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J.C.S. STRATEGIC STUDIES AND OUTLINE PLANS

BOOK I

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES

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PLANNING FOR CONFERENCE

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TAB
A

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PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT
(Brief)

The British Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Minister of Defense, submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a proposed Agenda for the "QUADRANT" conference, as outlined in C.C.S. 288. The British Chiefs of Staff point out that the main object of having the conference is to enable rapid decisions to be taken in the light of the results of "HUSKY" on the question of future operations in the Mediterranean to eliminate Italy from the War. They therefore suggest that POST-"HUSKY" operations be the first subject for discussion and that consideration then be given to a policy to be followed in the event of an Italian collapse. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Defeat of Japan be next on the agenda.

After study of the British proposal, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff presented a proposed agenda (C.C.S. 288/1) which includes practically all of the items suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff. However, they believe that the first item on the Agenda should be a reaffirmation of the "TRIDENT" decisions as to the overall objective, the overall strategic concept, and the basic undertakings in support of the overall strategic concept as were approved by the President and the Prime Minister in C.C.S. 242/6.

In reply, the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 288/2) explain that it is hoped it may be possible to confine the Agenda as far as possible to those specific issues on which decisions are required to cover operations in the comparatively near future. They suggest that the first "QUADRANT" meeting be limited to the Chiefs of Staff and that in it they should decide:

(1) The composition of the Agenda.

(2) The order in which it should be taken.

(3) The procedure to be followed at the Conference.

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C.C.S. 288

26 July 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

The following Agenda, proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff for Quadrant, as approved by the Minister of Defense, is submitted herewith for the agreement of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

1. It was decided at TRIDENT, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet "In July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time". (See CCS 242/6 para (7) 2)

2. Strategy in MEDITERRANEAN. The main object of the above was to enable rapid decisions to be taken in light of results of HUSKY, on question of further operations in MEDITERRANEAN to eliminate ITALY from the war. It is therefore suggested that first subject for discussion should be post-HUSKY operations followed by policy in event of an ITALIAN collapse.

3. Defeat of JAPAN. In course of TRIDENT conference Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan "for the defeat of JAPAN". (See CCS 242/6 (4) 3). It is suggested that if sufficient progress has been made this should be next subject for discussion together with following cognate matters.

(i) Progress report of operations in PACIFIC.

(ii) Progress report of preparations for operations from INDIA with special reference to CCS 242/6 para (4) 3A.

[redacted]

(111) Establishment of South East ASIA Command organization and appointments.

4. Operations from U.K.

(1) U-Boat Warfare.

(11) OVERLORD-Outline plan air organization and command.

(111) BOLERO-SICKLE building up.

5. Miscellaneous.

(1) HABBAKUK

(11) Operation ALACRITY

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C.C.S. 288/1

27 July 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff have given their careful consideration to the agenda proposed by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 288. They recommend that the agenda include the following:

I. Conference procedure.

II. Consideration of: Over-all Objective, Over-all Strategic Concept, and Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept. (Similar to Sections I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6.)

III. a. Consideration of specific operations for 1943-44 in the European-Mediterranean area.

(1) Progress and planning report on BOLERO-OVERLORD.

(2) Progress report on SICKLE-POINTBLANK; use of Italian air bases to extend POINTBLANK.

(3) Anti-submarine warfare.

(4) Review of approved post-HUSKY operations.

(5) Employment of French forces.

(6) Subsequent operations in the Mediterranean.

(7) Other European operations.

(a) Emergency invasion of the Continent in the event of an imminent German collapse.

(b) Emergency operations in the event of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.

b. Consideration of specific operations for 1943-44 in the Pacific-Asiatic area.

(1) Appreciation and plan for the defeat of Japan, including preparation for maximum exploitation of air offensive against Japan.

(2) Progress and planning reports on NOTEBOOK, BULLFROG and SAUCY.

(3) Porgress and planning reports on Pacific operations.

c. Miscellaneous considerations.

(1) HABBAKUK.

(2) Operation ALACRITY.

(3) Equipping of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals.

(4) Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated territories.

IV. Decisions as to 1943-44 operations.

V. Availability of resources to implement specific undertakings, to include timing.

VI. Final report to the President and the Prime Minister.

VII. Preparation of necessary directives.

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29 July 1943

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

The Agenda proposed for QUADRANT by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 288/1 has been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff and their reply has now been received. The following is the gist.

1. It is hoped that it may be possible to confine the Agenda as far as possible to those specific issues on which decisions are required to govern operations in the comparatively near future. It was on that principle that the Agenda suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, as set out in C.C.S. 288, was designed. The British Chiefs of Staff hope, therefore, that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will be willing to dispense with lengthy discussions on over-all strategic concepts or global strategy.

2. Section 3 of the U.S. proposed Agenda includes most of the points the British would like to discuss. If anything, they feel that it is perhaps a little too comprehensive.

3. In Section 3(a)(vi) it is assumed that "Action in the event of Italian collapse" will be included.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are not anxious to discuss the item "Emergency Operations in the event of a German Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula" because they regard this as an exceedingly remote contingency.

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5. Under "Miscellaneous Considerations" it is requested that an item on future allocation of landing craft should be included. At present, landing craft can only be allocated expressly for operations approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff do not think that this method should continue as it is unduly expensive and hampers future planning and training.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff note that the item "Establishment of South-East Asia Command: Organization and Appointments", suggested by them, has been excluded. The British Chiefs of Staff assume that this is because the U.S. Chiefs of Staff hope that all these questions will have been settled before the QUADRANT Conference. The position is, however, that the Prime Minister has decided that this must be dealt with at QUADRANT since there is much that can only be satisfactorily dealt with by personal discussion. In the meantime, General Auchinleck has been instructed to press on with all preparations for the agreed operation.

7. The British Chiefs of Staff foresee great difficulties in settling the Agenda by exchange of telegrams and therefore suggest that the first QUADRANT meeting should be limited to the Chiefs of Staff and that it should decide

a. The composition of the Agenda;

b. The order in which it should be taken; and

c. The procedure to be followed at the Conference.

8. The British Chiefs of Staff think that it would be immensely helpful if an officer from AFHQ could be present at QUADRANT. General Bedell Smith was quite invaluable at TRIDENT.

9. They hope that their colleagues, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, will be able to arrive at Abraham on August 10th or as soon as possible afterwards.

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PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT U.S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE
(Agreed Essentials for the Conduct of the War)
(Brief)

On 27 July, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff present for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a proposal that for the next U.S.-British Staff Conference, the overall objective, the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, and the basic undertakings in support of the overall strategic concept remain the same as those approved at the "TRIDENT" Conferences and published in Sections I, II, and III of C.C.S. 242/6.

In reply, the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 289/1) agree but indicate that "QUADRANT" discussions may require some slight changes in Sections I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6.

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C.C.S. 289

27 July 1943

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT U.S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE
(Agreed Essentials for the Conduct of the War)

Memorandum from the U. S. Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that, for the next U.S.-British staff conference, the over-all objective, the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, and the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concept, remain the same as those approved at the TRIDENT conferences and published in Sections, I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6 as follows:

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of RUSSIA.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective ally and as a base for operations against JAPAN.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY in the war on the side of the ALLIES. (See also Section VI, par. 1 (page 10) of C.C.S. 242/6).

9. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the war against the AXIS Powers. (See also Section VI, par. 2 (page 10) of C.C.S. 242/6).

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C.C.S. 289/1

1 August 1943

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT U.S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

The proposal by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that "the agreed essentials for the conduct of the War" as set out in Sections I, II, and III of C.C.S. 242/6 should be accepted for the QUADRANT Conference is agreed to, it being understood that courses of action are not thereby excluded from consideration which may appear likely to facilitate or to accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

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J.C.S. 443

"QUADRANT" AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY
(Brief)

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee submitted its comments on coming discussions at the "QUADRANT" Conference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting the situation of the war existing at this time (6 August) and outlining possible courses of action; whether the main effort against the Axis on the continent should be made from the U.K. or from the Mediterranean and the implications of each. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded by pointing out that the committee believes the U.K. affords the most advantageous bases for launching an invasion of continental Europe. They also express the opinion that should the decision reached at "QUADRANT" be to make our major effort in the Mediterranean, "OVERLORD" should be affirmatively abandoned and the ground forces maintained in the U.K. be limited to those necessary for security and for an opportunistic cross-Channel operations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the recommendations set forth in this paper as a guide in carrying on the discussions at the "QUADRANT" Conference.

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(J.C.S. 443 - Revised)

6 August 1943

(1) CCS Memo Inf 557 #118
(2) JCS 422
(3) JSSC 22
(4) JCS 422/1
(5) CCS 288
(6) JPS 230/D
(7) JPS 230/1
(8) JCS 422/2
(9) CCS 288/1
(10) CCS 289
(11) JPS 189
(12) JPS 189/1
(13) JCS 410
(14) JPS 189/2
(15) JPS 189/3
(16) JPS 189/4
(17) CCS 288/2
(18) CCS 289/1
(19) JSSC 23

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

QUADRANT AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY
Reference: a. J.C.S. 422/1

Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

(This memorandum is a redraft of J.C.S. 443 on the same subject which has been revised in the light of the discussion of the J.C.S. at their meeting on 6 August 1943.)

1. In par. 6 of ref. a the Joint Strategic Survey Committee discussed the "Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe" in connection with QUADRANT. Since that paper was written -

a. There has been an acceleration in Italian deterioration, marked by the fall of Mussolini, which is imposing new burdens on Germany and may result in the withdrawal of Italy from the war.

b. AVALANCHE has been approved, with resources limited to those available for PRICELESS plus certain carrier support to be supplied by the British.

c. Exchanges on the highest level indicate that operations in the Balkans after the fall of Italy may be suggested.

d. Russian initiative on the Eastern Front has been more firmly established with the capture of Orel.

e. British position indicates that they want to undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean, at the expense of Burma operations set up at Trident.

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By RHP Date [redacted] 7-11-73

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2. In view of these developments, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee submit the following general comment and recommendations concerning the strategy of Europe.

a. In its relation to global strategy the Committee remains firmly convinced that the strategy in Europe must not be allowed to encroach upon current commitments for the war against Japan. To do so would be in conflict with the accepted over-all objective of defeating the Axis powers at the earliest possible date.

b. As regards strategy within the European theater, we must recognize that we are in a rapidly changing situation, with the tide of events setting strongly in our favor. We should carefully avoid on the one hand being influenced too much by preconceived ideas and on the other, being carried away by the inviting promise of new situations.

c. As between the Mediterranean and Northwest areas of European strategy, the committee finds no reason to change its previous opinion that there should be no interference with SICKLE, (except as advantage may be taken of Italian bases to extend the scale of the combined bomber offensive), and no encroachments on OVERLORD.

3. Major Military Effort in Europe from the U.K.

The fundamental question to be resolved at QUADRANT is that of whether or not the Trident agreement as to OVERLORD is to be implemented and carried out in good faith. The Committee recommends that this agreement be adhered to, and that operations in the Mediterranean be strictly subordinated thereto and involve no means that are needed for OVERLORD or for approved undertakings in the Pacific.

It is the opinion of the Committee that the U.K. affords the most advantageous base for launching an invasion of Continental Europe and securing an area in which we can most effectively employ our available resources against

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the German Army, because among other reasons (secure communications, base installations, narrowness of Channel), it offers the cardinal advantage of affording the base from which we can capitalize to the maximum extent on the use of air power in support of ground operations.

4. Major Military Effort in Europe in the Mediterranean.

If the decision be reached at QUADRANT to make our major effort in the Mediterranean, we will be in effect accepting the role of the beseiger of a fortress, with an indefinite prolongation of the war in Europe and a corresponding postponement of decisive measures against Japan.

In the event of such a decision, OVERLORD should be affirmatively abandoned, and the ground forces maintained in the U.K. should be limited to those necessary for security and for an opportunistic cross-Channel operation to take advantage of a marked deterioration in German morale.

The operations to be undertaken in the Mediterranean under these circumstances should be confined to its Central and Western sections, and should be in extension generally of those outlined in paragraph 5.

5. As to operations in the Mediterranean with the forces to be available under the Trident agreements, the Committee offers the following comment and recommendations:

a. While the situation as regards Italy has not yet been clarified, it does seem established that Italy wants to get out of the war as soon as possible. However, the German intentions as regards Italy are not yet apparent, and the extent to which Germany can delay or prevent Italy's surrender remains to be seen. The most probable course of German action would be to delay the Allied advance into Italy as long as possible with available resources, and then to defend Northern Italy against a further Allied advance into that area.

[redacted]

b. Before any other operations are undertaken, Italy should be occupied if practicable as far North as the PISA-ANCONA line. While firm decisions as to the future operations cannot be made until the situation at that time has developed, it is desirable to make tentative decisions and plans, based on reasonable assumptions.

c. Assuming that Italy has surrendered and been occupied by the Allies as far north as PISA-ANCONA line, that we hold CORSICA and SARDINIA and that Italian troops in the Balkans have been withdrawn or neutralized, there are four possible areas for further operations - Northern Italy, the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans via Salonika, the Balkans via the Adriatic, and the Southern coast of France.

(1) Further operations in Northern Italy with a view to our occupation of the Valley of the Po, or beyond can be decided only at the time. The scale of German resistance would be the main consideration. Such an operation would continue the momentum of our Italian campaign and under favorable conditions might develop into a collateral threat against Southern France. On the other hand, such an operation would not be necessary to gain bases for bombing Southern Germany, it would not lead to a direct attack against Germany, and it might involve so much of our Mediterranean resources as to prevent their employment in a more promising operation.

(2) A campaign to seize the Eastern Mediterranean islands for an advance into the Balkans via Salonika undoubtedly has attractions for the British, both historically and politically - though their military experiences in that area in the past have not been very happy. The Prime Minister has shown interest in such a plan, in

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connection with his ideas concerning Turkey. However, as an operation to follow the surrender of Italy it should not be accepted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. From the military point of view it is an eccentric operation as regards Germany, involving enormous resources in an area remote from our bases of supply, while holding little promise of prompt and decisive results. Politically, it would not receive popular support in this country and there are probable complications with the Soviets, which should be avoided.

(3) Operations in the Balkans via the Adriatic, have been a British concept ever since we entered North Africa. The President has also indicated interest in the possibilities in this area, and it is probable that the British will endeavor to capitalize on that interest if possible. An examination of this course of action has developed the following conclusions:

(a) Full invasion of the Balkans by way of the Adriatic is impracticable due to lack of adequate ports and the rugged and undeveloped character of the country.

(b) Seizure of a bridgehead at Durazzo from which to supply and support the guerrilla forces is a practical operation which would probably require assault forces of about 30,000 and follow-up forces of about 90,000 for which the necessary air support and shipping could probably be made available.

(c) Supply and support of the resistance groups on a large scale by sea and air from Italy or North Africa would be a far less expensive undertaking than seizing a bridgehead for that purpose, and would accomplish almost as much in support of the resistance groups as would that much more extensive operation.

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(d) Of the above three courses of action, the last is preferable. In other words, the Balkan problem, after the occupation of Italy, would be best handled by supply and support of the resistance groups, by air and small vessels, without seizing a bridgehead.

(4) There remains the Western Mediterranean area and operations against the South coast of France. Such an operation would be admittedly difficult, primarily due to lack of shore-based air cover, with possibility of failure. If deterioration of the German position continues at the rate of the past few months, however, an operation against the South coast of France, keyed to and integrated with OVERLORD, should have good chances of success.

6. In view of the above, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommend that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff take the following position as regards the coming discussions of strategy in Europe:

a. If the British insist on a strategy in Europe which cannot be reconciled with the overall objective of ending the war as soon as possible, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will have to consider transferring to the Pacific some of the U.S. resources now committed to Europe.

b. Prospective operations in the Eur-African Theaters should not interfere with present plans for war against Japan.

c. Mediterranean operations should be subject to a clear-cut acceptance by the British that the major effort against Germany is to be made from the U.K.

d. Mediterranean operations should not interfere with POINTBLANK (except as advantage may be taken of Italian bases to extend the scope of the combined bomber offensive), nor encroach on OVERLORD.

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e. Operation AVALANCHE should be developed to include Southern and Central Italy as far as the PISA-ANCONA line, to the extent that it can be done with the resources already assigned.

f. The question of a further major effort to occupy all of Northern Italy should be examined in the light of the then situation, while recognizing the indecisive character of such an undertaking, the adequacy of our air fields without it and its adverse effect on other possible operations.

g. SARDINIA and CORSICA should be occupied.

h. No major operation should be undertaken in the Eastern Mediterranean, nor in the Balkans via the Eastern Mediterranean

i. No major operation should be undertaken in the Balkans via the Adriatic.

j. Plans should be developed and operations undertaken to assist guerrilla activity in the Balkans by air and sea, without capturing a bridgehead on the Eastern Adriatic.

k. Contingent plans should be made for a diversionary attack on Southern France in close integration with OVERLORD.

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BACKGROUND MATERIAL

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29 July 1943

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

COLLAPSE OF ITALY

Note by the Secretary

The attached paper, which was prepared by the Subcommittee in response to an informal request from the Joint War Plans Committee, is submitted to the Committee for its consideration.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD, III,
Secretary.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 21-73
By RT Date APR 24 1973

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COLLAPSE OF ITALY

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the situation in Italy, the manner in which Italian resistance is most likely to cease and the conditions which would then ensue within that country. The effect of the loss of Italy on the Axis situation in other areas will be treated in a subsequent paper.

The situation in Italy is now extremely unstable and its development unpredictable, except in the most general terms. This should, therefore, be regarded as an interim report of tentative nature.

DISCUSSION

2. Discussion is contained in the following enclosures:

"A" -- Axis Order of Battle.

"B" -- Axis Capabilities and Intentions.

"C" -- The Form of Italian Collapse.

"D" -- The Situation in Italy after Resistance has Ceased.

CONCLUSIONS

3. Germany will attempt to defend Italy, but not to the extent of seriously impairing her capabilities on other fronts. If unable to hold the entire peninsula, she may attempt to hold a defensive line in the north.

4. Regardless of whether its purpose is to continue or to withdraw from the war, the Badoglio government will seek to maintain Italian resistance for the time being. Italian forces will probably continue to resist in some degree, pending an armistice.

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5. Resistance, even with German support, offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. Circumstances, however, may prevent escape by negotiation with the United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained by formal surrender, the internal situation will continue to deteriorate. Collapse would then occur as piecemeal and progressive disintegration under continued attack.

6. Where resistance has ceased, the local civil authorities, clergy, and population will, in general, cooperate with a military government in restoring orderly civil and economic conditions. The Vatican, while maintaining a position of neutrality, will exert its influence toward the restoration of order.

7. Considerable economic aid will be required to maintain a tolerable scale of living in Italy.

8. The Italian Fleet will probably follow the edict of the King. A substantial amount of usable merchant tonnage may be obtained, but such tonnage will probably not be much in excess of that required to transport the economic aid mentioned in paragraph 7 above.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

ORDER OF BATTLE

9. Italian

a. Ground.

(1) Dispositions are believed to be as follows (as of 29 July).

	Field div.	Coastal div.
Sicily	5*	2**
Sardinia	3	2
Corsica	2	2
France	5	2
Italy ***	11	3
West Balkans	20	-
Greece-Agean	11	-

* Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived.
** Three others have disintegrated.
*** Exclusive of 8 divisions badly mauled in Russia and now reorganizing at home stations.

(2) Movements. Some Italian withdrawals from France and the Balkans are probable. Such withdrawals would increase German occupational responsibilities and to that extent reduce German reinforcement of Italy. We believe that the occupational divisions will probably be ordered to return to Italy. However, a wholesale Italian withdrawal from the Balkans would take time (from two to three months at least). It may be assumed, therefore, that the majority of Italian field divisions will remain outside of the Italian peninsula for the present.

(3) Effectiveness. In general the equipment of Italian troops is poor and their morale is low. Those in Sicily, particularly the coastal divisions, have not offered determined resistance, even though supported by German troops. It is probable that the conduct of other Italian forces will be similar. It is not to be expected, however, that they will surrender before strong forces are brought to bear on them.

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b. Air.

(1) Dispositions (as of 24 July).

The front-line strength of the Italian Air Force disposed in the Central Mediterranean area (which includes Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Southern France) is believed to consist of 1,045 aircraft of which 475 are fighters. That disposed in the Eastern Mediterranean, from which transfers could be readily made for reinforcement is estimated to consist of 335 aircraft of which 105 are fighters. There are also 190 non-operational aircraft in Italy.

(2) Effectiveness.

Except for some fighter and torpedo bomber squadrons which are equipped with modern and efficient types of aircraft, the combat efficiency of the air force is so low that for purposes of comparison it should be discounted at least 30%. Present indications are that pilot morale, known previously to be low, has greatly deteriorated. In view of the fact that the air force was the most strongly Fascist branch of the Italian armed services, its potential may be further reduced under present political influences. The situation is still so obscure, however, that it seems unsafe at this time to discount too heavily its capabilities, so long as the possibility exists that fighter and torpedo squadrons might be inspired to put up a fight.

c. Naval.

(1) Dispositions of effective units in Mediterranean waters are believed to be as follows (as of 27 July):

	BB	CA	CL	DD	MTB	SS
Western Basin	2/3*	1	5	15/20	40)	35
Eastern Basin	3/4#	-	1	15/20	60)	

* 15" # 12.6"

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(2) Effectiveness. The effectiveness of Italian submarines and motor torpedo boats is believed to be fairly high; that of the major units is considered to be low. It seems probable that the major units would continue inactive during a United Nations landing in force on the peninsula, provided that the landing had strong air and naval support.

10. German.

a. Ground.

(1) Dispositions are believed to be as follows (as of 29 July):

	Pz.div.	Mtz.div.	Inf.div.	Total Strength
Sicily	1	1	1½	75,000* (11,500 Flak)
Sardinia	-	-	1	28,000 (6,500 Flak)
Corsica	-	-	-	2,000
Italy	2	1	-	60,000 (13,000 Flak)

* Less Casualties.

(2) Movements. The German divisions in Italy have recently come from France and there are indications that others will follow. As many as 12 additional divisions are available in France and could move into Italy within thirty days.

(3) Effectiveness. The divisions used and available to reinforce Italy from France are, for the most part, reformed "Stalingrad" divisions. Although perhaps not up to pre-Stalingrad standards, they must be considered as effective combat units. This is illustrated by the conduct of the two original German divisions in Sicily, which are units hastily reformed after having been involved, in whole or in part, in the Tunisian debacle.

b. Air. The operational strength of the German Air Force in the Central Mediterranean area (as of 24 July) is believed to consist of about 1,242 aircraft of which 474 are fighters.

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Disposed in the Eastern Mediterranean and available for reinforcement are believed to be 183 aircraft of which 45 are fighters. No considerable deterioration in pilot morale has been noted.

c. Naval. Effective units in Mediterranean waters are believed to be (as of 27 July) about 20 submarines, one destroyer, and some 45 motor torpedo boats. Perhaps 20 motor torpedo boats were in the Western Basin; the destroyer and the remaining motor torpedo boats were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of all units is believed to be fairly high, though the heavy losses suffered by German submarines in the Mediterranean may considerably have reduced the willingness of their commanders to press home an attack in the face of air cover and anti-submarine vessels.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

AXIS CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

11. General. Axis capabilities are limited to strategic defense. Italy, without German support, cannot offer strong, determined, or prolonged resistance. Within thirty days Germany can reinforce Italy with 12 additional divisions from France. Since this could be done by the use of reformed "Stalingrad" divisions just becoming effective, such reinforcement would not impair her existing strength in any other theater. Further reinforcement, however, could be accomplished only by withdrawals from other theaters, with a consequent impairment of German capabilities there. Any air reinforcement would be at the expense of other theaters. Decisive naval reinforcement is impossible.

12. Capabilities. Depending upon the scale of reinforcement, Germany, with Italian assistance, could:

a. Attempt to defend the entire peninsula.

b. Delay in the south and attempt to hold a defensive line covering either the Po Valley or the mouths of the Alpine passes.

c. Delay in the south, pending the arrival of reinforcements, and then counterattack to destroy United Nations forces in Italy or to expel them from the continent.

13. German intentions. Current German movements into and within Italy indicate an intention to defend the peninsula. If, however, Axis forces in Italy, reinforced by the 12 German divisions available, prove inadequate to defend the whole peninsula, we believe that, after maximum delay in the south, the Germans will withdraw to and attempt to hold a defensive line in the north.

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S E C R E T

ENCLOSURE "C"

THE FORM OF ITALIAN COLLAPSE

14. Italian Morale.

We now believe that Italian morale is so low that the military forces, if unsupported by German units, will in most instances not offer more than a weak and half-hearted resistance to any strong attack by United Nations forces, and even if so supported, will not offer determined or prolonged resistance. Among the civil population the will to resist, already known to be weak, may be expected to deteriorate further under intensive air attack and propaganda.

15. Possibility of formal surrender. Even though Badoglio were to succeed in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with German reinforcement, could not now protect Italy from the ravages of war, and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. Unless effective relief from further Allied attack is soon obtained, the internal situation will continue to deteriorate. It would appear, therefore, that the only course whereby disintegration approaching anarchy can be avoided and the position of the House of Savoy can be in some degree maintained, is formal surrender. However, the presence of German forces in Italy, and the absence of the greater part of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 field divisions) from the peninsula, may prevent Badoglio from effecting such a surrender.

16. The probable alternative form of collapse: If the Badoglio government cannot or will not surrender, the internal situation will continue to deteriorate and collapse of resistance will take the form of piecemeal disintegration coincident with the invasion of the peninsula by Allied forces and the defeat or retirement of German forces. In those circumstances, Italian

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armed units, cities, and even whole regions may surrender at the discretion of individual commanders and authorities. This disintegration would, of course, be hastened by the loss of Rome. Furthermore, such disintegration would be cumulative in effect and might, at a certain point, precipitate complete collapse of all parts of Italy not occupied by strong German forces.

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ENCLOSURE "D"

THE SITUATION IN ITALY AFTER RESISTANCE HAS CEASED

17. Civil Reaction. With few changes in personnel, local administrative and judicial procedures can probably be maintained and effectively utilized by a United Nations' Military government. The cooperation of local police and carabinieri in the maintenance of order may be expected. The civil population in general will accommodate itself to and may even welcome these changes.

18. Attitude of the Church. The Vatican will maintain its attitude of strict neutrality, but will not obstruct the operation of the military government. The Church as a whole will exert its influence toward the restoration of order and will cooperate in relief of distress and in rehabilitation. Parish priests should prove helpful in the administration of civil affairs.

19. Economic Factors. We estimate that in order to maintain a tolerable level of existence in Italy, it may be necessary to import as much as 400,000 metric tons a month, including 300,000 tons of high-grade coal. We believe, however, that there will be no general economic problem grave enough, in itself, to produce serious civil disturbances calling for extraordinary vigilance or protective forces.

After the earliest stage of occupation, Italy will have serious unemployment due to demobilization of the armed forces, to the stoppage of war industries and to the closing of factories which will not be able to get enough raw materials to keep going. This unemployment can be handled in part by allocating manpower to farms, by replacement of women, old men and children, by repairing war-damaged houses, public buildings, etc., and by collecting battlefield scrap and salvaging ships. There will still be an irreducible minimum of unemployment in industries where raw materials are unavailable.

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20. Surrender of Italian Fleet and Merchant Marine:

a. Fleet. We believe that the Italians are not, in any case, likely to demolish thoroughly many of their combatant vessels or naval installations before surrendering. Whether or not they will do some damage to them will depend principally on the order of the King or his representatives. The Germans, on the other hand, will presumably do everything within their power to prevent the United Nations from deriving any benefit from captured Italian naval vessels or installations.

b. Merchant Marine. We consider it unlikely that the Italians will do extensive damage to merchant vessels or ship repair facilities before surrendering. The probable importance of such vessels in the supply of necessities to Italy after surrender and the hope of eventually getting them back should both act as deterrents. The Germans, on the other hand, if the surrender of Italy appears imminent, will presumably try to destroy repair facilities and to destroy vessels or move them to ports expected to remain under German control. The amount of shipping likely to be captured in Italian ports in serviceable condition, or not damaged beyond the possibility of fairly easy repair, is subject to a high degree of uncertainty but might amount to as much as 500,000 G.R.T. of dry-cargo carriers, 100,000 G.R.T. of large passenger vessels, and 100,000 G.R.T. of tankers. However, the amount of dry-cargo carriers and tankers will probably be not much in excess of that required to transport the economic aid indicated in paragraph 19. In addition, there might remain in Italian ports about the same tonnages of more seriously damaged vessels of the same types which would be worth repairing and which could be repaired in Italian shipyards.

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ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA
(Brief)

This paper, a report by the Joint Staff Planners on an estimate of the enemy situation prepared by the J.I.C. was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended and approved the report, directing that it be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The report, in brief, sets forth the situation, capabilities and probable intentions of the enemy in Europe, concluding with a summary of "Germany's most probable courses of action, 1943-1944" and the "Forecast for 1943-1944", Paragraphs 9 and 10, page 19.

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quadrant Conference.

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ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944
EUROPEAN AREA
(As of 30 July 1943)

NOTE: In view of very recent developments in Italy, the ultimate consequences of which are as yet unpredictable, related paragraphs of this paper must be regarded as tentative.

1. Basic factors in the European situation.

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstances. None of them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now dissociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R. Italy's special position as a nominally equal partner with Germany would, however, make her surrender more impressive than that of any of the others.

b. Germany's basic task is now to defend "Festung Europa",* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. Although she may no longer expect to impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, she can still hope to avert surrender and even to gain an advantageous negotiated peace by dividing her enemies politcally (in particular, by dividing the U.S.S.R. from Great Britain and the United States), by beating off their attacks, or by making her defeat so costly as to dissuade them from the task. This hope, as long as it persists, will justify and support a determined resistance.

c. "Festung Europa".* Germany now controls, directly or indirectly, all of continental Europe west of the Russian

* As herein conceived, "Festung Europa" consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas.

front, except the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade, but contains within itself the requisites of a practical military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack (assuming the continued neutrality of Spain and Turkey). The western face has been strengthened by extensive fortification; the southern face is backed by formidable mountainous terrain. Major industrial areas in western territory under German control, however, are subject to heavy aerial attack.

The eastern face of "Festung Europa" is without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the eastern front must continue to be Germany's chief preoccupation in land operations.

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda, the inhabitants of "Festung Europa" are not united in its defense. That fact entails not only the employment of considerable occupational forces, but also the necessity of bolstering wavering allies.

2. The existing overall situation.

a. Ground forces. The Axis armies are now all at or near peak strength in number of combat divisions - German, 311; Italian, 74; Romanian, 27; Hungarian, 21; Bulgarian, 20; Croat, 8; Slovak, 4; total, 465. The German Army in particular has been brought to such strength only by lowering physical standards, combing out industrial personnel

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hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined and war production will be adversely affected. Replacement of future losses will augment those tendencies and may be inadequate to maintain existing strength.

b. Air Forces. We estimate that the total first-line strength of the German Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 4,600 aircraft. Of these, approximately 1,500 are on the Western Front, 1950 in the Russian Front, and 1125 in the Mediterranean. In addition, approximately 450 are in Germany for refitting. In structure the German Air Force lacks strength in depth because it has no substantial Stored Reserves of aircraft to back up the first-line units. Opposed upon all fronts by United Nations air forces greatly superior in numbers and in offensive power, the German Air Force has been forced to adopt a defensive role but this defensive role is rendered even more difficult due to its extended commitments. In an effort to meet this situation its defensive strength has been increased by concentration upon production of fighter types at the expense of other categories. Because of the comparative ease of manufacture of the fighter type, this has resulted in a slight upward trend in total production and has improved the defensive power of the German Air Force while the offensive power has further deteriorated. Due largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force is at its lowest point since the beginning of the war. In equipment some improvement in present types is noted, but no important production of radically new types is expected.

We estimate that the total first line strength of the Italian Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 1,400 aircraft, of which 1,050 are disposed in the Central Mediterranean and 350 in the Eastern. In addition approximately 250 are in Italy for refitting. During the past

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year this air force has been deteriorating in numerical strength, in rate of new production, in pilot and crew training, and in combat efficiency. Due to these factors the figures given should be discounted by at least 30% for purposes of comparing the fighting effectiveness of the Italian Air Force with that of the German. Under existing conditions continuance of this downward trend in overall effectiveness is to be expected.

c. Naval forces.

(1) Submarines. As of 27 July 1943, the estimated numbers of European Axis submarines were 436 German and 74 Italian. Of these 211 German and 45 Italian were operational and were in the Atlantic or Mediterranean or in waters accessible to those areas, 43 German were used only for training purposes, and 176 German were undergoing trials, training, or repairs in the Baltic. The average rates of completion of new submarines are estimated to be 25 German a month, or possibly a few more, and between one and 2 Italian (if construction still continues).

(2) Surface vessels. As of 27 July, all effective German major units (2BB, 4 CA, and 4 CL) were divided between the Baltic and Norwegian waters. All effective German light forces (40 DD, and perhaps 150 PT) were in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward, except for perhaps 45 PT in the Mediterranean. It is possible that the experienced personnel have been largely transferred from the major units other than TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, LUETZOW (the three in northern Norwegian waters) to the submarine service and that the newly completed aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN has been laid up. Subject to that, the effectiveness of both the major units and light forces, especially the latter, is believed to be high. The new construction of combatant surface vessels is believed to be confined to about 21 DD and a large but uncertain number of PT.

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As of 27 July, the larger portion of the effective Italian surface forces (consisting of 2/3 BB, 1 CA, 5 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 40 PT) were in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean. Except for a few motor torpedo boats in the Black Sea, the rest (consisting of 3/4 BB, 1 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 60 PT) were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of the major units is believed to be low. The effectiveness of the light forces, especially the motor torpedo boats, is believed to be fairly high. Repair work on combatant surface vessels and new construction (if still continuing) is believed to cover 0/1 BB, 1 CA, 3 CV (under conversion from other types), and 1 CL -- all in the Western Basin; 1/2 BB and 2/3 CL -- all in the Eastern Basin; and an uncertain number of DD and PT in each basin.

d. Munitions Production. There is no reason to believe that decline in munitions production has as yet affected German tactical efficiency. However, labor shortage and bomb damage have more than balanced German progress in organizing the exploitation of non-German labor and facilities. Even with further civilian sacrifices, output of finished munitions may have declined about 5 percent net from the 1941-42 peak. The capacity of the area integrated under German control would have permitted a substantial expansion of output if the manpower shortage and bomb damage had not interfered.

A scale of military activity involving attrition at 1942 rates could be maintained only by drawing on stocks of most major items. Output of fighter aircraft, however, is increasing and has been well in excess of wastage in recent months. Fighter wastage could increase by one-third to one-half during the coming year without occasioning a decline in fighter strength.

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e. German morale. The two big factors in German morale are the attitude towards (1) the outcome of the war and (2) the treatment of Germany in the event of her defeat. There is evidence that a considerable part of German military personnel still believe that Germany will not be defeated, but belief in total victory seems to be fading. Civilian morale is undoubtedly lower than military morale, but has demonstrated no positive tendency toward defeatism. Morale is supported by the widespread conviction that Germany would be ruined if defeated and German propaganda zealously engenders this belief. In consequence, most German civilians appear reconciled to the prevailing standard of living, which is far from intolerable, for as long as is necessary to secure an acceptable peace. Morale is being increasingly affected by air attack. There are indications of growing uneasiness over the presence of so many foreign workmen and prisoners of war in Germany. Continuation of reverses may weaken German morale further by spreading conviction of inevitable defeat.

3. The situation by fronts.

a. The Russian front. Since early spring two-thirds of Germany's ground strength (203 divisions) has been on the Russian front, with very heavy offensive concentrations near Orel and Belgorod. It is believed that the Germans planned an early operation to pinch off the Kursk salient at least, but that it was suspended on account of the sudden collapse in Tunisia. On 5 July, the Germans launched a violent attack northward and eastward from Belgorod, which failed, apparently with severe losses. A complementary attack southward from Orel made no headway. The Russians seized the initiative and launched a heavy converging attack on Orel, where the German position now appears to be precarious. This situation,

if not preliminary to more extensive operations (as was the Russian Kharkov offensive in the spring of 1942), marks a new phase in the war in the east, with the Russians conducting a mid-summer offensive and the Germans professing to welcome a positional battle of attrition.

On the whole front, Russian ground strength is to the German as 3 to 2. The superiority of German communications, staff work, and fighting skill may yet compensate for this disparity. Russian staff planning, however, has improved since 1941-1942.

Germany has, on the Russian front, some 2,000 aircraft, of which 1,170 are bombers of all types. Available information indicates that the U.S.S.R. air strength is numerically superior in the ratio of approximately 2 to 1. But due to a large proportion of obsolescent aircraft and to a low rate of serviceability its overall effectiveness has until recently been low. As a result, the Germans have been able to prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing effective air superiority in any large sector. This advantage is rapidly being lost as the proportion of first-line aircraft is increased and combat efficiency improved.

b. Mediterranean front. The Axis forces available for the defense of this front are for the most part Italian, although Germany has recently sent ground reinforcements to both Italy and the Balkans. Axis ground strength in this area is believed to be disposed as follows (28 July):

	Italian divisions		German divisions	Bulgarian divisions
	Field	Coastal		
French Coast	5	2	6	-
Corsica	2	2	-	-
Sardinia	3	2	1	-
Sicily	5*	2**	3½	-
Italy	11	6	3	-
Balkans-Aegean	31	-	18***	20

* Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived.
** Three others have disintegrated.
*** Six defensive.

Axis air strength in this area was approximately as follows (24 July):

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	Italian Total	(Fighter)	German Total	(Fighters)
Central Med.	1050	(475)	~~1240~~ 945	(~~440~~ 275)(320)
Eastern Med.	350	(100)	~~160~~ 180	(45)

The Italian battleships and cruisers seem likely to continue inactive. Naval defense will depend primarily on Italian and German submarines, motor torpedo boats, and possibly destroyers.

Movement of German ground forces into and within Italy has hitherto indicated an intention to defend the peninsula. Twelve additional divisions are available in France for reinforcement. However, the apparent reluctance of the Italians to fight, and the instability of the internal situation in Italy brings the capability into question. The repercussions of an Italian collapse would be particularly serious in the Balkans.

c. Western front. Germany has fortified the coast from Hendaye to Potsamo and can offer formidable resistance to any attempted landing. She cannot, however, prevent heavy aerial bombardment of the industrial bases of her military power in western Germany.

The coastal defenses are particularly strong and in depth from Brittany to Holland (the area in which a landing could be supported by land-based fighters) and are backed by two interior defensive zones in advance of the reversed Maginot Line and the West Wall. There are in France and the Low Countries 44 German divisions, 14 more than the estimated defensive minimum.

In Norway (exclusive of the Kirkenes area) there are 12 German divisions supported by approximately 200 aircraft. German defensive capabilities are enhanced by the presence of major naval units (TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, and LUETZOW).

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d. The bomber offensive. The scale of bombing attacks on Germany's vital centers is steadily increasing. Due to improvements in equipment and bombing technique the weight of bombs now being dropped monthly is more than three times that of a year ago. Far greater precision, penetration and saturation of targets is being achieved. This rising scale of effectiveness must be considered in any assessment based upon past results.

In the Ruhr, where German heavy industry is principally concentrated, the bomber offensive has effected a reduction of about 30% in normal production. In Axis Europe as a whole, it is believed to have effected a gross reduction in mine and manufacturing output of between 5 and 10%. Due to the fact that the reduction in industrial production to date has been largely confined to primary and semi-fabricated materials, its effect upon the military potential cannot be expected to be immediate and direct. However, since no considerable relocation of vital war industries is practicable, and since the range of bombing flights is increasing, the results so far achieved justify the expectation that the long-range effects of bombing attacks, if continued and intensified, will seriously impair the ability of the Axis to equip and supply its forces in the field.

The possibility of offsetting production losses in part by utilizing spare capacity exists in the coke and iron and steel industries as well as certain branches of the chemical industry; cuts in non-military consumption of some chemical products can be made without serious sacrifice.

Of great importance in a general assessment of the results of the offensive, is the consideration of the imponderable effects upon the civil population. Increasing casualties, extensive destruction of housing (about 16% of the population of the Ruhr have already been made homeless),

disruption of transportation and public services with consequent food and water shortages, constant fear and nights of sleeplessness, have greatly increased the strain upon the people. With no prospect of relief from continuous and more intense bombing, and with hope of ultimate victory waning, further deterioration in morale may be expected.

e. The war against shipping. The destruction of shipping by the European Axis, after rising to almost 2 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1942 and continuing near that level during the two remaining quarters of the year, dropped sharply to 1.3 million G.R.T. during the first quarter of 1943 and to 0.6 million during the second. Attacks by German and Italian submarines accounted during each of those periods for 80 to 95% of the destruction of tonnage by the European Axis - 90% or more during the last three - and for 70 to 80% of the combined destruction of tonnage by the European Axis and by Japan.

The net results of all efforts at destruction by the European Axis and by Japan, of the losses of vessels from all other causes, and of new construction, on the tonnage available to the United Nations have been approximately as follows:

(1) The tanker tonnage available on 1 July 1943 was less by 700,000 G.R.T. than at the beginning of 1942, but was greater by 400,000 G.R.T. than at its low points reached during that year. This tonnage increased 300,000 G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 470,000 less losses of 170,000 G.R.T.).

(2) The non-tanker tonnage available was greater by nearly 4 million G.R.T. on 1 July 1943 than at the beginning of 1942. This tonnage increased 2.6 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 3.3 less losses of 0.7 million G.R.T.).

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A great increase has unquestionably occurred during the past year or more in the difficulties and hazards experienced by Axis submarines in locating and attacking suitable shipping targets. This has resulted, not only in a marked downward trend in the rate of destruction of shipping, but also in a marked upward trend in the rate of loss of submarines. During May, June, and July of this year the losses of German submarines may have equalled their average rate of production; and the losses of Italian submarines probably exceeded theirs. Another result in evidence during July has been a marked shift of German and Italian submarines from the main convoy routes to other areas where targets, though fewer, tend to be less well protected by anti-submarine forces.

No marked drop in the morale of German submarine personnel can be said to have occurred, though there have been various indications of some degree of deterioration, especially in security consciousness. There are many indications of a shortage of well trained personnel.

Whatever steps Germany may now take to overcome her loss of headway in the war against shipping must be taken in face of large increases in the advantage and momentum gained by the United Nations and in face of the persistent tendency of technical developments to be more favorable to the anti-submarine forces than to the submarine. But by continuing her submarine warfare against shipping Germany can at least prevent the United Nations from diverting to other channels the huge amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which they must then devote to counter measures.

4. The situation in the satellite countries.

a. Italy. The fall of Mussolini is indicative of the unstable situation in Italy. The immediate purpose of

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Badoglio's appointment appears to have been to arrest serious internal disintegration. Although he may succeed in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with German reinforcement, cannot now protect Italy from the ravages of war, and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. On the other hand, the presence of German forces and absence from the peninsula of the greater portion of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 first-line divisions) may prevent Badoglio from escape by negotiation with the United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained, the internal situation will continue to disintegrate.

b. Hungary and Romania. Because of the vital importance to her of Romanian oil and of Hungarian communications and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as she is able, but each would be glad to escape (unless the tide turns toward Germany). Both fear the U.S.S.R. Each is hostile toward the other. Each would seek terms guaranteeing protection against the other and against the U.S.S.R. as well as against Germany.

c. Bulgaria has undertaken no more than the defense of her sphere of interest in the Balkans (including Greek and Yugoslav territory) and particularly has insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

d. Finland is bound to Germany by her fear of the U.S.S.R., her dependence on Germany for essential supplies, and the presence of German troops. She would willingly withdraw from the war if these problems could be solved. She maintains contact with the United Nations through continued relations with the United States.

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5. The situation in occupied countries.

a. Norway. Strong undercover resistance to German occupation continues unabated.

b. Denmark. Although Denmark has been set up as a model for the "New Order," receiving exceptionally mild treatment, anti-German sentiment continues in relatively passive form.

c. The Low Countries. Hostility toward Germany exists in both countries, although less bitter in Belgium than in Holland.

d. France. Although the puppet regime at Vichy is being forced into closer collaboration, hostility toward Germany is general and underground resistance appears to be well organized.

e. Poland. Although an effective national underground organization exists, the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian guerrillas and various Russian-influenced underground organizations independent of the Polish government in London.

f. Yugoslavia. German and Italian forces have conducted extensive operations to eliminate guerrilla activity, but such resistance continues on a reduced scale. Although guerrilla forces which recognize the government-in-exile and others which are influenced by the U.S.S.R. have clashed, latest reports indicate that some degree of coordination between them may have been established.

g. Greece. Some underground and guerrilla activity exists, but the country is so exhausted that little effective military assistance can be expected. There is considerable opposition to a restoration of the government of King George II.

h. Occupied Russia. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communist Russian forces have had only limited success.

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6. The attitudes of European neutrals.

a. Sweden is firm in her neutrality and is taking a stronger attitude than formerly in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations, especially with Norway, is increasingly permitted.

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude.

c. Spain. The steadily mounting show of power of the Western United Nations in the Mediterranean area has impressed the high command of the Spanish Army that Franco's past alignment was wrong. The Falange is very unpopular with the people in Spain. Liberals and conservatives including those elements in favor of a restoration of the monarchy have been estranged by Franco pronouncements and it is now clear that the Army holds the key to the Spanish situation.

Franco himself has given no indication of abandoning his proposed belief in the Spanish types of totalitarianism which he has rechristened "Unitarianism" and which he claims is peculiarly suited to the Spanish people. He has maintained that all nations, including the United Nations, will emerge from the war with some form of totalitarianism. Whether these beliefs arise from sincere conviction or whether it is that he has been so sheltered and isolated that he has recently been unable to gauge the sentiments and strength of the United Nations or the feeling of his own people cannot be ascertained.

The Army high command, convinced of the change in the international and domestic situation, have let it be known that they intend to confront Franco with the true picture, and call for an immediate restoration of the monarchy with a liberalized constitution before it is too late.

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Franco has said that he would resist any invasion of Spanish soil, whether by the Western United Nations or by the Axis, and it is generally believed that he would keep his word. A junta of generals representing the most popular elements in the army are reported to have agreed that they would resist any such invasion, irrespective of Franco's decision, and would depose him if he declined to take the leadership or showed signs of aligning himself more closely with the Axis.

It is therefore considered possible that under increasing pressure of events, Franco may, in order to hold his position, seek United Nations support.

d. Portugal. Although remaining neutral, Portugal now leans toward the United Nations.

e. Turkey. Although well disposed toward Great Britain and the United States, Turkey is not apt to make an early departure from her position of neutrality. Her fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans, however, will probably lead her to active participation in the war, when it can be done at minimum cost, in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement.

7. Summary of the existing situation. The situation of the European Axis has definitely deteriorated during the past year. The war against shipping, which was to prevent effective support of United Nations operations from overseas, has failed to accomplish that purpose. German air strength has proved insufficient to meet all defensive requirements; in particular, the G.A.F. has been unable to challenge Allied air superiority in the

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Mediterranean or to prevent devastating aerial bombardment of western Germany. Although the German Army has been brought to peak strength by scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, it has not been able, at that strength, to eliminate the Russian threat in time to gain for Germany freedom of action in dealing with attack from the west and south. As a result of aerial bombardment and manpower shortage, German war production has begun to decline. Italy is reeling under direct attack, and the other satellites cannot be relied upon in similar circumstances.

Although Germany cannot now impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, the High Command, the armed forces, and the German people still hope to gain an acceptable and even advantageous negotiated peace by stubborn resistance and by diplomacy.

8. Courses of action open to Germany, 1943-44.

a. To continue the war against shipping. Germany will follow this course to the end, to the best of her ability, regardless of what other courses she may adopt.

b. To seek a decision in Russia. Only by the destruction of the Soviet armies can Germany completely free herself of her huge commitment in the east in order to concentrate her forces against her enemies in the west. The lateness of the season and the course of operations around Kursk would seem to indicate that she cannot accomplish this in 1943. In 1944 she will have less force available for the purpose.

c. To seek during 1943 to improve her defensive position in the U.S.S.R. and to impair or destroy Soviet offensive capabilities. This would be the best alternative to b as a means of reducing her commitment in the east in order to meet attack in the west in 1944. It may be the object of current German operations in Russia. So far the Germans have failed to straighten their Russian front by the recapture of Kursk. They may hope that the battle of attrition at Orel will significantly impair Soviet strength. Attrition, however, is double-edged.

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d. To undertake offensive operations in the west or south. Such a course would sacrifice her advantage of position and expose the forces engaged to destruction. Moreover, she lacks the requisite air and naval strength to conduct such an operation. The present deployment of the German Army indicates that this course has been discarded for 1943. It will be even less feasible in 1944.

Since an invasion of Spain is the only overland operation which Germany can undertake in this direction, we examine that capability in greater detail.

By crossing the Pyrenees, where the rail net changes to a different gauge from that standard in central Europe, and where both road and rail communications are subject to interdiction by aerial attack, any forces so committed are subject to denial of supply and reinforcement.

At present Germany is believed to have 186 operational aircraft (mostly long range bombers) now disposed in Southern France. Any build-up of air support for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula at this time could be made only by a transfer of operational aircraft from other theaters where German air strength is inadequate to meet, successfully, its commitments. The Germans have the capability of increasing the strength now in Southern France to from 500 to 600 aircraft by withdrawals from Italy and the Western front. In the event such an undertaking were accepted as a calculated risk, the complications of supply and maintenance will probably reduce effectiveness to below 30% by the end of the first month. Germany could presumably divert 250 transport aircraft (JU-52) to this zone of operations within a week, from her strength of 1250 transports (of which 40% are non-operational in Central Germany), and possibly another 250, including 25 Me 323's, within two

weeks; but this would leave her practically without transport aircraft on other fronts. The JU-52 has a range of about 780 miles, which would enable it to be flown from southern France (Bayonne) to Madrid and return without refueling. It is not believed that, except for limited offensive strikes, the German Air Force could advance through a hostile Spain any more rapidly than the ground force, owing to logistical problems and inability to protect advanced airdromes. The available airdromes, though scattered, are believed to be adequate for such aircraft as might be used, apart from logistical considerations.

It is estimated that 12 German divisions will be required in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. 7 divisions have actually been identified in those areas and there are indications that an additional 5 are "ear marked" for Italy. In France, where we believe the German strategic reserve to be stationed, there will then remain 11 divisions available for use in Spain above what we believe to be the minimum defensive commitment there. To these could be added one division from Germany and another from Denmark. We believe that none of these 13 divisions are up to pre-Stalingrad standards in training and combat efficiency. We further believe that to successfully accomplish an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even with no Spanish resistance, would require 12 German divisions. We believe that the Spanish will not cooperate. We believe that to accomplish this mission at least 20 German divisions would be required against Spanish resistance augmented by United Nations forces as they become available. We believe that such an operation would originate from Southern France where, along the Spanish border there are now only 2 divisions disposed.

The German comb-out and call-up of the fall of 1942 has, we believe, extracted practically all available German manpower except oncoming classes. If casualties continue at approximately the same rate as 1941 and 1942, Germany will not

be able to maintain existing Army strength. As the Western United Nations continue to expand their capabilities in England and the Mediterranean, German defensive commitments will increase and in consequence less force will be available in 1944 for such an invasion.

Such a course of action might, in desperation, be adopted by Germany, in order to create a situation for the negotiation of an acceptable peace with the United States and Great Britain. The poorly equipped Spanish ground forces, with practically no air support, are not presently deployed to resist Axis penetration. Even if the military successes or diplomatic pressure of the United Nations should bring about the redisposition of these Spanish forces essentially to block the Pyrenees, German forces would probably still be capable of occupying strategic areas threatening the Straits of GIBRALTAR unless United Nations' forces intervene. From bases in southern Spain, the German Air Force might temporarily interrupt the passage of our convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. Should the United Nations increase their commitments in the Central Mediterranean and penetrate deeper into the Axis Citadel from this area, the temptation to interdict their vital artery of communication correspondingly increases.

e. To stand on the strategic defensive. This is the present German attitude in the west and south and may be forced upon Germany in the east as well. It is a negative course which cannot bring victory, but may serve to avert complete defeat. Its adoption would not preclude counteroffensive action to destroy or expel any United Nations force which gained a lodgment on the continent.

f. To abandon outlying territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, portions of Russia, Finland) in order to conserve and concentrate strength. The consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situation will not permit Germany to adopt this course voluntarily.

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g. To sue for peace. Germany is probably already willing to accept a negotiated peace, but is unable to obtain acceptable terms from the United Nations. In this situation, if she cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts, she will seek to divide her enemies and obtain an acceptable negotiated peace with one party in order to concentrate against the other. Although a separate peace with Great Britain and the United States might be preferable to her, one with the U.S.S.R. might be more practicable and might appear to be advantageous.

Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. Should the High Command conclude that surrender is inevitable, it may try to yield to the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States separately, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time, meanwhile trying to hold off the other party.

9. Germany's most probable courses of action, 1943-1944.

a. To continue the war against shipping.

b. To endeavor, during 1943, to improve her defensive position in Russia and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition.

c. To stand on the strategic defensive in the west and south during 1943 and on all fronts during 1944.

d. To abandon outlying territory only under compulsion.

e. If surrender becomes inevitable, to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time.

10. Forecast for 1943-1944.

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German industrial potential, the G.A.F. fighter force, the air defenses, and morale.

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It may create conditions within the country which will facilitate and hasten complete military defeat.

c. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a negotiated peace. When surrender becomes inevitable, she may seek to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect to her at that time.

d. The German satellites (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland) will collapse or come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany and of the U.S.S.R.

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C.C.S. 303

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE
(Brief)

The Joint Staff Planners forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a paper on "Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe", prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended and approved this paper and directed that it be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This paper discusses the AXIS strategic situation and United Nations strategic concept for their defeat. It strongly urges continued adherence to the idea that "OVERLORD" is to be the main effort against the Continent with such operations being conducted in the Mediterranean as can be with the forces available after HUSKY.

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C.C.S. 303

9 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT
OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

Memorandum by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The enclosed memorandum by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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ENCLOSURE

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE
DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop a strategic concept for the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE.

DISCUSSION

2. AXIS strategic situation and United Nations strategy. From the AXIS point of view, objective evaluation of the events of the past year must present a discouraging picture. At sea, the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign has decreased sharply. In the air, the AXIS has seen its enemies achieve varying degrees of superiority on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Combined Bomber Offensive accelerates. On the ground, the AXIS has seen initial successes in both EGYPT and RUSSIA degenerate into a steady series of military reverses: EL ALAMEIN--STALINGRAD--winter defeat in RUSSIA--TUNISIA--BELGOROD--SICILY--and now OREL.

Due primarily to inadequate air power, the AXIS now lacks the capability of destroying the Russian armed forces, particularly while engaged in containing or parrying the blows of the increasing Anglo-American sea, air, and ground forces in Western EUROPE. As long as the bulk of the German forces is contained on the Russian front, the AXIS has very limited offensive capabilities, including invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA, which is now considered unlikely.

It is difficult to believe that current AXIS strategy still visualizes total victory, as once conceived. There are as yet no definite indications, but it is reasonable to suppose that the AXIS leadership may now seek a satisfactory

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negotiated peace. Failing in this, an "honorable" surrender might be the next AXIS objective. The AXIS, however, still retains strong defensive power. A defensive strategy on the part of the AXIS might develop into a protracted struggle and result in a stalemate on the Continent. It is imperative, therefore, that the Allied Powers penetrate to the heart of the fortress of Europe, come to grips with the enemy and thus bring about the early and decisive defeat of the AXIS.

In the early stages of the present war, the United Nations of necessity pursued an opportunistic strategy forced upon them by their comparative weakness. However, the present rapidly improving position of the United Nations in relation to the Axis in Europe demands an abrogation of opportunistic strategy and requires the adoption of and adherence to sound strategic plans which envisage decisive military operations conducted at times and places of our choosing--not the enemy's.

IF PRESENT CONDITIONS JUSTIFY OUR PRINCIPAL EFFORT IN THE MEDITTERANEAN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve plans:

a. That would require the concentration of our strength in that area, and concurrently

b. That would provide only sufficient forces in the British Isles to secure this important base and to make available opportunistic forces to cross the channel if a German collapse should occur.

HOWEVER, CONDITIONS HAVE NOT SO CHANGED AS TO JUSTIFY ON SOUND MILITARY GROUNDS THE RENUNCIATION OF THE TRIDENT CONCEPT. We must not jeopardize our sound over-all strategy simply to exploit local successes in a generally accepted secondary theater, the Mediterranean, where logistical and terrain difficulties preclude decisive and final operations designed to reach the heart of Germany.

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A careful evaluation of the march of events in the world and particularly in the European-Mediterranean area indicates that the strategy enunciated in TRIDENT is sound--specifically:

a. That Operation OVERLORD, carefully synchronized with the Combined Bomber offensive, if given whole-hearted and immediate support, would result in an early and decisive victory in Europe;

b. That continued operations in the Mediterranean should be conducted with available Allied resources as stipulated in TRIDENT in order to cause the collapse of Italy, to create diversions of enemy forces, and to destroy vital AXIS installations on the Continent.

It is on this basis that the strategic concept for the defeat of the AXIS in Europe is developed in the present paper.

3. Operations in RUSSIA

It is assumed that RUSSIA will continue to exert increasing and eventually crushing pressure against the German armies massed against her. In the unlikely event of either a separate Russo-German armistice or peace, the strategy of the UNITED NATIONS will require reexamination. In that case, the defeat of JAPAN would probably take priority over the defeat of GERMANY.

4. European strategic concept 1943-44. For the purposes of clarity and analysis, the concept of operations here recommended is outlined first in its entirety; thereafter, its component elements are discussed.

a. Operation POINTBLANK

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian

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victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

b. Operation OVERLORD

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944.) After securing adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(2) Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE.

(3) As between the operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, when there is a shortage of resources OVERLORD will have an overriding priority.

c. Operations in ITALY

(1) First phase. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases at least as far north as the ROME area, and, if feasible, to include the ANCONA area.

(2) Second phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

(3) Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in northern ITALY, and the creation, with available MEDITERRANEAN forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into southern FRANCE.

d. Operations in southern FRANCE

Offensive operations against southern France, utilizing available MEDITERRANEAN forces (to include trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the TOULON-MARSEILLES area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD.

e. Air operations

(1) Strategic bombing operations from central MEDITERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

(2) Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

(3) Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES.

(4) Air supply of BALKAN guerrillas (see g below).

f. Operations at sea

(1) Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the AZORES.

(2) Security of our sea communications.

(3) Continued disruption of AXIS sea communications.

(4) Support of amphibious operations.

g. Operations in the BALKANS

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of PLOESTI and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

h. Garrison requirements and security of lines of communication in the MEDITERRANEAN

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix "A") in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA.

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5. Operation OVERLORD

This is the main U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in Europe. In consonance with the decisions made at TRIDENT and reaffirmed for QUADRANT (par. 5, Section III, Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept), maximum resources will be concentrated in the U.K. "as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel." Target date for execution of plans now being prepared by COSSAC is 1 May 1944. After a firm lodgment has been established and adequate channel and Atlantic ports secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

By TRIDENT decisions, OVERLORD will consist of 29 divisions of which 7 are to be HUSKY veterans withdrawn from the MEDITERRANEAN. If only 3 of these divisions were moved to the U.K., enough personnel shipping would be available to move 4 additional U.S. divisions to the U.K., and thus our strength in the MEDITERRANEAN would be increased by 4 divisions without decrease in the planned number for OVERLORD. However, there would then be only 3 instead of 7 battle-tested divisions for OVERLORD, a disadvantage which cannot be accepted. The maximum support should be given the main effort. Hence, the TRIDENT decision to move 7 divisions to the U.K. should not be changed.

6. Operations in ITALY and her possessions

a. General objectives. Our immediate objective (TRIDENT) in the MEDITERRANEAN is to knock ITALY out of the war. This will open the door to the accomplishment of many other important objectives. These are:

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(1) The progressive establishment of air bases in ITALY, at least as far north as the ANCONA area, and the initiation of a strategic bombing offensive therefrom against the Reich and the BALKANS, coordinated with and complementing POINTBLANK.

(2) The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation, with available MEDITERRANEAN forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army, into Southern FRANCE.

(3) The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war.

(4) The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet.

(5) The occupation of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

b. Specific operations. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent does not necessarily mean that the Germans will withdraw behind the ALPS. The more likely German reaction will be to defend on the RIMINI-PISA line. Regardless of where GERMANY may defend in ITALY, our strategy must contemplate maintaining steady pressure against her forces. In our view, however, the mere maintenance of pressure on German forces remaining in ITALY does not constitute an adequate mission for the powerful forces we will have in the MEDITERRANEAN after ITALY is knocked out of the war. Including the French, there will be approximately 4,500 combat aircraft and at least 24 offensive divisions above and beyond garrison and security requirements. Our strategy must provide an appropriate task for these forces in the MEDITERRANEAN. Such a task should, if possible, lend support to our main effort across the CHANNEL. Broadly speaking, there are but three places where the ground element of these forces could be utilized: The BALKANS, the TRIESTE-VIENNA region, or in Southern FRANCE. Each of these warrants brief discussion:

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(1) BALKANS. The BALKANS are unsuitable for large scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. This course, therefore, is rejected. (We do recommend special operations in the BALKANS. These are discussed in paragraph 9 below).

(2) TRIESTE-VIENNA. Offensive operations, either limited or unlimited in their scope and objective, along the TRIESTE-VIENNA line would strike directly at the German heartland. Consequently, such operations would insure a swift and positive German reaction. The nature of the terrain, however, is such that great German forces would not be required to halt our advance. There is no reason to believe that a limited-objective operation in this area would contribute materially to OVERLORD success by drawing significant German forces out of FRANCE. The establishment of a new front, moreover, in this area would undoubtedly guarantee the continuous separation of our forces between the MEDITERRANEAN and Western FRANCE for the duration of the war. Lastly, and by no means of least importance, the French Army wants to fight in FRANCE and will have little stomach for operations in the TRIESTE-VIENNA region. Consequently this course is also rejected.

(3) Southern FRANCE. Southern FRANCE is retained as being the only suitable area in which ultimately to utilize the forces that will be available in the MEDITERRANEAN after ITALY is knocked out of the war. Our concept for the eventual operations in Southern FRANCE is developed in paragraph 7, below.

c. Elimination of the Italian fleet. The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war will release the larger units of the British fleet for use in other theaters.

d. Italian merchant fleet. The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet will be of assistance to the UNITED NATIONS in the rehabilitation of ITALY.

e. Occupation of SARDINIA and CORSICA. Our forward advance on the mainland of ITALY, before ITALY is knocked out of the war, need not be restricted by continuing AXIS occupation of SARDINIA and CORSICA. These two islands are very likely to fall when ITALY goes out of the war. If not, their reduction and occupation must be accomplished before operations in Southern FRANCE are undertaken.

7. Operations in Southern FRANCE

a. After ITALY is eliminated and the Germans are forced back into Northern ITALY, FRANCE becomes a vulnerable salient to GERMANY. At first glance, this salient appears most formidable, bounded as it is on the three exposed sides by heavily-defended seacoasts and neutral Spanish territory. If, however, Russian pressure continues undiminished, the intensity of POINTBLANK is augmented from bases in ITALY, our pressure in ITALY remains steady, and appropriate political and economic measures are taken with regard to SPAIN, the adequate defense by the AXIS of the French salient will have become a confounding problem. Exposed to steady and increasing pressure, GERMANY will not have the air power required to adequately maintain her perimeter and internal defense. The German air force will be stretched some 3000 to 4000 miles around three sides of the continent of EUROPE. In view of present estimates that the over-all German strategic situation will continue to deteriorate, we believe that operations for the conquest of FRANCE can be initiated in the spring of 1944.

b. On the assumption that conditions are substantially as stated in paragraph a above, operations in Southern FRANCE coordinated with OVERLORD are believed feasible, with the first objective the establishment of a firm lodgment in the MARSEILLES area. The sequence of operations is envisaged as follows:

(1) Holding attack with strong ground forces in Northern ITALY.

(2) Amphibious invasion of Southern FRANCE, under carrier and land-based air support, with relatively small forces. Due to the distances involved, only limited land-based air support can be expected for this operation.

(3) Security of the lodgment by rapid introduction of strong reinforcements, overland if feasible, from Northern ITALY, and by sea within the limits of available shipping.

(4) Exploitation to secure the Port of MARSEILLES, and airfields in the area.

(5) Offensive operations designed to assist OVERLORD by containing maximum German forces.

c. For available means see Appendices "A", and "B". Exclusive of garrison and security requirements in the MEDITERRANEAN area and the 7 divisions transferred to the UNITED KINGDOM for OVERLORD, and assuming that 10 divisions will be adequate to maintain pressure against the Germans in Northern ITALY, it is estimated that the following forces will be available for offensive operations against Southern FRANCE:

10 U.S. and British divisions.

4 French divisions

4500 U.S. and British combat aircraft.

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Approximately enough amphibious lift for at least 2 reinforced divisions (44,000). (If LCM's can be used, the lift can be increased to 3 divisions.)

Adequate Naval escort vessels are now allocated for MEDITERRANEAN operations.

8. Air operations

a. The main effort of our Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom progresses and should accomplish the expected results in the destruction of German air power, air defenses, war-making resources, and general morale. This bomber offensive will be carefully integrated with OVERLORD and should be directed so as to reach its greatest effectiveness in the spring of 1944 and thereby create conditions favorable for the OVERLORD operation.

b. A strategic bombing offensive from Italian air bases as far north as ANCONA and from other MEDITERRANEAN air bases would complement the POINTBLANK offensive. With our MEDITERRANEAN air power advanced to bases in the ANCONA area of ITALY, many critical AXIS war industries and resources, including fighter aircraft and oil production, would be within operating radius of our medium as well as heavy bombers.

c. Provision for air support of surface operations requires careful and timely planning. Carrier-borne air cover will probably be required in support of amphibious operations in the MEDITERRANEAN beyond the radius of action of land-based fighters.

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d. The necessity for air staging points and anti-submarine bases in the AZORES was recognized at TRIDENT. Reduced flying time and better weather along this route would result in combat units in the EUROPEAN, MEDITERRANEAN, and FAR EAST theaters receiving initial and replacement equipment more expeditiously and in better condition. Anti-submarine bases would complete the air and surface coverage of the central and north Atlantic. Hence, air and naval bases in the AZORES should be secured as early as possible.

9. Operations in the BALKANS

The BALKANS are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. Nevertheless, as long as Germans occupy the BALKANS there remains a problem as to how to deal with them. It is our view that our strategy is best served if GERMANY should continue to hold the BALKANS, provided GERMANY can be forced to garrison heavily and be made to pay a high price in attrition of personnel and materiel.

Therefore, our strategy should be to supply the BALKAN guerrillas by air and sea, with the object of enabling them to compel the Germans to maintain not only present forces of 12 divisions in that region, but also to provide additional divisions to replace the 30 Italian divisions now there.

10. Policy toward SPAIN and TURKEY

a. SPAIN

SPAIN is assisting the AXIS with her economic resources and even with armed forces. The UNITED NATIONS have endured Spanish official approval of AXIS war aims and denunciation of our own with an attitude of conciliation. At the present moment we find Spanish troops defensively disposed against us, with little or no disposition facing our enemy. We are forced by this disposition to maintain large forces ready to protect our lifeline through the Straits of GIBRALTAR and constantly to plan for immediate provision of additional

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forces to hold GIBRALTAR should SPAIN permit a German offensive through her territory. Indications are that Franco is realizing the final UNITED NATIONS' victory and is tending toward a position of real neutrality.

The time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy toward SPAIN. The UNITED NATIONS should require SPAIN, for the price of wartime economic assistance and postwar friendship, to:

(1) Shift the bulk of her defensive forces from MOROCCO and Southern SPAIN to Northern SPAIN.

(2) Cease military and economic aid to GERMANY.

b. TURKEY

To date, the UNITED NATIONS have devoted-- and, by TRIDENT, are continuing to devote-- considerable effort toward bringing TURKEY into the war as an ally. This effort takes the form of very sizeable economic aid and involves a UNITED NATIONS military commitment of considerable proportions. This policy toward TURKEY has not been fruitful. The current estimate is that the Turkish attitude is unlikely to change. It is believed, therefore, that the continuation of aid to TURKEY, at the present scale, is not warranted.

11. Relations with patriot forces in EUROPE. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces, everywhere within enemy-occupied territory in EUROPE, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Since our strategy contemplates the conquest of FRANCE, the French underground can be expected to make a very important and direct contribution to the U.S. and British effort in Western EUROPE. The supply of the French underground, and the development of plans for the use of these Patriot Forces, therefore, should have a relatively high priority in our program.

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12. Operations in liberated areas. Should GERMANY, of her own volition, withdraw her forces from NORWAY or the Southern BALKANS, our policy will be limited to the economic and military supply of the liberated nations to the extent of our capabilities without prejudice to military operations in more vital areas. The advisability of conducting military operations in and from NORWAY, in the event of German withdrawal therefrom, will be assessed in the light of the then-existing over-all strategic situation.

[redacted]

APPENDIX "A"

SUGGESTED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE CONQUEST OF ITALY

	Br. & Others	U.S.	French	Total
Available in divs. and equivalent divs.	28	9	5	42
Garrisons and Commitments				
Sicily and So. Italy	2			2
Central Italy	2			2
Sardinia	1			1
Corsica			1	1
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica	1			1
Egypt and Palestine	2			2
Syria and Cyprus	1			1
North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco)		1	*	1*
Recommended commitment to OVERLORD	3	4		7
	12	5	1*	18*
Available for operation in North ITALY and Southern FRANCE	16	4	4	24

* 6 additional French divisions, being equipped and trained in North Africa.

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[redacted]

APPENDIX "B"

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN

Unit equipment and total airplanes available as of August 2, 1943:

TYPES	U.S. UE	U.S. Total	R.A.F. UE	R.A.F. Total	FRENCH UE	FRENCH Total
Heavy Bombers (D)	262	393	--	--	--	--
Heavy Bombers (N)	--	--	48	72	--	--
Medium Bombers (D)	389	588	--	--	--	--
Medium Bombers (N)	--	--	183	275	--	--
Light Bombers	57	86	384	576	--	--
SEF, TEF, Ftr Bombers	1069	1604	942	1413	60	90
TEF (N)	24	36	120	180	--	--
Recn and Photo	78	116	72	108	3	3
T/C	364	546	--	--	--	--
Torpedo Bombers	--	--	160	240	3	3
TOTALS	2246	3369	1909	2864	66	96

GRAND TOTALS - Unit Equipment 4221

Total Airplanes 6329

Less for garrison and security in Mediterranean (fighters only):* Unit equipment 1164

Total Airplanes 1747

Balance remaining for offensive operations:

Unit equipment 3057

Total Airplanes 4582

* Figures based on Trident Estimates.

NOTES: a. Total RAF strength is figured as follows: Number of squadrons x authorized strength + 50% reserve. There is not a definite figure set as a reserve but 50% is known to be very conservative as far as fighters are concerned.

b. It is contemplated that the number of U.S. planes will be reduced 365 by Jan. 1944 if proposed planning is carried out.

c. Reductions or additions in RAF strength not included.

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TAB G

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C.C.S. M-111

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date
MAR 22 1974

CONTRIBUTION OF CHINA TO ALLIED STRATEGY
(Brief)

The Combined Intelligence Committee submitted for information a report on the Contribution of China to Allied Strategy. This paper discusses the present situation in China and the indications of possible collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan; assesses the importance to the United Nations' war effort of China's contribution and the effect the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan would have on it; and finally, indicates the measures considered necessary to ensure that China continues in the war.

In conclusion, it is the view of the Combined Intelligence Committee that; in view of the fact that very little direct military pressure is being exerted against China on land or in the air, such limiting factors as lack of food, inflation and decline in morale, are insufficient at present to cause the collapse of China's resistance. But a continuation of the present rate of deterioration might do so. Nevertheless, for the next 12 months at least, formal peace between China and Japan is extremely unlikely. On the other hand, in the absence of some Allied action, there is a danger that we might be faced with a situation amounting to an "undeclared peace" between China and Japan.

A formal peace would adversely affect the United Nations' prestige and public opinion. An undeclared peace would make much more difficult the use of bases in China and would deprive the United Nations of the present and potential contributions to the war effort of the Chinese army.

Measures most likely to ensure continuance of Chinese resistance are successful Allied military operations close to China; the increased delivery of supplies, particularly military equipment; the build-up of the American Air Force in China; and, on psychological rather than on practical grounds, the re-opening of the Burma Road.

U. S. [redacted]
BRITISH [redacted]

COPY NO. 55

5 July 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 111

CONTRIBUTION OF CHINA TO ALLIED STRATEGY

References: a. C.C.S. 263 and 263/1
b. C.C.S. 100th Mtg., Item 5

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report is in the form adopted by the Combined Intelligence Committee and is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It will be forwarded to the Combined Planners in London.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHINA TO ALLIED STRATEGY

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To review the present situation in China and the indications of possible collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan; assess the importance to the United Nations' war effort of China's contribution and the effect the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan would have on it; and finally, indicate the measures considered necessary to ensure that China continues in the war.

DISCUSSION

2. It became evident in the course of the recent discussion of the Combined Staffs in Washington that the U. S. view of the situation in China was graver than the British and that the U. S. valued the Chinese military contribution to the Allied war effort more highly than the British. In particular, great weight is attached by the U. S. to the following factors:

a. The deterioration in economic conditions during the last few months.

b. The possibility of a Japanese drive towards Chungking or towards Kunming, or both.

c. The value of the Chinese Army; and the value of China as a whole, as a base for operations, and as a reserve of military manpower.

The U. S. evaluation of these factors has led them to conclusions which differ from the British, particularly with regard to the positive effort which can be expected from China. We therefore, examine the position, having regard to the latest evidence we have received.

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3. Collapse of Chinese Resistance to Japan. In reviewing the present situation and considering the possibility of collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan, it is first necessary to be clear as to the form such collapse might take. Any formal declaration of peace would require a decision by the Government of Chungking and at the present moment this means in practice a decision by Chiang Kai-shek. While there probably are some persons in high places at Chungking who would favor a compromise peace with Japan, it is extremely unlikely that they would be strong enough to force Chiang Kai-shek to make peace against his will, or to eliminate him. He has a clear realization that China cannot live and develop her own existence unless Japan is defeated; he is also convinced that the Allies will win the war; and he is by nature obstinate and not easily moved from any decision he has taken. It is highly improbable that, so long as Chiang Kai-shek remains in control, he would sign a formal peace with Japan.

The other, and much more likely possibility, is that Chinese resistance would fade away into an "undeclared peace." A general deterioration might cause Chiang Kai-shek to lose control over his armies in the outlying provinces. Local commanders and governors might negotiate with the Japanese in their vicinity. The present illicit trading would increase, and Japanese infiltration would gradually develop without serious opposition.

4. Economic Situation. Since last December there have been signs of increasing deterioration in the economic situation, due primarily to:

a. Continued insufficient imports.

b. Deterioration of the internal transportation situation.

c. The Honan Famine.

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d. Japanese raids on food-producing areas in Chekiang and Kiangsi, and in the Ichang and Tungting Lake areas.

e. Continued inflation which affects soldiers and wage earners and is especially severe in its effect upon the official and educated classes.

Crops in Szechwan, however, seem to be good, although it is still too early to forecast the size of the final harvest.

Neither the food situation nor the inflation are serious enough at present to cause Chiang Kai-shek to give up the struggle, or to break his power.

5. Possibility of Japanese Attacks. The prospects of a Japanese attack on Kunming from Indo-China are now being examined in detail. It is a possible operation but hazardous. The Japanese show no signs of attempting it at present and we consider that they will not spare troops to undertake it unless they feel that a serious threat to their position in China is being created by the increasing use of the air ferry service which terminates at Kunming. The naturel difficulties of the route which the Japanese would have to follow are so great that if the Chinese forces stationed in Yunnan put up a determined opposition there would be little likelihood of the Japanese succeeding.

The chances of a Japanese advance to capture Chungking are also being carefully examined. This operation also is possible but difficult. The Yangtze River has many rapids between Ichang and Chungking and there is a considerable hill barrier both north and south of the river. Even if Chungking were captured Chiang Kai-shek could move his capital further into the interior of China, though his position would then be greatly weakened and his ability to make any contribution to Allied strategy correspondingly reduced.

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In general the capture of Chungking and Kunming would mean major military operations and represent a major increase in Japanese commitments in China, both for garrison and L. of C. troops and for air forces. Japan would be particularly unwilling to engaged in further air commitments. Her troops are substantially occupied either in garrisoning the more important cities or in holding the long and vulnerable lines of communication.

6. Morale.

a. Fighting Forces. There are a number of factors which cause a low state of morale in the Chinese Army and so reduce its fighting value. These are the lack of equipment and ammunition, the lack of good N.C.O.'s and officers, particularly senior officers, the lack of military tradition in the Chinese nation and the Chinese inability ever to withstand a determined Japanese attack. Recently this situation has been aggravated by shortage of food.

b. Home Front.

(1) Official and Educated Classes. The shortage of food, inflation, and general war weariness are all lowering the morale of the official and educated classes. It is probable that economic conditions are better for these classes in the Japanese occupied territory, and this combined with the effect of the present Japanese policy of seeking their ends by cajolery and propaganda rather than by offensive military operations tend to reduce the will to resist. On the other hand, it can be assumed that these factors will be to some extent counterbalanced by national pride and aversion to subjugation under a foreign soldiery.

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(2) The Masses. The morale of the uneducated classes will depend almost entirely on whether or not they have food to eat; and at present there is a food shortage. They are, however, in any case accustomed to endure famines from time to time and are not in a position to influence the political situation. It is at present unlikely that the peasants who form a large majority of the population will stop producing food for the market.

In general, doubt as to whether adequate Allied assistance will arrive in time, and the lack of striking Allied success in any area of immediate interest to China are further important factors affecting mainly the educated classes and fighting forces.

The decline in morale is probably the most serious factor of the Chinese situation today. Morale, however, may have recently imporved as a result of the successful Chinese operation in the middle Yangtze valley and recent developments in the Pacific.

7. Importance to the War Effort of the United Nations of China's Contribution. There are three main Chinese contributions to the war effort of the United Nations:

a. China forms a serious occupational and maintenance commitment for Japan, amounting at present to 22 divisions and 14 mixed brigades. This commitment is due partly to the Chinese armed forces but primarily to the size and topography of China.

b. China provides possible air bases for future air attacks against Japan and Japanese communications. The area most suited for attack against Japan proper by long range bombers is the province of Chekiang, where suitable airfields already exist. The two most suitable airfields (Chuhsien and Lishui) are temporarily unserviceable but could readily be restored whenever adequate protection could be provided.

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They are not at present in the area occupied by the Japanese. The province is partly mountainous, and airfield development on a large scale in the parts not occupied by the Japanese would present considerable difficulty. A chain of airfields extending into W. China is in existence and a number of these places have runways of from 1,400 to 2,000 yards.

c. A very important current contribution of China as a member of the United Nations lies in the moral and political fields.

8. Chinese Army. The Chinese Army numbers more than 2½ million men, but is almost entirely deficient in modern equipment (except rifles), in aircraft and administrative services. Still more important there is a serious shortage of trained commanders and staffs, and scarcely any military tradition. It is not at present capable of offensive operations, other than guerrilla warfare, except in conjunction with Allied forces. The latest evidence suggests that the fighting value of the Chinese armies as a whole is probably less than it was six months ago.

Chinese military units, specially trained and equipped by the Americans and/or British would be of greater fighting value. Such troops would be more valuable as light infantry for reconnaissance and wide outflanking movements, always provided that for some time to come at least, they are not expected to operate as the main or independent striking forces. However, this light infantry role, while limited, should be of particular importance in any operations in the mountains and jungle of Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indo-China.

While comparatively small forces can be trained to carry out the light infantry role suggested above, to bring the present Chinese Army as a whole up to any reasonable standard of military

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efficiency would be an undertaking so vast that it could only be accomplished in a period of years. We do not think it would be possible for Chinese formations and units to be commanded by American or British officers. Considerations of nationalistic sentiment, quite apart from difficulties of language, would preclude this.

Provided the Chinese Army remains under centralized control, it should be of very great value to Allied operations in China, if only as a source of manpower and labor for the L. of C. and for work on airfields and as a guerrilla screen restricting Japanese activities in subsidiary theaters.

9. China's Naval and Air Forces and Economic Contribution. China is not capable of making any naval contribution to the Allied war effort. Nor can she contribute air equipment. Capable Chinese pilots are beginning to be produced and are now in combat service. From unoccupied China there comes some economic contribution, especially certain materials -- such as tungsten.

10. United States Air Forces in China. At the moment there is an increase of U.S.A.A.F. offensive activity in the Ichang area, and there have recently been a number of Japanese air attacks on the U.S.A.A.F. formations in South China. Reports indicate that Japanese wastage has been disproportionately high. Bringing the Japanese to combat, and forcing them to dispose modern types of aircraft in China are factors of increasing importance. The presence of the U.S.A.A.F. has a good effect on Chinese morale.

11. Effect on the Allied War Effort of the Collapse of China's resistance to Japan.

As shown in paragraph 2 above, collapse of China's resistance, if it should occur, would be most likely to take the form

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of an "undeclared peace." Such conditions almost certainly imply a period of internal chaos which will make it unlikely that Japan will be able to free any large portion of her garrisons for large scale operations elsewhere.

Because of the strategic importance to the United Nations of bases in China, our task would be made much harder if Chinese resistance were to collapse before the stage in the war has been reached when these bases are required.

Were there to be a formal peace between China and Japan, we would lose the moral asset of the alliance with a nation whose resistance to aggression has excited sympathy in all parts of the neutral and democratic worlds. It would provide valuable material for Axis propaganda and a powerful basis for Japan's claims to primacy in Asia.

12. Measures to keep China in the War. Successful Allied military operations in the Far East close to China's borders would have an important effect in stimulating the will to resist in China and the fighting spirit of China's armies.

China's will to resist until large scale Allied operations in her aid take place will be stiffened as the air ferry service is stepped up, the U.S.A.A.F. is increased, and military equipment for the Chinese Army is received. Reopening of the Burma Road, which has acquired a psychological importance out of proportion to the material help it would bring China, would greatly stimulate morale.

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CONCLUSION

13. In view of the fact that very little direct military pressure is being exerted against China on land or in the air, we do not consider that the factors already mentioned - lack of food, inflation and decline in morale - are sufficient at present to cause the collapse of China's resistance. But a continuation of the present rate of deterioration might do so. Nevertheless, we consider that, for the next 12 months at least, formal peace between China and Japan is extremely unlikely. In the absence, however, of some Allied action to stimulate Chinese morale there is a danger that we might be faced with a situation amounting to an "undeclared peace" between China and Japan.

A formal peace would adversely affect the United Nations' prestige and public opinion. Even an undeclared peace would make much more difficult the use of bases in China and would deprive the United Nations of the present and potential contribution to the war effort of the Chinese army.

A new and large scale Japanese offensive in China is unlikely. Japan may, however, appreciate that the increasing use of the air ferry service to Kunming is indicative of the build-up of a serious threat to her whole position in China. The danger period for a possible new Japanese offensive in China is therefore likely to lie between the moment when this service is substantially stepped up and the moment when Japan becomes seriously apprehensive of a major Allied offensive threatening from some other direction her position in occupied territories. When the second of these points is reached, the likelihood of a new Japanese offensive in China will probably quickly diminish.

The measures most likely to ensure continuance of Chinese resistance are successful Allied military operations close to China; the increased delivery of supplies, particularly military equipment; the build-up of the American Air Force in China; and, on psychological rather than on practical grounds, the re-opening of the Burma Road.

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C.C.S. M-120

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST
(Brief)

The Combined Intelligence Committee submitted for information a report on "Russian Capabilities and Intentions in the Far East". This report sets forth Russia's defensive and offensive capabilities and such information as is available relative to Russia's strength in Siberia.

The Combined Intelligence Committee summarizes its views regarding Russia's intentions with the following statement:

> "Russia is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Russian intervention."

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MAR 22 1974

U. S. [redacted]
BRITISH M[redacted]

COPY NO. 53

25 July 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 120

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

References: a. C.C.S. 263 and 263/1
b. C.C.S. 100th Mtg., Item 5.

Note by the Secretaries

The attached paper, in the form adopted by the Combined Intelligence Committee, is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in response to reference b.

The Combined Intelligence Committee states it will be noted that in paragraph 8 a - Russian Ground Strength - views of the British and United States Military Intelligence Staffs are set out in parallel columns. The Committee points out that so far it has proved impossible to reach agreement on the Russian Order of Battle in the Far East but it is understood that the matter is under active consideration by Military Intelligence Staffs of the two countries.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAR 22 1974

U. S. [redacted]
BRITISH M[redacted]

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate present Russian capabilities and intentions with respect to Japan.

DISCUSSION

2. Information regarding Russian strength in Siberia is meager and uncertain.

3. Russian capabilities are discussed in Enclosure "A"; Russian intentions in Enclosure "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. Defensive capabilities. In the event of a Japanese attack, the Russians would probably be unable to prevent the isolation of the Maritime Provinces by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Defensive operations, however, should be possible on present stored reserves for at least six months. The defense of the Kamchatka Peninsula would devolve almost exclusively on Russia's Allies. Subsequent developments in the whole area would depend largely on the effectiveness of the assistance of the other United Nations.

5. Offensive capabilities. Russian submarines and air forces are capable of increasing appreciably the attrition now being suffered by Japanese shipping and aircraft and possibly of increasing the attrition of Japanese naval forces. Strategic bombing by Russian air forces would be relatively ineffective. United Nations air reinforcements--now feasible--would greatly enhence the air capabilities. Decisive ground operations against the Japanese in Manchuria would be practicable only after Russian forces in the west had been released by the defeat of Germany or after the other United Nations had gained access from the Pacific to the sea of Okhotsk.

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6. Intentions. Russia is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Russian intervention.

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U. S. [redacted]
BRITISH [redacted]

ENCLOSURE "A"

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST

7. General. Information regarding Russian strength in Siberia is meager and uncertain. We believe that Russian ground and air forces in eastern Siberia are equal or superior in numbers to the Japanese forces opposed to them, but the Japanese advantages in strategic position, available reserves, and logistics offset their possible inferiority in numbers. Soviet naval strength is not comparable to that of Japan.

8. Ground Strength.

U.S.

a. Russian. The Russians are believed to have east of Lake Baikal, 20 infantry divisions (of 15,000 men each), 11 cavalry divisions (6,600 each), 1 mountain division (9,000), 2 motorized divisions (7,000 each), 13 tank brigades (2,000 each), 5 motorized brigades (4,000 each), 9 infantry brigades (4,000 each), and 1 composite brigade (5,000); total 480,000 men. With corps, army, line of communications, and other troops, total ground strength is believed to be about 660,000 men. Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. In any event, the rate of build-up is limited by the capacity

BRITISH

a. Russian. The Russians are believed to have east of Lake Baikal, 16 infantry divisions accepted plus 4 infantry divisions unconfirmed (13,000 men each); 7 cavalry divisions (6,000 men each); 8 tank brigades (1,500 men each); 3 motorized brigades accepted plus 1 motorized brigade unconfirmed (1,500 men each); 9 infantry brigades (6,000 men each); 2 armored car brigades (1,000 men each); total 322,500 men accepted plus 53,500 unconfirmed; total including corps, army and line of communications troops 450,000 accepted. Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. In any event, the rate of build-up is limited by the capacity of a single

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of a single railroad eastward from Novosibirsk. A railroad has been projected to connect Taishet with Sovietskaya. The completeness of this route is questionable.

Present Russian strength is believed to be disposed as follows: Outer Mongolia, 65,000; Transbaikalia, 183,000; the Amur River area, 195,000; the Vladivostok area, 188,000; Sakhalin, 11,000; Kamchatka, 10,000; the Kolyma area 6,000.

railroad eastward from Novosibirsk. A railroad has been projected to connect Taishet with Sovietskaya. The completeness of this route is questionable.

Present Russian strength is believed to be disposed as follows: Transbaikalia and outer Mongolia 205,000; Amur River area Kamchatka and Kolyma area 86,000; Vladivostock area and Sakhalin 159,000. Total - 450,000.

b. Japanese. There are believed to be in Manchuria 14 infantry divisions (of 18,500 men each), 1 cavalry brigade (3,500), 12 tank regiments (1,000 each), and 13 border garrisons (3,000 each), amounting, with army troops to 370,000 men. In addition there are 80,000 Japanese line of communication troops and 250,000 Manchurian troops. This strength can be reinforced with 160,000 Japanese troops from Japan and China within thirty days.

9. Air Strength.

a. Russian. It is estimated that total Russian air strength east of Lake Baikal consists of about 2,000 tactical aircraft. Although available information affords no dependable basis for determining the percentage of this strength which is in operational squadrons, we believe that for strategical purposes it is reasonable to assume arbitrarily a factor of 60% or 1,200 aircraft. The force is apparently disposed on the southern border of Russian controlled territory from Ulan Bator

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to Vladivostok. Main concentrations are believed to be in areas near Chita, Khabarovsk and in the Vladivostok-Spaask sector, with a lesser concentration probably at Ulan Bator. Reinforcement from the west is unlikely pending the defeat of Germany, but through Alaska, and from China, reinforcement could be effected by the other United Nations should their assistance be sought. No dependable information with regard to serviceability or combat efficiency is available. Existing airports are adequate for flexible operation. Stores of aviation gasoline and other supplies are believed to be adequate for at least six months.

b. Japanese. We estimate that the Japanese have 1,100 aircraft of operational types located in Manchuria, Korea, Japan Proper, and the Kuriles, of which approximately 25 percent are believed to be reserves and/or in advanced operational training units.

Under present commitments, we believe that reinforcements of land-based aircraft from other areas would be limited and probably would not exceed 200 operational aircraft. A maximum of about 400 ship-based aircraft might also be readily concentrated in home waters.

10. Naval Strength. The Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters are not comparable to those available to Japan. They are estimated to consist of one light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 60/100 submarines, 60/100 motor torpedo boats, and a number of other vessels of little or no combatant value. The only available Russian naval reinforcements are 20 submarines, 10 destroyers, and other light craft in the Murmansk area. There are believed to be base and repair facilities at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk (usable throughout the year), at Nikolayevsk, Komsomolsk, and Nagayevo (usually closed by ice from November to May), and at Anadyr (usually closed by ice from October to June); and there are probably some facilities of those natures at other points on the Gulf of Tartary and the Pacific Coast, if not on the Sea of Okhotsk. Russian submarines are believed to be fairly effective.

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U. S. [redacted]
BRITISH M[redacted]

11. Supply Situation.

a. Russian. Although the Russian forces in the Far East are supposed to be self-sufficient, their local sources of supply are actually both limited and vulnerable. Until the German menace to her has been removed, Russia can hardly furnish significant support from the west. Such support would, in any case, have to be delivered via a long and in part exposed line of communication. Russian forces in the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok areas are liable to be cut off from both Russia and the Pacific, and their continued resistance is therefore dependent upon stored supplies. It is believed that a six-months' supply may be on hand.

b. Japanese. The Japanese supply situation in Manchuria is greatly superior to that of the Russians in eastern Siberia as regards both local resources and communications.

12. Terrain and climate. Along most of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier the terrain is steppe, prairie, and park land. Only at the great northern bend of the Amur and southward on the Manchurian side past Blagoveshchensk is the frontier zone mountainous and heavily forested. West of Vladivostok the hills are bare.

For troops equipped to fight in bitter cold, as are both the Russian and the Japanese forces in this area, the winter is a favorable season for operations. Various rivers are substantial obstacles to military maneuvers during the late spring and early autumn. In summer and winter they form channels of communications.

13. Defensive capabilities. A necessity of defending a 2,000 mile front on exterior lines, with lack of depth at certain key points, offers serious strategical disadvantages. However, we believe that strong local fortifications and sufficient air fields to protect these key points exist. The only known reliable means of ground transportation from the West is the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which is extremely vulnerable because of its numerous large bridges and its close proximity at various points east of Chita to Japanese-held territory.

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Nothing is known of Russian military plans. In the event of a Japanese attack, it is probable that the Russians initially could not prevent the isolation of the Maritime Provinces from the West particularly by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Russian Forces in the Far East should be capable of defensive operations for at least six months on local stored reserves. Subsequent developments would depend on Russian ability to reopen communications with the West, the degree of United Nations pressure on Japan in other theaters, the scale of United Nations direct reinforcements of Siberia, and the extent to which the serious impairment of Trans-Pacific supply routes could be compensated for by increased deliveries over other routes. The defense of the Kamchatka Peninsula would depend almost entirely upon action taken by the other United Nations.

14. Offensive capabilities.

a. Ground. The Russians are not now in a position to undertake decisive operations without reinforcements. Reinforcements for such a purpose cannot be expected until the German menace to her has been removed.

b. Air. The Russian air force in the Far East should be able to increase appreciably the already serious rate of attrition of the Japanese air force and, to a lesser extent, of shipping. Limited strategic bombing of objectives in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, and the Kuriles can be undertaken, but upon such a small scale as to be relatively ineffective without the participation of other United Nations from Siberian bases.

c. Naval. Russian surface forces have little offensive capabilities. Russian submarines should be able to add to the already serious rate of attrition of Japanese shipping and might be able to destroy some Japanese naval vessels.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

15. Russia's long-term policy in the Far East is to insure the security of her position there. It is consequently in Russia's interest:-

a. That Japan should be weak.

b. To occupy or neutralize certain areas, for example, Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles; and possibly to extend her Maritime Provinces a short distance southwards to include the ice-free ports of Rashin and perhaps Seishin.

c. To extend the sphere of Russian economic and political influence in the Far East. Russia has already secured for herself a special position in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia and probably has ambitions in Inner Mongolia. These ambitions may well extend also to Korea and to Manchuria with its strategically important communications. The products of Manchuria, particularly its foodstuffs, would help towards the economic self-sufficiency of Russia's Far Eastern territories.

16. Russian intentions in the Far East whilst Russia is still at war with Germany. Russia is engaged in a life and death struggle with Germany, and Japan is likewise engaged with America and Great Britain. The armies of both Russia and Japan facing each other in the Far East are so balanced that, in the event of war under present conditions, no quick decision could be expected by either side. Both Russia and Japan must be anxious to avoid the opening of a new theater of operations with the unforeseeable drain on their resources which would be entailed.

Each country is suspicious of the other and both are at present at pains to avoid incidents. The fact that, of the two, Russia is adopting the firmer attitude should not be taken to indicate any readiness to start operations against Japan but merely that Russia feels in a slightly stronger position.

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17. Russian intentions in the Far East after the defeat of Germany. When Germany has been defeated, or is clearly on the verge of defeat, Russia will no doubt review her attitude towards Japan. It is impossible to foresee the conditions in which the war against Germany will end; and this makes it difficult to forecast Russia's decision about the war in the Far East. In the following paragraphs we discuss factors directly affecting Russia's decision as to intervention and the extent to which the Allies might influence its timing.

18. Factors influencing Russia's decision on intervention against Japan after the defeat of Germany. The principal reasons why Russia should not be expected to intervene, at least at an early stage, would be her exhaustion after the defeat of Germany, and the feeling that her armies would be the only available forces occupying a position from which the main Japanese armies could be engaged, and that she would therefore once again have to bear the brunt of the land fighting until Britain and the United States had made sufficient progress in their campaign to be in a position to engage the Japanese armies. Due to the severe losses that Russia has suffered on the German front, she presumably feels that it would be to her interest to have the other United Nations, as well as Japan, equally exhausted at the end of the war.

In spite of these factors, however, the principal consideration that will probably force Russia into the war sooner or later is the wish to occupy an equal position with the United Nations in a Far Eastern peace settlement, including the future development of China. Another consideration may be a fear that Britain and the United States might agree to a compromise peace that would leave Japan a potential menace.

We conclude that, while ultimately Russia is likely to intervene, there are strong reasons why she would delay doing so until she is sure her efforts would not be prolonged.

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19. Extent to which the Allies can influence the timing of Russian intervention. Any appeal to the Russians for help against Japan before Germany's defeat is clearly in sight would almost certainly meet with a reply that the Soviet Union considers itself bound by its treaty of neutrality with Japan and intends to observe that treaty as long as Japan does and that it cannot presently add to its commitments.

In deciding, after Germany's defeat, whether or not to participate in war against Japan, Russia will be guided only by her own interests. Appeals to gratitude or to the spirit of the Alliance are unlikely to carry weight.

It appears unlikely that offers of territory would induce Russia to come in at a time of our choosing. Most of the areas of interest to Russia, referred to in paragraph 14 above, could not be offered to Russia without creating difficulties with China. Unless we were in occupation of such territories or areas of interest, Russia might well argue that we were either offering something which it would not be in our power to give or offering something that she would be able to take whether we offered it or not.

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C.C.S. 300

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA
(Brief)

This report, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report as presented and directed that it be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration at the "QUADRANT" Conference.

The Joint Intelligence Committee's report submitted an estimate on the present Japanese capabilities, Japan's relationship with the Axis and with Russia; noting Japan's present strategic situation in regard to China and the United Nations and her possible courses of action.

Japan's probable intentions are outlined as follows:

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from China, Japan would strike first; (3) if Japan had inflicted a severe defeat upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might follow up offensively; (4) if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet.

b. North Pacific. Japan will contine to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she would probably try to seize Kamchatka.

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c. Manchuria. Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with Russia in all circumstances except as indicated in a (1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in a (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be Kunming and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

e. Burma. Japan will remain on the strategic defensive.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

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C.C.S. 300

6 August 1943

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-1944, Pacific-Far East Area for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference.

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ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA
(As of 20 July 1943)

1. Basic factors in the Japanese situation.

a. Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective, but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern Siberia by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in China of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese communications; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Melanesia area and the Aleutians. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only insofar as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective or - in the long run - to her security.

c. Relations with Russia. There exists between Russia and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. Russia is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both Russia and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their

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respective enemies. Russia is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German threat to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at small cost to her.

d. Time. Japan will take maximum advantage of such time as is left to her to consolidate and, if possible, to improve her present position, hoping that, in the eventual reckoning, the United Nations, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her advantage. We estimate that from mid-1943 to mid-1944 total Japanese industrial production will increase approximately 10 per cent. However, the production of many critical categories -- notably merchant ships, aircraft, trucks, and armored vehicles -- will increase by more than 10 per cent. Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her.

2. The existing overall situation.

a. General. Japan is on the strategic defensive. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) Naval, 10 BB, 6 CV, 4 ACV, 14 CA, 16 CL, 81 DD, 84 SS; (2) air, 1400 fighters, 1,450 bombers, 800 other types. Of the total, 390 fighters and 120 bombers are ship-based; (3) ground, 64 divisions, 17 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 18 tank regiments and many independent units, totaling in round numbers 3,000,000 men (this total includes naval, ground, and air personnel, but not Puppet Troops).

Japan's position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength but requiring secure and sufficient ocean transport

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over long lines of communication. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Russian commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan's northern flank. Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

b. Limitations on Japanese striking power.

(1) Shipping. The margin of Japanese shipping, after allowing for essential trade and the maintenance of Japan's many distant overseas commitments, is small and continues to fall. Additional tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this need not have serious effects on Japan's capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan's rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace even with the present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments or incurring losses such as she would have to expect from any further large-scale sea-borne offensive operations. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944.

The situation in regard to tankers is more critical. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by the use of dry-cargo ships as oil carriers.

(2) Air power. We believe that lack of sufficient air strength will prevent Japan from engaging in more than one major operation at one time.

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(3) Naval requirements. Japan's naval strength is adequate for present requirements, but must be carefully husbanded for future decisive action. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) Military requirements. A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Russian forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is limited by shortage of shipping.

3. The existing local situation on various fronts.

a. North Pacific. Japan holds an exposed outpost at Kiska, but will not risk major forces in order to prevent its fall. We believe the Japanese are preparing for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

b. Manchuria. Japanese forces in Manchuria and Russian forces in eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia are roughly in balance. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply, but is deterred from aggression by a healthy respect for Russian armed forces; the vulnerability of Japan to bombing and submarine attack; and the additional strain which such a commitment would impose on her resources in general, including the strain on her shipping.

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c. China (except Yunnan). The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country's principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, and trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local aggressive action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China's generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness. Although a formal separate peace is highly improbable, it is possible that, if China's condition is not effectively relieved, an "undeclared peace" may eventually result.

d. Yunnan. Active operations are not indicated. The inconsiderable Japanese forces on the Indochina and Burma frontiers are separated from Kunming by extremely rugged terrain. Malarial conditions in the area would impose a high rate of attrition on any troops operating there.

e. Burma. The wet monsoon precludes major operations from May to October. Present Japanese strength is sufficient for only local offensive action.

f. Southwest Pacific. The build-up of ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner Seas area and northeastern New Guinea appears to have been defensive in character. No important ground force movements have occurred since 1 March.

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g. Central Pacific. Of the heavy naval units withdrawn from Truk to Japan at the time of the capture of Attu, some have returned to Truk. Air strength in Micronesia is being reinforced, but attrition and reinforcement are approximately in balance.

h. Strategic reserves

(1) Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened point of the defensive perimeter in from 6-9 days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming critical.

(2) Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such, but Japan's ability to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position enables her to reinforce quickly any threatened front at the expense of other theaters.

(3) Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes Japan's initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

i. Puppet Troops.

(1) Manchuria, strength. (a) In Manchuria there are reported to be 328,000 Puppet Troops. They are organized both as combat divisions and as garrison troops. Only in recent years have they received automatic weapons and artillery and, in view of apparent Japanese shortages in both these categories of weapons, it is not thought that the puppet units are completely equipped.

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(b) Disposition. About 12,000 Manchurian Puppet Troops are reported to be in China. The mass of Manchurian Puppet Troops are stationed along the Siberian border, near the larger cities, and in strategic locations generally but never without sufficient Japanese units in the vicinity to keep them under control.

(c) Effect on Japanese Strategy. In the past the Manchurian Puppet Army has been maintained principally for political reasons, to maintain internal order, and to prevent former soldiers from resorting to banditry. However, in the event the Japanese - Soviet situation remains unchanged Japan may replace two or three of her divisions in Manchuria with Puppet Troops.

(2) (a) China and Mongolia. Strength. At present there are reported to be 366,000 Nanking Government Puppet Troops in China. They consist mainly of numerous small commands readily controlled by the Japanese. There are indications that these troops are now being reorganized into infantry divisions of three regiments each with a divisional strength of about 6,000. It is reported that light artillery and heavier machine guns will now be issued to Puppet Troops whereas these weapons were denied them in the past. Because of the unreliability and defection of Nanking Puppet Troops in the past, we believe that the Japanese will hesitate to increase them beyond 500,000 during 1943 - 1944. Rather than increase the Nanking Puppets, it is more likely that Manchurian Puppets will be brought south for garrison duties.

(b) Disposition of Puppet Troops. About 209,000 Puppet Troops are located in Central China, 93,000 in North China, 48,000 in South China, and 16,000, mostly

cavalry units, in the Chaher - Suiyuan area. Future dispositions will not change radically except that the distribution of new contingents will be influenced by the location of the Japanese troops which they relieve.

(c) Effect on Japanese strategy. Nanking Puppet Troops have been used as garrison troops for maintaining internal order and have been employed in no offensive to date. We believe that the Japanese may by the end of 1944 further reduce their forces by four divisions in North China and by two divisions in Central China, replacing them with Nanking and Manchurian Puppet Troops. At all times a nucleus of Japanese forces must remain in all strategic centers to keep the Puppet Troops in line.

4. China.

a. Strength. While China is reported to have over 300 divisions, including Communist divisions, of about 7,000 men each, problems of equipment, training, leadership, supply, and loyalties to local military leaders make it improbable that more than one-fifth of that number are better than fairly reliable troops capable of defensive operations on any front. Even fewer are sufficiently well equipped, trained, and led to undertake offensive operations. If sufficient supplies get through and the United Nations program for equipping and training some of the Chinese is successful (the 30 division plan), the situation may improve and more of China's tremendous manpower may be effectively available for United Nations operations. However, it is improbable that the effect of this, at best, could be felt strategically before the summer of 1944.

China's guerrillas, estimated at some 500,000 men, in addition to many of her divisions are rendering excellent service in compelling Japan to keep a large occupational force in China.

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b. Capabilities. If given adequate United Nations air support China may be able to defend her own strategic areas against anything but an all-out Japanese offensive. If given strong United Nations air support China might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive. It is doubted that she would have the ability to hold such an objective, if attained, against a determined Japanese counter offensive.

c. Probable intentions. The Chinese probably intend to remain on the defensive and concentrate on reequipping and retraining their army for offensive action at a later date.

5. Prospective overall developments through 1944.

a. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese naval strength should increase as a result of new construction, as follows:

	BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	DD	SS
15 June 43	10	6	4	14	16	81	84
1 Nov. 43	12	8	7	16	18	93	102
1 May 44	13	10	10	18	20	105	120

b. Air strength. Aircraft production is expected to continue to increase gradually during 1943 and 1944. Present increase is balanced by present attrition.

c. Ground strength. It is expected that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 72 divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, three cavalry brigades, and twenty or more tank regiments.

d. War production. During 1944 Japanese munitions and other war production is expected to show a substantial increase over 1943, provided that ocean shipments can be maintained and that industrial plants escape bombing. The overall rate of industrial production may increase by about 10 per cent. In addition to overall increased production, Japan is continuing to develop uneconomic production of materials in the "Inner Zone"* (such as oil, coal, iron, aluminum) for strategic reasons. This work should be well advanced by the end of 1944.

* Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin).

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e. Shipping. Despite Japan's strenuous shipbuilding efforts estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 G.R.T. of steel operating tonnage from 1 June 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

f. Morale. Japanese morale will remain high until, through an effective attack on vital areas or a major defeat which cannot be concealed, faith in their leaders has suffered severe impairment.

6. Forecast for 1944.

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from China, Japan would strike first; (3) if Japan had inflicted a severe defeat upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might follow up offensively; (4) if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet.

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she would probably try to seize Kamchatka.

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with Russia in all circumstances except those indicated in a (1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity.

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d. China (including Yunnan). We believe that Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in e (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be Kunming and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

e. Burma. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

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C.C.S. 301

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944
(Brief)

An outline plan for specific operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44, prepared by the Joint Staff Planners was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the report be amended and forwarded as amended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at "QUADRANT".

Taking into consideration the Estimate of the Enemy Situation as presented in C.C.S. 300 and the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan as presented in C.C.S. 220 (TRIDENT), the Joint Staff Planners submit specific outline plans for operations against Japan and conclude that:

Specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST for 1943-44 should include the recapture of Burma and the opening of a land route to China through Northern Burma, meanwhile furnishing all possible logistic and air support to China in order to insure the availability of Chinese areas suitable for operations of United Nations forces against Japan, and a westward advance in the Pacific to the Palau-Vogelkop line. An analysis of the separate operations outlined in this paper shows that sufficient means can be made available for their accomplishment in 1943-44. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in a position to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.

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C.C.S. 301

9 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The enclosure, an outline plan for specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44, which represents the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff, is presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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ENCLOSURE

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

Report by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

PROBLEM

1. Prepare an outline plan for specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 to be in consonance with the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that ITALY is eliminated from the war in 1943; GERMANY will be defeated in the fall of 1944; JAPAN and RUSSIA remain at peace.

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION,
1943-44, PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA

3. An estimate of the enemy situation is contained in C.C.S. 300. This concludes that:

a. General. JAPAN will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that RUSSIA had decided to attack her or to grant to the other UNITED NATIONS the use of Siberian air bases, JAPAN would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious UNITED NATIONS operations against her from CHINA, JAPAN would strike first; (3) if JAPAN had inflicted a severe defeat upon UNITED NATIONS forces operating against her in the PACIFIC, she might follow up offensively; (4) if RUSSIA met with serious reverses on the Western Front, JAPAN might take the opportunity to attack the SOVIET.

[redacted]

b. North PACIFIC. We believe that JAPAN will continue to strengthen her defenses in the KURILES as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with RUSSIA, in which case she would probably try to seize KAMCHATKA.

c. MANCHURIA. We believe that JAPAN will continue to seek to avoid war with RUSSIA in all circumstances except those indicated in a (1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in SIBERIA, reducing her forces in MANCHURIA only in case of extreme necessity.

d. CHINA (including YUNNAN). We believe that JAPAN will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in CHINA by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in a (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be KUNMING and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

e. BURMA. We believe that JAPAN will remain on the strategic defensive.

f. Southwest and Central PACIFIC. We believe that JAPAN will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

4. The Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN (C.C.S. 220) envisages the actual invasion of JAPAN following an overwhelming air offensive from bases in CHINA. This requires the opening of lines of communication to CHINA which, in turn, involves the early recapture of BURMA and the seizure of a port in CHINA. This requires a westward advance by the UNITED STATES through the Central and South-Southwest PACIFIC. Operations during this

period must have as their objectives those stated in C.C.S. 242/6: "to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced." An analysis of our capabilities prior to 1945 indicates that we can conduct operations in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters which will be in consonance with the above objective.

5. A phase in the North PACIFIC, now drawing to a close, deals with the ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIONS. Consideration is being given to plans for an operation against PARAMUSHIRU in 1944 considering means available and feasibility in connection with our other operations in the PACIFIC.

6. In the Central and South-Southwest PACIFIC during 1943-44, we can continue our objective of reaching positions for an all out effort against JAPAN by attaining a line that runs roughly through the PALAUS and the VOGELKOP in western NEW GUINEA. At the same time we will constantly be restricting Japanese communications. It may be found desirable or necessary to seize GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS, possible the BONINS, in conjunction with the seizure of the western CAROLINES, and in particular with the attack on the PALAUS. The MARIANA-BONIN attack would have profound effects on the Japanese because of its serious threat to the homeland.

7. In the Asiatic Theater, during this period, the British will begin the ejection of the Japanese from BURMA. This will constitute a further pressure against the Japanese and will increase the attrition of their military power. The early increase in assistance to CHINA is of the utmost importance in keeping her in the war. In addition to assisting CHINA materially, our air efforts in CHINA will be furthered. The British forces are scheduled to complete the conquest of BURMA with operations beginning in late 1944.

8. The various operations required in the several theaters, during 1943-44, together with a brief statement of the concept of each operation, are listed below. These operations further the objectives stated in C.C.S. 242/6 and, as will be shown later, are within our capabilities during the period under consideration. Outline plans for these operations are available.

a. GILBERTS

This is a plan for the seizure and consolidation of the GILBERTS preparatory to a further advance into the MARSHALLS. NAURU, TARAWA, and MAKIN are to be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the rapid development of airfields in the forward (TARAWA-MAKIN) area and staging fields along the GILBERT line.

b. MARSHALLS

This is a plan for the seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central PACIFIC. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the GILBERTS through JALUIT and MILI.

c. PONAPE

This is a plan for the capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations against the TRUK area. The main effort is to be against the northern (PONAPE Town) area. Subsequent operations provide for the elimination of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions.

d. CAROLINES (TRUK area)

This is a plan for the seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west at WOLEAI and the establishment of a fleet base at TRUK. Atolls to the southeastward of TRUK are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of airfields in the area. These will provide bases for a sustained fighter-supported bombing offensive against TRUK. Subsequent operations provide for capture of TRUK and the reduction as necessary of the remaining enemy positions as far west as WOLEAI.

e. PALAU ISLANDS

This is a plan for the capture of the PALAUS including YAP. The plan calls for the initial capture of YAP and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensified air attack against the PALAUS. The initial phases of the final assault against the PALAUS center largely on the MALAKAL-KOROR Harbor area, with the objective of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or neutralization of all the islands.

f. Operations against GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS (In preparation)

This is a plan for the seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS.

g. Operations in the NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS subsequent to CARTWHEEL

This is a plan for the seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced naval anchorages are to be established at KAVIENG and MANUS ISLAND. The plan envisages: (1) an advance to WEWAK, (2) the seizure of NEW IRELAND and the outlying islands of NEW HANOVER and ST. MATTHIAS, and (3) the seizure of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS in the order listed. Concurrently with these operations, RABAUL is to be neutralized by an air offensive of increasing intensity.

h. Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG Operation

This is a plan for an advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGELKOP. It provides for step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances. Each successive offensive

is predicated on the consolidation of earlier seizures, including the activation of airfields from which to provide close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations.

i. Operations in BURMA at end of 1943 monsoon (to be presented by British

These are plans for advances, with limited objectives, in both north and southwest (ARAKAN coast) BURMA in November 1943. The northern advance will be made by Chinese troops from YUNNAN and LEDO and by British forces from IMPHAL. The objective of this operation is to clear the Japanese from northern BURMA and allow the completion of the LEDO Road to a junction with the BURMA Road. The operation in the southwest is to be an overland advance and an amphibious assault against AKYAB. The capture of AKYAB will be followed by operations for the seizure of RAMREE ISLAND. The objective of these operations is to place our forces in a position to interdict RANGOON, and Japanese lines of communication into BURMA.

j. Operations in BURMA at end of 1944 monsoon (to be presented by British)

These are plans for an overseas operation to drive the Japanese from BURMA, with the objective of opening additional routes to CHINA and increasing the flow of supplies at the earliest practicable date.

k. Operations in CHINA

These operations are of a continuing nature, being increased as our resources permit. They envisage the maximum possible flow of supplies to CHINA and the maintaining of increased American Air Forces in CHINA.

l. Operations against PARAMUSHIRU

A plan for operations against PARAMUSHIRU is under consideration.

[redacted]

9. Increased bombing of the KURILES from the ALEUTIANS and possibly an amphibious movement against PARAMASHIRU would have a measurable effect on other operations against the Japanese. The KURILES are a part of the Japanese Archipelago and a threat against them also threatens the Empire and will tend to pin down forces at home.

10. The two areas where operations come nearest to being mutually supporting are the Central PACIFIC and South-Southwest PACIFIC. An advance in either of these two Theaters will either increase the threat to the other or increase the difficulties of its logistic support. Our seizure of the BISMARCKS would place TRUK under threat. Our seizure of TRUK would tend to flank western NEW GUINEA, thereby increasing the difficulties of its supply. The fleet can operate to support operations in both Theaters simultaneously. Diversions can frequently be made from one Theater to the other without adversely affecting planned operations.

TARGET DATES

11. The target dates shown below are for the most part tentative and are listed only for planning purposes.

Target Dates	Central PACIFIC	Southwest PACIFIC	CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
15 Aug. 1943	KISKA	---	---
1 Sep. 1943	---	LAE-MADANG	---
15 Oct. 1943	---	BUIN-FAISI	---
1 Nov. 1943	---	---	(1) Upper BURMA (2) AKYAB-RAMREE
15 Nov. 1943	GILBERTS	---	---
1 Dec. 1943	---	(1) W. NEW BRITAIN (2) KIETA (3) BUKA (Neutralize)	---
1 Jan. 1944	MARSHALLS	---	---

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Target Dates	Central PACIFIC	Southwest PACIFIC	CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
1 Feb. 1944	---	(1) RABAUL (Neutralize) (2) WEWAK	---
1 May 1944	---	KAVIENG	---
1 June 1944	PONAPE	MANUS	---
1 Aug. 1944	---	HOLLANDIA	---
1 Sep. 1944	TRUK	---	---
15 Sep. 1944	---	WADKE	---
15 Oct. 1944	---	JAPEN	---
1 Nov. 1944	---	---	Complete BURMA
30 Nov. 1944	---	MANOKWARI	---
31 Dec. 1944	PALAU	---	---

AVAILABILITY OF MEANS

12. An analysis indicates that, provided the shipping needs of the PACIFIC will continue to be fulfilled, the requirements for the above operations can be met by presently planned deployments.

CONCLUSION

13. Specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST for 1943-44 should include the recapture of BURMA and the opening of a land route to CHINA through Northern BURMA, meanwhile furnishing all possible logistic and air support to China in order to insure the availability of Chinese areas suitable for operations of United Nations forces against Japan, and a westward advance in the PACIFIC to the PALAU-VOGELKOP line. An analysis of the seperate operations indicated in paragraph 11 above shows that sufficient means can be made available for their accomplishment in 1943-44. The completion of these operations will place the UNITED NATIONS in a position to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after GERMANY is defeated.

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