December 1, 1943.

November 28, 1943

Memorandum of Conference between the President and Marshal Stalin - 3 P.M.

Summary of 1st Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M.

Dinner - The President, Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin, etc.

Memorandum of Marshal Stalin's views as expressed during the Evening of November 28.

November 29, 1943

Memorandum of Conference between the President and Marshal Stalin

Summary of 2nd Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M.

Dinner - The President, Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin, etc.

November 30, 1943

Memorandum of Luncheon - The President, Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister

Memorandum of Luncheon - Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov

Summary of the 3rd Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M.

Dinner - The Prime Minister's birthday, at the British Legation

December 1, 1943

Luncheon - The President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, etc. - 1:00 PM

Memorandum re agreement on observation planes using Russian bases

Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Marshal Stalin- 3:20 PM

Memorandum of Conference, the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, etc. - 6:00 PM

Military Conclusions of Tehran Conference

Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran

Communique

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Translation of Communication November 28, 1943

from Mr. Molotov at Tehran

Marshal Stalin has acquainted himself with the communique concerning the conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, which took place in North Africa in the second half of November this year.

Marshal Stalin expresses his thanks for the information and states that he has no observation at all to make in regard to the communique.

[redacted]

Memorandum of Conference

3 PM, November 28, 1943

The President
Mr. Bohlen

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Pavlov

[redacted]

[redacted]

Memorandum of Conference, 3 PM, November 28, 1943

THE PRESIDENT greeted Marshal Stalin when he entered with "I am glad to see you. I have tried for a long time to bring this about."

MARSHAL STALIN, after suitable expression of pleasure at meeting the President, said that he was to blame for the delay in this meeting; that he had been very occupied because of military matters.

THE PRESIDENT inquired as to the situation on the Soviet battle front.

MARSHAL STALIN answered that on part of the front, the situation was not too good; that the Soviets had lost Zhitomir and were about to lose Koresten -- the latter an important railroad center for which the capture of Gomel could not compensate. He added that the Germans have brought a new group of divisions to this area and were exercising strong pressure on the Soviet front.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether or not the initiative remained with the Soviet forces.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that, with the exception of the sector which he had just referred to, the initiative still remains with the Soviet Armies, but that the situation was so bad that only in the Ukraine was it possible to take offensive operations.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished that it were within his power to bring about the removal of 30 or 40 German divisions from the Eastern front and that that question, of course, was one of the things he desired to discuss here in Tehran.

MARSHAL STALIN said it would be of great value if such a transfer of German divisions could be brought about.

THE PRESIDENT then said that another subject that he would like to talk over with Marshal Stalin was the possibility that after the war a part of the American-British merchant fleet which, at the end of the war, would be more than either nation could possibly utilize, be made available to the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that an adequate merchant fleet would be of great value, not only to the Soviet Union, but for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after the war, which he hoped would be greatly expanded. He said, in reply to the President's question, that if equipment were sent to the Soviet Union from the United States, a plentiful supply of the raw materials from that country could be made available to the United States.

The Conference then turned to the Far East.

[redacted]

THE PRESIDENT said that he had had an interesting conversation with Chiang-Kai-Shek in Cairo, on the general subject of China.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Chinese have fought very badly but, in his opinion, it was the fault of the Chinese leaders.

THE PRESIDENT informed Marshal Stalin that we were now supplying and training 30 Chinese divisions for operations in Southern China and were proposing to continue the same process for 30 additional divisions. He added that there was a new prospect of an offensive operation through North Burma to link up with China in Southern Yunan and that these operations would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired as to the situation in the Lebanon.

THE PRESIDENT gave a brief description of the background and events leading up to the recent clashes and in reply to Marshal Stalin's question said that it had been entirely due to the attitude of the French Committee and General De Gaulle.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not know General De Gaulle personally, but frankly, in his opinion, he was very unreal in his political activities. He explained that General De Gaulle represented the soul of sympathetic France, whereas, the real physical France engaged under Petain in helping our common enemy Germany, by making available French ports, materials, machines, etc., for the German war effort. He said the trouble with De Gaulle was that this movement had no communication with the physical France, which, in his opinion, should be punished for its attitude during this war. De Gaulle acts as though he were the head of a great state, whereas, in fact, it actually commands little power.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that in the future, no Frenchman over 40, and particularly no Frenchman who had ever taken part in the present French Government, should be allowed to return to position in the future. He said that General Giraud was a good old military type, but with no administrative or political sense, whatsoever. He added that there were approximately 11 French divisions, partly composed of Algerians and other North Africans, in training in North Africa.

MARSHAL STALIN expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they should not be entitled to share in any of the benefits of the peace, in view of their past record of collaboration with Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view since he felt that many years of honest labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and went on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indo-China, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people

who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addition to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the political sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indo-China and that the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indo-China, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. He said that Chiang-Kai-Shek had told him China had no designs on Indo-China but the people of Indo-China were not yet ready for independence, to which he had replied that when the United States acquired the Philippines, the inhabitants were not ready for independence which would be granted without qualification upon the end of the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang-Kai-Shek the possibility of a system of trustee-ship for Indo-China which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.

MARSHAL STALIN completely agreed with this view.

THE PRESIDENT went on to say that Mr. Hull had taken to the Moscow Conference a document which he (The President) had drawn up for the purpose of a National Committee to visit every year, the colonies of all nations and through use of instrumentalities of public opinion to correct any abuse that they find.

MARSHAL STALIN said he saw merit in this idea.

THE PRESIDENT continued on the subject of colonial possessions, but he felt it would be better not to discuss the question of India with Mr. Churchill, since the latter had no solution of that question, and merely proposed to defer the entire question to the end of the war.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that this was a sore spot with the British.

THE PRESIDENT said that at some future date, he would like to talk with MARSHAL STALIN on the question of India; that he felt that the best solution would be reform from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the India question was a complicated one, with different levels of culture and the absence of relationship in the castes. He added that reform from the bottom would mean revolution.

It was then 4 o'clock and time for the General Meeting.

THE PRESIDENT, in conclusion, stated that an additional reason why he was glad to be in this house was that of affording the opportunity of meeting Marshal Stalin more frequently in completely informal and different circumstances.

MEMORANDUM OF MARSHAL STALIN'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED DURING THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 28, 1943.

During dinner and afterwards Marshal Stalin kept returning to the following subjects:

(1) TREATMENT TO BE ACCORDED GERMANY.

In regard to Germany, Marshal Stalin appeared to regard all measures proposed by either The President or Churchill for the subjugation and for the control of Germany as inadequate. He on various occasions sought to induce The President or the Prime Minister to go further in expressing their views as to the stringency of the measures which should be applied to Germany. He appeared to have no faith in the possibility of the reform of the German people and spoke bitterly of the attitude of the German workers in the war against the Soviet Union. As evidence of the fundamental German devotion to legality he cited the occasion in 1907 when he was in Leipzig when 200 German workers failed to appear at an important mass meeting because there was no controller at the station platform to punch their tickets which would permit them to leave the station. He seemed to think that this mentality of discipline and obedience could not be changed.

He said that Hitler was a very able man but not basically intelligent, lacking in culture and with a primitive approach to political and other problems. He did not share the view of The President that Hitler was mentally unbalanced and emphasized that only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people whatever we thought of the methods. Although he did not specifically say so, it was apparent from his remarks that he considered that Hitler through his stupidity in attacking the Soviet Union had thrown away all the fruits of his previous victories.

As a war time measure Marshal Stalin questioned the advisability of the unconditional surrender principle with no definition of the exact terms which would be imposed upon Germany. He felt that to leave the principle of unconditional surrender unclarified merely served to unite the German people, whereas to draw up specific terms, no matter how harsh, and tell the German people that this was what they would have to accept, would, in his opinion, hasten the day of German capitulation.

(2) FRANCE AND THE FRENCH EMPIRE.

Throughout the evening Marshal Stalin kept reverting to the thesis that the French nation, and in particular its leaders and ruling classes, were rotten and deserved to be punished for their criminal collaboration with Nazi Germany. In particular he reiterated that France should not be given back her Empire. He took issue with the Prime Minister when the latter stated that France had been a defeated nation and had suffered the horrors of occupation, and denied that France had been in effect defeated. On the contrary their leaders had surrendered the country and "opened the front" to the German armies. He cited as characteristic of French political thinking the views of Lergery, former Vichy Ambassador to Moscow. Lergery had felt that the future of France lay in close association with Nazi Germany and not in association with Great Britian and the United States. When the Prime Minister stated that he could

not conceive of a civilized world without a flourishing and lively France, Marshal Stalin somewhat contemptuously replied that France could be a charming and pleasant country but could not be allowed to play any important role in the immediate post war world. He characterized DeGaulle as a representative of a symbolic and not a real France but one who nevertheless acted as though he was the head of a great power. He appeared to attach little importance to DeGaulle as a real factor in political or other matters.

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Both in regard to German and French questions Stalin was obviously trying to stimulate discussion and to ascertain the exact views of The President and Prime Minister on these questions without, however, stating clearly what solutions he himself proposed. On all questions of future general security which arose in the discussion of the French and German questions he appeared desirous to ascertain exactly what form of security organization would be developed after the war and how far the United States and British governments were prepared to go in implementing the police power of such an organization.

MEMORANDUM ON LUNCHEON AT BRITISH LEGATION

TEHRAN, IRAN NOVEMBER 30, 1943

PRESENT:

MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

MR. ANTHONY EDEN

MR. V. MOLOTOV

MR. PAVLOV

CAPTAIN LUNGHI

CAPTAIN WARE

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MR. HOPKINS brought up the question of the "Strong points" to which reference had evidently been made previously in discussions with Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin about post-war Europe.

MR. MOLOTOV specifically mentioned Biserte and Dakar and was interested in the question of the sovereignty of Biserte. He said it would be difficult to realize how the war could not but affect such places, and that this was Marshal Stalin's point of view also.

He added that it would be difficult also to comprehend how France, specifically, could be considered for treatment which would exclude punishment for her hostile acts committed in the past--in other words, how France could go unpunished for these acts.

MR. HOPKINS, specifically mentioning Belgium and Holland, brought out the implications of the fact that these countries were in close proximity to Germany and questioned the ability of such countries to defend themselves after this war.

MR. MOLOTOV said it had been shown once more that they are unable to defend themselves. Regarding France, however, he stated that this was a different matter. He said that France did not want to defend herself and in this respect she could be held much more responsible for her hostile acts than could Belgium and Holland.

MR. EDEN very willingly admitted that Great Britain should have given France more help.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that France was not merely a country overpowered by the Germans but in fact was now with the Germans actively supporting German strategy. He added that France was not weak and that France did not want to join the Allies but wanted to collaborate with Germany. He said that the former French government had collapsed and that France made an alliance with Germany.

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MR. EDEN, in reference to possible future attitudes toward France said that nothing was too bad for the Lavals and Petains.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that they are supporting Hitler now and that regarding France it is not just a matter of weakness.

MR. HOPKINS mentioned as an example the possibility of a strong point and airbase in Belgium and wanted to know what sort of agreement could be worked out in regard to who would operate such a base and under what right or authority.

It was pointed out that it would perhaps be easier just to arrange for the use of such bases for the Allies following the war in countries which had been enemy countries, and that in order to get the use of such bases in friendly countries, certain complications and rights of sovereignty might arise.

MR. EDEN suggested that the leasing of bases in the West Indies to the United States by Great Britain might serve as a rough example of these future arrangements.

Turning to Mr. Hopkins he said that it seemed that this was an exchange of bases for United States ships but really it was because "We like the United States to be there." He asked Mr. Hopkins if he did not think that was really it.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that he would object to any such conclusion.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that it would be hard to realize how such future arrangements for strong points could not but affect the countries where such bases were located but that at the present time it seemed uncertain what countries would be so affected. He said that he felt he was expressing the views of Marshal Stalin in stating that after the war in order to assure that there would be no future big war, the States particularly responsible for securing the peace will have to see to it that the main strategic bases will be in their control.

Regarding the strong points which will be taken from Germany or Japan, he remarked that these could be under the control possibly of Great Britain or the United States or both.

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Specifically concerning Bizerte and Dakar, he mentioned United States or British control.

It appeared that he assumed there would be United States control in the Atlantic, and he asked if this was the correct understanding.

MR. EDEN said that the Prime Minister had stated that he did not want any more territory and that in regard to strong points taken from Germany and Japan, there might be joint control by the United States and Great Britain or United Nations control.

Regarding French bases, he could not say, since this matter would take great consideration, particularly in view of the fact that for many years England had been very close to France.

It might be supposed that the French could make a contribution by placing their bases under some United Nations control. In this way it would be possible for France to give something, and this should not in any way hurt the pride of France.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that these sounded like legitimate demands.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that the place and strength of these future strong points would have to be worked out with a view as to who would possibly be a potential future enemy. He said that the President feels it essential to world peace that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States work out this control question in a manner which will not start each of the three powers arming against the others.

He indicated that the people would select as likely future enemies, Germany and Japan.

He said that the question of building up bases in the Pacific would not be a difficult one. Specifically in regard to the Phillipines, he indicated that following their independence we would still consider it advisable to have naval and air bases there. He indicated that we feel such bases in the Phillipines would not be under United Nations control but rather United States control.

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In the event that Formosa was returned to China, naval and air bases would be desired there also.

The size, character, and duties of occupying forces on such bases would have to be worked out.

MR. EDEN said he agreed also.

MR. HOPKINS said that there are two problems which disturb the President in this connection. We do not want sovereignty over any islands which will be free from Japanese domination. The United Nations may perhaps exercise some sort of protective influence.

The problem remains as to the type of base and as to who will operate them. The three great powers should decide these basic questions regarding strong points and who will control these. This control will involve air, naval, and ground forces.

Mr. Hopkins pointed out that it is relatively easy for the United States to discuss the question of strong points because the United States is not located under any possible immediate danger from Germany. The difficult problem will be to enforce peace upon Germany. The Russian and British strong points located nearer to Germany would involve more immediate problems in connection with the enforcing of peace on Germany.

The question of the location of strong points should not be too difficult once the most difficult problems in this connection have been basically agreed upon here. This whole question of strong points is one of the most important post-war problems.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there had been a brief discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on this subject and that it would be fully worthwhile, he believed, if the President, Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin could further discuss this problem but that he understood that time was short and that possibly we could go into this matter now.

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MR. MOLOTOV indicated that of course the heads of the governments had greater authority and would be more fully competent to talk through the issue but that possibly we could clarify the matter now.

MR. EDEN said he would like to know what Mr. Molotov recommends on the matter. Then he turned to the problem of Turkey.

He said that the Turkey problem had been thought over carefully and that it was his suggestion that we should make a joint summons to Turkey to enter the war. This summons would be made to Turkey, making clear what consequences would follow if Turkey refused, with all three of us backing the demand. He indicated that if it were agreeable to Mr. Molotov, an invitation could be extended to President Inonu of Turkey to come to Cairo where he could meet with the Prime Minister and the President if the President would be willing to stop over for this purpose in Cairo on his way back.

Mr. Eden said to Mr. Molotov that he would like to have Russian participation also and that it would be good if they would send someone representing the Soviet Government to the proposed meeting with the Turkish President in Cairo.

Mr. Eden added that it may be likely that President Inonu would not come; that he might make a constitutional excuse. But in case President Inonu does refuse to come to Cairo, he would suggest that the President or the Prime Minister should go to Turkey. If President Inonu does not come, perhaps an Ambassador or better yet, some special envoy should be sent to President Inonu in Turkey with our demands.

Mr. Eden emphasized that he thought there should be a special person sent and asked who this person should be.

Mr. MOLOTOV stated that he was in favor of bringing Turkey into the war not in the distant future, but now, this year.

Mr. EDEN remarked that the problem then is not when we want it but how. He stated that he understood that Marshal Stalin does not believe that Turkey will go to war, but Mr. Eden added it should be tried.

He said to Mr. Molotov that it was his feeling that the Soviet Politburo was of much greater optimism in regard to the

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possibility of getting Turkey into the war at the time of the Three Power Conference in Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that following the Newman request and the negotiations with Turkey conducted by Mr. Eden in the name of the Three Powers, that the reply which Great Britain had received from Turkey had caused the Russian loss of optimism.

MR. HOPKINS said that he understood that the Russians had wanted Turkey to enter the war particularly for immediate military benefit which the Russians had felt they would derive from having this action force more German troops away from the Soviet front.

He understood that the Prime Minister had discussed with Marshal Stalin on several occasions, the Turkey problem and that Marshal Stalin had emphasized his desire to have Turkey in the war now.

He said that the President would want to know more about the present Soviet attitude on this question. He assumed that all of us would want Turkey in the war and wanted to know whether there was actually a change in emphasis in the Soviet analysis of this situation.

MR. EDEN, in answer to a question put to him, stated that he had spoken in Turkey on behalf of the three countries.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that under the authority of the protocol of the Three Power Conference, this was as it should be.

MR. HOPKINS indicated that it was quite all right for Mr. Eden to speak for the United States.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the reply made by Turkey was very bad and could not but affect the Soviet point of view which he understood had been made clear to Mr. Churchill by Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Molotov then added that if Turkey does declare war on Germany and if Bulgaria continues to take a hostile attitude, the Soviet Union will not only break diplomatic relations with Bulgaria but will be at war with Bulgaria. This all goes to show, he indicated, that the Soviet Government does attach importance to the participation of Turkey in the war.

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MR. EDEN said that when he first learned of this Soviet analysis in regard to Bulgaria in this connection, and that he had heard about this at the conference yesterday, that he was frankly surprised.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this was a brief exposition of the Soviet point of view.

He asked Mr. Eden if he could elucidate a statement made at the conference yesterday by Prime Minister Churchill to the effect that if Turkey refuses the demands, that Turkey's post-war rights in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be effected. He asked Mr. Eden what Mr. Churchill meant by this.

MR. EDEN replied "frankly I do not know."

Then he went on to add that he supposed the Prime Minister had meant that the present cordiality and support being offered Turkey would be changed; in fact that the whole basis of relationship with Great Britain would be changed.

He offered to ask Mr. Churchill for further elucidation if Mr. Molotov would so desire.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that he would like to know.

MR. EDEN then asked Mr. Molotov if specifically his government would agree to the suggestion to try to bring President Inonu of Turkey to Cairo.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he thought it would be a good idea but that he would ask Marshal Stalin.

MR. EDEN thanked Mr. Molotov very much.

MR. HOPKINS, turning to Mr. Eden, stated that he had good reason to believe that a substantial understanding on these points under discussion would be arrived at between Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and the President.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was convinced that the results of this conference would add vigor to the people of our respective countries and that the coming together of the three heads of government would do still more toward improving the morale in our countries.

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MR. HOPKINS indicated that if large undertakings were started following Turkey's entry into the war, and if in this connection the island of Rhodes were occupied and attacks were made on the Dodecanese Islands, that such large commitments which would inevitably follow, would possibly cause at least a delay of Overlord. However, he stated that aside from the military situation which might be of sufficient importance that also there might be a psychological advantage in developing the war in this area at this time which would justify a delay in Overlord. Among other things, this might force Finland to ask for peace from Russia.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if he was to understand that the entry of Turkey into the war at this time was connected with a delay in the timing of Overlord in the opinion of Mr. Hopkins.

MR. HOPKINS said that the President was under this impression and so also our Chiefs of Staff.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Marshal Stalin would be against getting Turkey into the war now if this necessarily meant a delay of Overlord.

MR. [illegible] said he hesitated to be too encouraging but that he might be mistaken and that possibly a formula was being worked out whereby this possible action in the Eastern Mediterranean could take place without interfering with Overlord.

Mr. Hopkins said that he understands there were three questions of urgent importance to the Russians in regard to Overlord as stated at the conference yesterday.

1. The assurance that Overlord will take place and on time.

2. The [illegible] of Overlord.

3. The supporting action in Southern France.

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MR. EDEN then turned to the question of aid to Tito in Yugoslavia. He made mention of a mission with United States Officers in it and suggested to Mr. Molotov that the Russians might also want to send a mission and that maybe the Russians would want to have an airbase in Northern Africa.

Mr. Eden stated that the British were ready to provide that base.

MR. MOLOTOV said thank you.

MR. EDEN went on to explain that the British airbase for sending supplies to Tito is located at Cairo and asked Mr. Molotov where he would like to have a base for the Russians.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that he would leave that to the discretion of Mr. Eden and that as Mr. Eden suggested Cairo he thought that would be a good location for the Russians too.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet General Staff plans to send a mission to Yugoslavia and that on his return to Moscow he will be able to state who is taking part in this mission.

MR. EDEN said that he would try to get preliminary arrangements made and a place ready for an airbase for the Russians at Cairo and assured that such a base would be made available.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether it would not be better to have a mission to Michaelovich rather than to Tito in order to get better information.

MR. EDEN said that he would know better tomorrow but that from reports he had received from British Officers, Michaelovich would not be good to deal with, but he said that maybe it would be good for the Russians to send some of their people to Michaelovich.

Then he brought up the question as to whether the territory occupied by Tito was or was not separated by German forces from the area or areas occupied by Michaelovich.

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MR. EDEN then referred to Mr. Molotov making reference to what he termed an "indiscreet conversation" held between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin the other day on the subject of Poland.

He added that the British have only one desire to prevent the problem from becoming a source of friction between our countries. He said that if the question of two steps to the left was to be considered for Poland, then he would want to know how large these steps would be. He said that if he knew what was in the minds of the Russians on this question he would then be able to ask them for some sort of an agreement of opinion. Therefore he suggested that this problem should be carefully looked over.

MR. MOLOTOV added that he agreed.

MR. HOPKINS said that he was under the impression that the President had spoken quite openly and frankly with Marshal Stalin and that he had told him or would tell him all that he had on his mind on this subject and that he was sure the President and Prime Minister had talked over the question of Poland.

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Dinner - The British Legation, Teheran, Iran.

Tuesday, November 30, 1943

File Teheran trip file

Thirty-three members of the American, British and Russian representatives at the Teheran conference gathered with Mr. Churchill for dinner on the occasion of his 69th birthday. A list of the guests, and the seating arrangement at the dinner table, is attached.

It was clear that those present had a sense of realization that historic understanding had been reached and this conception was brought out in the statements and speeches. Back of all was the feeling that basic friendships had been established which there was every reason to believe would endure.

This strong feeling of optimism appeared to be based on the realization that if the three nations went forward together, there was real hope for a better world future, and that their own most vital interests dictated such a policy.

President Roosevelt sat on the Prime Minister's right, and Marshal Stalin on his left. All speeches took the form of toasts, following the Russian custom and the policy established at the Stalin dinner at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday night.

The President opened the proceedings with the first toast, an unusual departure from rote in that he, instead of the host, proposed the traditional toast to the King. The President said that as an old friend of King George he had requested of Mr. Churchill the privilege of offering the toast.

The Prime Minister then paid a warm official and personal tribute to the President, whom he characterized as a man who had devoted his entire life to the cause of ~~the~~ defending the weak and helpless, and to the promotion of the great principles that underlie our democratic civilization. Following this with a toast to Marshal Stalin, he said the latter was worthy to stand with the great figures of Russian history and merited the title of "Stalin the Great".

The President spoke of his long admiration for Winston Churchill and his joy in the friendship which had developed between them in the midst of their common efforts in this war.

Marshal Stalin said the honors which had been paid to him really belonged to the Russian people; that it was easy to be a hero or a great leader, if one had to do with people such as the Russians. He said that the Red Army had fought heroically, but that the Russian people would have tolerated no other quality from their armed forces. He said that even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who didn't, he said, were killed.

The Prime Minister spoke of the great responsibility that rested on the three men who have the power to command some 30 million armed men, as well as the vast number of men and women who stood behind these men in their work in field and factory, which makespossible the activities of the armies. In a personal toast to Franklin Roosevelt, the Prime Minister expressed his opinion that through the President's courage and foresighted action in 1933, he had indeed prevented a revolution in the United States. He ex-

pressed his admiration for the way the President had guided his country along the "tumultuous stream of party friction and internal politics amidst the violent freedoms of democracy".

Among the many toasts of the evening was one by President Roosevelt to Sir Alan Brooke, the British Army Chief of Staff. Marshal Stalin stood with the others, but he held his glass in his hand, and when the others had drunk he stayed on his feet. He said he wished to join in the toast to General Brooke, but wished to make certain observations.

Acknowledging the general's greatness, Marshal Stalin, with a twinkle in his eye, said he regretted that Sir Alan was unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and adopted a grim and distrustful attitude toward the Russians. He drank the general's health in the hope that Sir Alan "would come to know us better and would find that we are not so bad after all".

Some time later, in reply to Stalin, General Brooke rose and with some stiffness of manner declared that the Marshal had made note of the means used by the Russians in deceiving the enemy on the Eastern front. For the greater part of the war, he went on, Great Britain had adopted cover plans to deceive the enemy, and it was possible that Marshal Stalin had mistaken the dummy "tanks and airplanes" for the real operations. "That is possible" interjected Stalin, drily, bringing chuckles around the table. His real desire, continued Brooke, was to establish closer collaboration with the Russians. "That is possible", Stalin repeated, "even probable." And there were more chuckles.

It was thought that General Brooke would wind up with a toast to Marshal Vorshilov, the Russian chief of staff, but instead he broke away completely from his vein and abruptly proposed the health of Admiral Leahy.

Mr. Churchill took indirect note of the incident and seemed inclined to soften the effect of it, and in a subsequent toast he observed that he had heard the suggestions concerning changing political complexions in the world. He said that he could not speak with authority concerning the political view which might be expressed by the American people in the coming year's elections, and that he would not presume to discuss the changing political philosophy of the Russian nation. But, he continued, so far as the British people were concerned, he could say very definitely that their "complexions are becoming a trifle pinker". Stalin spoke up instantly: "That is a sign of good health!"

In what he declared would be the concluding toast of the evening, Mr. Churchill referred to the great progress which had been made at Teheran toward solution of world affairs, and proposed a joint toast to the President and Marshal Stalin.

But before the dinner could break up, Stalin requested of his host the privilege of delivering one more toast. Mr. Churchill nodded assent and Stalin then said he wished to speak of the importance of "the machine" in the present war, and to express his great admiration for the productive capacity of the United States. He had been advised, he said, that the United States would very soon be producing 10,000 planes every month. This compared, he said, with 2,500 to

3,000 planes which the Soviet Union was able to produce, after making every effort to speed the task, and with a somewhat similar number of planes produced monthly by Great Britain.

Without these planes from America the war would have been lost, said Stalin with emphasis. He expressed his gratitude and that of the Russian people for the great leadership of President Roosevelt which had developed the great production of war machines and made possible their delivery to Russia. He wound up with a warm toast to the President.

Then the President sought the privilege of adding a last word, and he said these meetings at Teheran had raised all our hopes that the future would find a better world, an ordered world in which the ordinary citizen would be assured the possibility of peaceful toil and the just enjoyment of the fruits of his labors.

"There has been discussion here tonight of our varying colors of political complexion", he said. "I like to think of this in terms of the rainbow. In our country the rainbow is a symbol of good fortune and of hope. It has many varying colors, each individualistic, but blending into one glorious whole.

"Thus with our nations. We have differing customs and philosophies and ways of life. Each of us works out our scheme of things according to the desires and ideas of our own peoples.

"But we have proved here at Teheran that the varying ideals of our nations can come together in a harmonious whole, moving unitedly for the common good of ourselves and of the world.

"So as we leave this historic gathering, we can see in the sky, for the first time, that traditional symbol of hope, the rainbow".

Dinner - The British Legation

Teheran, Iran

Tuesday, November 30, 1943

Major Boettiger	Mr. Holman
Lt. General Sir H. Ismay	Mr. Martin
General Arnold	Lt. Gen. Somervell
Lord Moran	General Sir Alan Brooke
The Hon. W. A. Harriman	Mr. Berejkov
Field Marshal Sir J. Dill	Marshal Voroshilov
Major Birse	Sir Reader Bullard
Marshal Stalin	Mr. Molotov
The Prime Minister	Mr. Eden
The President	The Hon. Harry Hopkins
Mr. Bohlen	Sir. A. Clark Kerr
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. Cunningham	The Hon. J. G. Winant
Admiral Leahy	Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Section Officer Oliver	General Marshall
Admiral King	Captain Randolph Churchill
Sir Alexander Cadogan	Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
Mr. Robert Hopkins	Commander Thompson

Published in FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran (1943), pp. 594-596.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec.

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3:20 P.M. DECEMBER 1, 1943

THE PRESIDENT

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

MR. BOHLEN

MARSHAL STALIN

MR. MOLOTOV

MR. PAVLOV

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec

THE PRESIDENT said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American politics.

He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally he did not wish to run again, if the war was still in progress, he might have to.

He added that there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said personally he agreed with the views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state but would like to see the Eastern border moved further to the west and the Western border moved even to the River Oder. He hoped, however, that the Marshal would understand that for political reasons outlined above, he could not participate in any decision here in Tehran or even next winter on this subject and that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that now the President explained, he had understood.

THE PRESIDENT went on to say that there were a number of persons of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin, in that order, in the United States. He said that he fully realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently been a part of Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies re-occupied these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.

He went on to say that the big issue in the United States, insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination. He said he thought that world opinion would want some expression of the will of the people, perhaps not immediately after their re-occupation by Soviet forces, but some day, and that he personally was confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite see why it was being raised now.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the truth of the matter was that the public neither new or understood.

MARSHAL STALIN answered that they should be informed and some propaganda work should be done.

He added that as to the expression of the will of the people, there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could not agree to any form of international control.

THE PRESIDENT replied it would be helpful for him personally if some public declaration in regard to the future elections to which the Marshal had referred, could be made.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated there would be plenty of opportunities for such an expression of the will of the people.

After a brief discussion of the time of the President's departure and that of Marshal Stalin, THE PRESIDENT said there were only two matters which the three of them had not talked over.

He said he had already outlined to the Marshal his ideas on the three world organizations but he felt that it was premature to consider them here with Mr. Churchill. He referred particularly to his idea of the four great nations, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, policing the world in the post-war period. He said it was just an idea, and the exact form would require further study.

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MR. MOLOTOV said that at the Moscow Conference, in accordance with the Four Power Declaration, it had been agreed that the three governments would give further study as to the exact form of world organization and the means of assuring the leading role of the four great powers mentioned.

During the conversation, in reply to the President's question, MARSHAL STALIN said that he had received the three papers which the President had handed him the day before yesterday, one in regard to air bases, and the other two in regard to secret contacts involving the Far East, but said he had not had time to study the documents carefully, but would take it up in Moscow with Ambassador Harriman.

REGRADED
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[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Dear Miss Tully:

In accordance with Mr. Hopkins' instructions, I am sending you herewith, for the President, two copies of the Minutes of the Meetings with the Turks in Cairo.

D.E.Krauss
Secretary to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

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DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.

Record of Meeting held
at President Roosevelt's
Villa on December 4th at
5 p.m.

Present:

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Mr. L. Steinhardt,
United States Ambassador to Turkey
President Inonu
Mr. Numan Menemencioglu
Mr. Surreya Andermon,
Private Secretary to President Inonu
Mr. Churchill
Mr. Eden
Sir A. Cadogan
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm

(Mr. Surreya Andermon acted as Interpreter)

President Roosevelt welcomed the opportunity of discussion with the Turkish President. It was important that as many Nations as possible should join the United Nations, now numbering about 35, and Turkey's accession to the United Nations would be welcomed. They were concerned not only with winning the war but also with the period after the war, and for both, unity of Nations was necessary to achieve the purpose of them all. At Tehran important decisions had been reached.

(1) As regards the war itself. Agreement had been come to for operations in 1944 for Russian, British and American Forces in such a way that an Anglo-American Second Front would be opened on a very large scale. This would be timed with an increase of Russian pressure, so that attacks would be developed against Germany from all sides.

(2) As regards post-war problems. It must be seen to that Germany and Japan did not start another war in 20 years' time.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that he had assured the Turkish President and Government that the British Government would not invoke the alliance or ask them to join the war unless and until such action could be taken without unfair risk for Turkey, for whom he had great regard. He now thought the moment had come when Turkey should very seriously consider associating herself with the great Allies. The dangers which had been present at the time of the Adana Conference had now very largely passed away. The advantages to Turkey from joining in the war would be permanent and lasting, more particularly from the point of view of Turkish relations with Russia. These were causing Turkey anxiety, but if Turkey accepted the invitation being put to her, Turco-Russian relations would be put on the best possible footing. Turkey would sit on the Bench with Russia, America and the United Kingdom and the other United Nations. Turkey's great friend and Ally felt it would be a pity if she now missed her chance. In a few months, perhaps six, German resistance might be broken, and Turkey, if she did not accept the invitation now, might then find herself alone, not on the Bench, but wandering about in Court. It would be dangerous if Turkey now missed the chance of joining the English speaking peoples numbering, excluding coloured races, some two hundred million souls. There were risks either way. But if Turkey associated herself with the United Nations she would also be associated with Russia, one of the strongest military Powers in the world, if not the strongest, at any rate in Europe and Asia. President Roosevelt and he had been authorised by Marshal Stalin to assure President Inonu that, if Turkey entered the war against Germany or if Germany attacked Turkey, and Bulgaria took action, Russia would

at once declare war on Bulgaria.

President Roosevelt remarked that Marshal Stalin had been very clear about that. The moment Bulgaria acted, Russia would declare war.

Mr. Churchill also asked President Inonu to note that at Tehran the Soviet Union had signed, with Great Britain and the United States, a new undertaking to respect Persia.

Mr. Churchill said that these were important declarations. If in the circumstances Turkey should feel inclined, at the request of her ally, Great Britain, who was now invoking the Alliance, and of the two greatest Powers in the world, America and the Soviet Union, to throw in her lot with them in the near future, we could then go ahead and consider how best to help Turkey with her preparations, more particularly against the possibility of German and Bulgarian aerial attack. The publicity side was also most important, as the greatest possible time should be gained for preparation before everything became known. Finally it would be necessary to discuss the nature of the campaign to be waged by Turkey, i.e., whether it should take an offensive or defensive form.

Mr. Churchill said that the entry of Turkey into the Grant Alliance of 35 nations would bring about great international changes. Roumania was now begging for peace. Hungary wished to get out of the war. Bulgaria was greatly divided. Mr. Churchill's own opinion (and he had been associated with European politics for about 35 years) was that the entry of Turkey into the war, arranged in the right way and at the right time, would bring about a series of landslides in these countries. It would be most fruitful and welcome.

After a brief interval President Inonu said that he attached the

greatest importance to this meeting. When he learnt that President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill wished to study and discuss the situation with him in full sympathy and friendship, the possibility of the discussion was envisaged by his country and by the Turkish Assembly with the greatest confidence. He expressed thanks for the invitation and for the offer of study.

The Turkish President said that since the beginning his country had taken a clear decision - to stand beside those who were fighting the cause of the United Nations. She had been one of the first so to state her position clearly. The war had shown great fluctuations and difficulties, but throughout Turkey had remained firmly anchored to her Alliance with Great Britain, and to the ideas which she postulated for the future of humanity. In this decision Turkey had not been moved by any egotistical or personal interest.

In connection with the object in view, it was equitable to think of the method which those who had provoked this war had used to convince their peoples - vengeance, etc. Turkey had been one of the greatest victims of the last war. From the first moment, however, she had decided firmly and seriously to collaborate with those who were fighting for the fraternity of peoples, and she had remained faithful throughout the years. These had not been without risks for Turkey. She had been alone and isolated. Great Britain had gone through a hard time and had fought gallantly. In her own way Turkey had done her best and she had sacrificed none of her principles.

President Inonu said that he did not want to go over all the ground, but President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill would remember that the Turkish attitude had been appreciated, and the Turks were very pleased at the repeated assurances of this appreciation. At the moment when Germany was about to declare war on Greece, she gave as one of the reasons for doing so that the

Greeks had sent an officer to Ankara for consultation. (Mr. Churchill pointed out that it had only been a pretext.) President Inonu said that this was typical, and no doubt had Germany thought it worth while to make Turkey pay for her policy, she would have done so.

Now, However, President Inonu continued, the situation had totally changed. Mr. Churchill had outlined the advantages which would accrue to Turkey if she joined in the war. President Inonu must, however, first point out that so long as Turkey was not in the war she was not in danger. He could not accept the thesis that there would be danger for Turkey in staying out. Turkey's attitude was not a matter for discussion. Turkey knew her engagement and she had replied to the invitation. She wished to collaborate with her Allies. She remained faithful to the principles which she had embraced from the first moment.

The points which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had disclosed were of great importance. The Soviet engagement about Persia and collaboration in connection with Bulgaria were of appreciable value. The Turkish reply of November 17th had re-affirmed Turkey's desire to collaborate. Naturally Turkey had to state conditions, political and otherwise. But practical considerations, i.e., military needs etc., came before all others. Turkey was alone. If Germany declared war on her, the situation would be dangerous. Turkey was not prepared. From the beginning of the war there had been talk of preparation, and help had come along, sometimes quickly and sometimes more slowly. To a certain extent this was fair. The Turks had asked for aeroplanes and tanks, but these had often been refused. The President had agreed to these not being supplied when he was assured that they were needed for active operations. In face of this assurance he had had nothing to say. If, however, the reason

was not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration or another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely different.

A general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish President meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish cordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and El Alamein, i.e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed their assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together Turkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this. The Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually, and although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the Turks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the dangerous moment, he had repeated his advice "be strong in Egypt". All this background conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready. Supposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy, he alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in.

Mr. Churchill said that he had always realised that Turkey's preoccupation was Russia. But Turkey's only sure course was with the Allies. As he had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen moment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world.

President Roosevelt said there was no implication of a threat. The advantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles away, but would always remain Turkey's friend. The United Kingdom would also be the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and if he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very seriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with

Russia - Mr. Churchill interjected 'to bind themselves with Russia'.

President Inonu said he dealt with the past in order to arrive at one point. He had wanted to explain Turkey's entirely loyal attitude. The war might finish with or without Turkey's collaboration. In neither event would egotistical factors dominate. He had, of course, to pay attention to the interests of his country, but Turkey remained faithful to her original decision of association with the common cause. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had responded to the invitation of a month ago, and the Turkish Government had replied. Turkey wished to be with the Allies. But there was the practical side, and the practical difficulties must be resolved. Turkey was not prepared. If the Allies were prepared to meet the minimum essential requirements of Turkey, and if after these had been met Turkey could be useful to the Allies, "we will come with you".

But the Germans would understand. They knew that there was effective collaboration, and that Turkey was doing many things which were incompatible with neutrality. It was for this reason and in order to gain time for preparation that the Germans had been told that the Allies had asked Turkey to come into the war, but that she had refused. It was possible that Germany did not believe this statement. In any case, she would watch every development most carefully. So far Germany had raised no strong objection to Turkey's actions. There had been no serious protests against her unneutral actions. Turkey was not in the war and perhaps Germany still thought that she would not come into it. But if the day came when Germany was persuaded that Turkey was coming into the war, the Germans would react to the utmost of their ability.

Mr. Churchill agreed, but said that Germany could not do nearly as

such as she could have done previously.

President Inonu said that the Turks had considered all these things. It was true that Germany could not execute a campaign from Istanbul to Syria. She could, however, by air action do vast destruction and could seize Istanbul. She had the material readily available to the westward of Turkey, where it had been concentrated for two reasons, as a menace to Turkey and to prevent the Allies getting at her.

President Inonu said, however, that for him there was one practical point, i.e., the capacity to defend herself with the minimum indispensable requirements. It was essential that in the period of preparation the Germans should not be provoked. If the Allies have no confidence in Turkey they would not discuss future developments until the period of preparation was over. If they had confidence they could discuss plans now.

President Roosevelt remarked that this was reasonable.

President Inonu said that so far preparations and supplies had not been encouraging. If a new decision were taken it would depend on the Allies how long it would be before Turkey was ready. He could not say. But essential things must be provided. Turkey had mobilised everything she had, even material dating from the Middle Ages.

President Roosevelt enquired the position as regards anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and was told that so far about 800 of the latter had been provided.

Mr. Churchill said that this was more than the United Kingdom had at the outbreak of war.

President Inonu said that no doubt Turkey's Allies sometimes asked

themselves why they should go on sending supplies to Turkey if she was never going to come into the war. The Turks for their part complained that although they were not given supplies, they were still asked to come into the war. It was a vicious circle. But Turkey could be got in for the last stage of the war if there were collaboration. He would be glad if the war were over in two months without Turkey acquiring any glory. He thought, however, that the war would last another year, and there was therefore plenty of time for Turkey to help.

Mr. Churchill said it was most important that Turkey should decide to enter the war when her influence would be greatest, and so take her place among the victorious nations. It was essential to shorten as much as possible the conflict, which was costing so much in blood and treasure.

President Inonu said he could contemplate two things, (1) a plan of preparation involving supplies to Turkey and (2) a plan of collaboration. It was naturally essential that effective collaboration should be studied by the military experts, and he hoped it would be studied on a big basis. What would suit Turkey best would be that she should fight side by side with British and American contingents in her own part of the world. The President and Mr. Churchill could however say that they had made their plans embracing the whole field of world operations, and that Turkey's role was so and so. That he would understand. What he would not accept was a background of suspicion of Turkey's intentions, and a demand to come into the war blindly, with a statement that when Turkey had entered the war she would be told what her part was to be.

President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill vigorously disclaimed any such intention. Discussions could start now on the two stages indicated, and

President Roosevelt said that there was no question of Turkey being asked to come in and wait for a month or six weeks without any air protection. They contemplated building up that protection at once. When that had been done by a certain date, Turkey could come in without the risk of having Istanbul bombed to the ground. If President Inonu could accept this in principle, the military authorities could take up the question and get ready.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that this work was already in hand, and he hoped that in a few weeks the preparations would be complete so that the air bases could then be used for attacks on the German held islands. A programme could be arranged.

President Roosevelt suggested that nothing should be done to induce German attacks.

Mr. Churchill said that there was always a danger of this. The Turks had been asked to allow 7000 personnel to be infiltrated, and that involved some risk.

President Roosevelt suggested that the personnel might enter Turkey in plain clothes.

Mr. Churchill said that it would be impossible to avoid dangerous moments. It might be that two-thirds of the preparatory work would be completed when the Germans would become convinced that Turkey was irrevocably committed and would act. This danger could not be eliminated. It should, however, be reduced to a minimum by precautions, camouflage etc.

President Inonu said that the period of preparation would be a delicate one in spite of all precautions. These precautions must, however, be taken and preparations made sincerely and seriously. He did not think that

four or five or six weeks would be enough for the preparations, but if in that time the anti-aircraft preparations were got ready, that would be something.

Mr. Churchill said that in six or seven weeks the anti-aircraft defences could be in a good state. Moreover, in that time the strategic situation might have changed appreciably. There might, for instance, be a considerable change in the strategic situation as a result of the Russian advance towards Roumania.

Mr. Churchill then said that he contemplated a programme somewhat on the following lines:

(1) A declaration after the present Conference that Turkish policy had not changed.

(2) A period of approximately six weeks during which material, especially for anti-aircraft defence, would be pushed into Turkey.

(3) Immediately thereafter, the placing of British and American combat squadrons on the prepared air fields.

(4) German protest and Turkey's diplomatic reply, but steady continuation of reinforcement and preparation.

(5) Reactions in the satellite countries - Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. These reactions would be very important, as they would dominate the attitude of Germany. Throughout this period Turkey would continue to send supplies including chrome (but only a little) to Germany. The Germans would be afraid to push things too far. They would be afraid of the Turkish advance towards belligerency having the effect on Bulgaria of making her change sides.

President Roosevelt confirmed that in this phase American heavy bombers, which had already made two raids on Sofia, would be attacking Bulgaria on a scale much greater than they had done hitherto.

Mr. Churchill added that at the right moment in this stage the Bulgarian Government would learn that a Bulgarian declaration of war on Turkey would automatically mean a Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria.

President Roosevelt again stressed the importance of this Russian assurance, and remarked that he had been surprised when Marshal Stalin had volunteered it.

At this stage (7 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

President Roosevelt suggested that President Inonu would no doubt wish to consider what had been said and the conversations would be continued later.

[redacted]

DRAFT.

Record of meeting held at President Roosevelt's villa on December 5th at 3 p.m.

Present:

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Mr. L. Steinhardt,
United States Ambassador to Turkey
President Inonu
Mr. Numan Menemencioglu
Mr. Cevat Acikalin
Mr. Surreya Anderman,
Private Secretary of President Inonu
Mr. Sadi Kavour
Mr. Torgut Menemencioglu
Mr. Churchill
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen
General Sir Maitland Wilson
Air Marshall Sir Sholto Douglas
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm

(Mr. Surreya Anderman acted as Interpreter).

Prior to the full meeting President Roosevelt had been in conference with the Turkish representatives. On the arrival of H. M. Ambassador at Ankara, but before the arrival of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, President Roosevelt had explained what he had been saying to the Turks. Though he did not know what Mr. Churchill might say, it seemed to him that there could be three stages. He saw objection to dates for these stages though there should be a general date. In the first phase he felt that the delivery of the Adana material, which he understood was considerably behind, should be got on with as quickly as possible. Also in this first phase the air-fields and other

defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.

President Roosevelt's second phase would overlap the first. It was what he would call the co-operative period, during which he regarded as an real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Military Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British representative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would know all that was going on as regards military plans and activties, e.g. as regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.

Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase - political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until everything else had been tied up. The Russians were now in a good mood and now was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates would be fixed for these stages.

President Inonu remarked that the practical side must be envisaged. If the Russians continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war and for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates

was impracticable.

President Roosevelt thought there was much in this and summarised the position as being that the Turks did not want to be caught with their pants down.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said that this would depend on the extent of infiltration in the preparatory period.

President Roosevelt said that the target date was dependent on progress.

General Wilson said that they did not want a scramble. They wanted to get the equipment and everything in so as to be in a position to operate within 24 hours. If things had to be rushed they would not be used to the best advantage. It would be best if nothing happened before all was ready.

At this stage Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden joined the meeting.

President Roosevelt then briefly summarised the above, remarking that he thought it a mistake to date each stage. The final date might be determined but not the date of the intermediate stages. He understood that there had been a fall-down on Adana promises. As an instance he quoted that 1800 trucks had been promised but only 800 delivered. These past delays today affected Turkey's ability to defend herself.

Mr. Churchill said that there was another factor. The Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material. In this connection Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that 70 aircraft (54 Hurricanes and 18 Beauforts) had been waiting ready for the Turks to collect for the last three months.

President Inonu reminded Mr. Churchill of his remark at Adana when

inspecting newly arrived Hurricanes, that we no longer regarded these as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt imperative considerations had made it impossible to supply better planes.

Mr. Churchill said that the situation had greatly changed since Adana. In the interval Italy had fallen and it had been necessary to take military supplies for the battle-fields in the Central Mediterranean. As a result the Eastern Mediterranean had not received full supplies. Even so Turkish sea and railway transport had been fully engaged since Adana and the greater part of the Adana supplies had been delivered. The result was that today the Turks were much stronger than they had been at Adana.

President Inonu said that the position taken up by Mr. Churchill at Adana had been generous and comprehensible. The situation today was not so clear and in fact was not known. Frankly he did not know what was required. Was it not possible to get out of the impasse? If a date was fixed for pushing Turkey into the war in the near future, e.g. in a matter of weeks, there would be an impasse. Was not the decision of Turkey to come into the war of some importance?

Mr. Churchill said it was fundamental. It represented a new stage. The principle had been established. It remained to study the method.

President Inonu said the question seemed to be when Turkey would enter the war. She had stated her conditions. He had spoken of plans of preparation and collaboration. Her representatives wanted to know how they could render service. They wanted to know the risks they would run and how their forces would be used.

Mr. Churchill assented.

President Inonu remarked that the question of when Turkey would be ready was a practical one. It depended on preparation. Just before lunch he had received a plan. (Mr. Eden remarked that this plan had been based on a telegram from Tehran). President Inonu went on to say that since Adana 250 medium anti-aircraft guns had been delivered; of these about half were in use and the other half had arrived in recent months. The Turks were agreeable to giving them to British personnel to handle.

Air Vice-Marshal George remarked that there were 138 of these anti-aircraft guns to be taken over. According to General Wilson they would be replaced by guns already in the Middle East.

Mr. Churchill said that the replacement guns were here but that they must not go into store. They should go straight to the air fields.

President Inonu said that this, (the Teheran plan) though something by itself, was not a sufficient preparation for an army. He had thought it a complete plan and it seemed to him to be only a semblance of preparation.

Mr. Churchill remarked that it was not so bad as that. It seemed to Mr. Churchill that first of all there should be the period of preparation. He hoped that this could begin at once. Throughout it transport facilities should be utilised to the maximum extent. Perhaps a period of six weeks would be required. Throughout this period everything would be camouflaged though the flow would steadily grow. But Turkish policy outwardly would be unchanged. No doubt the Germans would be suspicious but the development would go steadily on.

President Inonu remarked that if the experts studied the necessary measures for two or three days they would no doubt be able to say when every-

thing would be ready.

Mr. Churchill replied that within a period of six weeks it ought to be possible to make considerable preparations against air attack.

Mr. Churchill said that the second stage would then come, i.e. British and American aircraft would come to the fields prepared for them.

President Inonu said that the Turks must regards the day of the arrival of the aircraft as the day of the declaration of war. They must regard the arrival of the Allied aircraft with the utmost seriousness and must count it as the beginning of a state of war with Germany.

President Roosevelt said that it was not desired that war should occur until the fields were ready or indeed until everything was ready. He explained that by everything he meant everything in connection with the preparation and defence of the air fields.

President Inonu said that as he understood the position, the air fields would be prepared in six weeks as one part of a general plan of preparations. After six weeks the Allied planes would arrive.

Mr. Churchill seemed to think that this did not necessarily mean a declaration of war by either side. In that event preparations would continue to go on, e.g. for two months (Mr. Churchill suggested one month) or two weeks, and that then the Turks should take the initiative in declaring war.

Mr. Churchill said preparations would continue so long as they were not interrupted. Effective air protection would be provided when everything was in place. Then would come the third phase when it could be arranged to employ forces against the German-held islands. At the same time American aircraft would bomb Bulgarian air fields and so reduce the possibility of

air attack on Turkey. Russia also would warn Bulgaria. This might be somewhere about January 15th or 20th. He did not want to push Turkey into a bad position and perhaps she might be ready for effective action about the end of February.

President Inonu said that he could not contemplate conclusion of the first stage mentioned by Mr. Churchill and the arrival of the Allied aeroplanes without the expectation or intention of a declaration of war.

Mr. Churchill said this was not certain.

President Inonu said he must be able to explain the position to his people. He must say that there had been no provocation. Turkey's engagements to Britain were known and it was right that Turkey should be prepared to defend herself. He understood that if Turkey were attacked the aircraft would be there to help her within 24 hours.

Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas explained that this would depend on the moment of attack. If Germany were to attack immediately the Turks returned to Angora and before any preparations had been made, air assistance could not arrive for a week. If the attack came 15 days after the beginning of the period of preparation, there would be a delay of 3 or 4 days. If however it were delayed for a month after the beginning of the preparatory period, the planes would be there in 24 hours. Thus, Mr. Churchill pointed out, it was very important that the period of infiltration should be as long as possible so that the planes could come effectively into action immediately they arrived.

At the request of President Inonu, Mr. Numan said that the discussions had perhaps rather wandered and that there might be some misunderstanding. It had not been President Inonu's purpose to ask how soon the Allied squadrons

would arrive. His point was the danger of war at the end of the 6 weeks' period of preparation. This danger might be 100%, but even if it were only 30% the Turks must still regard it as 100%, and Mr. Numan said that Turkey could not envisage being in the war at the end of this period of preparation.

Mr. Eden enquired what therefore was the Turkish proposal.

President Inonu said that a general plan of preparation must be agreed among the experts. Both parties must play a part in reaching a decision as to what was a reasonable, practical plan. The British would then be able to estimate the period required for its execution. Within that period the plan of future collaboration could be developed and the contemplated political discussions could be engaged. The Allies must however give up the idea of having Turkey in the war within 6 weeks. Otherwise the discussions had reached an impasse.

Mr. Numan said that the difference between the two sides seemed to be essentially that, whereas the Allies regarded time as being the determining factor, the Turks regard preparations as being that factor. The Turkish President wanted a plan of preparation. It might be that that could be completed in 5 days. If it could, then the Turks would come in in 5 days. If however it took 5 months the Allies on their side must accept that period.

Mr. Churchill said he was in sympathy with much of what Mr. Numan had said. The preparatory period would however be over when the squadrons could land in force and be in action within 24 hours. The guns would be there to defend the nests but the fighters were the birds which used these nests. Mr. Churchill explained that what he asked for was the inception at the earliest possible moment and in full vigour of the preparatory plan. This meant the arrival of supplies and material and of men in mufti against the

arrival of the protecting air squadrons. Once this protection was established the situation would become dangerous for the enemy. In the intervening period, i.e. before the arrival of the protecting squadrons, the situation would be dangerous for Turkey. Once the air fields were ready the squadrons could come in within 24 hours. He doubted whether the Germans would then declare war on Turkey. Perhaps they would not attack. The Turkish Government could say that the squadrons were there for Turkish protection. Once there, Turkey would be defended. The personnel would come in advance and the squadrons later. This was what had happened at Lisbon. He knew that the circumstances were not the same. They were however similar.

Mr. Numan contested this. He pointed out that the Germans could not attack the Azores.

Mr. Churchill replied that this was so but that the Germans could have bombed Lisbon. President Roosevelt and he had always thought that the Germans would not bomb Lisbon. They had an interest in not doing so. Portuguese wolfram was important to Germany - it was in fact the chrome of Portugal. The position was much the same as regards Turkey. What point would there be in Germany attacking her?

Mr. Numan suggested that the question of the Azores be left alone. The Atlantic battle had been decided. The use of Turkish bases was quite a different matter since it would be for direct attack on Germany.

President Inonu inquired what differences there were between what the Prime Minister had said and what the British had negotiated with the Turkish General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said there was no real difference.

The Air Attache had merely been discussing the first phase.

Mr. Numan pointed out that there had been 5 points in the discussions of the Service Attaches. Some of these were practicable. Others were not. The Turks could not agree to the infiltration of personnel but they could and did agree to the infiltration of the requisite number of specialists.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that the Service Attaches had asked for the infiltration of 7,000 personnel. This figure had now been reduced to 2,000.

At the request of President Inonu Mr. Numan explained that the question of the preparation of the air fields was not the only question. There must be a general plan of which the question of air fields would form a part, indeed perhaps the principal part and the one requiring the greatest priority. He suggested the despatch of experts to Angora to discuss the general plan and to make any other necessary proposals.

Mr. Churchill said that he wanted the preparations to begin at once, i.e. to get supplies, material and personnel introduced into Turkey forthwith and so get the air fields ready. This must be done with the utmost discretion and secrecy. There would be no overt change of Turkish policy. It was however essential that it should begin at once and when the air fields were ready for the planes, we should then want them to come in. The Turkish position would then be completely changed.

Mr. Numan said there was one small point on which he hoped for agreement, namely that there were two questions: that of the period of preparation and that of the declaration of war. He considered that the entry of personnel would provoke war. The second stage would come with the arrival of the squadrons, for within a few days thereafter Turkey would be at war. It was

necessary to separate these two points now. At the same time it was however also necessary to begin preparations now.

Mr. Churchill remarked that the discussion seemed to have got into a difficult circle. We were satisfied that no preparation could be effective without the introduction of personnel while the Turks refused the introduction of personnel because of the danger of provoking Germany. Thus no preparation could be made against Germany being provoked.

At this stage the meeting was adjourned and on the resumption it was suggested that, before a further plenary meeting was held, a discussion should take place between a small committee headed by Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Numan and Mr. Eden. The meeting of this committee was arranged for 6 p.m.

[redacted]

Draft Record of Meeting held at Villa Casey at 6 p.m.
on December 5th, 1943.

Present:

Mr. Numan Menemencioglu
Mr. Cevat Acikalin
Mr. Surreya Anderson,
Private Secretary of President Inonu
Mr. Sadi Kavour
Mr. Torgut Menemencioglu
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Mr. L. Steinhardt,
United States Ambassador to Turkey
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen
General Sir H. Maitland Wilson
Air Marshal Sir W. Sholto Douglas
Air Vice Marshal George
Brigadier Stayner
Mr. Helm

(Mr. Torgut Menemencioglu acted as interpreter)

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by suggesting that Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas should explain what was proposed since he had a feeling that the Turks were under a wrong impression.

Mr. Numan thanked Mr. Eden. He said he would be glad to listen. He must however make it clear that he could not commit himself on military matters which were the concern of the experts and on which he was not competent.

Sir Sholto Douglas said that he was not going to deal with technicalities. He was merely going to make a general exposé to show why we wanted advance infiltration. In this there were two main objects. The first to provide adequate defence for the most vulnerable points, and the second to provide a force for offensive operations in the AEGEAN. As regards the first, the vulnerable points were Istanbul Izmir and Zonguldak. For these it was

proposed to send in 17 squadrons (12 of them Spitfires) and 5 regiments of light and 5 of heavy anti-aircraft guns. For purposes of defence it was essential to have an adequate warning system and also adequate anti-aircraft defence for the air fields on which would depend the defence of Istanbul and other vulnerable places. Until these essentials had been secured it would not be feasible to introduce the necessary squadrons. This brought the Air Marshal to infiltration and his proposals were:

(1) For radio location and operations room - 200 - 250 specialists and 20 - 30 vehicles.

(2) Signals personnel for radio location and for linking air fields with operations room - 400 persons.

(3) Key specialist personnel of anti-aircraft guns - 420 persons.

(4) Additional personnel for radio location, i.e. for extension of system round the coast from Zonguldak to Antalya - 300 persons.

(5) Administrative personnel for dumps, etc. - 500 persons.

This represented a total of about 2,000 personnel.

The introduction of this personnel was the problem. Until something like this had been introduced Turkey would not be in a position of security when the moment of need came.

Mr. Eden remarked that when all this personnel had been brought in the squadrons could be produced in 24 hours for the defence of Turkey if Turkey were attacked. The complete effectiveness of defence would of course also be dependent on Turkey doing her bit as promised with personnel for the anti-aircraft guns. It was as a result of the promise of this personnel that the estimated infiltration needs had been reduced from 7,000 to 2,000. Thus it

could be seen what were the indispensable minimum needs to be introduced during the period of preparation.

Mr. Numan said that he took the infiltration to be part of the general minimum plan. He could not say whether the number of squadrons was adequate, though it sounded good. He obviously must however make a reservation on the question of their utility.

Mr. Eden stressed that in our opinion what Sir Sholto Douglas had explained was the minimum necessary for Turkey's protection. In addition we should of course be ready to specify the material which we should be prepared to supply for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Numan remarked that matters were advancing. There was not an impasse. The arrival of foreigners was very important. Even a civilian arriving in Turkey to serve would be known to Germany and the latter would not be indifferent. He did not want to provoke the Germans before a certain degree of preparation could be achieved. Mr. Churchill had described this as a vicious circle. He (Mr. Numan) did not agree but saw the problem from a different point of view. He was ready to accept the requisite number of technicians for the material supplied. How many technicians these might be he did not know. That would be a matter for the Turkish General Staff. He could not however accept personnel additional to the proper complement of technicians.

Mr. Eden remarked that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs must have confidence. There surely could be no question of our wanting to introduce one single specialist more than was necessary. But how could the Turkish General Staff say whether particular personnel was necessary or not? During the preparatory period we did not wish to rush things any more than

the Turks did. But we did want to get the preparations completed quickly.

Mr. Numan said that the Turks had the same object. They did not wish to provoke the Germans. He could not agree to the introduction of personnel but he did agree to the introduction of technicians, though he must make a reserve regarding the number of these. What he had said amounted to an acceptance in principle of technicians for the material promised.

Mr. Hopkins remarked that President Inonu had several times spoken of Turkey's minimum defence requirements. He wondered if he was right in assuming that this did not refer to infiltration and air material but to other needs. He assumed that the British had been discussing such questions with the Turkish General Staff. Had the British any idea of Turkish minimum requirements? Did they, for instance, include anti-aircraft guns and aircraft? This brought up the question of the commitments to be made and he realised that it was necessary to get personnel introduced in advance. But he wished to be clear in his own mind about the details.

Mr. Eden thought this was a good question. It seemed to him that there were two points - the material to be used by us in order to give protection to Turkey, and the material to be given to Turkey for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there was also the Anglo-American force to go into Turkey in the event of war.

Mr. Eden said that in the first instance this was air alone - anti-aircraft.

Mr. Numan said he wished to make an observation and to compare what Turkey had got with what she had asked for. After the Adana Conference the Turks had prepared a list of requirements which had been more or less discussed.

Later the British had entered into a definite commitment for delivery on the basis of that list. The Turkish list had remained a dead letter. The British list had not been much better (Mr. Eden said that he could not agree). Mr. Numan went on to say that only some 4% of the items on the general list had been delivered to Turkey. He did not wish to make reproaches. He would only state facts and mentioned in particular the case of lorries of which 300 a month had been promised. For some time deliveries had been about 160 or 180 a month. In recent months there had been no deliveries at all. Deliveries did in fact represent a very small proportion of promises.

Mr. Eden said that he could not accept Mr. Numan's figures. He must make it plain that the position now was not the position as it had been at Adana and he personally would not consider recommending his Government now to supply to Turkey all of the material which had been discussed at Adana.

Mr. Numan remarked that his had only been an observation.

General Wilson said that even if it had been possible to supply all the items on the Turkish Adana lists, it would have taken the Turkish railways three years to carry them. As it was Turkey had since Adana been supplied with 350 tanks, 48 self-propelled guns, nearly 300 anti-aircraft guns (over 100 of them heavy) 300 field and medium guns, 200 mortars, rather less than 500 anti-tank guns, an enormous quantity (about 99,000) of various guns and automatics, 420 mortars, and about one million anti-tank mines for the defence of Turkey. It was unfortunately true that there had been a shortage of delivery on motor transport. This had happened because the transport did not exist in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks had however said at Adana that they had enough to defend themselves except for three anti-tank units and

aviation support.

Mr. Hopkins expressed surprise at the extent of material assistance already given since Adana. He wished however to clear the position up. As he understood things, the Allies had agreed, in the event of war, to put in air squadrons and anti-aircraft guns and personnel. How far removed were we from ~~what~~ President Inonu's minimum requirements in the event of war?

Mr. Numan said that if it were desired to negotiate on the basis of these past figures, he also could cite figures. At one moment 40 air squadrons had been promised in the event of war. This had been reduced by half. The percentage of deliveries was not impressive. As for circumstances he agreed that they had changed since Adana, but things had turned out exactly as they had been foreseen at Adana.

Mr. Hopkins said it seemed necessary to get to grips with the problem. Was he to understand that the Turkish President considered he should have twice the air force suggested? Was he to understand that the anti-tank preparation was not enough? Were the Turkish railways a limiting factor in so far as concerned Turkey coming into the war? He asked because if Turkey was not coming into the war she must understand that these munitions, so vitally required elsewhere, would not come into Turkey at all.

Mr. Numan remarked that there must be some misunderstanding. The position had been quite clearly stated. The President had announced his intention of coming into the war. The question of material had however always been a serious one. At the time when the Anglo-Turkish Alliance was negotiated there had at first been a clause which postponed the operation of the Alliance until supplies were provided. He had realised that the supplies could not

be provided and the clause had been suppressed. Since then and until now supplies had still not been available. Today Turkey lacked everything. Not only anti-aircraft guns and tanks but every sort of war material. He did not suggest that the Adana lists or any other list or anything like either of them should be supplied. He did however think that there ought to be a list of reasonable requirements. The Turks would not ask the impossible and with a maximum effort, a list could readily be drawn up.

Mr. Eden said we had given the list of all that we wished to introduce for the defence of Turkey. If this were agreed we could then fix up what we could provide for use by the Turks. But we did not want the preparations of defence to be delayed during the consideration of the second list.

Mr. Numan said he agreed but that it must be part of a general plan in which the air preparations would of course take complete precedence. Mr. Eden enquired what general plan? Mr. Numan answered that it was necessary to decide the minimum requirements of Turkey if she were to enter the war. A list would be necessary.

Mr. Hopkins said he understood that the limiting factor was motor transport. Was it a limiting factor for anti-aircraft personnel? There had been talk of years for the introduction of requirements. We were dealing in weeks.

Mr. Numan pointed to General Wilson's statement that two or three years would have been necessary to introduce the items on the Adana lists. Had one-third of these been introduced in the year since Adana?

Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen suggested that we were all wasting our time in discussing the past. It was a wasted effort. In the interval

everything had changed and it would be a waste of transport even to send to Turkey today the material contemplated at Adana. Surely we should look at the future and not at the past.

Mr. Numan welcomed the Ambassador's interjection and said he quite agreed. He wanted to propose something practical. Could we not at once send to Angora the two Generals (one British, one American) proposed by President Roosevelt so that they could concert at once with the Turkish General Staff and establish a list of requirements and work out complete collaboration.

Mr. Eden said that this was something apart from the fundamental question. We had this afternoon given to our Turkish friends a list of what we thought necessary for the defence of Turkey against attack. This must be the basis of working. In addition we could discuss further material but he could not accept the delay involved in the addition of other material quite unknown.

Mr. Numan said that the President had answered Mr. Eden's point. He had said that 2,000 men and 600 vehicles were not enough for the defence of Turkey though they were no doubt enough for the defence of British air bases.

Mr. Eden pointed out that they were not for the defence of British air bases but for that of Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak.

Mr. Numan remarked that the Turks could not contemplate Turkish defence being entrusted to the British. What they would and did contemplate was the defence of Turkey by the Turks with British help.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that air defence depended essentially on fighters and this must be defended by anti-aircraft guns. The first essential was to get the fighter defence established.

Mr. Eden said that there were two points. The first, what we introduced for the security of Turkey and the second the other things which the Turks must have before Turkey could take action.

General Wilson explained that what had been mentioned hitherto was for Turkish defence. It was only an advance guard. Actually the total force contemplated would be 32,000 troops (11,600 of them air), and 6,000 guns and vehicles (375 guns representing 5 light and 5 heavy anti-aircraft regiments).

Mr. Eden said the urgent plan was one for immediate defence and the execution of this represented the dangerous period.

Mr. Numan having remarked that he could not comment on these figures, Sir R. Knatchbull Hugessen pointed out that as men and material were introduced, the danger to Turkey would be correspondingly diminished. The first problem was to ensure safety and then to build up.

Mr. Numan said Turkey was coming into the war. It was necessary to draw up a plan of preparation and a plan of collaboration and at the same time to take up political matters in another direction.

Mr. Hopkins having remarked that reinforcement would be limited by transport facilities and that as regards priority for air we already give the Turks what they can take, said he must come to the main point. The war had reached a critical stage. It was impossible to divert to a neutral country war material which was not to be used against Germany. The British Prime Minister had been authorized to express the hope of the United States and of Russia that Turkey would enter the war at an early date. We knew that when a nation went to war with Germany she might suffer losses - the United Kingdom, ~~the~~ Russia and the United States had suffered severe losses. He knew that

Turkey wanted to enter the war. In the last analysis a country went to war in its own interests. We wanted Turkey in the war even if she could not have all she wanted. Great Britain, Russia and the United States had not all they wanted when they entered the war. At this critical period in the war the entry of Turkey might save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied nationals. January 1st was not a set date but Turkish participation might not be useful after very long after that date. We wanted Turkey to enter the war willingly and whole-heartedly. We should like Turkey to enter the war about February even though we knew that in doing so Turkey might suffer. We hoped Turkey would enter because all Allied military and political opinion considered that her entry would shorten the war. Only the Turks themselves could speak for Turkish self-interest.. If however discussions were prolonged about the adequacy of material etc. Turkey's entry would be futile. Turkey could be sure that if she came in we would do everything we could - all possible military and air support would be afforded her. He knew he was correctly interpreting President Roosevelt when he said that he hoped that Turkey would in her own interests come in willingly and whole-heartedly.

Mr. Eden said that he wished to have the Turkish position correctly understood and Mr. Numan confirmed that it was as follows:

(1) Our proposals for infiltration were accepted in principle but Mr. Numan made a reservation as regards numbers pending consideration by the Turkish General Staff.

(2) If the programme involving infiltration were accepted Turkey will not take action which she considers might lead her into a state of war with Germany until material and supplies for her use have been given, and the figures of these yet remain

to be determined.

(3) Mr. Eden understood that Turkey had political questions to raise. He did not know what these were.

As regards (3) Mr. Numan referred to the Russian undertaking regarding Bulgaria. He thought that this was the sort of point which he would like to discuss with the Russians. There were other points which he would also like to discuss. But these discussions could take place during the period of preparation and would in no way delay either preparation or collaboration.

Mr. Eden enquired whether there were any other points to be put down.

Mr. Numan said that Mr. Hopkins had spoken of willing entry. This was also the desire of the Turks. They must however have a minimum of essential preparations. Moreover this was a commitment to the Turkish people and to the Party.

Mr. Eden enquired what Turkey wanted under (2). Was it not possible for these requirements to be stated without discussions at Angora?

Mr. Numan repeated that he was not competent to say what the military needs were. All he asked for was comprehension. It lay in our hands to determine when Turkey could enter the war since this would be determined by the supply of the necessary material.

Mr. Numan confirmed that, as he had previously said, the infiltration programme under (1) above could go ahead while the discussion of (2) was in progress.

At this stage (8.15 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

[redacted]

December 1, 1943.

November 28, 1943

Memorandum of Conference between the President and Marshal Stalin - 3 P.M.

Summary of 1st Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M. [See bound Minutes]

Dinner - The President, Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin, etc. [See bound Minutes]

Memorandum of Marshal Stalin's views as expressed during the Evening of November 28.

November 29, 1943

Memorandum of Conference between the President and Marshal Stalin [See bound Minutes]

Summary of 2nd Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M. [See bound Minutes]

Dinner - The President, Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin, etc. [See bound Minutes]

November 30, 1943

Memorandum of Luncheon - The President, Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister [See bound Minutes]

not here

Memorandum of Luncheon - Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov

Summary of the 3rd Regular Session of Tehran Meeting - 4 P.M. [See bound Minutes]

Dinner - The Prime Minister's birthday, at the British Legation

December 1, 1943

Luncheon - The President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, etc. - 1:00 PM [See bound Minutes]

Memorandum re agreement on observation planes using Russian bases

Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Marshal Stalin- 3:20 PM

Memorandum of Conference, the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, etc. - 6:00 PM [See bound Minutes]

not here

Military Conclusions of Tehran Conference

Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran

Commun

[redacted]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[redacted]

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

THE CONFERENCE:-

(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations;

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year;

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war;

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front;

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

F.D.R.
H. G!

Teheran, December 1, 1943.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE AND SECRECY

INITIALED ORIGINAL

OF MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHERAN (EUREKA)

CONFERENCE.

Delivered to Admiral Brown 12-2-43 at Teheran
by Ambassador Harriman.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE AND SECRECY

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE.

Delivered to Admiral Brown 12-2-43 at Teheran by Ambassador Harriman.

November 17, 1944.

Opened this date by the undersigned to verify contents and to clear the State Department records.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, USN.,
Naval Aide to the President.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

To be released to the Press, 8:00 p.m. Moscow Time, December 6, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

WE--The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war--Our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace--we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome then, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, [redacted], December 1, 1943.

[redacted]. Roosevelt
[redacted] Stalin
[redacted] Churchill

To be released to the Press, 8:00 p.m. Moscow Time, December 6, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

WE--The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war--Our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace--we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome then, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, [redacted], December 1, 1943.

[redacted]. Roosevelt
[redacted] Stalin
[redacted] Churchill

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

On the morning of 2 December, 1943, at the airport in Teheran, Mr. Bohlen, in the presence of Mr. Harriman, delivered to me a sealed packet of papers which he said were records of the Teheran Conference. They were delivered to me for safekeeping. About an hour later, while in the plane, Mr. Harry Hopkins asked for the papers in order that he might study them. I delivered them to him and obtained his receipt for them. The receipt is attached herewith. The papers have never been returned to my custody.

This memorandum is made in view of Mr. Harriman's memorandum for file, dated November 13, 1944, a copy of which is attached hereto.

W. Brown

WILSON BROWN.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

[redacted]

Washington, D.C.
November 13, 1944

From: W. A. Harriman

Subject: Teheran Declaration on Iran

On the last night of the Teheran Conference (Dec. 1-2) I was assigned the responsibility of seeing that agreement was finally reached as to the text of the Iran Declaration, which had been previously accepted in principle, and that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister signed the Declaration. I showed the English draft to Marshal Stalin, and asked him whether he wished it translated into Russian in order that there might be both a Russian and an English text to be signed. Stalin asked Pavlov to translate it to him verbally, and in my presence and Mr. Bohlen's said that he approved the Declaration and that, in view of the shortness of time, it was not necessary to have a Russian text. I then asked Stalin to sign the Declaration. He said he would do so after the President. I then took the Declaration to the President, who signed it. Thereupon Stalin signed it forthwith. I do not recall at what moment Mr. Churchill signed it, but I am positive that all three signatures were attached.

After the dinner, General Hurley came to me and asked whether the Declaration had been signed. I gave him a corrected copy of the Declaration as signed to take to the Shah. He said that it would be impossible for him to show the Shah a copy and, as there was only the one signed copy, the original, I gave this to General Hurley, with the definite understanding that he would return it that night, in order that it might be transmitted with the other records of the meeting to Washington with the President. On the copy of the Declaration which I took to Moscow there is a notation by Lt. Meiklejohn that the original had been given to General Hurley.

I understand that a search of the Embassy files at Teheran has not brought forth the signed original of the Declaration.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date NOV 12 1973

I discussed this matter with General Hurley when he was in Moscow in September 1944. He told me that he had shown the Declaration to the Shah that same evening and that the Shah had attached his signature to it. He did not, however, recall what he had done with it thereafter and believed that there was a possibility (provided it is not among the documents brought back from Teheran with the President) that the Declaration was among his papers. He told me that he would search his papers.

Walt

Note: I confirm completely Ambassador Harriman's recollection that the document was signed in the manner described above.

CRB

Copies to: Harry Hopkins
Admiral Wilson Brown
Mr. Bohlen

Dec 2 - 1943

Received from Admiral Brown
all copies of Teheran conference
minutes taken by Mr. Bohlen
except 1) signed entitled copy
of Iranian declaration
2) Military protocol signed
on initial by F.D.R.
Stalin + Churchill

Henry Wallace