SEXTANT CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER—DECEMBER 1943

THE PRESIDENT
SEXTANT CONFERENCE
November-December 1943

PAPERS
AND
MINUTES OF MEETINGS
SEXTANT AND EUREKA CONFERENCES

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270/13</td>
<td>Use of Facilities in the Azores by U.S. Aircraft</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270/14</td>
<td>Development of Facilities in the Azores</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300/2</td>
<td>Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300/3</td>
<td>Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308/7</td>
<td>Boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320/4</td>
<td>Operation RANKIN</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>379/7</td>
<td>Retention of LST's in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380/2</td>
<td>Basic Policies for the Next United States-British Staff Conference</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Note by the Secretaries)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387</td>
<td>Mediterranean Command Arrangements</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387/3</td>
<td>Directive for Unification of Command in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390/1</td>
<td>Future Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>397</td>
<td>Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>398</td>
<td>Specific Operations for the Defeat of Germany and Her Satellites, 1943-44</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>399</td>
<td>Report on Recent and Prospective Developments in Anti-Submarine Operations Since QUADRANT</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399/1</td>
<td>Progress Report on the U-Boat War—September-October 1943</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400/1</td>
<td>Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400/2</td>
<td>Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>V.L.R. Airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401/1</td>
<td>V.L.R. Airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401/2</td>
<td>V.L.R. Airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Note by the Secretaries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Progress Report, Combined Bomber Offensive (Report by the Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Air Force)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403/1</td>
<td>Progress Report on Combined Bomber Offensive (Note by the Chief of the Air Staff)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Agenda for SEXTANT (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404/1</td>
<td>SEXTANT Agenda (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>Role of China in Defeat of Japan (Memorandum from Lt. General Stilwell, USA)</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.S.</td>
<td>PAPERS</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff—United Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406/1</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff—United Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>Collaboration with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407/1</td>
<td>Collaboration with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Note by the Secretaries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating Against Germany</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408/1</td>
<td>Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating Against Germany</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>OVERLORD and the Mediterranean</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Note by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>The Effect of Weather on Operation OVERLORD</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411/2</td>
<td>Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Note by the Secretaries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411/5</td>
<td>Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413</td>
<td>French Participation in Cairo Conference</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413/2</td>
<td>French Participation in Cairo Conference</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Note by the Secretaries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415/3</td>
<td>The Provision of Merchant Shipping for the British Fleet for the War Against Japan</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and First Sea Lord)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S.</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>417</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Staff Planners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418/1</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry of Turkey into the War</td>
<td>(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Progress Report on Recent Operations and Future Plans in the Pacific</td>
<td>(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423/2</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operation Against the South of France</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Staff Planners in Collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive for Intensification of Support of Partisan Forces in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Staff Planners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426/1</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to the President and Prime Minister</td>
<td>(Note by the Combined Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>427</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to BUCCANEER</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Staff Planners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>427/1</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to BUCCANEER</td>
<td>(Message from Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation of Available Resources to Agreed Operations</td>
<td>(Report by the Combined Administrative Committee and Shipping and Logistics Experts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-165</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Conclusions of the EUREKA Conference</td>
<td>(Note by the Secretaries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MINUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Future Operations in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Operations in Europe and the Mediterranean Aid to the Balkan Patriots Southeast Asia Theater OVERLORD</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>OVERLORD and ANVIL Operation BUCCANEER Entry of Turkey into the War</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Operations in Southeast Asia Command Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Plenary Meeting</td>
<td>Report to the President and Prime Minister Messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MINUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S. Meeting</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>127th Meeting</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed SEXTANT Agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUREKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations Between Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Representatives of the U.S.S.R. and China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaffirmation of Over-All Strategic Concept and Basic Undertakings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Meeting</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of China in the Defeat of Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944-Pacific-Far East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff—United Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Present Situation in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Meeting</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanksgiving Day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff—United Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda for EUREKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions with Representatives of Chinese Government on Operations in Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130th Meeting</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERLORD and the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131st Meeting</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports from Commanders in Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERLORD and the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration with the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vi
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MINUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.C.S. 132d Meeting (Tehran)</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERLORD and the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.S. 133d Meeting</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of Military Conclusions of the EUREKA Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Partisans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Russian Declaration of War on Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) OVERLORD and Operations Against the South of France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Coordination with the Russian Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Agenda for the Remainder of SEXTANT Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry of Turkey into the War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress Reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Combined Bomber Offensive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.S. 134th Meeting</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Command Arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation RANKIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Conditions in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of the Plenary Session Held at 1100, 3 December 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.S. 135th Meeting</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive for Unification of the Command in the Mediterranean Amphibious Operation Against the South of France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive for Intensification of Support of Partisan Forces in Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MINUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S. 136th Meeting</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation ANVIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directions to Combined Staff Planners and the U.S. and British Shipping Authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message for Admiral Mountbatten from the Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S. 137th Meeting</th>
<th>497</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Command Alternative to BUCCANEER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Strategic Air Forces in N.W. Europe and in the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in the Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Report to the President and Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation of Resources to Plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.C.S. 138th Meeting</th>
<th>503</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to BUCCANEER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Merchant Shipping Types for the War Against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation of Available Resources to the Operations Decided upon Development of Facilities in the Azores</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Command Arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Southeast Asia Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of French Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viii
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MINUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st EUREKA Plenary Session</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Survey of the War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Strategic Concept of the War in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry of Turkey into the War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUREKA Military Conference</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of the War in Europe and the Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation OVERLORD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd EUREKA Plenary Session</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to the Balkan Partisans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry of Turkey into the War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of French Troops in Invasion of France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd EUREKA Plenary Session</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of Allied Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deception Plans for Operation OVERLORD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.C.S. 270/13 and 270/14

USE OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES BY U.S. AIRCRAFT

Reference:

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 6

In reply to a memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/12) which outlined a formula for operational control in the Azores, the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/13, 6 December 1943) noted that consideration is being deferred. They suggested steps to expedite an early completion of Lagens Field. The British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/14, 6 December 1943) outlined formulae for the development of facilities in the Azores.

C.C.S. 270/13 and C.C.S. 270/14 were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 138th Meeting. They approved C.C.S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4 and agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army Air Forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerating Memo 52-73
By Date Oct 24 1973
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

USE OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES BY U.S. AIRCRAFT

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/12), dated 3 December 1943, it is considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and recommendations are available from such sources as the U.S. Army-Navy Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, A.A.F., and the Transport Command, R.A.F.

2. Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, and control of U.S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain U.S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed to send appropriate U.S. construction, communications, meteorological and maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio Salazar, Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions regarding this procedure.


2. As regards a formula of Government Azores would use American officers from a British officer.

3. As regards the outcome of D.D.N. should construct Government. If the British should return to American use American.

4. The formation of that aircraft report Command using Lagens Command, as using Lagens.

5. In any be done overseas officers who in completion of
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U.S. are prepared to work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war.

2. As regards U.S. operational facilities at Lagos, we would suggest that a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the Azores would be on loan to H.M.G. operating under the command of a British officer from a base under British control.

3. As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the outcome of Dr. Salazar's consideration of the American proposal that the U.S. should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar's insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement, the British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should use American material and assistance under British cover.

4. The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those using Lagos.

5. In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after completion of work by American survey party recently in that island.
6. We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British and all under British command.
C.C.S. 300/2

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST

Reference:
CCS 128th Meeting, Item 3

C.C.S. 300/2 was circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as a basis of discussion at SEXTANT.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East area for information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference.
ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST
(As of 1 November 1943)

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East, 1944, with due regard to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2. We do not feel it practicable to attempt a summarization of the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East as projected through 1944. Such a condensation, in our opinion, would inevitably result in incomplete treatment of factors essential to the over-all picture. Our view of the situation, 1944, is therefore attached as Appendix "A," to which reference is hereby made.

3. As of 1 November 1943, we estimate Japanese intentions in the Far East, 1944, as follows:

   a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive unless convinced that the U.S.S.R. has decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases. In such an event Japan would attack the Soviet Union. It is probable, however, that Japan will assume the tactical offensive whenever she considers it necessary, and it may be expected that Japan will initiate local offensive actions to forestall operations by the United Nations in Burma and to prevent the establishment of air bases by the United Nations in China. Japan will take full advantage of any breathing spell permitted her by Allied inactivity to strengthen her defensive cordon with installations of all types in order to make Allied advance most costly in time and casualties.

   b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles and Hokkaido, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with the Soviet Union.

   c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. in all circumstances except as already mentioned above.
She will continue to balance Soviet strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). Although Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, chances of success have deteriorated since the Moscow conference. We believe that she will undertake decisive military operations only to prevent the United Nations from establishing offensive air bases for action against her vital installations.

e. Burma and Southeast Asia. We believe that Japan will seek to maintain her present position in Burma and Southeast Asia, devoting especial attention to Burma, while extending her efforts when necessary to prevent large scale reinforcements and supplies reaching China.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing her efforts to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

4. Our estimate of Japanese intentions, as set out in paragraph 3 above, is in part based upon our beliefs as to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions, which are attached as Appendix “B” and Appendix “C.”
APPENDIX "A"

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST
(As of 1 November 1943)

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SITUATION

a. Objectives. Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern Siberia by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in China of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese lines of communication; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Melanesia area. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only in so far as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective.

c. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between the U.S.S.R. and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. The U.S.S.R. is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both the U.S.S.R. and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies.

d. Relations with subject peoples. Wherever circumstances allow, Japan's policy is to establish nominally independent, but actually controlled, national governments. This policy fits in with two powerful propaganda themes: (1) "Asia for the Asiatics"; (2) the "Co-Prosperity Sphere," ostensibly a cooperative project.
Japan has recognized the "independence" of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai. She has granted "independence" to Burma and the Philippines, thereby seeking to enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor. She has hinted that other occupied areas, e.g., Java, may receive similar grants of independence. Thailand has been rewarded for cooperation by the cession of bits of neighboring territory to which she had some pretensions. By such policies, Japan hopes to strengthen somewhat her position among the subject peoples.

e. Strategic and economic position. Although the strategic initiative has passed from Japan to the United Nations, a far-flung perimeter of defense positions must be penetrated before areas of great strategic or economic importance to Japan are subject to attack. Within this empire, Japan is practically self-sufficient except for textiles. Furthermore, Japan, by stockpiling materials from the Outer Zone and by pursuing a policy of developing resources within the Inner Zone wherever possible, has obtained within the Inner Zone a high degree of short range self-sufficiency in most of the essential materials of war. However, the loss of Sumatra and Borneo would seriously impair Japan's oil position, and loss of the Philippines would seriously impair her ferro-alloy position. Her manufacturing facilities, located mainly in Japan proper and in Manchuria, are accessible only to air attack. Meanwhile, the expansion of war production capacity undertaken in recent years will bear fruit in growing rates of output. For certain critical items, however, growing output is unlikely to offset attrition (ships) or to do more than keep pace with losses (planes). Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her, but she will continue to hope that the United Nations will hesitate to face the tremendous logistical problems, or pay the price in lives, involved in an invasion of Japan proper.

f. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are a close-knit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fibre and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin and that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the nation. They are taught that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided towards the establishment of a new world order dominated by Japan.

To attain this goal the Japanese soldier is taught to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor.
He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender is to accept disgrace.

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, remains high in spite of recent reverses. As much of popular morale is, however, based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats when and if brought home to them will tend to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole.

In contrast with the broad mass of the people, real power in Japan rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of manipulating the symbols of emperor-worship for their own self-interest. An early collapse of Germany would have a tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a re-shuffling of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace.

g. Propaganda. Official propaganda on the home front has shifted from that of the self-assured offensive to propaganda of the defensive, and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the capital and the production centers of the homeland. The government is also preparing the Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe. Japanese withdrawals are admitted, and it is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend their own islands from frontal attack.

2. THE EXISTING OVER-ALL SITUATION

a. Military strength. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) Naval, 11 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 5 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 14 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, 78 destroyers, 89 submarines. (2) Air, 1,660 fighters, 1,770 bombers, 490 float planes and 300 other types. Of the total, 110 fighters and 130 bombers, and 185 float planes are ship-based. In addition to the above total of 4,220 U.E. combat aircraft there are some 1,375 combat type aircraft engaged in advanced operational training. (3) Ground, a total ground strength of 2,500,000 representing approximately 110 equivalent divisions, which include 65 infantry divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 20 tank regiments, 13 border garrisons, 17 independent divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 20 tank regiments, 13 border garrisons, and 17 independent
garrisons and other independent units. (4) Totaling in round numbers 3,500,000 men (exclusive of Puppet Troops).

Puppet Troops. There are some 330,000 Manchurian troops and more than 420,000 Nanking puppet troops. For the most part, both forces are organized into small garrison units lacking in automatic weapons and artillery. Some Manchurian combat divisions exist, and similar Nanking divisions are said to be forming (strength about 6,000 per division), but it is doubtful whether Japan can provide them normal equipment in heavier weapons in view of her own shortages in those categories. Japan has found Nanking troops particularly unreliable in the past.

Burmese and other puppet forces are so small as to be inconsequential.

b. Positional strength. Japan is now on the strategic defensive. Her control of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Pacific islands and parts of China keeps United Nations forces at a distance too great for delivery of effective blows against Japan itself and prevents effective development and use of the Chinese war potential. Thus Japan's position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Soviet commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan's northern flank, Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

c. Limitations on Japanese Power

(1) Shipping. Japan's defensive position requires secure and adequate ocean transport over long lines of communication. The Japanese shipping situation has become acute, with her total tonnage being further reduced by sinkings in excess of total new construction. We estimate that 50-60% of her total tonnage is committed to maintaining her military forces outside the homeland and that the remainder is used primarily to maintain the essential part of her war economy. From this latter bracket some tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this would not necessarily have serious effects on Japan's capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan's rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace even with the present rate of sinkings, she

Appendix "A"
would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944. The situation in regard to tankers is also acute. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by continuing to fit out dry-cargo ships for use as oil carriers.

(2) Air requirements. Until recently Japan has not only been able to maintain her over-all air strength at approximately the same total figure but has kept her allocated air strength along the perimeter in reasonable balance with her requirements. At present, however, indications point to such a rapid attrition in the Melanesian area that she is having difficulty in replacing losses. We believe that as United Nations pressure increases along the outer defense frontier, she will be unable to maintain sufficient strength to offer effective resistance at all points under attack. Assuming that the United Nations carry out the agreed program for 1944, we are of the opinion that Japan's defensive air requirements will preclude the possibility of her engaging in any offensive operation requiring heavy air support.

(3) Naval requirements. Japan cannot afford to risk large commitments of naval strength except for the defense of vital areas. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) Military requirements. A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Soviet forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Developments of the last few months indicate the necessity of using her superiority in ground forces to compensate for her relative inferiority in naval and air forces. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is restricted by availability of shipping.
3. THE EXISTING LOCAL SITUATION

a. North Pacific. Japan is strengthening the fortifications and garrisons on her “Northern Fortress” (Shimushu and Paramushiru), and we believe that preparations are being made for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

b. Manchuria. Japanese ground forces in Manchuria probably balance the Soviet ground forces in Eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia, but Japanese air strength is believed to be relatively inferior. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply but is deterred from aggression by respect for Soviet armed forces and reluctance to commit herself further while her army is actively engaged in other areas. Japan is also apprehensive of vulnerability to bombing and submarine attack and fears the probability that in the event of war between Japan and the U.S.S.R., the United States would utilize air bases in Siberia for direct attacks on Japan.

c. China (except Yunnan). The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country’s principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, fed, and trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China’s generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness.

d. Yunnan. Active operations have recently been launched by the Japanese along the Salween River. We believe these operations are to strengthen the Japanese position along the Burma frontier in anticipation of a United Nations increase in activity in that area.

e. Burma. The wet monsoon very greatly hinders major operations from May to October. Recently the Japanese have been increasing their ground and air forces in Burma. It may be that the supply to these forces overland via Indochina and Thailand may be increased considerably in the near future.
f. Southwest Pacific. The ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner
Seas area and New Guinea-Bismarck area appears to be defensive in charac-
ter. Because of recent United Nations successes in this area, Japan, in order
to maintain her defensive position has been forced to increase her strength
by one division over and above replacements for her combat losses. Due to
extreme losses in this area, it now appears that she is having difficulty in
maintaining the air strength disposed heretofore.

g. Central Pacific. At present Japan bases 50-60% of her naval strength
at Truk. The total air strength of this area has been increasing, particularly
in the Marshalls and Gilberts.

4. STRATEGIC RESERVES

a. Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such. Although Japan's
staging facilities are sufficiently developed to enable her to fly even fighter
planes to practically any part of her position, theoretically allowing the
quick reinforcement of any threatened front, there are indications that
simultaneous pressure on several fronts would prevent substantial rein-
forcements being sent to more than one area.

b. Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength
in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to
circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened
point of the defensive perimeter in from 6-9 days, can be quickly assembled
in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming
critical.

c. Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes
Japan's initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength
from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

5. PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 1944

a. Air strength. Although Japanese aircraft production is expected to
continue to increase gradually during the remainder of 1943 and during
1944, attrition will probably keep pace with and may even exceed this
increased production.

b. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese
naval strength should increase as a result of new construction to the fol-
lowing totals:

Appendix "A"
c. Ground strength. We expect that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 2,750,000, comprising approximately 120 equivalent divisions (including 73 infantry divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, 3 cavalry brigades, and 24 tank regiments, 20 independent garrisons, and 13 border garrisons).

d. Shipping. Despite Japan's strenuous shipbuilding efforts, estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 gross registered tons of steel operating tonnage from 1 November 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

e. War production. Assuming that Japan retains control of the productive areas now under occupation, that shipments by sea can be maintained, and that there be no effective bombing of Japanese industry or land transportation, Japan's production of critical finished war goods may increase materially in 1944 as compared with 1943. Heavy industrial production as a whole, however, is not expected to show great gains in 1944, chiefly because steel output seems unlikely to rise by more than a few percent. The steady development of economically unprofitable but strategically important resources of Japan proper and immediately adjacent areas and the use of stock piles will make it possible for Japan's war industry to continue for about two years at approximately its present rate of consumption of raw materials (except for oil, chromite, and possibly lead and zinc), even if cut off from access to resources south of the Yangtze River.
APPENDIX "B"

U.S.S.R. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

I. STRENGTH

We estimate that total Soviet air strength east of Lake Baikal consists of some 2,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, some 1,200 are believed to be organized into operational squadrons. This force is apparently disposed on the southern border of Soviet-controlled territory from Ulan Bator to Vladivostok. Existing airfields are believed adequate for flexible operation.

Naval strength is estimated to consist of one light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 60 submarines, 60 motor torpedo boats, and a number of assorted small craft of no combatant value. There are believed to be sufficient bases available for this force.

The ground strength east of Lake Baikal is estimated to total some 660,000 men divided into units as follows:

- 20 infantry divisions (15,000 men each)
- 11 cavalry divisions (6,600 men each)
- 1 mountain division (9,000 men)
- 2 motorized divisions (7,000 men each)
- 13 tank brigades (2,000 men each)
- 5 motorized brigades (4,000 men each)
- 9 infantry brigades (4,000 men each)
- 1 composite brigade (5,000 men)

Corps, army, line of communication, and other troops (180,000 men)

Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. Although these forces in the Far East are supposed to be self-sufficient, their local sources of supply are actually both limited and vulnerable. Support, in any case, would have to be delivered via a long, and in part exposed, line of communication.

Appendix "B"
2. CAPABILITIES

Offensively, the U.S.S.R. could scarcely hope for any success until her forces in the west have been released by the defeat of Germany or until after the other United Nations have gained access from the Pacific to the Sea of Okhotsk. Defensively the U.S.S.R. would probably be unable to prevent the isolation of the Maritime Provinces by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Holding operations, however, should be possible on present stored reserves for at least six months. Subsequent developments in the whole area would depend largely on the effectiveness of the assistance of the other United Nations.

3. INTENTIONS

Pending further information as to the results of the Moscow Conference, we estimate Soviet intentions as follows:

The U.S.S.R. is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After that, she would be likely to intervene only when she reckoned that Japan could be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Soviet intervention. On the other hand, we believe that large-scale hostilities between the United States and Japan in the Northwest Pacific would make the Soviet Union's present neutrality in the Far East increasingly difficult to maintain.

18

Appendix “B”
APPENDIX "C"

CHINESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

1. STRENGTH

The Chinese active army has a nominal strength of 320 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, plus 30 independent infantry brigades. Infantry divisions average 7,000 each; cavalry divisions and infantry brigades average 3,000 each. The combat efficiency of the bulk of the force never was very high and it has deteriorated considerably since 1938. At the present time malnutrition and lack of medical attention are prevalent and have reduced the combat potential of many units to a very low point. Armament consists almost wholly of infantry weapons. Such heavy material as is available is inadequate and is largely obsolete. The augmentation of this armament to any appreciable degree by the United Nations will not be possible until capacity of transport into China is greatly increased. We feel that, at most, not more than one-fifth of the Chinese Army is currently capable of sustained defensive operations and then only with effective air support; we believe that with the possible exception of the American-trained Chinese divisions, no large number of troops can be expected to undertake more than very limited objective offensive operations, at the present time.

Chinese guerrillas, whose strength is estimated to be 600,000 part-time troops, have proved of value. In recent months, they have done the bulk of the fighting against the Japanese. They share with the regular divisions credit for retaining substantial Japanese occupational forces in China.

2. CAPABILITIES

If given adequate United Nations air support, China might be able to defend her major strategic areas against a Japanese offensive and might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive.

3. INTENTIONS

The Chinese probably intend to remain generally on the defensive, pending the re-equipping and training of their army for offensive action at a later date.

Appendix "C"
APPENDIX G

CONSUMER CAPITALISM AND TRADE

INTRODUCTION

A description of the future national consumerist community

Consumer Capitalism as a Concept

The concept of consumer capitalism is based on the idea that the focus of economic activity should be on satisfying consumer needs and desires, rather than on maximizing profits for shareholders. This perspective emphasizes the role of consumers as active and informed participants in the economic system, rather than as passive recipients of goods and services. Consumer capitalism encourages the development of products and services that are designed to meet specific consumer needs and preferences, and it values the role of consumers in shaping the direction of economic growth.

Characteristics of Consumer Capitalism

Consumer capitalism is characterized by a focus on consumer needs and preferences, the use of market mechanisms to allocate resources, and the importance of consumers as active agents in the economic system. Key elements of consumer capitalism include:

- Consumer sovereignty: Consumers are seen as the ultimate arbiters of what is produced and sold in the market.
- Market competition: Firms are encouraged to compete with each other to meet consumer demands and provide value to customers.
- Consumer choice: Consumers are given the freedom to choose from a variety of products and services, based on their preferences and needs.
- Consumer welfare: The welfare of consumers is considered a primary objective of economic policy, with government regulation and oversight designed to protect consumers from harm and to promote fair and transparent markets.

Areas for Future Research

Despite the widespread adoption of consumer capitalism as a guiding principle in many countries today, there are still many unanswered questions about the implementation and impact of this approach. Further research is needed to understand the complex interplay between consumer sovereignty, market competition, and consumer welfare, and to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of consumer capitalism for both individuals and society as a whole.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE

Reference:

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4A

C.C.S. 300/3 was circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as a basis for discussion at SEXTANT.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Europe, for information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference.

ENCLOSURE

[Printed in FRUS, Conference at Cairo-Tehran 1943, 214–215]

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE
(As of 1 November 1943)

THE PROBLEM

1. To prepare an estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Europe.

SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION (1 November 1943)

2. Germany is now under severe strain, and her general situation is deteriorating. Her strength remains formidable, however, and, granted relief from pressure, she still has the power of recuperation.

Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts. She has no decisive offensive capabilities. Her military resources are inadequate to meet all of her defensive requirements. The German Air Force is unable to ward off destructive Allied strategic bombing. Its concentration to resist such bombing leaves Germany's land fronts in the east and south inadequately supported. On both of these fronts the German Army has been compelled to yield considerable ground, at the sacrifice of military, economic, political, and psychological interests, in order to conserve its strength for a final decisive conflict. The German Navy has been unable to strike back on the surface.
Navy has been unable to prevent the build-up of Allied offensive forces within striking distance of the Continent.

The bomber offensive is increasingly destructive of German air strength, industrial capacity, and morale. Reserves of fit German manpower being now exhausted, continued heavy casualties must cause either a decrease in strength or a decline in quality in the German Army. The prospect is such as to cause her allies to seek means of escape, to encourage renewed resistance in occupied areas, and to impair her own morale. Signs of deterioration in her political structure are beginning to be discernible.

Nevertheless, Germany's armed forces are still strong, experienced, and willing to fight hard. By reason of past conquests, she is still able to fight well in advance of her vital areas (except in the air). Her political structure is designed to withstand internal strain. Given any relief from pressure, she has the power of recovery.

**GERMANY'S MOST PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION**

3. We conclude that Germany's most probable courses of action (a and b to be followed concurrently) are:

   a. To stand on the strategic defensive. This includes:

      (1) Continuation of the war against shipping.

      (2) Continued direction of her primary air effort to defense against the bomber offensive.

      (3) An intention to counterattack to destroy or expel any hostile force entering her defensive perimeter.

      (4) A probable intention to yield outlying occupied territory only under pressure and with maximum practicable delaying action.

   b. To seek a negotiated peace by psychological and political means. This includes continuation of her efforts to divide her principal enemies.

   c. To sue for peace only after it has been proved impossible to achieve either a negotiated peace or a stalemate.
FORECAST FOR 1944

4. Our forecast for 1944, so far as we are now able to make one, is that:

   a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.

   b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German fighter force, industrial capacity, and morale. It will create conditions within Germany conducive to complete military defeat.

   c. The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked by the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and give decisive battle since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas.

   d. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a stalemate or negotiated peace. When that hope fails, the High Command may assume control in order to halt destruction prejudicial to Germany's eventual recovery. Unmistakable signs of German collapse will not become apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand; when that point has been reached, disintegration will proceed with startling rapidity.

   e. Germany's allies (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland) will come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R.
APPENDIX

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—EUROPE
(As of 1 November 1943)

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstance. None of them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now disassociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R.

b. Germany’s Basic Task is now to defend “Festung Europa,”* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. We believe that her leaders now realize that they cannot win the military victory, but that they still hope that they may be able to avert complete defeat by making the operations of the United Nations so costly as to induce one or more of them to conclude some type of negotiated peace. These hopes provide a basis for continued resistance.

c. “Festung Europa.”* Germany now controls, directly or indirectly, all of continental Europe west of the Soviet front, except part of Italy and the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade but contains within itself the essentials of a military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are now subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack or through mountainous terrain. The eastern face is, however, without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the Eastern Front must continue to be Germany’s chief preoccupation in land operations.

* As herein conceived, “Festung Europa” consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas.
Despite the best efforts of German propaganda and the employment of large occupational forces, resistance (active or passive) by the subject peoples within “Festung Europa” continues to increase.

2. THE EXISTING OVER-ALL SITUATION

a. Ground Forces. European Axis armies now (1 November 1943) comprise 433 combat divisions—315 German, 29 Rumanian, 37 Hungarian, 21 Bulgarian, 15 Finnish, 8 Croat, 6 Slovak, and the equivalent of 2 Italian divisions. Only 258 German divisions and the 7 depleted Rumanian divisions in the Crimea could, however, be counted on for front line service.

The German Army has been brought to such strength only by lowering the physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined. Assuming a continuation of losses at current rates, Germany must either permit the size of her armed forces to decrease or see their quality deteriorate further.

Morale among the German ground forces until lately has been generally excellent, but among the satellite forces it has been only good to fair. Further reverses may produce a lowering of morale during 1944.

b. Air Forces. The total first-line strength of the German Air Force (29 October 1943) is approximately 5,325 U.E. aircraft. The high proportion of fighters (2,550) to bombers (2,300) and other types (475) is indicative of the continued emphasis upon defensive capabilities at the expense of offensive. The rate of production has recently declined as a result principally of bombing attacks, bringing it into approximate balance with the rate of attrition. If the attrition rate can be maintained and further reduction in the rate of production can be effected by increased bombing attacks, a downward trend in over-all strength would promptly result, for no substantial stored reserves of aircraft exist to serve as a cushion.

Owing largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force continues to be low. In equipment, some improvement in present types continues, but no important production of radically new types is expected. In defense against daylight bombing attacks and in offensive operations against shipping, some tactical and technical improvements have been made, particularly in the use of rocket projectiles and radio-controlled bombs.
and radio-controlled bombs, and further improvement may probably be expected. Little, if any, deterioration of air force morale is apparent.

We believe that the remnants of the Italian Air Force in German hands have little, if any, present or potential value. Satellite air strength is negligible except for that of Rumania, which has about 200 aircraft of modern type, half of which are on the southern section of the Eastern Front. Dependent as the satellite air forces are upon German production, they are unlikely to receive any substantial increase in first-line equipment.

c. Naval Forces

(1) Submarines. Germany now (1 November 1943) possesses around 400 German-built submarines, of which about 200 are attached to the operating forces. Of the ex-Italian submarines a few in use as supply vessels or blockade runners may be operational but probably no others. None of the ex-French submarines are believed to be operational.

The rate of completion of new submarines (all German-built) may be expected to continue at approximately 20 a month.

Germany is encountering great difficulty in manning submarines. The quality and morale of the personnel have on the average declined and in some instances are very low, but there are no reliable indications that any general breakdown of morale is imminent.

(2) Surface Vessels (effective combatant types — 1 November 1943). The major units are 2 battleships, 2 pocket battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, and 4 light cruisers. Of these, the battleships TIRPITZ (damaged to an unknown extent) and SCHARNHORST are in northern Norwegian waters; the rest are in the Baltic with their effectiveness probably much reduced by the transfer of experienced personnel to submarines. (The aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN is not operational.) Some 30 destroyers and 40 torpedo boats are in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward (including the Baltic). In service in Mediterranean waters are perhaps 2 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats in the Western Basin and perhaps 5 destroyers and torpedo boats in the Aegean (all ex-French or ex-Italian); as many as 40 more of such light units might be placed in service but no major units.

New construction in progress consists of about 18 destroyers and possibly two ex-Netherlands light cruisers.
We believe that morale is low in the major units but is reasonably high in the light forces.

d. Manpower. German reserves of combat manpower (physically fit German men aged 17-37) are by now exhausted. Future losses in that category can be replaced only from boys attaining age 17 and from recruitment of foreigners and over-age German men.

In contrast to the position in German combat manpower, large reserves of German men in the limited service categories and of foreign manpower still are available.

During the past year the civilian labor force in Germany has actually increased slightly in numbers, mainly as a result of compulsory recruitment of foreigners. It is, however, still 3,000,000 (8%) below the figure for May, 1939. It has been kept up, despite drafts of men for the armed services, by recruitment of foreigners, women, and substandard men. This change in composition has caused a decline of about 5 percent in per capita productivity, additional to the numerical decline previously noted.

e. War Economy

(1) General. The general level of German industrial production has declined probably 10 percent in recent months, principally because of Allied bombing. Other factors are the blockade, sabotage, and the general strain of war. The deterioration would have been greater had the Germans not achieved improvements in industrial efficiency and obtained additions to the labor force.

(2) War Production. Aircraft production and submarine construction facilities have been particular objects of air attack. Single-engine fighter production has been so reduced that it no longer exceeds attrition; submarine construction has fallen below attrition. Motor vehicle production also has failed to equal recent wastage rates. The production of anti-friction bearings has been so seriously interrupted that it is now believed to be inadequate to sustain the required flow of military equipment. With the exception of fighter aircraft, however, these losses may not be felt immediately on fighting fronts.

With respect to synthetic rubber, aircraft tires, and petroleum products, the protective cushion afforded by excess capacity has already been dangerously thinned or eliminated.
The production of anti-aircraft equipment has probably increased.

The German retreat in the east has brought a saving in rail transport of the order of 3 percent of total ton-miles. This eases the entire German rail situation and permits reallocations of materials and labor as between rail equipment and other products. There is also a saving of the several hundred thousand tons of steel required for repairs of Soviet railroads in 1942.

(3) Civilian Economy. Civilian economy in Germany is seriously strained. On top of the pre-war shortage, 15 percent of all dwellings in 43 cities subjected to Allied air attacks have been rendered uninhabitable, and three times that number have suffered damage requiring some emergency repair. Four and one-half million persons have been transferred from danger areas. This, in addition to the social dislocations involved, has placed a heavy burden on transportation. There is a severe shortage of most civilian goods, and services such as electric power and transportation have been greatly curtailed. The food situation is, however, reasonably satisfactory; and, except in heavily bombed areas, civilian living standards have been maintained at a tolerable level.

J. German Civilian Morale and Internal Political Situation. A popular feeling of intense war-weariness and discouragement exists in Germany as a result of the vanishing prospects of victory, the heavy damage and casualties inflicted by the Anglo-American bomber offensive, the heavy casualties on the Eastern Front, the reverses on that front and in North Africa and Italy, the defection of Italy, the comparative failure of the submarine campaign, the feeling that all the victories to date have accomplished nothing decisive while their achievement has drained Germany's strength, the long hours of work, and the uncomfortable, though not generally intolerable, living conditions. But the popular acceptance of the war's continuation is supported by deep fear of the consequences of surrender, which has been zealously fostered by propaganda.

Because of the ruthless and thorough methods employed to prevent the existence in Germany of any free political parties or other voluntary organizations except the churches, almost no opportunities exist for low popular morale to find effective expression in concerted action. The only change of leadership which therefore appears possible at an early date is
one which might be engineered by army officers, supported by big industrialists and landowners. Such a change might, however, lead to a weakening or relaxation of the system of control and thereby make it less difficult for low popular morale to express itself in effective action.

Lacking channels of effective expression, low popular morale appears generally to be taking the form of numbness and apathy. For this reason the internal political situation appears today less precarious than it was, say, in August 1918.

Unmistakable signs of German collapse will probably not become apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand. We believe that the cumulative effect of the factors listed above will then cause disintegration to proceed with startling rapidity.

3. THE SITUATION BY FRONTS—1 NOVEMBER 1943

a. The War Against Shipping. Germany's war against ocean shipping has fallen far short of achieving its objective of preventing effective support from overseas of United Nations operations. It has, however, succeeded in delaying such support and limiting its scale, and its effects are still felt in such ways. Moreover, the Germans realize that as long as they continue their submarine attacks, or threaten them, on a serious scale, they will force the United Nations to devote to anti-submarine activities large amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which could advantageously be used for other war purposes and will prevent them from making the most efficient use of available shipping. We believe that the effectiveness of the war against shipping will not increase.

b. Strategic Air Operations. The current primary commitment of the German Air Force is defense against Allied strategic bombing. To this end, out of an over-all fighter strength of 2,422 in operational units, 1,686 are concentrated in Germany, the Low Countries, and France. In addition to established dispositions and installations for defense against bombing attacks from Great Britain, it has now become necessary to set up in southern Germany and Austria similar defenses against such attacks from Mediterranean bases. In order to meet these requirements, German air support of the Eastern and Mediterranean land fronts has been seriously curtailed.

Despite these efforts and sacrifices, the Germans have not succeeded in warding off the Allied air offensive, which continues to develop in weight
of attack, range of penetration, and technical effectiveness. In addition to
general destruction of German industrial capacity and dislocation of civilian
life, the German Air Force itself has suffered direct and indirect damage
which tends to impair its ability to maintain the present scale of defense.
Heavy combat losses have been inflicted on it, single-engine fighter produc-
tion has been substantially reduced, the percentage of serviceability has
been lowered, and the flow of replacements has been seriously interrupted.
The growth of the German fighter force has been checked; attrition and
production are now approximately in balance; and, if the attack is pressed,
and resisted at current intensity, a decline in strength may be expected,
opening the way to further progress in the effectiveness of the attack.

Assuming continued growth in the strength of the Allied air offensive,
the results achieved may be expected to increase progressively. The cumu-
lative effects may so weaken Germany's capacity for armed resistance as
to accelerate greatly the collapse of her will to continue the conflict.

c. Eastern Front (from Leningrad southward). During 1943 approxi-
mately two-thirds of Germany's ground strength has been committed to
this front. The proportion of Germany's air strength so committed has been
significantly less and has been steadily reduced to meet the increasing
requirements of the Western and Mediterranean Fronts, thus facilitating
the Soviet advance. German ground strength on the Eastern Front consists
of 205 German and 14 satellite divisions of varying strength. Numerically,
Soviet ground strength is to the German approximately as 3 to 2. Present
air strengths may be compared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1,062†</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Includes 90 Rumanian.

During 1943 Germany has surrendered the initiative to the U.S.S.R.
and has accepted the necessity of yielding space under pressure in order
to minimize losses. The Germans may have hoped that eventually the exten-
sion of Red communications and the shortening of their own would
bring them to a position which could be held with reduced forces against
weakened Red pressure. Thus they might gain greater freedom of action
in meeting the requirements of 1944. However, the pressure developed and

* See paragraphs 2 e and 2 f, Appendix to C.C.S. 300/3.
maintained by the Red Army has exceeded German expectations; and German losses of men, material, and ground have been greater than were anticipated.

At present (1 November 1943) Red penetrations of the Dnieper Bend and the Nogai Steppe have rendered those areas untenable and German withdrawal from them is apparently in progress. The Crimea has been isolated, and may not be tenable for long. In the Ukraine the Germans may well attempt delay in successive positions (e.g., Kremenchug-Krivoi Rog-lower Dnieper, and Cherkassy-Nikolaev), but no position suitable for a determined stand is apparent east of the general line Dniester River-Zhitomir-Pripet Marshes.

Between the Priet Marshes and the Dvina River, the Germans will apparently seek to hold on the general line Dnieper River-Orsha-Vitebsk. Further north they may withdraw from the Leningrad-Novgorod area to the general line Vitebsk-Pskov-Narva.

The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked by the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and give decisive battle, since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas.

d. Finland and Adjacent Norway. This front has long been quiet. Finnish strength is equivalent to 15 divisions, with 7 German divisions in northern Finland and adjacent Norway. The Soviet numerical superiority is as 3 to 2. Air strengths in the area may be compared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A German withdrawal from before Leningrad would have psychological repercussions in Finland, but would not affect basically the military situation so long as the Germans remained in Estonia.

e. Norway and Denmark. In Norway (less the area adjacent to Finland) there are 11 German divisions; in Denmark, 5. Of these 16, only 6, in Norway, are naval forces in the Black Sea consist principally of 4 Rumanian destroyers, a few submarines, and some motor torpedo boats.
are offensive in type. German air strength in the area consists of 126 fighters, 42 bombers, and 45 other types. Two German battleships, one of which is damaged, and their accompanying light forces remain in north Norwegian waters.

f. Western Front. The coast from Brest to Den Helder has been well fortified in depth. Although various interior installations have been locally fortified, it is now believed that no prepared defensive line exists between the coast and the West Wall.

In France and the Low Countries there are 42 German divisions (including 10 training divisions). Seventeen of them are offensive in type, but only 11 of these are now fully effective. German air strength in the same area, less southern France, consists of 796 fighters, 267 bombers, and 30 other types.

g. Italy. We believe that from 22 to 25 German divisions are in Italy, all of them offensive in type. Twenty have been identified, of which 10 are panzer or panzer grenadier. Ten are at Rome or southward (3 panzer, 3 panzer grenadier, 2 infantry, 2 parachute). Five (2 panzer, 3 infantry) are engaged against Partisans in Venezia Julia, and a sixth (panzer grenadier) may be en route thither. The remaining identified divisions (4 infantry) are in the Po Valley and Tuscany and are considered as equivalent to the minimum occupational requirement for that area. In Italy elements of 4 Italian divisions are cooperating with the Germans, of which only one is actively engaged (against the Partisans in Venezia Julia).

German air strength in Italy and southern France consists of 132 fighters, 362 bombers, and 27 other types. It is, for the most part, held back in the north, German air support in central Italy having been relatively slight.

Since the topography in central Italy is well suited to defense against frontal attack, the Germans are now principally concerned lest their flanks be turned by amphibious operations. Their intention appears to be to engage in strong delaying actions in successive positions as long as possible and eventually to hold when equilibrium is established, probably north of Rome but south of the Po watershed. A counter offensive capability exists, however, and may be promptly exploited if a good opportunity is offered. For such a purpose ground strength could be drawn, not only from northern Italy, but also from France. The principal deterrent factor would be Allied air superiority.
h. Adriatic-Aegean Area. Axis ground strength in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and the Aegean islands consists of 20 German, 8 Croat, 1 Serb, and 9 Bulgarian divisions. Of these, only 14 German divisions are offensive in type. German air strength consists of 65 fighters, 199 bombers, and 63 other types. Naval strength in the Aegean consists only of few ex-Italian destroyers and torpedo boats and some motor torpedo boats.

Germany's vigorous reaction to Italian defection in this area indicates a determination to maintain her position there. The prompt seizure of the Adriatic ports and the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Rhodes, and Cos, has practically restored the front. The British still hold Leros and Samos. The Germans are sensitive to this penetration and attacks to recapture these islands are anticipated.

Axis occupational forces are stretched thin to make up for the disappearance of 30 Italian divisions. They are still able to hold important localities and routes of communication, but they are inadequate to suppress guerrilla activity and probably inadequate to hold the interior and resist invasion simultaneously.

i. Strategic Reserves. No strategic reserves exist as such. Relief and reinforcement are accomplished by transfer of units from one front to another according to circumstances. Since air strength is inadequate on all fronts, reinforcement of one is possible only at the sacrifice of less important interests on another. With respect to ground forces, it still remains possible to withdraw one or two divisions from any one front (except the Balkans) without undue risk, and several such withdrawals in combination may constitute an appreciable reinforcement at the point where they are needed, but it is no longer possible to withdraw any considerable number of divisions from any one front.

In France an apparent surplus of divisions over minimum defensive requirements exists. France is a notable training and reforming area, however, and consequently a number of the divisions there are not fully effective. They could nevertheless be of some use in extreme emergency. France is thus the principal source of possible reinforcements for other fronts.

4. THE SITUATIONS IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES

a. Hungary and Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of Rumanian oil and of Hungarian lines of communication and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as possible. Each wishes
to escape that grip but is prevented from surrendering or terminating its resistance principally by fear of German occupation. Each also fears the U.S.S.R. and the other, and Hungary also has reason to fear Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

b. Bulgaria. The death of King Boris has as yet brought no significant political change, though future governments will find it harder to sustain a pro-German policy. The people of Bulgaria look to the U.S.S.R. for support, and the widespread pro-Soviet sentiment forces the government to maintain diplomatic relations with that country. Bulgaria has achieved her territorial aspirations at the expense of Yugoslavia and Greece and might not relinquish them easily.

c. Finland. Overwhelming fear of the U.S.S.R. is by far the greatest factor binding Finland to Germany. Less important factors are Finland's dependence on Germany for essential supplies and the presence of German troops in northern Finland. If a satisfactory territorial adjustment with the U.S.S.R. could be made, the less important factors probably could be overcome and Finland would willingly withdraw from the war.

5. THE SITUATIONS IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

a. Norway. Strong underground resistance continues to increase. Some rifts between the underground and the Government in exile are appearing. There is also some evidence, not yet fully evaluated, of Communist influence in the underground.

b. Denmark. As a result of German demands arising out of increased Danish resistance and sabotage the Danish Government tendered its resignation to the King. Although their resignations were not formally accepted, Denmark has since been without a Government and is ruled directly by the Germans.

c. The Low Countries. A general increase in sabotage and civilian resistance, somewhat more advanced in the Netherlands than in Belgium, has been accompanied by a disintegration of native pro-Nazi parties in both countries. Both countries are compelled to contribute substantial industrial manpower to Germany. Belgian industry, though below capacity, is important.

d. France. Resistance to German control has greatly increased and is seriously affecting production for the Axis. Recruitment of labor for Germany has nearly stopped. The underground movement, increasingly unified
and confident, has now reached a stage of considerable political effectiveness. French underground leaders show great irritation over attempts to exclude France from major political decisions. The present Vichy Government is likely to give way soon to a more pro-German regime, and even Laval and Petain are making overtures to the United Nations.

e. Italy. The Germans appear to have the situation behind their lines in Italy reasonably well in hand, although some Italian units continue to resist in the Alpine area, particularly on the French and Yugoslav frontiers, and some sabotage continues. The Mussolini Government appears to have acquired relatively few supporters.

f. Yugoslavia. The surrender of Italy and the disintegration of the Italian forces of occupation touched off more active campaigns by guerrilla forces. In spite of extensive operations by German forces, these activities, strengthened by the adherence of certain Italian units, the acquisition of Italian arms, the increased scale of Allied material support, and the psychological effect of the surrender of Italy, have now reached considerable proportions, especially in the western half of the country. The internal conflict between the Partisans and the Chetniks has, however, reduced guerrilla effectiveness.

g. Albania. There is some guerrilla activity but on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia.

h. Greece (Including Crete). Despite the exhaustion of the country there is considerable and increasing underground and guerrilla activity, but on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia. Greek guerrilla forces are divided politically and have clashed. There is general opposition to a restoration of King George II.

i. Poland. Considerable underground activity is carried on, but the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Soviet guerrillas and various Soviet fostered organizations independent of the Polish Government in London. Poland contributes manpower, and coal, food, and some oil to Germany.

j. Occupied U.S.S.R. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communists forces have had virtually no success. The Germans have obtained manpower and some food and raw materials from Occupied U.S.S.R. The food dividend for this crop year is at least partly safe against Soviet recapture.
6. THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN NEUTRALS

a. Sweden. Sweden is determined to maintain her neutrality and is now taking a firm attitude in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations and with German occupied countries, especially Norway and Denmark, is greatly increasing. Swedish fear of ultimate Soviet intentions in the Baltic area continues, however, to be a factor in the Swedish attitude toward the developing war situation.

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude. However, Switzerland depends heavily upon trade with Germany and continues to make economic contributions of value to that country.

c. Spain. The Franco regime is apparently torn between the dictates of sympathy and of discretion, with Spain's internal situation unstable but held in delicate balance. Since November 1942 Spanish policy has been progressively readjusted away from non-belligerent adherence to the Axis to one of "vigilant neutrality" in accordance with the increase of United Nations power in the Mediterranean. The fall of Mussolini, the capitulation of Italy, and its declaration of war against Germany have made a profound impression on Franco. It is possible that, in order to hold his position, he may seek British and American support and even acquiesce in a return of the monarchy, in which he might retain a favorable post.

d. Portugal. The Government of Portugal desires above all to remain neutral on the Continent. Owing to the need for outside economic aid and to popular sympathy toward the United Nations, Portugal has shown increased leanings toward them by granting to Britain the use of the Azores as bases. Further concessions cannot, however, be expected in the near future.

e. Turkey. Turkey's fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans or Dardanelles will probably lead her to active participation in the war in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement. But such participation will not take place until it can be done at minimum cost.

7. SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION—SEE PARAGRAPH 2.
8. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY IN 1944

a. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive. In view of Germany's lack of decisive offensive capabilities and the prospect of having to meet attack on three fronts, this is the only general course of military action open to her. It is a negative course, which cannot bring victory but which might serve to avert defeat. Although her military resources are inadequate to meet all of her defensive requirements, Germany may yet hope that a prolongation of resistance may lead to a favorable stroke of fortune or at least to a stalemate.

Within this general course are several subordinate courses of action, as follows:

(1) To Continue the War Against Shipping. Germany will follow this course to the end in order to impede support of Allied operations in Europe.

(2) To Continue to Direct Her Air Effort Primarily to Defense Against Strategic Bombing. Germany is compelled to adopt this course, regardless of its effect upon air support of her land fronts and upon her offensive air capabilities.

(3) To Counterattack to Destroy or Expel any Hostile Force Entering Her Defensive Perimeter. Germany's last military hope is by exploiting interior lines to concentrate against her enemies in detail and to inflict on at least one of them a repulse severe enough to induce a willingness to negotiate.

(4) To Abandon Outlying Territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, Occupied Russia, Finland). This course is responsive to Germany's need to conserve and concentrate strength. However, the consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situations will not permit her to adopt it voluntarily.

b. Contingent Courses of Action. Within the concept of the strategic defensive are certain contingent courses of offensive action. Since all involve dispersion of force, she will adopt none of them except under imperative necessity to forestall or counteract certain unfavorable developments.

(1) To Invade Sweden. Certain intelligence that United Nations bombers were to be permitted to operate against her from Swedish bases would compel Germany to adopt this course. German forces now surrounding Sweden cannot undertake the operation and at the same time
maintain their outward fronts against the United Nations. Their reinforcement would be required.

(2) To Invade Spain. In present circumstances this course could be adopted only as a diversion. A counter-offensive in Italy would probably be regarded as more effective for that purpose, at less cost in increased commitments.

(3) To Invade Turkey. Germany’s present strength in the Balkans-Aegean area is barely adequate to occupy and defend it. She is apparently determined, however, to maintain her position there, and, if compelled by a threat to it from Turkey, could divert sufficient strength from other fronts to advance at least to the Straits for defensive purposes.

(4) To Occupy Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria. Germany would occupy any one of them if it were absolutely necessary to prevent or counteract its defection.

c. To Seek a Negotiated Peace. Germany will continue, by means of propaganda warfare, to seek to persuade her principal enemies that her defeat is impossible or is possible only at prohibitive cost, in hope of inducing them to accept a negotiated peace advantageous to her. Included in this will be continued efforts to divide her principal enemies so as at least to impede their operations and at best to secure a negotiated peace with one which would enable her to concentrate against the others.

d. To Surrender. Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. It will, presumably, never be acceptable to the Nazi leaders. The only possibility of political change presently apparent in Germany is an assumption of control by the High Command. If Germany cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts and cannot divide her enemies, making peace with one in order to concentrate against the others, the High Command may elect to sue for peace in order to avert further destruction prejudicial to Germany’s eventual recovery.
C.C.S. 308/7

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Reference:

CCS 129th Meeting, Item 6

C.C.S. 308/7 was circulated by the United States Chiefs of Staff 24 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper in their 129th Meeting and agreed to defer action.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The Generalissimo has indicated his objection to the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command proposed at QUADRANT and in lieu thereof, after conferences with Admiral Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Somervell, has indicated his views as follows:

The Generalissimo approves wholeheartedly unity of command under Mountbatten for the Burma campaign. Under existing circumstances he feels that the inclusion of Thailand and Indochina in the Southeast Asia Theater would not be practicable and would deter rather than further the success of any project designed to defeat Japan. He cites as his reasons for this belief the effect which a change of boundary would have on the Chinese people, on Chinese troops, on the people of Thailand and Indochina and on the Japanese. The Chinese people and army are aware that those countries were included in the China Theater of War and that now to make the change would strike a blow at their morale which would affect the conduct of the coming operations and attitude of the people and troops towards the war. This is borne out by the effect of the announcement in the British press that such a change was contemplated. This caused repercussions involving necessity for the Chinese news agency to deny the statements. Japanese propaganda has been directed to convincing people of Indochina and Thailand that the British intended to hold those countries after the war. A change in boundaries at this time would tend to convince people that Japanese were correct and thus incur hostility to our cause and lastly the change would permit Japanese propaganda in China to be more successful in creating a breach in present happy British, American, and Chinese relations.

The China Theater comprises Thailand, Indochina, and the whole of China. As the war develops, the scope of operations of the United Nations' Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater newly created, besides Burma and Malaya, may involve Thailand and Indochina. The problem of unity of command is therefore of major importance. The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the view that the Generalissimo's objections are well-founded and the present boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command are hereby altered. The new boundaries of the Command will be as follows:

The Command will now include:

- Thailand
- Indochina
- The whole of China

The new boundaries will take effect immediately.
the two theaters to cooperate closely and satisfactorily, the Generalissimo deems advisable to reach the following arrangements in advance:

   a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indochina, the Chinese troops will attack from the north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the respective forces made.

   b. All matters of political nature that arise during operations will be dealt with at a Chinese-British-American committee which is to be located in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China Theater.

2. Admiral Mountbatten has accepted the suggestions of the Generalissimo insofar as the boundaries are concerned but objects to the political commission.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the President have approved the proposal of the Generalissimo as it stands and recommend British acceptance of his proposals.
With the above-mentioned facts in mind, the Chinese people will work for the
liberation of their country. The Chinese people will never forget the
brave sacrifices made by the Chinese soldiers. The Chinese people will
ever forget the contributions of the United Nations. The Chinese people
will never forget the support of the international community.

Affirmative statements by the Chinese people will be based on the
following considerations:

1. The Chinese people will strive for peace and prosperity. They will
work for a better future for their country.

2. The Chinese people will uphold the principles of the United
Nations. They will support the international community in its
pursuit of peace and development.

3. The Chinese people will contribute to the world. They will
work for the benefit of humanity.

In conclusion, the Chinese people will continue to
strive for a better future. They will work for
peace, prosperity, and development.

The Chinese people will never forget the
dependence of the United Nations. They will
support the international community in its
pursuit of peace and development.

In conclusion, the Chinese people will
continue to strive for a better future. They will
work for peace, prosperity, and development.
C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised)

OPERATION "RANKIN"

References:

CCS 134th Meeting, Items 5, 6, and 7
5th Plenary Meeting

C.C.S. 320/4 was circulated by the United States Chiefs of Staff 4 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 134th Meeting agreed to accept C.C.S. 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised)).
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION “RANKIN”

Reference: CCS 320 Series

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, C.C.S. 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:

a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Dusseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mainz; thence due east to Beyreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).

b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
C.C.S. 379/7

RETENTION OF LST'S IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

References:

CCS 132d Meeting
2d Plenary Meeting

C.C.S. 379/7 circulated a memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, 27 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff resolved this matter in their 132d Meeting and informed General Eisenhower (FAN 281) that the 68 LST's which are due to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD be retained in the Mediterranean until 15 January.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

RETENTION OF LST'S IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters

22 November 1943

1. In my NAF 486 and 505 I outlined my plans for the capture of Rome and explained the great part which an amphibious operation might play should the opportunity arise.

2. This operation is now being planned to take place south of Rome, but it cannot be launched until we are ready to advance from the Frosinone area. The reason is that the assault force, unable to depend on maintenance over beaches owing to the unreliability of weather on the Italian coast in winter, must be joined by the overland force within 48 hours in order to insure maintenance and withstand the estimated scale of enemy counter action.

3. We estimate that we will not be able to advance from the Frosinone area and launch the amphibious assault before mid-December.

4. If circumstances prevent our launching the amphibious assault, we will be faced with continued frontal assaults and there will be compelling demands for more infantry divisions and, therefore, for all available landing craft. I would remind you that our divisions will have been engaged in bitter fighting under very exacting conditions for many weeks with little or no relief, and I am concerned about the possibility of a low state of battle efficiency in January.

5. These requirements have not taken into account the possibility that the Combined Chiefs of Staff may order accelerated operations north of Rome. In any event, it is essential that these LST's remain in this area.
C.C.S. 380/2

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Reference:

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 5

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 127th Meeting, accepted the over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in C.C.S. 380/2.
C.C.S. 380/2

6 November 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT
UNIFIED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 126th Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.
ENCLOSURE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT

UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of basic strategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United States-British Staff Conference, it being understood that such agreement does not exclude from consideration courses of action which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.
C.C.S. 387 and 387/3

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

References:
CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B
CCS 134th Meeting, Item 3
CCS 135th Meeting, Item 4

C.C.S. 387 circulated a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 3 November 1943. This paper was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting, where they agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C.C.S. 387. C.C.S. 387/1 circulated a directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, and C.C.S. 387/2 circulated a directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 135th Meeting amended and accepted C.C.S. 387/2. The approved directive was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 387/3.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have been considering the present system of command in the Mediterranean under which General Eisenhower is responsible for operations in the Central Mediterranean and the Commander in Chief, Middle East, for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

2. They point out that the success or failure in one Mediterranean theater has an immediate effect upon the other theater. The present system whereby all transfers of even small forces have to be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, involves delays which are likely to lead to failure to take advantage of fleeting opportunities as has been illustrated by recent events in the Aegean. The restoration of our control of the Mediterranean has removed the necessity for two naval commands.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore consider that the time has come for one Commander to be made responsible for all operations in the Mediterranean and suggest that the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, should now assume responsibility for operations in the following areas in addition to those already in his command, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete, Aegean Islands and Turkey. The three Commanders in Cairo would be under his orders for these operations, but would remain responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Middle East base and for all matters pertaining to those parts of the present Middle East Commands situated in Africa, Asia and Levant (except Turkey) and should continue to receive political guidance from the Minister of State resident in the Middle East in respect of these responsibilities.

4. Such reorganization would insure that operations in the Mediterranean are regarded as a whole and would empower the Commander in Chief to
transfer forces from one part of the area to another in order to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. The British Chiefs of Staff consider this particularly desirable in view of possible opportunities in the Balkans and the effect that operations in that theater might have on the main operations in Italy.

5. On Air Marshal Tedder's recommendation the British Chiefs of Staff would like to suggest that the Mediterranean Air Command should be renamed Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

6. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on these proposals are requested. A diagram of the proposals is attached as an enclosure.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE FOR UNIFICATION OF COMMAND IN

THE MEDITERRANEAN

Note by the Secretaries

The attached directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 135th Meeting.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.
DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES
NORTH AFRICA

1. We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.

2. We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.

3. To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.

4. You will provide U.S. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and administrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U.S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is organized.

5. You will in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.
6. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.

7. You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at present uses.

8. The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix "A"). You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
APPENDIX "B"

BALKAN SUPPORT

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness.

You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation.

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment.

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff.
C.C.S. 390/1

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

References:
CCS 128th Meeting, Item 4
1st Plenary Meeting
2d Plenary Meeting
3d Plenary Meeting
4th Plenary Meeting
CCS 397 (Revised)
CCS 427 and 427/1

C.C.S. 390/1 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 128th Meeting, approved C.C.S. 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference. The decision relative to Operation BUCCANEER was resolved in the consideration of C.C.S. 427 (Operations in the Southeast Asia Command).
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Reference:

CCS 390

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff realize that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into the details of various operations, but do not agree, however, that only matters of grand strategy should be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The QUADRANT decisions (C.C.S. 319/5, paragraph 58) state that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater. This is construed as requiring decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken, and their sequence and timing.

3. Since the United States cannot furnish the required assistance for FIRST CULVERIN, it is agreed that Operation BUCCANEER should be mounted as early as practicable. However, we believe it may prove possible to conduct additional land, sea, and air operations in order to pin down Japanese forces in South Burma. We therefore recommend that the CinC, Southeast Asia, be directed to explore this subject, and to submit recommendations thereon to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
C.C.S. 397 (Revised)

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944

References:

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 5
1st Plenary Meeting
2d Plenary Meeting

C.C.S. 397 (Revised) circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, 3 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 137th Meeting, approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944, set out in C.C.S. 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944

References:  
  a. CCS 242/6  
  b. CCS 319/5  
  c. CCS 417

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event.

2. We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.

3. A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning purposes is given in the appendix to the enclosure (pages 70 and 71). The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all objective and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT and reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 380/2, and with the provisions of C.C.S. 417 (Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan).

4. General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated, supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date; to secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier-based air operations against Japan.
5. North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian cooperation. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.

6. Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New Guinea-N.E.I.-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the N.E.I.-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will be intensified.

7. China. Our efforts in the China area should have as their objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up of the U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese army and air forces. It shall include also the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very long range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese "inner zone."

8. Southeast Asia. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring of 1944 in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the forces available (see paragraph 14, C.C.S. 417) to extend the position held in upper Burma.

Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive operations, including carrier-borne raids, with the object of maintaining pressure on the enemy, forcing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping.

9. As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.

* Includes: Japan proper, Manchuria, Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin) and Formosa.
10. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.
ENCLOSURE

A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the appendix. Target dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska).

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault ship-building program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.

d. The early collaboration of the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan.

We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept up to date for the conditions assumed in c and d.

We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.

We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing, and deployment in the war against Japan of very long range bombers.
### SCHEDULE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES OF OPERATIONS FOR OBTAINING THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IN 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Dates</th>
<th>Central Pacific</th>
<th>Southwest Pacific</th>
<th>Southeast Asia Command and China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-31 Jan. 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of the Marshalls, including Eniwetok and Kusale.</td>
<td>Complete the seizure of Western New Britain; continue neutralization of Rabaul.</td>
<td>Operations in Upper Burma, Arakan Region and China. Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia. (BUCCANEER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan.-15 March 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb. 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Hansa Bay area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March 1944</td>
<td>Capture of Kavieng.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 April 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Manus.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 June 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Hollandia. (Humboldt Bay)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Target Dates</strong></th>
<th><strong>Central Pacific</strong></th>
<th><strong>Southwest Pacific</strong></th>
<th><strong>Southeast Asia Command and China</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 July 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Eastern Carolines (Truk Area).</td>
<td>Initiate V.L.R. bombing of vital targets in the Netherlands East Indies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug. 1944</td>
<td>Advance to westward along north coast of New Guinea to include Vogelkop.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Oct. 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Guam and Japanese Marianas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov. 1944</td>
<td>Intensification of offensive operations in the Southeast Asia Command.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(end of monsoon)</td>
</tr>
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C.C.S. 398

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER SATELLITES, 1943-44

C.C.S. 398 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum was noted informally by the British Chiefs of Staff.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER SATELLITES, 1943-44

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her satellites in 1943-44.

1. Facilities in the Azores Islands. The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for (1) intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat, and (2) air ferry operations. The British Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the assurance given by them in QUADRANT that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible to assist in making arrangements for facilities in the Azores for U.S. naval participation in the anti-U-boat campaign and for the operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

2. The Combined Bomber Offensive. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD. The Combined Bomber Offensive continues to have highest strategic priority. We have directed that studies be made of the use of bases in the U.S.S.R. for shuttle bombing operations.

3. Operation OVERLORD

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against Germany. (Target date 1 May 1944.) In the preparatory phase immediately preceding the invasion, the whole of the available air power in the U.K., tactical and strategic, will be employed in a concentrated effort to create the conditions essential to the success of the assault. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. For France, an intensive destruction of communications and collapse of enemy forces in the area will be essential.

b. There will be an overlay of OVERLORD, and available in the situation per

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d. The S

4. Planning

a. Strategic air power in Norway should be increased in preparation for OVERLORD.

5. Operations

a. Strategic air power in Norway should be increased in preparation for OVERLORD.
the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied Air Forces in France, an intensive air attack on Germany and her military forces, communications and installations will be launched, designed to precipitate the collapse of enemy resistance prior to a general assault on the hostile ground forces in the advance into the heart of Germany.

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted except in so far as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD, when appointed, will establish contact with the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of Operations, and the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, or with the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed, and recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their general missions and objectives, and the timing of their operations, so as best to support OVERLORD.

4. Planning for OVERLORD. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, Cossack will continue with the detailed planning and with full preparations for operations OVERLORD and RANKIN.

5. Operations in Scandinavia

a. Strong carrier-based raids on German combatant ships in northern Norway should be undertaken in order to relieve naval units from the eastern Atlantic for operations in other theaters.

b. Plans should be developed for operations in the Scandinavian area in the event that circumstances should render the execution of OVERLORD impossible. Such plans should envisage collaboration with the U.S.S.R., with particular reference to opening communications to Sweden and developing a situation favorable for Sweden to enter the war. In the event Sweden enters the war, we should make use of her air bases to establish an air task force of suitable composition to aid in the strategic bombing of Germany.
6. Operations in Italy. The maximum possible pressure will be maintained, with the forces allocated on German forces in Italy, in order to assist in the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD, and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France. The Allied Commander, North Africa, (or the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed) will, in the light of the changing strategic situation, make recommendations from time to time to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD concerning the operations in the Mediterranean that will, in his judgment, make the greatest contribution towards insuring the success of Operation OVERLORD. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, these recommendations will be made, after coordination with COS-SAC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. Operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region

a. Recognizing that (1) the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean approach to the European Fortress is unsuitable, due to terrain and communication difficulties, for large-scale military operations, (2) the implementation of our agreed strategy for the defeat of Germany will require all available military means, and (3) our experience shows that the acceptance of limited objective operations, however attractive in themselves, invariably requires resources beyond those initially anticipated, we are agreed that our strategy will be best served by causing Germany to dissipate her defensive strength in maintaining her position in the Balkan-Aegean area. So long, therefore, as the present strategic situation in this area remains substantially unchanged, operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region will be limited to:

(1) The supply of Balkan guerrillas by sea and air transport.
(2) Minor action by Commando forces.
(3) The bombing of vital strategic targets.

b. We agree that it is desirable to bring Turkey into the war at this time but this must be brought about without diversion of resources that would prejudice the success of our commitments elsewhere. To this end, in full collaboration with the U.S.S.R., we should bring pressure to bear on Turkey to enter the war and conduct offensive operations in the Balkans to the extent possible with the resources presently available to her. It must be made clear that military assistance to be furnished Turkey by the United States and Great Britain is limited to such supplies and equipment as can be our commitments elsewhere.

8. Garrison Mediterranean will be reviewed. The security will be assumed long as the Iberian Peninsula.

9. Cooperation and shall Germany according to United States.

10. Essential KIN plan available Allies into Euro entry into from the East, and

11. Governors of available to be made

12. Resources means as enable warfare
as can be furnished without prejudice to the successful accomplishment of our commitments elsewhere.

8. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean. Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans' invading the Iberian Peninsula.

9. Coordinated U.S.-British-U.S.S.R. Operations. We are now examining, and shall continue to seek out, methods and means whereby the defeat of Germany and her satellites can be expedited through maximum coordination of United States, British, and U.S.S.R. operations.

10. Emergency Entry into Europe. We have directed that an extended RANKIN plan be prepared in collaboration with the U.S.S.R., in order that available Allied forces may take prompt action in the event an opportunistic entry into Europe becomes possible. The extended plan will provide for emergency entry into Europe in collaboration with the U.S.S.R. of United Nations forces from the United Kingdom, the North African Theater of Operations, Middle East, and, if required, directly from the United States.

11. German Satellites. We are agreed that, in so far as means can be made available without prejudice to the over-all strategy agreed hereto, effort should be made to separate the satellite powers from Germany.

12. Relations With Patriot Forces in Europe. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces everywhere within enemy occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla warfare.
C.C.S. 399

REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE "QUADRANT"

Reference:
CCS 133d Meeting, Item 5

C.C.S. 399 circulated a report from the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of this report.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE "QUADRANT"

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The enclosed memorandum from the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations is presented herewith for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE "QUADRANT"

Memorandum from Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

8 November 1943

Subject: Report on Recent and Prospective Developments in Anti-Submarine Operations Since QUADRANT.

Enclosure: (A) Surface craft chart.  
(B) Aircraft chart.  
(C) Prospective Deployments of Anti-Submarine Aircraft.

1. OPERATIONS — AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT OF SURFACE CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT

a. In September, 17 merchant M/Vs were sunk; in October, 15. In September, 11 U-boats were sunk; in October, 32. For 1942, 1 submarine was sunk or probably sunk for every 9.3 M/Vs lost. For 1943 to date this figure is 2.1 M/Vs; for the past 5 months — .5.

b. Enclosure (A) indicates the status of Atlantic Fleet and Sea Frontier escorts as of 1 August and 1 November. Significant are:

(1) The increase of 51 DEs in the Atlantic Fleet;

(2) From 1 August to 1 November the reduction in DDs temporarily assigned ComNavNaw from 28 to 13;

(3) There were still 16 Pacific Fleet DDs on temporary duty with CinCLant on 1 November.

c. Matters of prospective interest in the escort situation are:

(1) Commencing with UGS 22 (about 25 October) a minimum escort strength of 1 DE Division plus 1 DD Division (10 ships) was established
for these convoys. This will be raised to 12 as a standard and CinCLant
plans to gradually increase this to 16 when more slow DEs become
available.

(2) The number of escort groups for CU convoys is being increased
from 1 to 4 because of reduced sailing interval.

(3) DesDiv 57 (ODDs) now with Fourth Fleet will be replaced by
CortDiv18. The 4 ODDs in CaribSeaFron and 1 ODD in PaSeaFron will
also be replaced by 327 ft. Coast Guard Cutters.

(4) 18 acquired craft 100 ft.-150 ft. category in Sea Frontiers and
LantFlt will be replaced by standard service designed craft, and 4 have
been decommissioned without relief.

d. Enclosure (B) indicates the status of anti-submarine aircraft as of
1 August and 1 November.

(1) The anti-submarine aircraft available are adequate to cope with
the anti-submarine situation present and prospective. It should be
noted, however, that the availability of PVs and B-24s until 1944 will
not permit those squadrons to be built up to 15 planes as planned and
that there is some question as to whether the 8 B-24 Squadrons can be
maintained at the strength of 12 planes, unless B-24s not now in the
program for the Atlantic are obtained. This plane shortage may adversely
affect our ability to meet emergencies.

(2) The present CVE situation will remain unchanged until the
end of the year when MISSION BAY is scheduled to arrive in the
Atlantic. Six additional CVEs are scheduled to arrive on the east coast
during the first quarter of the calendar year 1944. The CVEs have con-
tinued their effective offensive operations against U-boats and only 1
ship has been sunk in convoys in the Atlantic that have been covered
by a U.S. CVE Support Group.

(3) All Army aircraft in our Frontiers were relieved from anti-
submarine duties with the Navy by 1 October except 1 squadron of
B-25s in the Caribbean Sea Frontier equipped with 75 mm. cannon
which were loaned to the Navy for anti-submarine evaluation of that
weapon. The 4 Army B-24 Squadrons on anti-submarine operations in
U.K. were relieved by Navy squadrons in October. The 2 remaining
Army B-24 squadrons in anti-submarine operations in Morocco are in process of being relieved by Navy B-24 squadrons.

2. MATERIEL

a. Surface Craft

(1) A single towed parallel rod noisemaker is now issued to all U.S. escorts to counter enemy acoustic torpedo. Expendable devices actuated by explosives or air are under test and give promise of being superior to FXR.

(2) A surface craft division of the Anti-Submarine Development Detachment has been established, and in addition to conducting experiments will further develop coordinated air and surface anti-submarine tactics.

(3) Mark 9 Depth Charges with faster sinking rate now replacing Mark 6 Ash Can type depth charge.

(4) Mark 8 Depth Charge with proximity pistol now being produced with quantity production commencing 1 December.

(5) Bearing Deviation Indicators to improve echo-ranging sound equipment is in quantity production.

(6) Bathythermograph giving a water temperature depth curve is now being issued to escorts to obtain more accurate information on the sound conditions.

(7) 100 in. Dome being installed in new construction DDs will give improved echo-ranging performance at higher speeds — over 20 kts.

(8) Shipboard Anti-Submarine Attack Teacher is being issued to assist in shipboard training.

(9) Prospective developments to be accomplished within the next six months are:

(a) Mark 9 Mod 2 Depth Charge with Doppler Acoustic Proximity Fuse and improved sinking rate.
(b) Scatter Depth Charge to be projected from the usual projector.

(c) Mark 12 Depth Charge — small fast sinking stern dropped depth charges.

(d) The net result to be expected from improvements in depth charges is that effectiveness of patterns will be improved about 6 times.

b. Aircraft

(1) Rocket Projectile equipment is being introduced into service in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets; in the Atlantic as an anti-submarine weapon.

(2) Intercept receivers for enemy radar without direction finder and homing features are being installed in many Atlantic Fleet aircraft. A special test plane (B-24) is now in Moroccan Sea Frontier for purposes of obtaining data on German Radar wave lengths, etc. and when this is determined installed detectors will be made directional.

(3) Sono-radio Buoys and associated receivers are being installed in the Atlantic Fleet aircraft in limited numbers.

(4) Aircraft tactics to counter radar and use of intercept receivers by the enemy are being revised as new information is received.

(5) Increased forward firing power, additional armor and leak-proof tanks are being provided for all A/S aircraft to offset the fighting back tactics of U-boats.
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE U-BOAT WAR—
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1943

Reference:
CCS 133d Meeting, Item 5

C.C.S. 399/1 circulated a report from the British Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of this report.
U-BOAT TREND

1. After an absence since May, 1943, U-boats again formed a pack of more than 15 in the North Atlantic and broke the lull on the 19th of September. Since that date this pack has been maintained, refuelling as necessary from supply boats and the pack being moved to intercept convoys.

2. U-boats have only operated on other stations in a sporadic fashion. A group of U-boats has carried out a campaign in the Indian Ocean in the approaches to convoy assembly ports, but this appears to be on the wane; one or two U-boats have operated off the Brazilian Coast, the West African Coast, in the Caribbean, off the U.S. Coast, and off the Canadian Coast.

3. Recent successes against fuel supply U-boats must be causing the enemy much inconvenience and seriously restricting the length of patrols in the N. Atlantic and the number of 500-ton U-boats that can operate in distant areas.

4. One attempt was made during September to reinforce the 14 U-boats at present in the Mediterranean. To the best of our belief, only one or two passed Gibraltar and the remainder turned back. Recent attacks in the Cape St. Vincent area indicate that this attempt at reinforcement continues, and two U-boats have been sunk in the Straits of Gibraltar.
OPERATIONS BY AREAS

North Atlantic

5. When the enemy reopened his attack on North Atlantic convoys his U-boats were armed with a new weapon—the acoustic homing torpedo—and there is some evidence that experts in listening to our H/F D/F R/T wave were also carried in a few U-boats. The first two convoys intercepted (O.N.S. 18 and O.N. 202) were joined together in order to get the full benefit of the 17 A/S vessels escorting them. The enemy succeeded in torpedoing six merchant vessels, their new weapon sank three escorts and damaged one for a probable loss of three U-boats sunk.

6. This pack failed to intercept a convoy again until 7 October owing to the success of our evasive routing. On this date they commenced an operation against S.C. 143 but only succeeded in torpedoing one merchant vessel and one escort for the loss of three U-boats.

7. Two further convoys were shadowed and attacked ineffectively during October (O.N. 206 and O.N.S. 20). One merchant vessel sunk for the loss of six U-boats.

Air cooperation with the above convoys was very satisfactory and the U-boats suffered severely on each attempt to attack.

8. Three British Escort Carriers are now operating with the support groups. U.S. Carriers operating in the North Atlantic have been most successful.

Gibraltar Convoys

9. Most of the convoys between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom and vice versa have been shadowed by enemy long-range aircraft, probably with the object of homing U-boats onto them. It appears that a small pack of U-boats was concentrated on S.L. 138/M.K.S. 28 on the last day of October, one ship being torpedoed. Weather prevented air cooperation but effective counterattack by surface escorts appears to have prevented the assembly of the pack and probably resulted in sinking at least one U-boat.
Azores Area

10. There has been no U-boat activity in connection with our occupation of the Azores, although it is probable that a few U-boats did reconnoiter the area, and then left again owing to lack of profitable targets. Two Fortress squadrons are now based in the Azores and will afford A/S protection to U.K.-U.S.A. convoys on the southern route and to the U.K.-Gibraltar-Freetown convoys.

Caribbean Area

11. There has been only slight evidence of U-boat activity in the Caribbean, but it is suspected that mines may have been laid in the approaches to ports.

West African and Brazilian Areas

12. During September a German U-boat sank two ships off Brazil and was attacked by aircraft. Towards the end of October two or three U-boats operating between Freetown and Pointe Noire have sunk a single merchant vessel and her trawler escort. The small degree of success achieved off Brazil suggests that at least one of the U-boats operating there may have been sunk or driven off.

Indian Ocean

13. In the Indian Ocean, one U-boat was sunk by aircraft near Muscat and it appears that the campaign is now coming to a close. Japanese U-boats have also been taking part in this campaign. Twelve ships have been torpedoed and sunk in this area during the two months.

OPERATIONS AGAINST U-BOATS IN TRANSIT AREAS

14. U-boats in the transit areas are no longer remaining on the surface and fighting aircraft by day. They surface only to charge batteries for a minimum period by night, accepting the long time to pass through the danger area. The formation of a pack in the Atlantic forced us to withdraw escort vessels cooperating with Coastal Command aircraft in the Bay of Biscay.
15. The number of aircraft sightings in the Bay has dropped severely as we have insufficient aircraft fitted with Leigh searchlights; the Wellingtons so fitted are of insufficient range and bad weather has interfered with flying. Flying was cancelled on 13 nights in September. A comparison between the figures for sightings and attacks by aircraft taking part in the Bay offensive including sorties from Gibraltar and North Africa, and those by aircraft in the remainder of the North Atlantic, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BAY OFFENSIVE</th>
<th>NORTH ATLANTIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sightings</td>
<td>Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Similarly, the sightings in the Northern transit area have been very disappointing. We have inadequate air and surface forces for this task.

TACTICS

17. The use of an acoustic homing torpedo by a U-boat has increased the risk to an escort vessel chasing and attacking a contact. Measures have been introduced to enable an escort to avoid the probable danger area when these torpedos are suspected of having been fired (known as the “step aside” approach). They are apparently proving effective and, while delaying attack on the U-boat, enable an escort to continue the hunt as soon as clear of danger.

18. Otherwise there appears to have been little change in either the U-boat’s method of attack or the escort’s hunting tactics, although possibly the former are showing a greater timidity in closing to effective range when firing torpedoes.

NOISE-MAKING DEVICES TO COUNTER THE ACOUSTIC TORPEDO

19. The noise-maker known as the “Foxer,” two of which are towed astern of each escort vessel, is now in sufficient production for all slower escorts to be fitted before sailing for convoy duty. Its operation is proving unsatisfactory owing to structural weakness of design which prevents it standing up to heavy weather, and to the interference that it causes with Asdic detection results. It is hoped that some of these difficulties may be overcome.

20. The development of other noise-making devices is proceeding under first priority. Generally speaking, the acoustic torpedo has not yet given the
enemy the advantage they must have hoped for, and it is worth noting that the Germans claimed they had sunk fifteen destroyers when, in fact, they had only sunk three and damaged one.

RADAR DECOYS

21. U-boats have been employing a Radar decoy balloon, a device which carries a length of line secured to a small wooden float with metal foil reflectors suspended on the line. U-boats are believed to carry about 50 of these decoys with apparatus for inflating the balloons on deck. The best counter-measure to this device is for the ship to start a plot of the suspicious echo immediately it is detected. The fact that echoes travelling in a direction other than downwind cannot be due to decoys will be a means of differentiating between decoys and U-boats.

FUTURE POLICY

22. There is no doubt that the U-boats have returned to the North Atlantic convoy routes in considerable force and will endeavor to remain there until their losses become unacceptably high. They have been roughly handled by both aircraft and escorts and, from the number of attacks they have made on the latter, it can be assumed that they are endeavoring to torpedo escorts, using their acoustic homing torpedo, before concentrating on the convoy. In other respects the normal pack tactics are apparently still being employed. It is appreciated that enemy losses are already approaching the breaking limit and we must be prepared for yet another change on the part of the enemy.

23. When the aircraft in the Azores come into operation we may have great scope for evasive routing between the Azores zone and that of Iceland, and it may well be found that we can successfully secure the Atlantic trade routes by means of evasion.

24. This added scope will enable us to concentrate our striking forces in threatened areas and so develop the offensive against the U-boat. Coordination of the offensive with U.S.A. striking forces is satisfactory.

25. The above policy may not produce decisive results and we must take further measures to ensure making contact with U-boat concentrations and completing their destruction.
26. We have had opportunity to review the morale of the U-boat personnel in this new campaign and to assess their degree of determination or timidity. It is apparent from this examination that the U-boats are not pressing home their attacks and that they are more concerned with their own safety than heretofore.

27. It is considered, therefore, that we are now in a position to sail selected convoys on the most favorable route for air cover and efficient surface and air escort, prepared to accept battle with the U-boats in the confidence that we shall be masters of the situation whatever circumstances arise. This course of action has frequently been considered in the past, but the time has only just arrived when it is considered reasonable to accept the increased risk of encountering U-boats.

28. It is hoped that the above measures will inflict such heavy casualties on the enemy that he will be forced once again to withdraw from the North Atlantic and concentrate on attacks in dispersed areas.

29. This will be the moment to reinforce the Bay offensive to the maximum extent. Surface and air escorts to the convoys will have to be cut to a minimum in order to produce the necessary forces.

30. Preparations are now well in hand to provide increased numbers of Leigh Light-fitted aircraft, particularly to those of the V.L.R. and L.R. category. The enemy may be expected to strive for early warning of approaching aircraft by the use of listening devices against our A.S.V. and also by means of his own Radar. Measures have been taken to provide an alternative A.S.V. for our aircraft, also a device by which we can listen to enemy Radar and so home onto the U-boat. As expected from the outset of the Bay offensive in its present form, the only full answer to successful “early warning” of U-boats is the provision of sufficient aircraft for “flooding,” i.e., such vigorous and continuous flying that will force the U-boat commander to exhaust his batteries if he dives on every occasion an aircraft threatens him. This technique would necessitate reinforcing the air forces operating in the Bay.

31. It is by these means we hope finally to break the morale of the U-boat service, and encompass its destruction. If successful, it may well prove a decisive factor in the defeat of the German High Command and the armed forces of the Reich.
APPENDIX

U-BOAT SINKINGS

U-boats sunk and probably sunk are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHIPPING LOSSES (By U-boat) (September and October)

A. According to Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic North of Equator</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic South of Equator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>65,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>176,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. According to Duty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convoy and Escorted Groups</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>176,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.C.S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2

INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES
IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

References:

CCS 134th Meeting, Item 2
CCS 135th Meeting, Item 3
CCS 137th Meeting, Item 3
CCS 138th Meeting, Item 2

C.C.S. 400 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff dated 18 November 1943. The British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply (C.C.S. 400/1) on 26 November. The conclusions of the United States Chiefs of Staff relative to the alternate proposal suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 400/1 were circulated as C.C.S. 400/2, 4 December 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 138th Meeting, agreed to accept C.C.S. 400/2.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES

IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

THE PROBLEM

1. The provision of a directive to insure the most effective utilization of the U.S. Army Air Forces strategic bombing capabilities from all available European-Mediterranean bases in the accomplishment of the objectives of POINTBLANK.

DISCUSSION
(See Enclosure)

CONCLUSIONS

2. a. That control of all U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit U.S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities most effectively; and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives, or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for over-all base service and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain in the appropriate Commanders of U.S. Army forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as
to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U.S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R.A.F.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

a. There be established a U.S. Strategic Air Force Command with Headquarters in the United Kingdom, charged with the direction and coordination of all U.S. Strategic Air Force operations in the European-Mediterranean area.

b. A directive to implement the above, attached as Appendix, be issued to the following:

Supreme Allied Commander,
Commanding General, ETOUSA
Allied Commander in Chief, NATO
Commanding General, U.S. Strategic
Air Forces in Europe.
ENCLOSURE

DISCUSSION

1. There are at present in the Mediterranean Theater the 12th U.S. Army Air Force (Tactical) and the 15th U.S. Army Air Force (Strategic), as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a directive issued to General Eisenhower (C.C.S. 217/1, Appendix “C”), under which directive the Allied Commander in Chief, NATO, is charged with employing the 15th U.S. Air Force primarily against the selected targets of POINTBLANK. It is additionally directed that the operations of the 15th U.S. Air Force will be closely coordinated by direct liaison with the 8th U.S. Air Force.

2. The division of heavy bomber units between the 8th and the 15th U.S. Air Forces is likewise set forth in the above directive, upon a quarterly basis, resulting in the deployment of 41 heavy bomber groups in the U.K., and 21 heavy bomber groups in the Mediterranean, by 30 June 1944. This directive provides that those units of the current 12th U.S. Air Force, assigned to the newly organized 15th U.S. Air Force, may continue to be employed primarily against objectives other than POINTBLANK until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, and further that, should a tactical or strategical emergency arise, requiring such action, the U.S. Theater Commander is authorized, at his decision, to employ the 15th U.S. Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the action taken.

3. Strategic bombing operations from bases other than the United Kingdom which compel German forces to spread in breadth and depth for the defense of other areas, or cause parallel destruction of selected POINTBLANK objectives, and particularly to the German fighter aircraft and aircraft industry, will contribute heavily to the success of POINTBLANK, hasten the deterioration of the enemy over-all position and decrease losses.

4. Timing and coordination of the mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic Air Forces from the various bases is essential to achieve the most effective exploitation of U.S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities. Forces should be moved promptly from one area to another to take immediate advantage of varying weather conditions, dispositions of enemy forces, current tactical operations or other circumstances of opportunity. The present command arrangement with the 8th Air Force under CG, ETOUSA and the 15th Air Force under CG, NATO requires decisions to be reached on a mutually cooperative basis in

which both to capitali
which both commanders must agree. The integration of timing and services, to capitalize fully upon the mobility of aircraft and the need for prompt command decision not possible under the existing situation require a cohesive over-all control, not existent under present command directives.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the air war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over the components of the Strategic Air Forces is imperative. Unified command is necessary in order to achieve effective results from the concerted efforts of the bomber forces, and to reach the vital targets with minimum losses from the formidable defenses established by the enemy. Base facilities in the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean provide a potential flexibility which must be exploited to confuse, saturate and disperse the enemy defenses and reduce our losses. We feel that it is most urgent that we adopt every means known to us to save the lives of our men and sustain the impetus of their offensive. The one effective method is to insure the rapid, coordinated employment of the two components of our daylight striking force on a day-to-day basis, in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy defenses and to take advantage of weather conditions in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean. Unified command over the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Air Forces must, therefore, be established without delay.
APPENDIX

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED DIRECTIVE

To: The Supreme Allied Commander
The Commanding General ETOUSA
Allied Commander in Chief NATO
Commanding General U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” for the purpose of directing and coordinating the operations of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European and Mediterranean areas. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom.

2. Lieut. General Carl Spaatz is designated “Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.”

3. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will consist initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces.

5. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be employed initially to achieve the objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive, as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Commanding General, USAAF, will be charged with the strategic direction of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, and he will assign missions to them, keeping the appropriate theater commanders informed. In carrying out his strategic objectives, the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is authorized to allocate, reallocate, or move any or all of the air force units placed under his command.

6. The Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, will be charged with the coordination of the operations of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command, through the Chief of the Air Staff R.A.F.
7. The commanders of the U.S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area will continue to be responsible for administrative control of the U.S. Army air units in their respective areas, including the provision of base services. They will exercise a judicious allocation of resources and supplies and other services between tactical and strategic air forces in such manner as to provide the necessary support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

8. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion, utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE, of the action taken.

9. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provision of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254).
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.C.S. 400 the United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that the U.S. Strategic Air Forces operating from the United Kingdom and from Mediterranean bases, the 8th and 15th Air Forces respectively, should be placed under a single Command—the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe—with a Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The object of this proposal is to achieve the more effective exploitation of U.S. heavy bomber capabilities which, it is hoped, the new Headquarters will secure in two ways:

   a. By organizing mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic Air Forces in order to obtain the maximum dispersal of enemy defenses;

   b. By enabling advantage to be taken of changing weather and tactical conditions by switching heavy bomber forces quickly from one theater to another.

2. This proposal affects directly only U.S. heavy bomber forces, and we recognize the ultimate right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to decide the organization of U.S. forces in any theater of operations. We feel bound, however, to record our view that the adoption of this proposal would entail serious disadvantages far outweighing any advantages to be derived from it.

3. To deal first with the advantages which are expected from the present proposal:

   a. Great operational benefit would undoubtedly result if an effective combination of operations in the two theaters could be achieved. The operation of a large force of heavy day bombers is however a considerable undertaking and a period of up to 24 hours is required for the preparation and loading of aircraft and the briefing of crews. Unfortunately, the weather in the European theater is so uncertain that the decision to dispatch heavy bomber forces can only be taken a few hours before the time...
of take-off and it is then too late to make changes in targets and the timing of attacks. The conduct of operations in accordance with a settled policy in either theater is therefore a matter of great difficulty and frequently much effort is wasted, both in abortive operations and in standing by for operations which have to be canceled. A fortiori, the detailed coordination of attacks from two bases so far apart as the U.K. and Italy would be still more difficult and would in fact prove impossible. A commander set up to control the two forces would find in practice that he could do no more than insure that the subordinate commanders in each theater worked to a general plan and kept him and each other closely informed of the situation on their own front so that the general plan could be altered as necessary. Coordina-
tion of this type can be secured with the present organization without the introduction of a new headquarters.

b. The possibility of switching heavy bomber forces from one theater to another is at first sight an attractive one. In order to obtain full benefit from the plan, it would however be necessary to build up a margin of facilities in the two theaters involving the preparation of heavy bomber airfields, runways, and maintenance depots over and above what is required for the forces already based in the theater, and the locking up of additional maintenance personnel. If these additional facilities were not provided, the serviceability and effectiveness of the heavy bombers would fall considerably as soon as they were transferred and the operations carried out would be on a smaller scale and less effective than if the forces had to remain at their normal bases. The Air Ministry have, in the past, given very careful consideration to this plan but they have been forced to the conclusion that, except on rare occasions, the results would not justify the effort involved. Such occasional transfers of forces as are likely to be profitable can be secured by the present machinery.

c. The provision of the necessary margin of facilities which, if a large transfer of force is envisaged, may be considerable, must of necessity conflict in the U.K. with other service and governmental requirements. In Italy or other active theaters of war they can only be provided at the expense of other service requirements.

There is therefore a potential conflict of interest between the com-
mander of the Strategic Air Force on the one hand and the U.K. Government and theater commanders on the other.

4. Our conclusion is that the setting up of a new higher headquarters would not achieve the advantages which are claimed from it and would not in fact
be any improvement over the existing machinery. It would, moreover, entail certain disadvantages which we consider to be serious, namely the following:

a. The most serious disadvantage is that it would destroy the present arrangements for the close coordination of the 8th Air Force and the R.A.F. including the 2nd Tactical Air Force. This depends for its effectiveness on the fact that general direction over their operations is exercised by the Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. The latter, with his headquarters in London, possesses not only a complete operational staff but is also served by the central Intelligence Staff of the three Services, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the Secret Intelligence Service, and is in the closest touch with the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Ministry of Home Security, and other Government departments. The Air Staff is also in constant touch with the Mediterranean Air Command on matters concerned with operations and Intelligence, and very close liaison arrangements have been made between the different commanders in the Mediterranean theater and in the United Kingdom.

The interposition of a new link in the chain of control would, we are convinced, cause a reduction in the efficiency of these arrangements, and the reduction would be even more serious if, as indicated in paragraph 3 of the directive proposed to C.C.S. 400, the Commanding General of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is placed as an interim measure directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This latter proposal would mean the termination of the arrangement agreed to at Casablanca whereby the C.A.S. exercises general direction over the operations of the 8th Air Force in furtherance of the combined bomber offensive and would, in our opinion, be a retrograde step. It would, in fact, mean that the ultimate control required for the direction of the bomber offensive would have to be effected in Washington rather than as at present in London. Since all the Intelligence and administrative services which are essential for the efficiency of the bomber offensive are centralized in London, there could not fail to be a grave reduction in efficiency from this change.

The final arrangement proposed is that the new Commander should come directly under the Command of the Supreme Allied Commander for Operations in N.W. Europe. In our opinion, it would be fundamentally wrong in principle that the direction of a large part of the strategic bomber offensive which affects operations on all fronts in the European theater should be exercised by the Theater Commander of any single theater.
b. The new Commander would presumably require a large staff of all kinds in order to exercise operational and the necessary administrative control. We cannot help thinking that the provision of the large numbers of specialized and skilled staff officers needed must be a matter of considerable difficulty at the present time and, since the benefits expected from this proposal are in fact attainable under the present organization, that it would be highly wasteful in skilled manpower.

c. The proposal would also cause serious difficulties in the Mediterranean Air Command not only by a division of operational from administrative responsibility but also because it would mean that the night bomber component of the Mediterranean Strategical Air Force would be served by a different chain of information and would be under a different authority from the day bombing component though operated by the same headquarters staff in the Mediterranean theater. This could only make for confusion.

5. To summarize, we consider that the present proposal:

a. Would not secure any advantage over the present system of control;

b. Would mean breaking up the present highly integrated system of control, which has achieved considerable success, and the replacement of it by a less closely integrated and less effective system;

c. Would be wasteful in skilled staff.

We recognize however that there is much to be gained by having a single authority charged with the general direction of the heavy bomber offensive against Germany—someone who can interpret the Combined Chiefs of Staff directives by issuing detailed instructions from time to time according to the changing situation and who can exercise a general supervision over all bomber operations against Germany and the administrative support that they require, and over the provision of Intelligence and Tactical information so as to secure the most effective use of the heavy bomber forces engaged in the Combined Bomber Offensive. We do not see how such an authority can be on a lower level than a Chief of Staff since only on this level can the supervising authority keep in touch with all the strategical political and administrative factors which affect the bombing programme. Our conclusion is that the authority best able to exercise this general control is the Chief of the Air Staff. The latter, acting as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is already charged with the coordination of the operations of the 8th Air Force and the R.A.F. This coordination has been of the closest and, in our opinion, has enabled the best possible use to
be made of the available forces. It would not be difficult to extend this system to the 15th Air Force by giving the C.A.S. authority to regulate, in conformity with the plans of the Commanders of R.A.F. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force in this country, the priority of objectives to be attacked by the 15th Air Force. The C.A.S. would also be in a position, subject to the Theater Commander's assessment of his administrative capacity, to transfer strategical forces from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean and back if this seemed profitable.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider this alternative arrangement to secure the advantages which they have in mind in putting forward their present proposal.
C.C.S. 400/2

4 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 400/1, and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U.S. daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated by the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each A.A.F. group station is organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods.

3. Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the existing close coordination of operations between the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and the R.A.F., as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U.K. in unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th Strategic Air Force into a unified command.

4. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded:

   a. That control of all U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit the flexibility of U.S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.
b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for over-all base services and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate commanders of U.S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U.S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R.A.F.

f. That the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U.S. Strategic Air Force Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that operational and training technique and uniformity of U.S. tactical doctrine are maintained.

5. A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore being issued to the following:

Commanding General, USAFE
Commanding General, ETOUSA
Commanding General, NATO
ENCLOSURE

DRAFT OF A DIRECTIVE

To be Issued by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
The Commanding General, NATO.

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U.S. Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

2. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the S.A.C., and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of POINTBLANK targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available for his forces.

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

4. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U.S. Army air units in their respective area, including
the provision of base services. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth Air Force in performance of operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.

6. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254).
C.C.S. 401, 401/1, and 401/2

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

C.C.S. 401 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff. The reply from the British Chiefs of Staff was circulated as C.C.S. 401/1.

Informal agreement on interpretation of paragraph 3, C.C.S. 401/1 is noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 401/2, circulated 6 December 1943.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

References: a. CCS 323
   b. CCS 319/5

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In the final QUADRANT Report, C.C.S. 319/5, the following decisions were made:

   "6. h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan."

   "40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

   a. Keeping China in the war.
   b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
   c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
   d. Equipping Chinese ground forces."

2. It now appears possible that B-29 aircraft will be available early in 1944 and that offensive operations from India and China against Japan might be intensified earlier than contemplated at QUADRANT if suitable airfields could be constructed in India and the Chengtu area of China.

3. Current studies indicate that a minimum of four such airfields in the Calcutta area and five in the Chengtu area would probably be required for the employment of these aircraft.

4. The airfields in the Calcutta area would be constructed in coordination with British authorities in India.
5. The airfields at Chengtu would be constructed in coordination with the Chinese Government.

6. It is believed that operations against the Japanese from China can be intensified in the spring of 1944 by the use of B-29 bombers if airfields are made available in the Calcutta and Chengtu areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended:
   a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff impress the proper authorities to make available in the Calcutta area the facilities which are necessary for the construction of four V.L.R. airfields.
   b. That the proper U.S. authorities initiate necessary measures to construct five V.L.R. airfields in the Chengtu area of China.
   c. That these airfields be completed not later than May 1944 insofar as consistent with the commitments already placed on the Allied Commanders in those areas.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. As the United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware, the President has already telegraphed to the Prime Minister with regard to the provision of suitable airfields in India and China for the operation of B-29 aircraft against Japan in the spring of 1944. The Prime Minister has instructed the Commander in Chief, India, to render every possible assistance in the construction of the four air bases in India and has so informed the President. An examination of the project has been undertaken and we are satisfied that the difficulties involved, including the movement of the extra tonnage required through the port of Calcutta, can be overcome.

2. We therefore accept the recommendations of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 401 and are issuing the necessary instructions to the British authorities concerned.

3. If the necessary work in India is to be completed in time, it is essential that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by 15 January; otherwise the work will not be completed by 1 April and in fact would have to be stopped to allow resources temporarily diverted owing to airfield construction to be sent through to Ledo.
C.C.S. 401/2

6 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation of paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 401/1:

“If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired date of April first, it is essential that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would result in delaying progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months.

“Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units and equipment can be done without interfering with S.E.A.C. projects which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U.S. by January 15th, will permit completion of the airfields by May 15th.”

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.
C.C.S. 403 and 403/1

PROGRESS REPORT, COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

References:

CCS 133d Meeting, Items 5 and 6

C.C.S. 403 circulated a progress report on the Combined Bomber Offensive prepared by the Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Air Force. C.C.S. 403/1 presented comments by the British Chief of Air Staff which were circulated for information.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 133d Meeting considered the Combined Bomber Offensive plan and agreed:

a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged.

b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.
C.C.S. 403

21 November 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT, COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached message, on the program of the Combined Bomber Offensive, has been received from the Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Air Force, and is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.
# INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period Covered</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Employment of the Forces</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Employed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Results Achieved</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Results on Towns and Cities</td>
<td>9-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Results of Precise Day Attacks</td>
<td>11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Enemy’s War Economy Generally</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects on the General Military Situation</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects on U-Boat War</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed Estimates of the Total Effects of the Bomber Offensive</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of Effort</td>
<td>18-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties Involved</td>
<td>20-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Efforts to Counter the Bomber Offensive</td>
<td>23-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

117
ENCLOSURE

PROGRESS MADE BY THE R.A.F. AND UNITED STATES EIGHTH AIR FORCE IN THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

PERIOD COVERED

1. This report covers the period from 4 February to 31 October 1943. The former is the date of issue to Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive C.C.S. 166/1/D, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1943. This directive is attached as Appendix “A,” C.C.S. 403/1.

METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES

2. The forces concerned have operated in accordance with that directive and a supplementary directive issued on 10 June 1943 by the Chief of the Air Staff, in order to implement the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This directive is attached as Appendix “B,” C.C.S. 403/1.

3. The primary object of the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as stated in the earlier directive was:

"The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

The primary object of the subsequent directive remained as set out above. In view, however, of the increasing strength of the German fighter forces, and in order to check their growth and reduce their strength, it was decided that first priority should be accorded to the attack of these forces and the industry on which they depended.

4. At the beginning of the period covered by this report the Eighth Bomber Command, while in process of developing their offensive power, were employed mainly in the attack of submarine construction yards and operating bases. From the beginning of April, with the formulation of the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan, their effort was directed increasingly to the destruction of the
G.A.F. fighter forces. In the summer months the R.A.F. Bomber Command, being limited in radius of action by the available hours of darkness, concentrated upon the destruction of the Ruhr-Rhineland industries and the undermining of the morale of the workers of that area. With the incidence of longer nights they have been able to make a more direct contribution to the reduction of the German Air Force, and vastly to extend their effects on the enemy's military industrial and economic systems as well as on enemy morale generally, by the destruction of a number of towns and cities of critical importance in the enemy's war economy.

5. The British and United States medium bombers and British fighter-bombers have been used mainly against enemy airfields in diversionary attacks, so timed and directed as to reduce the concentration of fighters which could oppose the passage of the heavy formations.

6. British and United States fighters have been used increasingly to cover the bomber formations, both on the outward and return passage, to the limits of their range. By the use of long-range tanks, American fighters have been able to give effective fighter cover to targets as far afield as Bremen and the Ruhr.

FORCES EMPLOYED

7. The strategic bomber forces available during the period under review are shown in Plates I and II. The effort of the medium and light bomber and fighter aircraft in support of the Combined Bomber Offensive is shown in Plates III, IV, V, and VI.

ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS ACHIEVED

8. In assessing the results of the Combined Bomber Offensive it will be appreciated that our sources of information are necessarily limited; a complete and accurate picture of results achieved is not possible. We are dependent to a large extent on air photography, but much damage sustained in air bombardment is not revealed by air photography. Assessments of results based on photographs, even when interpreted in the light of known effects produced by the enemy attacks on objectives in the United Kingdom, are liable to large discrepancies. Comparison is the more difficult since the scale of enemy attack on this country, even when the enemy was making his heaviest raids in 1940 and 1941, was far smaller than we are now delivering on objectives in Germany.
Moreover, his general economic structure is far weaker and less resilient than was that of the United Kingdom at that time. Viewed as a whole, however, all evidence points to the fact that conditions in Germany are resolving themselves into an ever more acute conflict of priorities, and a marked deterioration in morale.

**GENERAL RESULTS ON TOWNS AND CITIES**

9. With photographic cover as the basis of calculation, it is estimated that of the towns of outstanding importance in the enemy's war economy 19 have been virtually destroyed, 19 seriously damaged, and 9 damaged. The term "destroyed" can be taken as expressing devastation to a degree which makes the objective a liability to the total German war effort in excess of any remaining assets; "serious damage" implies urban destruction greater than the most serious damage experienced in the United Kingdom.

10. This degree of devastation of industry and urban areas is illustrated by the following figures of acreage devastated by our own attacks on Germany and by enemy attacks on the United Kingdom:

- **Coventry:** 120 out of 1,922 acres devastated.
- **Hamburg:** 6,200 out of 8,382 acres devastated.
- **Cologne:** 1,785 out of 3,320 acres devastated.
- **Essen:** 1,030 out of 2,630 acres devastated.
- **Elberfeld:** 825 out of 1,068 acres devastated.

**GENERAL RESULTS OF PRECISE DAY ATTACKS**

11. VIII Bomber Command have concentrated their attacks upon individual targets, as well as individual industries, selected in the light of their critical importance to the German war effort. Damage to such targets must, therefore, have proportionately greater effect upon the German military machine as a whole than damage achieved in the course of area attack, which normally embraces a wide range of unrelated industries. Thus the attacks on the ball-bearing industry at Schweinfurt and the synthetic rubber plant at Huls have undoubtedly produced far-reaching effects throughout the range of German war industry.

12. Similarly the ability to concentrate a series of daylight attacks on a single vital system, as in the case of the attacks made upon the fighter
factories at Regensburg, Kassel, Oschersleben, Marienburg, Anklam, Warne­
munde and Wiener Neustadt are likely to have produced effects within that
dustry far in excess of the sum of the visible damage. Thus by means of
precise and selective attack it may well be possible to reduce below a critical
level an individual industry without which Germany cannot continue her
military resistance.

EFFECTS ON ENEMY'S WAR ECONOMY GENERALLY

13. The general effects of our bomber offensive against Germany are indi­
cated briefly in the following extracts from a Joint Report by the Ministry
of Economic Warfare and the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch:

Over-all Effects

(i) (a) "It is difficult to estimate the over-all effect in quantitative terms,
but it is considered to be now in the region of 10 percent of the total war
potential. A total decline of 20 percent in over-all effort may well be fatal."

(b) "The effects of bombing do not fall evenly on the various parts of
the enemy's war potential, and, to some extent, they are redistributed
according to the immediate requirements of the consumers of war
material having the highest priority in Germany."

(c) "There is the very much greater decline in some individual indus­
tries (e.g., ball-bearings and rubber), which may be near the point where
they could cause the collapse of the whole war machine."

Effects on manpower

(ii) "The employment of a considerable and increasing number of full­
time adult personnel in anti-aircraft and civil defense, factory repair and
reconstruction, and first-aid to housing, represents a serious drain on
Germany's industrial manpower that might otherwise have been
employed on production."

Effects on Fighter Aircraft Production

(iii) "Damage to assembly factories alone . . . has resulted in the pro­
duction loss of 880 single-engined fighter aircraft, and production in
October was between 600 and 700 against an estimated planned produc­
tion of 1,000."
"Single-engined fighter production in the months of September and October was on a lower level than in the month of July, notwithstanding the high degree of priority accorded to single-engined fighter production and the considerable planned expansion in output."

Effects on Morale

(iv) "The maintenance of morale is the greatest single problem confronting the home authorities. The full effects of air attack since the devastation of Hamburg have become known in all parts of the country. The increasing death roll is the important factor and, coupled with military failures, the general attitude is approaching one of 'peace at any price' and the avoidance of the wholesale destruction of further cities in Germany."

"Damage to housing, combined with evacuation, has resulted in the final saturation of all suitable accommodation in Germany. In the coming winter the problem of housing evacuees, many of whom have hitherto been in temporary dwellings unsuitable to winter conditions, will put upon the home administration a burden that it may not be able to support."

"... The housing situation and the general morale are both so bad that either might cause a collapse before industry became unable to sustain the war effort.

EFFECTS ON THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION

14. The bomber offensive has made a significant contribution to the success of the Allied military operations on the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts. The enemy has been compelled to withdraw fighters from the support of his armies to counter the threat from the West. A year ago 38 percent of his fighter strength was deployed on the Western Front. With the growth of the bomber offensive the proportion had risen to 45 percent in April and is now 63 percent. The changes in this situation are outlined in Plate VII. The repercussions upon the armies in the field of this denial of the essential minimum of air support have been far reaching in their general effect on the conduct of enemy military operations, particularly on the Russian Front, where our Allies have now achieved outstanding air superiority as a direct result of our efforts on the Western Front. The very fact of these changes which have been imposed on the enemy is an indication that he is forced to defend his home front even at the cost of serious military reverses."
15. The reduction of supplies of weapons, technical equipment and transport vehicles consequent upon our sustained and damaging air offensive has doubtless played a great part in further restricting the enemy's military capabilities.

**EFFECTS ON U-BOAT WAR**

16. The attacks by the VIII Bomber Command on submarine construction yards and operating bases, coupled with the area attacks upon industrial centres by the R.A.F. Bomber Command, have reduced the scale of U-boat activity. It is estimated that attacks on U-boat construction and components manufacture have in 1943 caused a direct loss of at least 22 U-boats out of a total of about 200 that would have been launched by the end of October. The delayed action of attacks on areas producing materials and components appears now to be having an effect on the average rate of completion. See Appendix "C", C.C.S. 403/1.

**DETAILED ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE**

17. Estimates of the total effects of the Bomber Offensive are given in the following reports:

(i) Joint report by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch dated 4 November 1943. Appendix "C", C.C.S. 403/1.

(ii) Summary of conclusions on effects of bombing offensive on German war effort in 1943 up to July by the British War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Subcommittee. Appendix “D”, C.C.S. 403/1.

(iii) Summary of conclusions on effects of bombing offensive on German war effort for the period July to October 1943 by the British War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Subcommittee. Appendix “E”, C.C.S. 403/1.

(iv) Joint Report by the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch and the Political Warfare Executive on Allied Air Attacks and German Morale. Appendix “F”, C.C.S. 403/1.
SCALE OF EFFORT

18. The effort of the combined strategic bomber forces during the period under review totalled 61,690 sorties. They consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Night sorties</td>
<td>45,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day sorties</td>
<td>15,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,690</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. The detailed statistics of scale of effort are given in Plates VIII, IX, X, and XI.

CASUALTIES INVOLVED

20. The number of strategic bombers missing during the period under review was:

- R.A.F. (averaging 198 a month with a cumulative rate of 3.9 percent) 1,784
- VIIIth Bomber Command (averaging 78 a month with a cumulative rate of 4.4 percent) 698
- **Total (cumulative rate, 4 percent)** 2,482

21. Notwithstanding these casualties, and the higher rate incurred in deep daylight penetrations into Germany, the morale of crews remains high. It appears to be governed only by the degree of success achieved.

22. The casualties for heavy, medium and light bombers and fighters are given in Plates VIII, X, XII, and XIII.

ENEMY EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE

23. The enemy has been unsuccessful in his attempt to counter effectively the bomber offensive, and there is as yet no indication that he can develop new methods which will defeat our offensive. His efforts have taken the form of:

(i) Increased production of fighters at the expense of bombers.
(ii) Redistribution of fighter and other defense resources to meet the threat.

(iii) New tactics and weapons.

24. The increasing effort devoted to fighter production continues. This is shown graphically in Plate XIV. Single-engined fighter production, on which our attacks have so far been concentrated, has been reduced materially, but production of twin-engined fighters has increased. Bomber production continues on a reduced scale. The first-line strengths of the German fighter and bomber forces are shown in Plate XV.

25. The German fighter force has been increasingly concentrated on the Western Front until it has now reached a figure of 1,800. The redistribution of fighter forces following on our bomber offensive is shown in Plate VII.

26. The deep daylight penetrations into Germany of the United States bombers have forced the enemy to deploy his defenses in depth. Although he has disposed on the Western Front the maximum possible number of fighters, this in itself does not meet his needs, and he has been forced to increase their mobility and to employ increasing numbers of twin-engined fighters. He can now concentrate against bomber formations penetrating deep into Germany, fighters from an area extending from the West of Paris to the Baltic. The main counter to this mobility continues to be feints and diversionary attacks.

27. At night the use of "Window" and other radio counter-measures has largely neutralized his controlled night fighter system. He has been forced to adopt a new system of concentrating large forces of single-engined and twin-engined fighters which "free-lance" over what he assumes will be the target. This opens up exceptional opportunities for feint attacks, and these have already been exploited with success; the enemy night defense system has frequently been thrown into great confusion.

28. Flak and searchlights have equally been disorganized by "Window," the use of which, coupled with the expected presence of night fighters over the target, has restricted flak activity to barrage fire below the level of the bomber stream. This has increased the reliance and hence the strain on the fighter defenses. Our new tactics have substantially reduced the percentage success of the enemy's night fighter sorties, and up to date he has found no method of meeting the situation, except to increase continuously the number of fighters available for the purpose.
29. The day and night fighters responsible for the defense of Germany have now been placed under a single command, and are required to deal with both the United States attacks by day and the R.A.F. attacks by night. This system of employment in a dual role may produce weaknesses during the periods of sustained day and night attack.

30. The principal new weapon developed for day use by the enemy is the rocket, mounted mainly on twin-engined fighters. This weapon has been used effectively in massed attacks delivered from the rear of the bomber formations and from beyond the range of the .50 calibre tail guns. Such attacks have been coordinated with single-engined fighter attacks from other quarters. Rocket-equipped aircraft are extremely vulnerable to our fighters, and although their employment is increasing, the most dangerous enemy of the day bomber remains the single-engined cannon fighter.

31. In the face of these new tactics and new weapons the bombers have continued to operate successfully and have every expectation of being able so to continue.

RECOMMENDATION

32. All evidence indicates that the Combined Bomber Offensive is achieving a profound effect upon Germany's war economy and upon the morale of her people. In the continuation of the offensive toward a decision, time is a vital factor. The offensive should be pressed on, in accordance with the existing directives, with all vigor, and its intensity increased.

7 November 1943
ROYAL AIR FORCE

HEAVY BOMBERS, WELLINGTONS AND MOSQUITOS

MONTHLY AVERAGE—FEBRUARY 1943 TO DATE

- CREWS ASSIGNED BOMBER COMMAND
- AIRPLANE STRENGTH OF OPERATIONAL SQUADRONS
- AIRPLANES AVAILABLE WITH CREWS
ROYAL AIR FORCE
FIGHTER BOMBER AND LIGHT BOMBER AIRPLANES DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED

R. A. F. LOSSES

GERMAN LOSSES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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</table>
EIGHTH AIR FORCE

MEDIUM BOMBER AIRPLANES
DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND
GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED

U.S. LOSSES

GERMAN LOSSES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3
ROYAL AIR FORCE
FIGHTER AIRPLANES
(INCLUDING ARMY CO-OP & TAF)
DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND ENEMY AIRPLANES DESTROYED

R. A. F. LOSSES

GERMAN LOSSES

135
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
FIGHTER AIRPLANES
DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND
ENEMY AIRPLANES DESTROYED
DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN AIR FORCE FIGHTERS

Graph showing the number of German air force fighters for different months and areas from August 1942 to November 1943.
ROYAL AIR FORCE
HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES
(INCLUDING WELLINGTONS & MOSQUITOS)
DISPATCHED FROM AERDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION

GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED

<table>
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<td>JULY</td>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>SEPT</td>
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141
ROYAL AIR FORCE
TOTAL LONG TONS OF BOMBS
DROPPED MONTHLY
HEAVIES, WELLINGTONS & MOSQUITOS
FEBRUARY, 1943 TO DATE
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES
DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND
GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED

U.S. LOSSES

GERMAN LOSSES

1 FEB. THROUGH 30 OCT.
3,088 ENEMY AIRPLANES DESTROYED
HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES
DISPATCHED FROM AIRBASES

AIRPLANES Missing IN ACTION AND
GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED

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<td>1943-12</td>
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146
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
TOTAL SHORT TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED MONTHLY
APRIL 1943, TO DATE

<table>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
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<td>JULY</td>
<td>3,881.7</td>
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<td>NOV</td>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>8,519.3</td>
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ROYAL AIR FORCE

HEAVY BOMBERS, WELLINGTONS AND MOSQUITOS

PERCENT MISSING PER AIRPLANE DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES

MONTHLY & CUMULATIVE

PERCENT

MONTHLY

CUMULATIVE

FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.

1943
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES
PERCENT LOSS PER AIRPLANE DISPATCHED
FROM AIRDROMES

MONTHLY & CUMULATIVE

* MISSING IN ACTION ONLY
GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTERS

TWIN ENGINE FIGHTERS

TOTAL FIGHTER PRODUCTION

BOMBERS

NOTE: Figures for the last two months should be treated as tentative.
GERMAN AIR FORCE
FIRST LINE STRENGTH

NOTE: Decrease in actual strength of bombers is only 15%. Decrease in effectiveness (due to the equipment and personnel position) approaches 50%.
3 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT ON COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached note on the Combined Bomber Offensive has been prepared by the British Chief of Air Staff and is circulated for information. On 3 December 1943, at their 133rd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed Passages A, B and C. It was generally agreed that General Eaker should be ordered to proceed with the present plan up to the limit which can be achieved without seriously outrunning the supply of replacement aircraft and crews in prospect for the units which he has at any time.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.
ENCLOSED

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

Note by the British Chief of Air Staff

General Eaker and I have prepared in accordance with the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the report (C.C.S. 403) which is before you. It contains, largely in the form of diagrammatic charts, statistical information of many kinds. It also contains appreciations by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Air Intelligence and the Political Warfare Executive stating what they believe to be the effects of the bombing on Germany to date.

I do not of course intend to take you through the report in detail, but I will try to give you a brief summary of what has been achieved, and then I will deal shortly with certain features of the report which deserve particular attention.

This is a short summary of what has been done. First, mainly as a result of the successful attacks on factories, German single-engined fighter production has been reduced by some 40 percent below what the Germans had planned that it should be at the present time. This is equivalent to a strength of about 750 less than the planned strength.

Secondly, attacks on other factories and industrial areas have seriously affected the German capacity for armament manufacture, chiefly in respect of ball-bearings, rubber, electrical equipment, vehicles, machine tools, steel, shipbuilding and heavy industry. It is not possible to assess the loss accurately, but Appendix “C” contains some approximate estimates. Of course damage to capacity is not immediately reflected in shortages with the fighting forces, especially with the heavy industries, but there is very good evidence that actual shortages exist in certain important finished products and the field of these shortages will doubtless steadily widen.

Thirdly, the effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive on German morale, though incidental, are nevertheless of tremendous importance, are summed up as follows in Appendix “F”:

158
“We conclude that during the period under review:

(i) Fear of air attack has been the dominant pre-occupation of a large part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in which fear of the consequences of continuing the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequences of defeat.

(ii) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute the war and threatens the structure of the entire home front.

(iii) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of a compromise with one or other of the belligerents, and the favorable climatic conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any general break in morale, it is not reasonable to infer that no such break in morale can occur, and we do not exclude the possibility that, in conjunction with further large-scale military reverses and with the advent of winter air operations may exercise a decisive influence on conditions inside Germany.”

I will give you a few statistics not recorded in the report which form a solid basis for the above opinion. Some 38 German cities have now been more or less seriously attacked. They aggregate a population of 18 millions. These cities contain 84,000 acres or 133 square miles of built-up area. Of this total 20,700 acres or 32 ½ square miles have been devastated. This does not include the heavy damage in industrial areas or suburbs, which is additional.

Ninety percent of the above has been done in 1943.

It is approximately equivalent to the devastation of three-fourths of the total built-up area comprised in the 10 largest cities in England and Scotland, excluding only London. I have brought to this Conference two books containing photographs of these German cities and transparencies showing the devastation achieved at each of them and a comparison, on the same scale, of what the Germans did at Coventry. Perhaps 6,000,000 people or more have been made homeless and have spread alarm and despondency in the areas into which they have gone. They are crowding into areas as yet unbombed, and huts are being built for some of them, but the replacement of their clothing and moveable goods destroyed in these devastating attacks is either impossible or can only be done at the direct expense of the war effort. There is no shadow of doubt that morale is at an extremely low ebb.
I do not think it is optimistic to suggest that we are now at least half-way along the road of industrial devastation towards the point where Germany will become unable to continue the war. With the winter coming on we may be even further along the road towards morale breakdown, though measurement of the destruction of morale is impossible.

I now come to one or two points in the report to which I would like to direct your attention.

You will remember that the essence of the first stage of the POINTBLANK Plan was the progressive destruction of the German fighter force. This was to be achieved in three ways:

(a) By destruction of assembly plants by day bombing;
(b) By general destruction of the industrial facilities on which aircraft production depends;
(c) By the attrition resulting from air fighting.

Now if the POINTBLANK operations had proceeded exactly in accordance with the plan and had achieved exactly the planned effect the strength of the German fighter force, as then estimated, would have been reduced at the 1st July 1943 from a possible 2,480 to 2,450 and at the 1st November from a possible 2,900 to 2,250. You will note that very little effect was expected by the 1st July.

In fact, the rate of increase of the German single-engined fighter strength had not been accurately appreciated at the time the plan was formulated. The actual strength SEF and TEF on the 1st July was 2,720 and on the 1st November 2,850. I should nevertheless point out that had it not been for the POINTBLANK Plan, and had the observed rate of production in April, May and June been maintained, the total strength might well have been 2,760 in July and would certainly by now have mounted off the graph altogether, probably to over 3,500. If you will look at Plate XIV, annexed to C.C.S. 403 (blue line), you will see very clearly how single-engined fighter production has declined as a result of POINTBLANK.

Of course there are several things to account for the incomplete fulfillment of our hopes.

One of the most important is shown in Plate II, annexed to C.C.S. 403, where the black line shows the U.S. heavy bombers required by the Plan and
the broken line the aircraft assigned to the U.K. The red line in relation to the green reflects the serviceability rate and the availability of crews.

I must say that I regard the achievements of the Eighth Air Force in relation to the resources available to them as highly creditable. Moreover, there is a concealed achievement which is, of course, to a considerable extent shared by the R.A.F. in that an ever-increasing proportion of the German fighter strength has been drawn away from other fronts to the immense advantage of the fighting in Russia and the Mediterranean.

In emphasizing the extent to which the POINTBLANK Plan has fallen short in one direction of what was intended of it I am not in any way minimizing what has been done towards achieving the primary object of the Combined Bomber Offensive which is stated in paragraph 5 of Appendix "B."

You will see from Plates IX and XI, annexed to C.C.S. 403, the total of bombs dropped and from Appendix "C" some of the results.

The R.A.F. Bomber Command has of course had its own difficulties to contend with in supporting the POINTBLANK Plan. The short summer nights virtually limited its effort for two months to the Ruhr. The mounting scale of defence caused a sharp rise in the casualty rate as shown in Plate XII, annexed to C.C.S. 403. The towns where twin-engined fighters are mainly constructed are distant and hard to find at night, yet the scale of assault on Germany mounted steadily until autumn weather of an unusually unfavorable kind set in during September.

I would refer you for a moment to Plate I, annexed to C.C.S. 403, which shows how the provision of crews is related to the scale of effort to be expected.

The weather in April was actually better than that in August and the aircraft on strength were almost exactly the same in the two months. The increase in crews (blue) is reflected not only in the increase available (red) but much more strikingly in the sorties and bomb delivery, which rose from 4,805 to 7,175 (Plate VIII) and from 11,193 tons to 20,149 (Plate IX) respectively.

There are two factors which affect the effort which can be sustained:

(a) The availability of aircraft and crew replacements.

(b) The casualty rate.

British heavy bomber production is now about 400 a month with corresponding crew output and it can only increase very slowly. Our casualty rate
as you see from Plate XII is at the moment stabilized at just under 4% of sorties. Whether we can keep it there or not will depend largely on the success of POINTBLANK.

The Eighth Bomber Command casualty rate, which was fluctuating between 3½% and 5% until August, dropped sharply in September to 2.6% and then rose sharply to 6.7% in October as a result of the deep penetration undertaken during that month against ever-increasing strength of the defence. (See Plate XIII).

The only other charts deserving mention are Plates V and VI, which illustrate how far we have employed the fighter forces in U.K. in support of the day bombers.

In August, September and October the R.A.F. flew over 26,000 and the U.S. fighters nearly 9,000 sorties on this work and destroyed 241 and 170 enemy aircraft respectively.

I now come to the point where I must ask for a decision on policy.

At the inception of the POINTBLANK Plan it was pointed out most clearly that the planned result could not be achieved unless the forces required were provided. This is how it was put:

"The task requires the force called for. The provision of a lesser force will not accomplish a proportionate result. For example, if only 75% of the force called for is made available, 75% of the result cannot be expected. If only 75% of the force called for is made available, less than 50% of the result outlined can be accomplished."

According to my calculations about 89% of the planned strength was provided for the first phase, 76% for the second phase and 67% for the first half of the third phase, where we now are. With this force 90% of the sorties required by the Plan have been despatched, but it has not been possible for them all to be against targets in the Plan. Nevertheless, 58% of the planned successful sorties have been flown against targets in the Plan and 54% against the G.A.F. targets in the Plan. The hard fact is that we are almost exactly three months behind schedule and German fighter production and strength are both higher than the Plan contemplated. This is in spite of the most gallant and successful efforts on the part of the squadrons to use surprise instead of numbers for achieving penetrations which were only intended to be attempted in the later stages of the Plan and with far greater strength.
The question is what is to be done in view of the arrears and the dependence of OVERLORD on POINTBLANK.

I think it is necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take responsibility for laying down a policy for the use of the Eighth Bomber Command in the remainder of Phase III and during Phase IV of the POINTBLANK Plan.

Is the Commander to go out for the completion of the present phase regardless of the fact that, being 26% short of planned strength, he must expect to suffer disproportionate losses?

Or on the other hand is he to be given a modified objective which is believed to be within the compass of the force he will have?

Or is some middle course possible?

After discussing this question at some length with General Eaker, I would advise against the modification of the Plan and also against his being ordered to complete it regardless of loss.

I would advise the following:

(a) The greatest possible increase in the force at General Eaker's disposal in respect of both formed units and replacement aircraft and crews. I suggest it may be necessary to give the Eighth Air Force priority over the Fifteenth Air Force in new groups until the spring.

(b) Subject to (a) above, General Eaker should be ordered to proceed with the present Plan up to the limit which can be achieved without seriously out-running the supply of replacement aircraft and crews in prospect for the units which he has at any time.

A decision to the above effect would enable General Eaker to feel his way and perhaps to achieve more than we at present dare to expect. It will also serve to sustain morale and to prevent the undue dissipation of the forces now in action which by its accumulated experience must form the basis of future expansion.
APPENDIX "A"

C.C.S. 166/1/D
January 21, 1943

"CASABLANCA DIRECTIVE"

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Directive to the appropriate British and United States Air Force Commanders, to Govern the operation of the British and United States Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom.

(Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th Meeting on January 21, 1943).

YOUR primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority:

(a) German submarine construction yards.
(b) The German aircraft industry.
(c) Transportation.
(d) Oil plants.
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.

Appendix "A"
The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategic situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. Examples of these are -

(i) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the U-boat war which the C.C.S. have agreed to be a first charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favourable for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives have not been included in the order of priority, which covers long-term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.

(ii) Berlin, which should be attacked when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavourable to the morale of the enemy or favourable to that of Russia.

3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy in connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theatre.

4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbour or at sea.

5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.

6. When the Allied Armies re-enter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.

Appendix “A”
7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDIX "B"

AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

S.46368/A.C.A.S. (Ops.)

10th June, 1943.

Sir,

I am directed to refer to Directive C.C.S. 166/1/D dated 21st January, 1943, issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command under cover of Air Ministry letter S.46368/A.C.A.S. (Ops.) dated 4th February, 1943. This directive contained instructions for the conduct of the British and American bomber offensive from this country.

2. In paragraph 2 of the directive, the primary objectives were set out in order of priority, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility. Since the issue of this directive there have been rapid developments in the strategical situation which have demanded a revision of the priorities originally laid down.

3. The increasing scale of destruction which is being inflicted by our night bomber forces and the development of the day bombing offensive by the Eighth Air Force have forced the enemy to deploy day and night fighters in increasing numbers on the Western Front. Unless this increase in fighter strength is checked we may find our bomber forces unable to fulfil the tasks allotted to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. In these circumstances it has become essential to check the growth and to reduce the strength of the day and night fighter forces which the enemy can concentrate against us in this theatre. To this end the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that first priority in the operation of British and American bombers based in the United Kingdom shall be accorded to the attack of German fighter forces and the industry upon which they depend.

Appendix “B”
5. The primary object of the bomber forces remains as set out in the original directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 166/1/D dated 21st January, 1943) i.e.:-

"the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

6. In view however, of the factors referred to in para. 4 the following priority objectives have been assigned to the Eighth Air Force:

   Intermediate objective:
   German Fighter strength
   The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command
   The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command
   The Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

   Primary objectives:
   German submarine yards and bases
   The remainder of the German aircraft industry
   Ball bearings
   Oil (contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean)

   Secondary objectives:
   Synthetic rubber and tyres
   Military motor transport vehicles.

While the forces of the British Bomber Command will be employed in accordance with their main aim in the general disorganisation of German industry their action will be designed as far as practicable to be complementary to the operations of the Eighth Air Force.

7. In pursuance of the particular requirements of para. 6 above, I am to request you to direct your forces to the following tasks:-

   (i) the destruction of German air-frame, engine and component factories and the ball-bearing

Appendix "B"
industry on which the strength of the German fighter force depend

(ii) the general disorganisation of those industrial areas associated with the above industries

(iii) the destruction of those aircraft repair depots and storage parks within range, and on which the enemy fighter force is largely dependent.

(iv) the destruction of enemy fighters in the air and on the ground.

The list of targets appropriate to these special tasks is in Appendix 'A' forwarded under cover of Air Ministry letter S.46368/III/D.B. Ops. dated 4th June, 1943. Further copies of this list, which will be amended from time to time as necessary, will be forwarded in due course.

8. Consistent with the needs of the air defence of the United Kingdom the forces of the British Fighter Command will be employed to further this general offensive by:-

(i) the attack of enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground

(ii) the provision of support necessary to pass bomber forces through the enemy defensive system with the minimum cost.

9. American fighter forces will be employed in accordance with the instructions of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force in furtherance of the bomber offensive and in co-operation with the forces of Fighter Command.

10. The allocation of targets and the effective co-ordination of the forces involved is to be ensured by frequent consultation between the Commanders concerned. To assist this co-ordination a combined operational planning committee has been set up. The suggested terms of reference under which this Committee is to operate is outlined in Air Ministry letter CS.19364/A.C.A.S. (Ops.) dated 10th June, 1943.

11. It is emphasised that the reduction of the German fighter force is of primary importance; any delay in its prosecution will make the task progressively more difficult. At the same time it is necessary to direct the maximum
effort against the submarine construction yards and operating bases when
tactical and weather conditions preclude attacks upon objectives associated
with the German Fighter Force. The list of these targets is in Appendix 'B'
forwarded with the Appendix 'A' referred to in paragraph 7 above.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) N. H. BOTTOMLEY.

Air Vice Marshal,
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations)
APPENDIX “C”

JOINT REPORT BY MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
AND AIR INTELLIGENCE ON EFFECTS OF
BOMBER OFFENSIVE

The effects of bombing do not fall evenly on the various parts of the Enemy’s war potential, and, to some extent, they are redistributed according to the immediate requirements of the consumers of material having the highest priority in Germany. There is a cushion represented by the margin over the bare minimum demands required by the workers and the armed forces, which is now being deeply depressed by aerial attack.

2. It is difficult to estimate the overall effect in quantitative terms but it is considered to be now in the region of 10% of the total war potential. A total decline of 20% in overall effort may well be fatal. Contributing to this average decline is a very much greater decline in some individual industries (e.g. Ball-bearings and rubber) which may be near the point where they could cause the collapse of the whole war machine. Moreover, the housing situation and the general morale are both so bad that either might cause a collapse before industry became unable to sustain the war effort.

Aircraft.

3. Direct attack on fighter-aircraft assembly and component plants did not begin until the end of July. Between that date and the end of October the eight attacks that were made by the U.S.A.A.F. on the Me. 109 works at Wiener Neustadt* and Regenburg and on the F.S. 190 works at Oschersleben, Warnemunde, Anklam, Marienburg and Kassel have been highly successful. They were aided by a night attack by Bomber Command on Kassel in October, which damaged the Bettenhausen components plant.

4. Single-engined fighter production in the months of September and October was on a lower level than for the month of July, notwithstanding the high degree of priority accorded to single-engined fighter production and the

* Two attacks by N.A.A.F.
considerable planned expansion in output. Damage to assembly factories alone in the above attacks has resulted in a production loss of 880 aircraft and production in October was between 600 and 700 against an estimated planned production of 1,000.

U-Boats.

5. The regular attacks on U-Boat construction and components manufacture have caused a direct loss of at least 22 vessels in 1943 out of the total of about 200 that would have been launched by the end of October. The delayed action of attacks on areas producing materials and components for U-Boats appears now to be having an effect on the average rate of completion.

Industrial Damage.

6. Up to the Spring of this year bombing appears to have had only a small effect on Coal output. Between April and July inclusive, however, Ruhr coal production probably declined by 10%. In spite of this, and presumably because consumers were harder hit than producers, supply still more than covers essential demand. Coke continues to be a limiting factor in steel production. There is increasing stringency in the supply of liquid fuels caused at least in part by the raid on Ploesti. At the peak of the Summer attack Ruhr steel output probably declined by 30-40%. This was partly offset by increased output in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, so that the maximum net drop was not less than 10% in German Europe. Bombing has also helped the shortage of ferro-alloys to reduce the quality and quantity of special-steel output. The decrease in the supplies of crude and special steels has made itself felt in armaments output, including aircraft, which has also been directly reduced by damage to the heavy-engineering industries of the Ruhr and other areas.

7. Virtually no rubber has been received through the blockade during the past nine months and consequently the raw material for tyres has been reduced in quantity and wearing quality. The destruction of the Huls plant has deprived Germany of 15% of her total rubber requirements and pressure has been increased by heavy losses of stocks at tyre factories.

8. Manufacturing centres for textiles have suffered heavily and the greater part of the remaining textile output is now reserved for essential military and industrial requirements. The civilian clothes ration has been
cancelled and parachute cloths, cords and harness have been affected. Losses of stocks have probably been an important factor in producing immediate effects.

9. Electrical engineering has suffered more heavily than any other branch of the engineering industry owing to the direct effects of factory damage and a high degree of concentration of the industry in a few concerns. There is evidence of continuing shortage of signals equipment in the Wehrmacht.

10. A few raids have resulted in damage to ball-bearing factories on a scale which may cause a 50% loss of production over the next six months, and in addition, by producing bottlenecks in an even shorter period, is likely severely to affect particular types of bearings required in the armaments and aircraft industry.

Housing.

11. Damage to housing, combined with evacuation, has resulted in the final saturation of all suitable accommodation in Germany. In the coming Winter the problem of housing evacuees, many of whom have hitherto been in temporary dwellings unsuitable to Winter conditions, will put upon the home administration a burden that it may not be able to support.

Land Transportation and Shipping.

12. Damage to the Western European communications system and its equipment, although heavy throughout the year, has declined of late; and this, coupled with the withdrawal on the Russian front and the reduction in traffic to Italy, has caused some easing in the general transport position. New construction of locomotive and wagons now probably more than offsets losses by bomb damage.

13. Damage to ports on Germany’s Western seaboard has necessitated a most inconvenient reorientation of sea-borne and internal transport.

Mining.

14. In Northern waters the continued mining offensive has further decreased the enemy’s shipping potential by sinking many of his ships and by causing him to divert tonnage from his now slender reserves to mine-sweeping. It has also contributed to the enforced reorientation of transport.

Appendix “C”
**Immobilization of Enemy Resources, etc.**

15. The employment of a considerable and increasing number of full-time adult personnel in anti-aircraft and civil defence, factory repair and reconstruction, and first-aid to housing, represents a serious drain on Germany's industrial man-power that might otherwise have been employed on production.

**Morale.**

16. The maintenance of morale is the gravest single problem confronting the home authorities. The full effects of air attack since the devastation of Hamburg have become known in all parts of the country. The increasing death roll is an important factor and coupled with military failures the general attitude is approaching one of "peace at any price" and the avoidance of the wholesale destruction of further cities in Germany.

*4th November, 1943.*
APPENDIX “D”

WAR CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE

EFFECTS OF BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON GERMAN WAR EFFORT

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

CONCLUSIONS

1. All the great industrial centres of the Ruhr and Rhineland have been so devastated by bombing that they are openly regarded as front line zones whose essential activities must somehow be kept going. The task of evacuating less essential personnel is being pressed forward on the highest priority, but is clearly meeting with very grave difficulties. A.R.P. services, even though reinforced, are increasingly inadequate to meet the strain of prolonged bombardment, and relief measures have lost much of their earlier efficiency. The willingness to hold out has been seriously lowered in the heavily bombed areas; in the less heavily bombed areas morale has most certainly been affected. The morale of the fighting forces has suffered in consequence of the plight of their relatives but there is as yet no evidence that their fighting spirit has been impaired.

2. The problem of housing workers in the heavily bombed industrial areas, and of housing refugees elsewhere is very acute. The effect of the offensive on transportation and administration and on the supply of consumer goods, though not calculable, is known to be severe and cumulative.

3. Though the physical destruction of productive capacity in Germany has been considerable, it comprises as yet only a small proportion of the total industrial capacity available to Germany. Indeed only about one-third of German industry has been under really heavy attack and that for only about three months.

4. No individual industry, with a few exceptions, has yet suffered the complete loss of a critical number of the factories on which it depends. There are also
still some small reserves of manufacturing capacity and some possible spheres of retreatment with which to “cushion” munitions production from the effects of bomb damage. Such “cushioning”, however, involves serious repercussions on capital construction, housing, repairs and consumer goods production. These in turn react on future production plans and on morale.

5. The reduction in steel production must already be having its effect on armament output; some other industries producing finished materials for the armed forces have already suffered immediate consequences as a result of the offensive. The chief of these are industries producing submarines, W/T, and other signals equipment, motor transport and perhaps heavy guns and ammunition. In other departments, it has so far been possible to maintain the supply of finished armaments to the forces by the expedients mentioned, and by depleting stocks.

6. The greater part of the damage has fallen on industries producing or processing for other industries. This means a time lag of weeks or even months before the impact is fully felt by industries producing finished equipment. Thus the final effect of the damage done to Krupps in March and April will not be seen until the Autumn or even the Winter of 1943.

7. On the other hand our offensive must have taken immediate effect on German plans by making production prospects both more adverse and largely incalculable at the very time when an unexpectedly high rate of military wastage had to be made good, and thus increasingly limiting German strategy.

8. Our bombing offensive has been a major factor in forcing Germany to adopt a defensive air strategy. It has forced the Germans to make a special effort to increase the production of fighter types and it has tied down fighter units on the Western Front in spite of a vital need for them elsewhere.

9. Our bomber offensive has made very heavy demands on skilled manpower for Radar and fighter defences. Large A.R.P. and fire services have had to be maintained at a high level of efficiency. The effect on Germany’s military manpower in causing men to be diverted from the armed forces or retained in civil life instead of being called up appears so far to have been very small. The Germans, however, appear to be now realising that their policy in this respect has been mistaken and members of the Todt organization have already been recalled from Norway and Russia to the Ruhr.
10. Although the rate of “softening” does not admit of numerical calculation without far greater knowledge of German policy and of the indirect results of bombing than we possess at present, enough is known to show that considerable progress has already been made, the effect of which is still developing.

(Signed) E.G.N. RUSHBROOKE
F.H.N. DAVIDSON
A.F. INGLIS
C.G. VICKERS
A. NOBLE (for Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck).

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

22ND JULY, 1943.

Appendix “D”
APPENDIX "E"

WAR CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE

EFFECTS OF BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON GERMAN WAR EFFORT

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
(November, 1943)

CONCLUSIONS

1. The extreme gravity with which the German High Command view the extension of the air offensive during the past three months is evidenced by changes effected between 1st July and 1st October in the distribution of the German fighter force. Whereas at the beginning of this period approximately 50% of the total German fighter strength was employed on the Western front, today the fighter defenses of the Reich comprise not less than 70% of the total fighter resources of the G.A.F. This policy of concentrating fighter forces for home defence has been pursued at the direct expense of the Russian and Mediterranean fronts and has contributed to the severe military reverses which Germany has suffered on these fronts.

2. The Allied air offensive has inflicted heavy casualties on the civilian population. In addition by compelling the German authorities to evacuate not only raided areas but also major cities throughout Greater Germany, it has spread alarm throughout the Reich, and has dislocated the social and economic life of the country. It has also greatly reinforced the effect of military reverses in convincing an increasing majority of the German people that defeat is now probable. Despite the strength of the Gestapo control and the increasing use of and publicity about the death sentence, often for minor offences, the discipline of the German people now shows signs of considerable weakening; in particular their co-operation in civil defence, in helping with the difficulties of evacuation and in complying with the direction of labour has been found wanting. The masses are still carrying on owing to fear of the Gestapo and to fear of the consequences of defeat. The sense of hopelessness, however, and still more the voluntary and involuntary withdrawal of support for the war effort.

3. 

3. 

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already seen, to what extent the increased...
already seriously impedes the German leaders in their conduct of the war. The extent to which this is attributable to Allied bombing has conspicuously increased in the last quarter.

3. Probably five to six million people have by now been rendered temporarily or permanently homeless by bombing. This, coupled with evacuation of many large cities under the threat of further bombing has resulted in final saturation of all existing accommodation in Germany. The authorities are now being forced to divert labour and materials to the erection of large numbers of emergency huts and shelters. Simultaneously, destruction of stocks of clothing in factory, shop and home have compelled the suspension of the clothing ration for adults. Lastly, the shortage of consumer goods has been so accentuated that even the needs of air-raid victims cannot be met. By the end of September, it is estimated that the number of workers displaced by bombing from their normal productive activities in industry, or engaged in rehabilitation work necessitated by bombing had reached the million mark (6½% of the industrial labour force). In addition a substantial carry-over of lost production and repair work has been created so that if the continuity of the attack can be maintained, there is every prospect that this figure will increase.

4. Since June the offensive has been directed primarily against the single-engined fighter industry and by the middle of October had deprived the G.A.F. of over 900 S.E.F.

5. Since the beginning of the year, five U-Boats have been destroyed by bombing of the yards. In addition damage to the yards and to the cities in which they are situated will result in the further loss of production of 17 U-Boats before September, 1944. Of the total of 22 U-Boats denied, 10 are attributable to attacks in the third quarter.

6. Although the shortage of A.F.V's., and Signals equipment is primarily due to the high rate of wastage, the inadequacy of production has been aggravated by bombing, particularly in the case of signals equipment for the G.A.F. It is probable that as a result the arming and equipping of new divisions is now a greater problem than manning them.

7. The attack on the Schweinfurt ball-bearing factories early in October is likely to produce a decline in Axis supplies by 15% - 20% over the next six months and may well begin to affect the production of aircraft, A.F.V's., and other military equipment after two months.

Appendix "E"
8. Over the past twelve months, Axis steel production as a whole has shown a net decline of 5%-7% and high-grade steel production for armament purposes an even larger decrease due to the concentration of damage in the Ruhr where the decline in steel output at the height of the offensive amounted to 30%-40%.

9. The bombing of synthetic oil plants and the temporary dislocation in distribution of oil from Floesti have contributed to maintaining the stringency of the German oil supply position.

10. As a direct result of bombing during the third quarter, combined with the enemy's lack of success in blockade running operations since the beginning of the year, the rubber position has deteriorated severely and has produced an acute shortage of tyres, the effects of which have not yet been fully felt.

11. In other industries damage has been distributed too widely to make a deep impression on any one of them. In its overall effort (i.e., allowing for bombing offensive resulted by the end of September, 1943, in a reduction of output of 10% - 15% as compared with the level of early 1943. Armament production as a whole has been reduced over this period perhaps to the same extent. In view of the wastage of equipment which the German armed forces, particularly the Army, have been and are incurring, and of the other factors operating after four years of blockade and intense military effort to impair Germany's economic potential, such a decline at this critical stage of the war is undoubtedly causing the greatest concern to the higher direction of the German war effort.

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH - BENTINCK
E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE
F. H. N. DAVIDSON
F. F. INGLIS
C. G. VICKERS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

12th November, 1943.
APPENDIX "F"

REPORT BY AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE

IN CONSULTATION WITH

POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE

ALLIED AIR ATTACKS AND GERMAN MORALE - IV

1. This paper appreciates the effect of Allied air attacks on German morale during the period July 15th - October 15th.

2. In these three months the Allied air offensive has increased in weight and has included night attacks on targets in Central, Southern and South-Western Germany and day attacks on targets in East Prussia, Austria and Bavaria. In North-Western Germany Hamburg was devastated between July 24th and August 3rd by four attacks of an unparalleled intensity; Hanover became the target of four successful attacks on September 22nd/23rd and 27th/28th, and October 8th/9th and 18th/19th; and notably effective single night attacks were made on Essen on July 25th/26th, Remscheid on July 30th/31st, Munchen-Gladbach on August 30th/31st, Bochum on September 29th/30th, Hagen on October 1st/2nd, and Kassel on October 3rd/4th. In South-Western Germany three very successful attacks were made on Mannheim on 9th/10th August and 5th/6th and 23rd/24th September, and Stuttgart and Frankfurt were raided on the nights of October 4th/5th and 7th/8th. In Southern Germany an ineffective attack on Munich on September 6th/7th was followed by a heavy and concentrated attack on October 2nd/3rd, and Nuremberg was raided on August 10th/11th and 27th/28th. In Central Germany two moderately effective attacks on Berlin at the end of August culminated in a very successful attack on September 3rd/4th; and on 20th/21st October a scattered attack was for the first time made on Leipzig. By day aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. have attacked targets as widely dispersed as Hamburg (July 25th and 26th), Kiel (July 29th), Kassel (July 29th and 30th), Bonn (12th August), Regensburg (17th August), Wiener-Neustadt (13th August and 1st October), Schweinfurt (17th August and 14th October), Stuttgart (6th September), Emden (September 27th and October 2nd), Frankfurt
(October 4th), Bremen (October 8th), Gdynia, Anklam and Marienburg (October 9th), and Munster (October 10th).

3. It was concluded in mid-July that attacks during the preceding two months had transformed what had previously been serious local difficulties into a threat affecting the entire structure of the German home front, and had caused a decline in morale which if it continued might prejudice the conduct of the war. It is appreciated that since that time the decline in morale as a direct and indirect result of air attack has been accelerated and that the tendencies noted in the earlier period are now present in a much exacerbated form. We single out for special notice the following reports:

(i) A reliable and somewhat conservative Berlin source indicated in the third week of August that bombing was having a progressive and extremely detrimental effect on morale, and that among the whole population it had given rise to an increasing desire for peace.

(ii) It was learned in mid-September that in the view of a responsible official the moral effect of Allied air attacks on Germany had been greatly increased by their systematic nature, since the Germans now had the impression that the Allies could wipe out any town district by district as they chose.

(iii) A collated Swiss report prepared during the second half of September concluded that air attacks were having a more lowering effect on morale than the withdrawal in Russia. It was being said that even victory (which was generally regarded as unattainable) would not be worth achieving at the cost of the destruction of so many German towns.

(iv) It was reliably indicated on 14th October that Allied air attacks were the main topic of conversation in Berlin. It was said that if no means could be found of putting an end to these attacks, the deterioration of economic conditions and morale would render a general collapse inevitable. The feeling in the bombed areas was that the war must be terminated regardless of what the terms might be, since even were Germany able to hold out in the hope of attaining a compromise peace, destruction would be on a scale which would preclude a return to normal conditions for an indefinite period.

We consider that these reports accurately describe the evolution of opinion in Germany since the attacks on Hamburg at the end of July.

Appendix “F”
4. Concurrently with the last of the Hamburg attacks the German authorities inaugurated a system of large-scale precautionary evacuation from Berlin and other threatened areas. Initiated at short notice and conducted in confusion, these evacuation measures gave rise to alarm merging on panic in the towns concerned. Described by Das Reich as "a movement of millions of individuals", they involved the wholesale removal of non-essential personnel inter alia from Berlin, Hamburg, Stettin, Nuremberg, Munich, Mannheim, Hanover, Kassel, Stuttgart, Augsburg, Leipzig, Vienna, Graz and Linz, and were accepted as a tacit admission on the part of the German Government that the security of centres of civilian population could no longer be ensured. An account of the evacuation of Berlin from an objective resident mentions the confusion resulting from the sudden recension of restrictions on individual movement, the appearance on the roads of large numbers of cars and lorries which had been laid up as a result of fuel rationing, the despatch of administrative departments to one point and of their archives to another, the unco-ordinated evacuation of industrial concerns without regard to technical considerations, and the temporary inability to trace evacuated offices.

5. On the disastrous long-term effects of this precautionary evacuation all sources are agreed. Earlier reports of the results of the evacuation of raised areas in the Ruhr described the tension which had arisen between evacuees and the inhabitants of evacuation areas. This has now become apparent on a national scale. Thus a responsible source reporting in late August describes the difficulties that had arisen from the tendency of evacuees to regard themselves as state pensioners, and to drift back to evacuated districts as a result of the discomfort to which they were subjected in evacuation areas and the quarrels to which their presence there had given rise. Another source refers to the hostility with which evacuees were greeted in Eastern Germany, to the lack of preparation which had necessitated their sleeping in sheds, and to the dislocation of the supply system of the smaller towns as a result of the influx of the evacuated population. A third source refers to the fear of evacuees that they might be despatched to Poland, which was generally regarded as a danger zone. Statements made by a German business man towards the beginning of September also pay tribute to the influence on morale of the movement of large numbers of civilians from place to place, and to the effect upon them of a period of residence in strange surroundings when they are regarded as intruders. That demoralisation extends to the residents of evacuation areas as well as to evacuees is suggested in a report of early September, which describes the latter as "about as welcome as the plague" in the areas to which they are despatched. A detrimental effect has undoubtedly been
exercised on local morale by the contagious despondency of refugees from raided areas. In this connection there is good evidence that the advent of evacuees from North-Western Germany resulted in an epidemic of defeatism in the Sudetenland. It was in these circumstances that Himmler in August assumed control of the Ministry of the Interior.

6. So far-reaching have been the consequences of evacuation and so complex the problem of housing, feeding and controlling the evacuated population, that a number of reports compare the low standard of living necessitated by evacuee conditions with Russian Communism. A responsible German business man, for example commented in the first week of September on the fact that evacuees who lost all their possessions constituted in effect a new proletariat, and on the inclination of residents in evacuation areas to regard the newcomers as Communists. The same theme recurs in a responsible report received in late October, which describes the automatic drift of this homeless, migratory population towards a Communist mentality. The danger that Europe might be "proletarianised by dispropriation through bombing" has also been mentioned in the German press. While it cannot be precluded that some of these references and reports are in the nature of propaganda addressed to Great Britain and the U.S.A. we believe that the tendency described has some basis in fact.

7. While it is difficult to provide firm figures for the number of individuals in Germany affected by evacuation, some conception of the magnitude of the problem which confronts the German authorities can be gained from reports estimating the evacuated population at between four and six millions and eight millions respectively. An index to the scale of evacuation following specific attacks is provided by Hannover, from which 250,000 homeless were transferred after the attack of October 8th/9th.

8. In conjunction with heavy residential damage, large-scale evacuation has contributed to the complete absorption of the housing resources of the Reich. The results of this are apparent both in raided districts and in evacuation areas. Thus during August evacuation from Hamburg caused a crisis in accommodation in Danzig, while by the third week of September (when evacuation to the Ostland was suspended) serious congestion had arisen in East Prussia, whither evacuees from the triangle Bremen - Hamburg - Berlin were moved, and where life was described as completely disorganised. From raided areas there is evidence that as late as 4th October essential personnel in Mannheim were living in air raid shelters for want of alternative accommodation, that in October further dwelling space was being requisitioned in
Bochum, and that in Bremen supplementary registration was in progress in anticipation of heavy air attacks. In late September the problem of housing the evacuated population during the winter months was reported to be causing the authorities the gravest concern, since in many areas refugees were accommodated in temporary wooden barracks. An official solution in the form of a German Housing Relief Scheme was announced by Ley on October 30th. This somewhat nebulous plan which provided for the large-scale construction of pre-fabricated emergency dwellings "in the form of summer houses" for evacuated families, had the merit of reassuring the evacuated population as to their chances of securing occupation of independent premises and even of returning to the vicinity of their native towns, and the disadvantage of an admission that since construction had only recently begun on an appreciable scale, it would be some time before the scheme was fully operative.

9. The regionalism noted in the Ruhr in a previous report as one of the administrative consequences of a heavy series of attacks have assumed more significant proportions. Separatist tendencies are reliably reported to be attracting official attention in Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden where deep-rooted hostility towards the Prussians is becoming evident. In Southern Germany during the first week of October demoralisation was stated to have expressed itself in growing anti-Prussian feeling. While it would be a mistake to attach undue importance to this point, sources agree that this development is largely due to the effect of air attacks on Nuremberg and Munich and to the transfer to Bavaria of large numbers of evacuees from raided areas in North-Western Germany.

10. Not unnaturally the authorised evacuation of non-essential civilian personnel led to the unauthorised evacuation of large numbers of civilians in essential occupations. In Vienna and other centres, which have not yet been attacked, a large section of the population is reported to sleep outside the town. In Berlin non-evacuated workmen are described as crowded into camps within a fifty mile radius of the city returning to the city daily for their work, while in Mannheim it proved necessary to institute a special check on motor-cars and trucks "loaded with goods as camouflage", which were transporting the inhabitants into the country at night. A serious view is taken by the German authorities of this practice on the ground that it places an unnecessary strain on local communications and results in a depletion of the A.R.D. services. Absconding A.R.D. workers have been threatened that their ration cards will be withdrawn if the practice does not stop.

Appendix "F"
11. A by-product of the Hamburg raids was the diffusion of rumours on a scale and of a kind unparalleled in earlier periods. Lurid accounts of men and women with their clothes on fire running like living torches through the town seem to have gained immediate currency, and every effort has been made by the German authorities to dispel an illusion that liquid phosphorous was sprayed over the town by the attacking aircraft. An unprecedented number of injunctions against rumour mongering have been delivered, warnings have been issued against retailing sensational stories in shelters during air attacks, and heavy sentences have been imposed on individuals stabbing the home front in the back. There is no doubt that in the minds of the authorities the new credulity with which the German public discusses the effects of air attack is an important factor in undermining civilian resistance.

12. There is good evidence that the number of fatal casualties incurred in raids has greatly increased during this period. In the case of four attacks on Cologne in June and July the German press admitted a total of over 4,000 deaths; and in the case of the Hamburg attacks of 28,000 dead. There is some reason to think that in the latter instance the admitted casualties were about 50% of the true figures, and many reports from Hamburg have mentioned totals of between 100,000 and 120,000. At Hannover 3,000 were killed in a single raid. While there is no means of forming an accurate estimate of aggregate casualties for any specific series of attacks, it is clear that in Germany casualties are believed greatly to exceed the totals admitted by the authorities. The fact that it is found necessary to deny the "gruesome figures" in current circulation indicates that in the eyes of the public the expectation of life of the average German civilian has sharply declined.

13. This has no doubt contributed to reduce the effort of the A.R.P. and fire-fighting services. That impaired efficiency is not confined to any one locality is indicated by reports from Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, by the threats of punishment meted out to defaulting A.R.P. personnel in Dusseldorf, Breslau, Chemnitz, Munich and Stettin, by press admissions of the failure of the fire-fighting services in Stuttgart during the attack of October 4th/5th and by a local announcement that the material losses incurred at Frankfurt on October 7th/8th could have been reduced by 25% had the fires been fought in a more energetic and determined way.

14. The organisation of relief in raided areas varies greatly in efficiency from town to town. Whereas in Hannover the relief organisation evidently functioned reasonably well, in Mannheim and Ludwigshafen hitches seem to
have occurred. At Hamburg the distribution of food and commodities broke down after the first two attacks, while the non-availability of drinking water and the dislocation of the drainage system presented major medical problems, with which Conti, the Reich Health Leader, was called upon to deal. As late as the first week of October the Hamburg press contained references to the “open ditch latrines”, which had had to be instituted, and to living conditions, which suggest that the rate of recovery, even in the quite exceptional circumstances obtaining, was very slow. Contributory evidence of a decline in the rate of repairs comes from Stuttgart, where the population were asked in mid-October to show understanding of the situation. The need to use the existing retail supply system after air attacks accounts for the cancellation during August of the order providing for the closure of surplus retail establishments.

15. The shortage of consumer goods mentioned in earlier reports as a factor in intensifying and prolonging the effect of raids has become progressively more serious with the advent of evacuation and the extension of attacks. It was alleged, for example, in a collated Swiss intelligence report, that two-fifths of the entire July production of consumption goods were commandeered in factories for the bombed areas. Following the Hamburg attacks, the sale of textiles was suspended throughout the whole of Germany, but as late as the third week of September this does not seem greatly to have alleviated the textile supply position in Hamburg itself. Elsewhere at the end of September the impossibility of obtaining goods not sold on the card system was popularly attributed to the results of air attack.

16. One outcome of the shortage of consumer goods has been an increase in the incidence of looting after raids. Cases have been reported *inter alia* from Berlin, Cologne, Hannover, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and Oldenburg. First-hand observers have alluded to the prevalence of looting in Hamburg, in which the police were alleged to have participated. Looting on the part of the police has also been reported on by Russian prisoners-of-war in Bremen.

17. Of the effect of raids on industrial morale there is cumulative evidence. Reporting in early August, a Hamburg business man mentions a marked deterioration in the industrial situation as a result of the effect of air attacks upon the workers; in this lack of sleep, a sense of insecurity, and changes in living and factory conditions played their part. An authoritative report of mid-September also testifies to the decline in working capacity of raided or evacuated personnel, and in general it appears that nervousness and overstrain have served appreciably to reduce industrial effort. French workers

Appendix “F”
in Germany (whose statements must, however, be treated with reserve), have consistently reported on the low state of industrial morale. To this the presence of foreign workers has contributed. Thus a source who left Hamburg before the July attacks mentioned that at that time the foreign workers, many of whom were Communists, were already fomenting unrest amongst the German workmen, while a member of the staff of I. G. Farben indicated that an armed organisation had been formed from German staff to handle foreign workmen in the event of any crisis. That these apprehensions are not altogether unfounded is confirmed by the difficulty known to have been experienced in rounding up conscripted workmen and prisoners-of-war after attacks.

18. The anti-Party bias noted in the preceding period as an effect of air attack has assumed more formidable proportions. A Berlin source indicated in late September that Hitler was more or less openly criticised as a result of his responsibility for the deteriorating military position on the Eastern Front and for the continuance of air attacks. Another source reported in mid-August that Hitler’s personal prestige had greatly declined. Accounts of anti-Nazi slogans chalked up after raids come from a number of sources. A Spaniard reported in mid-September that in the Berlin factory in which he was employed he observed a diminution in Hitler’s influence with the workers and the growth of a new antipathy towards the regime. A similar report emanates from a French workman in a North-West German factory. According to some sources, resentment in Hamburg was also directed in the first instance against Hitler and the Party. In press and public statements the Fuehrer’s personal interest in the home front has been increasingly insisted on, and a somewhat defensive tone has been adopted in respect of local Party leaders. Only in the post-war period, it is insisted, will the achievements of National Socialism receive the appreciation and esteem which is their due. Instances of a new effort to counter the prevailing impression that the Fuehrer is not interested in events in Germany are Ley’s statement that Hitler was responsible for devising the Housing Relief Scheme and Hitler’s own participation in the much publicised conference on the home front held at his headquarters in the third week of October.

19. Whereas during the preceding period there was little evidence as to disturbances after attacks, in the present period the number of first-hand reports of demonstrations after raids has tended to increase. A circumstantial report from Nuremburg describes an anti-Nazi demonstration after the attack of August 10th/11th, which resulted in a hundred or more arrests; this report is the more credible in view of a tendency to panic during the attack reported on by many sources notwithstanding the small scale of damage caused. Small-scale anti-Nazi demonstrations were also reported from Aachen. At Hamburg
incidents broke out in connection with the distribution of relief, and sources described the defacement of pictures of Hitler "to the accompaniment of extremely coarse language." Difficulties are reliably reported to have arisen at Cologne, where a body of workmen downed tools after a heavy attack, a number being shot and the remainder transported to other areas, and disturbances have also occurred at Mannheim (as the result of a delay in carrying out evacuation). Munich and Frankfurt. Tension in Munich is mentioned by several sources.

20. First-hand observers continue to express the view that the German security forces remain strong enough to deal with such disturbances as may occur. It was appreciated by an officer of the German Intelligence Service in early October that the repressive measures adopted would not lose their efficacy until the end of 1944, and by a German businessman a month earlier that the sporadic disturbances which had occurred were relatively insignificant in face of the repressive measures which were used to check the growing desperation following attacks. In Mid-August (when panic was at its worst) reports were circulating in Berlin of the arrival in the capital of some 60,000 S.S. troops, and of an incident a month earlier at Essen in which a clash with the S.S. had led to many deaths. While it is a fact that repressive measures have so far lost little or nothing of their efficacy and that there is as yet no indication of organised revolt, it would none the less be a mistake to accept these indications in too literal a way. On the one hand, the slight weakening of control recorded earlier in the Ruhr has become apparent in other areas, notably in Hannover, and on the other it is credibly reported that S.S. units brought in to raided areas from Eastern Germany are relieved as rapidly as possible in order to minimise the danger of any form of disaffection. It is also stated that in early August a secret investigation was instituted into the reliability of S.S. officers. In addition, evacuation and the extension of attacks should have resulted in some thinning out of the forces of control.

21. The attempt to stimulate flagging morale by creating a demand for retaliation has continued, and references to coming reprisals have been a feature of Ley's speeches to factory workers and other quasi-official pronouncements. The consensus of evidence suggests that despite the hysterical vilification of the attacking air forces, which has been noticeable in the local press in Frankfurt and elsewhere, reprisals are viewed rather as a vague means of averting further attacks than in a strictly retaliatory spirit. It was indicated by a Swiss source in late July that the middle classes in particular were placing what hopes they had upon reprisal action. Elsewhere press threats seem to
meet with scepticism. A significant sentence in a Munich paper reads: “Remembering the binding statements of the Reich leaders, the German people awaits the hour of retaliation with set teeth lest this frantic terror should become an unassailable law against us.”

22. The general tendency of propaganda, however, has been to divert attention to Allied losses in aircraft and personnel as a limiting factor on the development of operations. Propaganda of this type reached its climax with the U.S.A.A.F. attack on Schweinfurt on October 15th, when the loss of 121 four-engined bombers was claimed in the official communique and the loss of 199 in unofficial statements put out on the German-controlled wireless. Concurrently with these announcements, a tone of cautious optimism became apparent in German press statements, which had for some time previously alluded to the strengthening of the German defensive system. At the same time no specific promise of immunity or even of an appreciable decline in the incidence of air attack within any specific period was made. Locally this line of propaganda has been followed out in public tributes to the leaders who had “built up new German air defences.”

23. The myth of the invulnerability of German industry, to which propaganda statements had adhered in the preceding period, has been abandoned, and a number of press articles have gone so far as to refer to the possibility that German industry will be unable to recover in the post-war period, and that the U.S.A.A.F. may “destroy all our factories in order to prevent German-European competition.” This is one among a number of instances of the great moral effect exercised by day attacks.

24. Mosquito attacks on Berlin and other towns have lost none of the effectiveness with which they were credited in the preceding two months, and we are satisfied that these are playing an important part in wearing down morale.

25. Evidence as to the impact of air attacks on the morale of German troops on the war fronts or abroad is fragmentary. The most significant item is a categorical but uncorroborated statement in a Swiss intelligence report that an O.K.W. circular had been issued to troops in the East, assuring them that every possible measure was being taken to relieve the lot of the bomb victims, and exhorting them to stand firm in the belief in final victory. Unconfirmed reports refer to the deleterious influences exercised by air attacks on the morale of German troops in Oslo and on personnel of the Todt Organisation.
at Bodo, while a report despatched in August from Crete stated that R.A.F. attacks had done more to lower the morale of the German occupying forces than military defeat. It may well be that this attitude is representative of that of garrison forces in other occupied areas.

26. We conclude that during the period under review:—

(i) Fear of air attack has been the dominant preoccupation of a large part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in which fear of the consequences of continuing the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequences of defeat.

(ii) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute the war and threatens the structure of the entire home front.

(iii) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of a compromise with one or the other of the belligerents, and the favourable climatic conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any general break in morale, it is not reasonable to infer that no such break in morale can occur, and we do not exclude the possibility that, in conjunction with further large-scale military reverses and with the advent of winter, air operations may exercise a decisive influence on conditions inside Germany.

7th November, 1943
## APPENDIX "G"

MAJOR TARGETS ATTACKED BY R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND

FEBRUARY 4—OCTOBER 31, 1943

TARGETS IN THE RUHR AND RHINELAND

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<td>12/13 June</td>
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**BERLIN**

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THE CENTRAL COMPLEX, THE “BERLIN ROAD,”
THE NORTH SEA AND BALTIC PORTS

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(* Including 5 U.S. Fortresses. 1 reported missing on night 27/28 Sept.)

(Table continued on following page)

Appendix “G”
## THE UPPER RHINE AND THE SOUTHERN COMPLEX

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<td>409*</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(* Including 3 U.S. Fortresses)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannheim</td>
<td>16/17 April</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/10 Aug.</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/6 Sept.</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23/24 Sept.</td>
<td>630*</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(* Including 5 U.S. Fortresses)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>9/10 March</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/7 Sept.</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/3 Oct.</td>
<td>298*</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(* Including 4 U.S. Fortresses)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuremberg</td>
<td>25/26 Feb.</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/9 March</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/11 Aug.</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27/28 Aug.</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>11/12 March</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14/15 April</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/8 Oct.</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)
IMPORTANT WAR FACTORIES ATTACKED IN GERMANY
AND OCCUPIED TERRITORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sorties Desp’d</th>
<th>Bomb Tonnage</th>
<th>A/C Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jena (Zeiss Works)</td>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peenemunde (Experimental Station)</td>
<td>17/18 Aug.</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilsen (Skoda Works)</td>
<td>16/17 April</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13/14 May</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnage (Renault Works)</td>
<td>9 March</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Creusot (Schneider Works)</td>
<td>19/20 June</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montbeliard (Peugeot Works)</td>
<td>15/16 July</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montlucon (Dunlop Works)</td>
<td>15/16 Sept.</td>
<td>376*</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Including 5 U.S. Fortresses)

FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sorties Desp’d</th>
<th>Bomb Tonnage</th>
<th>A/C Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnage (Renault Works)</td>
<td>9 March</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Creusot (Schneider Works)</td>
<td>19/20 June</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montbeliard (Peugeot Works)</td>
<td>15/16 July</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montlucon (Dunlop Works)</td>
<td>15/16 Sept.</td>
<td>376*</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NORWAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sorties Desp’d</th>
<th>Bomb Tonnage</th>
<th>A/C Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knaben (Molybdenum Mines)</td>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SEA-MINING OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Aircraft Despatched</th>
<th>Mines Laid</th>
<th>No. of Aircraft Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,094</td>
<td>10,752</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)
LEAFLET OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Aircraft Despatched</th>
<th>No. of Aircraft Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the Total Effort, 89.8% was expended on Bomb Raids, 3.1% on Sea-Mining and 2.1% on Leaflets.
APPENDIX "H"

MAJOR TARGETS ATTACKED BY VIII BOMBER COMMAND

FEBRUARY 4 — NOVEMBER 1, 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb.</td>
<td>ST. NAZAIRE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb.</td>
<td>WILHELMSHAVEN—Submarine Building Yards</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>161.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb.</td>
<td>BREST—Submarine Base</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>155.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mar.</td>
<td>HAMM—Railway Marshalling Yard</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar.</td>
<td>LORIENT—Submarine Base</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>157.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar.</td>
<td>BREST—Submarine Base</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mar.</td>
<td>VEGESACK—Submarine Building Yard of Bremer Vulkan Schifffab u Maschinen-Fabrik A.G. (Subsidiary of Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G.)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>268.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar.</td>
<td>WILHELMSHAVEN—Submarine Building Yard</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>224.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April</td>
<td>PARIS (BILLANCOURT)—Motor Vehicle and Armament Works of Soc. des Usines Renault</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>251.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>ANTWERP (MORTSEL) — Aircraft and Aero Engine Works of Erla Maschinenwerk G.m.b.H. (formerly Soc. Nouvelle des Automobiles Imperia) (formerly S.A. Minerva Motors)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>245.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>LORIENT—Submarine Base</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>147.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>BREST—Submarine Base</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)

198

Appendix "H"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>BREMEN (NEUENLAND)—Bomber Aircraft Assembly Factory of Focke Wulf Flugzeugbau A.G.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>263.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>ST. NAZAIRE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>ANTWERP—Motor Assembly Plant of Ford Motor Co. Motor Assembly Plant of General Motors</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>161.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>MEAULTE Nr. ALBERT—Aircraft Factory of Soc. Nationale de Constructions Aéronautiques du Nord (S.N.C.A.N.) (formerly Avions et Hydravions Potez-C.A.M.S.)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>218.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>KIEL—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Fried Drupp Germania-Werft</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>293.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>ANTWERP—Motor Assembly Plant of Ford Motor Co. Motor Assembly Plant of General Motors</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>HELIGOLAND—Submarine Base</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>186.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>LORIENT—Submarine Installations</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>197.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>KEROMAN—Submarine Base</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>KIEL—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A. G.</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>236.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>FLENSBURG—Submarine Building Yard of Flensburger Schiffsbaugesellschaft A. G.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>134.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>WILHELMSHAVEN—Submarine Building Yards</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>190.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>EMDEN—Submarine Building Yard of Nordseewerke G. m. b. H. (Subsidiary of Vereinigte Stahlwerke A. G.)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>111.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>ST. NAZAIRE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>277.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>LA PALLICE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>RENNES—Submarine Installations</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>132.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>WILHELMSHAVEN — Submarine Building Yards</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>417.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>BREMEN—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Schiff u Maschinenbau A.G. (Deschimag)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>253.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>KIEL—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A.G.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>HULS Nr. RECKLINGHAUSEN—Synthetic Rubber (Buna) Works of Chemische Werke Huls G.m.b.H.</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>422.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>ANTWERP—Motor Assembly Plant of General Motors</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>ST. NAZAIRE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>301.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>LE MANS—Aero Engine Factory of Societe des Moteurs Gnome et Rhone</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>181.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>LE MANS—Aero Engine Factory of Societe des Moteurs Gnome et Rhone</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>254.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>NANTES—Aircraft Assembly Plant of Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques du Sud-Ouest (S.N.C.A.S.O.) (formerly S.A. des Ateliers d'Aviation Louis Breguet)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>145.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>LA PALLICE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>137.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>VILLACOUBLAY — Aircraft Factories of Breguet</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>202.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>LE BOURGET Nr. PARIS—Aircraft Repair Installations</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>122.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>AMSTERDAM—Aircraft Factory of Fokker Aircraft Co.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>HEROYA (68 miles S.S.W. of Oslo) — Aluminum Works of Nordisk Lettmetal A/S</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>414.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>TRONDHEIM—Submarine Base</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>HAMBURG—Submarine Building Yard of Blohm &amp; Voss K.G.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>HAMBURG (MONFLETH)—Aero Engine Works of Klockner Flugmotorenbau A.G.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>HANNOVER—Tyre and Tube Factory of Continental Gummiwerke A.G.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>HANNOVER—(NORDHAFEN)—Synthetic Rubber (Buna) Processing Works of Continental Gummiwerke A.G.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>115.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>HAMBURG—Submarine Building Yard of Blohm &amp; Voss A.G.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>HAMBURG (MONFLETH)—Aero Engine Works of Klockner Flugmotorenbau A.G.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>KASSEL (BETTENHAUSEN)—Fighter Aircraft Components Factory of Fieseler Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>137.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>OSCHERSLEBEN—Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factory of AGO Flugzeugwerke A.G.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>KIEL—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A.G.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>KIEL—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Howaldtswerke A.G.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>115.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>WARNEMUNDE—Fighter Aircraft Assembly and Airfield of Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H. (formerly Arado Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H.)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>129.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>KASSEL (BETTENHAUSEN)—Fighter Aircraft Components Factory of Fieseler Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>222.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>KASSEL (WALDAU)—Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factories of Fieseler Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August</td>
<td>LE BOURGET (Nîmes, PARIS)—Aircraft Repair Installations</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>397.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>SCHWEINFURT—Ball-bearing Works of Kugelfischer Schweinfurt; Undercarriage, Clutch and Cycle Accessories Works of Fichtel &amp; Sachs A.G.; Ball-bearing Works of Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken A.G. (Werk I and II)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>424.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>REGENSBURG—Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factory of Messerschmitt A.G.</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>299.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 August</td>
<td>VILLACOUBLAY (Nîmes, PARIS) — Aircraft Factories of Breguet</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>257.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sept.</td>
<td>ROMILLY-SUR-SEINE—Air Park and Airfield</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>294.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sept.</td>
<td>PARIS—Aircraft Components Factory of S.A. des Avions Caudron-Renault</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on following Page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Attack</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACKED</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Sept.</td>
<td>BRUSSELS (EVERE) — Aircraft Repair Works of Erla Maschinenwerk G.m.b.H. (formerly S.A.B.C.A.)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>282.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>ROMILLY-SUR-SEINE—Air Park and Airfield</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>246.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>PARIS—Aircraft Components Factory of S.A. des Avions Caudron-Renault and Automobile Engine and Lorry Assembly Works of S.A. Andre Citroen</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>118.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>PARIS (BILLANCOURT)—Motor Vehicle and Armament of Soc. Des Usines Renault</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept.</td>
<td>PARIS—Aero Engine Factory of Soc. Hispano-Zuiza and Ball Bearing Works of Compagnie d'applications Mecaniques (C.A.M.)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>229.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept.</td>
<td>NANTES—Naval Installations</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>233.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept.</td>
<td>LA PALLICE—Submarine Base</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>131.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sept.</td>
<td>NANTES—Naval Installations</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>134.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sept.</td>
<td>NANTES—Naval Installations</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sept.</td>
<td>REIMS/CHAMPAGNE—Aircraft Assembly and Repair Plant of Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke A.G.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>118.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oct.</td>
<td>EMDEN—Submarine Building Yard of Nordseewerke Emden G.m.b.H.</td>
<td>341</td>
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<td>4 Oct.</td>
<td>FRANKFURT—Built up area of City</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>88.3</td>
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(Table continued on following Page)
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of attack</th>
<th>Target Attacked</th>
<th>A/C Attacking</th>
<th>Tonnage on Target</th>
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<td>8 Oct.</td>
<td>BREMEN—Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Schiff u Maschinenbau A.G. (Deschimag)</td>
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<td>BREMEN (OSLEBHAUSEN)—Bomber Aircraft Assembly Factory of Weser Flugzeubau G.m.b.H.</td>
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<td>BREMEN—Center of City</td>
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<td>VEGESACK—Submarine Building Yard of Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau u Maschinenfabrik A.G.</td>
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<td>ANKLAM—Trainer, Reconnaissance and Bomber Aircraft Components Factory of Arado Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H.</td>
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<td>MARIENBURG—G.A.F. Station</td>
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<td>DANZIG—Naval Installations</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>9 Oct.</td>
<td>GDYNIA—Naval Installations</td>
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<td>10 Oct.</td>
<td>MUNSTER—Railway Junctions</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>354.0</td>
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C.C.S. 404 and 404/1

AGENDA FOR SEXTANT

References:

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 2
CCS 133d Meeting, Item 3

On 22 November 1943, the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed an agenda for SEXTANT (C.C.S. 404). The British Chiefs of Staff circulated C.C.S. 404/1. In their 127th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the SEXTANT agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 404/1.

On 2 December 1943, the Secretaries circulated a draft agenda for the remainder of the SEXTANT Conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 133d Meeting agreed that all but the most essential items should be excluded from the SEXTANT agenda and listed in their decision the priority in which the remaining conference items should be dealt with.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

AGENDA FOR "SEXTANT"

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The attached proposed agenda is presented for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSED

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR "SEXTANT"

1. Agreement as to conference procedure.

2. Over-All Objective; Over-All Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War; Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept.

3. European-Mediterranean
   a. Estimate of the enemy situation.
   d. Report on status of development of facilities in the Azores, air and naval.
   e. Readiness report on OVERLORD, RANKIN, and JUPITER.
   f. Report on Mediterranean operations, including the Middle East.
   h. Specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her Satellites, 1943-44.
1. Policies with respect to military considerations in dealing with neutral, liberated and occupied countries, including agreement as to division of responsibility between the United Nations.

4. Japan
   a. Estimate of the enemy situation, 1944, Japan (giving consideration to Russian and Chinese intentions).
   b. Short Term Plan for the defeat of Japan.
   f. Transfer of United Nations efforts to the defeat of Japan upon the defeat of Germany.
   g. Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944, including amphibious operations in Southeast Asia.

5. Relation of resources to plans.

6. Final report to President and Prime Minister.

7. Preparation and approval of any directives arising from conference decisions and of any reports to other Allies.

8. Discussion as to the next conference.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEXTANT AGENDA

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have considered the Agenda for SEXTANT proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 494) and while we have no specific objections to the subjects set out in their memorandum, we suggest that a more simple agenda would meet the case.

2. We, therefore, propose that the main subjects for discussion should be as follows:

I. REAFFIRM OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE, OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND BASIC UNDERTAKINGS
   (C.C.S. 319/5, paragraphs 2-5 and paragraphs 6, as subsequently amended by agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff (see C.C.S. 380/2))

II. SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS

III. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

IV. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

V. PROGRESS REPORTS

3. Discussion of the above main subjects would include the introduction of most, if not all, of the points put forward in the American agenda. The arrangements for dealing with the detailed subjects would, however, be made from day to day.

4. It will be noted that Southeast Asia operations have been placed second on the list, in view of the intention to bring the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten into the discussions at the earliest stage.
5. It is thought that the Progress Reports should be left to the end of the Conference when the main items have been disposed of. This procedure will not, of course, preclude points being raised for discussion when the Progress Reports are taken.

(Signed) A. F. BROOKE,
C. A. PORTAL,
A. B. CUNNINGHAM.

CAIRO.

22 November 1943
C.C.S. 405

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Reference:

C.C.S. 128th Meeting, Item 2

C.C.S. 405 circulated a memorandum from Lt. General Stilwell, 22 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum in their 128th Meeting and agreed that operations proposed in paragraphs 2 a to d inclusive are in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in C.C.S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. They further agreed that operations proposed in paragraphs 2 e to h inclusive go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties. This study, when completed, to be incorporated in the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum from Lt. General Stilwell, USA

1. At QUADRANT an outline plan for operations against Japan was presented in Annex "I" to C.C.S. 319/2. These operations culminated in an invasion of Japan some time after 1947.

2. The question at hand which concerns the China Theater is "what operations can be mounted from China which will have the greatest effect on the course of the war in the Pacific?" This question can be answered as follows:

   a. Assist S.E.A.C. in operations against North Burma—Current.

   b. Develop land route to China and improve internal communications—Current.

   c. Continue to train and improve combat effectiveness of Chinese Army—Current.

   d. Initiate intensive bombing of Japan by V.L.R. bombers—Early 1944.


   f. Carry out intensive bombing of Formosa and P.I., deny use of Straits of Formosa and South China Sea to Japan and furnish land-based air support to any U.S. Navy activities in these areas—October 1944-

   g. Attack Formosa if required—May 1945-November 1945.

   h. Offensive operations towards Shanghai—November 1945.

The above operations are tactically and logistically feasible. The cost is low. There is no competition with other theaters for specialized equipment and there is no conflict with operations projected by other theaters. These operations will:

   (1) PROVIDE GREATEST AID POSSIBLE TO OTHER THEATERS,

   and

C.C.S. 405

22 November 1943
(2) CUT DOWN "QUADRANT" TIME TABLE FOR FINAL DEFEAT OF JAPAN BY ONE TO TWO YEARS.

3. REQUIREMENTS

a. One U.S. Infantry Division in India by March 1944. Two additional divisions about a month apart thereafter. (These to be definitely earmarked for China Theater.)

b. Continuation of supply program from U.S. for equipping Chinese troops.

c. Setting up India as a base for both China and Southeast Asia Theaters. All U.S. Troops now in India except those necessary for operation of the Communication Zone to be moved to China after recapture of North Burma.
C.C.S. 406 and 406/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

References:

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4
CCS 128th Meeting, Item 5
CCS 129th Meeting, Item 3

C.C.S. 406 circulated a memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff 23 November. The British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply 24 November. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 129th Meeting took note of C.C.S. 406 and 406/1 and agreed to a reply to the Chinese and/or U.S.S.R. if the question of machinery for closer military cooperation should be raised.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF — UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Reference: CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The discussion in the C.C.S. 127th Meeting concerning the Chinese military representatives meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the first of a series of such problems which will arise, particularly as our cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese develops. It would seem highly desirable to find a solution which will permanently (a) maintain the exclusive American-British character of the Combined Chiefs of Staff while avoiding these embarrassing complications and (b) furnish adequate and satisfactory machinery for discussions by the principal Allies at the Chiefs of Staff level, as military problems arise or political considerations make such meetings desirable.

2. As a solution it is suggested:

   a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be recognized as an exclusive American and British Body, and

   b. That a "United Chiefs of Staff" be set up at the Chiefs of Staff level to include the principal Allies — that is, for the present, the four "Moscow" powers.

3. The United Chiefs of Staff would function only when necessity arose, and would provide for attendance either by all members or by only those concerned in the problems to be discussed. This arrangement would give an "out" to China or Russia as the case might be. The proposed United Chiefs of Staff should consist of a single representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation. This representative would not necessarily have to be the same official at all meetings. Our Allies could not complain of being left out of Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions, since in theory, at least, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be the lesser of the two bodies.

4. Such a "United Chiefs of Staff" should be considered as a flexible organization designed to meet situations as they develop, including possible inclusion of other Allies at a later date, on the same basis of participation when concerned.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

We have studied the question of the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, of the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We appreciate, moreover, the need for us all to have our minds made up on this subject, in view of the increasing pressure that is likely in the future. Our views are as follows:

a. The chief need is that the best possible coordination of our military effort with that of the Russians and of the Chinese should be ensured. We feel strongly that, whereas the integration of U.S. and British forces is complete and worldwide, this is in no way the case with regard to the Russians or the Chinese, whose outlook, indeed, is largely confined to their own particular main front. We feel, therefore, that no change whatever should be made in the present Combined Chiefs of Staff standing organization, and that it should remain essentially U.S.-British.

b. We have considered whether there should be any other organization, such as a United Chiefs of Staff, and have come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to establish any form of standing machinery. Relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult. It might even claim to be the more representative body, and therefore to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions, and in consequence, such an organization could serve no useful purpose, excepting as a means of improving liaison. This could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London, Moscow and Chungking.

c. Our final conclusion, therefore, is that the best way of ensuring inter-Allied coordination and at the same time meeting the Russian and Chinese susceptibilities, is to ensure that whenever the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet for a big conference such as Sextant, they should be invited to attend to discuss the military problems with which they are concerned, as has been done on the present occasion.
C.C.S. 407 (Revised) and 407/1

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R.

References:

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4
CCS 129th Meeting, Item 4
CCS 131st Meeting, Item 5

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting amended and accepted C.C.S. 407. The amended paper, in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at the C.C.S. 129th Meeting, was circulated as C.C.S. 407 (Revised).

C.C.S. 407/1 circulated an agenda of items which are currently under discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference and which should be discussed between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned.
C.C.S. 407 (Revised) 26 November 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the U.S.-British strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime Minister before meeting the Soviets.

b. That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations offensive by effective coordination with OVERLORD.

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous agreement.

d. That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean.

e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war but to stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere.

2. Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets it should be made clear that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the over-all situation.

3. At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on the Soviets.

4. A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure.
ENCLOSURE

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U.S.-BRITISH-U.S.S.R. CONFERENCE

1. COORDINATION OF MILITARY EFFORT

The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

2. ITALY

Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy.

3. TURKEY

Turkish action on entry into the war.

4. SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA

5. STRATEGIC BOMBING

Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets in Germany or her satellites in extension of POINTBLANK. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian front — 130 serviceable fighters.)

6. JAPAN

On the assumption that the U.S.S.R. will bring up for discussion its entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following should be considered:

a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow.

b. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U.S. territory.
c. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles.

d. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to use. Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we can employ.

e. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could be provided?
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 131st Meeting, Item 5, agreed that the following items, which are currently under discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference, should be discussed between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned:

A. SHUTTLE BOMBER BASES

(1) When will the U.S.S.R. be prepared to designate air bases for our use? What are presently available locations, facilities, and capabilities? The United States tentatively desires 10 bases so distributed as to permit shuttle bombing from Italy and United Kingdom.

(2) When may we begin sending the required service personnel into the U.S.S.R. to the designated bases?

(3) What is Soviet proposal for handling the close operational liaison required?

(4) What signal communications with the United Kingdom and Italy can be provided?

B. AIR TRANSPORT ROUTES

Request establishment of U.S. Air Transport Service on a minimum frequency basis of one round trip weekly on three routes in the following order of priority:

(1) ALSIB

In order that the U.S. may have a direct and independent air line of communications with the U.S.S.R.

In order that the basic machinery may be set up and be in operation to provide a direct U.S.-U.S.S.R. aerial route of supply to support any future U.S.S.R. military air operations.
(2) U.S.-U.K.-MOSCOW

Primarily to support shuttle bombing operations.

(3) TEHRAN-MOSCOW

In order to transport munitions and spare parts required in connection with shuttle bombing operations and to connect Moscow with our Mediterranean and S.E. Asia fronts. This will provide an alternative during the winter months when the northern route (U.S.-U.K.) is not operating regularly.

C. WEATHER INFORMATION

(1) Request Soviet basic weather ciphers in order to interpret weather broadcasts. The U.S. will furnish weather ciphers desired by the U.S.S.R.

(2) Alternatively if foregoing is not acceptable to the Soviets, U.S. desires weather data on specific areas, using special ciphers as follows:

(a) Shuttle bombing areas.
(b) Tehran transport route; data west of Long. 75° E.
(c) From 60° E. to 160° E., (for operations in China).
(d) From 90° E. to 180°, (for the Alsib route).

(3) Request U.S.S.R. to indicate the procedure they suggest in the mutual exchange of weather information. We propose exchange of meteorological liaison officers for coordination of technical details and arrangements for distribution of weather codes and ciphers.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire their respective missions to make periodic reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding progress made in the negotiations on the above subjects.

H. REDMAN,

F. B. ROYAL,

Combined Secretariat.
C.C.S. 408 and 408/1

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES
OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

C.C.S. 408 circulated a proposal by the United States Chiefs of Staff, 25 November 1943. The reply from the British Chiefs of Staff was circulated 26 November as C.C.S. 408/1.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES
OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:
   a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.
   b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.
   c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective — DEFEAT OF GERMANY. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate necessity, therefore, will be to organize his situation with the utmost possible speed, and to create, over-all command of the Combined Chiefs of the Allied forces. General confusion must be avoided and the early victory must be preserved.

5. In meeting this situation, the Allied command structure for air operations in the Mediterranean and for General Eisenhower's command in northwestern Europe, cannot escape the fact that the essential role is to save the lives of the men who are to insure victory in each theatre, on the basis, of the principle of planning the defeat of the enemy, of the United Nations. It is possible additional planning can be made by the Combined Chiefs of the Allied Forces, but the Eighth and Fifteenth Chiefs of Staff.

6. The situation calls for the prompt and effective command of the United States forces, in conjunction with the planning made by General Eisenhower, and should be made by the United States Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The
immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day-to-day operational basis, of the United States Air Forces in both the U.K. and Mediterranean by day and R.A.F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area. We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British Chiefs of Staff:
   a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
   b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.
   c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.
d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.

8. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations;

b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and materiel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and

c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
1. The British Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 403 that "a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic." This proposal has immense political implications and is clearly a matter for the most earnest consideration of the U.S. and British Governments. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff must say at once that, from the military point of view, they profoundly disagree with the proposal. Their reasons are set out in the paragraphs that follow.

2. Total war is not an affair of military forces alone, using the word "military" in the widest sense of the term. There are political, economic, industrial, and domestic implications in almost every big war problem. Thus it seems clear that the Supreme Commander for the war against Germany will have to consult both the U.S. and the British Governments on almost every important question. In fact, it boils down to this, that he will only be able to make a decision without reference to high authority on comparatively minor and strictly military questions, such as the transfer of one or two divisions, or a few squadrons of aircraft, or a few scores of landing craft, from one of his many fronts to another. He will thus be an extra and unnecessary link in the chain of command.

3. There is no real analogy between the position of Marshal Foch in the last war and the position now contemplated for the Supreme Commander against Germany. Marshal Foch was responsible only for the Western Front and the Italian Front. His authority did not extend to the Salonika Front, the Palestine Front, or the Mesopotamian Front. Under the arrangements now contemplated, the Supreme Commander will have not only OVERLORD and the Italian Front under his authority, but also the Balkan Front and the Turkish Front (if this is opened). There must be some limit to the responsibi-
ties which Allied Governments can delegate to a single soldier and the sphere
now proposed seems to exceed these limits considerably.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose (see paragraph 8 c) that the
decisions of the Supreme Commander should "be subject to reversal by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff." If the main object of this new arrangement is to
insure rapid decisions, it looks as though the above proviso will lead to deplor-
able consequences.Instances will occur in which the Supreme Commander
has issued orders and the troops have marched in accordance with these
orders, only to be followed by a reversal of the order by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff and consequent confusion. Again it may happen that the British
Chiefs of Staff agree with a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, while
the United States Chiefs of Staff totally disagree with it. What happens then?
Or again, the Combined Chiefs of Staff may wholeheartedly support on mili-
tary grounds a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, only to find that
one or other of the Governments concerned is not prepared to ratify it. Then
what happens?

5. If the Supreme Commander is going to exercise real control, he will
need to assemble the whole paraphernalia of Intelligence, Planning and
Administration on an unprecedented scale. This staff will merely be a great
pad between the theater commanders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. Finally, it is not admitted either that the existing machinery for the
higher direction of the war has failed, or that the situation which now con-
fronts us is so inherently different as to demand a revolutionary change.

7. The conclusion to be drawn from the above arguments is that the
Supreme Commander of the war against Germany will never have, under the
system of government which now obtains in the U.S.A. and U.K., authority
to deal with anything but strictly military, and comparatively minor, problems.
He will be boosted by the Press and public opinion as a superman who is going
to lead the two nations to victory. This is a mere delusion. His position will be
a sham. In important matters, he will not be able to do anything more than
is now done by the theater commanders.

8. If the well tried machinery that has led us safely through the last two
years has failed in the smaller problems, it would be better to examine that
machinery and see how it could be speeded up and adjusted, rather than to
embark upon an entirely novel experiment, which merely makes a cumbrous
and unnecessary link in the chain of command, and which will surely lead to
dissillusionment and disappointment.
C.C.S. 409

"OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

References:

CCS 130th Meeting, Item 4
CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B
CCS 132d Meeting

C.C.S. 409 circulated a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 25 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff resolved this subject in their 132d Meeting at EUREKA.
C.C.S. 409

25 November 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

“OVERLORD” AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Note by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. For some time past it has been clear to us, and doubtless also to the United States Chiefs of Staff, that disagreement exists between us as to what we should do now in the Mediterranean, with particular reference to the effect of future action on OVERLORD. The point at issue is how far what might be termed the “sanctity of OVERLORD” is to be preserved in its entirety, irrespective of developments in the Mediterranean Theater. This issue is clouding the whole of our future strategic outlook, and must be resolved at SEXTANT.

2. At the outset we must point out that, since the decisions taken at QUADRANT, there have been major developments in the situation. The Russian campaign has succeeded beyond all hope or expectations and their victorious advance continues. Italy has been knocked out of the war; and it is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that Turkey will come in on our side before the New Year. In these changed conditions, we feel that consideration of adjustments of, if not actual departures from, the decisions taken at TRIDENT and QUADRANT are not only fully justified but positively essential.

3. Nevertheless, we emphasize that we do not in any way recoil from, or wish to sidetrack, our agreed intention to attack the Germans across the Channel in the late spring or early summer of 1944, or even earlier if RANKIN conditions were to obtain. We must not, however, regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns. In actual fact, the German strength in France next spring may, at one end of the scale, be something which makes OVERLORD completely impossible and, at the other end, something which makes RANKIN not only practicable, but essential. Consequently, to assume that the achievement of a certain strength by a certain date will remove all our difficulties and result in shortening the duration of the war is entirely illusory. This policy, if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyze action in other theaters without any guarantee of action across the Channel.

4. With the Germans in their present plight, the surest way to win the war in the shortest time is to attack them remorselessly and continuously in any and every way at which are stretched our forces to the limits of our superior power.

5. If, in the for...
any and every area where we can do so with superiority. The number of places at which we can thus attack them depends mainly on the extent to which they are stretched. Our policy is therefore clear; we should stretch the German forces to the utmost by threatening as many of their vital interests and areas as possible and, holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in superior force.

5. If we pursue the above policy we firmly believe that OVERLORD (perhaps in the form of RANKIN) will take place next summer. We do not, however, attach vital importance to any particular date or to any particular number of divisions in the assault and follow-up, though naturally the latter should be made as large as possible consistent with the policy stated above. It is, of course, valuable to have a target date to which all may work, but we are firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our master, and to prevent us from taking full advantage of all opportunities that occur to us to follow what we believe to be the correct strategy.

6. In the light of the above argument, we submit the following proposals for action in the Mediterranean:

a. Unification of Command

Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, as outlined in C.O.S. (W) 919 is an essential and urgent measure which should be put into effect irrespective of any other decisions taken about this theater.

b. The Italian Campaign

The Offensive in Italy should be nourished and maintained until we have secured the Pisa-Rimini line.

c. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania

Our policy should be to place on a regular military basis and to intensify our measures to nourish the Partisan and irregular forces in these countries.

d. Turkey

We should bring Turkey into the war this year.

e. The Dardanelles

We should aim to open the Dardanelles as soon as possible.

235
f. The Balkans

We should undermine resistance in the Balkan States and do everything possible to promote a state of chaos and disruption in the satellite Balkan countries.

7. If the above measures necessitate putting back the date upon which the forces agreed to be necessary for OVERLORD will be available in the United Kingdom, this should be accepted since it does not by any means follow that the date of the invasion of France will be put back to the same extent.

8. To sum up, our policy is to fight and bomb the Germans as hard as possible all through the winter and spring; to build up our forces in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible consistent with this; and finally to invade the Continent as soon as the German strength in France and the general war situation gives us a good prospect of success.
C.C.S. 410

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION “OVERLORD”

Reference:

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B

C.C.S. 410 circulated a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 25 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of this subject in their 131st Meeting.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION “OVERLORD”

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The following examination has been made regarding the limitations imposed by weather conditions on the postponement of Operation OVERLORD.

2. Suitable weather conditions are required for two phases of the operation, firstly, the assault for which a four-day fine weather period is required; secondly, the maintenance and build-up period for which suitable weather for a decreasing degree of beach maintenance is required for about three months.

THE ASSAULT

3. In order to launch the assault a quiet spell of four days with winds of force 3 or less is desirable. Over ten consecutive years there were quiet spells for four or more consecutive days on the following number of occasions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Occasions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>18 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>21 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>19 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>16 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>23 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>17 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>14 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be seen that there is no serious deterioration in the chances of launching the assault between the months of May and September with the exception of July, where the incidence of a fine spell is only slightly less than in the month of June. It is therefore considered that, purely from the assault aspect, the operation could be postponed up to the month of September.

4. For tidal reasons the assault is limited in each lunar month to two periods of five or six days, which occur at times of full and new moon. The air lift can only be carried out in the full moon period. It therefore follows that if the full moon period is missed on account of the weather conditions being unsuitable, the assault must be postponed for 24 days. By sacrificing the air lift this postponement could be reduced to 10 days.
AIR FACTORS AFFECTING THE ASSAULT

5. a. For fully effective operation of air forces the following conditions must be satisfied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum horizontal visibility</th>
<th>Night</th>
<th>Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum cloud base above ground level</td>
<td>3,000 feet</td>
<td>11,500 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum cloud</td>
<td>6/10</td>
<td>10/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum wind at ground level</td>
<td>20 m.p.h.</td>
<td>20 m.p.h. (if airborne forces are used by day)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum moon

5 days each side of full.

Moon 20° above horizon.

b. If high level bombing is abandoned, the cloud conditions by day are then limited by the requirements of the fighter cover over shipping and beaches. These are 10/10 at not less than 5,000 feet.

c. The chances of obtaining these conditions are not yet available, but it is evident that they will lengthen the odds against launching the assault to some extent, although settled summer weather suitable for the landing will most probably be suitable for the air operations.

MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP PERIOD

6. COSSAC has stated that, making full use of every captured port, large and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over the beaches during the first month of the operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number rapidly diminishing to nil during the third month. It is believed that the use of MULBERRIES will approximately halve this commitment for beach maintenance. Therefore, during this period there will be at first a considerable, and later a gradually diminishing dependence on fine weather conditions. In assessing suitable weather for carrying out beach maintenance any day with wind of not more than Force 3 on shore and not more than Force 4 off shore has been accepted. In the OVERLORD area the average number of suitable days per month is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Suitable Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>24½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

239
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>23½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>18½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent from the above figures that a marked deterioration does not occur until October. Although the months of October, November, and December appear to provide a reasonable number of quiet days, it is considered that this proportion cannot be fully relied on owing to the severe weather which may occur during unsuitable days, thereby producing conditions of sea or swell which will render beach maintenance impracticable on the subsequent quiet day or days.

7. It is impossible to calculate what loss in expectation of suitable maintenance days can be accepted by COSSAC during the second and third months of the beach maintenance period without a very intimate knowledge of his maintenance and build-up plan; but it would appear that weather should be suitable for sufficient beach maintenance at least up to the end of September and possibly, in view of the dwindling commitment in this respect, up to the middle or end of October.

**CONCLUSION**

8. It is not possible to submit a firm recommendation on this subject, but from the limited facts available for this brief examination, there does not appear to be any overriding reason why the assault could not be carried out up to about the middle of July.

9. This means that the target date should be in the middle of June to allow for a postponement of 24 days in case weather conditions are unsuitable.

10. Thus if the target date is mid-June and the air lift is not sacrificed, only two periods of four or five days when Moon and Tide conditions are suitable will occur in 1944; and these must coincide with a four day spell of fine weather.
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

References:
CCS 128th Meeting, Item 6
CCS 129th Meeting, Items 5 and 7
CCS 130th Meeting, Item 1
CCS 131st Meeting, Item 1
CCS 132d Meeting
CCS 138th Meeting, Item 8
1st Plenary Meeting

At their 130th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff invited Admiral Mountbatten to prepare a list of the points with regard to operations in the Southeast Asia Command on which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence should be obtained before his departure from SEXTANT. CCS 411 circulated the draft prepared by Admiral Mountbatten 25 November 1943. Amendments proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were circulated as CCS 411/1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 131st Meeting approved the memorandum as amended (subsequently circulated as CCS. 411/2).

CCS 411/3 and 411/4 circulated memoranda by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Southeast Asia Command proposing an amendment to paragraph 4, CCS. 411/2, also stating that it is understood that CCS. 411/2 was explained to the Generalissimo but not handed to him.

CCS. 411/5, 7 December, circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff suggesting a solution to the proposal contained in CCS. 411/3 and 411/4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 138th Meeting, accepted CCS. 411/5.
The enclosure, a list of points with regard to operations in the Southeast Asia Command on which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s concurrence is to be sought, was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting and is circulated herewith for information.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.

1. Since the transport air plan may be accepted.

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4. The to divert no of this flig the "hump" gencies of port Comm and increa by the late

5. The Chinese-f command when he tv

6. It monsoon which wi
POINTS ON WHICH GENERALISSIMO’S AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINED

1. Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff are unable to find the 535 additional transport aircraft which are required for the Mandalay plan, it is agreed that the plan presented by Admiral Mountbatten at the First Plenary Session shall be accepted.

2. The stipulation which the Generalissimo has made that an amphibious operation is to be carried out in March is noted, and will be taken into consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when amphibious operations in all parts of the world are reviewed in about a week’s time. Meanwhile preparations are being pushed forward in the Southeast Asia Theater for an amphibious operation to meet this date, should approval be subsequently given.

3. A fleet of adequate strength to cover such an operation and to obtain command of the Bay of Bengal will be assembled by the beginning of March.

4. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, will be authorized to divert not more than an average of 1,100 tons per month from tonnage over the “hump” to the requirements of the Burma campaign. Diversions in excess of this figure may be made by him only to meet sudden and critical emergencies of the battle or by permission of the highest authority. The Air Transport Command will use its utmost energy to raise the efficiency of its operation and increase the “hump” tonnage to a full 10,000 tons per month into China by the late winter and a further increase in the spring.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is delegating his command over the Chinese-American Task Force starting from Ledo to Lieutenant General Slim, commanding the 14th British Army, until the main body reaches Kamaing, when he will place the force under the command of Lieutenant General Stilwell.

6. It is the intention to resume the offensive in October 1944, when the monsoon stops; it is, however, too far ahead to decide the precise resources which will be available.
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In order to settle the question of tonnage lift to China versus availability of aircraft from A.T.C. India-China Wing, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the following in lieu of the solution recommended in C.C.S. 411/4, Sextant, 5 December 1943:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize the principle that the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command must have control over resources allocated to him for the accomplishment of the assigned objectives.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also recognize the necessity of firm commitments of tonnage over the “hump” into China during the next six months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct:

(1) That the tonnage over the “hump” be maintained on the following basis of transport plane allotments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>C-87’s</th>
<th>C-46’s</th>
<th>Tons Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>9,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>11,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9,686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) They further direct that transport plane allotments to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, for Tarzan, be on the following basis:

- 15 Dec to 31 Jan— 18 C-47’s or 12 C-46’s
- 1 Feb to 28 Feb— 11 C-47’s or 8 C-46’s
- 1 Mar to 31 Mar— 188 C-47’s or 126 C-46’s
- 1 Apr to 15 Apr— 183 C-47’s or 122 C-46’s
- 16 Apr to 15 May— 114 C-47’s or 76 C-46’s
- 16 May to 30 Jun— 43 C-47’s or 29 C-46’s
Note: The above subparagraph is based on the assumption that 35 additional C-47's will be available in the theater by 1 February. (Now allotted to the 10th Air Force)

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that any shortages in delivery of transport aircraft into the theater on present allotment bases be prorated in proportion to the allotments outlined in b (1) and (2) above. Excess in numbers of A. T. C. aircraft over the expectations outlined in (1) and (2) above will be allocated by direction of the Commanding General, U.S.A.A.F., India, during the above period.