings Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of U.S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the following order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qtr</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Qtr</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qtr</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>187,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. As requirements for other theatres are more or less fixed, the blow would fall on movements to the U.K. Some adjustment might be necessary in timing of Russian shipment to avoid interference with special requirements.

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine losses below the 2.5% assumed in these calculations; (b) by eliminating conversion of 100 EC 2's into transports; (c) by savings through the use of the Mediterranean route; (d) release of U.S. from obligation to replace British losses in like amount.

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 2.6% per month to only 2.06% per month would increase the troop carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a third of this, or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4%, would make these shipments to Russia possible, without lessening troop movements. With the measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is a possibility.

12. If conversion of EC 2's were stopped at the end of February, a gain in transport capacity of 153,000 would be possible. If losses are not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can be obtained, such a course would be desirable.

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in the Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports.

14. The U.S. is committed to replace losses in British tonnage in accordance with an agreement dated November 30, 1942. If there is a reduction in the number of sinkings the assistance required will be reduced. As a reduction is expected in some measure there will be a credit on this account.
U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists that movements to the U.K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard should be accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should be a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements should be assigned to combined troop movements.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SYSTEM OF AIR COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff

1. There shall be appointed an Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean Theatre with his headquarters at Algiers under whom will be the A.O.C. in C. North West Africa (General Seetwood), the A.O.C. in C. Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Douglas) and A.O.C. Malta.

2. The relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief, N.W. African Theatre, are defined as follows:

(a) The Air Commander-in-Chief is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in N.W. Africa in respect of:

(i) The air forces stationed from time to time in the N.W. African Theatre, and their operations;

(ii) The operations of other Mediterranean air forces in conjunction with operations conducted in or from the N.W. African Theatre.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F. in N.W. Africa will afford to the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, all possible support and facilities in the N.W. African Theatre for the operation of the Mediterranean air forces and for their efficient co-operation with the lend-lease forces in the theatre.

3. NORTHWEST AFRICA

This will be divided into three sub-commands:

(a) Heavy and medium bombers and appropriate escort fighters.

(b) General reconnaissance and fighters for the defence of shipping, ports and beach areas.
(c) An Air Support Command, which is dealt with in detail in paragraph 4 below.

The detailed organization of the Command must, however, be left to the decision of the Air Commander-in-Chief when he is appointed. Air Force supply, maintenance and repair arrangements in the whole of North West Africa shall be centralized under one control, direct under the A.O.C. in C., North West Africa.

4. In order that land operations may be effectively supported by the combined air forces there must be one Army Commander or Deputy Commander-in-Chief appointed to co-ordinate the operations of all three armies in the Tunisian Theatre - the British 1st Army, the American/French Army under General Bedell Smith and the British 8th Army. The Air Officer Commanding the Air Support Command must similarly co-ordinate the operations of the air forces supporting all three armies, and will share an advanced headquarters with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, whence he can direct the operations of the air forces to the best advantage of the land battle.

Army Support Wings will be attached to each of the three armies. The Wing Commanders will act as Air Advisers to the Army Commanders and will command such air forces as may from time to time be assigned to them by the A.O.C. Army Support Command in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Commander.

5. MIDDLE EAST

The organization of Middle East will remain as it is at present, except that Malta will be detached and come direct under Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Further, certain air forces employed in close support of the 5th Army will cease under the command of the A.O.C. Air Support under A.O.C. in C. North West Africa.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION ANAKIN - PROVISION OF FORCES

Report by British Joint Planning Staff

1. The general conception of Operation ANAKIN has already been set out in C.C.S. 154.

ASSUMPTION

2. It is assumed that Operation ANAKIN will be launched in November 1943, so giving five to six months of dry weather in which to re-open the Burma Road.

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES

3. Until an outline plan is received from India no accurate estimate can be made. The forces required and their availability, as now forecast, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REQUIRED</th>
<th>AVAILABLE FROM BRITISH RESOURCES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Naval Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 8 escort carriers</td>
<td>submarines and mine-sweepers will probably be available. Of the remainder, the British are unlikely to be able to provide more than half.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 destroyers and escorts</td>
<td></td>
<td>The provision of naval forces must be decided upon at a later date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 submarines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 fleet minesweepers and cover by heavy forces depending on the situation at the time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Infantry divisions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Will be available in India by 1st Oct., including sufficient assault trained troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armoured division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUIRED</td>
<td>AVAILABLE FROM BRITISH RESOURCES</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Air</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Bomber squadrons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Will be found from air forces already in India, raised to requisite strength by transfer from Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Fighter squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Coastal squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Assault shipping and Landing Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 H.Q. Ship</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Ex Husky or other Mediterranean Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 L.S.I. (L)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 L.S.T. (2)</td>
<td>From 7 - 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 L.S.D.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 L.C.T. (5)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 L.C.H.</td>
<td>100 only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 L.C.P.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 L.C.A.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 L.C.S.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Shipping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Personnel ships</td>
<td>No estimate</td>
<td>This deficiency will have to be met by improvisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 M.T ships</td>
<td>yet possible</td>
<td>This requirement has not yet been confirmed by C-in-C India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are asked to:

(a) approve 15 November 1943 as provisional date for ANAXIM assault.

(b) approve provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 3 above; it being recognized that actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping must depend on situation in late summer of 1943.

(c) agree to confirm in July 1943 decision to undertake or to postpone Operation ANAXIM.
21 January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION ANAKIM - PROVISION OF FORCES

Report by British Joint Planning Staff

1. The general conception of Operation ANAKIM has already been set out in C.C.S. 154.

ASSUMPTION

2. It is assumed that Operation ANAKIM will be launched in November 1943, so giving five to six months of dry weather in which to re-open the Burma Road.

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES

3. Until an outline plan is received from India no accurate estimate can be made. The forces required and their availability, as now forecast, are:

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<tr>
<td>9 L.S.I. (L)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 L.S.T. (2)</td>
<td>From 7 - 13</td>
<td>Balance not available from British resources will require to be provided and manned by U.S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 L.S.D.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 L.C.T. (5)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 L.C.M.</td>
<td>100 only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 L.C.P.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 L.C.A.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 L.C.S.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>This deficiency will have to be met by improvisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Shipping</td>
<td></td>
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CONCLUSION

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are asked to:

(a) approve 15 November 1943 as provisional date for ANAKIM assault.

(b) approve provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 3 above; it being recognized that actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping must depend on situation in late summer of 1943.

(c) agree to confirm in July 1943 decision to undertake or to postpone Operation ANAKIM.
The Sub-Committee appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 61st Meeting (Item 4) has prepared a draft telegram to Premier Stalin which is circulated here-with for consideration.

V. Dykes  
J. R. Deane

* Enclosure
ENCL.

Mr. T. L. W. From the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin.

We have been in conference with our military advisors for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements in other theatres. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing and intensified offensive effort on our part.

4. Our first intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:

   (1) An effective passage through the Mediterraneans for military traffic, and

   (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in Southern Europe.

5. It is our intention to undertake considerable amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese. In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defences over a very wide area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected.
as soon as we can release our bomber forces from the task of clearing North Africa. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German air force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that the operations which we are undertaking will compel further withdrawals from the Russian Front.

6. These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defection of other German satellite States would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements.

7. Concurrently with amphibious operations from the North African shore, we shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

8. We shall, of course, continue and intensify the Allied bomber offensive from the United Kingdom against Germany.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to re-open our channel of supply to China. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardise our capacity to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1945.
The Sub-Committee appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 61st meeting (Item 4) has prepared a re-draft telegram embodying changes suggested by the Chiefs of Staff to Premier Stalin which is circulated herewith* for consideration.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane

* Enclosure
1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements in other theatres. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort on our part.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:
   (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
   (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Cadiaria, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese. In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defenses over a still wider area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected.
6. These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defection of other German satellite states would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it will attain great destructive power. By the middle of the year, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo of daylight attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air from the Russian front.

8. We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.
22nd January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT TELEGRAM from the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

Prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. We have been in conference with our Military
Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the
operations which are to be undertaken by American and
British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to
know our intentions at once.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy
is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view
to achieving early and decisive victory in the European
Theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient
pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific
and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese
from extending their aggression to other theatres such
as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity
of diverting strong German land and air forces from the
Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow
of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements
in other theatres. We shall spare no exertion to send
you material assistance by every available route, but it
would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at
a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pres-
sure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort
on our part.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis
out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installa-
tions to open:

(1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean
for military traffic, and

(2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis
installations in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest
possible moment. The preparation for these operations is
now under way and will involve a considerable concentration
of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in
Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will
certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know
where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike.
They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both
land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sarosinia,
Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and
the Dodecanese.

6. These operations may result in the collapse of
Italy. The defection of other German satellite states
would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with
the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major with-
drawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some
fifty divisions and 1,000 aircraft in her global require-
ments.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber
offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and,
by midsummer, it should be more than double its present
strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day
bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large
numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an in-
creased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will
lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in
Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Ger-
many and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are
already containing more than half the German Air Force in
Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt
that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together
with the other operations which we are undertaking, will
compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces
from the Russian front.

8. We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom
the maximum American land and air forces that shipping
will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the
United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to re-
enter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation of-
fers reasonable prospect of success.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the
Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and there-
after to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also
intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in
order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We shall
not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopar-
dize our capacity to take advantage of any favorable oppor-
tunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of
Germany in 1943.

-2-
C.C.S. 166
January 29, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

It is suggested that the following directive be
issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate
British and U.S. Air Force Commanders to govern the opera-
tions of the British and American Bomber Commands in the
United Kingdom.

DRAFT DIRECTIVE

1. Your objective will be the progressive destruction
and dislocation of the German military, industrial and
economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the
German people to a point where their capacity for armed
resistance is fatally weakened.

2. Within that general concept, your primary ob-
jectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of
tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the order of
priority set out below. This order of priority may
be varied from time to time according to developments in
the strategic situation. It is not to be taken to pre-
clude attacks on Berlin when conditions are suitable for
the attainment of specially valuable results unfavourable
to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of Russia.

(a) German submarine operational bases and
construction yards.

(b) The German aircraft industry.

(c) Transportation.

(d) Synthetic oil plants.

(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.

3. There may be certain other objectives of great
but fleeting importance for the attack of which all ne-
essary plans and preparations should be made. Of these,
an example would be important units of the German Fleet in
harbour or at sea.
U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

4. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German night fighter force and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.

5. If and when it is decided that the Allied Armies should re-enter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.

6. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
21st January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM


(Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th Meeting on 21st January 1943)

1. Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority:

(a) German submarine construction yards
(b) The German aircraft industry
(c) Transportation
(d) Oil plants
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry

The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. Examples of these are:

(1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the U-boat war which the C.C.S. have agreed to be a first charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is...
necessary. These objectives have not been included in the order of priority, which covers long-term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.

(11) Berlin, which should be attacked when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of Russia.

3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy in connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theatre.

4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.

5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.

6. When the Allied Armies re-enter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.

7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
In view of the recommendations approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 155/1, for the "Conduct of the War in 1943", we examine below the possibilities of cross-channel operations in 1943.

Object of Operations.

2. The objects of cross-channel operations in 1943 may be set down as:

A. Raids with the primary object of provoking a major air battle and causing the enemy loss.

B. Operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and strength of her resources permit, of exploiting success.

C. Operations on a larger scale to take advantage of German disintegration.

Assumption as to date.

3. Where figures are quoted, we have assumed a target date of 1st August.

Resources.

4. The number of divisions available will be twelve British, including one airborne, and about four American.

5. Training of naval crews will be the limiting factor in the provision of landing craft for the initial assaults. It is estimated that, without U.S. assistance, the maximum lift which can be provided will be:

- Initial assault force: Two brigade groups, with proportion of armour and commandos.

- Total lift including initial assault force: Two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade on light scales, of which two brigade groups and a proportion of armoured can be mounted in the initial assault.
6. There will by August 1943 be sufficient air forces, British and American, to support a limited Cross-Channel operation either against the Pas de Calais or the Cotentin Peninsula, provided operations in the Mediterranean have not drawn too heavily on our Fighter reserves. The decision to carry out such an operation would, however, entail a re-organisation of part of the metropolitan Air Force with a consequent brake on its expansion and operational effort.

7. It may be assumed that the Germans will continue to develop their system of coast defences; but it is fair to expect that the formations holding those defences will be of poorer quality than at present.

8. The reserves which the Germans will be able to bring against us must depend entirely on the progress of operations elsewhere in Europe.

In the worst case, if they succeeded without heavy losses in stabilising their Eastern Front on the shortened line of R. NIZZER, and in checking our operations in the Mediterranean, they might rebuild their reserves in N.W. Europe to approximately the level of November 1942, i.e. 41 divisions.

It is possible, however, that they may be forced to make further substantial reductions in the number of their reserve formations in N.W. Europe; and that their capacity to reinforce N.W. France rapidly may be decreased.

9. It is improbable that the strength of the German Air Force on the Western Front will be less than it has been during the last six months, i.e. about 1,000 first line aircraft of all types. In the event of a clear threat of a large scale landing by our forces in North France or in the Low Countries, the G.A.F. might be prepared to withdraw forces both from the Mediterranean and Russia to increase this strength to 1,500.

**Possible Areas for Raids.**

10. Raids of which the primary object is to provoke an air battle would best be conducted against the Pas de Calais, but the nature of the defences would be extremely costly to the assault forces.

**Possible Area for a Limited Bridgehead Operation.**

11. The **COTENTIN PENINSULA** is the only possible objective for offensive operations of which the object is to remain on the Continent, as it is the only area with a short and easily defensible line within reasonable distance of the beaches,
and one which, at the same time, permits reasonable air support.

Combined Commanders' Plan for Assault of the COTENTIN PENINSULA (Operation OVERLORD).

12. In November 1942 the Combined Commanders in London made a detailed study of the problems involved in an assault to seize and hold the COTENTIN PENINSULA, on the assumption that the Germans would bring up to 15 reserve divisions against the assaulting force during the first fourteen days. They concluded that the minimum requirements for success were:

(a) initial assault to be made by 5 brigade groups.
(b) assault to be supported by 10 parachute battalions and an airborne division, less one parachute brigade, for lifting which 847 transport aircraft would be required.
(c) the total force, including assault forces, to be approximately 8 divisions.
(d) the build-up of fighting troops to be substantially complete by evening of D + 1.

General Eisenhower did not himself see the plan, but his representatives collaborated in its preparation and fully concurred in the conclusion as to minimum requirements.

Feasibility of Operation with Forces set out in Para. 5.

13. With the resources available in 1943, neither the size of the seaborne and airborne assault forces nor the rate of build-up can approach the requirements of the Combined Commanders. It is clear, therefore, that no operation to seize and hold a footing in the COTENTIN PENINSULA has any prospect of success unless the German reserves have been very greatly reduced. Similar considerations would apply to a limited operation anywhere on the French coast.

14. There is, however, a good prospect that the German reserves will in fact be greatly reduced by August. It will therefore be necessary to make a detailed examination to determine:

(a) whether, with the small assault forces available, it is possible successfully to assault the COTENTIN PENINSULA.
(b) if such an assault is practicable, to what level German reserves in N.W. France must be reduced in order to give our forces a reasonable chance of holding the PENINSULA.
15. It can, however, be said at once, without further examination, that:

(a) A minimum of four brigade groups in the initial assault will almost certainly be necessary.
(b) Shortage of sea-borne assault troops will make provision of air-borne troops the more necessary.
(c) To ensure the success of the initial assault against the strong defences of the French coast, and to reduce casualties among the assaulting troops, maximum allotment of support craft will be necessary.
(d) The limiting factor in the rate of subsequent build-up is availability of vehicle-carrying craft.

Possibility of Exploiting a Limited Operation.

16. In view of the limited capacity of the port of CHERBOURG, operations to exploit success must be designed to secure additional port facilities so as to permit the maintenance of larger forces. Such operations might take the form of an advance by a mobile force, supported by sea-borne and air-borne assaults, either eastwards to capture the ScaRN ports or south westwards to secure the BRATON ports. In either instance, preliminary operations would be necessary to expand the bridge head so as to obtain the use of the port of CAEN and the group of airfields in that area.

17. The practicability of undertaking such subsequent operations will, however, depend entirely on the state of German morale and on the extent to which they are able to concentrate reserves to oppose our further advance. The rapidity with which such operations can be undertaken will in any case depend on the rate at which we are able to reconstruct the ports and to build up our own forces and reserves, even if German opposition is negligible, progress will be slow on account of our limited resources in vehicle-carrying craft suitable for landing over beaches.

Operations on a Larger Scale to Take Advantage of German Disintegration.

18. The return to the continent in the case of German disintegration will be primarily an administrative problem. The Combined Commanders in London should therefore be instructed to make the necessary plans.

Conclusions.

19. (a) Unless the Germans are forced to reduce their reserves and their beach defences in N.W. Europe
substantially, no limited operation to seize and
hold a footing in France is practicable with the
resources likely to be available in 1943.

(b) A detailed plan for an operation to seize and
hold the COTENTIN PENINSULA should be made on
the basis of resources likely to be available.

(c) An examination should be made to determine to
what level German reserves in N.W. Europe must
sink in order to give such an operation a reason-
able chance of success.

(d) Preparations should be made to mount the oper-
tion by 1st August but the decision to put this
plan into execution should be deferred until a
reasonably firm estimate of the German reserves
on that date can be made.

(e) Outline plans should be made for further opera-
tions to exploit success in the event of a break-
down in German morale, e.g. to extend the bridge-
head to include GAUCH and subsequently to secure
either the NORTH Sea or Brest group of ports.

(f) The Combined Commanders in London should be in-
structed to draw up plans for a return to the
continent in the case of German disintegration.

(g) U. S. Government will have to provide:-

(1) Assault shipping and landing craft, manned
by U. S. crews, to carry at least two bri-
gade groups at assault scales.

(ii) Such additional parachute battalions and
transport aircraft as may be necessary.

(h) All possible steps should be taken to provide:-

(1) Support craft for the assault.

(ii) The maximum number of improvised craft for
 carriage of vehicles.

(Signed) C. M. LAMBK.

G. H. STEWART

W. KLLIOT.

ANFA CAMP.
22nd January, 1943.
1. Japan has expanded the scope of her occupation so that it includes not only her former holdings of (1) Korea and Manchuria on the mainland of Asia and (2) a considerable part of China (including all of the coast), but in the past year, (3) all of Indo-China, Malaysia, Thailand, most of Burma, and as well, (4) all of the Philippines and (5) the Dutch East Indies.

2. The ultimate defeat of Japan proper will be accomplished by measures which greatly resemble those which would be effective against the British Isles - blockade (attack on ships and shipping), bombing (attack on forces, defenses, industries, and morale), and assault (attack via the sea). Of these measures, attacks on ships and shipping along enemy lines of communications are inherent in all offensive operations; it is our purpose during 1943 to work toward positions from which Japan can be attacked by land based air; assault on Japan is remote and may well not be found necessary. Allied offensive measures in 1943 comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in the cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings, and in attacks on enemy sea, air, and ground forces by obliging them to fight to retain their holdings and to maintain their lines of communication.

3. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific during 1943, while conditioned on the premise that Germany is the principal enemy, requires that sufficient means be in hand surely to counter enemy potentialities (para. 4 to follow) and, further, must take care that the means in hand are actively employed to best advantage. The general capabilities of the Allied effort in the Pacific in 1943 comprise:

(a) Keep Japan from further expansion, and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings.
(b) Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
(c) Secure the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Block enemy approaches to Australia (1) from the Northward via Adak; (2) from the Northwestward via the Malay barrier.
(e) Attain positions which menace enemy line of communication with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.
(f) Open the line of communications with China via Burma — in order to make use of Chinese geographical position (as to attack enemy line of communication in Formosa Straits and along the coast of China, perhaps to bomb Japan).
(g) Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.
(h) Continue and intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea (including submarine) action.

4. Japan's potentialities for offensive action during 1943 embrace:

(a) the Maritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) — Russia;
(b) Alaska via the Aleutians;
(c) the Midway-Hawaii line — key to the Pacific
(d) the Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line, which covers the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand;
(e) Australia and New Zealand — via the Bismark Archipelago and/or the Solomons;
(f) Australia — via the Malay barrier;
(g) India — via Burma;
(h) China;
(i) of the above, (a) is static unless and until war takes place between Russia and Japan; (b) has proved, and will continue, unprofitable to Japan; (c) has been tried and may be tried again but is unlikely to succeed; (d) is now unprofitable except via the Gilbert and Ellice Islands toward Samoa (the Jaluit-Samoa line); (e) is now under contest by United Nations forces; (f) is unprofitable except to forestall Allied advance from N.W. Australia; (g) is feasible except that enemy position is already well extended; (h) same as (g) — profitable chiefly to forestall Allied action.

5. Allied seizure and occupation, now in progress, of the New Caledonia—New Guinea line has for objectives:

(a) security of the line of communications from U. S. to Australia and New Zealand;
(b) blocking of enemy approaches to Eastern Australia;
(c) points d'appui for further action;
(d) attrition of enemy forces which oppose our occupation.

6. Additional to the objectives attained by the seizure and occupation of the New Caledonia-New Guinea line (para. 5 above), the other feasible objectives for us appear to be:

(a) Japan via the Maritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) noted only for record to offset 4(a) above.
(b) Japan via the Aleutians and Marshall - from Alaska.
(c) Advance from Midway towards Truk-Gum line via Wake and North-western Marshall Islands.
(d) Advance on the Sanwo-Jaluit line via Ellice and Gilbert Islands.
(e) Advance from Rabaul area on Truk-Gum line.
(f) Dutch East Indies via Malak barrier (as Timor).
(g) Participation in ANAKIN.

Of the above (which are set down to match the items of para. 4 above):

(a) is merely potential unless and until war takes place between Japan and Russia;
(b) is unprofitable with means in sight in 1943 and is best undertaken if at all, in connection with (a);
(c) is most useful, not only as to

(1) retention of initiative;
(2) partial counter to enemy potentialities of para. 4 (c); and, particularly,
(3) to draw off enemy forces involved in holding Rabaul area;

(d) is effective

(1) to forestall enemy potentialities in para. 4 (d);
(2) to make the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand fully secure; and
(3) to draw off enemy forces involved in Rabaul area;

(e) cannot be done until after consolidation of the Rabaul area upon completion of operations now in hand - see para. 5 above - but should perhaps must, eventually be undertaken;

(f) useful on limited scale

(1) to counter enemy potentialities of para. 4 (f);
(2) to draw off enemy forces elsewhere in
the Pacific;
(3) to employ forces available in Aus- 
tra- lia (after completion of para. 6) which 
would not otherwise be employable; 
N.B. - Attacks are not to be developed 
fully, as this might lead to 
extensive operations of the na- 
u-ure of frontal attacks.

(g) not effective before November though forces 
contributed would likely have to be made 
available in October - but - ANAKIM is of 
such importance in respect of its objective 
bringing Chinese manpower and geographic 
position to bear on Japanese forces and 
positions) as to merit that priority which 
may be found indispensable to mount it.

7. Referring now to the general capabilities of 
Allied action listed in para. 3 above, set off against 
enemy potentialities in para. 4 above, we intend, as to 
the feasible objectives of para. 6 above - additional to 
those of para. 5 above - to:

(a) and (b) - make the Aleutians as secure as may be - 
which will implement 3 (a) (g) (h);
N.B. - Germany can be expected to intensify 
pressure on Japan to attack Russia in 
Siberia (Maritime Provinces).

(c) undertake advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam 
line as practicable - to implement 3 (a) (b) 
(e) (h) and, particularly, when 6 (e) is under- 
taken;
(d) undertake advance along Sansa-Jaluit line to 
implement 3 (a) (c) (h);
(e) refrain from advance from Rabaul area towards 
Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in 
hand to enable it to be carried through and 
followed up. Noted that it implements 3 (a), 
(b), (d) (i), (e), (h);

(f) undertake advance on the Malay barrier (at Timor) 
on limited scale to counter enemy capabilities 
and divert his forces - to implement 3 (a), 
(d) (2), (e), (h);

(g) participate in ANAKIM as may be found indispen- 
sable to mounting it.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING
AND TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS FOR A RE-ENTRY TO THE
CONTINENT ACROSS THE CHANNEL, BEGINNING IN 1943.

(Note by the Combined Staffs).

1. Strategic Basis: The Combined Chiefs of Staff
agree that there is no chance of our being able to stage
a large scale invasion of the Continent against unbroken
opposition during 1943. Their policy is, however, that we
should -

(a) undertake such limited operations as may be prac-
ticable with the forces available and

(b) assemble the strongest possible force (subject to
certain prior commitments in other theatres) in
constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as
soon as German resistance is weakened to the re-
quired extent.

2. The organization should therefore provide for -

(a) Small scale amphibious operations, such as the
progressive re-occupation of the Channel Islands.
(Note. Raids are already adequately taken care of
by the existing organization).

(b) The need to re-enter the Continent with all avail-
able forces at the shortest possible notice in the
event of a sudden and unexpected collapse of
German resistance. The aim would be to seize criti-
cal political and military centers in Germany in
the shortest possible time.

(c) Operations to seize a bridgehead late in 1943,
leading up to a rapid exploitation or

(d) an invasion in force in 1944.

3. Need for a Directive: The first thing that is es-
sential, whatever organization is set up, in a clear directive
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out the objects of
the plans and the resources likely to be available. In this
latter connection some inevitable difficulty arises from the
fact that - except for the operation in Para. 2 (a) - prepa-
ations for the other possible operations must be based, not on any given strength of forces available nor on any fixed estimate of enemy opposition to be encountered, but on the maximum forces that are likely to be available in the U.K. at any given time. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to fix a date, because that must depend entirely on the state of enemy resistance on the Continent.

All plans and preparations must therefore be extremely flexible.

4. Training. In order that training and preparation of the forces may not be unduly hampered by the maintenance of an unnecessarily high state of readiness, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions on this point. In the first instance, the degree of notice might be fixed at three months. But planning for the operation described in para. 2 (b) above must be on the basis of immediate re-entry into the Continent at the shortest possible notice with whatever resources are available at the time.

5. Principles of Command and Planning. It is suggested that 2 (a), small scale operations, such as the Channel Islands, should they be considered desirable either separately or as part of a larger operation, could adequately be dealt with by C.C.C.'s organization on the same lines as was the Dieppe raid.

6. As regards the larger operations in 2 (b), (c) and (d), the governing principle should be that the responsibility for planning and training should rest with, or under the direction of, the Commanders who will have to carry out the plans, who will be the same Commanders for all three operations. These should be designated at once.

7. Supreme Command. This raises the question of a Supreme Commander. It is considered that when the operations in 2 (b) to (d) become reasonably imminent a Supreme Commander must be appointed. He should have a small combined staff of British and American Officers of all three services, and under him will be subordinate Commanders, air, land and sea, corresponding to the organization just approved for the operations in the Mediterranean.

It is considered desirable that the Supreme Commander should be appointed at once. If this is not feasible his Chief of Staff or Deputy and a nucleus of the combined staff should be appointed immediately to give the necessary impetus and cohesion to planning.
8. The present "Round-up" Planning Staff. For some months a special inter-allied staff drawn from all three services has been in existence working together in one building in London, studying the problem and planning for a return to the Continent. In this way much specialized experience has been gained and planning has progressed far beyond the staff study stage. In particular a great deal of administrative work has been done and measures - such as the acquisition and preparation of airfields - actually put in hand.

9. This special planning staff should be adapted to the new conditions and strengthened by the addition of American personnel. They should work, under the direction of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy until he is appointed), in conjunction with the nucleus of his combined staff in London.

Administrative planning will have to be done very largely by the normal administrative staffs in the Service Departments and in H.Q. E.T.O. U.S.A. These Headquarters should, however, appoint representatives to form, together with the Administrative Staff in Norfolk House, a joint administrative planning staff for the re-entry to the Continent.

One of the first tasks of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) should be to simplify the existing system of inter-departmental administrative planning which at present is unduly cumbersome.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF

Report to the President and Prime Minister

Note by the Secretaries

In accordance with the directions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th Meeting (Item 6), a draft report to the President and Prime Minister of the decisions reached subsequent to the submission of C.C.S. 153/1 is circulated herewith for approval.

V. DYEES
J. R. DEANE
DRAFT REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S.155/1) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S.160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We shall not be in a position to accomplish the destruction of submarines at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted the following resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S.65th Meeting, Item 1):

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER CONTINENTS

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these shipments.
on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a programme of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after the 1st July, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 168).

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(a) OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF SICILY.

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theatre and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1).

-2-
(i) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favourable July moon as the target date.

(ii) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than the 1st March firstly whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon, and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

(iii) That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

A. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.

B. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

C. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(iv) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff.
for planning and preparing the operation.
The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions has been drafted.

(b) **COVER PLANS.**

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

(c) **COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE.**

We have agreed the following Command arrangements in the Mediterranean:— (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4 and C.C.S. 163).

(i) **SEA.**

For operation HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary between the two Commands will be drawn from Zenti to Bardia. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(ii) **LAND.**

At a moment to be determined after the
British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East. After the conclusion of these operations, he will take charge of Operation HUSKY. The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier.

(iii) LAND.

We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Toddor shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theatre with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, North-West Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in North-West Africa, and we have laid down
certain principles for the organisation of the
Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor
changes which the Air Commander-in-Chief may
find necessary after his appointment.

(d) THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA.

We have laid down the following as the objects
of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order
of time (C.C.S. 159/1):

(i) The furtherance of operations for the evic-
tion of all Axis Forces from Africa.
(ii) When (i) has been achieved, infliction of
the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air
and Naval forces in preparation for HUSKY, in-
cluding bombing required by cover plans.
(iii) The direct furtherance of Operation HUSKY.
(iv) The destruction of the oil refineries at
Ploesti.

So far as is possible without prejudice to the
achievement of objects (i), (ii) and (iii) above,
bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to
weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(a) THE OPERATION OF AIR FORCES FROM THE UNITED

KINGDOM.

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bom-
bardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate
under the strategical direction of the British Chief
of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the
United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 2).

We have agreed upon a directive to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom to govern the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom; a copy of this directive is at Annex 'A'. (C.S. 166/1/D).

(b) BOLERO.
(c) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN 1943 FROM THE UNITED
KINGDOM. (C.C.C. 167 and 169 and C.C.C. 20th
Meeting Item)

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are
three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:

(i) raids with the primary object of provoking an air battle and causing enemy losses,

(ii) operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and the strength of her resources permit, of exploiting successes,

(iii) a return to the continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (i) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of operation which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1st, 1943. This operation comes under type (ii) above.

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a
return to the continent under (iii) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. The directive will also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the continent in force in 1944.

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATRE.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE. (C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting Item 1)

The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1):

(i) Operations to make the Alcutans as secure as may be.

(ii) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.

(iii) An advance along the line Saona/Jaluit.

(iv) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.

(v) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.

(b) RE-CONQUEST OF BURMA.
We have approved the 15th November, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIN assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and sea forces can be provided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943. (C.C.S. 164).

6. THE AXIS OIL POSITION.

We have had laid before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position, (C.C.S. 156). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in
Germany, be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow. (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1).

7. NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA.

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to cover the French West African Coast. (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3)

   (1) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rif d'Ore) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

   (11) That subject to (1) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

   (111) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

8. TURKEY.

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2).
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Report to the President and Prime Minister

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S. 160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We ought not to count on the destruction of submarines at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti U-boat war.

(C.C.S. 65 Meeting, Item 1)

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these shipments.
on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a programme of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after the 1st July, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 162).

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(a) OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF SICILY.

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theatre and we have recorded the following conclusions: - (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1).
(1) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favourable July moon as the target date.

(11) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than the 1st March firstly whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon, and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

(iii) That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

A. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.

B. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

C. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(iv) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff,
(a) COVER PLANS.

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

(c) COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER.

We have agreed the following command arrangements in the Mediterranean:— (C.O.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4 and C.O.S. 165).

(1) SEA.

For operation HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(11) LAND.

At a moment to be determined after the
British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation MUSKY. The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier.

(iii) **AIR.**

We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theatre with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, North-West Africa (General Spence), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in North-West Africa, and we have laid down
certain principles for the organisation of the Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes which the Air Commander-In-Chief may find necessary after his appointment.

(d) THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA.

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order of time (C.C.S. 159/1):

(1) The furtherance of operations for the evic-

tion of all Axis Forces from Africa.

(ii) When (i) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for HUSKY, including bombing required by cover plans.

(iii) The direct furtherance of Operation HUSKY.

(iv) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (1) (ii) and (iii) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(a) THE OPERATION OF AIR FORCES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the
United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th meeting, Item 2).

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/D) to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

(b) BOLERO
(C.C.S. 172 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 1)

A study has been made of the shipping capabilities for BOLERO build-up in 1943.

With the data available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, Appendix III, we calculate that the U.S. forces as shown in the following table will be available for continental operations in the U.K. on the dates shown. The figures given in the last column include the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Total Numbers Equipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 15 Aug.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and availability date.

As the movement proceeds the overall number of men per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be down to 40,000, in which case the number of divisions available on the 31st December may be 19 instead of 15. The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased.

-7-
We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:

(i) raids with the primary object of provoking air battles and causing enemy losses.
(ii) operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of exploiting successes.
(iii) a return to the continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (i) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of operation which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1st, 1943. This operation comes under type (ii) above.

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a
return to the continent under (iii) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. The directive will also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the continent in force in 1944.

5. PACIFIC AND MIDDLE EAST THEATRE.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE. (C.O. 169 and C.S.S. 67th Meeting Item 1)

The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.S.S. 155/1):

(i) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be.
(ii) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.
(iii) An advance along the line Samoa/Jaluit.
(iv) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.
(v) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.

(b) RE-CONQUEST OF BURMA.
We have approved the 15th November, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and air forces can be provided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943. (C.C.S. 184).

6. THE AXIS OIL POSITION.

We have had laid before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position. (C.C.S. 186). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in
Germany, be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow. (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1).

7. NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA.

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to cover the French West African coast. (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3)

(i) That the West African coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio d'Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

(ii) That subject to (i) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

(iii) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

8. TURKEY.

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2).
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister

Summarizing Decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S. 160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We ought not to count on the destruction of U-boats at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S. 65 meeting, Item 1).

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these shipments.
on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a programme of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after the 1st July, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 162).

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
   (c) OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF SICILY.

   We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theatre and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1).
(i) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favourable July moon as the target date.

(ii) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than the 1st March firstly whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon, and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

(iii) That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

A. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

B. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal T. 9. rder the Air Commander.

C. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(iv) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation.

*We have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favourable June moon period as the date for the operation. If at the end of the three weeks our efforts have proved successful, the instructions to General Eisenhower will be modified accordingly.
The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions has been drafted.

(b) COVER PLANS.

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

(c) COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER.

We have agreed the following Command arrangements in the Mediterranean:— (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4 and C.C.S. 163).

(1) SEA.

For operation HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levent. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(11) LAND.

At a moment to be determined after the
British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation BUNNY. The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisien-Tripolitania frontier.

(iii) AIR.

"We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theatre with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, North-West Africa (General Spants), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in North-West Africa, and we have laid down
certain principles for the organisation of the Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes which the Air Commander-in-Chief may find necessary after his appointment.

(d) THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA.

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order of time (O.C.S. 156/1):-

(i) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.
(ii) When (i) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for NUSKY, including bombing required by cover plans.
(iii) The direct furtherance of Operation NUSKY.
(iv) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (i) (ii) and (iii) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(a) THE OPERATION OF AIR FORCES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategic direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the
United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th meeting, Item 2).

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/D) to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

(b) BOLERO (C.C.S. 172 and C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 1)

A study has been made of the shipping capabilities for BOLERO build-up in 1943.

With the date available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, Appendix III, we calculate that the U.S. Forces as shown in the following table will be available for continental operations in the U.K. on the dates shown. The figures given in the last column include the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000. They may be regarded as the minimum, and every effort will be made to increase the number of trained and equipped divisions in the United Kingdom by 15th August.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Equipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By 15 Aug.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>264,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>634,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>759,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>936,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops (2) 45 days allowance.

- 7 -
between sailing date and availability date.

As the movement proceeds the overall number of men per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be down to 40,000, in which case the number of divisions available on the 31st December may be 19 instead of 18.

The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased.

(c) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN 1943 FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(C.U.S. 167 and 177 and C.O.S. 66th Meeting Item 2.)

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:

(1) raids with the primary object of provoking air battles and causing enemy losses.

(2) operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of vigorously exploiting successes.

(3) a return to the continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of operation which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1st, 1943. This operation comes under type (2) above.
U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a British Supreme Commander, with an American Deputy Commander, is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the continent under (iii) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATRE.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE.

(C.C.S. 169 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting Item 1)

The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1):

(i) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be.

(ii) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.

(iii) An advance along the line Samoa/Jaluit.

(iv) An advance on the Malakai Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.

(v) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.

- 9 -
(b) SUPPORT OF CHINA

(1) Immediate Operations

Subsequent to the operations now in progress which are aimed at the capture of Akyab, a limited advance from Assam will be carried out to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air transport route to China by enabling aircraft to fly at lower altitudes; and, if Chinese cooperation is available, to gain ground for additional airfields and to extend the air warning system.

(2) Operations in China

In order to support the Chinese war effort, to provide means for intensifying attacks on Japanese shipping, and to strike at Japan herself when opportunity offers, it is intended to improve air transportation into China by supplying additional transport aircraft, and to build up the U.S. Air Forces now operating in China to the maximum extent that logistical limitations and other important claims will permit. We hope that more sustained operations with increased Air Forces may begin in the Spring, and we regard this development as of great importance in the general scheme.

(3) Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of the Burma Road

We have approved the 15th November, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation. (C.S.S. 55th Meeting, Item 4).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and air
forces can be provided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943. (C.C.S.164).

6. THE AXIS OIL POSITION

We have had laid before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position. (C.C.S. 158). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany, be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow. (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1).

7. NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to cover the French West African Coast. (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3).

(1) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio d'Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.
(ii) That subject to (i) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

(iii) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

A. TURKEY

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British. (C.O.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2).
U. S. SECRET
RUSSIAN MOST SECRET
C.C.S. 171
22 January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION Husky

DIRECTIVE

Enclosed is a draft directive to General Eisenhower regarding operation Husky which is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an
attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that
the following command set-up shall be established for the
operation:

1. You are to be the Supreme Commander with General
   Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsi-
   ble for the detailed planning and preparation
   and for the execution of the actual operation
   when launched.

2. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be the
   Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the
   Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your
recommendations for the Officers to be appointed Western
and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up
at once a special operational and administrative staff, with
its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the
operation.

The provision of the necessary forces and their
training in time for the assault on the target date given
above have been the subject of exhaustive study by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff and their Staffs. A Memorandum
setting out the various considerations and the outline
plan for the operation which formed the basis of this study, is attached for your information. (C.C.S. 161/1). Plan A. (wide para. 5 of this paper) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional forces which will be made available to you for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of the Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above decisions, is attached for your information.

You are to report to them not later than the 1st March, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon. In the event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date will not be later than the favourable August moon.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION HUSKY

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

(Approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 60th Meeting)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943, with the target date as the period of the favourable July moon (Code designation HUSKY).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the following command set-up shall be established for the operation:

1. You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

2. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be the Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommendations for the Officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation, including cover plans.

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their Staffs. A Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan for the operation which formed the basis of this study, is attached for your information. (C.C.S. 161/1). Plan A (vide para. 5 of this paper) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional forces which will be made
available to you for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of the Minutes of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above decisions, is attached for your information.

You are to report to them not later than the 1st March, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon. In the event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

The code designation will apply to all general preparations for MEDIT in the Mediterranean Theater, including training, cover plans and preliminary air operations. Specific operations will be given special code designations.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATION HUSKY

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

(Approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 69th Meeting)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943, with the target date as the period of the favourable July* moon (Code designation HUSKY).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the following command set-up shall be established for the operation:

1. You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

2. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be the Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommendations for the Officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation, including cover plans.

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their Staffs. A Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan for the

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favourable June moon period as the date for the operation. If at the end of the three weeks their efforts have proved successful, your instructions will be modified accordingly.
operation which formed the basis of this study, is attached for your information. (C.C.S. 161/1). Plan A (vide para. 5 of this paper) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional forces which will be made available to you for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of the Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above decisions, is attached for your information.

You are to report to them not later than the 1st March, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon. In the event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

The code designation to be communicated to you later will apply to all general preparations for HUSKY in the Mediterranean Theater, including training, cover plans and preliminary air operations. Specific operations will be given special code designations.
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 178
22 January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR BOLERO BUILD-UP

Note by Lt. General R.H. Somervell

1. The attached tables (App. 1 and 2) show the possibilities with existing and presently projected shipping of moving troops and equipment from the U. S. to the U. K. Estimates of capability of British shipping have been prepared on the basis of ship sailings provided by the Ministry of War Transport, estimates on American shipping have been prepared by the Commanding General, Services of Supply, United States Army. The assumptions on which these tables have been prepared are shown in Appendix 3.

2. There seems little possibility in the first half of the year to improve the situation. By conversion, increasing the capacity of troop ships and other combinations there does seem to be the possibility of some increase in the latter half of the year. This possibility is restricted in the winter months by the limitations on U.K. port and railway capacities under blackout conditions.

3. Continuing study will be given to securing such increases as may be possible.

4. In terms of divisions available for continental operations, the U. S. forces in the U. K. over and above the build up of the air contingent to 175,000 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Total Numbers Equipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is based on (1) the figure of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and availability date.

- 1 -
### SHIPPING CAPABILITIES ON ROLO EN ROUTE BUILD-UP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Present or Enroute Dec. 31, 1942</th>
<th>Quarterly Increments during '43</th>
<th>Total for 1943</th>
<th>Grand Total by 12/31/43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Cargo Ships</td>
<td>80,000 116,000 369,000 491,000</td>
<td>1,056,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. Cargo Ships</td>
<td>- 52,000 25,000 64,000</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Capability of Cargo Shipping</td>
<td>80,000 169,000 384,000 554,000</td>
<td>1,187,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Troop Ships</td>
<td>103,000 105,000 235,000 299,000</td>
<td>742,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. Troop Ships</td>
<td>100,000 105,000 235,000 299,000</td>
<td>742,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Capability of Personnel Shipping</td>
<td>143,000 220,000 375,000 559,000</td>
<td>1,007,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Build-up in U.K.</td>
<td>80,000 169,000 375,000 559,000</td>
<td>983,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulated Strength in U.K.</td>
<td>135,000 215,000 384,000 759,000</td>
<td>1,118,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) It is estimated by British Ministry of War Transport that the above figures would involve approximately 150 ROLO cargo ships per month in the last quarter of the year. Provided U.S. dock labor and locomotives are forthcoming as stipulated, this rate is possible during the summer but not during the winter months.
### Projected U.S. Troop Movements in 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theatre</th>
<th>Present or Enroute Dec. 31, 1942</th>
<th>1st Q</th>
<th>2nd Q</th>
<th>3rd Q</th>
<th>4th Q</th>
<th>Total for 1943</th>
<th>Grand Total by Dec. 31, 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. and S.W. Pacific</td>
<td>224,000</td>
<td>48,700</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>111,200</td>
<td>335,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Africa and Husky</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases</td>
<td>454,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>471,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>983,000</td>
<td>1,118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,060,000</td>
<td>208,200</td>
<td>327,000</td>
<td>418,500</td>
<td>371,900</td>
<td>1,325,600</td>
<td>2,385,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) One division (16,000 troops) combat loaded from U.S.
ASSUMPTIONS FOR CALCULATIONS OF
U. S. SHIPPING CAPABILITIES
UNDER PLAN ADOPTED BY
C.C.S. FOR 1943

1. Loss rate in dry cargo ships taken at 2.6% per month.

2. U. S. controlled dry cargo shipping taken at
9,185,000 DWT on 1 October, 1942.

3. British controlled dry cargo shipping taken at
19,700,000 DWT on 1 October, 1942.

4. U. S. construction program for 1943 as reported in
Anfa No. 339, i.e., 10,440,000 DWT of dry cargo ships, of
which 387,000 DWT will be converted to tankers. Construction
is estimated to proceed at the following rate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov. 15 Program</th>
<th>Jan. 16 Program</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr.</td>
<td>3,265,000</td>
<td>3,610,000</td>
<td>345,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qtr.</td>
<td>3,220,000</td>
<td>4,104,000</td>
<td>884,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Qtr.</td>
<td>3,214,000</td>
<td>3,745,000</td>
<td>531,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qtr.</td>
<td>3,191,000</td>
<td>3,717,000</td>
<td>526,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Dry Cargo</td>
<td>12,890,000</td>
<td>15,067,000</td>
<td>2,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>3,118,000</td>
<td>3,472,000</td>
<td>354,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,008,000</td>
<td>18,539,000</td>
<td>2,531,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. British and Canadian construction programs as fur-
nished by Munitions Assignment Board.

6. Excess of British losses over construction in U.K.
and Canada replaced from U.S. construction. This will permit
the re-establishment of the British Import Program at a level
considered as meeting their minimum requirements.

7. No ECO's converted to transports through 1943.

8. Five cargo ships converted to combat loaders by Navy
each month, November to April, inclusive.

9. Shipping employed on an average turn-around of 2½
months.

10. Repair rate taken at 28½% of total dry cargo fleet.

11. Initial movement based on 8 ship tons per man.

12. Maintenance based on 1.3 ship tons per man per month
except for U. K. where it is reduced to 1.0 ship tons per man
per month.
U. S. SECRET

13. Navy employment of dry cargo tonnage in 4th Quarter of 1942 averages 1,180,000 DWT and is increased by 300,000 DWT each quarter of 1943 as assumed in JPS 57/2.

14. The transfer of vessels between oceans to meet theater requirements.

15. U. S. shipping for war economy and defense aid taken at 4,000,000 tons supplemented by 170 voyages in Russian aid according to C.C.S. 162/1.

16. Lift ratio between North Atlantic and South and Southwest Pacific taken at 1.4 to 1.

17. British aid reckoned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIPMENTS</th>
<th>1st Q</th>
<th>2nd Q</th>
<th>3rd Q</th>
<th>4th Q</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (lift)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>345,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (1000 shpg tons)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

3. The figures are based on a very rapid estimate and must, of course, be subject to check after detailed examination.

3. The assistance shown is dependent on the following assumptions:-

(1) That no shipping can be taken from the U. K. Import Programme.

(2) That TORCH build-up ceases with KM 11 and that thereafter the British shipping released from TORCH can be employed on BILENCO assistance except for the demands of HUSKY and ANARH.

(3) That the Ministry of War Transport are able to continue to provide shipping to cover all other military requirements on the agreed minimum level without encroaching on the TORCH pool.

(4) That it is possible to find escorts for the convoy programmes involved.

18. Movements to U. S. bases will be restricted to 17,400 to Iran.

19. Requirements for HUSKY as decided in C.C.S. 161/1 (Plan A).
APPENDIX III

20. Any excess movements to South and Southwest Pacific and Burma over 141,200 to be by Navy tonnage.

21. U. S. movements to North Africa to cease when total of 400,000 is reached. One division (16,000 troops) to be combat loaded from the United States.

22. Escorts are not limiting factor.