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THE
TEHRAN CONFERENCE

28 November - 1 December

1943

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THE
TEHRAN CONFERENCE

*Minutes of the Meetings
of President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin
and Prime Minister Churchill*



*28 November - 1 December
1943*

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SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REGULAR SESSION OF THE TEHRAN MEETING

4 P.M. - NOVEMBER 28, 1943

THE PRESIDENT
MR. HOPKINS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
ADMIRAL KING
GENERAL DEANE
CAPTAIN ROYAL
MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL
SIR ALLEN BROOKE
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR CHARLES PORTAL
GENERAL ISMAY
MAJOR BIRSE

MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MARSHAL VOROSHILOV
MR. PAVLOV
MR. BEREZHKOVA

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THE PRESIDENT said as the youngest of the three present he ventured to welcome his elders. He said he wished to welcome the new members to the family circle and tell them that meetings of this character were conducted as between friends with complete frankness on all sides with nothing that was said to be made public. He added that he was confident that this meeting would be successful and that our three great nations would not only work in close cooperation for the prosecution of the war but would also remain in close touch for generations to come.

THE PRIME MINISTER then pointed out that this was the greatest concentration of power that the world had ever seen. In our hands here is the possible certainty of shortening the war, the much greater certainty of victories, but the absolute certainty that we held the happy future of mankind. He added that he prayed that we might be worthy of this God-given opportunity.

MARSHAL STALIN welcomed the representatives of Great Britain and the United States. He then said that history had given to us here a great opportunity and it was up to the representatives here to use wisely the power which their respective peoples had given to them and to take full advantage of this fraternal meeting.

THE PRESIDENT then gave a general survey of the war as a whole and the needs of the war from the American point of view. Before turning to the war in the Pacific, The President said he desired to emphasize that the United States shared equally with the Soviet Union and Great Britain the desire to hasten in every way possible the day of victory. He then said that the United States was more directly effected by the war in the Pacific and that the United States forces were bearing the chief burden in that theater with, of course, help from Australian and British forces in that area; the greater part of the U.S. naval establishment was in the Pacific and over a million men were being maintained there. He pointed out as evidence of the immense distances in the Pacific that one supply ship operating from the United States could only make three round trips a year. The allied strategy in the Pacific was based on the doctrine of attrition which was proving successful. We were sinking more Japanese tonnage than the Japanese were able to replace. He said that the allies were moving forward through the southern islands and now through the islands to the east of Japan. On the north little more could be done due to the distance between the Aleutian and Kurile islands. On the west our one great objective was to keep China in the war, and for this purpose an expedition was in preparation to attack through North Burma and from Yunan province. In this operation Anglo-British forces would operate in North Burma and Chinese forces from Yunan. The entire operation would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten. In addition, amphibious operations were planned south of Burma to attack the important Japanese bases and lines of communication in the vicinity of Bangkok. The President pointed out that although these operations extended over vast expanses of territory the number of ships and men allocated for the purpose were being held down to a minimum. He summed up the aims of these operations as follows: (1) to open the road to China and supply that country in order to keep it in the war, and (2), by opening the road to China and through increased use of transport planes to put ourselves in position to bomb Japan proper.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would turn to the most important theater of the war -- Europe. He said he wished to emphasize that for over one year and a half in the last two or three conferences which he had had with the Prime Minister all military plans had involved around the question of relieving the German pressure on the Soviet front; that largely because of the difficulties of sea transport it had not been possible until Quebec to set a date for the cross-channel operations. He pointed out that the English channel was a disagreeable body of water and it was unsafe for military operations prior to the month of May, and that the plan adopted at Quebec involved an immense expedition and had been set at that time for May 1, 1944.

THE PRIME MINISTER interposed and remarked that the British had every reason to be thankful that the English channel was such a disagreeable body of water.

THE PRESIDENT then said that one of the questions to be considered here was what use could be made of allied forces in the Mediterranean in such a way as to bring the maximum aid to the Soviet armies on the Eastern front. He added that some of these possibilities might involve a delay of one, two or three months in the large cross-channel operation and that before making any decision as to future operations in the Mediterranean he and the Prime Minister had desired to ascertain the views of Marshal Stalin on this point. He pointed out that among the possible points of future operation in the Mediterranean were Italy, the Adriatic and Aegean seas and Turkey. In conclusion The President emphasized the fact that in his opinion the large cross-channel operation should not be delayed by secondary operations.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that in regard to the Pacific war the Soviet Government welcomed the successes of the Anglo-American forces against the Japanese; that up to the present to their regret they had not been able to join the effort of the Soviet Union to that of the United States and England against the Japanese because the Soviet armies were too deeply engaged in the west. He added that the Soviet forces in Siberia were sufficient for defensive purposes but would have to be increased three-fold before they would be adequate for offensive operations. Once Germany was finally defeated, it would then be possible to send the necessary reinforcements to Siberia and then we shall be able by our common front to beat Japan. Marshal Stalin then gave a brief review of military developments in the Soviet-German front since the German offensive in July. He said that the Soviet High Command had been preparing an offensive of its own but that the Germans had stolen the march on them and attacked first. Following the failure of the German offensive, the Soviet forces had passed over to the attack, and he admitted that the successes which they had achieved this summer and autumn had far exceeded their expectations as they had found the German army much weaker than they had expected. He said that at the present time there were 210 German Divisions facing the Soviet armies with six more in the process of transfer from the west. To this should be added 50 non-German Divisions (10 Hungarian, 20 Finnish, 16 to 18 Rumanian), making a total of 260 Divisions facing the Soviet armies with six more on the way. In reply to The President's question, Marshal Stalin stated that the normal battle strength of a German front line Division was from 8,000 to 9,000 but that if Auxiliary corps, supply, etc. forces were added the total strength of each Division was around 12,000. He said that last year the Soviet armies

had faced 240 Axis Divisions of which 179 were German, whereas this year they faced 260 of which 210 were German with six more on the way. He said that the Soviet Union had had 330 Divisions at the start of the summer campaign and that it was this numerical superiority over the Germans which permitted the offensive operations to develop so successively. He added, however, that the numerical superiority was gradually being evened up. He said one of the great difficulties encountered by the Soviet armies in advancing was the question of supply since the Germans destroyed literally everything in their retreat. He mentioned that although the initiative on the front as a whole remained in Soviet hands, the offensive because of weather conditions had slowed down in those sectors. In fact, in the sector south and southwest of Kiev the German counter-offensive had recaptured the town of Zhitomir and would probably recapture Korosten in the near future. He said the Germans were using for this counter-attack three old and five new tank Divisions and twenty to twenty-three motorized infantry Divisions in an attempt to retake Kiev.

MARSHAL STALIN then turned to the allied operations in Italy. He said that from their point of view the great value of the Italian campaign was the freeing of the Mediterranean to allied shipping but that they did not consider that Italy was a suitable place from which to attempt to attack Germany proper; that the Alps constituted an almost insuperable barrier as the famous Russian General Suvorov had discovered in his time. He added that in the opinion of the Soviet military leaders, Hitler was endeavoring to retain as many allied Divisions as possible in Italy where no decision could be reached, and that the best method in the Soviet opinion was getting at the heart of Germany with an attack through northern or northwestern France and even through southern France. He admitted that this would be a very difficult operation since the Germans would fight like devils to prevent it. Marshal Stalin went on to say that it would be helpful if Turkey would enter the war and open the way to the Balkans, but even so the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and while with Turkish participation operations there would be useful, northern France was still the best.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the United States and Great Britain had long agreed as to the necessity of the cross-channel operation and that at the present time this operation, which is known as OVERLORD, was absorbing most of our combined resources and efforts. He added that it would take a long statement of facts and figures to explain why, to our disappointment, it would be impossible to undertake this operation in 1943 but that we were determined to carry it out in the late spring or early summer of 1944. He went on to say that the operations in North Africa and Italy had been clearly recognized by both The President and himself as secondary in character but that it was the best that could be done in 1943. He said that the forces which were now in process of execution for the OVERLORD operation involved an initial assault of 16 British and 19 U.S. Divisions, a total of 35. He pointed out that the strength of the individual British and American Divisions was considerably stronger than a German Division. He said it was contemplated to put one million men on the continent of Europe in May, June and July.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked at this point that he had not meant to convey the impression that he considered the North Africa or Italian operations as secondary or belittle their significance since they were of very real value.

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THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the Marshal for his courtesy by repeating that neither he nor the President had ever considered the operations in the Mediterranean for the main cross-channel operation. He said that when the 16 British Divisions earmarked for OVERLORD had landed in France, they would be maintained by reinforcements, but that no additional British Divisions could be sent to Europe since, taking into consideration the British forces in the Middle East, India and the size of the Royal Air Force which was not idle, this would utilize all British manpower which was based on a population of only 46 million. He added that it was the United States which would send in a steady stream of necessary reinforcements for the development of OVERLORD. He added, however, that the summer of 1944 was a long way off and that following the capture of Rome, which was hoped would take place in January, 1944, it would be six months before OVERLORD would begin. He and the President had repeatedly asked themselves what could be done with forces in the Mediterranean area during this period to bring the greatest pressure to bear on the enemy and help relieve the Soviet front. He said he did not wish to have any allied forces to remain idle during this period. He admitted that some of the operations which had been discussed might involve a delay of some two months in OVERLORD. He added, however, that they are all ready to withdraw seven of the best British Divisions from the Italian theater in preparation for OVERLORD, but emphasized that the great difficulty lay in the shortage of landing craft and that this constituted a great bottleneck of all allied operations.

Reverting to the Italian theater, the Prime Minister said that the weather had been exceptionally bad in Italy and that General Alexander, who under General Eisenhower was in command of the 15th Army Group in Italy, believed that in taking Rome there was an excellent opportunity of destroying or at least mauling 10 to 15 German Divisions. There was no plan for going into the broad part of Italy subsequent to the taking of Rome, and once the great airfields in the vicinity of that city had been captured and the Pisa-Pimini line had been reached, the allied forces would be free for other operations, possibly in southern France, or an enterprise across the Adriatic.

He said that the operations of the Partisans in Yugoslavia, which had been greater and better than those of Mihilovic, opened up the prospects to the allies to send additional help to Yugoslavia, but there was no plan to send a large army to the Balkans, although through commandos and small expeditions something might be done in that area.

The Prime Minister then said that he had come to one of the largest questions we had before us, namely, the question of Turkey's entrance into the war which we should urge upon that country in the strongest possible terms. If Turkey would enter the war it would open up the Aegean sea and assure an uninterrupted supply route to Russia into the Black Sea. He mentioned that only 4 Arctic convoys to the North Russian Ports could be considered this season because of the need of escort vessels in connection with OVERLORD. He then inquired, how shall we persuade Turkey to enter the war and in what manner? Should she provide the allies with bases or should she attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany, or should she move forward or stay on the defensive on the fortified lines in Thrace. He added that Bulgaria owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for her liberation from Turkish rule.

MARSHAL STALIN interposed to remark that this liberation had taken place a long time ago.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that Turkey's entrance into the war would undoubtedly have an effect from Rumania from whom peace feelers had already been received, and also from Hungary and might well start a landslide among the satellite States. He added that the Soviet Government had special feelings and special knowledge on these questions and he would welcome their views. The Prime Minister concluded by inquiring whether any of the possible operations in the Mediterranean were of sufficient interest to the Soviet Union if these operations involved a two or three months delay in OVERLORD. He said that he and the President could not make any decision until they knew the Soviet views on the subject and therefore had drawn up no definite plans.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he had thought of a possible operation at the head of the Adriatic to make a junction with the Partisans under Tito and then to operate northeast into Rumania in conjunction with the Soviet advance from the region of Odessa.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that if we take Rome and smash up the German armies there we will have a choice of moving west or, as the President says, east in the Mediterranean, and suggested that a sub-committee be appointed to work out the details of the various possibilities.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired if the 35 Divisions which he understood were earmarked for OVERLORD would be affected in any way by the continuation of the operations in Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that they would not, since entirely separate Divisions were being used in the Italian Theater. The Prime Minister, in reply to Marshal Stalin's questions as to the relationship of the operations which he had outlined, explained that after the taking of Rome there would be available some 20 to 23 British, American, French and Polish Divisions which would be available for operations in the Mediterranean without in any way effecting the preparations for OVERLORD. He repeated that this force could either move west, or as the President suggested, to the eastern part of the Mediterranean. He said that since shipping was already allocated, any movements of effectives between OVERLORD and the Mediterranean would be very limited. He added that while the OVERLORD involved an initial assault of 35 Divisions, of which 16 would be British, the development of the operation envisioned by July 50 or 60 Allied Divisions on the continent, but repeated that the additional Divisions would come from the United States and not Great Britain. He added that the total strength of an American or British Division, including auxiliary forces, amounted to 40,000 men. He also stated that although the British and American air forces were very large and undertaking great operations, it was expected that the United States air force would be doubled or tripled within the next six months. He proposed to make available to Marshal Stalin the exact schedule of movements of supplies from the United States to Great Britain which already involved one million tons of stores.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired if Turkey entered the war would some Anglo-American forces be allocated to that area.

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THE PRIME MINISTER replied that two or three Divisions, British or British controlled, were available for the capture of the islands of the Aegean, and that as an immediate aid to Turkey it was proposed to send 20 squadrons of fighters and several anti-aircraft regiments, adding that the preparation to send these forces to Turkey were already far advanced.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion he questioned the wisdom of dispersing allied forces of the various operations mentioned such as Turkey, the Adriatic and Southern France since there would be no direct connection between these scattered forces. He said he thought it would be better to take OVERLORD as the basis for all 1944 operations; that after the capture of Rome the troops thus relieved might be sent to Southern France, and in conjunction with forces operating from Corsica might eventually meet in France the main force of OVERLORD from the north. These would be in the nature of diversionary operations to assist OVERLORD. Marshal Stalin said that he favored the operations in Southern France particularly as he thought Turkey would not enter the war. He repeated that he was convinced that Turkey would not enter the war.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that there would be 8 or 9 French Divisions, which included native Divisions, available for an operation against southern France.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that in an operation against southern France the transportation difficulties would be greatly facilitated.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with Marshal Stalin in regard to the inadvisability of scattering our forces. He pointed out that the squadrons destined for Turkey and the Divisions for the seizure of the Aegean islands were now being used for the defense of Egypt and that their use would not distract in any way from OVERLORD or the operations in Italy.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that these operations would be worthwhile only if Turkey entered the war which he again repeated he did not believe would happen.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had in mind the six months which would elapse after the expected capture of Rome before the beginning of OVERLORD, and that both he and the President were most anxious that their troops should not remain idle since if they were fighting, the British and American governments would not be exposed to the criticism that they were letting the Soviet Union bear the brunt of the war.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion OVERLORD represented a very large operation and that it would be facilitated and, in fact, would be certain of success if the invasion of southern France was undertaken some two months before OVERLORD. This would divert German troops from the northern part of France and assure the success of OVERLORD. He said that as an extreme measure he would be inclined to leave 10 Divisions in Italy and postpone the capture of Rome in order to launch the attack in southern France two months in advance of OVERLORD.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he was sure Marshal Stalin would permit him to develop arguments to demonstrate why it was necessary for the allied forces to capture Rome, otherwise it would have the appearance of a great allied defeat in Italy. He pointed out the allied forces would be no stronger before the capture of Rome than after, and in fact without the fighter cover which would be possible only from the north Italian fields it would be impossible to invade northern France. In reply to Marshal Stalin's questions regarding Corsica, the Prime Minister pointed out that there were no adequate airfields on the island.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the question relative timing was very important and that he personally felt that nothing should be done to delay the carrying out of OVERLORD which might be necessary if any operations in the eastern Mediterranean were undertaken. He proposed, therefore, that the staffs work out tomorrow morning a plan of operations for striking at southern France.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that the Russian experience had shown that an attack from one direction was not effective and that the Soviet armies now launched an offensive from two sides at once which forced the enemy to move his reserve back and forth. He added that he thought such a two way operation in France would be very successful.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he personally did not disagree with what the Marshal had said and that he did not think he had said anything here which could possibly effect adversely an operation in southern France, but he added it would be difficult for him to leave idle the British forces in the eastern Mediterranean which numbered some 20 Divisions, British controlled, which could not be used outside of that area, merely for the purpose of avoiding any insignificant delay in OVERLORD. He said that if such was the decision they would, of course, agree, but they could not wholeheartedly agree to postpone operations in the Mediterranean. He added, of course, that if Turkey does not enter the war that is the end of that, but that he personally favored some flexibility in the exact date of OVERLORD. He proposed that the matter be considered overnight and have the staffs examine the various possibilities in the morning.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that as they had not expected to discuss technical military questions he had no military staff but that Marshal Voroshilov would do his best.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated it would not be necessary to consider how far we could meet Turkey's request in the event that she agreed to enter the war.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Turkey was an ally of Great Britain and at the same time had relations of friendship with the United States and the Soviet Union who as friends could ask Turkey and indeed bring pressure to bear on her to carry out her obligations as an ally of Great Britain. He said that all Neutrals considered Belligerents to be fools and it was up to the countries represented here to show that the Neutrals were the ones that were fools and that we must prove to Turkey that if they stay out of the war on the winning side that they were indeed the fools.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought it would be an act of supreme un-wisdom if the Turks were to refuse an invitation from Russia to join the war on the winning side. He added that Christmas in England was a poor season for Turkey. When the joke had been explained to Marshal Stalin he said he regretted that he was not an Englishman.

THE PRESIDENT then stated that should he meet the President of Turkey he would, of course, do everything possible to persuade him to enter the war, but that if he were in the Turkish President's place he would demand such a price in planes, tanks and equipment that to grant the request would indefinitely postpone OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated his doubt as to Turkey's intention and said that they had in fact already replied to the suggestion that they enter the war. Although many considered this reply favorable, he personally thought it was negative in character.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that in his opinion the Turks were crazy.

MARSHAL STALIN said there were some people who apparently preferred to remain crazy.

The meeting adjourned until 4 P.M., November 29, 1943.

DINNER, NOVEMBER 28, 1943

The President
Mr. Hopkins
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Churchill
Mr. Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, EVENING NOVEMBER 28, 1943

During the first part of the dinner the conversation between the President and Marshal Stalin was general in character and dealt for the most part with a suitable place for the next meeting. Fairbanks seemed to be considered by both the most suitable spot.

MARSHAL STALIN then raised the question of the future of France. He described in considerable length the reasons why, in his opinion, France deserved no considerate treatment from the Allies and, above all, had no right to retain her former empire. He said that the entire French ruling class was rotten to the core and had delivered over France to the Germans and that, in fact, France was now actively helping our enemies. He therefore felt that it would be not only unjust but dangerous to leave in French hands any important strategic points after the war.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he in part agreed with Marshal Stalin. That was why this afternoon he had said to Marshal Stalin that it was necessary to eliminate in the future government of France anybody over forty years old and particularly anybody who had formed part of the French Government. He mentioned specifically the question of New Caledonia and Dakar, the first of which he said represented a threat to Australia and New Zealand and, therefore, should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In regard to Dakar, the President said he was speaking for twenty-one American nations when he said that Dakar in unsure hands was a direct threat to the Americas.

MR. CHURCHILL at this point intervened to say that Great Britain did not desire and did not expect to acquire any additional territory out of this war, but since the two great victorious nations - the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China - will be responsible for the future peace of the world, it was obviously necessary that certain strategic points throughout the world should be under the joint control.

MARSHAL STALIN again repeated and emphasized his view that France could not be trusted with any strategic possessions outside her own border in the post-war period. He described the ideology of the Vichy Ambassador to Moscow, Bergery, which he felt was characteristic of the majority of French politicians. This ideology definitely preferred an agreement with France's former enemy, Germany, than with her former allies, Great Britain and the United States.

The conversation then turned to the question of the treatment to be accorded Nazi Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that, in his opinion, it was very important not to leave in the German mind the concept of the Reich and that the very word should be stricken from the language.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it was not enough to eliminate the word, but the very Reich itself must be rendered impotent ever again to plunge the world into war. He said that unless the victorious Allies retained in their hands the strategic positions necessary to prevent any recrudescence of German militarism, they would have failed in their duty.

In the detailed discussion between the President, Marshal Stalin and Churchill that followed Marshal Stalin took the lead, constantly

emphasizing that the measures for the control of Germany and her disarmament were insufficient to prevent the rebirth of German militarism and appeared to favor even stronger measures. He, however, did not specify what he actually had in mind except that he appeared to favor the dismemberment of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN particularly mentioned that Poland should extend to the Oder and stated definitely that the Russians would help the Poles to obtain a frontier on the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would be interested in the question of assuring the approaches to the Baltic Sea and had in mind some form of trusteeship with perhaps an international state in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal to insure free navigation in both directions through the approaches. Due to some error of the Soviet translator Marshal Stalin apparently thought that the President was referring to the question of the Baltic States. On the basis of this understanding, he replied categorically that the Baltic States had by an expression of the will of the people voted to join the Soviet Union and that this question was not therefore one for discussion. Following the clearing up of the misapprehension, he, however, expressed himself favorably in regard to the question of insuring free navigation to and from the Baltic Sea.

THE PRESIDENT, returning to the question of certain outlying possessions, said he was interested in the possibility of a sovereignty fashioned in a collective body such as the United Nations; a concept which had never been developed in past history.

After dinner when the President had retired, the conversation continued between Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill. The subject was still the treatment to be accorded to Germany, and even more than during dinner Marshal Stalin appeared to favor the strongest possible measures against Germany.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he advocated that Germany be permitted no aviation of any character - neither military or civilian - and in addition that the German general staff system should be completely abolished. He proposed a number of other measures of control such as constant supervision over such industries as might be left to Germany and territorial dismemberment of the Reich.

MARSHAL STALIN to all of these considerations expressed doubt as to whether they would be effective. He said that any furniture factories could be transformed into airplane factories and any watch factories could make fuzes for shells. He said, in his opinion, the Germans were very able and talented people and could easily revive within fifteen or twenty years and again become a threat to the world. He said that he had personally questioned German prisoners in the Soviet Union as to why they had burst into Russians homes, killed Russian women, etc., and that the only reply he had received was they had been ordered to do so.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he could not look more than fifty years ahead and that he felt that upon the three nations represented here at Teheran rested the grave responsibility of future measures of assuring in some manner or other that Germany would not again rise to plague the world during the period. He said that he felt it was largely the fault of the German leaders and that, while during war time no distinction could be made between the leaders and the people particularly in regard to Germany, nevertheless, with a generation of self-sacrificing, toil and education, something might be done with the German people.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed dissent with this and did not appear satisfied as to the efficacy of any of the measures proposed by Mr. Churchill.

MR. CHURCHILL then inquired whether it would be possible this evening to discuss the question of Poland. He said that Great Britain had gone to war with Germany because of the latter's invasion of Poland in 1939 and that the British Government was committed to the reestablishment of a strong and independent Poland but not to any specific Polish frontiers. He added that if Marshal Stalin felt any desire to discuss the question of Poland, that he was prepared to do so and he was sure that the President was similarly disposed.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had not yet felt the necessity nor the desirability of discussing the Polish question (After an exchange of remarks on this subject from which it developed that the Marshal had in mind that nothing that the Prime Minister had said on the subject of Poland up to the present stimulated him to discuss the question, the conversation returned to the substance of the Polish question).

MR. CHURCHILL said that he personally had no attachment to any specific frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union; that he felt that the consideration of Soviet security on their western frontiers was a governing factor. He repeated, however, that the British Government considered themselves committed to the reestablishment of an independent and strong Poland which he felt a necessary instrument in the European orchestra.

MR. EDEN then inquired if he had understood the Marshal correctly at dinner when the latter said that the Soviet Union favored the Polish western frontier on the Oder.

MARSHAL STALIN replied emphatically that he did favor such a frontier for Poland and repeated that the Russians were prepared to help the Poles achieve it.

MR. CHURCHILL then remarked that it would be very valuable if here in Teheran the representatives of the three governments could work out some agreed understanding on the question of the Polish frontiers which could then be taken up with the Polish Government in London. He said that, as far as he was concerned, he would like to see Poland moved westward in the same manner as soldiers at drill execute the drill "left close" and illustrated his point with three matches representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that it would be a good idea to reach an understanding on this question but said it was necessary to look into the matter further.

The conversation broke up on this note.

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Conference - November 29, 1943

The President
Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Stalin
Mr. Bereshkov

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Memorandum on Conference, November 29, 1943

THE PRESIDENT opened the conference by saying that he wished to lend to Marshal Stalin a most interesting report from an American Army officer who had spent six months in Yugoslavia in close contact with Tito. This officer had the highest respect for Tito and the work he was doing in our common cause.

MARSHAL STALIN thanked the President and promised to return the report when he had read it.

THE PRESIDENT then said that during the Moscow Conference, the American Delegation had introduced a proposal to make available to the United States Air Forces, air bases in the USSR for the primary purpose of the shuttle-bombing between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. He handed Marshal Stalin a memorandum on the subject and expressed the personal hope that the Marshal would give this project his support. He then said that this was of great future importance and he wished to tell the Marshal how happy he would be to hear his word in the conference in regard to the defeat of Japanese forces and victory over Germany. He said however, that we must be prepared for that eventuality and do some advance planning, and he therefore was giving the Marshal two papers ^{one} on the air operations against Japan and the other relating to naval operations. In handing these papers to Marshal Stalin, the President emphasized that the entire matter would be held in the strictest security and any contacts between Soviet and American officers on the subject would be strictly secret.

MARSHAL STALIN promised to study the documents the President had given him.

THE PRESIDENT then said he had a great many other matters relating to the future of the world which he would like to talk over informally with the Marshal and obtain his view on them. He said that he hoped to discuss some of them before they both left Tehran. He said that he was willing to discuss any subject military or political which the Marshal desired.

MARSHAL STALIN replied there was nothing to prevent them from discussing anything they wished.

THE PRESIDENT then said the question of a post war organization to preserve peace had not been fully explained and dealt with and he would like to discuss with the Marshal the prospect of some organization based on the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT then outlined the following general plan:

(1) There would be a large organization composed of some 35 members of the United Nations which would meet periodically at different places, discuss and make recommendations to a smaller body.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this organization was to be world wide or European, to which the President replied, world-wide.

THE PRESIDENT continued that there would be set up an executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and China, together with two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, one Far Eastern country, and one British Dominion. He mentioned that Mr. Churchill did not like this proposal for the reason that the British Empire only had two votes. This Executive Committee would deal with all non-military questions such as agriculture, food, health, and economic questions, as well as the setting up of an International Committee. This Committee would likewise meet in various places.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this body would have the right to make decisions binding on the nations of the world.

THE PRESIDENT replied, yes and no. It could make recommendations for settling disputes with the hope that the nations concerned would be guided thereby, but that, for example, he did not believe the Congress of the United States would accept as binding a decision of such a body. The President then turned to the third organization which he termed "The Four Policemen," namely, the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China. This organization would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action. He went on to say that in 1935, when Italy attacked Ethiopia, the only machinery in existence was the League of Nations.

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He personally had begged France to close the Suez Canal, but they instead referred it to the League which disputed the question and in the end did nothing. The result was that the Italian Armies went through the Suez Canal and destroyed Ethiopia. The President pointed out that had the machinery of the Four Policemen, which he had in mind, been in existence, it would have been possible to close the Suez Canal. The President then summarized briefly the idea that he had in mind.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not think that the small nations of Europe would like the organization composed of the Four Policemen. He said, for example, that a European state would probably resent China having the right to apply certain machinery to it. And in any event, he did not think China would be very powerful at the end of the war. He suggested as a possible alternative, the creation of a European or a Far Eastern Committee and a European or a Worldwide organization. He said that in the European Commission there would be the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and possibly one other European state.

THE PRESIDENT said that the idea just expressed by Marshal Stalin was somewhat similar to Mr. Churchill's idea of a Regional Committee, one for Europe, one for the Far East, and one for the Americas.

MR. CHURCHILL had also suggested that the United States be a member of the European Commission, but he doubted if the United States Congress would agree to the United States' participation in an exclusively European Committee which might be able to force the dispatch of American troops to Europe.

THE PRESIDENT added that it would take a terrible crisis such as at present before Congress would ever agree to that step.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that the world organization suggested by the President, and in particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to Europe.

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THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he had only envisaged the sending of American planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to handle the land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace. He went on to say that if the Japanese had not attacked the United States he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe. The President added that he saw two methods of dealing with possible threats to the peace. In one case if the threat rose from a revolution or developments in a small country, it might be possible to apply the quarantine method, closing the frontiers of the countries in question and imposing embargoes. In the second case, if the threat was more serious, the four powers, acting as policemen, would send an ultimatum to the nation in question and if refused, would result in the immediate bombardment and possible invasion of that country.

MARSHAL STALIN said that yesterday he had discussed the question of safeguarding against Germany with Mr. Churchill and found him optimistic on the subject in that Mr. Churchill believed that Germany would not rise again. He, Stalin, personally thought that unless prevented, Germany would completely recover within 15 to 20 years, and that therefore we must have something more serious than the type of organization proposed by the President. He pointed out that the first German aggression had occurred in 1870 and then 42 years later in the 1st World War, whereas only 21 years elapsed between the end of the last war and the beginning of the present. He added that he did not believe the period between the revival of German strength would be any longer in the future and therefore he did not consider the organizations outlined by the President were enough.

He went on to say that what was needed was the control of certain strong physical points either within Germany along German borders, or even farther away, to insure that Germany would not embark on another course of aggression. He mentioned specifically Dakar as one of those points. He added that the same method should be applied in the case of Japan and that the islands in the vicinity of Japan should remain under strong control to prevent Japan's embarking on a course of aggression.

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He stated that any commission or body which was set up to preserve peace should have the right to not only make decisions but to occupy such strong points against Germany and Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed 100% with Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN then stated he still was dubious about the question of Chinese participation.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had insisted on the participation of China in the 4 Power Declaration at Moscow not because he did not realize the weakness of China at present, but he was thinking farther into the future and that after all China was a nation of 400 million people, and it was better to have them as friends rather than as a potential source of trouble.

The President, reverting to Marshal Stalin's statements as to the ease of converting factories, said that a strong and effective world organization of the 4 Powers could move swiftly when the first signs arose of the beginning of the conversion of such factories for warlike purposes.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Germans had shown great ability to conceal such beginnings.

THE PRESIDENT accepted Marshal Stalin's remark. He again expressed his agreement with Marshal Stalin that strategic positions in the world should be at the disposal of some world organization to prevent a revival of German and Japanese aggression.

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PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY UNITED STATES DELEGATION AT
MOSCOW CONFERENCE

During the recent Moscow Conference the United States Delegation proposed that air bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired and rearmed in connection with shuttle bombing from the United Kingdom. It was also proposed that a more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented and that both signal and air communication between our two countries be improved.

It was my understanding that the U.S.S.R. agreed to these proposals in principal and that appropriate Soviet authorities would be given instructions to meet with my Military Mission for the purpose of considering concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out the proposals.

I hope that it will be possible to work out these arrangements promptly.

November 29, 1943.

*Printed in FRUS, Conferences
at Cairo & Tehran, 617-618.*

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Printed in FRUS,
Conferences at Cairo,
& Tehran, 618-619

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

With a view of shortening the war, it is our opinion that the bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately following the beginning of hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, will be of the utmost importance, as it will enable us to destroy Japanese military and industrial centers.

If agreeable, would you arrange for my Military Mission in Moscow to be given the necessary information covering airports, housing, supplies, communications, and weather in the Maritime Provinces and the route thereto from Alaska. Our objective is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 100 to 1,000 four-engined bombers, with their maintenance and operating crews in that area; the number to depend upon facilities available.

It is of the utmost importance that planning to this end should be started at once. I realize that the physical surveys by our people should be limited at this time to a very few individuals and accomplished with the utmost secrecy. We would of course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard.

If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced that the time of employment of our bombers against Japan will be materially advanced.

November 29, 1943.

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Printed in FRUS, Con-
ferences at Cairo & Tehran, 619

Advance Planning for Naval Operations in Northwestern Pacific

I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange of information and for such preliminary planning as may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated from the war. The more of this preliminary planning that can be done, without undue jeopardy to the situation, the sooner the war as a whole can be brought to a conclusion.

Specifically, I have in mind the following items:

a. We would be glad to receive combat intelligence information concerning Japan.

b. Considering that the ports for your Far Eastern submarine and destroyer force might be threatened seriously by land or air attack, do you feel it desirable that the United States should expand base facilities sufficiently to provide for these forces in U. S. bases?

c. What direct or indirect assistance would you be able to give in the event of a U. S. attack against the northern Kuriles?

d. Could you indicate what ports, if any, our forces could use, and could you furnish data on these ports in regard to their naval use as well as port capacities for dispatch of cargo?

These questions can be discussed as you may find appropriate with our Military Mission in Moscow, similar to the procedure suggested for plans regarding air operations.

November 29, 1943

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SUMMARY OF THE SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE TEHRAN MEETING

4 P.M. - NOVEMBER 29, 1943

THE PRESIDENT
MR. HOPKINS
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL LEAHY
ADMIRAL KING
GENERAL ARNOLD
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
GENERAL DEANE
CAPTAIN ROYAL
CAPTAIN WARE
MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL
GENERAL SIR ALLEN BROOKE
ADMIRAL SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM
AIR MARSHAL SIR CHARLES PORTAL
SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR
LT. GENERAL SIR HASTINGS ISMAY
GENERAL MARTEL
MAJOR BIRSE

MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MARSHAL VOROSHILOV
MR. PAVLOV
MR. BEREZHKOVA

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at Cairo & Tehran, 533-540

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THE PRESIDENT said that since there was no agenda for the conference he thought it would be a good idea to have a report from the military staffs who had met this morning, and if there was no objection they might hear from General Brooke, Marshal Voroshilov and General Marshall.

GENERAL BROOKE said that the committee had not finished its work and had merely made a survey of the various operations mentioned, and had also examined the operation OVERLORD, taking into account the period of time which must elapse before OVERLORD was put into effect. He said that the committee considered the fact that if active operations were not undertaken in the Mediterranean during this period it would provide the Germans with an opportunity to remove their forces from that area either for the Soviet front or for the defense against OVERLORD. The committee also examined the advantages of continuing the operations up the leg of Italy until they had brought the Germans to a decisive battle. The committee briefly reviewed the question of providing the Partisans in Yugoslavia with aid and supplies in order to assist them in containing German forces. The advantages of Turkey's participation in the war from the point of view of opening up the Dardenelles, the supply route to Russia and its effect on the Balkans was also considered. The possibility of an operation in southern France in connection with OVERLORD was also briefly discussed. The effect of the air attacks on Germany was outlined to the committee by Air Marshal Portal, and General Marshall provided the figures of the United States build-up in England, and General Brooke himself had described the change-over from the defense to offensive preparations in England. General Brooke concluded that Marshal Voroshilov had put forth a number of questions and had received answers.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had little to add to what General Brooke had said and he did not intend to go into any detail. He said that the chief problems were landing craft and suitable airfields to afford fighter protection for any operation. He emphasized that the question of adequate landing craft came first in importance, and added that by landing craft he meant those capable of carrying 40 tanks. He said that he had endeavored to make clear to the committee the manner in which preparations for OVERLORD were proceeding; that the flow of troops from the United States were on schedule and that one million tons of material had already been shipped to England. He repeated that the variable factor was production of landing craft and that the schedule of production had been stepped up. He said that some veteran divisions had already been transferred from the Italian theater to England.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOV said that the answers which he had received to his questions at the committee meeting had been confirmed here at the conference by General Brooke and General Marshall. He added that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey mentioned by General Brooke had not been considered in detail.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired who will command OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT replied that it had not yet been decided.

MARSHAL STALIN said that nothing would come out of the operation unless one man was made responsible not only for the preparation but for the execution of the operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Morgan had been in charge of the preparatory work for some time but that the actual Commander had not yet been appointed. He said the British Government was willing to have a United States General in command in view of the fact that from the United States would come the bulk of the troops, and that possibly the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean would be a British General. He suggested that the question of who should command OVERLORD had best be discussed between the three of them rather than in the large meeting.

THE PRESIDENT said that the decisions taken here will affect the choice of the particular officer to command OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that the Russians do not expect to have a voice in the selection of the Commander-in-Chief; they merely want to know who he is to be and to have him appointed as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed agreement and said that he thought the appointment could be announced within a fortnight. He then went on to say that he was a little concerned at the number and complexity of the problems which were before the conference. He said many hundreds of millions of people are watching this conference, and he hoped that it would not break up until an agreement had been reached on big military, political and moral questions. He said that the British Staff and himself had given prolonged thought to the Mediterranean theater and that they were most anxious to have the armies there fight against the enemy and not have them stripped of essential elements. He stated that their Soviet allies had now had an opportunity to survey the scene and that he would appreciate learning their views as to the best which could be made of the British forces in the Mediterranean area. He said the question of what help could be given from the Mediterranean theater to OVERLORD and the scale and timing of such help was of great importance. The operation into southern France from northern Italy had been mentioned but not studied and should, therefore, be explored more fully between the United States and British Staffs. Mr. Churchill said that Marshal Stalin had correctly stressed the value of pincers movement but that the time element was important and a premature subsidiary attack might be wiped out. He went on to say that personally all he wanted was landing craft for two divisions in the Mediterranean and that with such a force many operations would be feasible, for example, it could be used to facilitate the operations in Italy or to take the island of Rhodes if Turkey will enter the war, and could be used for these purposes for at least six months and then employed in support of OVERLORD. He pointed out that this force of landing craft could not be supplied for the forces in the Mediterranean without either delaying OVERLORD six to eight weeks or without withdrawing forces from the Indian theater.

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That is the dilemma. He said he would appreciate the views of Marshal Stalin and his military aides on the general strategy. The Prime Minister continued that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey were more political than military. He said that there are now in the Balkans 21 German Divisions and 21 Bulgarian Divisions, a total of 42. He added that there were 54,000 Germans scattered around the Aegean islands which would be an easy prey. If Turkey came in, the nine Bulgarian Divisions from Yugoslavia and Greece would be withdrawn, thus endangering the remaining German Divisions. No important operations were envisaged for the Balkans but merely supply and commando raids to assist Tito and his forces to contain the German forces there. Mr. Churchill added that Great Britain had no ambitious interests in the Balkans but merely wanted to pin down the German Divisions there. With regard to Turkey Mr. Churchill said that the British Government as allies of Turkey had accepted the responsibility to persuade or force Turkey to enter the war. He would need, and he hoped to obtain, help from the President and Marshal Stalin in his task in accordance with the agreement reached at Moscow. He added that the British Government would go far in pointing out to the Turks that their failure to respond to the invitation of our three great powers would have very serious political and territorial consequences for Turkey particularly in regard to the future status of the Straits. He said this morning the military committee had discussed briefly the question of aid to Turkey, but it appeared to be more political than military, and there was no thought of using a major army, and that at the most two Divisions apart from the air and anti-aircraft forces would be sent to Turkey. Mr. Churchill proposed that the two foreign secretaries and the representative of the President meet to discuss the political aspects of the Turkish question as well as other political questions involving the Balkans area. Mr. Churchill said that he had asked some questions yesterday regarding Bulgaria, in particular if Bulgaria attacked Turkey would the Soviet Government consider Bulgaria as a foe. The Prime Minister concluded that if Turkey declared war on Germany it would be a terribly blow to German morale, would neutralize Bulgaria and would directly effect Rumania which even now was seeking someone to surrender unconditionally to. Hungary likewise would be immediately effected. He said that now is the time to reap the crop if we will pay the small price of the reaping. He summed up the task before the conference as: (1) to survey the whole field of the Mediterranean, and (2), how to relieve Russia, and (3), how to help OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Mr. Churchill need have no worry about the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria; that if Turkey entered the war the Soviet Union would go to war with Bulgaria, but even so he did not think Turkey would come in. He continued that there was no difference of opinion as to the importance of helping the Partisans, but that he must say that from the Russian point of view the question of Turkey, the Partisans and even the occupation of Rome were not really important operations. He said that OVERLORD was the most important and nothing should be done to distract attention from that operation. He felt that a directive should be given to the military staffs, and proposed the following one:

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(1). In order that Russian help might be given from the east to the execution of OVERLORD, a date should be set and the operation should not be postponed. (2). If possible the attack in southern France should precede OVERLORD by two months, but if that is impossible, then simultaneously or even a little after OVERLORD. An operation in southern France would be a supporting operation as contrasted with diversionary operations in Rome or in the Balkans, and would assure the success of OVERLORD. (3). The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for OVERLORD as soon as possible. Until that is done the OVERLORD operation cannot be considered as really in progress. Marshal Stalin added that the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief was the business of the President and Mr. Churchill but that it would be advantageous to have the appointment made here.

THE PRESIDENT then said he had been most interested in hearing the various angles discussed from OVERLORD to Turkey. He attached great importance to the question of logistics and timing. He said it is clear that we are all agreed as to the importance of OVERLORD and the only question was one of when. He said the question was whether to carry out OVERLORD at the appointed time or possibly postpone it for the sake of other operations in the Mediterranean. He felt that the danger of an expedition in the eastern Mediterranean might be that if not immediately successful it might draw away effectives which would delay OVERLORD. He said that in regard to the Balkans, the Partisans and other questions are pinning down some 40 Axis Divisions and it was therefore his thought that supplies and commando raids be increased to that area to insure these Divisions remaining there. The President then said he was in favor of adhering to the original date for OVERLORD set at Quebec, namely, the first part of May.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to see OVERLORD undertaken during the month of May; that he did not care whether it was the 1st, 15th or 20th, but that a definite date was important.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it did not appear that the points of view were as far apart as it seemed. The British Government was anxious to begin OVERLORD as soon as possible but did not desire to neglect the great possibilities in the Mediterranean merely for the sake of avoiding a delay of a month or two.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the operations in the Mediterranean have a value but they are really only diversions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said in the British view the large British forces in the Mediterranean should not stand idle but should be pressing the enemy with vigor. He added that to break off the campaign in Italy where the allied forces were holding a German army would be impossible.

MARSHAL STALIN said it looked as though Mr. Churchill thought that the Russians were suggesting that the British armies do nothing.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that if landing craft is taken from the Mediterranean theater there will be no action. He added that at Moscow the conditions under which the British Government considered OVERLORD could be launched had been fully explained, and these were that there should not be more than 12 mobile German divisions behind the coastal troops and that German reinforcements for sixty days should not exceed 15 Divisions. He added that to fulfill these conditions it was necessary in the intervening period to press the enemy from all directions. He said that the Divisions now facing the allies in Italy had come from the most part in France, and to break off the action in Italy would only mean that they would return to France to oppose OVERLORD. Turning again to the question of Turkey, the Prime Minister said that all were agreed on the question of Turkey's entrance into the war. If she refused, then that was the end of it. If she does enter, the military needs will be slight, and it will give us the use of Turkish bases in Anatolia, and the taking of the island of Rhodes which he felt could be done with one assault Division. Once Rhodes was taken the other Aegean islands could be starved out and the way opened to the Dardanelles. Mr. Churchill pointed out that the operation against Rhodes was a limited operation and would not absorb more effectives, and that in any case the troops for this purpose would come from those now used for the defense of Egypt. Once Rhodes was taken these forces from Egypt could proceed forward against the enemy. All he wanted was a small quantity of landing craft. He then said that he accepted Marshal Stalin's suggestion that terms of reference be drawn up for the military staffs.

MARSHAL STALIN interposed to ask how many French Divisions were being trained in North Africa.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that for the present there were five Divisions ready and four in training, and that one of these five was in Italy with the American Fifth Army and another was enroute. He said that from the battle experience gained it would be possible to decide how best to utilize the other French Divisions.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that instead of three directives to the three Staffs that one directive be agreed upon here. He then proposed a joint directive as follows: (1). That the military staffs should assume that OVERLORD is the dominating operation. (2). That the Staffs make recommendations in regard to other operations in the Mediterranean area, having carefully in mind the possibility of causing a delay in OVERLORD.

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MARSHAL STALIN said he saw no need for any military committee here, that the questions involved should be decided at the conference. He also saw no need for any political sub-committee. Marshal Stalin then said he wished to ask Mr. Churchill an indiscreet question, namely, do the British really believe in OVERLORD or are they only saying so to reassure the Russians.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that if the conditions set forth at Moscow were present it was the duty of the British Government to hurl every scrap of strength across the channel. He then suggested that the British and American Staffs meet tomorrow morning in an endeavor to work out a joint point of view to be submitted to the conference. It was further agreed that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister would lunch together at 1:30, and that Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins would likewise lunch together separately.

The meeting adjourned until 4 P.M., November 30, 1943.

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Dinner, November 29, 1943, 8:30 PM

The President
Mr. Hopkins
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Bereznev

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Birse

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at Cairo & Tehran, 553-555

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Dinner, November 22, 1943, 8:30 PM

The most notable feature of the dinner was the attitude of Marshal Stalin toward the Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin lost no opportunity to get in a dig at Mr. Churchill. Almost every remark that he addressed to the Prime Minister contained some sharp edge, although the Marshal's manner was entirely friendly. He apparently desired to put and keep the Prime Minister on the defensive. At one occasion he told the Prime Minister that just because Russians are simple people, it was a mistake to believe that they were blind and could not see what was before their eyes.

In the discussion in regard to future treatment of Germans, Marshal Stalin strongly implied on several occasions that Mr. Churchill nursed a secret affection for Germany and desired to see a soft peace.

Marshal Stalin was obviously teasing the Prime Minister for the latter's attitude at the afternoon session of the Conference, he was also making known in a friendly fashion his displeasure at the British attitude on the question of Overlord.

Following Mr. Hopkin's toast to the Red Army, MARSHAL STALIN spoke with great frankness in regard to the past and present capacity of the Red Army. He said that in the winter war against Finland, the Soviet Army had shown itself to be very poorly organized and had done very badly; that as a result of the Finnish War, the entire Soviet Army had been re-organized; but even so, when the Germans attacked in 1941, it could not be said that the Red Army was a first class fighting force. That during the war with Germany, the Red Army had become steadily better from point of view of operations, tactics, etc., and now he felt that it was genuinely a good army. He added that the general opinion in regard to the Red Army had been wrong, because it was not believed that the Soviet Army could re-organize and improve itself during time of war.

In regard to the future treatment of Germany, Marshal Stalin developed the thesis that he had previously expressed, namely, that really effective measures to control Germany must be evolved, otherwise, Germany would rise again within 15 or 20 years to plunge the world into another war. He said that two conditions must be met:

- (1) At least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated.
- (2) The victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

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Marshal Stalin added that similar strong points now in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies.

THE PRESIDENT jokingly said that he would put the figure of the German Commanding Staff which should be executed at 49,000 or more.

THE PRIME MINISTER took strong exception to what he termed the cold blooded execution of soldiers who had fought for their country. He said that war criminals must pay for their crimes and individuals who had committed barbarous acts, and in accordance with the Moscow Document, which he himself had written, they must stand trial at the places where the crimes were committed. He objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.

MARSHAL STALIN, during this part of the conversation, continuously referred to Mr. Churchill's secret liking for the Germans.

With reference to the occupation of bases and strong points in the vicinity of Germany and Japan, THE PRESIDENT said those bases must be held under trusteeship.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that as far as Britain was concerned, they do not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but intended to hold on to what they had. He said that nothing would be taken away from England without a war. He mentioned specifically, Singapore and Hong Kong. He said a portion of the British Empire might eventually be released but that this would be done entirely by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral precepts. He said that Great Britain, if asked to do so, might occupy certain bases under trustee-ship, provided others would help pay the cost of such occupation.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that England had fought well in the war and he, personally, favored an increase in the British Empire, particularly the area around Gibraltar. He also suggested that Great Britain and the United States install more suitable government in Spain and Portugal, since he was convinced that Franco was no friend of Great Britain or the United States. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what territorial interests the Soviet Union had, Marshal Stalin replied, "there is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak."

Although the discussion between Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister remained friendly, the arguments were lively and Stalin did not let up on the Prime Minister through the entire evening.

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LUNCHEON
November 30, 1943
1:30 p.m.

The President
Mr. Bohlen

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Bereszkov

The Prime Minister
Major Birse

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at Cairo + Tehran, 565-568

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LUNCHEON
November 30, 1943
1:30 p.m.

Before luncheon, at the Prime Minister's request, the President read to Marshal Stalin the recommendations of the combined British and American Staffs, which had been approved by himself and the Prime Minister.

MARSHAL STALIN had expressed his great satisfaction with this decision. He added that the Red Army would at the same time undertake offensive operations, and would demonstrate by its actions the value it placed on this decision. He asked when the Commander in Chief would be named.

THE PRESIDENT said he had to consult with his Staff, but that he was sure that the Commander in Chief would be named in three or four days or, in other words, immediately following his return, and that of the Prime Minister, to Cairo. The President said that there were a number of questions in regard to command which he had had to discuss with Mr. Churchill. He added that the Commander in Chief of OVERLORD would operate from England, and that there would be a Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean area. And one question was, under whose command the operations in Southern France would fall.

At this point the PRIME MINISTER interrupted to say that the operations in Southern France should be under the Commander in Chief of OVERLORD, but the operations in Italy, which must be intensified to co-ordinate with the operations in France, would be under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean theater.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed agreement with this idea, and said it was sound military doctrine.

For the next part of the luncheon the conversation was general, until the PRIME MINISTER asked Marshal Stalin whether he had read the proposed communique on the Far East of the Cairo conference.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he had and that although he could make no commitments he thoroughly approved the communique and all its contents. He said it was right that Korea should be independent, and that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China. He added, however, that the Chinese must be made to fight, which they had not thus far done.

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THE PRESIDENT reverted to the question of the approaches to the Baltic Sea, which he had previously discussed with Marshal Stalin. He said he liked the idea of establishing the former Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck into some form of a free zone, with the Kiel Canal put under international control and guaranty, with freedom of passage for the world's commerce.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought that that was a good idea, and then asked what could be done for Russia in the Far East.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was for this reason that he had been particularly glad to hear the Marshal's views on the Cairo communique, since he was interested to find out the views of the Soviet government on the Far East and the question of warm water ports there.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that of course the Russians had their views, but that it would perhaps be better to await the time when the Russians would be taking an active representation in the Far Eastern war. He added, however, that there was no port in the Far East that was not closed off, since Vladivostok was only partly ice-free, and besides covered by Japanese controlled Straits.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the idea of a free port might be applied to the Far East besides, and mentioned Dairen as a possibility.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not think that the Chinese would like such a scheme.

To which THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought they would like the idea of a free port under international guaranty.

MARSHAL STALIN said that that would not be bad, and added that Petropavlovsk or Kamchatka was an excellent port, and ice-free, but with no rail connections. He pointed out in this general connection that Russia had only one ice-free port, that of Murmansk.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that it was important that the nations who would govern the world after the war, and who would be entrusted with the direction of the world after the war, should be satisfied and have no territorial or other ambitions. If that

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question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he felt then that the world might indeed remain at peace. He said that hungry nations and ambitious nations are dangerous, and he would like to see the leading nations of the world in the position of rich, happy men.

THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

It was then decided that after a short session this afternoon at 4:30 there would be no more full sessions of the conference, but at 4:00 o'clock tomorrow the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, together with Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins, would meet to discuss political matters, and reference was made to Poland, Finland and Sweden as possible subjects of discussion.

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SUMMARY OF THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE TEHRAN MEETING

4 P.M. - NOVEMBER 30, 1943

THE PRESIDENT
MR. HOPKINS
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL LEAHY
ADMIRAL KING
GENERAL ARNOLD
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
GENERAL DEANE
CAPTAIN ROYAL
CAPTAIN WARE
MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. ANTHONY EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL
GENERAL SIR ALLEN BROOKE
ADMIRAL SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM
AIR MARSHAL SIR CHARLES PORTAL
SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR
LT. GENERAL SIR HASTINGS ISMAY
GENERAL MARTEL
MAJOR BIRSE

MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MARSHAL VOROSHILOV
MR. PAVLOV
MR. BEREZHKOV

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Cairo & Tehran, 576-578

SECRET

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THE PRESIDENT opened the proceedings by stating that while most of those present were aware of what had occurred this morning at the meeting of the British and American Staffs, he wished personally to express his happiness at the decision reached which he hoped would be satisfactory to Marshal Stalin. He proposed that Sir Allen Brooke, British Chief of Staff, report for the combined Chiefs.

GENERAL BROOKE said that sitting in combined session the United States and British Staffs had reached the following agreement, which had been submitted for the approval of the President and the Prime Minister. It was agreed:

- (1). That OVERLORD will be launched during the month of May, 1944.
- (2). That there will be a supporting operation in southern France on as large a scale as possible, depending on the number of landing craft available for this operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that it was important that close and intimate contact be maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff since it was important that in closing on the wild beast all parts of the narrowing circle should be aflame with battle. All operations must be considered, and if Turkey entered the war her action as well as the resistance operations in Yugoslavia should also be coordinated with the actions of the allied army.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully understood the importance of the decision reached and the difficulties which would be encountered in the execution of OVERLORD. He added that the danger in the beginning of the operation was that the Germans might attempt to transfer troops from the eastern front to oppose OVERLORD. In order to deny to the Germans the possibility of maneuvering he pledged that the Red Army would launch simultaneously with OVERLORD large scale offensives in a number of places for the purpose of pinning down German forces and preventing the transfer of German troops to the west. He said that he had already made the foregoing statement to the President and Mr. Churchill but he thought it necessary to repeat it to the conference.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were all aware of the importance of maintaining the closest cooperation between the three Staffs, and now that they had gotten together he hoped they would stay together. He went on to say that he had already told Marshal Stalin that the next step would be the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for OVERLORD, and that he was confident that this appointment would be made within

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three or four days or immediately after he and the Prime Minister had returned to Cairo. He suggested that if Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister had no objection it might be advisable for the British and American military staffs to return to Cairo tomorrow as they had a great deal of detail work to do in working out the decisions reached here. Both Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that having taken this important decision the main question now was to find enough landing craft for all our needs. He said he could not believe that the great resources of the United States and England could not make available what was needed. He said he had caused an inquiry to be made in regard to the total number of landing craft in the Mediterranean, and that upon their return home his military staff would have this information. Mr. Churchill added that he wished to state that now the decision had been taken he felt that OVERLORD should be delivered with smashing force and he hoped that it would be possible to add to the strength of the operation as he wished to place that man in a position where there was no way out for him; if he put force in the west he would be smashed on the Soviet front, and if he attempted to hold firm in the east he would be smashed on the west. He went on to say that the present conclave might now break up as the military questions had been settled. Some political questions remained to be discussed and he hoped it would be possible on December 1st and 2nd to discuss these questions since he felt it would be of great value to be able to tell the world that full agreement had been reached on all questions at this conference. He expressed the hope that the President and Marshal Stalin would be willing to remain in Tehran through December 2nd if necessary. Both the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

THE PRESIDENT then said it would be necessary to consider the text of the communique to be issued and suggested that the military staffs before their departure work out a draft of the military aspects of the conference for their consideration. This was agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said some form of cover plan should be worked out in order to confuse and deceive the enemy as to the real time and place of our joint blows. He said that the vast preparations in England could not be concealed from the enemy, and it was therefore important that every effort be made to confuse and mislead him. He said that "truth deserves a bodyguard of lies".

MARSHAL STALIN then described the methods used on the Soviet front to conceal the location and timing of Soviet offenses. This was done through the use of dummy tanks, aircraft, fake landing fields and false information on the military radio.

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The formal conference then closed with the agreement that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hopkins would meet tomorrow to discuss political questions.

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LUNCHEON

December 1, 1943

1:00 p.m.

PRESENT

THE PRESIDENT
MR. HOPKINS
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK-KERR
MAJOR BIERCE

MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. PAVLOV

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During the first part of luncheon the text of a telegram to be dispatched to the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara to deliver orally an invitation to the President of Turkey to meet the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo on December 3rd, 4th or 5th, was discussed and was agreed to.

MR. HOPKINS then stated that before any meetings with the Turkish President, it was essential that we were agreed as to exactly what form of military assistance could be rendered to Turkey in the event she agreed to enter the war.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with Mr. Hopkins, and said that the American Staff had not yet worked out anything in detail on that question.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he only intended to offer the Turks 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and some 3 anti-aircraft regiments, but he had no intention of offering any land forces at this time.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the big problem confronting his Staff was the number of available landing craft in the Mediterranean and how much would be needed for the Italian operations, those in Southern France and in England, as well as for the operations in the Indian Ocean.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that as he understood it, if Turkey entered the war there would only be made available the air force and anti-aircraft force mentioned by the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and spoke of the great assistance to the Allied cause that would result from obtaining Turkish air bases, with the possibility of continual bombing of the Ploesti oil fields. He added that he wanted landing craft only for the assault on the Island of Rhodes, which would be a temporary operation in the month of March.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he desired to have military advice on the subject, as he did not know whether it would be possible to sandwich in, between the Italian and OVERLORD operations, for any operation in the Aegean, the landing craft which the Prime Minister desired.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that he had made no promises to Turkey, and would make none beyond the aircraft and anti-aircraft of which he had spoken.

He said if the Turkish President, which is possible, would be unable to come to Cairo, that he proposed himself to go to Ankara subsequently and present to him the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the unappetizing picture of what help could be afforded her if she did.

MR. HOPKINS again pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had not given consideration to the detailed requirements of the Turkish operation. The whole of the Mediterranean was soon to come under the Combined Chiefs of Staff--hence the resources must be examined in the light of that fact.

It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing craft available for an attack on Rhodes--and more important still that even if the landing craft were available--no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.

Under any circumstances it should be clearly understood that no mention can be made to President Inom, implied or otherwise, that an amphibious landing can be made on Rhodes.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought we could have the precise information desired by Mr. Hopkins within three days, and in any event before any meeting with the Turkish President. He went on to say that landing craft was the bottleneck, and it might be possible to divert some from the Pacific theater, but that one thing was certain after yesterday's decision, and that was that OVERLORD not suffer.

THE PRESIDENT said, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw any landing craft from that area. The distance alone from the Mediterranean would make it impossible, and besides all landing craft out there were urgently needed for the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and for the Burma campaign.

MR. EDEN then explained that in his conversations in November with the Turkish foreign minister in Cairo he had only asked for bases from Turkey, and had made no mention of any assistance other than the air forces mentioned by the Prime Minister, and no reference whatsoever to any other forces. He said that he had expressed the view that Turkey could make available these bases to the Allies without being attacked by Germany, but the Foreign Minister had not agreed with this opinion.

The Foreign Minister then repeated what he said about the advantages of acquiring bases in Turkey; that it would permit healthy battles with the German Air Force in that region, and in all probability starve out the German garrisons on the Aegean Islands. It might not even be necessary to take Rhodes by assault.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed agreement with this view, and felt that the German garrisons would be so demoralized following the loss of air superiority that they would be easy prey. He added however, that he thought some bombers would be necessary for any such operations.

THE PRESIDENT then said he was in favor of meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, but he intended to make no offer of any amphibious operations to Turkey whatsoever, and that any commitments should be confined to the air forces referred to by the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER then summed up the advantages to Turkey which would accrue if she accepted the invitation to join the war, and mentioned particularly the possibility of sitting alongside the Soviet Union at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden's question as to the exact attitude of the Soviet Union towards Bulgaria, which Marshal Stalin had referred to at the formal conference, Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria, or if Bulgaria attacks or goes to war with Turkey, the Soviet Union will break relations or declare war on Bulgaria.

He also inquired of what other assistance would be required of the Soviet Union in such an event.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that they were seeking nothing more of the Soviet Union, but that it was obvious that if the Soviet Armies approached Bulgaria, the pro-German Bulgarian circles would be in great fear.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired what particularly the Turkish Army lacked in the way of armaments.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the present Turkish Army would have been a good army at the end of the last war, but that when they had seen the modern Bulgarian equipment received from French arsenals, the Turks realized that their army was not a modern one.

He pointed out that they had brave infantry, but lacked anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, and airplanes. He mentioned that 25 million pounds worth of military equipment, mostly American, had been sent to Turkey.

MARSHAL STALIN then said it was possible that Turkey would not have to go to war if she granted bases to the Allies; that she need not attack; and that it was possible that neither the Bulgarians or the Germans would do so.

THE PRESIDENT then mentioned the case of Portugal as an example of the granting of bases without the involvement in war.

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With reference to Mr. Eden's remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister had preferred to go right into war rather than to be dragged in by bases, the PRIME MINISTER said that was Turkey's usual behaviour. If you suggested a small move they said they preferred the big. And if you suggested the big, they said they were not ready. Mr. Churchill said that he personally preferred that we offer something substantial to the Turks, and that if they refused, then they would wash their hands of Turkey, both now and at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden's question, MARSHAL STALIN stated that it was expected that Turkey would declare war only on Germany, and not on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria attacks or declares war on Turkey, the Soviet Union goes to war with Bulgaria.

Marshal Stalin mentioned that there was one other possibility, and that was that if Turkey declared war on Germany, and Bulgaria refused to accede to German demands to go to war, the Germans might occupy Bulgaria. In which case Bulgaria might ask help from the Allies, and what then would be our position?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in such an event great strain would be put on Germany's strength, and undoubtedly result in the removal of some German divisions from the Eastern front.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had talked the day before yesterday with the Prime Minister, who had referred to the idea that if Turkey would refuse an invitation to enter the war, Great Britain would tell her that her interests in the Straits and in the Bosphorus would be adversely affected. He wished to know what this meant.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he was far from his cabinet, but he personally favored a change in the regime of the Straits if Turkey proved obdurate.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had merely meant to indicate that the Black Sea countries were very much interested in the regime of the Straits.

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to see the Dardanelles made free to the commerce of the world and the fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not.

After agreeing that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey would come to Cairo and Mr. Bushinsky would come to Cairo from Algiers for the meeting with the Turkish President, if it occurred that the Turkish president was present, THE PRESIDENT then said he would like to take up the question of Finland. He said that he wished to help in every way to get Finland out of the war, and he would like to have the views of Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that recently the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Boheman, had inquired of the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm as to what were the Soviet Union's intentions regarding Finland, saying that the Finns were afraid that the Russians intended to make good the Russian promise and destroy the independence of Finland, and added that the Finns would like an opportunity to talk to the Russians.

The reply from Moscow was to the effect that Russia had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so. Also that the Soviet Government had no objection to the Finns coming to Moscow for conversations, but would like to have the conditions in which the Finns would negotiate, in advance.

He added that only today they had had word of a Finnish reply through the Swedish, but did not yet have the full text. The gist of the reply was, however, to the effect that the Finns desired to take as a basis the 1939 frontier, and made no mention of disassociation from Germany. Stalin said in his opinion that this unacceptable reply indicated that the Finns were not anxious to conduct serious negotiations, since they knew that such conditions would be unacceptable.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Marshal's statement had been most interesting, but also unsatisfactory.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Finnish ruling groups obviously had hopes still of a German victory.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought it would be any help if the United States suggested that the Finns send a delegation to Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN said he personally had no objections.

THE PRIME MINISTER outlined the change in his own and British feeling that had occurred toward Finland from 1939 to the present as a result of the Finnish associations and the German attack on Russia. He said that Great Britain was at war with Finland, and the first consideration was that the city of Leningrad would be secure, and also that the position of the Soviet Union as the leading naval and air power in the Baltic Sea should likewise be secure.

He said, on the other hand, he would greatly regret to see anything done to impair the independence of Finland, and would therefore welcome the Marshal's statement on that point. He went on to say that an indemnity would not be much good from a country as poor as Finland.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed disagreement, and said that payments in kind over a period of from 5 to 8 years, such as timber, paper and other materials, would cover some of the damage done by Finland during the war, and that the Soviet Government intended to demand such reparation.

MR. CHURCHILL developed at some length the reasons why he did not consider reparations, in regard to such a country as Finland, either desirable or feasible. And he said in his ears there was an echo of the slogan "No Annexations and No Indemnities".

MARSHAL STALIN laughed, and replied that he had already told Mr. Churchill that he was becoming a Conservative.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he attached great importance to Finland's being out of the war and Sweden's being in, at the moment of the great attack in May.

To which STALIN expressed assent.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought that the Finns could expel the Germans from their country by their own efforts.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that there were 21 Finnish divisions on the Soviet front, and that while they were expressing their desire to negotiate, they had recently increased their divisions to this number from 16.

Marshal Stalin agreed on the desirability of getting the Finns out of the war, but not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.

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MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that for 27 months the Finns and the Germans had had Leningrad under artillery fire.

THE PRESIDENT said that according to his information the Finns were willing to remove the frontier a long distance from Leningrad, but hoped to have Vivorg (Marshal Stalin interrupted to say that this was impossible). The President went on to say that Hango should be demilitarized and made into a bathing beach.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not wish to press his Russian friends, but he would like to know what their conditions were; that the British Government was leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the Russians.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in February the Soviet Government had told the United States Government what the conditions were, and the British Government had been likewise informed, and that since the United States Government did not transmit these terms to the Finns it was obvious that it was not believed that the Finns would accept them.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that at that time it was felt that the Finns would not go along with any proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Treaty of 1940 was broken and must be restored, but if Hango were belonging to the Finns he was willing to accept Petsamo instead, which would give them a common boundary with Norway. He added that Petsamo had been in the first instance a gift from Russia to Finland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British Government desired first of all to see the Soviet Government satisfied with the border in the west, and secondly would like to see Finland remain independent.

MARSHAL STALIN thought that it was alright to let the Finns live as they wished, but they must pay half of the damages they had caused.

THE PRESIDENT asked if it would be helpful if the Finns would go to Moscow without any reservations or conditions.

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MARSHAL STALIN replied that if there was no prospect of success, such a move might play right into the hands of the Germans, since the reactionary group in Finland would exploit such a failure and pretend that it was impossible to talk with the Russians. He added, however, that if the President insisted, let the Finns come to Moscow, but who could they send?

MR. CHURCHILL interjected that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.

MARSHAL STALIN said that allies could occasionally use pressure on one another, and repeated that if the President thought it was worthwhile, an attempt might be made.

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the present Finnish Government was pro-German, and that nothing could be done with them, but that it might be possible to send other Finns.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that of course that would be better, that they had no objection to anyone the Finns wanted to send, even Ruti, or even, he added, the devil himself. Stalin then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:

1. The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.
2. Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.
3. Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.
4. Reorganization of the army.

THE PRIME MINISTER and MARSHAL STALIN entered into a friendly discussion as to the advisability of reparations from Finland, and Marshal Stalin made clear his determination that Finland should pay.

The meeting adjourned until 6 o'clock.

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MEETING

6:00 P.M. DECEMBER 1, 1943

THE PRESIDENT

MR. HOPKINS

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER

MR. EDEN

SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR

MAJOR BIRSE

MARSHAL STALIN

MR. MOLOTOV

MR. PAVLOV

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[Changes not indicated in printed
version.]

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THE PRESIDENT stated he thought that there were two main questions to be discussed--the question of Poland and the treatment of Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it would be possible to obtain any answer on the Soviet Union's request for Italian ships.

THE PRESIDENT replied his position on this question was very clear; that the Allies had received a large number of Italian merchant ships and a lesser number of warships and that he felt they should be used by our three nations in the common cause until the end of the war when the division based on title and possession might be made.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that the Soviet Union would use these ships during the war in the common war effort, and after the war the question of possession could be discussed.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked where the Soviet Union would like to have these ships delivered.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the Black Sea if Turkey entered the war. If not, to the northern ports.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was a small thing to ask in the face of the tremendous sacrifices of Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he knew how great the need for war vessels was on the part of England and the United States but that he felt the Soviet request was modest.

Both the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER said they were in favor of acceptance of the Soviet suggestion.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would require some time to work out the arrangements and that he personally would welcome the sight of these vessels in the Black Sea and hoped some English war vessels could accompany them in action against the enemy in those waters.

He said it would take a couple of months to work out the arrangements with the Italians, since they wish to avoid any possibility of mutiny in the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the ships.

It was agreed that the ships would pass over to Soviet command sometime around the end of January, 1944.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that it would be one of the advantages to be attained from Turkey even if she did not enter the war; namely to permit the passage of war vessels through the Dardanelles.

THE PRESIDENT, turning to the subject of Poland, said it was his hope that negotiations could be started for the re-establishment of relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments. He felt that the re-establishment of relations would facilitate any decisions made in regard to the questions at issue. He said he recognized the difficulties which lay in the way.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Polish Government in exile were closely connected with the Germans and their agents in Poland were killing partisans. He said it is impossible to imagine what is going on in Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the great question before the English was the fact that they had declared war because of the German invasion of Poland.

He said he personally had been astonished when Chamberlain had given the guarantee in April, 1939 to Poland when he had refused to fight for the Czechs. He had been astonished and glad.

He said that England and France had gone to war in pursuance of this guarantee and it was not that he regretted it, but still it would be difficult not to take cognizance of the fact that the British people had gone to war because of Poland.

He said he had used the illustration of the three matches the other evening in order to demonstrate one possible solution of the question.

He said that the British Government was first of all interested in seeing absolute security for the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union against any surprise assault in the future from Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Russia, probably more than any other country was interested in having friendly relations with Poland, since the security of Soviet frontiers were involved.

He said the Russians were in favor of the reconstitution and expansion of Poland at the expense of Germany and that they make distinction between the Polish Government in exile and Poland.

He added that they broke relations with Poland not because of a whim but because the Polish had joined in slanderous propaganda with the Nazis.

He inquired what guarantee could there be that this would not be repeated. He said they would like to have a guarantee that the Polish Government in exile would cease the killing of partisans in Poland and secondly to urge the people to fight against the Germans and not to indulge in intrigues.

The Russians would welcome relations with a Polish Government that led its people in the common struggle but it was not sure that the Polish Government in exile could be such a government. However, he added, if the government in exile would go along with the partisans and sever all connections with the German agents in Poland, then the Russians would be prepared to negotiate with them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to obtain the views of the Soviet Government in regard to the frontier question, and if some reasonable formula could be devised, he was prepared to take it up with the Polish Government in exile, and without telling them that the Soviet Government would accept such a solution, would offer it to them as probably the best they could obtain. If the Polish Government refused this, then Great

Britain would be through with them and certainly would not oppose the Soviet Government under any condition at the peace table.

He said the British Government wished to see a Poland strong and friendly to Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN replied this was desirable, but it was not just for the Poles to try and get back the Ukraine and White Russia; that the frontiers of 1939 had returned the Ukrainian soil to the Ukraine and White Russian soil to White Russia. The Soviet Government adheres to the 1939 line and considers it just and right.

MR. EDEN said that was the line known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.

MARSHAL STALIN said call it what you will, we still consider it just and right.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected to say that the 1939 frontier was the Curzon Line.

MR. EDEN said there were differences.

MR. MOLOTOV replied in no essential points.

There was then an examination of maps as to the exact location of the Curzon Line, and its location was finally established.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether in the opinion of Marshal Stalin, East Prussia and the area between the old Polish frontier and the Oder was approximately equal to the former Polish territory acquired by the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied he did not know.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it was possible to work out some fair solution that it would be up to the Polish to accept it.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Soviet Union did not wish to retain any regions primarily occupied by Poles even though they were inside the 1939 Line.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether an (i)voluntary transfer of peoples from the mixed areas was possible. ✓

MARSHAL STALIN said that such a transfer was entirely possible.

Turning to the question of Germany, THE PRESIDENT said that the question was whether or not to split up Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they preferred the dismemberment of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was all for it but that he was primarily more interested in seeing Prussia, the evil core of German militarism, separated from the rest of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said he had a plan that he had thought up some months ago for the division of Germany in five parts. These five parts were:

1. All Prussia to be rendered as small and weak as possible.
2. Hanover and Northwest section.
3. Saxony and Leipzig area.
4. Hesse-Darmstadt
Hesse-Kassel and the area South of the Rhine
5. Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg

He proposed that these five areas should be self-governed and that there should be two regions under United Nations or some form of International control. These were:

1. The area of the Kiel Canal and the City of Hamburg.
2. The Ruhr and the Saar, the latter to be used for the benefit of all Europe.

THE PRIME MINISTER said, to use an American expression, "The President had said a mouthful."

He went on to say that in his mind there were two considerations, one destructive and the other constructive.

1. The separation of Prussia from the rest of the Reich.
2. To detach Bavaria, Baden, Wurtenburg and the Palatinate from the rest of Germany and make them part of the Confederation of the Danube.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt if Germany was to be dismembered, it should really be dismembered, and it was neither a question of the division of Germany in five or six states and two areas as the President suggested. However, he said he preferred the President's plan to the suggestion of Mr. Churchill.

He felt that to include German areas within the framework of large confederations would merely offer an opportunity to the German elements to revive a great State.

He went on to say that he did not believe there was a difference among Germans; that all German soldiers fought like devils and the only exception was the Austrians.

He said that the Prussian Officers and Staffs should be eliminated, but as to the inhabitants, he saw little difference between one part of Germany and another.

He said he was against the idea of confederation as artificial and one that would not last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elements to control.

Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed with the Marshal, particularly in regard to the absence of differences between Germans. He said fifty years ago there had been a difference but since the last war it was no longer so.

He said the only difference was that in Bavaria and the Southern part of Germany there was no officer cast as there had been in Prussia. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the Austrians were an exception.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not wish to be considered as against the dismemberment of Germany—quite the contrary, but he felt to separate the parts ~~within to leave it grow, alone~~ would merely mean that sooner or later they will reunite into one nation and that the main thing was to keep Germany divided if only for fifty years.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated what he had said as to the danger of the re-unification of Germany. He said no matter what measures were adopted there would always be a strong urge on the part of the Germans to unite.

He said it was a great mistake to unite Hungary with Germans since the Germans would merely control the Hungarians and to create large frameworks within which the Germans could operate would be very dangerous.

He felt the whole purpose of any international organization to preserve peace would be to neutralize this tendency on the part of the Germans and apply against them economic and other measures and if necessary, force, to prevent their unification and revival. He said the victorious nations must have the strength to beat the Germans if they ever start on the path of a new war.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether Marshal Stalin contemplated a Europe composed of little states, disjoined, separated and weak.

MARSHAL STALIN replied not Europe but Germany.

He supposed for example that Poland would be a strong country, and France, and Italy likewise; that Rumania and Bulgaria would remain as they always had; small States.

THE PRESIDENT remarked Germany had been less dangerous to civilization when in 107 provinces.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped for larger units.

The Prime Minister then returned to the question of Poland and said he was not asking for any agreement nor was he set on the matter but he had a statement which he would like to have the Marshal examine.

This statement suggested that Poland should obtain equal compensation in the West, including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on the Oder to compensate for the areas which would be in the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT interjected to say that one question in regard to Germany remained to be settled and that was what body should be empowered to study carefully the question of dismemberment of Germany.

It was agreed that the European Advisory Committee would undertake this task.

THE PRIME MINISTER said in his opinion the Polish question was ~~xxx~~ urgent.

He repeated if it would be possible to work out a formula here, and then he could go back to the Polish Government in London and urge on them the desirability of at least attempting to reach a settlement along those lines, without however indicating any commitment on the part of the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if the Russians would be given the northern part of East Prussia, running along the left bank of the Neissen and include Tilsit and the City of (Kiel), he would be prepared to accept the Curzon Line as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. *Königsberg*

He said the acquisition of that part of Eastern Prussia would not only afford the Soviet Union an icefree port but would also give to Russia a small piece of German territory which he felt was deserved.

Although nothing definitely was stated, it was apparent that the British were going to take this suggestion back to London to the Poles.