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ARGONAUT
CONFERENCE

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1945

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CONFERENCE
U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
1945

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE

January-February 1945

PAPERS

AND

MINUTES OF MEETINGS ARGONAUT CONFERENCE

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
OFFICE, U.S. SECRETARY
OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
1945

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73

By RHP Date OCT 26 1973

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5 February 1945

C.C.S. 320/35

C.C.S. 320/37

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

C.C.S. 320/35

C.C.S. 320/37

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

Reference:

CCS 186th Meeting, Item 5

On 5 February 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a revised draft agreement for the American control of the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave (Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 320/35) in lieu of the draft agreement proposed in the appendix to Enclosure "B."

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 186th Meeting amended and approved the draft agreement proposed in the appendix to Enclosure "B," which was subsequently circulated on 6 February as C.C.S. 320/37.

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C.C.S. 320/35

5 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

References:

- a. CCS 320/33
- b. CCS 320/34

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy (Enclosure "B"), the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve Enclosure "A."
2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready's letter it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot be agreed to by the local commanders of the Zones of Occupation should be referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. There will be undoubtedly some problems of overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and cooperation.
3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must rest with the American commander of the Southwestern Zone. It is subordinate of the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof conform to the general policy pursued in the administration of the British Zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement.

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4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready's letter it is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement.

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.

1. The Bremen and - Bremerhaven enclose Area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a substitute of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will continue to be administered in the administration of the larger British controlled area. The administration will always to the right of the American command to vary the administration of the enclose Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any particular that may be necessary on military grounds.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary areas by the British to office and necessary use of available installations situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area which provide services essential to British administration of the British Zone of Occupation.

3. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Baltic Sea is to be maintained and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to assist in transit of supplies to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To insure efficient response, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of movement and transport out from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic. Arrangements are being made to insure that the map referred to is attached is the same as that attached to C.S.B.

4. The map referred to is attached is the same as that attached to C.S.B.

Enclosure "A"

ENCLOSURE "A"

(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to
General Macready's letter. Underlining and *italiciz-*
ing represent amendments to that attachment.)

1. The Bremen and - Bremerhaven *enclave* Area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization *but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area*. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the *larger district* British Zone, subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the *enclave Bremen-Bremerhaven Area* in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by the British to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services essential to British administration of the British Zone of Occupation.

2. 3. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve *responsible responsive* service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. 4. The map *referred to is* attached is the same as that attached to C.C.S. 320/29.

Words underlined are proposed additions.
Words italicized are proposed deletions.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

General Staff

20 January 1945

Hon. J. J. McCloy,
Assistant Secretary of War,
Room 4E886 Pentagon Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. I am now glad to be able to inform you that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to accept the formula which was arrived at our meeting in the War Department on the 5th January subject to the American Chiefs of Staff confirming their interpretation of one or two points.

For convenience I attach a copy of the formula with two small amendments inserted which I have underlined. These amendments are proposed in order to ensure that the British and American interpretations of the formula are the same.

2. I think you will agree that the interpretation by the British Chiefs of Staff as indicated by these amendments is correct. With regard to the amendment in paragraph 2 the British Chiefs of Staff understand the "Deputy Controller" to be an officer deputed to a functional control office situated outside his national zone, which controls the agents of that office situated within his national zone. He controls such agents only, and does not, in the absence of the "Controller" assume authority over any other portion of the area within the sphere of that Controller.

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3. The British Chiefs of Staff would also like confirmation that administrative questions such as wage rates, which raise points of principle, will necessarily fall into line with the general policies of the Governments or of the Control Commission.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff understand that the proposed formula will have to be read in conjunction with paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 320/34* which will in practice be modified by the principles enunciated in the formula.

It would appear that such modification, however, will be in favor of American interests and providing that it is understood that paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 320/34 is modified by the formula, the British Chiefs of Staff do not consider it necessary to amend C.C.S. 320/34.

5. If you can confirm that the American Chiefs of Staff agree the interpretation of the formula in paragraphs 1 to 4 above, the British Chiefs of Staff propose:

(a) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff respectively issue instructions that the United States group, and the British element, of the Control Council for Germany should jointly proceed forthwith with the detailed planning of the arrangements in connection with the Bremen enclave.

(b) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions that the naval elements of the two Control Council groups should examine the extent of the naval command to seaward referred to in paragraph 7 (b) of C.C.S. 320/33* and should submit their joint proposals to the Navy Department and Admiralty.

(c) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now recommend that the United States Government ratify the occupation protocol for Germany (E.A.C. (44) 12th Meeting).

(d) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now approve:

(i) Paragraphs 1 to 6 of C.C.S. 320/33.

(ii) C.C.S. 320/34.

* Not published herein.

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Malta and Yalta, 1945

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

(ATTACHMENT)


THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.
2. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.
3. The map referred to is that attached to C.C.S. 320/29.

(ATTACHMENT)

Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945.

BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE



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ENCLOSURE

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

C.C.S. 320/37

6 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 186th Meeting on 6 February 1945, approved the attached agreement with respect to the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave.

A. J. McFARLAND,
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U.S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/ British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to C.C.S. 320/29.*

* C.C.S. 320/29 is not published herein but reference map is reproduced facing page 8.

CCS-417/11 dated 22 January 1945
Statement by the United States Chiefs of Staff

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

C.C.S. 417/11

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

References:

CCS 184th Meeting, Item 5

2d Tripartite Military Meeting, Item 7

CCS 776/3, Paragraph 15

C.C.S. 417/11, dated 22 January 1945, was circulated by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and was noted in their 184th Meeting.

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is...
Following the Chinese operations to seize additional positions in...
intensity the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create...
a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese...
capacities by continuing and destroying major enemy forces and...
further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to...
establish a tactical condition favorable to:

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the...
Tokyo Plain.

OPTIONAL CONTINUOUS BOOK PAGE 11

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Malta and Yalta, 1945, 395-396

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C.C.S. 417/11

22 January 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows (C.C.S. 417/9*):

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning in the war against Japan:

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is (C.C.S. 417/10):

a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

* OCTAGON Conference book, page 38.

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3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:—

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Target Date</i>
Continuation of operations in the Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte)	—
Iwo Jima	19 February 1945
Okinawa and extension therefrom in the Ryukyus	1 April-August 1945

4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 1945-1946.

5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until well into 1946.

The following program and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Object	Target Date
Continuation of operations in the Philippines (Iloilo, Manila, Legaspi)	18 February 1945
Two main thrusts to be made in the Philippines	1 April - August 1945
Operations and expansion from Iloilo to the Philippines	

1. That a firm date can be established when operations from Iloilo can begin planning will be required for an operation to take place in the Cebu-Manila area and for invasion of Mindanao in the summer of 1945-1946.

2. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and the extent of operations to maintain and extend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk with the view of having the sea route open between Iloilo and the Philippines. It has been shown that the possibility of having a position in the Philippines for that purpose during the latter part of the year is not to be lost. The possibility of maintaining and extending the sea route from Iloilo to Kamohara also is being further examined.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff have the direct responsibility and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that operations of the Government are required to be conducted in Japan will well into 1946.

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By RAHP Date OCT 26 1973

C.C.S. 452/37

C.C.S. 452/38

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

References:

- CCS 183d Meeting, Item 5
- CCS 184th Meeting, Item 4
- 1st U.S.-U.K. Plenary Meeting, Item e.
- CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT)
- CCS 776/3, Paragraph 16

In C.C.S. 452/35, dated 30 January 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff proposed a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. The United States Chiefs of Staff replied on 31 January (C.C.S. 452/36) accepting the proposed directive subject to agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the policy as set forth therein regarding U.S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 184th Meeting considered C.C.S. 452/35, C.C.S. 452/36 and C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT), a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. After discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff amended and approved the policy contained in C.C.S. 452/36 (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 452/37); approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia as amended to draw his attention to the agreed policy set forth in C.C.S. 452/37 (approved directive subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 452/38); and took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw C.C.S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

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By RSP

Date OCT 26 1973

C.C.S. 452/37

1 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Note by the Secretaries

In their 184th Meeting on 1 February 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the policy set forth in the enclosure.

A. J. McFARLAND,
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,
Combined Secretariat.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo

52 - 73

By RHP Date OCT 26 1973

ENCLOSURE

The primary military object of the United States in the China and India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China.

The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA's use of resources of the U.S. India-Burma Theater in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C.C.S. 452/38

20 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Note by the Secretaries

1. In their 184th Meeting on 1 February 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, contained in C.C.S. 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in C.C.S. 452/37.
2. The directive, as dispatched, is circulated for information.

A. J. McFARLAND,

R. D. COLERIDGE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

From: British Chiefs of Staff
To: Headquarters, Southeast Asia Command
No: COSSEA 200 (CM-IN-3376)

3 February 1945

Following to SACSEA has been approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Begins 1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as operation *LOYALIST*.)

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. (To be known as operation *BROADSWORD*.)

3. In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the despatch of further reinforcements from the European Theatre should circumstances make this possible.

4. You will prepare a programme of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theatre of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theatre.*

Ends

* Enclosure to C.C.S. 452/37.

10-22-52
RMS-16-71

ENCLOSURE

To: British Chiefs of Staff

From: Headquarters Southeast Asia Command

REF: COMINT 300 (CM-11-3170)

1 February 1945

Following to SACSEA has been approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. Your first object is to locate Burma at the earliest date to be known as operation JOY ALLEY.

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. To be known as operation BARABANGOR.

3. In view of your recent success in Burma and of the importance of the task of the final defeat of Germany, a great aim at the commencement of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the possibility of further reinforcements from the European Theatre should circumstances make this possible.

4. You will prepare a programme of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff would draw attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theatre of United States resources destroyed in the India-Burma Theatre.

Yours

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RAP 3-16-71

C.C.S. 625/14

LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS

References:

- CCS 185th Meeting, Item 4
- CCS 186th Meeting, Item 2
- CCS 187th Meeting, Item 2
- CCS 776/3, Paragraph 21

In C.C.S. 625/10 (ARGONAUT), dated 1 February 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff requested agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the minimum stock levels of supply proposed therein for Northwest Europe.

C.C.S. 625/11 (5 February) circulated a reply from the Combined Administrative Committee in response to a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as agreed in their 185th Meeting.

In C.C.S. 625/12, dated 6 February, the United States Chiefs of Staff submitted certain comments on the proposals set forth in C.C.S. 625/10 (ARGONAUT).

C.C.S. 625/13 (7 February) circulated the report by a combined *ad hoc* committee appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 186th Meeting.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting amended and approved the enclosure to C.C.S. 625/13. The agreement for levels of supply of all petroleum products in all theaters as amended and approved was circulated as C.C.S. 625/14.

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C.C.S. 625/14

8 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS

Note by the Secretaries

In their 187th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff amended the agreement set forth in the enclosure to C.C.S. 625/13. The agreement as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is enclosed herewith.

A. J. McFARLAND,

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

AGREEMENT ON LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS

1. The theater level should equal operating level plus emergency reserve level.
 2. Each level shall be expressed in days of forward consumption. The rate of forward consumption used takes into account the size and degree of activity of the consuming forces as estimated by the theater commanders or other appropriate authorities.
 3. The operating level provides the working stock required to be in the theater to provide for planned operations. It represents the number of days of supply to sustain the theater at the expected rate of consumption during the maximum interval which may exist between sustaining shipments. Experience has shown that all theaters (except ice-bound ports for which special levels must be established) can be assured of such a shipment at least every 30 days.
 4. The emergency reserve level is intended to provide for unexpectedly high rates of consumption, destruction of stocks and handling facilities, and interruption of supply due to enemy action. It is based on the number of days or average number of days necessary to make emergency replacements from the principal port or ports of embarkation to the points of consumption in a theater of operation, and it includes loading time, voyage time, unloading time, and theater distribution time. Theater distribution time provides for the products which are necessarily absorbed and immobilized in the internal theater distribution system and takes account of variations in the different theaters.
- It is considered that an emergency reserve level based on emergency replacement time in each theater is adequate to meet any contingency that might arise until special provision can be made for additional supplies.
5. The theater level of petroleum products shall include all bulk and packed stocks in the theater except those products which are (a) en route to the theater prior to discharge ashore, unless held as stock afloat, (b) issued

to civilian garages, retailers and other small consumers, (c) issued to actual consuming units (aircraft, vehicles, ships, craft, and so forth) or issued to dumps forward of Army rear boundary in combat zone.

6. The following theater levels expressed in days of forward consumption have been agreed upon for the supply of all petroleum products for military services and essential civilian use:—

<u>THEATER</u>	<u>Operation Level</u>	<u>Emergency Reserve Level</u>	<u>Theater Level</u>
Northwest Europe and U.K.*			
Admiralty			
Fuels	30	60	90
War Office and European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army			
Motor Transport Fuels	30	30	60
Air Ministry			
100 Octane	30	35	65
Other Grades	30	35	65
Others			
Motor Spirit	30	45	75
Other White	30	60	90
Gas/Diesel	30	60	90
Fuel Oil	30	60	90
Lubricants	30	150	180
Central Mediterranean	30	40	70
Middle East	30	30	60) see para-
Persia and Iraq	30	30	60) graph 6 a.
South & East & West Africa	30	30	60)
Southeast Asia Command (Including India-Burma)	30	55	85
China Theater	30	55	85
Southwest Pacific	30	55	85
South Pacific	30	45	75
Central Pacific	30	50	80
Alaska	30	30	60) see para-
North America	30	25	55) graph 6 b.
Latin America	30	30	60

* Emergency level for this theater takes special cognizance of the complexity of the distribution systems.

a. In these theaters the theater level for aviation spirit will be 75 days instead of 60.

b. Within the Alaskan, North American, and other applicable theaters special levels over and above the theater level will be necessary for ice-bound areas.

c. It is agreed that the above theater levels except as noted for Northwest Europe and U.K. will not apply to stocks of lubricating oils and greases which are subject to special considerations, particularly in areas where blending or packing takes place. The stocks required consequently vary considerably between theaters but normally approximate to 180 days consumption needs.

7. As some theaters have insufficient tankage to accommodate stocks at theater level, consideration will be given to the holding of a proportion of the reserves for these theaters in other areas which have surplus storage capacity available and are suitably placed strategically for this purpose.

8. Priority for providing supplies and allocating tankers shall be accorded to the maintenance of the emergency reserve levels in all theaters with the balance of all theater levels to be accumulated as rapidly as practicable thereafter, each theater taking its proportionate share of any shortage in supplies and tankers.

After all theater levels have been attained, any surplus supplies should be stored, under the control of the owner or as otherwise agreed upon, in available tankage nearest to the source of supply or where it appears most desirable strategically.

Theater stocks in excess of the theater level, unless permitted by specific agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, shall be reduced promptly to authorized levels by appropriate allocation of supplies and/or tankers.

9. If priorities among theaters become necessary they will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

10. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board and appropriate British authorities will be the agencies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with the proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of any required revision of the levels of supply of petroleum products in any or all theaters and the principles governing these levels.

in those theaters the theater level for allocation shall be 15 days
 6. Within the Atlantic, North American, and other applicable theaters
 special theaters over and above the theater level will be necessary for the
 7. It is agreed that the above theater level except as noted for Pacific
 West Europe and U.K. will not apply to blocks of housing and other areas
 which are subject to special considerations, particularly in areas where
 housing or parking takes place. The above request contemplates any
 consistency between theaters but normally operations in the day
 transportation needs.

7. As some theaters have insufficient capacity to accommodate their
 theater level, consideration will be given to the inclusion of a portion of the
 reserves for these theaters in other areas which have surplus theater capacity
 available and are suitably placed strategically for this purpose.

8. Priority for providing supplies and allocating funds shall be accorded
 in the maintenance of the emergency theater level for all theaters with the
 balance of all theater levels to be accumulated as rapidly as practicable there-
 after each theater taking its proportionate share of any change in available
 theater level.

After all theater levels have been allocated, any surplus theater level
 to be used, under the control of the owner or an authority agreed upon, to avail
 this surplus amount to the source of supplies where it appears most desirable
 strategically.

The Air blocks in excess of the theater level, unless restricted by theater
 agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, shall be referred to the
 authorized levels by appropriate allocation of supplies, and a transfer
 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. It is further agreed that theaters become necessary they will be allocated
 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

10. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board and appropriate British authorities
 will be the agencies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with
 the process to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of any request for the
 issue of supply of petroleum products in any of all theaters and the procedure
 governing these levels.

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ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE

(as of 23 January 1945)

24 January 1945

C.C.S. 660/3

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 660/3

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE

(as of 23 January 1945)

Reference:

The enclosed estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 785/2, is submitted for consideration.

CCS 183d Meeting, Item 6

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 660/3 in their 183d Meeting.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo

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By RAIP

Date OCT 26 1973

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C.C.S. 660/3

24 January 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE
(as of 23 January 1945)

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed estimate of the enemy situation in Europe as of 23 January 1945, prepared by the Combined Intelligence Committee in accordance with paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 765/2,* is submitted for consideration.

A. J. McFARLAND,
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,
Combined Secretariat.

* Not published herein.

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ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE

(as of 23 January 1945)

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation in Europe.

DISCUSSION

2. See "Appendix."

CONCLUSIONS

3. Germany's fundamental situation is relatively weak and deteriorating in comparison with the basic military and economic resources of her enemies. However, by skillfully applying available resources in selected efforts, Germany's leaders can, in favorable circumstances, achieve a local and temporary superiority of immediately available strength.

4. The Germans intend to conduct an active defense on interior lines with a view to preventing a concerted attack upon the Reich, and to launch an all-out submarine assault against Allied shipping. By this strategy they hope to wear out their enemies before exhausting their own resources, to gain time for the development of anticipated dissensions among them, and so to gain ultimately an acceptable peace.

5. In Poland, Silesia, and East Prussia the Germans are now under powerful assault by the Red Army. To avert a fatal collapse of that front they must reinforce it with ground and air strength drawn from elsewhere. Withdrawals from the West would be dangerous in the face of strong Allied pressure, while

Enclosure

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withdrawals from Italy would be seriously hampered by continued Allied pressure there. It is evident, therefore, that Germany has most to fear from a full-scale, coordinated Allied assault on all fronts.

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE

6. Although German resources are inadequate for a prolonged defense of the Reich against a determined, simultaneous assault on all fronts and in the air, the Germans can postpone the decision by fanatical refusal to accept defeat and skillful employment of such resources as they have. This factor and the lack of a firm basis for estimating the scale and timing of concerted Allied offensive efforts make any estimate of the probable time of German collapse highly speculative and probably misleading.

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation in Europe.

DISCUSSION

1. See "Appendix"

CONCLUSIONS

1. Germany's fundamental situation is relatively weak and deteriorating in comparison with the basic military and economic resources of her enemies. However, by skillfully applying available resources in selected efforts, Germany's leaders can, in favorable circumstances, achieve a local and temporary superiority of immediately available strength.

2. The Germans intend to conduct an active defense on interior lines with a view to preventing a concerted attack upon the Reich, and to launch an all-out offensive against Allied shipping. By this strategy they hope to wear out their enemies before exhausting their own resources, to gain time for the development of anticipated thrusts among them, and so to gain ultimately an acceptable peace.

3. In Poland, Rumania, and East Prussia the Germans are now under pressure to assault by the Red Army. To avert a fatal collapse of their front they must reinforce it with ground and air strength drawn from elsewhere. Withdrawals from the West would be dangerous in the face of strong Allied pressure.

Enclosure

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

1. *General Strategic Situation.* During the summer of 1944 the Germans, under concerted attack from the west, south, and east for the first time, were compelled to abandon the concept of *Festung Europa* and were driven back upon the Reich itself in such fashion as to put in question their ability to rally for a final stand at or near its frontiers. They succeeded, however, in stabilizing their fronts and even recovered sufficiently to seize a temporary initiative in the West.

This recovery was not the result of any change in Germany's fundamental situation, which is weak and deteriorating in comparison with the basic military and economic resources of her enemies. However, by skillfully applying available resources in selected efforts, Germany's leaders can, in favorable circumstances, achieve a local and temporary superiority of immediately available strength.

The radical reduction of her occupational commitments and lines of communication, the diminution in intensity of the pressure maintained against her as compared to that exerted during the summer, and the advantage of operating on interior lines have enabled the Germans to mobilize and concentrate their resources with the urgency of desperation. The bold and concentrated application of these resources in the Ardennes offensive, although achieving no decisive results, did relieve pressure on a vital area, and, in its spoiling effect, prevent a full-scale assault in the West in coordination with the Soviet offensive in the East.

The Germans intend to conduct an active defense on interior lines utilizing to the full the Westwall and other strong defensive positions as bases for operations designed to engage their enemies in detail with a view to preventing a concerted attack upon the Reich. They also intend to launch an all-out submarine assault against Allied shipping. By such strategy they hope to wear out their enemies before exhausting their own resources, to gain time for the development of anticipated dissensions among them, and so to gain ultimately an acceptable peace.

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In Poland, Silesia, and East Prussia the Germans are now under powerful assault by the Red Army. To avert a fatal collapse of that front they must reinforce it with ground and air strength drawn from elsewhere. Withdrawals from the West would be dangerous in the face of strong Allied pressure, while withdrawals from Italy would be seriously hampered by continued Allied pressure there. It is evident, therefore, that Germany has most to fear full-scale, coordinated Allied assault on all fronts.

2. *Political and Psychological Factors.* One of the strongest elements in the German strategic situation continues to be the political and psychological forces which have united the majority of the German people behind the total war effort. This support derives from effective Nazi control of every aspect of German life, from the strong basic patriotism of the German people in defense of the Fatherland and from increased acceptance of the following ideas:

a. Unconditional surrender involves the destruction of the German nation. Only the Nazi regime has the power and determination to prevent this.

b. Continued resistance will permit the emergence of conflicts among the Allies and out of these conflicts Germany will obtain an acceptable peace.

German acceptance of a. above has been strengthened by the publicity given to reported Allied plans for post-war treatment of Germany. The effect of this upon the German soldier has been to convince him not only that the fate of Germany is at stake, but that he must resist or be enslaved.

The effectiveness of b. above has been strengthened by the following developments:

(1) Allied failure to end the war at early dates publicly announced by Allied officials.

(2) Inter-Allied political friction as evidenced in the Polish and Greek situations.

The German winter offensive did have the effect of stimulating German confidence in the Wehrmacht, but its failure to achieve decisive results and the opening of the Soviet offensives are undoubtedly undermining this confidence.

There is, however, little sign that the mass of the German people has the inclination, the energy, or the organization to break the Nazi grip and to take

active steps to end the war. Since the failure of the attempted putsch of 20 July 1944, the likelihood of popular revolt has become increasingly remote. The military and conservative opposition represented in the putsch has been disorganized and discouraged by its aftermath, and at present collaboration between the Party and the Army appears to be effective, despite a certain measure of mutual distrust.

Underground opposition of German workers is not strong enough to constitute an effective political force prior to German collapse, and conciliatory measures toward foreign workers have somewhat lessened the potential threat from that group.

While antagonisms, susceptible to development by Allied psychological warfare, clearly exist within the Nazi state, none of these antagonisms is at present strong enough to endanger the national cohesion, or to elude the strict, efficient Nazi control apparatus.

3. *Economic Factors.* Possible expansion of specific items of German war production cannot reduce substantially the present marked Allied superiority in the production rates of almost all categories of military matériel. Territorial losses, bomb damage, and other factors will continue to cause a decline in the general level of German production.

However, materials in process, and stocks on hand, as well as further reduction of long-term uses of scarce materials, may cushion and postpone the military effects of Germany's economic deficiencies. Moreover, the existence of a straitened and inferior economic situation does not necessarily result in a corresponding inferiority in relative military strength at the front. Germany's matériel requirements are subject to wide fluctuations depending mainly upon the length of supply lines and the nature and extent of actual operations. Any statement of Germany's economic ability to meet her military "requirements" depends not so much upon comparison with Allied production as upon the actual rates of matériel expenditure which are imposed upon Germany. This latter factor is always problematical since it depends largely upon Allied operations and upon the skill of German leaders in resisting with a minimum expenditure of material.

In most categories of equipment recent wastage rates exceed current production levels. However, unless there is an Allied breakthrough with exploitation into a key industrial area, we believe there will be no general critical deterioration of Germany's economic ability to support her armed forces during

the next six months, provided that the rate of wastage imposed upon Germany is not much greater than that of the last six months of 1944. Should the Red Army occupy Upper Silesia, Germany's position would be greatly weakened. Even if, however, the Germans succeed in retaining both Upper Silesia and the Ruhr, with over-all production declining and given the continuance of a rate of wastage at least equal to that of the last six months, the gap between production and wastage will progressively widen, with the result that in future the German Army, except in certain critical items which may even improve, will be less well equipped than it is today.

With these factors in mind, the German economic position in certain important categories may be summarized as follows:

- a. Monthly oil production which reached 1,360,000 metric tons in April of 1944 was reduced to 310,000 tons in September and has now recovered to a rate of more than 400,000 tons, without prospect of further substantial increase. Only the most drastic reduction of military and civilian commitments, aided by economies resulting from the loss of large occupied areas, plus the most extreme conservation measures makes possible the reduction of consumption to about the present production level. Although the present oil position permits vigorous defensive warfare, including limited counter-offensives, it is equally true that the oil position reduces the effectiveness of the German armed forces especially in any situation requiring tactical mobility over a broad area. This is one of the major factors which limits German strategic offensive capabilities, and their ability to deal with a future Allied breakthrough. Germany's future oil position depends not only upon the rate of expenditure, but upon future bomb damage to German oil production and storage facilities and upon the extent to which the Germans can recuperate from damage. If they could disperse and protect their remaining oil facilities, the Germans might be able in the future to effect some reduction in damage from bombing. On the other hand, their ability to repair damage is progressively decreasing.
- b. Raw materials shortages, notably in ferro-alloys, which will effect a reduction in the quality of some steels, will be felt over an ever-wider field of production, even though the military effects of such shortages can be partially postponed and minimized by planning production in terms of Germany's most pressing combat needs and at the expense of her longer range position.

c. *Aircraft* production has continued to increase in spite of bomb damage, which, however, has prevented a much greater planned increase. Because aircraft production has to a large extent been dispersed or placed underground, its future reduction by bombing attack will become progressively more difficult.

d. *Tank* production has increased from 450 a month in July, 1944, when air attacks on engine and gear works ceased, to possibly 550 a month now.

e. Production of most categories of *weapons* and *ammunition* will face growing difficulties. The effects of these difficulties on the fighting fronts will depend upon the rate of attrition incurred.

f. *U-boat* production is increasing.

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt, but may cause some political difficulties and further reduce labor efficiency.

4. *Manpower*. Germany's lack of fully fit men aged 17 to 37 constitutes one of her critical weaknesses. Her position in regard to older and less fit manpower is not so severely strained. As a result of the heavy attrition suffered since 1941, the number of fully fit young men remaining in the entire German population is substantially less than that required to maintain the German armed forces according to their former standards, and a considerable proportion of them must be deferred for occupational reasons. This deficiency in fully fit young manpower has been met to some extent by the maintenance of elite units at standard strength and quality, and by the extensive use of foreigners and less fit Germans, not only in rear establishments, but in other combat units and in every possible individual role.

The heavy attrition suffered by the German Army during the summer of 1944 was substantially offset by a contraction of the area of German occupation which permitted the absorption of line-of-communications personnel into combatant units as replacements. Some further absorption of such personnel may occur as a result of further withdrawals but at the maximum would not be comparable to the gains of 1943-1944. By the same token, the possibilities of further recruitment or impressment of foreigners are now strictly limited. The German population itself has already been thoroughly combed over, except for German womanpower, which has not yet been fully exploited.

Thus, while the German Army can still find replacements among older and less fit Germans, and, directly or indirectly, by the impressment of foreigners, its opportunities in this regard are decreasing. In any case, it cannot fully replace in kind heavy losses of fully fit young Germans, and consequently its combat effectiveness must progressively decline in the face of heavy attrition.

5. *Ground Forces.* The estimated divisional composition of German ground strength as of mid-October and mid-January is set forth below:—

	<u>October</u>	<u>January</u>
Panzer-type	47	50
Field	127	121
Limited employment	85	113
Static	7	7
	—	—
Totals	266	291

The indicated net gain of 25 divisions during the three-month interval resulted from the disbandment of 14 divisions, the formation of 6 new divisions, and the reconstitution of 33 divisions previously destroyed or at least badly mauled and out of action. The indications are that, as a general rule, the numerical strength of the existing divisions has been brought up approximately to the reduced tables of organization. Some 10 additional divisions are believed to be now in the process of formation or reconstitution.

The German Army is experiencing some stringencies in the provision of important items, such as tanks, field artillery, signal equipment, and particularly motor transport and fuel. The effect of these stringencies is to limit the German Army's freedom of action, but none of them is likely to have a decisive effect upon the strategic situation in the predictable future. Although the number of tanks and assault guns has declined, new types have shown increased effectiveness.

In such a situation as has now arisen, imposing heavy attrition of manpower, the Germans face a choice between replacement of casualties in active divisions and the formation of new or reconstituted divisions. In the predictable future it is probable that they will attempt to keep active and experienced divisions up to minimal effective strength, while forming and training new or reconstituted divisions so far as the tempo of the war may permit. The over-all effect would be a further decline in the actual strength of the Army, whether or not there were a decline in the number of divisions. The effective combat

strength of the German Army will decline to a greater extent than the numerical strength owing to the high proportion of permanent casualties among fit Germans of military age. It is probable, however, that so far as manpower is concerned, the Army can be maintained as an effective combat force for at least six months, provided that it does not meet with military disaster in the field.

6. *Air Forces.* The operational strength of the German Air Force is approximately the same as that of mid-1944, although some fluctuations have taken place in the intervening period. During that period, however, there has been a considerable increase in stored reserves. In composition, the German Air Force has been expanding the forces equipped with single-engine fighters, particularly at the expense of long-range bombers. In disposition, it has been assigning an increasing proportion of its fighter strength for operations in the West. Until the opening of the German counteroffensive on 16 December, the increase in the single-engine fighter force was used to strengthen the air defense of Germany against strategic bombing. After 16 December a large proportion of this force was transferred and disposed for cooperation with ground forces in the western battle area. However, in view of its numerical inferiority on the Eastern Front, the German Air Force has already transferred a substantial number of units from the Western Front to meet the new Soviet offensive.

During the last two months the German Air Force has altered its policy of conservation and has intermittently put up a considerable effort for short periods both in defense of Germany against strategic bombing and in cooperation with the ground forces. However, in face of Allied superiority, it has been unable to sustain a high scale of effort and it has only been able to put up these intermittent bursts of high activity by taking advantage of the restrictions of operations by bad weather which have enabled it to replace losses and improve serviceability.

From the long-term point of view, if there is a continuation of present production rates and only short intermittent periods of high activity, the German Air Force will continue to expand in numerical strength, which will be mainly in the single-engine fighter and fighter-bomber categories. There will also be an improvement in performance and fire-power. Furthermore an increasing proportion of its aircraft will be jet-propelled, which by virtue of their superior performance in comparison with conventional types may so increase the effectiveness of German fighter forces as to constitute a serious threat to Allied daylight air operations.

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These developments, if not offset by other factors, would by the spring of 1945 increase the effectiveness of the German Air Force beyond that of the spring of 1944. We believe, however, that the over-all shortage of fuel, and the lack of pilots of a high degree of quality, training and experience will continue to impair the operational efficiency of the German Air Force and so prevent its effectiveness from surpassing that of the spring of 1944.

Hence, though the German Air Force will retain the capability of delivering damaging blows, particularly if surprise is achieved or targets are insufficiently defended, it will remain incapable of exercising more than a local and limited influence on the course of military operations.

7. *Naval Forces.* After the failure of U-boats to interrupt *OVERLORD* there has been, until recently, a comparative lull in the campaign. Activity in construction has continued and the highest priority has been given to the production by prefabricated methods of two new, improved types with high submerged speeds. The enemy has used the lull to work up his new boats, to refit old-type boats and incorporate structural improvements in them, and to give his commanders and crews experience during work-up patrols in operating close inshore and in the use of "schnorkel" and other new equipment.

The number of sinkings by submarines has recently been steadily increasing, probably as a result of:

- a. Increased skill and confidence in the use of "schnorkel" and other new equipment;
- b. The improvement in morale, due mainly to the ineffectiveness of our anti-submarine countermeasures; and
- c. The wish to embarrass our supply lines during the recent German land offensive.

This increase in sinkings must be expected to continue, since the new technical developments have increased the U-boats' potential for offensive action and have considerably reduced the effectiveness of our present naval and air countermeasures, especially in shallow coastal waters.

Germany now possesses a growing fleet of new U-boats which, though in commission and fully worked up, have not yet been used operationally. It is not known why she has not already used these boats, since there is no information to suggest that any serious technical delays have occurred. There is evidence that she intends to start a major offensive with them not later than mid-March, and that she expects to obtain spectacular results.

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In this new offensive the Germans may intend to operate their boats as follows:

- a. The new large type in packs with the object of annihilating Atlantic convoys. If pack tactics are not successful they will be redeployed in coastal waters.
- b. The small type in coastal waters off the east and southeast English coast and off Belgium.
- c. The old type boats to be so stationed as to cause the maximum dispersion of our anti-submarine forces.

The potential U-boat threat must be regarded as severe. It may lead to so large an increase in shipping losses as to prejudice the maintenance and build-up of our forces in Europe and to accentuate the existing shortage of shipping for other requirements.

The degree of success achieved in this new offensive will depend on:

- a. Our success in developing new technique in anti-submarine measures;
- b. The extent to which submarine construction may be disrupted by Allied action; and
- c. The morale of U-boat crews as influenced by the general war situation.

New technical developments in mines and torpedoes may, as in the past, also prove of material value to the enemy. Minelaying and the operations of one-man torpedoes, explosive motor boats, and such weapons, will probably continue, especially against our continental ports and their approaches.

All major surface units are in south Norway or the Baltic. Though these units may continue to play some part in delaying further deterioration of the situation in this area, it is most unlikely that they will be able to exert any appreciable influence elsewhere. German light surface forces in all other areas have been reduced to negligible strength.

8. *Long-Range Weapons.* Attacks by air-launched and ground-launched flying bombs and by long-range rockets are likely to continue on a steadily increasing scale.

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No radically improved types of these weapons are expected to be used for such attacks at any rate during the next few months.

It is possible that the Germans may increase the scale of long-range rocket and flying-bomb attacks against continental targets, particularly Antwerp, at the expense of the effort against the United Kingdom. In any event the continuation of long-range rocket attacks against the United Kingdom would depend on the retention by the Germans of the Hague area. The remote possibility exists that sporadic attacks might be launched against the eastern coast of the United States and Canada, and the Panama Canal.

9. *The Situation by Fronts.*

a. *Norway.* The Germans are gradually withdrawing from northern Norway. The indications are that, after a temporary stand at the Lyngsfjord line, they will withdraw to a line covering the Trondheim area and seek to hold there. Further withdrawal would jeopardize their U-boat campaign, as well as other strategic and economic interests.

After this withdrawal, and with appreciation that strong Allied operations against southern Norway would be unlikely, the Germans might undertake to hold the area from Trondheim southwards with six to eight divisions. Eight to six divisions in addition to those already withdrawn would thus become available for use elsewhere. However, judged by past experience, difficulties of sea transport would prevent their withdrawal complete with their heavy equipment at a faster rate than two to three a month. At best, therefore, Germany could evacuate some six additional fully equipped divisions from Norway before 1 April.

b. *Western Front.* Aided by fixed fortifications, favorable terrain, hastily assembled fresh forces, and Allied logistical difficulties, the Germans were able to check the Allied pursuit at or near their frontier and to stabilize the front. Although subsequently compelled to give ground in certain areas, they were able to maintain their front unbroken without employing strategic reserves being prepared for a countereffort. Although that effort, when made, failed to achieve decisive results, it did compel the temporary diversion of Allied forces from offensive operations in decisive areas and, in its spoiling effect, prevented full-scale Allied offensive operations in coordination with those of the Red Army in Poland.

This attack exemplifies the German doctrine regarding the function of such fortified zones as the Westwall. In contrast to the "Maginot complex," the Germans intend such a defensive system and its individual strong

points to serve as firm bases for tactical counterattack within the system or for strategic counterefforts of an offensive-defensive character, such as the recent thrust into the Ardennes. Consequently, whenever the Germans are able to provide the requisite local reserve strength, the Allies should anticipate an active defense including, according to the circumstances, vigorous attacks in advance of the fixed defenses or strong counteraction to seal off and destroy any penetration. In present circumstances, however, the necessity to reinforce the East will probably result in such a reduction of German strength in the West as to limit Germany's capabilities on that front to a passive defense. The value of the Westwall in either case, together with the vital importance of preventing a closer Allied approach to the Ruhr, will cause the Germans to conduct their defense in the West generally west of the Rhine.

The Germans appreciate the logistical factor in Allied capabilities and the effects of their previous success in denying the use of continental ports. They also attach great importance to the effects of their long-range rockets. For these reasons they may be expected to maintain their hold on Holland and do all in their power to prevent the full use of the ports now in Allied hands, especially Antwerp. They will also do their utmost to deny to Allied shipping the approaches to continental ports.

c. *Italy.* Allied penetration of the "Gothic Line" did not result in the expulsion of the Germans from the Po Valley. Adroit exploitation of water barriers has enabled them to maintain a front from Lake Comacchio to the Apennines east of Bologna. The Germans are prepared to retire by stages to the Alps if the occasion requires it, but will hold Bologna as long as profitable in order to retain the military, economic, and political advantages of the occupation of northern Italy, to keep their communications through Istria to the Balkans, to continue to contain Allied forces, and to divert Allied shipping and supplies from other vital areas. Their present strong position would permit them, unless vigorously pressed, to release on short notice some three veteran divisions for use elsewhere. Should they retire, comparatively unmolested, to the line of the Adige, they could increase this number to a total of ten to eleven divisions; should they retire to the line of the Alps, the total could be increased to fourteen to sixteen divisions, if the Germans retire in Hungary and Yugoslavia to the Austrian Alps and Bratislava Gap.

d. *Southeastern Front (Yugoslavia, Hungary, western Slovakia).* The Germans, with some Hungarian support and with considerable reinforcement from the Eastern Front, have offered stubborn resistance to the Soviet advance across Hungary, but have been gradually driven westward. Despite strong efforts, they have been unable to relieve a large force surrounded in

Budapest and now almost destroyed. Control of Budapest will materially strengthen Soviet communications. The Germans may attempt to stabilize for the winter on the general line Lake Balaton-Bakony Hills-Hron River. Should the Germans withdraw to the Bratislava Gap, however, they should be able to make a strong stand in prepared positions covering Vienna, with their flanks on the Slovakian mountains and the Austrian Alps. In these circumstances they should be able to transfer some divisions northward.

German forces from the southern Balkans are retreating generally northwestward through Yugoslavia under slight pressure, but subject to considerable Partisan interruption and harassment. Sarajevo will be held as long as necessary as an escape corridor, Vukovar as long as possible in order to block Soviet use of the Danube. An eventual retreat to the general line Fiume-Zagreb-Lake Balaton, or to the Alps, seems probable.

e. Eastern Front (Exclusive of the Southeastern Front). This front was relatively quiet until mid-January. The strength of the German defense based on the fortifications of East Prussia, the Narew, and the Vistula, their own logistical difficulties and to some extent the weather caused the Soviets to transfer their main effort to the Balkans, where they were able to effect easier conquests in an area of great strategic and political importance to Germany. This drive into Hungary caused some diversion of German strength from Poland, thus facilitating a resumption of the offensive there. Nevertheless the Germans, appreciating the decisive character and vulnerability of the Eastern Front north of the Carpathians, kept on that front some 40 percent of their total number of divisions, including a third of their panzer-type divisions and half of their field divisions. Even so, Soviet strength in the Polish and East Prussian sectors is preponderant in a ratio of approximately three to one.

The Narew-Vistula line has now collapsed under the impact of the present Soviet offensive and the Red Army is sweeping across western Poland. The vital industrial area of Upper Silesia is directly threatened. Except for the Eastwall, no strong barrier to the Soviet advance exists between the Vistula and the Oder. As it advances the Red Army must reckon with the necessity to neutralize the potential threat to its flanks. In addition as it approaches Germany it will be confronted with a railway system never adapted for Soviet rolling stock, will meet concrete defenses such as it has probably not encountered before, will enter a hostile country where it can expect no Partisan assistance, and will face the same fanaticism that has been experienced in the West.

The Germans' best hope of checking the Soviet advance would seem to lie in a vigorous counteroffensive undertaken after the Soviet drive had lost its momentum and when the Soviet forces were possibly overextended.

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There is some indication of a possible German concentration in northwest Poland and East Prussia for this purpose. Such a countereffort to be effective would have to be launched very soon.

In any event, the probable onset of adverse weather in March will presumably slow up operations on the Eastern Front. Although it is unlikely that the Red Army will have accomplished the final defeat of Germany by that time, it will probably have reached positions from which to launch a decisive effort in May or June.

9. *German Hopes and Prospects.* The Germans dread the consequences of unconditional surrender and hope for developments which will enable them to obtain an acceptable peace. They hope that such developments may arise in consequence of cumulative war weariness in one or more of the principal Allied Powers, of dissension among them, and of the impact on them of the employment of new weapons. This dread and these hopes, in conjunction with the continued possession of an unbroken military machine, constitute the basis for continued German resistance.

Although their resources are inadequate for a prolonged defense of the Reich against determined, simultaneous assault on all fronts and in the air, the Germans can postpone the decision by fanatical refusal to accept defeat and by skillful employment of such resources as they have. This factor and the lack of a firm basis for estimating the scale and timing of concerted Allied offensive efforts make any estimate of the probable time of German collapse highly speculative and probably misleading.

Appendix

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73
By RLP Date OCT 26 1973

C.C.S. 746/8

C.C.S. 746/10

C.C.S. 746/11

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION
FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945

References:

CCS 185th Meeting, Item 3

CCS 187th Meeting, Item 3

CCS 776/3, Paragraph 19

In C.C.S. 746/8, dated 31 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended certain action with regard to the memorandum of agreement signed by Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law concerning shipping of supplies to liberated countries during the first six months of 1945.

C.C.S. 746/10, dated 2 February, circulated a report submitted on their own initiative by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board presenting the current dry cargo shipping position and certain recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which, if approved, would serve as a guide for action by the appropriate military and shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 185th Meeting amended and approved the recommendation in C.C.S. 746/8; amended and approved C.C.S. 746/10. C.C.S. 746/8 and C.C.S. 746/10 are published herein as amended and approved.

In accordance with the approved recommendation, paragraph 6 d. of C.C.S. 746/10, the report from the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board setting forth the over-all review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 was circulated as C.C.S. 746/11, dated 8 February 1945.

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting approved C.C.S. 746/11 subject to change of date in sub paragraph (d) of the recommendations, on page 62, from "30 April 1945" to "1 April 1945."

C.C.S. 746/11 is published herein as amended and approved.

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945

References:

- COS 185th Meeting, Item 3
- COS 187th Meeting, Item 3
- COS 746/11, Paragraph 12

In C.C.S. 746/11, dated 31 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended certain action with regard to the transportation of equipment agreed by Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law concerning shipping supplies to liberated countries during the first six months of 1945.

C.C.S. 746/10, dated 3 February, circulated a report submitted on their own initiative by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board presenting the current air cargo shipping position and certain recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which, it appeared, would serve as a guide for action by the appropriate military and shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 187th Meeting amended and approved the recommendation in C.C.S. 746/10, amended and approved C.C.S. 746/11. C.C.S. 746/11 and C.C.S. 746/10 are published herein as amended and approved.

In accordance with the approved recommendation, paragraph 5 d of C.C.S. 746/10, the report from the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board setting forth the new air review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 was circulated as C.C.S. 746/11, dated 8 February 1945.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73

By RHP Date OCT 26 1973

C.C.S. 746/8

31 January 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SHIPPING AGREEMENT

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. On 14 January 1945 Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law signed a memorandum of agreement concerning shipping of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945 (Enclosure "A").
2. On 14 January 1945 Mr. Law sent a note to Mr. Hopkins in which he gave his interpretation of paragraph 10 of the above agreement as not changing any current procedures and that the clearance called for in no sense gives the power of veto to military authorities on civilian shipping allocations (Enclosure "B").
3. The principal points of the agreement are:
 - a. That the French import program and other import programs when received are endorsed for planning purposes, and the U.S. and U.K. agencies concerned should as necessary facilitate through the established procedures, procurement against these programs so that supplies will be readily available for shipment.
 - b. That, subject to military necessity, 7 ships are allocated in January, 13 in February, and 13 in March.
 - c. That U.S. and U.K. civilian and military authorities should consider what recommendations they can make to heads of governments to reduce the deficit either by downward adjustment programs or more effective use of shipping.
 - d. That theater commanders, Allied governments, and combined boards, departments and agencies concerned are to be notified.
4. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the agreement in Enclosure "A" and Enclosure "B" be referred to the Combined Military Transportation Committee for recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

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for implementation of those parts of the agreement of primary interest to Combined Chiefs of Staff agencies and that the recommendations of the Combined Military Transportation Committee be coordinated with the Combined Administrative Committee and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

SHIPPING AGREEMENT

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. On 14 January 1945 Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Richard Law signed a memorandum of agreement concerning shipping of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945 (Enclosure "A").

2. On 14 January 1945 Mr. Law sent a note to Mr. Hopkins in which he stated that the provisions of paragraph 10 of the above agreement as to shipping of supplies to military authorities on civilian shipping operations (Enclosure "B").

The principal points of the agreement are:

a. That the French import program and other import programs shall be handled in accordance with the existing procedures and the U.S. and U.K. agencies concerned should coordinate through the established procedures. In addition, special programs for supplies will be handled through the existing procedures.

b. That subject to military necessity, 7 ships are allocated in January, 1945, and 13 in March.

c. That U.S. and U.K. civilian and military authorities should coordinate their recommendations and make to heads of government to bring to effect either by downward adjustment programs or more effective use of shipping.

d. That theater commanders, Allied governments, and combined boards, departments and agencies concerned are to be notified.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the agreement in Enclosure "A" and Enclosure "B" be referred to the Combined Military Transportation Committee for recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945:

1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for national government import programs separate from and additional to military programs.
2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force has reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure in the near future.
3. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has submitted a program for Italy. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean has endorsed it provided that its implementation does not affect his ability to meet his operational and basic civil affairs requirements.
4. It is expected that in due course import programs will be put forward in a similar manner for other liberated European countries by their governments or by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration on their behalf.
5. The French import program and the other import programs when received are endorsed for planning purposes and the United States and

Enclosure "A"

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United Kingdom agencies concerned should as necessary facilitate, through the established procedures, procurement against these programs so that supplies will be readily available for shipment.

6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these programs for January, February and March loading from North America as follows:—

	JANUARY			FEBRUARY			MARCH		
	Total	MWT	WSA	Total	MWT	WSA	Total	MWT	WSA
France	6			10			10		
Belgium	1			2			2		
UNRRA (Italy)	-			1			1		
TOTAL	7			13			13		

7. There is attached a table showing for the period January through June 1945 the over-all shipping deficiency.* The deficit cannot be met by minor adjustments and calls for decision at the coming conference of heads of governments. In the meantime the responsible United States and United Kingdom civilian and military authorities should consider what recommendations they can make to the coming conference of the heads of governments to reduce the deficit either by downward adjustment of programs or more effective use of shipping.

8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in paragraph 6 are not to be reduced except in the face of military necessity and not without prior discussion with Mr. Harry Hopkins. The appropriate agencies should be notified accordingly.

9. The theater commander, the Allied governments, the combined boards and the departments and agencies concerned of the United States and United Kingdom Governments are to be notified of the action agreed under paragraphs 5 and 6.

10. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to alter any present procedures whereby the availability of shipping tonnage shall be determined

* Not part of this paper. Identical with table in paragraph 7, page 2, C.C.S. 746/6 (published for convenience on page 53).

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by the appropriate shipping authorities after clearance with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff. It is also understood that the determination of port and inland clearance capacity shall be certified by the theater commander.

14th January 1943

/Initialed/ H.H. by D.A.

R.L.

H.H. (Mr. Harry Hopkins)

D.A. (Mr. Dean Acheson)

R.L. (Mr. Richard Law)

I interpret this clause as a "no prejudice" clause leaving present procedures for the determining of shipping availability as they stand and making it clear that this Government in no way compromises any position or claim of anyone as to what those procedures are or should be. I do not intend it and I feel sure that it cannot reasonably be interpreted as introducing any change whatever in current procedures. As you know my understanding is that these procedures do not provide for "clearance" in the sense of a veto by the military authorities on civilian shipping allocations but do in practice result in the fullest exchange of information and consultation between the shipping authorities and the Chiefs of Staff.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73
By RCHP Date OCT 26 1973

Mr. Harry Hopkins
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure "B"

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73

By RLLP Date OCT 20 1973

ENCLOSURE "B"

14th January 1945

Dear Mr. Hopkins,

Memorandum of Agreement

In initialling this agreement on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, I must refer to the interpretation of clause 10 which I should have liked to see clarified if time had permitted and if all those concerned had been accessible.

I interpret this clause as a "no prejudice" clause leaving present procedures for the determining of shipping availability as they stand and making it clear that this document in no way compromises any position or claim of anyone as to what those procedures are or should be. I do not interpret it, and I feel sure that it cannot reasonably be interpreted, as introducing any change whatever in current procedures. As you know, my understanding is that these procedures do not provide for "clearance" in the sense of a veto by the military authorities on civilian shipping allocations, but do in practice result in the fullest exchange of information and consultation between the shipping authorities and the Chiefs of Staff.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Richard Law

Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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OVER-ALL SHIPPING DEFICIENCY

The combined deficiencies in terms of sailings disclosed by reports* of the U.S. and British dry cargo shipping positions respectively are:—

	Feb.	March	April	May	June
<i>Atlantic</i>					
British Ministry of War Transport (BMWT)	30	45	50	50	50
War Shipping Administration (WSA)	43	36	40	49	37
<i>Combined</i>	73	81	90	99	87
<i>Pacific</i>					
War Shipping Administration	35	51	45	72	56
<i>Total</i>	108	132	135	171	143

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Maritime

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 52 - 73
By RMP Date OCT 26 1973

* Appendices "A" and "B" to Enclosure "A," C.M.T. 66/3.

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C.C.S. 746/10

2 February 1945

OVER-ALL SHIPPING DEFICIENCY

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING

Reference:

CCS 746 Series

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board on their own initiative submit the enclosed report as a supplement to C.C.S. 746/6* to present the current dry cargo shipping position and to make recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which will serve as a guide for action by the appropriate military and shipping authorities.

A. J. McFARLAND,
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,
Combined Secretariat.

* Not published herein.

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ENCLOSURE

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING

Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee
and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

THE PROBLEM

1. To submit changes in the shipping position as given in C.C.S. 746/6, to bring it up to date and to make recommendations for action to be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. A consideration of the deficits resulting from a restudy of cargo shipping as presented in the following table shows that the shipping position is tight and that deficits approach unmanageable proportions, particularly in the Pacific, to which theater certain diversions from the Atlantic will probably have to be made:—

	March	April	May	June
<i>For U.S.</i>				
Atlantic deficits	31	24	18	35
Pacific deficits	51	38	45	34
<i>For British</i>				
Atlantic deficits	35	35	35	35

3. Military requirements have been severely cut in keeping with recent instructions to theater commanders by the United States Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and provide no factor of safety or provision for new, expanded, or advanced operations.

4. In the event that these deficits materialize some civilian programs will have to contribute by cuts towards the management of present deficits. Increased demands, if accepted, can only make deficits unmanageable.

CONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

a. In the consideration of basic strategic undertakings supplies to liberated areas should be considered only insofar as they contribute to the overall war-making capacity of the United Nations.

b. In view of presently foreseen deficits, lack of reserves for stepping up military operations and increasing civilian demands, there is no alternative but to exercise rigid control over all programs and particularly those devoted to rehabilitation rather than to the war effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that:

a. The appropriate Chiefs of Staff require rigid compliance of theater commanders with their orders relative to the control of shipping.

b. The appropriate Chiefs of Staff direct their military transportation committees in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities to adjust deficits in accord with the following principles:

"In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should be given to the basic undertakings in support of over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT.

"So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff."

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the shipping implications of proposed undertakings before their inclusion in the approved basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts recommended for adoption at ARGONAUT.

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff take note that the over-all shipping position will be reviewed again in determining the shipping position resulting from decisions made at the ARGONAUT Conference.

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FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945
OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION

C.C.S. 746/11

8 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING
POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945

Note by the Secretaries

Pursuant to paragraph 6 d. of C.C.S. 746/10, the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board have prepared the enclosed report for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND,

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES,

Combined Secretariat.

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FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945

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ENCLOSURE

OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING
POSITION FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1945*Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee
and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board*

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption of defeat of Germany 1 July 1945.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. A statement by Lord Leathers and Admiral Land of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board on the dry cargo shipping position prior to V-E Day* is attached as Appendix "A."
3. This review has been prepared in two parts (see Appendix "B"). The first part (Annex "A" to Appendix "B") summarizes the approved scheme of allocations, U.S. and British, to operate during the months March through June, 1945. The second part (Annex "B" to Appendix "B") is a planning study of some of the problems which will arise on V-E Day and which call for urgent policy decisions in order to ensure that essential preliminary action is taken with the least possible delay.

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:
 - a. *With respect to the position up to the defeat of Germany assumed at 1 July 1945:—*

* Victory Day (Europe).

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(1) This review of shipping covering both dry cargo and troop transport shows the following deficits:—

	March	April	May	June
<i>Dry Cargo (in sailings)</i>				
<i>For U.S.</i>				
Atlantic	-22	-18	-12	-31
Pacific	-44	-38	-45	-34
<i>For British</i>				
Atlantic	-35	-35	-35	-35
<i>Troop Shipping (in trooplift)</i>				
<i>For U.S.</i>				
	No deficiency			
<i>For British</i>				
	No deficiency			

(2) As indicated in C.C.S. 746/10 the cargo shipping position is tight and deficits approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. The recommendations given in C.C.S. 746/10 apply and have been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. *With respect to the position after the defeat of Germany:—*

(1) The indications are that cargo shipping will be easier for the first quarter following V-E Day and will become tight again during the second quarter thereafter. In view of that second, more stringent, quarterly period vigilance will be necessary to ensure meeting military requirements.

(2) It is in the troop shipping position after V-E Day, shown in the following table, that the real problems arise:—

	<i>Troop Shipping Position (in trooplift)</i>	
	<i>3rd Qtr.</i>	<i>4th Qtr.</i>
<i>For U.S.:</i>		
With no British assistance	-88,500	-148,200
If British assistance of 70,000 trans-Atlantic lift monthly is assumed	No deficit	- 59,700
<i>For British</i>	- 3,400	- 60,200

Enclosure

Enclosure

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The problem of greatest moment is the use of the combined troop transport pool in the redeployment of our forces to the Pacific and to Malaysia. While sharp definition is not given by figures because of lack of firm redeployment plans, particularly on the British side, the conflicts of interest that will arise are presently apparent. The U.S. position here given, even assuming British monthly assistance of 70,000 trans-Atlantic trooplift shows deficits, as shown in the table above, in meeting the redeployment program as presently planned. On the other hand, present British estimates show that the whole of the British trooping lift will be required for the deployment of British forces for the continuance of the war against Japan concurrently with the inescapable commitments of rotational movement and demobilization of forces already deployed. The problem will become further aggravated by the great pressures that will be exerted to repatriate nationals, both troops and civilians, at the fastest rate possible. Allocations of trooplift cannot be properly and firmly made for redeployment until the operations, the priorities thereof, and the redeployment therefor, are decided on a combined basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is therefore recommended that:
 - a. *With respect to the position prior to the defeat of Germany:*
Action approved in C.C.S. 746/10 be taken.
 - b. *With respect to the position after the defeat of Germany:*
 - (1) The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct as a matter of priority:
 - (a) The preparation of a combined redeployment plan.
 - (b) The fixing of priorities for continuance of the war against Japan.
 - (c) The agency or agencies given the task stated in b. (1) (a) above to confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities as to shipping possibilities.
 - (d) The combined report of these agencies with accompanying shipping program be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will include also the formulation of a shipping program for continuing the war against Germany beyond 1 July 1945 should the occasion require.

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(2) The combined shipping authorities convert dry cargo shipping after V-E Day on a combined basis to augment personnel lift as may be practicable.

APPENDIX "A"

STATEMENT BY LORD LEATHERS AND ADMIRAL LAMB OF THE COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD ON THE DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION PRIOR TO V-E DAY

The combined dry cargo shipping deficiencies for the remainder of the first half-year are shown in paragraph 4 a (1) of the Report. They have been reduced well below the levels shown in the recent Washington Over-all Review of Cargo Shipping (C.M.S. 12 January 1945). Nevertheless, as indicated in C.C.S. 748(10) the cargo shipping position will be tight and deficits will approach unmanageable proportions unless V-E Day tonnage has been placed upon a substantial relief to the strained shipping situation through economies in the use of tonnage as a result of action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 745(1)). On the basis of Combined Chiefs of Staff decision (C.C.S. 184th Meeting Item 8) has later approved in C.C.S. 547(4) have been used and no allowance has been made for the threatened increase of losses through U-boat attacks, although current estimates are not fully covered by the present tonnage.

The actual deficiencies will be dealt with month by month in accordance with the recommendations given in C.C.S. 748(10).

H. B. LAMB

LEATHERS

The Enclosed Report

Enclosure

Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "A"

STATEMENT BY LORD LEATHERS AND ADMIRAL LAND OF THE
COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD ON THE DRY CARGO
SHIPPING POSITION PRIOR TO V-E DAY

The combined dry cargo shipping deficiencies for the remainder of the first half-year are shown in paragraph 4 a. (1) of the Enclosure. They have been reduced well below the levels shown in the recent Washington Over-all Review of Cargo Shipping (C.M.T. 66/3, 12 January 1945*). Nevertheless, as indicated in C.C.S. 746/10 the cargo shipping position will be tight and deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. Reliance has been placed upon a substantial relief to the strained shipping situation through economies in the use of tonnage as a result of action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 745/1*). On the basis of Combined Chiefs of Staff decision (C.C.S. 184th Meeting, Item 6) loss rates approved in C.C.S. 547/4* have been used and no allowance has been made for the threatened increase of losses through U-boat attacks, although current sinkings are not fully covered by the present loss rate.

The actual deficiencies will be dealt with month by month in accordance with the recommendations given in C.C.S. 746/10.

LEATHERS

E. S. LAND

* Not published herein.

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

COMBINED SHIPPING REVIEW OF DRY CARGO AND TROOP
SHIPPING POSITION FROM MARCH THROUGH JUNE, 1945

LEAVINGS

Appendix "B"

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TAB "A" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

BRITISH CONTROLLED DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION
(MARCH-JUNE 1945)

1. British military sailings required to all existing theatres of war during March-June 1945, on the basis of known plans and requirements, and including military civil affairs requirements to purely British zones, are as follows:—

FROM	March		April		May		June	
	U.K.	N.A.	U.K.	N.A.	U.K.	N.A.	U.K.	N.A.
India	25	32	28	40	30	40	30	40
Persian Gulf	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2
Mediterranean—								
C.M.F.	20	16	20	15	18	14	16	14
Malta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
M.E. Maintenance	7	9	6	9	6	9	6	8
M.E. Collier	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Gibraltar	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Total Mediterranean	30	26	29	25	27	24	25	23
Total Mediterranean and Indian Ocean	57	59	59	67	59	65	57	65
Internal Mediterranean Services (Combined requirement, of which the British share is one half) *	120		85		70		60	
Australia	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	-
Russian Aid	4	-	4	-	4	-	4	-
OVERLORD—								
B.L.A. ex N.A.								
Maintenance	-	8	-	8	-	12	-	12
Civil Affairs	-	16	-	12	-	12	-	12
Total	-	24	-	20	-	24	-	24

* Excluding coasters—see paragraph 2 (b).

Tab "A" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

"B"

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- N.W. Europe—ex U.K. 40 M.T. ships in service (combined requirement),
24 British and 16 United States.
- 50 store ships in service on British account in
March and April.
- 60 store ships in service on British account in
May and June.
- 500,000 deadweight tons of coastal shipping allocated
as follows:—
 - 170,000 British stores lift.
 - 155,000 United States stores lift.
 - 175,000 Combined coal programme.

From March onwards the coaster allocation for the combined coal programme is likely to increase to 250,000 deadweight tons at the expense of both the British and United States general cargo allocations. Provision has therefore been included to cover this portion of the coaster cargo lift in ocean-going vessels.

2. The statement of the estimated British-controlled dry-cargo ocean-going shipping position during the first six months of 1945 set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 below should be read in conjunction with the following notes:—

(a) *The Fleet Train*. For the supply and maintenance of the British Fleet in the Pacific, British merchant shipping, existing or building, has been allocated or will have been allocated by the end of June 1945 as follows:

	<i>Deadweight tons</i>
(1) Allocated to the Fleet Train while under construction (White Ensign)	330,000
(2) Allocated to the Fleet Train while under construction (Red Ensign)	160,000
(3) Transferred to the Fleet Train from other naval services	225,000
(4) Transferred to the Fleet Train from other employment	120,000
	835,000

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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Items (2), (3) and (4) above are allowed for at Serial (5) (b) of the statement in paragraph 4; the tonnage for item (1) has been excluded both from the inventory and from the statement of requirements as it is being transferred direct to the Royal Navy for service under the White Ensign.

The Admiralty have notified further requirements for the Fleet Train which would involve the provision of some 200,000 deadweight tons of additional shipping but these have so far not been agreed, and no provision has therefore been made for them in the statement in paragraph 4.

(b) *The Mediterranean coastal tonnage* combined requirement, assessed at about 350,000 deadweight tons, will continue to be met from British resources. Serial (6) of the statement in paragraph 4 includes 250,000 deadweight tons of these coasters, the remainder being ships of under 1,600 gross registered tonnage (G.R.T.).

(c) *The Northwest Europe coastal tonnage* requirement for British Army Stores, United States Army Stores and coal (combined commitment) will be provided as shown in paragraph 1.

The whole of this requirement (one half of which is included at Serial (7) of the statement in paragraph 4, the other half consisting of shipping of under 1,600 G.R.T.) will be met from British coaster resources.

(d) *The United Kingdom import programme* has been taken as 6.0 million long tons in the first quarter of 1945 and 7.2 million long tons in the second quarter.

(e) *Supplies to liberated areas.* Provision has been made in the estimate for British-controlled shipping sufficient to carry the amounts set out below. These represent the agreed British share of desired import programmes submitted to the Shipping Authorities, phased on the advice of the Combined Staff Planners and screened for limitations likely to be imposed by reception capacity, or by supply or financial considerations, and after making allowance for cargoes carried in tonnage not under W.S.A. or B.M.W.T. control or as flatting in ships allocated for military cargoes.

	First quarter of 1945	Second quarter of 1945
	(million long tons)	
Civil Affairs	0.6	0.7
National Government	0.4	0.75

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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The estimated shipping cost set out at Serial (10) of the statement in paragraph 4 excludes provision for:—

(1) Supplies within the Mediterranean (which are carried in the tonnage referred to in paragraph 2 (b)).

(2) Civil Affairs supplies from the United Kingdom to Northwest Europe (which are carried in the tonnage referred to in paragraph 2 (c)).

(f) *The termination of the war in Europe* has been assumed as July 1, 1945.

(g) *Future shipping losses* have been estimated at the rates previously approved for planning purposes, and now reaffirmed, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Total shipping available (ships of 1,600 G.R.T. and over) is estimated to be as follows:—

Date	Estimated losses during preceding quarter-year	Estimated new construction during preceding quarter-year	Estimated inventory at date
	(million deadweight tons)		
31st December, 1944			22.09
31st March, 1945	0.16	0.36	22.29
30th June, 1945	0.12	0.45	22.62

Average for the first quarter of 1945: 22.20

Average for the second quarter of 1945: 22.45

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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4. The estimated requirements against this shipping are as follows:—

Serial	First quarter of 1945		Second quarter of 1945	
	(million deadweight tons)			
(1) Estimated tonnage available	22.20		22.45	
(2) Deduct average allowance for tonnage awaiting or undergoing repair	2.30		2.30	
<i>Net amount of tonnage available</i>	19.90		20.15	
(3) Tonnage for United Kingdom coastal services	0.60		0.60	
(4) Tonnage engaged permanently abroad in maintenance of the war-making capacity of areas of British responsibility (see also Serial (11))	2.20		2.20	
(5) Non-importing Naval and Military tonnage:—				
(a) Naval Commissioned vessels	0.50		0.50	
(b) Vessels for the Fleet Train (see para. 2 (a))	0.40		0.45	
(c) Other Naval, Military and R.A.F. Auxiliaries	0.25		0.25	
(d) Troopships	1.20		1.20	
(e) Vessels permanently in the Indian Ocean area carrying military cargoes	0.25		0.25	
	5.40		5.45	
<i>Tonnage available for voyage-by-voyage allocation</i>	14.50		14.70	

(Table Continued on Following Page)

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
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(Continued)

	First quarter of 1945	Second quarter of 1945
(6) Tonnage for Mediterranean inter- nal shipments (including coasters)	0.80	0.55
(7) Tonnage for shipments from the United Kingdom to N.W. Europe (including coasters)	1.00	1.05
(8) Tonnage for military maintenance from the United Kingdom and N. America to the Indian Ocean area and the Mediterranean, from the United Kingdom to N. Russia and from N. America to N.W. Europe	5.00	5.30
(9) Tonnage for United Kingdom im- ports (after allowing for imports brought in tonnage at Serial (8)) (see para. 2 (d))	6.95	7.35
(10) Tonnage for carrying supplies to liberated areas other than locally (see para. 2 (e)) :—		
(a) Civil Affairs	0.60	0.75
(b) National Government	0.25	0.65
(11) Tonnage engaged temporarily abroad in maintenance of the war- making capacity of areas of British responsibility (see also Serial (4))	1.90	1.85
<i>Total tonnage required for allocation</i>	<u>16.50</u>	<u>17.50</u>
(12) Deficiency	2.00	2.80

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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5. In the W.S.A. shipping statement (Tab "B" to Annex "A") provision is made for the following sailings from North America:—

	March	April	May	June
(a) to the Indian Ocean area) Eastern				
(b) to the Mediterranean) customaries	24	24	24	24
(c) to South and East) Africa and the) Southern Anzac area) customaries	9	8	9	8
(d) on the North Atlantic*	26	36	38	38

6. These sailings are insufficient to eliminate the whole of the deficiencies shown at Serial (12) of paragraph 4, and there remains an apparent deficit in the British-controlled shipping situation equivalent to the following North Atlantic sailings* :—

	March	April	May	June
	35	35	35	35

5. Although it has been made in estimating the availability of shipping for authorized operations in all theaters. It has been assumed that any presently existing shipping congestion will be immediately cleared and that vessels are turned around promptly and used in accordance with directions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to theater commanders.

* The use of North Atlantic sailings as a convenient yardstick does not imply that their number is a measure of a deficiency arising exclusively from programmes on that route. They, and all the other sailings mentioned, are associated jointly with the British deficiency as a whole, which it is impracticable to analyze according to cause.

Tab "A" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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TAB "B" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

(March-June, 1945)

1. The estimated United States dry cargo shipping is given through June of 1945 in Exhibit "A" on the assumption that hostilities will be terminated in Europe July 1st. In the event of the termination of hostilities at any earlier date, the position set forth would apply until that date.
2. United States military requirements, as stated in Exhibit "A," include provision for maintenance of all deployed forces and for all presently planned operations and have been adjusted by the United States Army and Navy as far as possible, so as to be within the limits of the availability of cargo and of estimated reception capacity in all theaters. Other requirements listed include regular W.S.A. allocations to British services, obligations under the Russian Protocol, and the programs for liberated areas accepted for planning purposes. The latter have been modified downward from the figures included in C.M.T. 66/3 as a result of a re-examination by the appropriate civilian agencies of the United States and British Governments.
3. Allowance has been made in estimating the availability of shipping for authorized retentions in all theaters. It has been assumed that any presently existing shipping congestion will be immediately cleared and that vessels are turned around promptly and used in accordance with directions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to theater commanders.

Tab "B" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "B" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION BEFORE V-E DAY

ATLANTIC AND GULF

	1945			
	March	April	May	June
1. U.S. ARMY				
ETO				
U.K. Military	30	30	30	30
Continent — Military	185	185	185	185
Civil Affairs	1	1	1	1
Sub-Total	186	186	186	186
S. France — U.S. & French Military	65	65	67	65
Civil Affairs	6	7	6	6
Sub-Total	71	72	73	71
TOTAL—ETO	287	288	289	287
ETO & Azores				
Military	47	45	45	45
Civil Affairs	43	42	42	42
TOTAL	90	87	87	87
Persian Gulf	1	1	1	1
India-Burma & China	1	1	1	1
Pacific Areas incl. SWPA	20	20	20	20
2. U.S. NAVY				
Pacific Areas	34	34	34	34
Sub-Total Military	433	431	432	430

(Table Continued on Following Page)

Exhibit "A" to Tab "B" to
 Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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(Continued)

	1945			
	March	April	May	June
3. WAR-MAKING CAPACITY OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE	12	20	20	20
4. BRITISH PROGRAMS				
North Atlantic Sailings(2)	26	36	38	38
Other British Programs				
Military(1)	24	24	24	24
Civilian	6	5	6	5
TOTAL BRITISH LEND-LEASE	<u>56</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>67</u>
5. RUSSIAN LEND-LEASE(3)	38	36	28	28
6. DESIRED NATIONAL GOVT. IMPORT PROGRAMS FOR LIBERATED AREAS	28	38	41	44
Sub-Total Lend-Lease and Civilian	<u>134</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>159</u>
7. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	567	590	589	589
8. TOTAL AVAILABLE	<u>545</u>	<u>572</u>	<u>577</u>	<u>558</u>
9. BALANCE	-22	-18	-12	-31

(1) Includes 1 India-China Defense sailing each month.

(2) Sailings for Liberated Areas included in sailings entered for North Atlantic sailings.

(3) Does not provide for 275,000 short tons per month now under consideration for trans-Atlantic delivery of Protocol cargo.

Exhibit "A" to Tab "B" to
 Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "B" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B" (Continued)

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION BEFORE V-E DAY

PACIFIC

	1945			
	March	April	May	June
1. U.S. ARMY				
Pacific Ocean Areas				
CPBC	21	24	26	18
SPBC	10	10	10	10
Southwest Pacific Area	50	55	60	65
India-Burma and China	23	24	22	21
2. U.S. NAVY				
Pacific Ocean Areas	129	132	151	154
Southwest Pacific Area	32	20	20	20
3. RUSSIAN	8	7	0	0
4. BRITISH EMPIRE PROGRAM	3	3	3	3
5. NON-MILITARY	9	9	9	9
6. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	285	284	301	300
7. TOTAL AVAILABLE	241	246	256	266
8. BALANCE	-44	-38	-45	-34

Exhibit "A" to Tab "B" to
Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "B" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B" (Continued)

RETENTIONS OF U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPS ALLOWED FOR

(All retentions are as of first day of month)

	1945			
	March	April	May	June
UNITED KINGDOM				
WSA M.T.	16	16	16	16
WSA Stores	12	12	12	12
WSA Other	0	0	0	0
<i>Total Ocean</i>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>
WSA Coasters (DWT)	70,000	70,000	70,000	70,000
MEDITERRANEAN				
Inside U.S. Sailings	(60)	(43)	(35)	(30)
WSA Retentions required for above sailings	40	29	24	20
SOUTH PACIFIC				
	8	8	8	8
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC				
	135	122	120	120
CENTRAL PACIFIC				
	30	36	45	48

Exhibit "A" to Tab "B" to
Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "C" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"
BRITISH CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING POSITION

(March-June, 1945)

1. In our consideration of the British personnel shipping position the following assumptions have been made:—

- (a) That British personnel shipping commitments for operational requirements will be as shown in Exhibit "A."
- (b) That British personnel shipping will be required to carry out troop movements (other than operational) and miscellaneous movements as detailed in Exhibit "B," Sections A and B, respectively.
- (c) That British personnel shipping of the "Indian Ocean" type will be capable of meeting all local requirements (both normal trooping and operational commitments) in the Indian Ocean.
- (d) That the frequency of the convoy cycle for normal trooping between UK/ITALY/MIDDLE EAST/INDIA, will be maintained at 20 days, as at present, and that no developments occur which would alter the conditions and areas in which fast ships are at present allowed to sail free of escort.
- (e) That the Chiefs of Staff proposal to develop an overland route for trooping via France (MEDLOC) will not result in any material benefits to long sea voyage troop movements before 1 July 1945.
- (f) That internal personnel movements in the Mediterranean (other than operational) can be met by allocation of a troop lift of 15,000 during the period under consideration.
- (g) That any losses to the troopship fleet, whether by enemy action, marine risk or transfer to other service (e.g., hospital ships) cannot be made good by new construction or conversion prior to 1 July 1945. The most serious effect on British estimates would result from any such loss in the unescorted class.
- (h) That the normal capacity of troopships proceeding from the United Kingdom to India will be reduced by at least 10% when east of Suez, in the interests of the health and morale of the troops, and the capacity of ships proceeding to the Antipodes (which have in the past been employed on the short Atlantic trip) will have to be reduced by some 20%.

Tab "C" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

Tab "C" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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2. On the above assumptions, it is estimated that existing British personnel shipping will be sufficient to provide for the whole of the British commitments, shown in Exhibits "A" and "B," and that it will also be possible to meet the assistance as requested by the U.S. authorities as indicated in Exhibit "C."

(March-June 1945)

In our consideration of the British personnel shipping position the following assumptions have been made:--

(a) That British personnel shipping commitments for operational requirements will be as shown in Exhibit "A."

(b) That British personnel shipping will be required to carry out troop movements (other than operational) and miscellaneous movements as detailed in Exhibit "B," Sections A and B, respectively.

(c) That British personnel shipping of the "Indian Ocean" type will be capable of meeting all troop requirements (both normal troop and operational commitments) in the Indian Ocean.

(d) That the frequency of the convoy cycle for normal trading between the Middle East and India will be maintained at 20 days as at present, and that no developments occur which would alter the conditions and areas in which fast ships are at present allowed to sail free of escort.

(e) That the Chiefs of Staff proposal to develop an equivalent route for troops via France (MEDLOC) will not result in any material change to long sea voyage troop movements before 1 July 1945.

(f) That internal personnel movements in the Mediterranean (other than operational) can be met by allocation of a troopship of 15,000 tons during the period under consideration.

(g) That any loss to the troopship fleet, whether by enemy action, maintenance or transfer to other services (e.g. hospital ships) cannot be made good by new construction or conversion prior to 1 July 1945. The most serious effect on British estimates would result from any such loss in the unescorted class.

(h) That the normal capacity of troopships proceeding from the United Kingdom to India will be reduced by at least 10% when east of Suez in the interests of the health and morale of the troops, and the capacity of ships proceeding to the East Indies (which have in the past been employed on the West Atlantic trip) will have to be reduced by some 20%.

Tab "C" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

Tab "C" to Annex "A"
to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "B" TO TAB "C" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

Section A OTHER BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS

Remarks	Estimated Numbers	Area
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(i) 4 Divisions - 8 Divs to U.K.
Includes Army & RAF	50,000 per month	(ii) U.K. to Gibraltar (iii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(iv) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(v) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(vi) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(vii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(viii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(ix) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(x) U.K. to India

EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "C" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"
BRITISH OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

1. Move of five divisions from Mediterranean area to N.W. Europe between mid-February and early May 1945 requiring a total lift of the order of 200,000.

2. Any operational commitments in SEAC.

Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(i) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(ii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(iii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(iv) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(v) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(vi) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(vii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(viii) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(ix) U.K. to India
Includes Army & RAF	10,000 per month	(x) U.K. to India

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Exhibit "B" to Tab "C" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

Exhibit "A" to Tab "C" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "B" TO TAB "C" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

Section A. OTHER BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS

	Area	Estimated Numbers	Remarks
(i)	Canada & North America to U.K.	10,000 per month	Covers RAF, Cdn. & misc. requirements.
(ii)	U.K. to Gibraltar, W. Africa, Italy, PAIC, India and S. Africa	50,000 per month	Includes Army & RAF rotational movement and reinforcements from W. Africa to India.
(iii)	Internal Mediterranean movement, N. Africa & M.E. to Italy, etc.	—	Covered by 15,000 lift retained locally.
(iv)	Naval forces to Australia	4,000 per month	
(v)	N. Zealand to M.E.	(3,000 mid-Apr.) (3,000 mid-Jun.)	Rotational moves of New Zealand forces.
(vi)	M.E. to N. Zealand	(5,800 mid-Mar.)	
(vii)	W. Indies to U.K.	6,000 RAF recruits	
(viii)	E. Africa to Ceylon	4,500 in March	Rfts for 11th) E.A. Div.)
(ix)	Italy to India) India to Italy)	2,000 a month	Rotational) Indian moves of) Ocean Indian troops.) shipping
(x)	PAIC to India) India to PAIC)	1,200 a month	Rotational) moves of) Indian troops.)

(Table Continued on Following Page)

Exhibit "B" to Tab "C" to
Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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Section B. MISCELLANEOUS COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN TROOPING
TO BE CARRIED OUT IN BRITISH SHIPPING

	Area	Estimated Numbers	Remarks
(i)	U.K. to M.E.	8,000)	German P.W.) To be) fitted in Repatriation) as and) of Soviets.) when The figures) shipping for UK and SE) available. Europe are) US ship- likely to) ping may increase.) be able to) assist.
	U.K. to Malta	2,000)	
(ii)	U.K.)	26,000)	The figures) shipping for UK and SE) available. Europe are) US ship- likely to) ping may increase.) be able to) assist.
	SE Europe) to	21,000)	
	Italy) USSR	4,000)	
	M.E.)	2,500)	

Exhibit "B" to Tab "C" to
Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "C" TO TAB "C" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES

(i) NORTH ATLANTIC	Feb/May incl.	48,000 per month
	June	36,000 per month

NOTE: This will be effected in the main by 20-knot class ships, in order to allow of the continuance of assistance to westbound evacuation of U.S. casualties as agreed. It will result in the necessity of such U.S. troop movement as is destined for N.W. Europe being oncarried from U.K.

(ii) CROSS CHANNEL

A lift of 10,000 has been allowed for in the estimates which should provide for a daily flow of some 3,000.

(iii) OTHER AREAS

Mutual assistance to troop movement in other areas will continue to be agreed between the authorities concerned, in order to achieve an overall economy of shipping.

Exhibit "C" to Tab "C" to
Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "A" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

PROVISIONAL FORECAST OF COMBINED DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

(March-June, 1945)

TAB "D" TO ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. TROOP SHIPPING POSITION

(March-June, 1945)

U.S. personnel shipping supplemented by British assistance in the Atlantic, which is estimated at 48,000 spaces per month February through May and 36,000 spaces in June, is adequate to meet presently estimated deployment requirements up to the defeat of Germany which is assumed at 1 July 1945. Allowance has been made for the probable U.S. troopship assistance to the movement of five divisions from the Mediterranean to southern France between mid-February and early May 1945.

reduction in the second and subsequent months. Other factors of which cannot at present be estimated, would tend to increase the controlled shipping situation. These include the possibility of an increase in Allied and Neutral tonnage willing to trade in the tonnage that may be recovered from enemy capture. The tonnage provided by the continuance of shipbuilding, and the tonnage performance resulting from the abolition of much of the tonnage. On the other hand it is expected that there will be some tonnage pairing. The Fleet Train may require additional tonnage. The tonnage may suffer some deterioration, and there will be a considerable tonnage in the import requirements of the United Kingdom and the United States. It is expected that, on balance, the British-controlled tonnage will show an improvement during a temporary period of a few months, but that thereafter a stringent situation will occur.

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Tab "D" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

**PROVISIONAL FORECAST OF COMBINED DRY CARGO AND
TROOP SHIPPING POSITION AFTER V-E DAY ON 1 JULY 1945**

the Atlantic which is estimated at 28,000 spaces per month February through May and 38,000 spaces in June. It is adequate to meet presently estimated demand for troop shipments up to the defeat of Germany which is assumed at 1 July 1945. Allowance has been made for the possible U.S. troop requirements to the movement of five divisions from the Mediterranean to southern France between mid-February and early May 1945.

in a position to make available to the United States Army and Navy for the purpose of carrying out the operations of the United States Army and Navy in the Mediterranean area.

Tab "D" to Annex "A" to Appendix "B"

Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "A" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

Remarks	4th Qtr	3rd Qtr	2nd Qtr	1st Qtr	VE 1 mth	VE 2 mth	VE 3 mth	VE 4 mth	VE 5 mth	VE 6 mth	VE 7 mth	VE 8 mth	VE 9 mth	VE 10 mth	VE 11 mth	VE 12 mth
	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK

1. For the first few months after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, maintenance requirements for the theatre as a whole will drop very considerably. On the other hand there will be additional demands of which the principal will be:—

- a. The rapid occupation of certain European areas, e.g., Norway.
- b. The redeployment of forces from Europe to India and Southeast Asia.
- c. The redeployment of air forces to the Australian area.

In the absence of any detailed plan for these contingencies it is clearly impossible to give a firm table of the monthly sailings required, but the table following paragraph 2 gives an indication of the way in which current levels are likely to vary during the first two quarters after V-E Day.

2. Tonnage required for military programmes would accordingly show a substantial reduction in the first month following V-E Day, and a smaller reduction in the second and subsequent months. Other factors, the scale of some of which cannot at present be estimated, would tend to improve the British-controlled shipping situation. These include the reduction in sinkings, the increase in Allied and Neutral tonnage willing to trade to European liberated areas, the tonnage that may be recovered from enemy hands, the additional tonnage provided by the continuance of shipbuilding, and the substantial gain in performance resulting from the abolition of much of the convoying system. On the other hand, it is expected that there will be some increase in ship repairing, the Fleet Train may require additional tonnage, turn-round time in ports may suffer some deterioration, and there will be a substantial increase in the import requirements of the United Kingdom and European liberated areas. It is expected that, on balance, the British-controlled shipping situation will show an improvement during a temporary period of up to perhaps two months, but that thereafter a stringent situation will again develop.

The effect of these contingencies has been taken into account in the estimates of available sailings.

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Tab "A" to Annex "B"
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Tab "A" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

Theater	VE 1 mth		VE 2 mths		VE 3 mths		4th Qtr.		Remarks
	UK	NA	UK	NA	UK	NA	UK	NA	
India	30	45	50	45	65	45	180	135	Some U.K. sailings will in fact originate from the Med.
P.G.	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	
Mediterranean Mtce.	12	12	12	12	15	15	45	45	
Australia	2	-	12	-	12	2	26	6	
B.L.A. Maint.	-	3	-	3	-	3	-	10	
Civil Affairs	-	12	-	15	-	18	-	60	
Russia	4	-	4	-	4	-	12	-	
Med. Retentions Combined	40		35		30		20		
N.W. Europe RETENTIONS M.T. (Combined)	50		40		20		20		
Stores	40		35		25		25		

NOTE: If the Coaster fleet is partially withdrawn, the ocean tonnage retained for stores movement will have to be correspondingly increased.

The fleet may require additional tonnage for stores movement and there will be a consequent increase in the requirements of the United Kingdom and European theaters. It is expected that on balance the British-controlled shipping situation will show an improvement during a temporary period of up to perhaps two months, but that thereafter a stringent situation will again develop.

Tab "A" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

Tab "A" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "B" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

(After V-E Day)

1. United States military requirements for the first and second quarters following the cessation of hostilities in Europe are set forth in Exhibit "A." On the assumption of July 1st as the date for the termination of the European war Exhibit "A" reflects the military requirements for the third and fourth quarters of 1945. On the assumption of any earlier date the requirements for months in the last half of 1945 would apply for the appropriate months succeeding V-E Day with only minor adjustments. These requirements are based upon present redeployment plans.

2. No authoritative advice has been forthcoming at ARGONAUT on the magnitude of requirements for U.S. shipping other than those of the United States Army and Navy after termination of hostilities in Europe. It is noted that some of these requirements are subject to a substantial increase as a result of the occupation of numerous additional Continental ports, the opening of access to large Allied populations now inaccessible or under enemy control, and the occupation of enemy territories, which demands, if accepted, would require more shipping.

3. The shipping situation during the first quarter following V-E Day will be eased by the reduction of military requirements to Europe incident to the cessation of hostilities against Germany and improvement in turn-rounds in the Atlantic trades.

4. Consideration of the United States troopship position indicates the desirability of further conversions of approximately 200 dry cargo ships to lift 500 personnel each. These conversions should be initiated immediately upon V-E Day subject to the urgency of other shipyard activity. For planning purposes, it is estimated that conversions should be accomplished at a rate of 50 the first month following V-E Day and 75 each of the following two months. The effect of these conversions has been taken into account in the estimation of available sailings.

Tab "B" to Annex "B"
to Appendix "B"

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5. Estimated military requirements show a large increase beginning in the second quarter after the end of hostilities in Europe, as a result of which it is expected that a renewed shipping stringency will develop. Non-military commitments which would extend into this period should, therefore, be assumed only with the greatest caution, and should be subject to the principles enunciated in C.C.S. 746/10.

United States military requirements for the first and second quarters following the cessation of hostilities in Europe are set forth in Exhibit "A". On the assumption of July 1st as the date for the termination of the European war, Exhibit "A" reflects the military requirements for the third and fourth quarters of 1945. On the assumption of any earlier date the requirements for months in the last half of 1945 would apply for the appropriate number and timing V-E Day with only minor adjustments. These requirements are based upon present redeployment plans.

No authoritative advice has been forthcoming at ARCONAUT on the magnitude of requirements for U.S. shipping other than those of the United States Army and Navy after termination of hostilities in Europe. It is noted that some of these requirements are subject to a substantial increase as a result of the occupation of numerous additional Continental ports, the opening of access to large Allied populations now inaccessible or under enemy control, and the occupation of enemy territories which demands it would require more shipping.

The shipping situation during the first quarter following V-E Day will be eased by the reduction of military requirements in Europe incident to the cessation of hostilities against Germany and improvement in transportation on the Atlantic theater.

Consideration of the United States troopship position indicates the desirability of further conversions of approximately 300 dry cargo ships to 400 personnel each. These conversions should be initiated immediately upon V-E Day subject to the urgency of other shipping activity. For planning purposes, it is estimated that conversions should be accomplished at a rate of 50 the first month following V-E Day and 75 each of the following two months. The effect of these conversions has been taken into account in the estimation of available sailings.

Tab "B" to Annex "B"
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EXHIBIT "A" to TAB "B" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. MILITARY DRY CARGO REQUIREMENTS

AFTER V-E DAY OF 1 JULY 1945

	1945				
	July	Aug.	Sept.	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
PACIFIC					
POA (Army and Navy)	225	233	235	693	812
SWPA (Army and Navy)	97	116	129	342	355
India-Burma & China	10	6	6	22	18
Less Army Atlantic Sailings	-50	-65	-75	-190	-220
Less Navy Atlantic Sailings	-45	-50	-55	-150	-240
TOTAL PACIFIC	237	240	240	717	725
ATLANTIC					
Army — ETO & MTO	170	160	155	485	406
CBI	15	19	19	53	63
Minor Areas	2	2	2	6	6
Pacific Areas	50	65	75	190	220
Navy — Pacific Areas	45	50	55	150	240
TOTAL ATLANTIC	282	296	306	884	935
Conversions*	50	0	-50	0	0
Europe — Pacific Sailings	(40)	(55)	(65)	(160)	(254)
Europe — Pacific Sailings Effect		40	55	95	232
TOTAL ATLANTIC ADJUSTED	332	336	311	979	1167
Retentions in Overseas Theaters	250	250	250	250	250

* Effect of 50 ships continuously under conversion during first quarter after V-E Day to provide a total of 200.

Exhibit "A" to Tab "B" to
Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "C" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

BRITISH CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING POSITION

(After V-E Day)

1. Exhibit "A" indicates availability of British trooping lift in the second half of 1945 with an estimate of military requirements as presently known. These are no more than tentative estimates. They include, as presently directed, certain allowances for inescapable commitments such as Class A demobilisation and rotational leave schemes. They do not, however, include any allowance for essential movement of a non-military nature for which it is considered certain provision will have to be made.

2. Apart from variation in the estimated British military requirements which have been used as a basis for Exhibit "A," the following factors may affect the problem:

- (a) Conversion of cargo shipping, which is already under investigation by M.W.T.
- (b) The achievement in practice of the planning figures assumed for air trooping.
- (c) No credit has been assumed for any captured shipping.
- (d) No allowance has been made for losses.
- (e) It has been assumed that convoys will be required east of Aden, and between Aden and Bombay these will be every 3 days.
- (f) No allowance has been made for any savings resulting from the opening of MEDLOC, but on the other hand no requirement has been included for ocean-going shipping for movement between the United Kingdom and Northwest Europe.

3. The balance between military requirements and total availabilities as shown in Exhibit "A" indicates no surplus in the third quarter and an appreciable deficit in the fourth quarter. To the extent that the requirements of any operations in SEAC during the period exceed the capacity of the available Indian Ocean shipping, a further deficit will occur.

Tab "C" to Annex "B"
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EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "C" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

TENTATIVE BRITISH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR TROOPSHIPS
 IN SECOND HALF OF 1945

	Personnel to be moved		Troop lift		Availability
	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.	
1. TROOPSHIP POSITION					
(a) Average number of spaces available			376,000	380,000	
(b) Estimate for repairs and conversions (12-1/2%)		47,000			
(c) Less Indian Ocean (local)		49,000			
(d) Less retentions in Mediterranean		5,000	101,000	101,000	
(e) Available for long sea voyage			275,000	279,000	
			Turn-round in days		Requirements
2. ARMY FORCES TO BE MOVED					
(a) U.K. to India	146,500	153,000	60	97,700	102,000
(b) U.K. to Mediterranean	40,000	40,000	30	13,000	13,000
(c) Mediterranean to New Zealand	17,000	17,000	120	22,600	22,600
(d) U.K. to Canada	—	20,000	20	—	4,400
(e) U.K. to Pacific	—	8,000	120	—	10,700
(f) W. Africa to India	6,000	6,000	60	4,000	4,000
	209,500	244,000		137,300	156,700
3. R.N. FORCES TO BE MOVED					
(a) U.K. to India (incl. M.N.)	28,500	25,500	60	19,000	17,000
(b) U.K. to Mediterranean	1,000	1,000	30	300	300
(c) U.K. to Australia	22,500	15,700	120	30,000	20,900
	52,000	42,200		49,300	38,200

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Exhibit "A" to Tab "C" to
 Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

Exhibit "A" to Tab "C" to
 Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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(Continued)	Personnel to be moved		Turn- round in days	Troop lift Requirements	
	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.		3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
4. R.A.F. FORCES TO BE MOVED					
(a) U.K. to India	30,500	40,000	60	20,300	26,700
(b) U.K. to Mediterranean	17,000	17,000	30	5,600	5,600
(c) U.K. to Pacific	10,000	20,000	120	13,300	26,700
(d) U.K. to Canada	52,000	—	20	11,600	—
(e) Canada to Pacific	—	30,000	120	—	40,000
(f) India to Pacific	10,000	20,000	90	10,000	20,000
	<u>119,500</u>	<u>127,000</u>		<u>60,800</u>	<u>119,000</u>
<i>Total to be moved to India</i>					
2(a), 3(a) & 4(a)	205,500	218,500		137,000	145,700
Less estimated air lift	17,000	30,000			
Net to be moved by sea	188,500	188,500			
Add 10% additional spaces	18,800	18,800			
	<u>207,300</u>	<u>207,300</u>		<u>138,200</u>	<u>138,200</u>
5. Net + or — in troop lift				+1,200	—7,500
6. Excess of 20% required to Australia on 2(c), (e), 3(c) & 4(c)				13,200	16,200
7. REPATRIATION OF VARIOUS COMMONWEALTH ex Ps.W.					
	25,000	25,000	60	16,600	16,600
8. TOTAL LONG SEA VOYAGE REQUIREMENT					
Items 2 to 7 incl.				<u>278,400</u>	<u>339,200</u>
9. OVER-ALL DEFICIT					
8 less 1(e)				<u>3,400</u>	<u>60,200</u>

(Table continued on next page)

Exhibit "A" to Tab "C" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

Exhibit "A" to Tab "C" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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TAB "D" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

U. S. TROOP SHIPPING POSITION

(After V-E Day)

1. Exhibit "A" indicates for the last half of 1945 the U.S. troop shipping requirements compared to availability. The requirements are based upon V-E Day of 1 July 1945, with the same troop movement following the beginning of redeployment as presently planned for a 31 March 1945 V-E Day and do not permit of any repatriation for demobilization during this period. Resulting United States Army overseas strengths are shown in Exhibit "B." Trooplift capabilities that were considered in determining the trooplift position were based on the following assumptions:

- a. Additions to United States troopship inventory resulting from construction now scheduled by the U.S. Maritime Commission after allowance for a six percent repair rate and approved C.C.S. loss rates.
- b. Scheduled use in the Pacific of APA's not assigned to operations.
- c. Full use of accommodations on cargo ships already converted for return of troops from Europe.
- d. Restoration to use of captured enemy shipping.

2. The balance between requirements and availability indicates an appreciable deficit during the third quarter increasing to a substantial deficit in the fourth quarter based on no British troopship assistance. To the extent that these deficits cannot be overcome by various expedients the rate of redeployment to the Pacific, both direct and through the United States will have to be slowed down. Acceptance of a reduced rate of troop movement will deny Pacific theater commanders desired forces with which to initiate the presently projected large-scale operations against Japan during the period September through December 1945 and would probably result in postponement of these operations.

3. Some of the possibilities which exist for reducing the deficit in troopship availability to meet requirements are:

- a. Double loading of ships during the summer and fall.

Tab "D" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"



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b. Conversion of approximately 200 additional cargo ships to lift 500 troops each involving the acceptance of the attendant inconveniences to personnel. These conversions could probably be accomplished at a rate of 50 the first month following V-E Day and 75 each of the following two months. This action would result in having practically all of the cargo ships employed between United States and Europe equipped to carry troops.

c. Greater assistance from British and captured enemy shipping.

d. Use of landing craft being transferred from Europe to the Pacific.

e. Full utilization of all available facilities of the Air Transport Command as well as movement by combat and troop carrier planes being transferred from Europe to the Pacific.

f. Scheduling of greater assistance from APA's in the Pacific and such other naval vessels as can be made available.

g. Integration of United Nations transport fleet to eliminate cross hauling and maximum use of troopships when returning from their outbound trips.

h. Careful scheduling of the return of sick and wounded so that the least interference is made with the quickest turn-round possible.

1. The balance between requirements and availability indicates an approval deficit during the third quarter increasing to a substantial deficit in the fourth quarter based on no British troopship assistance. To the extent that these deficits cannot be overcome by various expedients the rate of troopship movement to the Pacific both direct and through the United States will have to be reduced. Acceptance of a reduced rate of troop movement will deny Pacific theater commanders desired forces with which to initiate the presently projected large-scale operations against Japan during the period September through December 1945 and would probably result in postponement of these operations.

2. Some of the possibilities which exist for reducing the deficit in troopship availability to meet requirements are:

a. Double loading of ships during the summer and fall.

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EXHIBIT "A" TO TAB "D" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. TROOP SHIPPING POSITION
 (After V-E Day)

	Personnel to be moved		Turn- round (in days)	Troopship spaces	
	1945			1945	
	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.		3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
1. TROOPSHIP POSITION					
a. Average number of spaces available during quarter				620,700	685,800
b. Est. spaces in repair (6%)				37,200	41,100
c. Net troopship spaces available				583,500	644,700
d. Less local retentions				62,000	62,000
e. Troopship availability				521,500	582,700
Requirements					
2. ARMY TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED*					
a. Europe to the Pacific	287,800	287,900	90	287,800	287,900
b. Europe to C.B.I.	32,600	23,300	60	21,800	15,600
c. U.S. to Pacific (troops)	147,800	236,800	60	98,000	157,800
d. U.S. to Pacific (replacements)	123,600	171,700	60	82,400	114,000
e. U.S. to C.B.I. (troops)	0	0	90		
f. U.S. to C.B.I. (replacements)	20,200	21,800	90	20,200	21,800
g. Minor Areas to U.S.	16,750	13,050	45	8,400	6,500
h. Total	628,750	734,550		518,600	583,400
3. NAVY TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED					
a. U.S. to Pacific	191,000	220,100	60	127,300	146,700
b. Other Areas to U.S.	17,400	9,400	38	7,300	3,900
c. Total	208,400	229,500		134,600	150,600

(Table continued on next page)

* Deployment to North Pacific to be accomplished in tonnage frozen in the Alaskan pool.

Exhibit "A" to Tab "D" to
 Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

(Continued)

	Personnel to be moved		Turn- round (in days)	Troopship spaces	
	1945			1945	
	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.		3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
	Requirements				
4. TOTAL TROOPSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR ABOVE MOVEMENT				653,200	734,000
a. Less APA assistance*				116,000 ^b	33,300
b. Net requirement				<u>537,200</u>	<u>700,700</u>
c. Troop spaces available for use between Europe and U.S. (1 e. minus 4 b.)				-15,700	-118,000
5. TROOP FLOW FROM EUROPE TO U.S. FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO PACIFIC	217,300	237,000			
a. Less cargo ship assistance	45,000	90,000			
b. Less use of captured enemy shipping		0	75,000		
c. Net troopship requirement	172,300	72,000	38	72,800	30,200
d. Troopship availability (4 c.)				-15,700	-118,000
e. Over-all deficiency in troopship spaces (non-cumulative)				-88,500	-148,200
f. If British monthly assistance of 70,000 in terms of trans-Atlantic lift is assumed, over-all deficiency will be				0	-59,700

* These figures represent the theoretical number of troopship spaces which, during a given quarter, would accomplish the same personnel movement as the APA facilities which will be available during the quarter.

^b Based on scheduled use of APA's not assigned to operations.

of "G" set of "A" and "B" Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

Exhibit "A" to Tab "D" to Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXHIBIT "B" TO TAB "D" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

U.S. ARMY OVERSEAS STRENGTHS AFTER V-E DAY
Required by Assumed Redeployment Plan

	1945	
	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
EUROPE		
Strength 1 July 1945	3,500,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	2,960,000	2,430,000
PACIFIC		
Pacific Ocean Areas		
Strength 1 July 1945	600,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	860,000	1,545,000
Southwest Pacific Area		
Strength 1 July 1945	845,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	1,035,000	865,000
India-Burma and China		
Strength 1 July 1945	240,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	265,000	280,000
North Pacific		
Strength 1 July 1945	70,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	75,000	75,000
Total Pacific		
Strength 1 July 1945	1,755,000	
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	2,235,000	2,765,000

Exhibit "B" to Tab "D" to
Annex "B" to Appendix "B"

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EXHIBIT "B" TO TAB "D" TO ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"
 U.S. ARMY OVERSEAS STRENGTHS AFTER V-E DAY
 Required by Assumed Redeployment Plan

1945	3rd Qtr.	4th Qtr.
EUROPE		
Strength 1 July 1945	3,800,000	3,800,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	2,960,000	2,960,000
PACIFIC		
Pacific Ocean Areas		
Strength 1 July 1945	600,000	600,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	880,000	1,245,000
Southwest Pacific Area		
Strength 1 July 1945	545,000	545,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	1,025,000	1,025,000
India-Burma and China		
Strength 1 July 1945	240,000	240,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	285,000	285,000
North Pacific		
Strength 1 July 1945	70,000	70,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	75,000	75,000
Total Pacific		
Strength 1 July 1945	1,785,000	1,785,000
Cumulative Strength at end of quarter	2,335,000	2,785,000

Exhibit "B" to Tab "D" to
 Annex "B" to Appendix "B"