

Minutes of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945

Map Room
Box 29

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at the White House
on Monday, November 9, 1942, at 1430.

Map Room
Box 29

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS 927/425-1

6 July 72
By Jd Date JUL 10 1972

PRESENT

The President
Admiral W. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Brig. General J. R. Deane

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratification at the manner in which the operations in North Africa were progressing. He also stated that he noted that General Eisenhower had requested that there be no human interest stories for at least a few days.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General Eisenhower for recommendations with reference to publishing the story about General Clark's political negotiations in Africa. He stated that he thought that this would furnish good material for the present and would make up for a lack of news with reference to the operations.

THE PRESIDENT said that he noted one good human interest story on the front page of the paper this morning to the effect that the soldiers had been forbidden to flirt with the Moslem women.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for the locations of the Blida and Maison Blanche Airports and they were pointed out to him by General Marshall who also added that Hurricanes and Spitfires had already started operations from these fields.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral King if he had heard any news from the MASSACHUSETTS.

ADMIRAL KING replied that the only thing they had heard had been a request for additional ammunition.

THE PRESIDENT said he had heard rumors that the JEAN BART was out of action.

ADMIRAL KING replied that he had one report that the JEAN BART and the PRIMAUGENT had been bombed and were disabled and that the 2d French Light Division were all out of action; however, there were 3 or 4 submarines loose which constituted a serious hazard.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral King if he had been making arrangements for sending small craft over there, 110-foot and the like.

ADMIRAL KING replied that they were on their way and as far as the West Coast of Africa is concerned there will be a set-up comparable to a sea frontier. The British will take care of everything inside the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the British had sufficient forces to accomplish this, to which ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative.

THE PRESIDENT then asked about 2 boats which were reported to have been torpedoed, one the THOMAS STONE and the other the ST. PAUL.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the THOMAS STONE was due to arrive at its destination about noon today, but he could give no information with reference to the ST. PAUL. (It was later found that the reported damage to the ST. PAUL was in error and that the name given in the message as ST. PAUL should have been THOMAS STONE. A memorandum to this effect was sent to the President.)

THE PRESIDENT, commenting on the action of the First Division at Oran, asked General Marshall what he was going to do about the Second Division, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that it was now in Texas.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt we were particularly fortunate that the eastern landing had progressed so smoothly; also, that having accomplished the entire landing in 24 hours will permit an early start to Tunisia. He said he felt this was probably due to arrangements that Mr. Murphy had made and was the direct result of his having been there.

ADMIRAL KING asked if there were any indication of a landing having been made east of Algiers at Bone or Philippeville.

GENERAL MARSHALL said no, not so far, but he thought there was a distinct possibility troops from the next convoy might be sent into Tunisia if the attitude of the French troops was favorable, and there was also the possibility that the 1800 parachute troops now in Oran could be flown to Tunisia. He stated that he had just sent a message to General Andrews in Cairo with reference to a request from the British for additional transport planes to assist them in their pursuit of Rommel's forces. General Marshall stated that he had informed General Andrews that instructions had been issued to the Air Transport Command to have as many transports as possible, up to 40, report to General Andrews in Cairo with the understanding that there would be a resulting delay in supplies being delivered to the British over the ferry route. He is also sending a group of transport planes from Texas to assist in the Middle East operations, and this is the one that will eventually be included in our operations in the Caucasus. They will replace the transports being lent by the Air Transport Command.

THE PRESIDENT then said that General Holcomb had said he believed Guadalcanal could be held if it could be kept supplied with gasoline, ammunition, and food.

ADMIRAL KING stated that we had been particularly successful in the last week. One ship, however, had had to be beached.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then brought up the question of a reward for Mr. Murphy's work in North Africa.

THE PRESIDENT said he should be given the Order of Merit at once.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that his work may have been almost solely responsible for us getting Algiers, and that if so, the Order of Merit should be only a beginning toward rewarding Mr. Murphy.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he would recommend against any rewards to General Giraud, at least until he had "delivered the goods." He said our gentleman's agreement with General Giraud is only valid in the event that Giraud does fulfill his promises. He felt that eventually Giraud would have to be removed from command but that possibly he could be retained in a political position such as governor. The President said he felt that probably

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there would eventually be established a commission in each of the 3 provinces and also one in Tunisia when that province is taken. He thought that Mr. Murphy should be given supreme charge and be permitted to pick the members of each commission. On such commissions there should be one Frenchman known to be friendly and one representative of the native population, and Mr. Murphy should retain membership on each commission himself.

THE PRESIDENT then asked to be given the immediate missions of the forces landing on the west coast.

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING pointed out certain lines of communications that they were to block and also certain airfields that were to be taken over.

THE PRESIDENT then asked about communications to Dakar and the available roads were pointed out to him on the map. He stated that he was concerned about the policy we should take toward the French Governor at Dakar, suggesting that perhaps we should tell him that we will not bother him as long as he behaves.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that he should be told nothing at this time. Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING expressed the opinion that Dakar was now cut off from the Axis and would fall of its own weight, also that their coastwise shipping will be interrupted and that it would not be at all surprising to have the authorities at Dakar approach us with a friendly attitude in the near future.

THE PRESIDENT then asked what should be our attitude with respect to coastwise vessels.

ADMIRAL LEAHY and ADMIRAL KING agreed that we should take action against any warships encountered and bring merchant ships into port.

Both ADMIRAL KING and GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Dakar might eventually be valuable as a naval base, and GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that it would be of considerable value as one of the stops on our air transport command.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if it would be a good thing to send word to Petain somewhat as follows: that we are sorry he decided to break diplomatic relations, but we hope he will realize that this is serious business. We will not permit the French fleet to move out of Toulon, but that if it does, we will have to attack it. We do not desire to see more bloodshed. However, if the French fleet does come out, the responsibility will be his.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested waiting a few days before taking such action, as he doubted if they would send the French fleet out.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what the President thought would be the reaction of the French to the British as a result of the American invasion of North Africa, suggesting the possibility that this action might soften them toward the British somewhat.

ADMIRAL LEAHY responded that he didn't think so because "the French just do not like the British."

THE PRESIDENT said he hoped that General Eisenhower would emphasize the fact that we are occupying Algeria and Tunisia in order to obtain an avenue of approach toward the rear of Rommel's forces.

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ADMIRAL LEAHY then said that a message had been received asking for guidance with reference to his propaganda attitude toward Vichy. Admiral Leahy added that in his opinion General Eisenhower should refrain from any propaganda, at least until the situation has become clarified.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy, but that if it was necessary to adopt an attitude with reference to the propaganda toward Vichy, we should put the onus of breaking relations on Laval, emphasizing the fact that while we have broken with the Vichy Government, and particularly Laval, the people of the United States can never break off relations with the French people. (A message to this effect was later sent.)

THE PRESIDENT then brought up the subject of the adequacy of the supply of petroleum, saying that Mr. Ickes is also very much worried about it. He asked Admiral King if he had taken up the question of the building of additional tankers with the Maritime Commission and ADMIRAL KING replied that he had.

THE PRESIDENT then said he was considering the possibility of making Mr. Ickes Petroleum Director instead of Petroleum Coordinator. He stated that there are many questions involved, particularly with reference to the supply of high octane gasoline needed for the expanded air program and also the question of sponsoring more wildcatting in a search for oil. He stated that he had provided Mr. Ickes with \$1,000,000 for the purpose of prospecting for oil in Alaska.

There followed some discussion with reference to the Army and Navy moving into the Pentagon Building and with regard to the approaches to the Pentagon Building.

The meeting then adjourned.

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6 July 1972 JUL 10 1972
By JL Date

NOTES TAKEN AT THE MEETING

Held in the Executive Offices of the President
on Wednesday, November 25, 1942, at 1430

PRESENT

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By Authority of

922/4851
6 July 1972
JUL 10 1972
By *js* Date

The President
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieut. General Arnold
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Brig. General Deane

THE PRESIDENT first discussed the question of what operations should be undertaken as soon as the following have been accomplished in North Africa: first, a secure situation to the south and east of Spanish Morocco; and, second, the complete occupation of Tunisia. He asked General Marshall for his estimate of when Tunisia would be occupied.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that, unless the Axis forces develop some unforeseen strength, he estimated that the occupation of Tunisia could be accomplished in from two to three weeks, provided that two divisions were sufficient to accomplish the task. He stated that if, on the other hand, General Eisenhower found it necessary to commit four divisions for the purpose, the complete occupation would take somewhat longer because of the delay involved in assembling this number of troops.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Marshall for his estimate as to the time required for driving Axis forces from Tripoli.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that, if we succeed in taking Tunisia, and barring the breakdown of General Alexander's forces due to overextension, the Axis powers would find themselves in an impossible situation in Tripoli and would be forced to evacuate that area by what might be termed attrition.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if any information had been received about the fortified position which he had been informed of about ten miles inside of the Tunisian border from Tripoli. He was informed that no reports had been received concerning this position. (A message will be sent to General Eisenhower, asking if any information is available on this subject.)

THE PRESIDENT and GENERAL MARSHALL then discussed the possibilities of future operations. Action in Turkey was discussed, and it was agreed that there were many diplomatic questions involved, and that probably Turkey would not consider aligning herself with the United Nations until she had been given considerable armament and other munitions of war. In this connection, GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he felt that, if we were to strengthen the Turkish forces, it would be better to give them small arms and ammunition for their infantry units, but to have the heavier artillery and mechanized weapons manned by American troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that before any operations were decided on very careful consideration should be given to the cost of actually clearing the Mediterranean for sea traffic. He felt that the occupation of Sicily, Sardinia, and Crete would be

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necessary for this, and pointed out that a careful determination should be made of whether or not the large air and ground forces required for such a project could be justified, in view of the results to be expected.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Marshall what he considered to be the lines of action open to the Axis powers.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he considered that, in order of probability, their lines of action were as follows: first, occupation of Spain; second, a continued drive through the Caucasus; and, third, an attack against the British Isles.

There followed a discussion concerning the production program. THE PRESIDENT initiated this discussion by stating that the 82,000 combat airplane program had his approval and must be carried out.

ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL LEAHY advised the President that Mr. Nelson had informed them that, if this air program was carried out, many of the essential features of the naval program could not be accomplished without some delay.

THE PRESIDENT was of the opinion that the aircraft program would not conflict with the Navy program in any way.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that a conflict had already occurred in the matter of machine tools and was very apt to occur in connection with the allocation of certain metals, instruments, and fittings.

ADMIRAL KING then presented a list to the President of those things which he considered should be of the highest and equal priority. He informed the President that this list had not yet received full consideration from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor had it been approved by them.

THE PRESIDENT examined the list, and indicated that it should include articles of equipment and other "gadgets" for the aircraft and surface vessels shown in the list. He also thought it should include radar equipment. (This is included in the Army Supply Program shown on the list.)

THE PRESIDENT directed that the list be amended as he had indicated, and also that it should include the requirements of the Maritime Commission for the merchant shipbuilding program for 1943, and submitted to Mr. Nelson as a "Number One Group" of items which should be produced in 1943 to attain a balanced military program, and also directed that Mr. Nelson be asked if the program included on the list is possible of accomplishment. He indicated that we should first find out from Mr. Nelson what he can do, and then follow this action with an appropriate directive to him.

GENERAL ARNOLD then brought up the question of allocating the aircraft to be constructed in 1943, stating that it was necessary to make the allocation now in order to plan for the units to be constituted to operate the aircraft.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the belief that any allocation made at this time should include a proviso that it is subject to such revision from time to time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the strategic situation necessitates.

THE PRESIDENT then asked that General Arnold submit his recommendations along these lines prior to Monday, November 30th. GENERAL ARNOLD stated that he could do this.

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A proposed directive to be issued by the War Production Board was then discussed. ADMIRAL LEAHY and GENERAL MARSHALL stated that this directive, if approved, would result in a considerable alteration of the present production set-up. It would give the War Production Board power to say what munitions would be produced and would conflict with the authority now bestowed upon the Under Secretaries of War and Navy with reference to production.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not fear that the War Production Board would attempt to dictate what type of weapons would be produced, because this was manifestly absurd and could be easily stopped or corrected. He did feel, however, that it would be unwise for the War Production Board to assume the responsibilities of those agencies now set up by law and which were now going concerns. He felt that the War Production Board was attempting to set up an administrative organization that would fall of its own weight.

GENERAL MARSHALL further stated that he felt the title "War Production Board" was a misnomer, and that their job was not to produce finished items, but rather to furnish to production agencies the raw materials which would enable them to produce such items.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with General Marshall's remarks, and mentioned that there were several other features of the War Production Board's organization which required correction. He stated that matters which were purely military must be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by himself, and that, when the military conflicted with civilian requirements, the decision would have to rest with him.

THE PRESIDENT then read a radiogram received from the Prime Minister which indicated the latter's fear that the United States had abandoned plans for carrying out certain European operations. He also read a proposed reply to this message which had been prepared by General Marshall. The message from the Prime Minister indicated a desire to have a military conference held between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia somewhere in the Middle East. In this connection, the President stated that such a conference should not be held until the North African situation had been stabilized with the complete occupation of Tunisia and a more secure situation with reference to Spain and Spanish Morocco.

The meeting then adjourned.

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July 1972

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Date

JUL 10 1972

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at the White House
on Thursday, December 10, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *JH 927/495-1*

July 1972

By *JH* Date Jul 10 1972

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General Geo. C. Marshall
Lt. General H. H. Arnold
Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Brig. General J. R. Deane

THE PRESIDENT first discussed a message which he had received from the Prime Minister with regard to our inability to exercise control over local French authorities in the internal administrative affairs of French North Africa. The establishment of a civil authority for the purpose of controlling such matters had been under discussion.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he had consulted the State Department concerning this matter, and that they strongly recommended against the establishment of such authority at this time. ADMIRAL LEAHY recommended to the President that he merely forward the radiogram to General Eisenhower, requesting his comments and advice on the matters covered in the Prime Minister's message.

THE PRESIDENT approved Admiral Leahy's recommendation, but directed that General Eisenhower be instructed to talk the matter over with Mr. Murphy, and also that a short message be prepared from him to the Prime Minister, informing him of the action taken.

THE PRESIDENT then discussed what was to be done upon the conclusion of the present campaign in North Africa. In this connection, he stated that he would like to have all studies that are being made on this subject submitted to him for his consideration.

(Note by the Secretary: A compilation of studies prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Staff Planners, and the Joint Intelligence Committee will be prepared and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for approval prior to its transmission to the President.)

THE PRESIDENT indicated that his views were that we should continue to build up our forces in the United Kingdom and North Africa with the greatest possible speed. He felt that it was not necessary to make an immediate decision as to our next strategic move, and stated that possibly it could be delayed until as late as March 1st. Meanwhile, we would be building up two strong striking forces which would be prepared to take any line of action which appeared to be indicated. He thought that as long as the Germans had brought the fight to us in Tunisia we were accomplishing the purpose of helping the Russians even though we did not meet with immediate success in clearing the enemy out of Tunisia.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that there were many proposals for our next strategic move. He felt that operations through Turkey would be well worth consideration, provided we could obtain the cooperation of that country.

GENERAL MARSHALL then stated that the most urgent necessity was to clear the Axis forces from Tunisia, in order that we might hold that area with a minimum force and be prepared to adopt strong measures to protect our line of communications in the Straits of Gibraltar. He stated that he was particularly opposed to "dabbling" in the Mediterranean in a wasteful logistical way, and that, before any new operation was undertaken in that area, he wanted to make sure that the attrition which would certainly result would be justified by the objectives to be attained. He stated that in his opinion it was also necessary to settle the North African situation quickly in order to expedite the despatch of U.S. forces to the United Kingdom, our monthly rate of flow to there being only 8500 men. He considered it important that we be ready by March or April to launch operations against the Brest Peninsula or Boulogne, or both, the moment the Germans showed signs of aerial weakness or started a move through Spain.

THE PRESIDENT then asked how many troops could be shipped overseas to England or Africa in the next four months.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he could not state definitely, because recent losses in shipping necessitated a complete restudy of that subject.

(Note by the Secretary: The Operations Division, War Department General Staff, has been requested to prepare a memorandum to the President for the signature of the Chief of Staff showing the maximum number of troops that could be transported to England or Africa, or to both, in the next four months.)

GENERAL MARSHALL then discussed a proposal to undertake certain operations in Burma, and the President expressed his accord with General Marshall's views.

GENERAL ARNOLD then raised the possibility of bombing the French fleet at Toulon, and recommended that it be done. He stated that there were sufficient four-engine bombers in the United Kingdom at this time which could be made available for the purpose.

ADMIRAL LEAHY and ADMIRAL EDWARDS agreed that the French fleet did not have any combat power at this time, and probably could not be made into effective fighting units in less than three or four months. However, in view of the fact that the Axis Powers would undoubtedly build up strong anti-air defenses in this area, now that it is under their control, they could see no objection to undertaking such a bombing operation at this time.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his agreement with this view.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then informed the President of a message which had been received from General Eisenhower, recommending that the Eastern border of Tunisia be established as the dividing line between the areas of British and American administrative responsibility in North Africa.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he felt that all of Tripoli should be included in the area with Tunisia, because of the strong social and economic ties between those two countries.

MR. HOPKINS expressed the view that, this being a political question, it should be referred to the State Department for negotiation and settlement with the British Foreign Office.

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THE PRESIDENT agreed with this and directed that the State Department be so informed. He also desired that the State Department be informed of his views about including Tripoli in the same area of responsibility with Tunisia, but stated that this was merely his opinion, and that he would not make a great issue of it.

The question then arose as to the availability of a French aircraft carrier now in Martinique. ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that Admiral Hoover was handling these matters with the French Admiral Robert.

THE PRESIDENT suggested the possibility of having the State Department prepare terms by which we might either buy or lease this aircraft carrier, putting the purchase price or rental in escrow for whatever French government is established at the end of the war.

THE PRESIDENT then brought up the matter of a staff conference to be held between military representatives of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States in the near future, and asked General Marshall his opinion as to when it should be held.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that, before holding such conference, we should decide what we are going to do, or what we are prepared to do, in order to meet the Russians with definite proposals. He felt that, unless we could be this, the conference might be more of an irritation than a success. He suggested that, when the conference is held, it take place somewhere east of Basra. In that way the Russian delegation would be required to go but a short distance to attend it; this would indicate a desire on our part to meet them more than half way.

GENERAL MARSHALL then requested the President to limit the number of civilians now being authorized to proceed to North Africa by air. He stated that every seat on our transport airplanes is necessary to send military personnel to assist General Eisenhower in his operations.

THE PRESIDENT directed that no civilian personnel be authorized to proceed to North Africa by air until after the first of the year.

The meeting then adjourned.

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16 July 1972

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Date *11 10 1972*

MINUTES OF A MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE
ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1943, AT 1500

PRESENT

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By Authority of JCS 927/495-1

6 July 1972

By J Date JUL 10 1972

The President
Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA
Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA

THE PRESIDENT first discussed the contemplated trip to North Africa indicating that he had had word that the British might be somewhat delayed. He said that he proposed to spend four or five days with Mr. Churchill and thereafter for at least two days he wished to visit troops, going as far east as Algiers. He is particularly anxious to keep on the move and not spend more than a few hours with the troops at any one place. He would like to have his sleeping accommodations and meals with our armed forces and indicated he would be perfectly satisfied with a tent. He said he did not want to go as far east as Bone.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that most of our troops were concentrated in the largest numbers in General Patton's forces in the vicinity of Casablanca.

THE PRESIDENT then said that on the way back he wanted to stop in Liberia, perhaps for a day, also in Natal, and either Dutch or British Guiana. He indicated that either on the way down or the way home he would like to stop at Trinidad, but that if he visited either of the Guianas on the return trip he would probably spend the night in Puerto Rico.

In response to a query from Admiral Leahy, THE PRESIDENT said he had no objection to visiting Dakar. He particularly stated that he did not wish to return to Casablanca once his part of the conference had ended. He felt that he could go from Algiers or Oran directly to Liberia.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Marshall if he thought that he, General Marshall, should go to Moscow.

GENERAL MARSHALL said, "What would I be expected to accomplish there?"

THE PRESIDENT replied that the visit would be particularly for the purpose of giving impetus to the Russian morale. He said that Mr. Stalin had been invited to confer with the President and the Prime Minister on two occasions but had been unable to do so. He said he thought that Mr. Stalin probably felt out of the picture as far as Great Britain and the United States were concerned and also that he has a feeling of loneliness. THE PRESIDENT said he was going to speak to Mr. Churchill about the advisability of informing Mr. Stalin that the United Nations were to continue on until they reach Berlin, and that their only terms would be unconditional surrender. He also proposed to discuss with Mr. Churchill some political questions particularly with regard to disarmament after the war. He thought he would suggest that there be a meeting between Mr. Churchill, the Generalissimo, Mr. Stalin, and himself some time next summer, possibly in Nome. He informed General Marshall that if his discussions with Mr. Churchill along these lines were favorable, he, General Marshall, could be the emissary to inform Mr. Stalin of these results.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that after the conference was over he and General Arnold and General Somervell propose to go to Basra where they would separate, General Marshall going to Moscow, General Arnold going to Chungking, and General Somervell looking into the shipping and other logistical matters in the Iran-Iraq Area. After that he would return and pick up General Somervell and eventually they would leave from Ceylon and go to Australia, returning to the United States via the Pacific. General Arnold would return to the United States alone.

THE PRESIDENT then asked who was to take the places of the Chiefs of Staff when they left.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that in the War Department General McNarney would take over his duties and that General Styer would act for General Somervell. He felt that the immediate operational affairs could be taken care of very well inasmuch as General Hull, who will be at the conference, will be returning to the United States directly. He said, of course, all the plans were contingent on the results of the conference and the immediateness of operations decided upon.

ADMIRAL KING then said that Admiral Horne would act as Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Edwards as Chief of Staff would act for him in his office of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He also informed the President he was taking Admiral Cooke with him.

THE PRESIDENT then referred to a message which he had just received from Mr. Stalin in which he said that he wanted 100 airplanes but not crews.

GENERAL MARSHALL and GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that to send heavy bombers might immobilize these planes for six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and creating the necessary ground installations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood the idea of sending planes at all was to placate Mr. Stalin and that he didn't see why it made any particular difference whether they sent the planes with or without crews.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there was much more to the question than placating Mr. Stalin. Had we been able to send the planes as units of the Caucasus they would have been in a position to cover our operations in Iran and Iraq, to have given added protection to the Caucasus, and would have been available to have left Russia in support of some of our operations in case of emergency on short notice.

It then developed that Mr. Stalin's reply was with regard to a proposal which had been sent to him that in the event of war between Russia and Japan we would be prepared to send 100 heavy bombers to Russia within a period of about 72 days. The message also contained a proposal that the Bradley Mission be sent in order to make the necessary survey as to what facilities would be necessary in case these planes were sent. (A copy of Mr. Stalin's reply will be sent to each of the Chiefs of Staff.)

GENERAL ARNOLD then suggested that we send 300 transport planes to Russia at the rate of twenty per month: ten from the United States and ten from the United Kingdom.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought we should just send an answer to Mr. Stalin informing him that General Marshall will be coming to Moscow in the near future and will discuss the matter with him at that time. (Such a reply will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.)

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By *[Signature]* Date *JUL 10 1972*

ADMIRAL LEAHY then submitted a radiogram to the President which he proposed be sent to the Prime Minister giving a brief of the message that had been sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning proposed operations in Burma.

THE PRESIDENT, in reading the message, said he didn't think we should use the words "Burma Operations" but should make the title descriptive of what the operation proposed to do, that is, simply open the Burma Road. He said he did not see any necessity to take Rangoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the operation now being considered was a limited operation for the purpose of opening the Burma Road and was confined to the northern part of Burma.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested calling it "The Burma Road Operation," to which all agreed.

THE PRESIDENT again asked what would be the necessity of taking Rangoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that Rangoon was included in the ANAKIM Operation and that it would be desirable to obtain the southern part of Burma because we could thereby increase the flow of freight over the Burma Road not only by having the port facilities at Rangoon but also through the use of the railroad which connects them. He pointed out that the limited operation now contemplated is over very difficult terrain and perpendicular to all of the parallel ridge lines. He said that as far as Akyab was concerned, the only purpose in attempting to capture that part was for the establishment of an airfield.

THE PRESIDENT then opened the discussion relative to the coming conference in North Africa asking if all were agreed that we should meet the British united in advocating a cross-channel operation.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there was not a united front on that subject, particularly among our Planners. The Chiefs of Staff themselves regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one. He said that to him the issue was purely one of logistics; that he was perfectly willing to take some tactical hazards or risks but that he felt we have no right to take logistical hazards. He pointed out that the British were determined to start operations in the Mediterranean but that they are ready to consider BOLERO operations for a later date. He said the British pressed the point that we must keep the Germans moving. They lay great stress on accomplishing the collapse of Italy which would result in Germany having to commit divisions not only to hold Italy but also to replace Italian divisions now in other occupied countries. The British also feel that Turkey would be much impressed by a success in the Mediterranean and that the communications in the Mediterranean would be improved.

GENERAL MARSHALL went on to say that Sicily was probably a more desirable objective but much more difficult because the Germans have been in Sicily longer, and that there were a great many more and much better airfields for them than in Sardinia. An operation against Sicily would be similar to an operation across the Channel, but that any operation in the Mediterranean would limit what could be sent to the United Kingdom.

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GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that his greatest worry about operations in the Mediterranean was the loss of tonnage which would be involved. Any such operation would have to be made under air attack from Italy, southern France, Corsica, possibly Greece, as well as under a concentrated submarine attack. Our Planners have estimated that there would be about 20% loss in shipping:- 10% in and 10% out. He also pointed out the danger of Spain becoming hostile, in which case we would have an enemy in possession of a defile on our line of communications. To point out the scarcity in shipping he stated that we were now about to undertake an operation in the Aleutians in which we could only make one combat loader available whereas the success of the operation would be much more assured if we could have had two combat loaders. He said we may learn something from the British in the conference, of which we are not now aware, but he felt that the tonnage involved in the Mediterranean operation was the most important consideration. He said that he personally favors an operation against the Brest Peninsula. The losses there will be in troops, but he said that, to state it cruelly, we could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the BRIMSTONE Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future.

ADMIRAL KING said that the occupation of Sardinia would not be of great assistance in opening communications through the Mediterranean whereas the occupation of Sicily would have a very decisive and favorable effect on such communications. He felt that the question of communications through the Mediterranean was a more important consideration than the effect of our operations on Italy.

THE PRESIDENT said that as far as Sardinia is concerned he felt that if we took it we could shout "Hooray" and then say "Where do we go from here?"

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he thought that Sardinia was a more difficult operation than Sicily from the air point of view because Sicily was not subject to attack from as many directions and also that it could be given fighter protection from the Tunisia Area more rapidly.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Marshall what he thought the losses would be in an operation against the Brest Peninsula.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there would of course be losses but that there were no narrow straits on our lines of communications, and we could operate with fighter protection from the United Kingdom.

THE PRESIDENT had questioned the practicability of a landing on the Brest Peninsula to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought the landing could be effected but the difficulties would come later in fighting off attacks from German armored units. He also said that the question of supplying fighter aircraft for an operation in the north was much simpler than for operations in the Mediterranean because such aircraft could be flown from the United States via Great Britain.

THE PRESIDENT then asked why the British opposed the Brest Peninsula operation.

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GENERAL MARSHALL said he thought they feared that the German strength would make such an operation impracticable.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked when such an operation could be undertaken, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied the earliest date would be some time in August.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that at the conference the British will have a plan and stick to it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at one stage of the deliberations General Brooke favored an operation against Sardinia while the Prime Minister favored a SLEDGEHAMMER coupled with an effort to get Turkey into the war, but he thought they were now agreed on Sardinia and it would be difficult to arrive at an agreement.

He indicated that there was a very decided difference of opinion between the American and British point of view and there the question had resolved itself into one thing or the other with no alternatives in sight.

THE PRESIDENT said that an operation in Turkey would involve more shipping than is available. The State Department's point of view is that Turkey will not enter the war until we can put sufficient forces in Syria, such as airplanes and tanks, to convince them that we can assure their success by simply moving across the border and joining them.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that it was essential to do something about Syria or the Germans would attack there.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the British 8th Army was planning on reinforcing British troops in Syria.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that one of General Eisenhower's greatest troubles at the present time was a lack of airfields, and that this would also hamper Operation BRIMSTONE.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that our Planners differed with the British on the effects that Operation BRIMSTONE would have with regard to Spain. The British feel that the successful capture of Sardinia would have a stabilizing effect on Spain and insure that they would not enter the war, whereas our Planners had exactly the opposite point of view, feeling that if we succeed in taking Sardinia Germany's logical move would be to occupy the Iberian Peninsula and cut our lines of communications.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if we captured the Brest Peninsula it would prevent an invasion of Spain.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed but stated that the occupation of Spain might come before we were prepared to mount the operation against the Brest Peninsula.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt we should reach a decision in January to which the President agreed.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when we were planning last July the possibilities of a Russian collapse were dominant in our thoughts and that we accepted the operation in North Africa realizing that it was extremely hazardous. He felt that the surprise attained in this operation had surprised us. He said that in no sense was it a normal operation, that everything about it was abnormal and perhaps that had been the reason for our gaining surprise.

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THE PRESIDENT indicated that if we undertake an operation against Sardinia the Germans would quickly become aware of it.

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that there was one point that General Eisenhower had presented which offered the only advantage for an operation against Sardinia that had impressed him. He said that he thought the operation should be mounted from outside the Mediterranean, at least one division coming from the United States and several from England. If this were done, the North African situation could remain unchanged, and there would be a good possibility of surprise since the Germans would not know whether plans contemplated an attack in the north or the south.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if it wouldn't be possible for us to build up a large force in England and leave the actual decision in abeyance for a month or two.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought perhaps the necessity for shipping landing craft would prevent this procedure.

ADMIRAL KING said that if the operation were mounted from England the landing craft would be sent there in any event.

ADMIRAL KING then suggested that perhaps the whole operation could be carried out from North Africa using the small type landing craft in which we could afford to take the attrition losses.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he thought that the President's suggestion had considerable merit, that is, building up a large force in Europe and making plans for both an attack against the Brest Peninsula and an attack against Sardinia, but delaying the decision for a month or two; the decision to be based on the situation existing at that time.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we now have 800,000 or 900,000 men in North Africa. He thought that 100,000 would be adequate for the protection of Syria, 200,000 would be necessary for the occupation of Algiers, Morocco, and Tunisia, once the Axis forces had been expelled.

The question then arose what to do with the additional 500,000 in North Africa and also the 500,000 that might be built up in the United Kingdom for an attack against either Brest or Cherbourg.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that we were already training divisions for the BRIMSTONE Operation in case a decision was made to mount it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would have a study prepared as to the limiting dates before which a decision must be made.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that perhaps General Deane could meet him in Bathurst on the night of his arrival and explain what had taken place in the conference up to that time in order that he would not arrive at the conference ignorant of what had previously transpired. He then indicated that perhaps it would be best to let him come right on to Casablanca, get a good night's rest, and then go into the subject thoroughly. He said that he would leave the decision as to which course should be followed to the Chiefs of Staff to do as they thought best.

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THE PRESIDENT then took up the question of the areas of administrative responsibility in North Africa, in response to a recommendation which he had before him which had been submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He decided that the boundary between the areas of responsibility between the United States and the United Kingdom should be the eastern border of Tunisia.

THE PRESIDENT then discussed the letter which he had addressed to the War Shipping Administration on December 18 with reference to shipping, and indicated that he wished his order to be carried out. He said that Mr. Douglas had assured him that there was no intent of changing the present system regarding loading, but only to insure that all cargo space was economically utilized. THE PRESIDENT said that he had seen cases where the Army and Navy had not cooperated in utilizing available cargo space.

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the conditions of which the President complained had been corrected and that they were now working together on an efficient basis.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked the President if he would read the letter submitted to him by the Chiefs of Staff and see whether or not the recommendations contained therein carried out the President's desire with regard to the utilization of loading ships.

THE PRESIDENT did this and indicated that where there was additional space available on cargo ships he did not want this space filled with lend-lease or civilian material, but rather more material for the Army and the Navy which might be required by them in the field. THE PRESIDENT also said that what he proposed doing was what had been done in 1918.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the situation in 1918 was not comparable to the present situation. In the last war there were no convoy or combat loaded vessels. All that was necessary was to deliver material to General Pershing to the ports in France, whereas in this war we have to deliver material to troops in such a manner as to make it available for immediate combat needs; that much of the unloading is done right in the active combat zone, and, therefore, special loading was necessary so that in unloading the necessary items could be given to the troops in the proper sequence.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested the possibility of having representatives of the Army and Navy and Maritime Commission enter into a conference with instructions not to emerge until they had come to a satisfactory solution. All of the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the situation had come to an impasse and that conferences would be of no assistance.

GENERAL MARSHALL then stated that in his opinion the greatest difficulty lay in the lack of an inspection service. He pointed out the efficacy of the Inspector General's Department in the Army and suggested that possibly General Frank Hines might head an inspection committee which would include representatives from the War and Navy Departments and from the Maritime Commission. This committee would be directly responsible to the President and charged with the duty of pointing out to him deficiencies in the shipping situation wherever they exist.

THE PRESIDENT said that he felt this was an excellent solution to the problem and instructed General Deane to prepare a directive along these lines for his approval.

THE PRESIDENT then discussed the question of sovereignty in North Africa. He said that no sovereignty exists in North Africa. He said that French sovereignty is derived from the

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people of France, and since at the present time there is no government in France, it is impossible for the people to exercise this sovereignty and indicate the type of government that they desire. All that can be accomplished is a de facto civil control carried on by civilians who are capable of exercising such control.

He said that the sovereignty of France ceased in June of 1940 when President LeBrun disappeared. He felt that Marshal Petain was really just a de facto dictator without legal functions and simply exercised control because he was a man whom the people would follow.

THE PRESIDENT said that what must be made clear is that in North Africa we have military occupation. General Eisenhower has the right to say to anyone, "Can you run this Government? Okeh; I'll give you a try at it, but I can recall you at any time." THE PRESIDENT said that when Admiral Darlan died, General Eisenhower should have said the same thing to General Giraud. He pointed out that instead of doing this General Giraud came to General Eisenhower and said that he had been chosen by a French Imperial Council. The President stated that there is no such thing as a French Imperial Council, and that General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief should have informed General Giraud that the United States does not recognize such a body. He felt that this matter should be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff with General Eisenhower and that the latter should be given a clear understanding with regard to it.

THE PRESIDENT stated that the British are trying to organize a Government of France under de Gaulle. He said that he has perfect confidence in Mr. Churchill, but not in the British Foreign Office. He indicated that the United States has the whip hand and that he would tell Mr. Churchill that de Gaulle is a military officer, but that he can be given no authority regarding the sovereignty of France because the people of France have not had an opportunity to give such authority.

ADMIRAL KING then asked about the status of President LeBrun.

THE PRESIDENT replied that Mr. LeBrun does represent the sovereignty of France since he is the duly elected President. He indicated that if Mr. LeBrun could resume his position as head of the French State and that it would then be possible for de Gaulle and Giraud to go to him for their orders, this type of government or sovereignty was one which we could recognize.

THE PRESIDENT then discussed Comte de Paris. He told the Chiefs of Staff that they should inform General Eisenhower that the United States cannot recognize Comte de Paris in any way.

THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Murphy had given certain written pledges to Giraud to restore France and the colonial possessions of France after the war. He said that in doing this Mr. Murphy had exceeded his authority and that he as President was not prepared to make any promises. There are some of the colonial possessions which he was certain would not be returned to France, and he had grave doubts as to whether Indo-China should be. He thought that the Chiefs of Staff in their discussions in North Africa should make this plain to both Mr. Murphy and to General Eisenhower.

The meeting then adjourned.

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16 July 1972

By *JCS*

Date *11/10 10 1972*

MINUTES OF A MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE
ON TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1943, AT 1645

PRESENT

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The President
Admiral W. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
General H. H. Arnold
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Brig. General J. R. Deane

1. POST-HUSKY PLANNING

THE PRESIDENT read a message which he had received from Mr. Churchill in which the Prime Minister spoke of talks he had had with Mr. Eden regarding the strategic situation. The message also said that the Prime Minister was glad to hear that Mr. Hopkins was to visit England in the near future, and suggested that General Marshall accompany him. The largest part of the message was devoted to a minute that the Prime Minister had sent to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee relative to Post-HUSKY planning.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished the Chiefs of Staff to know of this message of the Prime Minister to the British Chiefs of Staff in order that they could be thinking along the same lines. (At the close of the meeting it was arranged to have copies of the message prepared for delivery to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.)

2. ANAKIM

THE PRESIDENT noted that the Prime Minister had indicated in his message that ANAKIM had receded since the Casablanca Conferences. He said that he did not agree with this view and felt that the United States had not taken any steps which would create this impression. He admitted that the prospects of ANAKIM were jeopardized by the scarcity of available shipping. He doubted if an operation could be mounted to take the whole of Burma. THE PRESIDENT said that he disliked having white troops engaged in that theater.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the British Chiefs of Staff say that it is necessary to capture the whole of Burma if the route to China is to be made secure.

THE PRESIDENT said that his view was that we should be strong enough in the north to secure the communications to China and then adopt a defensive attitude to prevent the Japanese from interfering with them.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that we have an obligation to open the Burma Road. He felt that we had definitely committed ourselves to this course of action with the Generalissimo.

THE PRESIDENT said that, as a matter of time and space, if we succeed in the Burma operations during the next winter it will be impossible to have the road open before the monsoon season and that probably it would not be ready for traffic before the Autumn of 1944.

GENERAL ARNOLD replied that that would be true of the old Burma Road but that it was possible to open a new Burma Road almost as soon as we had control of the northern part of Burma. Certain parts of this road are under construction by General Wheeler's forces at the present time.

GENERAL MARSHALL then spoke of the present increased Japanese activity in Northern Burma. He indicated that their fighter defense was getting better all the time and that they were threatening General Wheeler's forces in Northern Burma, to say nothing of their successes against the British operations in the Akyab Area. He said that unless we took some offensive action against the Japanese he felt that our communications to China would be lost.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that air operations depend on ground support. He pointed out that the Japanese have already captured some of our weather stations in Burma. There must be sufficient ground forces available to open the Northern Burma Road. The Generalissimo is insistent that ground operations be inaugurated from the West to support his Yunnan troops. He felt that we cannot let the Generalissimo down.

THE PRESIDENT said that he too felt that offensive action must be taken but he thought it might be limited to Northern Burma with a view to keeping the Japanese in the lowlands.

ADMIRAL KING said that the British idea in sponsoring an amphibious attack against Rangoon was to cut the Japanese line of communications. Their theory, which he believes to be tactically sound, is that unless the Japanese communications are cut they will be able to reinforce much more quickly than we can, and therefore constitute a constant threat against our South flank.

GENERAL ARNOLD and ADMIRAL KING both pointed out that the Prime Minister's message indicated that HUSKY was merely to be a means toward an end and not an end in itself. Their understanding of the Casablanca Conferences was that HUSKY was an end in itself. It was to provide bases from which Southern Europe could be attacked by medium bombardment and long-range fighter aircraft, and was to provide the means whereby the Mediterranean would be open to allied sea traffic.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that some of the air forces used in HUSKY were being counted upon for diversion to ANAKIM as soon as the HUSKY operation was completed.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the same view, feeling that HUSKY was to furnish a base from which Italy could be bombed perhaps to the point of forcing her withdrawal from the war. The question of actually occupying Italy was rather unfavorably considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca.

THE PRESIDENT, returning to the ANAKIM discussion, said we must be sufficiently aggressive to avoid losing the air route to China.

ADMIRAL KING said that the final decision on ANAKIM was to be arrived at by the Chiefs of Staff in July but supplies for this operation are needed now. This fact did not come out in the Casablanca Conferences.

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THE PRESIDENT said that the British may be influenced to some extent in their desire to recapture the whole of Burma, by their ambition to win back every one of their colonies. He thought that their desire for this conquest might be influenced to some extent by psychological reasons.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, on the contrary, the British had been reluctant at Casablanca to undertake ANAKIM and that the United States Chiefs of Staff had really "booted" them into it.

THE PRESIDENT described the arc starting at Japan, down through New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma, as a "segment of pie." He felt that operations against Burma were merely biting into one small corner of the pie. He was anxious rather to strike at Japan proper and conduct what he described as a limited offensive operation in Northern Burma to secure the supply route to China.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British are opposed to anything short of a complete occupation of Burma because of the Japanese ability to supply their forces more quickly than we can. The roads and railroads run to the north from Rangoon whereas our supply lines are perpendicular to and run over difficult mountain ranges. Unless the rivers, roads, and railroads running north and south through Burma can be interrupted we cannot possibly meet Japanese reinforcements.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the Burma operation was really divided into four phases: In the first place the Akyab operation must be a success in order to provide air bases to cover future operations. Next the roads now being built in Northern Burma must be well under way prior to the opening of the operations next fall. Third, the Chinese from Rangarh must be able to form a junction with Chinese forces from Yunnan. While these operations are going on, the fourth and last phase must be launched which will be the amphibious attack against Rangoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Wavell had been reluctant to undertake the Burma operation because of the Japanese ability to concentrate quickly. He said the big issue was to get the Chinese to fight on the ground. If this can be done ANAKIM will engage considerable Japanese forces and take the pressure off the Southwest Pacific.

THE PRESIDENT asked if ANAKIM could be accomplished without the Rangoon phase.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he thought that it could if the Chinese fought better than they ever had been known to. He pointed out that the British operations had been relatively ineffective against Akyab but he thought some changes in command and staff setup might correct this situation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the success of ANAKIM depends upon cutting the Japanese sea communications by the navy and their land communications by air.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that air support of ground troops is difficult in jungle operations because of the cover available to the ground forces. The British are going to do the ground fighting. He did not believe that they would undertake the operation unless the Rangoon phase was included. He pointed out that the northern part of the operation will come first and that there was every possibility that the Rangoon operation would meet the Japanese with surprise. In this case they

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would be in the dilemma of whether to withdraw forces from the north which would facilitate our operations there, or to leave their forces in the north, in which case the Rangoon operation might be relatively simple.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that whether the operation was a success or not it was bound to divert considerable Japanese forces from the South and Southwest Pacific.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that Wavell was against undertaking any operations in Burma, even favoring an operation to retake Sumatra.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that this would be a much more extensive naval operation than the Rangoon phase of ANAKIM. He has done his best to get the British light forces to operate in the Bay of Bengal Area, even offering to divert the Dutch forces from the South Pacific to go to their assistance.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the Generalissimo insists upon a naval action to cut the Japanese line of communications before he will consent to utilizing Chinese forces from Yunnan and Rangoon. He felt that we were definitely committed to this naval action as part of the whole ANAKIM operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that as far as the 22 U.S. cargo ships necessary for ANAKIM for April were concerned, he had already decided that they should go. He said he was still skeptical, however, of undertaking to recapture the whole of Burma. In the first place he felt it had only a forty per cent chance of success and that up to the present that the operation still consisted only of "hopes," there being too many "ifs" involved. He suggested that we go ahead with preparations for ANAKIM up to the first of July and then review the situation to determine if we should continue. He asked if the cargoes sent up to July would be wasted if the operation were not to be undertaken.

The Chiefs of Staff were unanimous that they would not be.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that most of the equipment was to build up the line of communications and included such items as locomotives, rolling stock, and river boats all of which could be used even in a limited operation to secure communications into China.

MR. HOPKINS said that ANAKIM could be undertaken in full provided an immediate decision was given to send 22 cargo ships during the month of April and provided that all of the rest of the ships necessary could go through the Mediterranean. He said if it was necessary for the ships to be sent around the Cape of Good Hope there were not sufficient ships available to undertake ANAKIM and still meet our other commitments. He suggested that a committee be assembled that night to determine the projects from which the 22 ships should be taken in April in order to meet the ANAKIM commitments. The committee was to be instructed that they were not to take any ships from Africa, the Southwest Pacific, SICKLE, Russia, or the Aleutians. He asked General Arnold if SICKLE could not spare one or two ships in April.

GENERAL ARNOLD replies that he did not think so but he would prefer to present the matter to General Somervell and take his recommendations.

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MR. HOPKINS pointed out that every place could not be considered as untouchable if we were to retain any hope of getting the ships that are necessary for ANAKIM.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to other places from which ships might be taken. He asked if the new Alcan route to Alaska was going to save shipping; he suggested the possibility of stopping all shipment of nitrates from South America; also the possibility of taking some ships away from the bauxite trade; and finally, the possibility of reducing the scale of reserves in North Africa.

MR. HOPKINS said that the Alcan route cannot be counted upon to save any shipping this coming summer because of the temporary construction of bridges which will undoubtedly be washed out this spring and require extensive repairs.

GENERAL ARNOLD was not prepared to state whether we could further reduce our bauxite imports. He said he had conflicting reports as to the sufficiency of the aluminum supply.

MR. HOPKINS said that as far as the nitrates were concerned this would result in a saving of shipping but not immediately because it only affected those ships returning on the long run from Australia.

As far as the scale of reserves in Africa was concerned, GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was true there had been a large surplus built up in Morocco. This was the case at the time of the Casablanca Conference. However, since that time supplies have been constantly transported from Morocco to Algeria with the result that at the present time there are no large reserves in any one area. He indicated, however, that he would have this matter thoroughly investigated.

THE PRESIDENT said he had heard that a successful HUSKY would only represent an improvement of about 8% in the shipping traffic through the Mediterranean. He asked what was meant by this statement.

It was explained that as far as the total shipping was concerned the number that could pass through the Mediterranean would only be about 8% greater with Sicily in our possession than it would be without possession of Sicily, but that the saving in the number of ships lost would be 50% or greater. For example, if 100 ships pass through the Mediterranean there might be a loss of 2 ships if Sicily were in our possession, whereas there would be a loss of 10 ships if it were not in our possession. Thus 98% of the ships would pass through in the one case and 90% would pass through in the other. However, with Sicily in our possession the percentage of ships lost would only be 20% that of the losses sustained without possession of Sicily.

THE PRESIDENT then decided that a committee should meet at once, preferably that night, to determine from where the 22 ships necessary for ANAKIM in April should be obtained. The committee was to include Admiral Land, Mr. Louis Douglas, General Somervell, and Admiral Smith. The committee was to report to the President not later than April 7th and if they were unable to come to an agreement the President would arbitrarily determine the sources from which the 22 ships were to be made available.

The meeting then adjourned.

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JUL 10 1972

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at the White House
Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff
on 10 August 1943, at 1415.

PRESENT

The President
The Secretary of War
Admiral W. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
General H. H. Arnold
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane

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By Authority of *JCS 987465-1*

6 July 1972
By *[Signature]* Date *JUL 10 1972*

1. EUR-AFRICAN OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had just been talking with the Secretary of War who indicated that he gathered from conversation in England that the Prime Minister was opposed to an operation against Sardinia but favored operations against the Balkans.

MR. STIMSON said that in his final discussions with Mr. Churchill the latter had disclaimed any desire to land any troops in the Balkans. Rather, he wished to give them supplies. He indicated that the total supplies furnished the Balkans now amounted to 10 to 12 tons per month. The Prime Minister feels that considering what is being done with this small amount, much could be expected in the Balkan area if the Allies could give them additional supplies. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, wants the United Nations to invade the Balkans.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR said that the Prime Minister was rather apathetic and somewhat apprehensive with regard to BOLERO. His attitude is reflected by the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT said that the British Foreign Office does not want the Balkans to come under the Russian influence. Britain wants to get to the Balkans first. He said that personally he could not see the logic of this reasoning. He did not believe the Russians would desire to take over the Balkan states. Their wish is to establish kinship with the other Slavic people. In any event, he thought it unwise to plan military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.

SECRETARY STIMSON said he had talked to General Spaatz about the relative effectiveness of bombing Germany from northern or southern Italy. General Spaatz had said that it was not necessary to have bases north of the Po. The bombing would be just as effective from fields north of Rome as it would be further north.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he agreed, but that it was absolutely essential that Rome not be declared an open city. If fields north of Rome were to be used, the railway facilities of Rome would be an essential in supplying them.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that with the forces that General Eisenhower would have available, it would be possible to conquer southern Italy and obtain air bases north of Rome. It would not be necessary to leave the seven trained divisions in Italy that are now scheduled for BOLERO.

THE PRESIDENT suggested, as an alternative, that the 7 trained divisions might be taken from the Mediterranean but be replaced with an equivalent number from the United States.

ADMIRAL KING said that this procedure would cut into the troop lift in the Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL concurred, stating that there is a backlog of 87,000 troops needed in the Pacific. He had had a study made in the War Department which stated that if nothing was lost by submarine action, all convoys were to sail on schedule, and if the MONTICELLO and WEST POINT, two ships now scheduled for the Pacific troop lift, were allowed to remain in the Atlantic, there could be 7 divisions transported from the United States to North Africa by the end of June, 1944. This would still permit the planned troop lift to OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL indicated that in addition to garrison troops, General Eisenhower will have 24 divisions and 4500 aircraft available for operations in the Mediterranean. If 7 divisions were to be added, this would make a total of 31. In messages received, General Eisenhower himself has said that without the 7 divisions he will have sufficient force to take care of planned operations in Italy which will carry him well north of Rome, capture Sardinia and Corsica, and still have 14 divisions available for an invasion of southern France and coordination with OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the study which he had referred to did not take into consideration whether or not the landing craft or combat loaders would be available to utilize all the divisions that will be in North Africa. The views of General Eisenhower had been confirmed by his chief planner, Major General Rooks, who is now in the United States. However, General Rooks had said that one additional division would be desirable but not essential.

He said that in the Mediterranean after HUSKY there will be 11 French divisions, 28 British divisions, and 9 U.S. divisions, or a total of 48. Four of the French divisions will be available for combat by 1 November and the remainder will be ready for combat in the spring of 1944. The 28 British divisions include 2 Polish divisions and 1 Greek division.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the contemplated operations in the Mediterranean can be carried on without sending 7 additional divisions, to do so would simply invite having these extra divisions used for an invasion in the Balkans. This would meet the Prime Minister's and Mr. Eden's desires, but would make the Mediterranean operation so extensive as to have a disastrous effect on the main effort from England. He said that there will be but little difficulty in moving the 7 trained divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. A British convoy leaving the United States will proceed to England and thence to the Mediterranean, picking up 3 divisions and returning them to England. The remaining 4 divisions will be brought from the Mediterranean by troop ships returning from India and the Middle East.

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THE PRESIDENT asked Admiral King if he considered the Mediterranean was now open to traffic.

ADMIRAL KING replied that it is at the present time, and that the situation will steadily improve. Cargo convoys are moving through the Mediterranean now. However, there is some hesitancy about troop convoys moving through the Mediterranean because of a possible threat from Crete.

ADMIRAL KING said that the principal factor which must be met is the troop lift that will be available to General Eisenhower to conduct his operations in Italy, Sardinia, and possibly southern France.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed, saying the principal factor is the troop lift and secondly the provision of adequate service troops. He said he was going to get General Eisenhower's recommendations as to whether it would be necessary to send an additional division to the Mediterranean as had been suggested by General Rooks.

ADMIRAL KING suggested to the President that if the British insist upon abandoning OVERLORD or postponing the operation indefinitely, we should abandon the project as in carrying it on we would simply waste our substance.

THE PRESIDENT said we can, if necessary, carry out the project ourselves. He was certain that the British would be glad to make the necessary bases in England available to us.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the trouble with that plan would be that it would greatly overlook the availability of 15 British divisions available now in the United Kingdom. There is no other spot in the world where 15 divisions can be placed into an operation without large transportation and supply problems.

THE PRESIDENT said he was anxious to have American preponderance in the OVERLORD operation, starting from the first day of the assault.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the OVERLORD plans called for 29 divisions being available for combat immediately. As he recalled it, there were to be 14 American divisions and 15 British divisions in England at the time. In addition, there were to be about 6 American divisions just arriving in England which could not be considered as available for combat during the first two months after the OVERLORD assault took place. During this period these divisions would be assembling equipment, completing their training, and preparing themselves for combat.

THE PRESIDENT stated that, frankly, his reason for desiring American preponderance in force was to have the basis for insisting upon an American commander. He wished that preponderance of force to be sufficient to make it impossible for the British to disagree with the suggestion. He said that the British had once offered that the commander be American. He said he was anxious to get 14 or 15 divisions into France in the first action if possible, with several divisions left in England which could be shipped over later.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the coming conferences one of the most important points to be insisted upon by the American delegation would be that there should be no cuts made in the OVERLORD buildup.

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THE PRESIDENT stated definitely that he was going to advocate leaving General Eisenhower with his present buildup, less the 7 divisions scheduled to go to England.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the destructive effects of any divergence from the main plan. He said the 2d Division and one other American division would be in England now had it not been necessary to divert an entire convoy from England to the Mediterranean in order to deliver 66,000 troops needed by General Eisenhower. He said we must avoid being committed to some operation that would have to be done "on a shoestring." The question of infantry divisions was not serious. He pointed out that we have a reserve of infantry divisions, but as far as shipping and all other munitions of war are concerned, we have been living from hand to mouth, utilizing them as fast as they become available, and as yet no reserve has been built up.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if the French would occupy Corsica.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that that was the present plan and it was also anticipated that they should have a part in any operation against Sardinia. He hoped, however, that Sardinia would eventually fall of its own weight, and that the operations necessary to occupy it would be relatively insignificant.

THE PRESIDENT then summed up the discussion by stating that our available means seem to fit in pretty well with our plans. He outlined these as insistence upon continuation of the present OVERLORD buildup and carrying out that operation as our main effort. He desired that every effort be made to have additional American divisions available at the time OVERLORD is mounted in order to justify an American commander. He said he proposed leaving in the Mediterranean those forces now available to General Eisenhower and that he was opposed to operations into the Balkans.

2. FAR EAST OPERATIONS

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the President endeavor to persuade the Prime Minister to use his best efforts to stimulate and hasten the Burma operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that as yet a commander in chief had not been selected.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Burma operation was now only two and one half months distant and the planning was still in the hands of General Auchinleck.

GENERAL MARSHALL, in reply to a question by the President, said that the British would probably make another attempt to designate General Sholtor-Douglas as in command. If they did insist upon him as the commander, they would have to take the responsibility for the difficulties that might result.

ADMIRAL KING said that the British had issued a "stand-fast" order with regard to moving ships and other munitions from the Mediterranean that were needed in the Burma operations. As the matter now stood, they suggested that BULLFROG be set for 1 January. If this were done, it would mean that air coverage for the north Burma operations would be lacking.

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THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral King if he thought the Prime Minister still had an invasion of Sumatra in mind, to which ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that it was essential that an early decision be made as to what our ultimate plans were in southeastern Asia in order that he could provide for the preparation of airfields that would be necessary to carry out such plans.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read a report from the U.S. Planners which gave the impressions that they had obtained from the British Planners as follows:

a. The British do not appreciate the value of China as an ally in the war.

b. The British feel that if we lose China we can still obtain air bases for an attack against Japan by amphibious operations on the east coast of China.

c. The British look on Burma as a combined operation and not just a British operation. They also feel that eventually the British and Americans should pool their resources for an attack from Singapore to Hongkong.

d. The British anticipate a possible partial demobilization upon the defeat of Germany which will mean that more U.S. troops will be necessary to carry on the operations in the Far East.

THE PRESIDENT said he had heard from several sources that the British did plan to demobilize many of their ground forces, but he anticipated that we would receive all-out help from their air and naval forces.

3. OTHER OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary of War if the British were still interested in an operation against Norway.

MR. STIMSON replied that the British staff gave the Prime Minister more opposition on this subject than on any other. The staff is definitely opposed to it, although the Prime Minister still believes such an operation is feasible.

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary how many troops he thought it was necessary for the United States to have in Iceland.

MR. STIMSON said certainly far less than two years ago.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at present there are 31,000 troops in Iceland and that the 5th division was on its way to England. In his opinion, the garrison should be cut to about 16,000.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that in order to obtain more shipping, a survey should be made of the necessities for large British stock piles of raw materials and munitions. He felt that with the improved submarine situation, the British could cut their stock piles from a six months' supply to a three months' supply.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he imagined that such a proposal would meet with opposition from the British, since the situation has now arisen in which there is ample cargo shipping and more than enough to keep up with our available troop lift.

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GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out, however, that there were certain items in which it would be well to cut the size of the British stock piles. He said that Britain now has a six months' supply of gasoline. If this were to be cut to a three months' supply, there would be sufficient gasoline available in the United States to carry out training programs on schedule and thus increase the flow of trained personnel.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that there might be a possibility of converting cargo ships that are about three quarters completed into troop ships.

ADMIRAL KING said that as new escort vessels become available, he has undertaken to convert the old four-stacker destroyers to A.P.D.'s. These give a troop lift of about 250 people and are well suited for moving reinforced companies in the Pacific. He said that nearly all of the fast ships of the C type being constructed by the Maritime Commission are now being converted from cargo ships to some other use. These uses include conversion into small aircraft carriers and transports. He said, however, he would cause an investigation to be made as to whether or not more cargo ships could not be converted.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that again he wished to emphasize to the President that no future changes should be made in basic decisions. He said that the main plan should be carried through and only small diversions from this plan made when necessary. It is impossible to calculate the wastage that has accrued to the United Nations war effort from changes made in basic decisions. The first instance was carrying out TORCH which involved moving troops set up from the United States to England and thence to Africa. Every such change has effects which reach as far back as the Middle West in the United States, caused by the necessity for altering production schedules, special loadings of convoys, etc.

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6/24/72 1972

By *[Signature]* Date JUL 10 1972

MINUTES OF MEETING

Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff,
held on board ship in The President's Cabin,
on Monday, 15 November, 1943, at 1400.

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By Authority of JCS

927/495-1

6 July 1972

By J

Date Jul 10 1972

PRESENT

The President

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN

General G. C. Marshall, USA

Admiral E. J. King, USN

General H. H. Arnold, USA

Rear Admiral W. Brown, USN

Captain F. B. Royal, USN

1. U.S. DELEGATION IN MOSCOW TO PROCEED TO "SEXTANT"

THE PRESIDENT said that he desired a dispatch sent to Ambassador Harriman immediately upon arrival in port telling him to come to the place for the SEXTANT Conference, and bring with him General Deane, Mr. Bohlen of the State Department, and General Vandenburg.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF directed the Secretary to prepare an appropriate dispatch in compliance with the President's desires.

THE PRESIDENT then said that the big conference would be held in Tehran. He then read a dispatch regarding the fact that Mr. Molotov cannot come to SEXTANT by 22 November. However, Mr. Molotov will come to Tehran with Marshal Stalin by the end of November. THE PRESIDENT added that it was vague as to why Mr. Molotov could not come by the 22nd, but he inferred from the message that Molotov was probably ill.

2. FLOATING FLIGHT DECK

THE PRESIDENT referred to a memorandum which had been prepared by Admiral Horne and presented to him by Admiral King. He said that we should not build a floating flight deck unless we intended to use it.

ADMIRAL KING said that the floating flight deck was now in Narragansett Bay and had been seen by Admiral McKean and Admiral Noble, that they saw planes land and take off from the floating flight deck and that everything worked satisfactorily.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out, however, that the operations took place in smooth water and there was still a question as to how satisfactory the floating flight deck would be in a swell or seaway.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the floating flight deck had been anchored amidships.

In reply to a question from the President as to why not moor it by the bow and let it swing to the wind, ADMIRAL KING said that it was necessary to use a couple of tugs to keep the flight deck properly headed. He added that it would be recalled that consideration of the floating flight deck developed after the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec. He recommended that the Navy go ahead with the proposed trials of the floating flight deck.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that the trials should be proceeded with, and if any place could be found to use the floating flight deck, it should be used.

In reply to a question, ADMIRAL KING said that the present length of the floating flight deck is 1800 feet and that it would now require about 8 Liberty ships to transport it. He added that there was a proposal to increase the length to 2100 or 2200 feet, in which case a couple of additional Liberty ships would be required. He said that consideration must be given to fuel, storage of supplies, bombs and other equipment, that no living quarters would be provided in the floating flight deck, it being anticipated that personnel would live in the Liberty ships. Certain self-propelled hulks would be used in connection with the floating flight deck.

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In reply to a question from the President as to whether the British were trying out experiments with a floating flight deck or only we, ADMIRAL KING said that only the United States was conducting the experiments. He added that experts now felt that in connection with HABBAKUK II it would be better to use concrete rather than the proposed pykrete. He pointed out that the pykrete would require extensive piping for constant refrigeration if any life were to be maintained in the pykrete. The facilities, material, building materials, and so forth, in connection with HABBAKUK II were very extensive. He said he had sent the most recent report from the special board on HABBAKUKS back to them for further report.

In connection with a remark from General Arnold that the Prime Minister had become committed to the use of pykrete and had so informed certain builders, THE PRESIDENT said "We better leave HABBAKUKS to the British."

3. REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES
(J.C.S. 547/2)

THE PRESIDENT said that he considered the proposed reply presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 547/2 regarding rearmament of French forces as satisfactory. He felt that we should not commit ourselves to the French to give back to France all her colonies. THE PRESIDENT pointed out that France has now Syria and Lebanon. We should not let our policy regarding this matter give the appearance of a definite commitment. He pointed out that there were three places, or really four, which should definitely not go back to France as follows: (1) Indo China; (2) New Caledonia (except for purely civil activities only, i.e., bases for the United Nations but no French armament); (3) arrangements should be made for the United Nations naval bases or other communications in the Marquesas or Tuamotu. In connection with New Caledonia, THE PRESIDENT pointed out that it was immaterial as to the sovereignty or flag of the place, but there should certainly be no French fortifications in New Caledonia. The fourth place was Dakar. THE PRESIDENT felt that it would be satisfactory for Dakar to be operated as the civilian capital of French West Africa. On the other hand, armaments and airfields and ports must definitely be in the United Nations hands. It was proposed to give over to Brazil the administration of that part of Dakar assigned to the militarized control of the United Nations.

In reply to a question from the President as to within what radius of Dakar it was thought necessary to stipulate the area as being in the hands of the United Nations for suitable airfields and security, and whether 30 miles would be sufficient, GENERAL ARNOLD replied that 50 miles in each direction would be necessary.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that 50 miles it should be. He added that he regarded Dakar as a continental outpost for the Americas which would start on the Coast of West Africa. He pointed out that Dakar would be the outpost in the north while the bases being constructed in Liberia would suffice in the south. He reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the port project under way in Monrovia and also the development of Camp Marshall (named for ex-Chief Justice John Marshall). He pointed out that in Liberia there were north bases and south bases, with the main base in the middle, which main base would take a ship of 27 foot

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GENERAL MARSHALL observed that the British would be at Freetown and Bathurst. THE PRESIDENT agreed.

THE PRESIDENT said that we must soon make up our minds as to what we want to ask the British for regarding Ascension Island.

With regard to the matter of rearming of French forces, THE PRESIDENT read a recent telegram from the Prime Minister wherein he said he was much disturbed about the fact that DeGaulle had thrown out Giraud.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that we were committed to equipping the French to the extent of 11 or 12 divisions unless this matter should be stopped soon.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that General Eisenhower be interrogated as to whether he really needed these particular French divisions which were to be equipped.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that while the paper provided for the equipping of 11 French divisions, only about 9 of them would be effective. He felt that we should go ahead with the plans to equip these divisions but not commit ourselves beyond the present commitments.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that it might be desirable to delay on equipping the 11 divisions in question in that when they were equipped DeGaulle would undoubtedly use them as a lever with which to enhance his own position. He again suggested that General Eisenhower be questioned as to the need for equipping these divisions.

THE PRESIDENT observed that he understood General Eisenhower wants to use the 11 divisions.

ADMIRAL KING said he believed that DeGaulle was constantly increasing his prestige and would certainly take advantage of these 11 divisions to further strengthen his position.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that DeGaulle plans to use 9 divisions to solidify his own position in France. If DeGaulle gets into France with say 10 well equipped divisions, he can readily take charge of the government of France by force.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not say anything about this matter until after they had had an opportunity to talk with General Eisenhower. This would give General Eisenhower an "easy out", i.e., provide the French with equipment as we move out; in other words, not ship in any additional equipment for the French but transfer United States equipment as United States troops go out.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the British wanted to build up France into a first class power, which would be on the British side. He said it was his opinion that France would certainly not again become a first class power for at least 25 years.

4. GALAPAGOS ISLANDS

THE PRESIDENT said he had recently received a memorandum from Mr. Stettinius with regard to a desire of the War and Navy Departments to retain control of bases in the Galapagos Islands after the war. Mr. Stettinius considered that it would be unfortunate to suggest permanent use of the Galapagos Islands by

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the United States. In the original agreement with the Ecuadorian Government there was a clause to the effect that that agreement may continue thereafter if in the opinion of the two Governments use of the bases by the United States should be necessary to the protection of either. Mr. Stettinius said that while he desired to comply with the wishes of the War and Navy Departments, he did not feel it would be desirable to bring up the matter formally at the present time. Particularly was this so as it might jeopardize the chances of the President of Ecuador, whose position was not any too firm now. Furthermore, it might indicate untoward post-war intentions of the United States.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the subject of the Galapagos was a pending matter. He said that two years ago he had taken up with the President of Ecuador the desirability of putting the Galapagos in such a status that it would be safe from threat by any other power. He pointed out that the relics of the oldest form of animal life can be found in these islands. He had suggested at that time that the Galapagos be turned into an international park to be placed under the control of a Pan-American Commission, whose membership would change from time to time. The proposition would be to hold the Galapagos as an international park for biological research and to conserve plant and wild life thereon. He said that the Pan-American nations would patrol the Galapagos as an international park and see that no other nations occupy it or build fortifications. Undoubtedly development of the Galapagos as an international park would devolve on the United States to provide most of the money and the scientists. He said he agreed with Mr. Stettinius' point of view and directed that the matter be referred to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation of a suitable reply to Mr. Stettinius.

5. TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT

THE PRESIDENT referred to a recent telegram received from Ambassador Winant in which it was said that the Prime Minister was emphatically against the proposal that any U.S.S.R. officer should be present at the SEXTANT Conference. It was felt by Mr. Churchill that the difficulty of military planning must be settled between the U.S. and British Governments before any contact on this subject is made with the Soviet Government. The telegram further related to General Eisenhower's reply regarding the Italian Government.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed with General Eisenhower, but felt nevertheless that the King of Italy must go eventually.

6. UNITED NATIONS STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

(J.C.S. 558 and 558/1)

THE PRESIDENT then read the proposed policy regarding the United Nations strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean area presented to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S. 558 and 558/1). THE PRESIDENT said as far as he was concerned -- Amen. The paper was "okay" and approved by him. He added that he felt we should send the paper to the British and during the first few days of the SEXTANT Conference definitely stand on it.

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7. COMMAND

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now considering the very involved subject of high command in Europe and the Pacific.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was his idea that General Marshall should be the commander in chief against Germany and command all the British, French, Italian and U.S. troops involved in this effort.

8. ROME AN OPEN CITY

ADMIRAL LEAHY brought up the matter of Rome as an open city (J.C.S. 463/2 and 463/3).

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that we should leave this matter up to General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower knows that we do not want to burn Rome.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that in General Eisenhower's reply regarding Rome as an open city he had said that it would be necessary to set up the Italian Government in Rome. He felt that we could be placed in a difficult position in this matter if we moved now to refer it to the Germans. They could delay reply until the time for their withdrawal was imminent and then propose Rome as an open city without any restrictions, which would deny us the vitally necessary communications through the Rome district as well as the freedom to set up the Italian Government headquarters in Rome, which General Eisenhower regarded as an important necessity. It was not likely that with Berlin and London under bombardment the Germans would agree to the Italian Government being protected against such measures. He felt we should do nothing about Rome at this time.

MR. HOPKINS said that from a political point of view it would be worthwhile making Rome an open city. If, on the other hand, the Germans are getting ready to move out, it would probably be better to let the matter ride at this time as the United Nations definitely need the communication and transit facilities of Rome.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he still believed from a domestic, political point of view we should accept the original Italian proposal. He felt that it should have been accepted two months ago.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we had as yet received no final report about the plane which recently bombed the Vatican. It was his opinion that the question of whether or not Rome should be declared an open city should be delayed for the present and that matters regarding this subject should be decided upon an "episode basis." He pointed out that the Germans might desire to use Rome as a pivot and it would be preferable to do nothing about this matter at this time.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was General Eisenhower's intention to encircle Rome by an amphibious movement of one division, probably reinforced by certain units from a second (airborne) division.

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9. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

With regard to the matter of the Italian Government, THE PRESIDENT observed that the British are definitely monarchists and want to keep kings on their thrones. They are monarchist-minded. He then quoted from a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. McMillan. He observed that the British are definitely anti-Sforza. He added that the paper before him contained an extensive discussion of background by the British Foreign Office. While we would like to get the King out, at the same time General Eisenhower wants to get to Rome before there is any "bust-up."

THE PRESIDENT said that he felt we should go along with "Ike".

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Prime Minister is again using his old tactics and that he wants to go back to the old system. He evidently really desires a status quo as regards monarchies but would possibly be in a position to blame the United States for any overthrow of the King.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned whether it would make any difference to the United States whether King Emanuel stays or not.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we cannot sit tight after we get to Rome because we have promised the Italians a plebiscite.

ADMIRAL KING recommended that we let the situation solve itself.

10. TRUSTEESHIP

THE PRESIDENT referred to a recent memorandum from Mr. Stettinius with regard to the matter of "trusteeship", particularly as regards places in the Pacific. He felt that we should keep in mind the matter of "trusteeship" and that this form of administration presents itself to a very satisfactory solution of the government of ex-enemy territory.

11. DOCUMENTATION OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT handed the U.S. Secretary an envelope containing the documentation of the Moscow Conference which had been presented to him by Mr. Hull. It was directed that this paper be circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their perusal.

12. CIVIL AFFAIRS

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been informed that the British were proposing to acquire a large building in London in which could be set up a United Nations civil affairs administration. He said that it was evident that the British contemplated a very large Secretariat and it was a question as to whether we should match them with a large Secretariat or go into the matter on a smaller scale. He pointed out that regardless of the extent of the Civil Affairs Secretariat, decisions on major matters would have to be made by himself, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. The Secretariat itself would have no authority to make decisions. He pointed out that if the Secretariat became too large and unwieldy, it might become more than "advisory".

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GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the possibility of assigning to this proposed Civil Affairs Secretariat a small, very able planning group.

MR. HOPKINS said that just before the Presidential party left Washington, General Macready informed him that he had gotten a wire that the entire question of Combined Civil Affairs Committee versus the British idea of a large Civil Affairs Secretariat in London would be put on the table by the British at SEXTANT. He pointed out as it now stood the Soviets were not represented on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. He added that Mr. McCloy had been concerned with the "headache" of printing money for use in France. He said that it has been heard from London that all things of this sort will be settled and take place there.

MR. HOPKINS felt that the matter should be watched with great care lest the military layout be placed in jeopardy. He considered that this matter was a very tricky business and added that he believed the Soviets would not take the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that General DeGaulle will be right behind the army when there is penetration into France and take over by his faction as rapidly as the army advances.

MR. HOPKINS said that he had talked to several of the State Department people who accompanied Mr. Hull to Moscow. These gentlemen felt that the Soviets were not particularly interested in playing up the proposed large Civil Affairs Secretariat.

THE PRESIDENT observed that Mr. Hull's memorandum on the documentation of the Moscow Conference differed considerably from some of the cables.

MR. HOPKINS said that he bet Mr. Eden would be at SEXTANT.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that any move to remove the center of gravity from Washington to London concerns him extremely.

13. READERS DIGEST NOT CIRCULATED IN FRENCH-ARABIC COUNTRIES

THE PRESIDENT informed the Chiefs of Staff that it was very interesting that the French Committee would not allow circulation of the Readers Digest printed in Arabic, to be circulated in Syria, Lebanon, Algiers or Tunis. The French believed that to do so might stir up unrest. He then observed that at Casablanca the attitude of the Sultan of Morocco had been very simple and direct, i.e., to the effect that the Arabs required 40 years of tutelage and that they desired to educate their own engineers, doctors and other professional people. It was expected that the United States would further this tutelage. He added that since Casablanca he had received a communication from the Sultan of Morocco, in which he stated that he did not desire Morocco to remain under French rule. He preferred that Morocco would be placed under a tri-Governmental rule of British, American and French. It was definitely the objective of the French to keep the Arabs down and not permit them to become educated.

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By *J* Date JUL 10 1972

14. U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-WAR AIR BASES
(J.C.S. 570)

THE PRESIDENT was handed by Admiral Leahy a copy of the paper, J.C.S. 570, regarding post-war air bases. THE PRESIDENT said he would be very glad to read over the paper and give the Joint Chiefs of Staff his opinion regarding the matter.

15. AGENDA FOR COMING CONFERENCE

THE PRESIDENT said he hoped to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 22 November. He said he proposed to assign General Somervell to take care of Madame, if she comes. He said that he desired the meeting with the Generalissimo and himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be separate from and precede any meeting with the British. He said he would like to see a proposed agenda for his meeting with (1) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) with Prime Minister Churchill; and (3) with Marshal Stalin.

THE SECRETARY was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrange to have the proposed draft agenda drawn up by the Planners.

16. ABYSSINIA

THE PRESIDENT said that undoubtedly the British had in the back of their minds the control of Abyssinia and that he wished to take this matter up with Hailie Selassie. He pointed out that his idea was that the railroad to Addis Ababa should be owned at least 30 per cent by the Abyssinian Government. He added that prior to the Italian occupation, this railroad had paid 40 per cent dividends each year.

MR. HOPKINS said that the President had arranged for Mr. Kenneth Caldwell, Minister to Abyssinia, to meet the President at the time of the SEXTANT Conference.

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Date

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MINUTES OF MEETING

Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff,
held on board ship in The Admiral's Cabin,
on Friday, 19 November 1943, at 1500.

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By Authority of Ad 927/495-1

6 July 1972

By gj Date JUL 10 1972

PRESENT

The President

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN

General G. C. Marshall, USA

Admiral E. J. King, USN

General H. H. Arnold, USA

Rear Admiral W. Brown, USN

Captain F. B. Royal, USN

1. DAKAR
(J.C.S. 570)

THE PRESIDENT said with regard to the recent correspondence from Admiral Glassford which was referred to the Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation he had before him a proposed letter for the President to send to the Secretary of State. While he was in general agreement with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he did not consider the time was propitious to take up this matter now with the State Department. The matter would first have to be taken up between Prime Minister Churchill and himself. It should definitely not be taken up with the French now, who will want everything turned back to them.

THE PRESIDENT then turned over the papers (J.C.S. 570) regarding this matter to Rear Admiral Brown and directed him to bring it to his attention in order that he could take it up with the Prime Minister. He said to add it to the list of subjects to be discussed with the Prime Minister.

2. COMMAND

With regard to the memoranda dated 17 November 1943 submitted to him by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, THE PRESIDENT said he liked proposal "A" but did not like proposal "B". On the other hand, he said he may have to compromise. We should, however, definitely go after "A". He said he would take up the matter with the Prime Minister at the earliest time. He felt we should definitely try to go ahead with plan "A", although we may have difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING observed that in his personal opinion, in that OVERLORD is only a part of the whole, the position set forth in memorandum "A" is completely logical and should appeal favorably to the British. He said the logic was as much on our side for memorandum "A" as was the logic on the side of the British for a unified command in the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that while memorandum "A" may be completely logical, the Prime Minister may feel that under his form of government he could not accept such a proposal.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the principle of unified command already existed in General Eisenhower's theater. He felt that even though the British should point out that they would have difficulty in accepting the proposal in memorandum "A" because of their defense point of view, it should be pointed out to them that the "best defense is a vigorous offense." Certainly memorandum "A" made for the best offensive command setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Mediterranean unified command decision be postponed until after the over-all command matter is settled.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he could not entirely agree with Admiral Leahy. He referred to the setup in the Middle East where Mr. Casey of Cairo was supposed to act in the position of an intermediary, between the British and U.S. commanders in that theater, the result of which would leave three commanders trying to get an agreement on a committee basis. He felt that any such arrangement could never prove satisfactory and added that they had failed over a period of a year and a half to come to satisfactory agreements. He believed that a committee setup was not a proper form of military command.

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ADMIRAL KING commented on the relationship of Mr. Churchill to the British War Cabinet and GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that at times the British Cabinet has overridden Mr. Churchill's decisions.

In reply to a question from the President as to what total forces the U.S. and United Kingdom would have at home and abroad by the first of January 1944, the consensus of opinion seemed to be about as follows:

TOTAL MILITARY FORCES

U.S. - 11,000,000
U.K. - 4,500,000

OVERSEAS

U.S. Army - 2,500,000 - 2,600,000
U.S. Navy - about one million

UNITED KINGDOM

Army - About 2,700,000 total fighting men
Navy - About one million

THE PRESIDENT observed that we are definitely ahead of the British as regards the total number of men we have overseas at the present time and that we will soon have as many men in England for OVERLORD as the total British forces now in that place.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt we were already ahead of the British in England. There are only five British operational divisions in England. We have now as many men in England as can be deployed as have the British. The British have the problems of breaking down divisions in order to provide service troops and reorganize new troops.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister told him last June that the British had about one million men in the Middle East at that time, including Syria, Egypt, Persia, and so forth. He added that he would like to have the figures on deployment of total of U.S. forces versus British forces, and GENERAL MARSHALL undertook to obtain those figures for the President.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that with regard to the air, we have passed the British rapidly. By 1 January 1944 we will have over 12,000 operational planes, while the British will only have about 8,000.

THE PRESIDENT said he was concerned in the total number of U.S. forces engaged in the war against Germany, and much interested in the total air forces. He said he did not like memorandum "B".

ADMIRAL KING observed that a supplementary memorandum regarding a particular British officer for command was only proposed in the event that it is indicated that memorandum "B" is the only one that can be accepted.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that this particular British officer mentioned is well known in the United States. He understands us and is presumably a man of stature in Britain. He sticks to the point and does not permit himself to be pushed around.

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THE PRESIDENT referred to the last paragraph of memorandum "A" wherein it was stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could override the decisions of the proposed Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that that paragraph had been put in so that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have the option of negative action. The idea was to get away from the "committee" command system. The proposed Supreme Allied Commander would have complete command control and make command decisions. Of course, he would submit his plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have never taken away from General Eisenhower his military command prerogatives. They do, however, take "means" away from General Eisenhower or add to his "means." Our General Eisenhower makes his own plans and carries out his own operations. He decides where and when to bomb certain points.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that there had originally been another sentence included in this paragraph to the effect that either the U.S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff could effect the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander on request. He said that this had been deleted, however, on Admiral Leahy's suggestion, in that it was pointed out that the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander would be a matter for decision by the Chiefs of State.

In reply to a question from the President as to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding General Alexander as Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, Italy and the Balkans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a United States officer, he felt that General Alexander would be satisfactory for Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a British officer, General Eisenhower should become Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood at Quebec that it was the opinion that General Eisenhower should stay until his mission was completed, that is, until he reached the Ancona line.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had not known definitely about this until the last afternoon of QUADRANT but that he understood that General Eisenhower was to remain until he reached a point north of Rome.

ADMIRAL KING recalled that was the agreement at QUADRANT but said he believed that the decision had been taken with the understanding that German resistance would be less than had actually been offered.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the decision at QUADRANT had been for General Eisenhower to remain in command in Italy until north of Rome and in a defensive position.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the name of the particular British officer for Supreme Allied Commander had been suggested in order to throw the British into a position where they could not back out in the acceptance of memorandum "A". He pointed out that the Prime Minister had said to him (General Marshall) that it would be well for him to be the OVERLORD commander in that the Prime Minister was in England from where the operation would be launched whereas the President would be in the United States -- in other words, General Marshall would act as the President's direct representative on the spot.

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THE PRESIDENT asked for an opinion as follows: if we do not get a Supreme Allied Commander as proposed in memorandum "A", do the Chiefs of Staff believe that the British would accept General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean? The opinion of the Chiefs of Staff to this question was emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether General Eisenhower in Italy and General Wilson in the Aegean had really ever gotten together, GENERAL MARSHALL said that they had had one meeting, that he knew of, but that they had definitely separate commands.

ADMIRAL KING observed that both memoranda "A" and "B" accepted unified command in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be satisfactory if General Eisenhower became commander in chief of the Mediterranean. However, there might be some danger should General Alexander take over the Mediterranean command and then be dominated by the Prime Minister.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted the contingency of General Alexander being dominated by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the desirable condition of one command in the Mediterranean would exist. Naturally, executive direction would come from the British Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that evidently General Marshall thinks we should accept the British proposal for an Allied Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean and Middle East now. He (Admiral Leahy) did not feel that we should accept this until we have fought out the matter of a Supreme Allied Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that it would be illogical not to accept a Mediterranean commander in chief as proposed by the British, immediately. He felt that it would be more logical and show good faith to accept the British proposal forthwith.

ADMIRAL KING said he was inclined to agree with General Marshall, and felt that the Mediterranean command should be dealt with on its merits forthwith.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on the other hand, said that to agree to the over-all Mediterranean command immediately would certainly not help the situation now in the Dodecanese.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the over-all Mediterranean command proposed by the British might have resulted from an idea in the back of their heads to create a situation in which they could push our troops into Turkey and the Balkans.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Mediterranean commander in chief would be under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that whoever the Commander in Chief might be he would necessarily have to seek approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any changes in his over-all strategic plans.

THE PRESIDENT observed that even if General Alexander should become commander in chief and desire to use U.S. troops and landing craft against the Dodecanese, the President could say no.

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ADMIRAL KING observed that dispositions, allocations, lines of campaign of the commander in chief, Mediterranean, would be subject to decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of State.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that the British would point out that they had suffered last week as the result of the lack of unified command in the Mediterranean. He said that a commander, in a position such as General Eisenhower, was always conservative regarding the sending of reinforcements to another command that was not his own responsibility. On the other hand, an over-all commander who had responsibility for an enlarged theater would feel differently toward bolstering up any weakened position in the theater for which he was responsible. He cited a recent command situation in Alaska as an example.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if General Eisenhower had had responsibility for the Middle East, the British doubtless feel, and perhaps rightly so, he would have influenced the attitude of Generals Tedder and Spaatz towards additional air support in the Dodecanese and the situation might have been different.

THE PRESIDENT asked, why Leros, why Cos? He said the Prime Minister had been upset as regards the United States attitude regarding the Dodecanese. He asked whether we knew of the details of the British operations in the Dodecanese initiated by the Middle East command before those operations began? The general consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff was that the United States had not been informed in advance of the proposed operations in the Dodecanese. However, GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed possibly he had seen a British pink dispatch regarding their movements against these islands. He added that the British always regarded the Dodecanese as of greater importance than have we in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT stated that before any change is made in the principle set forth in the command setup proposed in memorandum "A" there should be another meeting between himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that we could agree to a unified command in the Mediterranean but not at the same time as we took up the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander.

MR. HOPKINS observed that in discussing the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, we were discussing a matter of principles rather than of personalities.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether it was felt the British would put General Wilson under General Eisenhower before General Eisenhower reached Rome, GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING said yes.

3. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMANY -- EUROPE-WIDE "RANKIN"

THE PRESIDENT observed that in the memorandum he received from Admiral Leahy on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for guidance regarding spheres of influence as a result of a European-wide RANKIN, the paper makes certain suppositions without actually saying so. He felt that whatever territorial dispositions were made should conform to geographic subdivisions of Germany. He said that the Soviet Government will offer no objection to breaking up Germany after the war, that practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five. He said (1) we might take southern Germany, Baden,

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Wurtenburg, Bavaria, everything south of the Rhine. This area forms a sort of southern state. (2) Take everything north and west of that area, including Hamburg and Hanover, and so forth, up to and including Berlin to form a second state, and the north-eastern part, that is, Prussia, Pomerania, and south, to form a third state. He believed these general divisions were a logical basis for splitting up Germany. Especially was this so because the first or southern state was largely Roman Catholic; the north-western portion is Protestant, while it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism. He felt that Marshal Stalin might "okay" such a division. He believed that the Chiefs of Staff would want to make a European RANKIN conform to such a division. Actually the British wanted the northwestern part of Germany and would like to see the U.S. take France and Germany south of the Moselle River. He said he did not like that arrangement. We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British "baby." United States is not popular in France at the present time. The British should have France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation of these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, also Norway and Denmark, and we should go as far as Berlin. The Soviets could then take the territory to the east thereof. The United States should have Berlin. The British plan for the United States to have southern Germany, and he (the President) did not like it.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the matter should be gone into again. He said the proposals in the paper before the President had devolved from a consideration of the United States concentration on the right of the OVERLORD line from England. The conceptions for occupation were primarily based on military considerations of OVERLORD. He said he saw a frank approach to the matter in the paper from three points of view: (1) a normal OVERLORD; (2) a partial OVERLORD, with some fighting; and (3) RANKIN Case "C" (total collapse of Germany before OVERLORD got underway).

ADMIRAL KING observed that if OVERLORD should be underway when Germany collapsed, we would necessarily have a cross-over of our forces under the President's plan. Particularly would this be so if we should have reached the line of the Seine.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when OVERLORD was launched we must have U.S. forces on the right from a logistics point of view.

ADMIRAL KING observed that while the President's idea regarding areas of occupation did not present insuperable difficulties, nevertheless there was a problem which would have to be worked out.

GENERAL MARSHALL said if a break comes, we could split our forces into two parts.

THE PRESIDENT observed that there were no ports south of Hamburg and Bremen until the Dutch ports are reached.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the military plans for OVERLORD were so far developed that it would not be practicable to accept any change in OVERLORD deployment.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the whole matter goes back to the question of ports in England. If we stick to OVERLORD we must have a scheme for disengaging OVERLORD at any stage of development in order to comply with the political considerations of occupation outlined by the President.

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THE PRESIDENT said it was his idea we should use as many troops from the United States in the occupation of Germany as possible. These can go around Scotland.

ADMIRAL KING felt that we must have a special occupational army, in a particular command, earmarked for occupation of northwest Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the OVERLORD conception was that the United States forces would be progressing on the right and those should be the divisions first to come home.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that the divisions now in North Africa, Sicily and Italy should be the divisions first to be sent back to the United States. He said one reason for the political "headache" in France was that DeGaulle hoped to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government. He felt that we should get out of France and Italy as soon as possible, letting the British and the French handle their own problem together. There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed it would be easy to go directly into northwest Germany. The problem of occupational troops proceeding to northwest Germany would certainly be less difficult than their fighting their way there across the intervening territory from northwestern France.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that it was most important to keep commands in homogeneous control.

THE PRESIDENT said he envisaged a railroad invasion of Germany with little or no fighting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he assumed there would be a difficult lack of rolling stock and the land advance would have to be largely made on a motor truck basis.

MR. HOPKINS suggested that we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany.

In reply to a question from the President as to Admiral Leahy's opinion of the occupational area divisions, from a State Department point of view, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt we should definitely get out of France as soon as possible. We should accept any difficulties in order to get out of France at the earliest possible time. If we want to let DeGaulle have France, all well and good. However, whatever troops there are in France at the time of German collapse will certainly have to stay in order to supervise any elections. General DeGaulle wants to start the French Government right now. Possibly there will be civil war in France. The British should clear up such a condition. On the other hand, it would be much easier for the United States to handle conditions in Germany. The Germans are easier to handle than would be the French under the chaotic conditions that could be expected in France.

THE PRESIDENT said he personally envisaged an occupational force of about one million United States troops. He expanded on the policy of "quarantine." He said that the four United Nations by their police power could, if necessary, maintain order in Europe by the "quarantine" method. For instance, we do not want to use our troops in settling local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia. We could use the Army and Navy as an economic blockade and preclude ingress or egress to any area where disorder prevailed.

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In reply to a question from General Marshall as to how long the President contemplated it would be necessary to maintain one million men in Europe, THE PRESIDENT replied for at least one year, maybe two.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that there will certainly be civil wars in many parts of Europe when the Germans let go. If the French divisions could be properly controlled, they could doubtless put down civil war in France. If DeGaulle could control the troops, he could put down the civil war -- but what then? France will require food and munitions. THE PRESIDENT said we may definitely have to keep certain divisions in France. He felt that Holland was no problem. The Queen will return there and all will be well. On the other hand, Belgium is a big question -- it is a two-language country. Possibly a buffer state between Germany and France will be necessary. This buffer state could run from northern France, say, Calais, Lille, and Ardenne, through to Alsace and Lorraine -- in other words, from Switzerland to the seacoast. This would be a single buffer state.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that this was also at one time a German proposal and called the interdicted zone.

THE PRESIDENT observed that if we take the RANKIN paper proposed by COSSAC, the British would undercut us in every move we make in the southern occupational area proposed for the United States. He said that it was quite evident that British political considerations were in the back of the proposals in this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the paper in the President's hands as regards occupational zones works out logically. There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be shorter and more direct. The paper was worked out on that basis.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was evident from any stage of OVERLORD it is imperative to plan for what operations should be necessary in order to switch to the occupation areas proposed by the President.

4. POST-WAR AIR BASES (J.C.S. 570)

THE PRESIDENT said that he had read the paper presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding post-war air bases, and while he agreed with it on the whole, there was one thing he was worried about; this was the matter of the Marquesas and Tuamotu Group. He pointed out that these islands were nearest to Mexico, the Panama Canal, and the West Coast of South America. He visualized that with the development of aircraft, planes could base in the Society Islands ten years from now and make things uncomfortable on the West Coast of the Americas.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that B-29's could now reach Mexico and the West Coast of South America from the Marquesas.

THE PRESIDENT said, with regard to the map (Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 570), he objected to a red line on the east side of the Pacific, east of Samoa. The blue line west of Samoa should continue south and curve east to take in the Society and Marquesas Groups. He said we want bases and the commercial traffic open to the world in all these islands. Aside from this, he considered the map a good plan. THE PRESIDENT then drew certain lines on the map and turned the paper over to Admiral Brown for formal return to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President's comments.

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5. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCES WITH
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
AND MARSHAL STALIN

With regard to Item 1 b of Enclosure "A", "Chinese attitude towards Russian participation," GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be wise to discuss this matter with the Generalissimo.

THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese desire equal rights with Russia in Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek wants Manchuria back. Unquestionably a discussion of this subject will cause trouble. The matter might be worked out, however, on the basis of "free zones". The Generalissimo desires a trusteeship over Korea, administered by Russia, China and the United States as trustees.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Soviets want Kuzan in that it is close to Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said the Soviets want a nice big port and communication to Darien.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Generalissimo might ask the President for a discussion of all operations contemplated against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he will tell the Generalissimo in general those operations, but did not propose to be specific or mention dates. THE PRESIDENT said undoubtedly the Generalissimo will inquire about the matter of tonnage over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how Admiral McKean's plan for the bombing of Japan was coming along, ADMIRAL KING replied that it was being worked out and they were having rehearsals now from which experience will be gained.

THE PRESIDENT said he will not bring up the question of a Supreme Commander in the Pacific.

With regard to item 1 b of Enclosure "A", "Importance of Chinese assistance to operations in North Burma" THE PRESIDENT said he thought it might be desirable to bring General Somervell into the discussion of this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL then told about the organization of 3,000 U.S. volunteers, organized as a special brigade for long-range penetration groups to precede the Chinese forces. He said that great efforts had been made to organize this United States unit. They had been provided with special equipment and special planes.

In reply to a question from the President as to what had been heard regarding the training of Chinese troops in Yunnan, GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Stilwell, in a recent dispatch, said that Chinese troops lacked equipment, lacked food, suffered from malnutrition, and that he had only received a very small percentage of the troops that were needed. The Chinese divisions each consist of from four to five thousand troops. They are all new men and underfed, and must first be brought into suitable physical condition before their training can commence. He added that the British were despondent regarding the matter of Yunnan forces.

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GENERAL MARSHALL added he thought it would be a serious error to clamp down additional United States troops between the Chinese, British and Indian troops. We are already sending 4,000 additional troops to India in order to build airfields. We also have a battalion in this area constructing a railroad.

In reply to a question from the President as to whatever happened about the Generalissimo's request for a regiment of marines near Ichang, which would result in making some 200,000 Chinese really fight, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF and MR. HOPKINS stated that they had never heard of such a request.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that any such proposition as putting a large unit of U.S. troops in the vicinity of Ichang would result in increasing the difficulty of the supply problem over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how the tonnage over the hump was getting along, GENERAL ARNOLD said that by means of night flying and thus avoiding Japanese fighter opposition and other improved methods, he hoped to attain a figure of about 10,000 tons this month. He added that we will step up the tonnage as rapidly as possible. He pointed out, however, that we must have American troops in China in connection with this supply route. As far as he knew the pipeline project was up to schedule.

THE PRESIDENT said if Germany should be cleaned up, we must study how many bombers could be operated from the vicinity of Vladivostok.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that General Bradley's plan had proposed the operation of 100 bombers maximum by supply from Alaska.

With regard to item 2 c (1), subject "Post-war Problems - Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan" - THE PRESIDENT said the Chinese will undoubtedly want to take part in the occupation of Japan.

With regard to item 2 c (3), "Military and naval bases for mutual assistance" - THE PRESIDENT said it was contemplated that the Mandated Islands would be under the composite sovereignty of the United Nations. The Chinese want Formosa and the Bonins. The military bases required in the Mandated Islands would be occupied by the United States. There might be an over-all civilian control of the entire group and civilian control of the smaller islands. Certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates.

MR. HOPKINS felt that if it was believed that Formosa would be an important place for a base, the Generalissimo would be glad to give base rights to the United States.

THE PRESIDENT agreed but said that these base rights in Formosa should not be given on a permanent basis in that the Generalissimo would not agree to any permanent bases.

With regard to Enclosure "B", "Proposed agenda for the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister" - THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill is still interested in working for a European economic federation. He said that we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence. We do not want to be compelled, for instance, to maintain United States troops in Yugoslavia.

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In reply to a question from General Marshall as to whether there would be any compromise in the Prime Minister's proposal, he (The President) said that the United States would not act initially but could send air or naval forces.

In regard to U.S. policy on non-participation in operation of eastern Mediterranean-Balkan area, THE PRESIDENT said we must be concerned with the Soviet attitude in this matter.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we must see the question of this Balkan matter settled. We do not believe that the Balkans are necessary. To undertake operations in this region would result in prolonging the war and also lengthening the war in the Pacific. We have now over a million tons of supplies in England for OVERLORD. It would be going into reverse to undertake the Balkans and prolong the war materially. It would certainly reduce United States potentialities by two-thirds. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that commitments and preparations for OVERLORD extend as far west as the Rocky Mountains in the United States. The British might like to "ditch" OVERLORD at this time in order to undertake operations in a country with practically no communications. If they insist on any such proposal, we could say that if they propose to do that we will pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces.

THE PRESIDENT said that we could tell the British that they have lots of troops in the Middle East, close to the Balkans, why not send them to the Far East? He pointed out that the Soviets are now only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the Bug River, which they might do within the next two weeks, they would be on the point of entering Rumania. The Soviets might say, "If someone would now come up from the Adriatic to the Danube, we could readily defeat Germany forthwith."

GENERAL MARSHALL said we will have to be ready to explain to the Soviets the implications of any such move. If the Soviet forces get to the Bug River, we can then throw in our air to assist them. We could force the issue from England. He felt that we should not bring up the matter of asking the Soviets for their plans until we are committed to our own plans. Then we could give them air support.

In this connection GENERAL MARSHALL inquired of the President what sort of an organization he contemplated for doing business with the U.S.S.R. on a military basis. He felt that we should come to the Soviets on specific problems and should definitely have a Soviet officer know what we are doing.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that we should not forget about the control commission in London. This commission will undoubtedly ask for a military committee as a part of that setup.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the control commission in London will mean nothing but trouble for us.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if Turkey entered the war it would result in drawing away supplies and troops from other operations. He asked whether it would be possible to have another conference like this before meeting with the U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT indicated in the affirmative.

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GENERAL ARNOLD said the Soviets should give us advance notice of what air facilities would be available for bases and operations against Japan. It was important to get this information as soon as possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that Burma, Sumatra and Akyab were not on the list for the President to discuss with the Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister was in favor of operations against Sumatra, or the Andaman Islands.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that by now the Prime Minister may be somewhat "fed up" with that idea.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the British say that without more help from us they can only do the Andaman Islands operation, which is certainly a case of marking time.

THE PRESIDENT said he was much annoyed about the Azores matter.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that it was perfectly proper to be annoyed and that the British could be of more help regarding the Azores if they wanted to.

ADMIRAL KING observed that recent naval ships and planes which entered the Azores were well treated by the Portuguese and British.

GENERAL ARNOLD said our first transport plane will arrive in the Azores tomorrow.

ADMIRAL KING observed that the airfields in the Azores were much better than had been expected.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that what we really should have had was a "go-getter" in Lisbon. From the attitude of our representative there he felt it was a wonder we have anything.

With regard to Item 1 a of Enclosure "C", "Proposed agenda for the President's meeting with Marshal Stalin" regarding the topic, "Soviet collaboration in Strategic Bombing, including use of Soviet Bases by U.S. Forces" -- THE PRESIDENT said that the Soviets would like to have our planes but not our personnel.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he believed the Soviets were softening in their point of view regarding this matter.

With regard to the Italian fleet and Italian shipping, ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe the Soviets were in a position to demand Italian ships.

THE PRESIDENT said it would be better to let the U.S.S.R. have one-third of the ships as a token of good-will. No transfer of title was contemplated. He said we should not be concerned about the Italian attitude in this matter. The idea was to retain the Italian ships in the possession of the Allies and allocate them for best use as necessary. We will certainly prevent any future Italian Navy. After using these ships to our heart's content we can talk about the matter of eventual title. Then we could give back a few of the ships to the Italians. He felt that it would be all right for the ships given to the U.S.S.R. to be manned by Soviet personnel if a reasonable proposition for the use of them is made by the Soviets.

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ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that the conference had been of great benefit to the Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then reiterated his idea of a U.S. occupational zone for Germany and drew out the proposed line of demarcation on a map. This map had been obtained from Rear Admiral Brown and was handed to General Marshall at the conclusion of the meeting.

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By Authority of

JCS 927495-1

6 July 1972

By

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Date

JUL 10 1972

"EUREKA" CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING

Between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
held in the American Legation, Tehran, Iran
on Sunday, 28 November 1943, at 1130

PRESENT

The President

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN

General G. C. Marshall, USA

Admiral E. J. King, USN

General H. H. Arnold, USA

Capt. F. B. Royal, Secretary

THE PRESIDENT said he understood that the British felt our forces in Italy could advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. He believed that as we push north into Italy, the German will retire behind the Alps.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said as he saw it we could do either of two things: (1) Undertake OVERLORD, or (2) go after Italy and Rhodes, and then OVERLORD would revert to the status of an operation of opportunity such as RANKIN.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if our forces advance as far as the Ancona line and the Rhodes operation should be undertaken in February, it would mean postponing OVERLORD probably until about 15 June, possibly July. He said the British want to do Rhodes earlier unless the Andaman operation is thrown out. The British propose to undertake Rhodes in lieu of the Andaman operation. The means which would be sucked in for the accomplishment of the Rhodes operation would be considerable. He pointed out that the Soviets probably want a more immediate operation than OVERLORD. He said we could probably increase the pressure in Italy and expedite General Eisenhower's advance. The British are very anxious to bring Turkey into the war and undertake the Rhodes operation. They state that this will result in opening the Straits. General Somervell believes that even should Turkey enter the war, it might be six to eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened. This consideration is predicated largely on the fact that in order to undertake operations in the Aegean, a change of base will be required, and it always takes considerable time to shift from one base to another.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the British had explained the total number of men they have in the Middle East.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the Prime Minister realizes and desires to deploy these troops. The main problem as regards collaboration with the Soviets is that they desire pressure exerted within the next two months. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide that they do not really need immediate assisting operations, it might be possible to complete the operation north of Rome, undertake Rhodes, and delay OVERLORD until about 15 June. The British Chiefs of Staff are in an embarrassing position with regards to giving up BUCCANEER. The Prime Minister claims that if Turkey entered the war and we undertake the Dodecanese operation, Bulgaria and Rumania would immediately fall.

THE PRESIDENT inquired, "Suppose we can get the Turks in, what then?"

GENERAL MARSHALL said the requirements will be difficult to provide for Aegean operations. The British idea is to have the Turks hold the Straits.

ADMIRAL KING added that the British furthermore consider that Rhodes and certain other islands in the Aegean must be taken. He pointed out that we can not do Rhodes before sometime in February.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he believed that we should buck up General Eisenhower without effecting any undue delay in OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the Soviets should know better than anyone else about the situation in Bulgaria, whether or not that country could be expected to fall if Turkey entered the war and the Dardanelles were opened.

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ADMIRAL KING pointed out that General Wilson had stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he did not know very much regarding the conditions in Bulgaria.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Germans already know considerable about the land and air build-up in the U.K. in preparation for OVERLORD -- also about the concentration of landing craft in the U.K. and they are conscious of the definite gathering of force in the U.K. He added that it looks as though a delay in OVERLORD would certainly be necessary if we undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that he understood there were now some 21 German divisions in the Balkans and the Dodecanese. What should we say if the Soviets inform us that they will be in Rumania soon, and inquire what can the United States and Britain do to help them?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we could certainly do more along the east coast of the Adriatic by opening up small ports and getting supplies in to the Tito forces. He pointed out that communications inland from the coast are very bad. He believed, however, that it would not be difficult to get in munitions, foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrilla forces. He said that it had been agreed with the British that the Adriatic should be made a separate command under one officer. He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had also agreed to a unified command in the Mediterranean, subject to the President's approval. It was believed that we could put ships into the Eastern Adriatic Coast and assist in supporting Tito.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that General Eisenhower feels that if he can get far enough north in Italy he can push into the north-east toward Austria.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that he could also push with a left wing toward Southern France. These two movements, together with the limited operations on the Adriatic Coast, could hold several German divisions.

THE PRESIDENT made the suggestion that certain special 2,000-ton merchant ships constructed for the U.S. Army be converted to LSI(L)'s.

GENERAL MARSHALL said delays would be caused largely by vehicular transportation facilities. LST's would not be the bottleneck in such a movement. On the other hand, LST's are a bottleneck as regards overseas transportation. One LST is equivalent to about six or seven LCT's. He believed that the Prime Minister would use every wile to cut out BUCCANEER. He pointed out that the United States have constructed suitable landing fields on captured islands in as short a period as twelve days.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that control of the Andaman Islands would make it possible to cut, by air, supply lines from Bangkok. He said we are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation BUCCANEER.

MR. HOPKINS observed that the Prime Minister considers that as between Rhodes and BUCCANEER, the former is the more important.

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ADMIRAL KING pointed out that as an alternative to withdrawing means for the carrying out of BUCCANEER, withdrawal of certain shipping earmarked for OVERLORD had been suggested.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the Generalissimo had been told that the British would build up their fleet in the Indian Ocean. The question was, of what value would the fleet be there unless some operation were carried out?

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that only a small portion of naval strength would be involved in the Burma operation.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister told the Generalissimo orally what ships would be available to support the Burma Command. The only place for the use of landing craft is the Andaman Islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British had observed that they can not decide about BUCCANEER versus Rhodes until after they have talked to the U.S.S.R. They feel they should not be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations are proven sound. He, GENERAL MARSHALL, considered that BUCCANEER is sound. He said he had talked to Admiral King regarding this matter. As regards the feasibility of constructing only one landing strip in the Andamans, GENERAL MARSHALL said he did not believe it.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the United States would have more experience with opening up and holding occupied territory.

ADMIRAL KING said the British idea is that if they take Rhodes, the Turks will take all other islands. The Allies will have to give material, ships, and supplies for opening up the Dardanelles.

THE PRESIDENT felt that the British would probably say after Rhodes was taken, "Now we will have to take Greece." He pointed out that the Turks are good fighters, but only on the defensive. If we should get the Andaman Islands, where would we go? He felt that small groups of commandos, operating in support of Tito along the Adriatic Coast, had great possibilities. Another suggestion would be for a small force to penetrate northward from Trieste and Fiume. He said he was much more favorably inclined towards operations from the Adriatic rather than from the vicinity of the Dodecanese.

ADMIRAL LEAHY observed that in order to put forces into Trieste and Fiume, we should have to push the German Army further north into Italy; otherwise they would be on the left flank of the penetrations from Trieste.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that the Germans should be pushed on toward the Alps. He thought it would be a good idea to go around the ends into France and Austria. He pointed out that during the last war the Austrians required Germans to help them. He believed that if we push far enough north into Italy, the Germans will retreat behind the mountains.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the Chiefs of Staff were being pressed by the French to go into Southern France, ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative. He added that if Turkey comes into the war, we certainly will be involved in the Dodecanese.

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In reply to a question from the President as to the value of airfields in the vicinity of Smyrna should Turkey come into the war, GENERAL ARNOLD said we could use certain of these fields for heavy bombers and we would be able to help by using other airfields in Turkey for both heavy and medium bombers.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the British had talked about a landing in the vicinity near Salonika, THE CHIEFS OF STAFF replied in the negative.

ADMIRAL KING observed that neither General Wilson nor General Donovan think the Bulgars will quit.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not have the conscience to urge the Turks to go into the war.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL ARNOLD stated that the Germans have now about 700 planes in the Balkans; furthermore, the Turks have no really modern planes, all are obsolete.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the British originally planned to give the Turks 27 fighter squadrons; they finally gave them 17, but more fighter squadrons would have to be given to the Turks.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that one of the difficulties in the Italian campaign is lack of equipment for troops due to lack of shipping. There are divisions sitting in North Africa now with insufficient equipment due to lack of shipping. These divisions could be used if the equipment were available. He pointed out that the real issue is, what do the Soviets mean by "immediate help"? The U.S.S.R. evidently wants Turkey into the war as a cold-blooded proposition. The Soviets definitely want something, and we should find out what it is.

THE PRESIDENT thought that by January we could mount commando group operations in the Adriatic and the Aegean.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned whether it would be feasible to undertake very many commando raids. He questioned whether these operations would conflict with planned operations in Italy.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that his idea was that a commando raid should be on a small scale, say with about 2,000 men to a group. These small groups would not require landing craft on the same scale as larger operations.

In connection with a remark from the President regarding retention of landing craft for OVERLORD, ADMIRAL KING pointed out another factor which should be given consideration with regard to the number of landing craft planned to return to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. He said we won't get the 67 retained in the Mediterranean into U.K. due to the fact that they will have been used in action operations and there will certainly be considerable attrition. He added that all landing craft production after March is earmarked for the Pacific. If there is a delay of one month in OVERLORD, the one month's increased production can be diverted to OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must tell the Soviets that we get just so much production per month. All this production is earmarked for definite planned operations. In order to transfer means such as landing craft, it is necessary to take them away from one place in order to add to the means at another. There is no pool available.

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GENERAL MARSHALL observed that when General Eisenhower has one command of the entire Mediterranean, better use of landing craft may be effected.

ADMIRAL KING observed that destroyers and other craft could be utilized for commando raids.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Prime Minister believes he could control the Mediterranean if he could get his own man, General Alexander, in as Commander in Chief.

THE PRESIDENT observed that we must realize that the British look upon the Mediterranean as an area under British domination.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British were wedded to committeeism. Unity of command would expedite operations. GENERAL MARSHALL explained to the President the relationship between General Eisenhower's and General Wilson's command, and the attitude of General Eisenhower's subordinate commanders in chief versus the independent commanders with General Wilson and the effects of this at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting last Friday. He pointed out that while the United States perhaps does not do committee work as well as the British, nevertheless they (the British) have certainly had a very serious time in the Middle East due to the lack of unity of command.

THE PRESIDENT said he was afraid that Marshal Stalin will ask just how many German divisions could be taken off the Soviet Western Front immediately. He said he did not intend to get involved in a discussion as between the relative merits of the Dodecanese and the Andamans.

GENERAL ARNOLD observed that the flow of planes through the Azores has already begun as of yesterday. He said it was planned to pass 147 through in December and as many as 154 in January.

In reply to a question from the President as to how many squadrons of planes were operating in antisubmarine work out of the Azores, ADMIRAL KING replied about three squadrons.

MINUTES OF MEETING

Between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Held in the White House, on Monday,
21 February 1944, at 1400

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By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1

PRESENT

The President

July 1972

By

Date JUL 10 1972

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN

General G. C. Marshall, USA

Admiral E. J. King, USN

General H. H. Arnold, USA

Captain F. B. Royal, USN

THE PRESIDENT greeted the Chiefs of Staff and asked what they were concerned about.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Chiefs of Staff had asked for a conference with the President because of the import of a recent message received from the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the recommended cancellation of ANVIL. ADMIRAL LEAHY then read to the President the latter part of COS(W)1156, and informed him that as the result of a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held this morning a memorandum had been sent to the British Chiefs of Staff setting forth their views regarding OVERLORD and ANVIL (C.C.S. 465/10). This memorandum was also being sent General Eisenhower for his information (Number 153 - CM-OUT 8837).

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read the principal parts of the memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff. After reading paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 465/10, the President interrupted.

THE PRESIDENT asked, "Why put that in about April?"

ADMIRAL LEAHY replied that the British Chiefs of Staff state they wanted to make the decision now regarding ANVIL.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British are trying to get the matter settled now. He then read the memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff starting at the beginning. He said that General Wilson now has his hands tied. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff maintain that General Wilson can go ahead with his Italian campaign. The fight should proceed but we can see on 1 April whether or not General Wilson has succeeded. All we have gotten so far from the British Chiefs of Staff, according to our point of view, is the request that we come over there. General Eisenhower says he has enough landing craft for both operations.

The British say that Wilson is having hard going in Italy and therefore we should cancel ANVIL now. We say ANVIL should not be cancelled.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether or not the British agree that ANVIL will take troops away from the Italian campaign.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the British say that ANVIL cannot be mounted with sufficient strength to justify the means which might be added to strengthen OVERLORD.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether or not the British mentioned in any place our agreement to Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the British did not mention our agreement with Russia but in this connection he was not in entire agreement with Admiral Leahy's point of view on the matter. He (General Marshall) felt that what the Russians want is the large attack in strength.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that it took three days at Teheran to get the British to agree to ANVIL. He said the Russians were then "tickled to death" in that their (the Russians') suggestion had been accepted. The Russians would not be happy even if we told them the abandonment of ANVIL would mean two or more divisions for OVERLORD.

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ADMIRAL KING said he thought it should be pointed out that not only has the OVERLORD lift, about which the Russians were informed, been increased from the original three to a present five-division assault but, further, it should be emphasized that each one of the presently contemplated five divisions in the OVERLORD assault is a reinforced division. He added that the traffic congestion in the Channel for OVERLORD as it now stands would be a terrifically serious matter.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether Admiral Leahy had discussed with Admiral King the matter of sending over certain additional small craft for OVERLORD, ADMIRAL KING pointed out that as it now stood he felt that with the terrific number of craft involved in the assault, one would almost be able to walk dry-shod from one side of the Channel to the other.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the additional craft, such as 30-foot cabin cruisers, might be useful for picking up survivors out of the water.

ADMIRAL KING said that the matter was being examined.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read to the President the British despatch (COS(W)1156) in its entirety.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether the Chiefs of Staff were familiar with the British proposal for the United States to join in sending troops in an expedition into Yugoslavia, and GENERAL MARSHALL replied in the negative.

ADMIRAL KING asked the President whether he had been informed about the Prime Minister's directions to Lord Mountbatten to set up his plans for CULVERIN.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that General Eisenhower was probably being badly pushed in London and being placed in a difficult position regarding his representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the OVERLORD-ANVIL conversations.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read to the President the message to General Eisenhower sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon (Number 151 - CM-OUT 8770).

THE PRESIDENT said that in addition to the message which had been sent to General Eisenhower, he felt that General Eisenhower's attention should be called to the fact that we are committed to a third power and that he, the President, does not feel we have any right to abandon this commitment for ANVIL without taking up the matter with that third power. He added that he did not feel willing to take up the abandonment of ANVIL with that third power at this time in that we had made previous promises to the Russians which we had not been able to meet. He felt that we have given up promises in the past and had better not do it again.

THE PRESIDENT said he had informed the Prime Minister that we would not even consider a token United States force going into Yugoslavia. The suggestion had been made that the troops be a British force under a U.S. commanding general.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that that would be very bad indeed and would probably be bound to result in a new war.

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6 July 1972
By *g* Date JUL 10 1972

THE PRESIDENT said that he had emphatically stated that we are not going to be put in the position of putting the Balkans or any other of those countries on their feet, and asked Admiral Leahy if he (the President) had not definitely so informed the Prime Minister.

ADMIRAL LEAHY confirmed the President's opinion that the Prime Minister had been emphatically well informed on this matter although many people in the United States might consider that we had responsibilities in that direction.

THE PRESIDENT said that most Americans want to get our Army out of Europe as soon as possible. He then pointed out that our Lend-Lease is being felt way down in Africa; that the British have been using U.S. equipment and selling U.S. tires through a commercial company at exorbitant prices.

THE PRESIDENT then read a lengthy report from the European Advisory Council in London which had been sent to him by the State Department, and then read his reply to Mr. Stettinius. This reply was to the effect that the United States could not take part in the internal problems of Europe but that our prime consideration was to preclude the possibility of Germany ever starting a third World War; furthermore, the argument regarding the impracticability of U.S. troops shifting to the occupation of Northern countries on the defeat of Germany was specious. There was nothing to prevent shifting U.S. and British troops; that is to say, letting them play "leapfrog" all day after Germany was defeated. He pointed out that the United States should use the northern ports of Germany and occupy northwestern Germany and the Low Countries.

THE PRESIDENT said that two years ago he had discussed with the Prime Minister the proposal of disarming Germany, Italy, and France after the war. The Prime Minister had asked, "Why France?", and the President had replied, "Well, why not France if Germany is disarmed?" The Prime Minister had nevertheless said the British looked to France as a bulwark in Europe. The British desire France built up into a strong power as a possible bulwark even against the Russians.

There ensued a brief conversation between the President and General Marshall regarding the discontinuance of college training for certain prospective Army personnel, particularly as to whether or not the pre-medical and pre-dental students were also having their courses curtailed. GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to let Mr. McNutt know definitely regarding this matter, the President having pointed out that unless the training of the doctors and dentists continues for the next two years there will be a serious dearth of doctors in this country.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the President that he had this day sent the President a memorandum from the Secretary of War covering this entire matter.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether it would not be possible to obtain additional manpower by the induction of certain young men now working in factories.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the President that that matter was being looked into at the present. There followed a discussion of the capability and adaptability of women in industry and favorable comments regarding the WAC.

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6 July 1972

By *J* Date *MAR 10 1972*

[Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Malta & Yalta, 564-567]

ARGONAUT CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting held in
the President's Sun Room, Livadia Palace,
on Sunday, 4 February 1945, at 1030

PRESENT

The President

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy

General of the Army
G. C. Marshall

Fleet Admiral E. J. King

Major General L. S. Kuter
(Representing General of
the Army H. H. Arnold)

Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Mr. W. Averill Harriman

SECRETARY

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

ADMIRAL LEAHY said there were two matters which the Chiefs of Staff considered it desirable to have settled at the tripartite meeting scheduled for 1700 today. The first was to get Marshal Stalin to instruct the Red General Staff to participate in full, free and frank discussions with the U.S. and British Staffs. It was also desirable to get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander and the Soviet General Staff by having them deal with each other directly through the Heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the establishment of direct liaison for day to day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the Russians had raised to the presence of General Burrows on the proposed tripartite liaison committee and to the fear that General Eisenhower would become involved in the settlement of matters which would be more appropriate for consideration on a higher level.

MR. HARRIMAN said with reference to discussions between the Russian and Allied staffs that Marshal Stalin's formal approval of the discussions would be necessary before it would be possible to get any information of value from the Russian General Staff.

At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal Stalin to agree to the proposed method of liaison through the Military Mission in Moscow was presented to the President, signed by him and dispatched at once to the Prime Minister.

THE PRESIDENT considered the agendas contained in Appendices "A" and "B" of J.C.S. 1227/3.

In answer to the President's question with reference to item e, GENERAL MARSHALL explained that MILEPOST requirements and progress was not a matter for discussion with the British but with the Russians only.

In reply to the President's question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British had not raised this point. He thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in Thailand.

THE PRESIDENT asked if any material and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read to the President a telegraphic report summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on the map.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT stated any action in Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U.S. action which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long as it did not involve any alignments with the French.

MR. STETTINIUS informed the President that there were seven major topics which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The first was the question of the post-war international organization. The matter of immediate interest was the question of who was to be invited to attend the next conference on this subject and where the conference was to be held. He indicated a number of locations which would be suitable and stated that he had options on all of the desirable places in the United States if this country should be selected as the site.

The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he preferred periodic meetings between Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to the creation of a formal commission.

The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite conference.

The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.

The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U.S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.

The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in Iran in June.

The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for the President's information.

MR. HARRIMAN stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the status quo in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Darien.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the status quo in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions.

At this point Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hiss entered the meeting to discuss the papers prepared by the Department of State for the President.