Folder 6. Oll ITALY -- Civil Affairs for Italy: February 23-April 6, 1944.

Communications via military channels re civil affairs in Italy.

Much of the materials are military communications between the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the War Department, and Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta. Also included are

Map Room Files.

BOX 30. (continued) messages to and/or from FDR to/from Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Edward J. Stettinius, Churchill, Anthony Eden, John G. Winant, Kirk and Schyler. The report of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for Italy (February 23, 1944) is also in this file.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 56037 NAF 912 6 April 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEP FWD for information. FX 56037 TOP SECRET signed Alexander cite FHGDS. This is NAF 912.

1. Reference Para 7 of NAF 864 following are proposed ration and clothing scales.

(A) Proposed to issue rations to Italian Partisans to full Italian armed forces scale. After deducting Allied Commission and Italian Government contributions in accordance with Par as 5 (A) and (B) of NAF 864 following items and quantities will be provided from US and Br military stocks in accordance with Para 5 (C) of NAF 864.

- Flour seven ozs,
- Canned meat or preserved fish or suitable substitutes three ozs,
- Cheese one oz,
- Macaroni three ozs,
- Dried vegetables two ozs,
- Tomato catsup one half oz,
- Coffee one half oz,
- Sugar three fourths oz.

CM-IN-5774 (7 Apr 45)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 56037 6 April 1945

(B) Proposed clothing scale stands as set out in Para 5 NAF 864.

2. Necessary arrangements for effectively handling and disarming Partisans must be completed immediately. Therefore, request urgent approval of proposals in NAF 864 and this cable.

End

Footnote: NAF 864 Is CM-IN-17695 (17 Feb 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Somervell; OPD; Gen Bissell; Gen Hilldring; Adm King; Mr McCloy; C of S

CM-IN-5774 (7 Apr 45) DTG: 061845B hjm

TOP SECRET
Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims, France

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D.C.

Number: WARX 61012

TOPSEC book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEP Rheims for Eisenhower and to AESSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, [AN 515] from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Combined Chiefs of Staff are informed that the Italian government has forwarded to the Prime Minister, the President, Marshal Stalin, and to General De Gaulle, a memorandum by the Italian Central Committee of National Liberation, pressing for the formation of a strong national army to take a more active part in the war on the side of the Allies. It is not clear whether the establishment of a separate Italian National Army or merely an increase in existing Italian forces fighting with the Allies in Italy is contemplated.

For your information the Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject of creating additional Italian units and the establishment of a separate Italian National Army, and have concluded that such a course of action is impracticable, due to difficulties in the provision of equipment. The State Department and Foreign Office have been informed accordingly and have been requested to take all necessary action.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-OUT-61012 (Mar 45) DTG 302102Z T's

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

British Joint Staff Mission
Washington, D. C.

Number: WARX 53623

TOPSEC book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower and to ANSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAW 509 to Alexander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

NAF 875 is the reference. We agree. Please keep us informed.

End.

NAF 875 is CM-IN-8745 (9 March 45)

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
General Arnold
General Bissell
General Hilldring

CM-OUT-53623 (March 45) DTG 152145Z da
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy
To: War Department

8 March 1945

TOP SECRET. To AGWAR for CCS and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to SHAEF and to ALCOM for information FX 39851 signed Alexander cite FHGE. This is NAF 875.

1. Concurrently with your FAN 497, Italian Government has asked permission to send Tornaquinci, present Under-Secretary of State for Ministry of Interior to contact Cleaf in occupied Italy. Object of visit to prepare ground in North to avoid misunderstandings at moment of liberation.

2. Tornaquinci is reliable and it is felt no harm can be done by such mission which may bring back useful information.

3. Proposed to await Tornaquinci's return which is stipulated should be within two to three weeks before deciding whether to attach officer as suggested FAN 497.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell

Gen Hilldring
Adm King
Mr McCloy
CofS

CM-IN-8745 (9 Mar 45) DTG 081516A bjm

TOP SECRET
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon, Versailles, France

British Joint Staff Mission
Washington, D C

Number: WARX 45043

TOPSEC book message to Alexander for action, to SHAFF Versailles for Eisenhower and to ANSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 45 to Alexander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In view of possibility that Committee of National Liberation in northern Italy may, at some stage, on the strength of powers conferred upon it by military agreement with SACMED and political agreement with Italian government, as on 7 and 26 Dec 1944 respectively, attempt to set itself up in opposition to Italian government in Rome, you should keep a close watch on developments and inform us of any indications of such a tendency on the part of the committee. Suggest you attach an officer of your staff to the committee as your representative, in a purely military capacity, for the purpose of reporting direct to you on the activities of the committee.

2. Should it become apparent that committee is attempting to set itself up in opposition to the Italian government in Rome, it may be necessary for us to instruct you, as a party to the military agreement with the committee, to denounce this agreement. If it is decided that such action should be taken the decision will be communicated to you as and when the situation renders it necessary.

End

ORIGINATOR: COS
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Hilldring, Adm King, Adm Leahy, C of S
CM-OUT-45043 (Feb 45) DTG 282007Z 1s

TOP SECRET
COPY No. 49

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: AFRC
To: AGWAR for CCS and
War Cabinet Offices for
British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: SHAEB for information
Frm: NAF 868 21 February 1945

TOP SECRET, Para 4 NAF 773 and Para 3 FAN 448 are
references. Signed Alexander.

1. Breakdown of international commitment of 124,000
provides for ceiling of 55,000 in respect of Carabinieri.
This ceiling now full and strength fully engaged in policing
liberated Italy.

2. Considered that problem of maintaining public
order in thickly populated industrial areas of North when
liberated will necessitate -

(A) Redistribution of present Carabinieri
strength throughout Italy involving withdrawal
of O.C.R.R. personnel from southern areas for
duty in the North.

(B) Increase of 10,000 in O.C.R.R ceiling to
facilitate this redistribution over the extended
area in which police duties will become neces-
sary when northern provinces are occupied.

CM-IN-22780 (22 Feb 45)

TOP SECRET

ITALY

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
3. To cover the suggested CRRR increase, approval is sought to an increase in the overall ceiling of the CRRR. Italian military forces by raising the international commitment from 124,000 to 134,000.

End TOO 211716A
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 29662 MAF 867

19 February 1945

MAF 865 refers for CCS and to AMSSO for BCS repeated to SHAPE and ACOM for info FX 29652 sgd Alexander elte FHQEG. This is MAF 867.

Bread ration for Italy.

1. We consider that it is administratively impossible for the Allied Commission to maintain fullest security while arranging for issue of 300 grams of bread to become effective 1st March.

2. It is most desirable that the issue begin on 1st March as authorized. To achieve this end and also to include an announcement in a joint press release with the Italians, it is proposed that the announcement date be advanced to 1600 hours Rome time 21st February. Otherwise security cannot be maintained while the administrative preparations are going forward.

End

NOTE: FAN 865 is CM IN 16384 (16 Feb 45) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Admiral Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, General Bissell, General Surles, General Hilldring, Admiral King, Mr McCloy, C of S
CM-IN-19189 (19 Feb 45) DTG 191420A m/m

SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department

Subject is bread ration for Italy.

1. Consequent upon shipments of wheat in sight for February arrival and scheduled for succeeding months I have authorized extension of a 300 gram bread ration for all liberated Italy effective 1 March 1945.

2. Reference joint announcement proposed in your FAN 478 and W 22519 of 18 January view held here is that is not desirable to give undue prominence to this increased ration because firstly unforeseen circumstances might later make it necessary to reduce the ration; secondly it will not be possible to give this ration in northern Italy when liberated some considerable period on account of transportation difficulties; thirdly the intention to increase the ration was made known sometime ago and an announcement that we are now fulfilling this intention might appear belated. For these reasons suggest matter should be not treated as if were some new step but merely as the natural outcome of previous announcements. This would not preclude some general reference to the increased ration in press release to which you refer in first paragraph of your W 22519. Grateful for your instructions on this point. Our suggestion for any announcement is 1600 hours Rome time on 1 March.

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy OPD Gen Hilldring Mr McCloy
CM-IN-16384 (16 Feb 45) DTG 161707A bjm

SECRET
Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main Echelon, Versailles, France
British Joint Staff Mission, Washington DC

Number: WARX 35252

Book Message to Alexander for action, to SHAPE Versailles for Eisenhower and to British Joint Staff Mission pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, PAN 488 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. See your NAF 838.

Rations for Italian military is subject.

An increase in the present Italian military ration scale of 3 ounces of flour from combined Allied sources and 1/2 ounce of oil from Italian resources is approved. The following revised scale is now authorized.

**PART A**
To be furnished from imported sources

- Flour, 15 oz
- Vegetables, dehydrated, 1 oz
- Canned meat or preserved fish, 3 oz
- Cheese, 1 oz
- Sugar, 1 oz
- Macaroni, 3 oz
- Rice, 1 oz
- Beans & peas dried, 2 oz
- Tomato catsup or puree, 1/2 oz
- Coffee 1/2 oz
- Pepper 1/200th oz
- Matches weekly issue, 2 books or 1 box

**PART B**
To be furnished from Italian military resources at their own expense

- Fruit, 4 oz
- Fresh vegetables, 8 oz
- Olive oil 1 1/2 oz
- Nuts, 1 oz
- Salt, 1/2 oz
- Wine, 1/2 litre
- Calorie value 1048

**CM-OUT-35252** (Feb 45)

SECRET
You are, however, advised that additional shipping will not be made available to meet this increased commitment.

End
Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main Echelon, Versailles, France.

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D.C.

Number: WARX 35403

Book message to Alexander for action, to SHAPE Versailles for Eisenhower and British Joint Staff Mission pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, PAN 489 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

UNRRA operations in Italy is subject (MAT 436, dated 6 December 1944, refers)

1. Agreement to relinquish to UNRRA responsibility for United Nations displaced persons in Italy is approved, as advised paragraph 1 (A) MAT 436.

2. Your further advice is awaited as to care of Italian displaced persons, reference paragraph 1 (B) of MAT 436.

3. Continuation of negotiations and preparatory work in the field relating to remainder of UNRRA program is approved.

4. Shipping may be made available specifically for this purpose in which case you will be advised as in CAL 1139.

CM-OUT-35403 (Feb 45)

SECRET
Unless you are so advised, however, you should avoid commitment to UNRRA concerning shipment of any portion of the UNRRA program except to the extent that you allocate space for it within your allotted shipping.

End.
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 23924 NAF 859 9 February 1945

FX 23924 to AGWAR for CCS and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE for information signed Alexander cite FHSUP. This is NAF 859.

Subject is request contained in NAF 838 dtd 21 January. May we have approval of request contained therein?

End

NAF 838 is CM-IN-21784 (22 Jan 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

CM-IN-10091 (10 Feb 45) DTG 092001A bjm

RESTRICTED
Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main Echelon, Versailles, France.

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D. C.

Number: WARX 35252

Book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower and to British Joint Staff Mission pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, PAN 488 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Rations for Italian Military is subject. See your NAF 838.

An increase in the present Italian military ration scale of 3 ounces of flour from combined allied sources and 1/2 ounce of oil from Italian resources is approved. The following revised scale is now authorized.

A. (To be furnished from imported sources)
Flour 15 oz; Vegetables, dehydrated 1 oz; canned meat or preserved fish 3 oz; cheese 1 oz; sugar 1 oz; macaroni 3 oz; rice 1 oz; beans & peas, dried 2 oz; tomato catsup or puree 1/2 oz; coffee 1/2 oz, pepper 12 hundredth oz, matches weekly issue 2 books or 1 box.

Calorie value 2671.

B. (To be furnished from Italian Military resources at their own expense)
Fruit 4 oz; fresh vegetables 8 oz; olive oil 1.5 oz; nuts 1 oz; salt 1/2 oz; wine 1/2 litre.

Calorie value 1048.
You are, however, advised that additional shipping will not be made available to meet this increased commitment.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell, Adm Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, Gen Henry, Gen Bissell, Gen Maxwell, Adm King, C of S.

CM-OUT- 35252 (Feb 45) DTG: 100118Z bb

SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

Fx: 15700 NAF 842 26 January 1945

Fx 15700 to AGWAR for CCS and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE for information signed Alexander cite FHCIC. This is NAF 842.

1. I appreciate the authority contained in your FAN 478 to issue 300 grams of bread per person per day in all presently liberated Italy and am anxious to use that authority as early as possible.

2. My present stock position and my advice of shipments for January and February make it impracticable to order the increased issue at an early date.

3. The present ration has been maintained only by most serious drain on indigenous stocks and borrowings from stocks originally intended for Balkan Countries. The actual arrivals for Nov/Dec/Jan have averaged only 70,000 tons monthly as compared with the 100,000 tons monthly which you have allocated. A continuation of this rate of arrival together with available indigenous stocks would produce an overall ration of approximately 250 grams per day throughout liberated Italy Sicily and Sardinia.

4. As advice received to date indicate February program of 100,000 will be met substantially in full should...
be possible to initiate the overall 300 gram ration in early March and to maintain it provided that we can assume that shipping on the same scale will remain available thereafter through July. Until this is clear no increase can be made and no announcement should be made at this stage.

5. I consider it is operationally necessary to have a contingent reserve of 60,000 tons immediately available for NW Italy.

6. The problems of tonnage requirements for operational maintenance referred to in your para three was given attn in para eight NAF 830. Operational shipping tonnages available for release will be notified as and if they become available.

7. I must make it quite clear that the failure to put the higher ration into operation in spite of your authority is not due to any objection on my part. I am most anxious to do so.

End

This message has been relayed to ARGONAUT.

ACTION: CCS

INFO : ADM LEAHY, CG AAF, GEN SOMERVELL, OPD, GEN BISSELL, GEN HILLDRING, ADM KING, LOG

CM-IN-26533 (27 Jan 45) DTG 261947A mos

SECRET
From: Allied Expeditionary Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

Nr: FX 89140 838 21 January 1945

This is NAF message number 838. FX 89140 cite FHSUP signed Alexander action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeat to SHAEF for info.

Rations for Italian Military is subject.

Experience in this theater since receipt of FAN 355, WX20936 dated 9 April indicates that the ration scale as approved is not sufficient in caloric content for the type of work performed by the Italian Military Forces. Considerable study has been given this question and as an emergency measure, the scale for those troops engaged in heavy work in the mountains has been increased by six ounces of flour and one ounce meat for a 90 day period, as outlined in ourad FX 52252 dated 23 November '44.

It is urgently requested that the ration scale for all Italian Military Forces be increased by 3 ounces of flour from imported sources and ½ ounce of oil from Italian resources. As an operational necessity this increase has been authorized to combat members of the Italian Air Force pending your decision. Experience indicates a deficiency in bulk and weight content. It is believed the above increases will assist this theater in obtaining better results in the utilization of the Italian Military Forces.

52252 is CM-IN-13405 (14 Nov 44) ASF End.

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy ASF Gen Bissell G-4
CG AAF OPD Adm King CoF5
CM-IN-21734 (23 Jan 45) DTG 212113A bjm

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: FX 46787 NAF 810 1 November 1944

FX 46787 to AGWAR for CCS and to Central District
UK Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff repeated
SHAEP for information signed Wilson cite FHSEG. This is
NAF 810.

Civilian supplies for Italy is subject.

In view of the public statements of the President
and of the Prime Minister, I am proposing to take the fol­
lowing steps.

1. I am arranging for all current requisitions for
basic civilian supplies to be reviewed on two assumptions:
first, that they will be provided and financed as heretofore;
secondly, that they would be framed upon a more liberal in­
terpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula.

2. In addition and in conformity with the joint
statement of September 26th and the President's statement of
October 10th, I have instructed the Allied Commission to
draw up a program of industrial first aid. This will be
forwarded to you as soon as possible.

CM-IN-1092 (2 Nov 44)

SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 46787 NAF 810 1 November 1944

3. I am assuming that the necessary finance for (1) will be provided so long as Italy is a theatre of or base for military operations and for a period of 6 months thereafter.

4. For planning purposes for (2) I am assuming an expenditure commensurate with the sources of new finance outside military responsibility mentioned in the President's statement, to be spent over a period of 12 months.

I hope this will meet with your approval as I am convinced that this is the right course to pursue.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Mr. McCloy
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-1092 (2 Nov 44) 0134Z hrt

SECRET

COPY NO.

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Commanding General,  
Allied Force Headquarters,  
Caserta, Italy.

Supreme Headquarters,  
Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main Echelon, Versailles, France.

Chief,  
British Joint Staff Mission,  
Washington, D.C.

Number:  WARX 22280

Book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower and to British Joint Staff Mission pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 478 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Para. 1. Critical food situation in presently occupied Italy and urgency of establishing a basis for supply planning for Northern Italy is fully appreciated here. However, in view of the extensive shipping commitments involved it will be impossible to give you a reply on your recommendation as to the basic ration to be established in areas now occupied by the Germans until completion of the current overall examination of the world shipping situation now being conducted in Washington.

Para. 2. Meanwhile you are authorized to establish within that part of Italy which has now been liberated from German control the maximum basic ration you decide is practicable in light of the currently approved shipping programme up to a maximum of 300 grams of bread (or equivalent) per person per day. In deciding upon this maximum basic ration you should take into account the greatest contribution operationally possible from your other military requirements.

CM-OUT-22280 (Jan 45)
Para. 3. As to German-occupied Italy, it is recognized that because of limited shipping you may be unable to stockpile reserves of wheat/flour in advance of liberation and that unless additional shipping can be provided you may be unable to establish and maintain in areas now occupied by the Germans a ration on the same scale as that which you are authorized to establish in areas now liberated. However, your import requirements for the mainland north reflected in IAC 91 and your recommendation with respect to the desirability of the establishment of a ration up to 300 grams in areas now occupied by the Germans, once they have been liberated, will be given urgent consideration in the current overall examination of the world shipping situation now being conducted in Washington. As soon as any decision is reached which will affect the shipping which may be available for supplies for German-occupied Italy, you will be advised.

Para. 4. Announcement of the increased ration in presently liberated Italy should be made simultaneously in Rome, London and Washington. Suggest this be done on any date you designate at 1600 hours Rome time, in order to permit convenient release hour in Washington.

Para. 5. Cable reply on Paragraph 4 as early as possible reporting your decision under Paragraph 2.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: GEN SOMERVELL, ADM LEAHY, CG AAF, OPD,
GEN BISSELL, GEN HILLDRING, ADM KING, LOG

CM-OUT-22280 (Jan 45) DTG 172037Z mcs

SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
CG United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

FX 72384 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Central District, United Kingdom Base Section, London, for British Chiefs of Staff rptd SHAEF for information signed Alexander cite FHCOS. This is NAF 830.

1. This is an earnest and urgent request to you for a firm statement of the policy of our two Governments on the provision of bread for the population of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, together with a request that steps may be taken to provide means to implement that policy. This request has the complete support of my economic and political advisers.

2. The past policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is understood to have been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in Italy a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognized as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in France and Greece. It is lower than that in northwest Europe as a whole.

The matter is therefore not one of preferential treat-
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384 HAF 830 21 December 1944

It is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in Italy necessary for the continuance of military operations.

3. As you have been advised it has been our constant endeavor to reach the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of Italy. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to amass for controlled distribution and what is in fact amassed and available for this purpose.

This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We cannot hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore unprofitable to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution in support of a ration scheme is non-existent. Nor is it more useful to pass the responsibility to the Italian Government for a problem which they cannot solve.

4. Hitherto we have been able to establish a ration of 300 grams south of the Garigliano. It has not been possible to do so north of this line where a 200-gram bread
ration obtains. Here the combination of under-nourishment and winter and operational conditions is causing great distress and resentment which have already led to disorders.

My Army commanders have again made forcible representations to me on the matter. The necessity for preventing militarily serious disorders in and near the combat line is patent.

5. There is no doubt that the Italian people regard the statements made by the President and the Prime Minister as constituting a pledge which will not be broken and in this connection I wish to quote the following statements on which they base their hopes:

A. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine." (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26th September 1944).

B. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency." (The President on 29th October 1944).
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

6. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks in whatever number is required to provide minimum transport system to get the food to the people." (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31st October 1944).

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these promises. Moreover, of late weeks, the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasize the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread.

It has, for example, been brought to my notice that some 77,000 tons only are expected to arrive in this country in January as against previously planned and advised shipments of 95,000 tons of wheat equivalent. It is impossible to plan the feeding of the population of 25,000,000 people, (and later 45,000,000) with a plan which from past experience has shown may be upset from week to week.

I would also draw your attention to the fact that
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

whatever difficulties confront us now, they may be counted as small compared with those which we march to meet in the densely populated areas of north Italy.

7. To assure a ration of 300 grams of bread in all Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, we estimate that it will be necessary for you to ship so as to arrive in Italy during the period January through June 1945, a total of 1,021,000 tons of wheat.

The manner in which shipments should be phased and an estimate of the shipping involved are being submitted to you separately in my LAC 911.

8. A careful examination has been made to see whether we can offer some reduction in shipping allotted for operational maintenance. As regards United States tonnages there have been as you know, considerable reductions already. Authorized stock levels have been reduced but additional commitments have arisen and any further cut in imports will cause reductions below authorized stock levels.

As regards British tonnages, cuts have also recently been imposed. A back-log has already accumulated. Authorized stock levels have been reduced but even the reduced

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44)

SECRET

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From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384  NAF 830  21 December 1944

Levels are not being maintained in certain items. The effect of further reductions in British tonnages would be to prejudice firstly maintenance of stock levels, particularly of supplies (rations) and secondly, current operational demands for items such as bridging vehicles etc.

To summarize United States and British positions we will continue to scrutinize our demands most carefully to ensure that we ask only for what is absolutely necessary. If you can find it impossible when you make your monthly allocations of shipping to meet the request put forward herein for additional wheat without some contribution from or deferment of operational maintenance, we will undertake to make the necessary contribution at the expense of military requirements if operationally possible to do so. We can only do this period by period after receiving from you the firm allocation for military imports during the period involved.

9. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theaters of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot administer those parts of Italy under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians unless I am regularly provided with the means to do so. The alternative is

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Ceserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384  NAF 830  21 December 1944

an Italy embittered by unfulfilled promises by hunger and distress. This, I believe, would be a grave handicap to our immediate war effort and a lamentable example to other nations of the justice of Allied dealing.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
CAD
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44) 0225Z bjm

SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
December 15, 1944

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 77741

Book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower and Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 468 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

You are authorized to negotiate to the extent and subject to the conditions specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of FAN 420 and paragraph 3 of your NAF 819.

ORIGINATOR: CC/3

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy; CGAAF; OPD; Gen Bissell;
Adm King; CofS

CM-OUT-77741 (15 Dec 44) 2058Z fbh

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
BONOMI SWORN IN AS PREMIER AGAIN

Promises Allies That Regime Will Respect Monarchy and Armistice Terms

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

ROME, Dec. 12—Premier Ivanoe Bonomi, in the presence of his Ministers, took the oath of office before Crown Prince Humbert this afternoon in the same terms as those employed last June.

Later he informed the Cabinet that he had made two important pledges to the Allies. In the first place, he assured them that the institutional set-up—that is, the monarchy—would be respected and that every Minister had promised that he would not prejudice it, leaving the people to choose the form of government that they wanted when the time came. Second, he acquainted those Ministers who were not in his previous Cabinet with the terms of the armistice (he characterized them as "very harsh") and said that he had pledged to the Allies that all the Ministers would abide by them.

According to the oath, "the members of the Government promise on their honor to carry out the terms of the armistice in the supreme interest of the nation and not to commit any act that might prejudice the institutional question until a constituent assembly has been convoked." This oath, first taken last June, abrogates the traditional pledge of fidelity to the Crown. Despite the ground that Prince Humbert has gained by this crisis, there was never any hope that the new Government would take an oath of loyalty to him.

Another development of great significance was the publication of a message from the Committee of National Liberation from northern Italy, dated Dec. 3, when the crisis was at its height, which reached Rome only yesterday. If it had arrived earlier it might have crippled Signor Bonomi's chances of success, for it demanded that the Government be an emanation of the committee and it was passed on the proposal of the Liberal party, which here was the strongest supporter of Signor Bonomi.

The resolution deplored the crisis that, it said, had been caused by the "intervention of obscure and uncontrolled forces."

"The committee for northern Italy proclaims that the political life of the country should be carried out purely within the atmosphere defined by the committees that compose them," an all-important passage said. "It excludes that any authority, even the Crown, can legitimately call on groups or camarillas outside the committees, from which alone the Government must emanate."

This was one of the crucial points of the whole long political crisis and it was settled contrary to this resolution. This means clearly that the whole question is going to be vital once the northern zone has been liberated. The Allies have been discouraging any solution that gives all powers to the Committee of Liberation and it is obvious that there is going to be trouble in that regard as there is with resistance groups in other countries.

The official list of under-secretaries was issued tonight. It is identical with the unofficial list given out on Sunday except that it gives as definite Dr. Eugenio Reale, Communist, for the Foreign Ministry. Dr. Reale headed the Communist party of Naples until Palmiro Togliatti came along. He is a medical doctor and, as far as is known, never specialized in foreign affairs, nor was he ever in the diplomatic service. In both respects, as well as politically, he will be in startling contrast to Viscount Vencola, whom he succeeds.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
9 December 1944

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Central District
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 74981

Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 466 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of additional civilian supply shipping for Italy is subject, reference NAP 814, dated 17 November 1944.

You were advised in FAN 450, dated 13 November 1944, that urgent consideration is being given to question of your responsibility beyond civilian supplies essential to your military mission.

In NAP 814 you request consideration of additional shipping to lift supplies in implementation of 3 projects outlined therein, all of which you say are over and above the measure of

CM-OUT-74981 (9 Dec 44)
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COPY NO.

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relief now applicable under existing directives.

Questions raised by you involve political and economic problems which must now be considered in the light of acute overall shipping shortages. Pending receipt of Combined Chiefs of Staff instructions, you should insure that no commitment is made either to the Italian Government or to UNRRA on projects programmed or contemplated along lines of NAF 814, particularly avoiding commitments either as to shipping tonnages or as to definite dates or periods as of which the Italians or UNRRA may bid for shipping independently of the military authorities.

Separate cable will be dispatched on UNRRA operations in Italy.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S
INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
             Adm Leahy
             CG AAF
             OPD
             Gen Bissell
             Gen Milldring
             Adm King
             Log

CM-OUT-74981 (9 Dec 44)  2101Z  ncb
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 74555

TOPSEC Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEP Versailles for Eisenhower and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 465 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Urgency of problems in Italy including bread ration is thoroughly understood here. Shipping situation is so acute that all theaters are currently accepting deficits in requirements of operational character as well as those for essential civilian supplies. This situation is under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. Meanwhile you should take no steps to establish or maintain any bread ration in Italy except such as you can support within shipping allocated to you under priorities which you are willing to establish in the light of your overall military responsibilities in the theater.

End

ORIG: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell;
Gen Hildrion; Adm King; Mr McCloy; Log.

CM-OUT-74555 (5 Dec 44) 23092 ekk

TOP SECRET

01/Italy

SECRET

COPY No.
December 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Exchange of Messages With Mr. Eden

You will find attached an exchange of personal messages between Anthony Eden and myself, in which I have always worked so closely with you and my British friends, both as Lend-Lease Administrator before coming into the State Department and more particularly since I have been here. We must keep up the close and intimate association which has always been so helpful in getting over even points of difficult discussion in dealing with our respective countries’ interests. Enclosures: count upon, as one of my greatest supports, in the tasks ahead, your close friendship. I know, and

1. Message to Mr. Eden. Everything which we can do up to and December 6, midnight, can be solved to the entire satisfaction of both our responsibilities.
2. Message from Mr. Eden. Will see that everything of December 9 received is right on to the two of us for approval.

"If the reaffirmation of our policy with regard to Italy has caused you embarrassment I see it only very. The feeling is such in this country, however, and the inquiries from all quarters so pressing, I have immediately a public statement in the House of Commons, and I had

sent 1020 v3 29007 630

Original in IN OUT file
no other choice than to make clear our position as sure that had there been prior consultation we could have worked the matter out together as we usually do in the past and, I feel sure, we will be able to do in the future. Mr. Churchill has told me of the debate on space which has been set for Friday and which you will attend. It will cause the Prime Minister and you some embarrassment. We are working on a friendly statement to be given at tomorrow which I sincerely hope will be helpful."

SECRET FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please deliver immediately the following personal message from me to Mr. Eden:

"Your personal message was read to me this afternoon and I wish to let you know without delay that it is a source of deep regret to me that so soon after taking office a difference should have arisen between us. I have always worked so closely with you and my British friends, both as Lend-Lease Administrator before coming into the State Department and more particularly since I have been here. We must keep up the close and intimate association which has always been so helpful in getting over even points of difficult discussion in dealing with our respective countries' interests. I count upon, as one of my greatest supports in the tasks ahead, your close friendship. I know, and you must feel, that anything which we put up to each other for cooperative working out can be solved to the entire satisfaction of both our responsibilities. Let us resolve that we will see that everything of any importance comes right up to the two of us for approval.

"If the reaffirmation of our policy with regard to Italy has caused you embarrassment I am truly sorry. The feeling is such in this country, however, and the inquiries from all quarters so pressing, following your public statement in the House of Commons, that we had
no other choice than to make clear our position. I am sure that had there been prior consultation we could have worked the matter out together as we have done in the past and, I feel sure, we will be able to do in the future. Michael Wright has told me of the debate on Greece which has been set for Friday and which you anticipate will cause the Prime Minister and you some embarrassment. We are working up a friendly statement to be given out tomorrow which I sincerely hope will be helpful."

It is my keen desire that we should work closely together.

STETTINIUS
Personal Message from Mr. Eden

to Mr. Stettinius.

Thank you so much for your helpful and understanding message which I received through Winant.

It is my keen desire that we should work close together.
MR-IN-220

9 December 1944

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM : THE PRESIDENT

9 December 1944.

The Secretary of State in Washington informed us last Marshal Badoglio had sought asylum in the British Embassy in Rome on December 6. He informed the British Ambassador that he was about to be arrested by the special police of the Italian High Commissioner for the Punishment of Fascist Crimes. Your message re Marshal Badoglio approved. (MR-OUT-625).

Roosevelt, who telephoned General Marshall yesterday that he had no objection to the Chiefs of Staff, was left to his own devices in the absence of any clear directive from the British Chiefs. After discussing the situation yesterday afternoon, however, the British Chiefs took the view that there were insufficient military considerations involved to warrant in instructions of this nature to Alexander without instructions from the United States Government.

By this time we had received word that Marshal had obtained promises of support from four of the six political parties and was proceeding to form a government immediately. Consequently we suggested to the British Embassy last evening that (1) since the Chiefs of Staff had felt unable to concur in instructions to Alexander on military grounds and (2) since Roosevelt, who had assured the British Ambassador that he would prevent Badoglio's arrest, appeared to be forming a new government with adequate party support, we were not prepared at this time to go along with them in any joint instructions to the Theater Commander.

Last evening we sent an urgent telegram to Churchill to ask him to see the Italian Prime Minister immediately and obtain assurances similar to those which Roosevelt gave the British Ambassador in December 9 that he would not (repeat not) permit Badoglio's arrest. This was also requested to be sent, after making discreet inquiries, to the Prime Minister at this time.

I feel that the American and British Governments have a certain moral responsibility for Badoglio's safety since it was we who signed the Italian armistice terms and brought Italy into the war on the side of the United Nations. While we, of course, have no political interest in Badoglio or in his political future, we might find it highly embarrassing to see him taken and brought to trial for Fascist crimes during our military occupation of Italy.
Yesterday the British Embassy in Washington informed us that Marshal Badoglio had sought asylum in the British Embassy in Rome on December 6. He informed the British Ambassador that he was about to be arrested by the special police of the Italian High Commissioner for the Punishment of Fascist Crimes (Count Sforza). The British Ambassador saw Prime Minister Bonomi, who said he would request Badoglio's dossier from the High Commissioner and would give orders that Badoglio should not (repeat not) be arrested. Despite these assurances and in view of Badoglio's apprehension, the British Ambassador permitted him to spend the night at the Embassy in Rome.

Eden has requested me to concur in instructions, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to General Alexander that the arrest of Badoglio cannot be tolerated. We informed General Marshall yesterday that we had no objection to the U. S. Joint Chiefs' concurrence in a directive of this nature on purely military grounds. At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs yesterday afternoon, however, the U. S. Chiefs took the view that there were insufficient military considerations involved to concur in instructions of this nature to Alexander without instructions from the United States Government.

By this time we had received word that Bonomi had obtained promises of support from four of the six political parties and was proceeding to form a government immediately. Consequently we suggested to the British Embassy last evening that (1) since the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had felt unable to concur in instructions to Alexander on military grounds and (2) since Bonomi, who had assured the British Ambassador that he would prevent Badoglio's arrest, appeared to be forming a new government with adequate party support, we were not prepared at this time to go along with them in any joint instructions to the Theater Commander.

Last evening we sent an urgent telegram to Kirk in Rome asking him to see the Italian Prime Minister immediately and obtain assurances similar to those which Bonomi gave the British Ambassador on December 6 that he would not (repeat not) permit Badoglio's arrest. Kirk was also requested to report, after making discreet inquiries, his views as to the likelihood of Badoglio's arrest at this time.

I feel that the American and British Governments have a certain moral responsibility for Badoglio's safety since it was he who signed the Italian armistice terms and brought Italy into the war on the side of the United Nations. While we, of course, have no political interest in Badoglio or in his political future, we might find it highly embarrassing to have him arrested and brought to trial for Fascist crimes during our military occupation of Italy.
Under the circumstances may I have your permission to request the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, should Kirk's reports indicate that Badoglio's arrest is imminent, to send permissive instructions to General Alexander to intervene on behalf of Badoglio only as the last resort to prevent his arrest.

STETTINIUS.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 849, 8 December 1944.

Your telegram Number 653.

1. MacMillan is leaving almost at once for Washington and will be able to discuss Italian questions with your people.

2. I have arranged for our views on the general question raised in your telegram to be taken up by the Foreign Office with the State Department. I fully endorse the line taken in the Foreign Secretary's telegram.

Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-621 (081832).
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 669, 6 December 1944

Your 845.

As you know, the letter to Berle merely transmitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way involved this Government. I see no reason why you should not use the message itself in any way you see fit. I believe the message has already been made public, having been given to the press by Badoglio at the time of its receipt.

I deplore any offense which the press release on Italy may have given you personally or any implication of my lack of understanding of your responsibility before your country. You must recognize, however, the untenable position in which we were put by Mr. Eden's prior statement in the House regarding the British Government's representations to the Italian Government on the position of Sforza in any new government. While military operations continue, Italy is an area of combined Anglo-American responsibility and our silence on this step made it appear that we agreed with the action taken. Actually this move was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter and it is quite contrary to the policy which we have tried to follow in Italy, since the Moscow Conference last year, in accepting democratic solutions in government worked out by the Italian people themselves. In the circumstances we had no other choice than to make our own position clear.

You will remember my feeling on this score expressed to you at the time Bonomi succeeded Badoglio in forming a Government last June.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE (WASHINGTON)

TO: THE PRESIDENT (WARM SPRINGS)

NO: MR-OUT-610, 6 December 1944

I have seen the telegram the Prime Minister sent to you about our statement on Italy of yesterday. The Prime Minister has also telegraphed a message to Halifax and I have received a message from Eden.

We simply could not understand why the British took the action they did with regard to Sforza without any consultation with us or with the Soviet Government, particularly in view of the declaration on Italy issued at the Moscow Conference in 1943. We are pledged under that Declaration and our policy to act on the principle of permitting the greatest freedom possible to the Italians in rebuilding their governmental institutions on democratic principles. All the correspondents here overwhelmed us for an immediate clarification of our position. We had no choice but to state promptly our established policy. After all our declarations of policy and protestations of devotion to the democratic principle, unless we promptly made our position clear, it was rapidly being assumed by the press and the public that we were in agreement with the British action. We avoided any reference to British action and merely stated our own position clearly and unequivocably. The general press and public reaction and that of important Senators has been strong and enthusiastic endorsement of our expression of attitude. The basic difficulty in this whole situation is that the British moved without informing us in any quarter in spite of the many points of contact we have and of our joint responsibility in Italy. Unfortunately, the British have always had the attitude that they had the exclusive right to decide the joint policies with regard to Italy and on many occasions where there was a difference of view we have acceded to their request that we not divulge this difference. Always when consultation takes place we arrive at a joint position and stick to it.

I am drafting a reply in answer to the message the Prime Minister sent you which I shall send across the street immediately.

STENTINIUS
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 845, 6 December 1944

1. In view of the State Department's communiqué in Italy issued yesterday, there will no doubt be a debate in Parliament. I shall be called upon to reply to its strictures by implication upon his Majesty's Government's policy and action not only in Italy but in Greece and possibly in Belgium. This I am quite prepared to do and I hope you will realise that I must have all liberty in this matter.

2. I should be very much obliged to you if you would authorize me to read the terms of Count Sforza's letter to Mr. Berle of September 23, 1943. It was on the faith of this letter that the British Government withdrew their opposition which they had a right to have considered to the sending of Count Sforza into Italy. When Count Sforza passed through London I went through this letter with him almost line by line, before witnesses who are available, and he made the strongest declaration amounting to a gentleman's word of honour that this represented his position. However no sooner had he got to Italy than he worked busily at the intrigues which destroyed the Badoglio Government. On account of this behavior I have regarded him as a man in whom no trust could be placed. It has never been our policy and we have no power, to veto the appointment of particular Italian ministers to particular positions. But it is certain that were Count Sforza to obtain the Premiershiip or the Foreign Secretaryship, the relations between the British Government and the Italian Government would suffer very much from our complete want of confidence in him. If you do not feel able to allow me to quote the letter, I shall none the less feel entitled to mention the substances of the undertakings given by Count Sforza to me.

3. I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communiqué to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it. I feel however entitled to remind you that on every single occasion in the course of this war I have loyally tried to support any statements to which you were personally committed for instance, in the Darlan affair I made the greatest possible exertions as you may remember to sustain the action of the United States Government and Commander, which was and still is much criticized in quarters ever ready to be critical. Also, in the matter of the division of the Italian Fleet I not only did all in my power to avoid the slightest appearance of difference between us, though the difference was considerable, but His Majesty's Government have actually supplied fourteen out of the fifteen warships lent to the Russians to make up for their one third share of the Italian Fleet to which you had referred. Finally, it was I who proposed to you the bulk of the mitigations which were introduced into our relationship with Italy as the result of our talks at Quebec and Hyde Park.

-1-
4. In all these circumstances I was much hurt that a difference about Count Sforza should have been made the occasion for an attempt on the part of the State Department to administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government. In the very dangerous situation in which the war is now it will be most unfortunate if we have to reveal in public controversy the natural differences which arise inevitably in the movement of so great an alliance. I do not remember anything that the State Department has ever said about Russia or about any other allied state comparable to this document with which Mr. Stettinius has inaugurated his assumption of office. I am sure such things have never been said by the State Department about Russia even when very harsh communications have been received and harsher deeds done.
VETO ON SFORZA HIT

Italy Should Be Allowed to Shape Her Destiny, Stettinius Asserts

BARS OUTSIDE INFLUENCE

Secretary Calls Self-Rule Even More Vital for the Liberated Nations

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—The State Department by implication criticized Great Britain today for the way in which she has intervened in the Italian political situation. The department issued a statement broad enough to define the attitude of the United States toward not only Italy but the Governments in all the liberated territories of the United Nations.

The definition of our position was directed to the British veto of Count Carlo Sforza as Premier or Foreign Minister. However, the statement went on to declare that the Italians should work out their problems of Government along democratic lines without outside influence. This position has been "reaffirmed," it was stated, to the British and Italian Governments.

Furthermore, it was declared, this policy would apply to an "even more pronounced degree" with regard to Governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories.

Lack of Advance Notice Cited

The statement reflected resentment over the reported omission of the British Government to consult or even inform us in advance of its stand against Count Sforza. It is held that, as a member of the Allied Commission, with Britain and Russia, this country was entitled to that courtesy and consideration.

Apart from this aspect, the British opposition to Count Sforza might have been less keenly resented had he been slated for the post of War Minister rather than a purely political office inasmuch as, the statement pointed out, there might have been an exception after due notice and consultation in the matter of intervention where military factors were concerned. British interest would have been understood to an extent in such an event, since the British and the Americans have a dominant interest in the military campaign in Italy. Russia occupies a subordinate place in that respect.

However, Russia is in the position of dominant military interest in Rumania and Bulgaria, where Allied Control Commissions are in authority. Presumably the rebuke issued today may have repercussions in these areas by encouraging the Russian Government to take the United States into consideration if it plans political action in either country.

The American statement is not confined to so narrow a field because of its pronouncement referring to liberated areas generally. However, Secretary Stettinius defined to amplify this part of the statement. He would not say whether it had a bearing on Greece or Belgium or whether it applied to Russian political intervention in Poland. Nor would he discuss its relation to the Atlantic Charter or the Declaration of the United Nations.

The statement, he said in response to all questions, had been very carefully prepared and he would have to stand on it without elaboration.

Mr. Stettinius manifested great interest in the statement of Prime Minister Churchill today intimating that relief supplies to Greece might be shut off if disturbances continued there and that armed force might be used to prevent the creation of a communist dictatorship in Greece. He refused to comment on it, however, explaining that he had not had an opportunity to analyze the statement closely.

MOVE SHOCKS BRITISH

Lack of Consultation Causes Some Astonishment

By CABLE TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

LONDON, Dec. 5—Sticklers for diplomatic proprieties, the British were shocked tonight by the State Department's plain and forthright public rebuke of their Government's policy in Italy and, by implication, in Greece.

Some of tomorrow's newspapers refer to the American statement as "astonishing" and "a direct slap." "Minister Churuchill or Foreign Secretary" was the banner headline in The Daily Mirror, a popular tabloid that has been attacking the Government's policy in the liberated countries. Early edition of other London morning papers displayed the American statement on their front pages without editorial comment.

The first unofficial British reaction was a tart expression of the intention to stand by what Britain had done in "vetoing" the appointment of Count Sforza and in bolstering the Greek Government against the Left. Whether Prime Minister Churchill or Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden would choose to make a public reply to a public reprimand remained to be seen. It is not likely, however, that those in this country who share the American Government's view will let the matter pass without comment by the Government.

Accustomed to close and friendly cooperation with the United States,
the British learned with some astonishment that their Government had neither consulted nor agreed with the United States before letting the Italians know of its desire to relieve those in need. The British seemed particularly stung by the last sentence of the American statement to the effect that the policy of noninterference "would apply to an even more pronounced degree with respect to governments in the liberated territories." This statement had no sooner been issued than it was learned from Athens that the British Government had intervened in Greece against the designation of Themistokles Sophoulis as Premier. The British contend that they too believe in allowing the liberated nations "to work out their own problems of government along democratic lines without interference from outside." But they say that their conception of "democratic lines" is not "mob rule" but the expression of the popular will in freely contested elections, which are not yet possible.

LONDON, Dec. 5 (AP)—A Foreign Office spokesman said today that "it is the aim of all of us to ensure the return of Italy to full and unfettered self-government," but reiterated the British Government's stand that it had a right to express its views on the appointment of any particular Italian statesman. He declined to comment directly on the State Department's disclosure that it had notified Britain and Italy that it expected the Italian people to develop their own government "without interference from the outside."

THE NEW YORK TIMES

AMERICAN POLICY SENSATION IN ROME

Italy Highly Pleased by Move, Which Interrupts Bonomi in Forming Cabinet

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ROME, Dec. 5—The State Department's declaration that the United States expected the Italians to form a Government "without influence from outside" dropped on Rome like a V-2 missile and temporarily scattered Premier Ivan Bonomi's almost-formed Government to the winds.

Pietro Nenni, Socialist leader, came rushing in waving a paper with the text of the declaration as Signor Bonomi was conferring in the Viminale Palace with the secretaries of the four parties that were expected to emerge with a Cabinet list. Emilio Lussu, the Action party leader, trailed excitedly after Signor Nenni and one of them was heard to say: "Well, I guess this shows we have been right all along."

Both the Actionists and the Socialists refused, during the latest developments this morning, to join any Government under Signor Bonomi. One of their main reasons was Britain's opposition to Count Carlo Sforza and her supposed support of Signor Bonomi.

The State Department's announcement was taken here as clear disapproval of the British attitude and it goes without saying that it has been received with gratification in almost all political circles. One may be sure it has greatly strengthened Italian faith in American democracy.

Its immediate effect on the political situation was still confusing at this writing. Clearly the Socialists and Actionists are trying to use it as a weapon to defeat Signor Bonomi's efforts. It is clear also that it will strengthen the Socialists in their determination to stay out of any combination under Signor Bonomi. The real question is whether it will induce Palmiro Togliatti, the Communist leader, to withdraw his support of Signor Bonomi. He definitely agreed today to take place in a four-party Government. It is also too soon to know how this will affect Count Sforza's position. When I telephoned him this evening to tell him about the declaration, he said only: "I did not expect less from American generosity and loyalty."

Most political observers feel tonight that Washington's move came too late to do more than delay Signor Bonomi's efforts and that he will be able to form his government tomorrow. However, this situation has been kaleidoscopic from the beginning. The Italian genius for political finance has never been better exemplified than in the past ten days, during which more moves took place than in a chess game.

On two occasions the Socialists were all but hooked and then backed away. Signor Togliatti was always eager to make the government, and he proved that today by agreeing to take part. The Socialists. In a sense, that must endanger their political fusion but, on the other hand, the Communists' presence in the government would induce Signor Bonomi to believe that Socialist opposition might not be too strong on the outside.

Signor Togliatti's move also has an advantage from Signor Bonomi's viewpoint. A Socialist in the Indipendent position in the German-occupied zone, where the main patriot forces are divided into Communist or Garibaldini units and Action party or "Justice and Liberty" forces. Yesterday, Radio-Milano Libera, a clandestine Actionist station, broadcast a strong attack against Signor Bonomi. "We wish to say to the country and to the Italian people in northern Italy that Trieste is demanded by the people's will and therefore of that of the Committee of National Liberation," it said.

"Since Signor Bonomi is accused of having broken away from the committee and placed the authority for calling a new government in the hands of Crown Prince Humbert, this line that the northern Parliaments are taking is directed against Signor Bonomi. However, it is presumed that Signor Togliatti will carry the Communist parliaments with him and thus greatly soften the blow for Signor Bonomi.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To : War Department
No : FX 62480 NAF 823 3 December 1944

Refer NAF 821. To AGWAR for CCS. Central District
UK Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF,
ALCOM for information signed Wilson cite FHGEG. This is
NAF 823. FX 62480.

Bread ration for Italy is subject.

1. In Para 3 of NAF 821 the date agreed with the
Italian Government was quoted as 1st December.

2. The A C has been directed to approach the Italian
Government to secure a postponement of this date to 10th
December. In view of cabinet crisis consent to change is
temporarily delayed.

3. In order that this headquarters may be prepared
to meet the proposed new date of announcement request that
instructions previously asked for be sent accordingly.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy; CGAAF; OPD; Gen Bissell; Gen Hilldring;
Adm King; Mr McCloy; C of S

CM-IN-3059  (3 Dec 44)  2212Z  ekk

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy
To: War Department
Nr: M 126 3 December 1944

Reencipherment by CRYPTO AFHQ of message filed 021915B. M 126 to Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington DC from Schyler ACC Rumanian. Please pass to DNI.

Following information obtained by OSS here and being reported through OSS channels is reported for your information:

"Following information received from Ionitiu, King's Secretary, by source TY PhoID this afternoon on Evaluation C-2.

Shortly after noon today General Sanatescu presented to the King his own resignation as Prime Minister and the resignation of the entire government. The King accepted the resignation. The King called upon General Radescu to form a new government and to have it ready to take the oath of office by Monday morning. During the course of the afternoon the King had interviews with leaders of all the principal political parties and they indicated that they wished that the new government would be political in form and not a technician's government. In view of these requests of the political leaders, the King instructed General Radescu to find a formula upon which the political leaders could agree for the formation of a political government; and that failing this General Radescu should appoint a technician's government. Maniu, Bratianu and Perrescu recommended to the King and to General Radescu that the latter pay a call upon Mr Vishinsky for the purpose of "informing" him of the prospective formation of the new government. The King and

CM-IN-2882 (3 Dec 44)

SECRET

COPY No.
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy

Nr: M 126 3 December 1944

General Radescu are as yet undecided as to whether this step should be taken as they are inclined to feel that this would constitute too much of an admission that the Russian Government has a legitimate interest in this matter which is of strictly internal significance. An officer of Mr Berry's staff has confirmed the resignation of the government stating that he received his information from "responsible" sources.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: ASF
G-2
CAD
Col Park
C of S

CM-IN-2882 (3 Dec 44) 1532Z pa

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 60395 NAF 821 30 November 1944

FX 60395 for CCS. Central District UK Base Section
London for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF for information
signed Wilson cite FRGEG, PHCAO this is NAF 821.

Subject is 300 gram bread ration for Italy. Reference LAC 763, 786, CAL 502 and NAF 814.

1. The situation in Central Italy, particularly in Rome, Florence, and Pisa, is deteriorating due primarily to the food situation. My intelligence reports indicate the possibilities of disturbance in the cities during coming weeks, and I have found it necessary to take certain precautionary measures.

2. Also, the Chief Commissioner A C has advised me that with the winter months upon us, he cannot much longer hold the population in line under the existing 200 gram ration and shortage of other foods.

3. Currently the Italian Govt has advised A C of its decision to raise the price of bread from its present subsidized figure of five lire per kilo to eight lire per kilo. This is a measure which A C approve as tending to cut down the substantial and uneconomic government deficit arising from the bread subsidy, but it feels that the price increase unaccompanied by a ration increase is more than likely to have unfortunate consequences. A C has therefore asked the Italian Govt to defer its announcement until 1 Dec.

CH-IN-29365 (30 Nov 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 60395 NAF 821 30 November 1944

4. In the face of this increasing pressure, I am still without a reply to my letter of 24 September recommending the authorization of the 300 gram ration. I have pointed out the urgency of this in my messages to you and officers from this headquarters and A C have visited Washington and transmitted our views fully. As I have also pointed out, the public announcements of the President and Prime Minister, including a statement of the President specifically referring to the 300 gram ration, have been given wide publicity in Italy. Our failure to act in implementing these statements is not understood by the population and makes our position doubly difficult.

5. I feel it is imperative that I be in a position to make an announcement on or prior to 1 December. I request instructions accordingly.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Admiral Leahy, CG AAF, General Somervell, OPD, General Bissell, Admiral King, Log.

CM-IN-29365 (30 Nov 44) 1212Z m/m

SECRET
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 66285

Book Message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 455 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Paragraphs one and two of RAF 796 refer.

1. As announced in Joint Statement of President and Prime Minister on policy towards Italy, the U. K. and U. S. have decided to enter into direct relations with the Italian Government. They have communicated this decision to Italian Government through the U. K. High commissioner and the U. S. Representative respectively. Sir Noel Charles will be the Representative of the United Kingdom to the Italian Government, with the personal rank of Ambassador. Mr. Kirk will be accredited formally to the Italian Government as United States Ambassador. As to the other United Nations, it is considered that the nature of their relations with the Italian Government is a matter to be worked out between the respective governments and the Italian Government. For your information in this connection, it is understood that the other American Republics and the U. S. S. R. are reestablishing formal

CM-OUT 66285 ( 21 Nov 44 )
diplomatic relations with Italy.

2. It is however the intention of the U. S. and U. K. Governments that, in general, their two representatives should for the time being handle only political questions of specific interest to their respective governments, while Allied Commission should continue to deal with economic and administrative matters as well as with questions arising out of the armistice terms.

3. In case of doubt decision as to proper channels of communication should be agreed between Sir Noel Charles, Mr. Kirk and the Allied Commission acting in the closest collaboration, subject to any general instructions you may wish to issue to Allied Commission.

4. You should arrange for Acting Chief Commissioner to communicate with Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Kirk with a view to practical arrangements being worked out and agreed upon.

5. A further directive covering other aspects of reorientation of Allied Commission is now under urgent consideration and will be forwarded earliest for your comment before final issue.

6. Press announcements concerning paragraph 1 above were released in Washington and London on 26 October.

End

ORIGINATOR: CCS
INFORMATION: ADM. LEAHY
CGAAF
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING
LOG

CM-OUT 66285 (21 Nov 44) 2117Z om

SECRET

COPY NO. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France.

Nr: FX 53735 17 November 1944.

To AGVAR for COS and to Central District UK Base Section London, for BCS repeated SHAEP for information FX 53733 signed Wilson cite FGOEQ this NAF 814.

Subject is provision of additional shipping for civilian purposes for Italy.

1. The shipping allocated from producer countries to ATO has hitherto been determined on the basis of operational requirements including civilian needs, screened as within the disease and unrest formula.

2. This basis of allocation will no longer satisfactorily meet civilian needs. There are already several major projects under consideration or actually programmed that together involve heavy shipping requirements.

For example:

(A) You have before you my request for authorization of 300-gram ration and for the import of supplies to meet it. This ration is in line with the statements of the President and Prime Minister of the new policy towards Italy, particularly in respect of the food ration.

(B) Substantial dollar credits have been promised to support an immediate industrial rehabilitation program in occupied Italy.
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 53735 17 November 1944.

(C) Decision has been taken at highest levels to commence an UNRRA program of supplementary relief in Italy.

All of these projects are over and above the measure of civilian relief which has been granted under the directives applicable thus far and all will involve increased tonnage for the theater.

3. My immediate concern is with the situation presented in paragraphs 2 (A) and 2 (C). As to 2 (A), I have been forced to cut civilian food tonnages along with cuts imposed on military services by reason of the reduction of shipping available for Nov/Dec. This means a reduction of about 40,000 tons destined for AC. This will barely permit the maintenance of the existing ration. It will definitely not permit of any increase. It will also make it necessary for me to go into the Winter months without reserves in the face of expanding commitments and renewed expectations of substantially increased aid. As to 2 (C), I am very conscious of the desirability of starting UNRRA operations in Italy as soon as possible. It is, however, patently impossible for me to authorize a supplementary feeding program for a portion of the Italian population if requirements must be provided from within a shipping allocation which is insufficient to meet what I consider to be the minimum overall ration.

4. I will advise you by separate cables of the supplementary tonnage requirements of the above programs as soon as they are known or can be estimated here. The most urgent in my opinion is that of the increased food ration as to which I await word from you. I request that in your CM-IN-17071 (18 Nov 44) SECRET
From: CG, Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 53735 17 November 1944.

consideration of each of the foregoing programs, parallel attention be given to the provision of additional shipping so that whatever steps you may authorize as called for by the declarations of the new policy of the two Governments, or otherwise, will not fail for want of tonnage.

5. It is not the intention of this message to indicate an unlimited port acceptance and internal distribution capacity. Overall shipping tonnage allocations remain subject to overall capacity to accept which in the future as in the past may be expected to vary with operational plans. It is submitted, however, that increased commitments should only be made after it is determined that the additional shipping can be made available. Shipments can then be called forward in accordance with our ability to accept.

End.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy Gen Bissell
CG AAF Gen Hildring
Gen Somervell Adm King
OPD Log

CM-IN-17071 (18 Nov 44) 0038Z pa

SECRET
SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

13 November 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles France

Commanding General
Central District UK Base Section
London England

Number WARX 62000

Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 450 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The extent to which you may have responsibility beyond that essential to the accomplishment of your military mission is under urgent consideration as previously requested in your NAF 776 and as supplemented by NAF 810. Pending issuance of instructions to you by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, you will take no steps to change the basis on which your headquarters approves for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirements for essential civilian supplies as being within military responsibility.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CGAAF
OPD
Gen Bissell

End

Gen Hilldring
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT 62000 (13 Nov 44) 2147Z khe

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

October 10, 1944

I have today approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War; and of the Foreign Economic Administrator, that the U. S. Government currently make available to the Italian Government the dollars equivalent to the Italian lire issued up to now and hereafter as pay to U. S. troops in Italy.

The dollar proceeds of remittances made by individuals in this country to friends and relatives in Italy are also being made available to the Italian Government as are the dollar proceeds of any products exported by Italy to this country.

It has been our intention to make available to the friendly Western European countries dollars equivalent to the local currency issued as pay to American troops in their territory. This policy differs from that to be applied in the case of Italy since in the latter case it is subject to special restrictions reserved to the United States in connection with the final peace settlement.

The dollars made available to Italy will be used by the Italian Government to pay for essential civilian supplies purchased in this country for use in liberated Italy. The U. S. Army has supplied substantial amounts of certain essential civilian goods such as food, clothing and medical supplies as a necessary part of military operations in Italy. The funds which I am now making available will enable the Italian Government under control of appropriate Allied authorities to obtain in this country other essential civilian supplies and to continue to obtain essential supplies after the U. S. Army program ceases.

This step has been taken after consultation with the British Government which has also been providing essential civilian supplies to the Italians and will continue to provide its share of an agreed program of such supplies, but under different financial arrangements.

The fascist dictatorship which led Italy into war against the United States and the other United Nations has been overthrown. Today, the Italian people are cooperating with the United Nations forces in driving the Germans from Italy. Our soldiers, sailors and airmen are welcomed and assisted by the civilian population in Italy wherever they go. Italian troops are joined with our forces at the front. And behind the German lines, Italian partisans are heroically giving their lives in the struggle.

It is to our interests that Italy be able to contribute as fully as possible to the winning of final victory. While the re-establishment of Italy as a free independent and self-supporting nation must be primarily the responsibility of the Italian people themselves, it is also to our interest that the Italian people be given the opportunity to obtain and pay for the necessities they need from us if they are to be able to help themselves.
The following is the text of a letter written by His Holiness The Pope, on October 4th and transmitted to the President by the Honorable Myron C. Taylor to whom it was addressed:

"To His Excellency Myron C. Taylor:

"It was with real pleasure that we read Your Excellency's letter of September 18th in which, on behalf of President Roosevelt and American Relief for Italy, Inc., Your Excellency very kindly expressed appreciation of our encouragement of the national agency for distribution of relief supplies for Italy.

"Constantly animated as we are by the resolve to avail ourselves of every occasion to alleviate the sad consequences of a conflict which alas we were unable to prevent, we are most happy to give our fullest support to an organization that has been set up with the object of bringing help to one of the peoples most severely tried by the war, all the more so because the elements constituting this national agency give every reason for confidence in its lofty ideals and thorough efficiency. Indeed, information already reaching us affords gratifying proof of the earnestness of its generous, zealous leaders. This confidence has now been increased by the assurance Your Excellency gives that American Relief for Italy, Inc., has accomplished much and we express the hope that under the able and enlightened leadership of Your Excellency other governmental and benevolent organizations will lend their hearty cooperation to further the most praiseworthy aims of this national agency.

"While then, we implore the most plentiful blessings of God on the united efforts of all concerned with these noble enterprises, we voice the prayer that the work already begun may develop and grow apace and that it may serve to offer suffering peoples an unmistakable testimony of the active presence in the world of that Christian charity without which justice would be inadequate to ensure for mankind the inestimable gift of peace.

"We are happy on this occasion to renew the expression of our sincere good wishes to Your Excellency."

---
The President today made the following statement:

"In accordance with the policies with respect to Italy which were outlined jointly by the Prime Minister and me in a statement issued to the Press on September twenty-sixth, measures are now being taken to provide Italy with supplies necessary to prevent civilian hunger, sickness, and fear during the forthcoming winter. Steps are also being taken to restore the damaged transportation and electrical generating facilities of Italy to the extent necessary to enable the Italian people to throw their full resources into the fight against Germany and Japan.

"A delegation of supply officers has been called from Italy to Washington to review the needs and requirements of the Italian civilian population. In addition to the substantial quantities of food and clothing which are now being shipped, and have for sometime been shipped into Italy, 150,000 tons of wheat and flour are now scheduled for shipment. Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency. The distribution of food and essential supplies within the country has been seriously impeded by the damage done to the transportation system and the wholesale commandeering of trucks by the enemy. To meet this emergency need it is planned to send 1,700 additional trucks to Italy.

"In addition, preparations are under way to supply substantial quantities of generating equipment including temporary power facilities to furnish electricity to essential industries and public utilities in central Italy which have been brought to a standstill by the almost complete destruction by the Germans of power plants.

"The aid which the Allies have already given to Italy has been substantial. Since the invasion of Sicily to the end of this year, 2,300,000 long tons of civilian supplies will have been shipped to Italy. Of this total, 1,107,000 tons were food and the balance consisted of coal, fertilizer, seeds, medical and sanitary supplies and clothing. As an integral part of military operations the Army has done a great deal to repair roads and bridges and railroads and to repair water and power systems and motor transport.

"Through these and other measures of assistance which are now in preparation, the Italian people will be enabled to increase their already significant contribution toward the defeat of the enemy. By doing these things, this country is serving the military aims and objectives of the United Nations which require the greatest possible contribution from the manpower and the resources of every nation engaged in the final overthrow of Germany and Japan."
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main, London, England
Headquarters Communications Zone in the European
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Paris, France
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

No. FX 34291 NAP 796 4 October 1944

FX 34291 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info
Central District UK Base Section London for British Chiefs
of Staff info Hq Com Zone ETOUSA info SHAPE signed Wilson
cite PHQEG this is NAP 796.

1. Joint statement on Italy by the President and
the Prime Minister issued to the press on 26th September,
which has been given wide publicity in Italy, has naturally
occasioned many inquiries from Allied as well as Italian
sources. In the absence of directives from you as to the time
and manner of implementation of the policies laid down, I
am instructing the Chief Commissioner that specific action
is to be withheld.

2. In order to enable me satisfactorily to answer
these inquiries and to cut short the present period of
speculation, I request that I may be given directives as
soon as practicable. I hope these may cover the matters
directly raised by the announcement, most important of which
is taken here to be the naming of direct Italian representa-
tives to the two governments, as well as matters necessarily
raised by implication, as for example, any modification in
the relations between other United Nations and Italy.

CM-IN- 4471 (5 Oct 44)

SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
No. FX 34291 NAF 796 4 October 1944

3. In connection with the naming of direct representatives I request that specific guidance be given on whether Italian representatives are to be allowed secret communication with their government. I also hope that character and scope of the functions of all representatives will be clearly defined. This I consider essential if there is to continue any satisfactory working relationship between the ACC and the government. I wish that there may be avoided any situation such as recently arose through an important direct communication, the fact and contents of which were generally known in Italian circles but were unknown to the senior officers of ACC or AFHQ until reported by OSS on NY Intelligence basis.

4. If there is implied in the statement a forthcoming reorientation of the functions of ACC, I request that the ACC and this Headquarters may be given an opportunity to comment. Considerable study has been and is being given to the possible future reorganization of ACC, as a result of which end on basis of experience in the field, I believe we may be in a position to offer useful suggestions which may fit within the framework of whatever policies may be laid down.

End

ACTION: CCS
INFO: Adm. Leahy, CGAAF, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm. King, CCAC, C of S.
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT has been informed by the US Secretary of State in memorandum dated August 19th that the United States Government is prepared to receive an unofficial capacity technical representatives to discuss Economic and Financial questions and to report directly to the Italian Government on certain matters.

Pursuant thereto Italian Government has inquired informally of State Department if Quintieri Mattioli in finance and economics would be acceptable. Neither ACC nor this Headquarters is expected to receive application from Italians for departure from theater until favorable reply received from State Department. Would appreciate directive on this matter including indication terms of reference proposed visit and whether visit to London also proposed.

ACTION: CC/S
CM-IN-3591 (4 Oct 44) 1827Z

SECRET
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER
NO : 623, 28 SEPTEMBER 1944

Your 788. I am pleased to know that our Italian announce-
ment went well in the U.K. It seems also to have been well re-
ceived here.

* * * * *
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 788, 27 SEPTEMBER 1944

I find on arrival here a very strong feeling that we ought to go a bit further than we have done towards recognizing the French Provisional Government. Our Italian announcement has gone well but of course people ask "What about the French?"
ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL MAP HELP FOR ITALY
NEW YORK TIMES, 27 SEPT 1944

UNRAA AID PLEDGED

U.S. and British Leaders Clear Path for Italy to Share Allies' Aims

PROMISE FREER HAND
But Ability to Maintain Order Is Requisite—Envoys Invited

Text of Roosevelt-Churchill statement or Italy is on Page 6.

Roosevelt and Churchill announced, the Allied Control Commission will drop the word "control" from its name.

Italian Envoys Invited
Further, the statement declared the Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct diplomatic representatives to Washington and London. The British High Commissioner in Italy, in turn, will assume the additional title of Ambassador, the rank now held by Alexander C. Kirk, representative of the United States in Rome.

The joint statement, issued at the White House at 5 P.M. simultaneously with its release in London, brought out officially for the first time that Prime Minister Churchill, following the war conferences in Quebec, had accompanied President Roosevelt to his Hyde Park home for further discussions of subjects dealing with post-war problems in Europe. These were held Sept. 18 and 19.

Results of the general conferences, the participants said, cannot be disclosed now for strategic military reasons and pending their consideration by others of the Allies.

Some information relating to the discussions of the immediate problems of Italy, however, was disclosed by the President at his news conference Friday. At that time he brought out that they had centered on two phases: that the Italian Administration should receive increasing responsibilities in a way in which all parties could be represented in rebuilding the nation for the welfare of the people and that no one shall starve or freeze this winter.

General Plan Bared
Today a general plan, calling for material aid in rebuilding the nation and its economy—and in encouraging the Italians to hold to their resolves against fascism—was revealed.

In concluding their joint statement, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill asserted: "We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of fascism in Italy will have been wiped out and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

This theme, the joint statement disclosed, ran through the charting of the plan for Italy. There were military as well as political and economic factors in the planning.

Reservations in the extension of new controls to the Italian Administration were made plain. "The American and the British people are of course horrified," the statement said, "by the recent mob action in Rome," by which was meant the lynching of a witness against Pietro Caruso, former police chief of Rome, who was executed Friday after a trial as a Fascist spy.

But Americans and Britons feel, the statement added, "that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and their own Government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts."

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 (AP)—The joint statement of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on post-war Europe follows:

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday. Sept. 18 and 19, at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice."

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political..."
rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own Government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed the Allied Commission.

The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy. We are happy to know that this view commend-ed itself to other members of the UNRRA Council.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy— an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading With the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to resume for the benefit of the Italian people.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."
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"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration’s proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed ‘The Allied Commission.’

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"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy - an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

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MR-IN-UNNO (H.P. to M.R.)

26 SEPTEMBER 1944

RE: Your 447. The President wishes us to advise you that he

is going to handle same by telephone to you direct. Major Greer
to Map Room.

The President wishes us to advise you that he

is going to handle same by telephone to you direct. Major Greer
to Map Room.

Resolution I of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting called

for the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany,
Italy and Japan and declared that the American repub-
lics would consult among themselves prior to re-
establishing those relations. Pertinent sections of
the Resolution are attached hereto.

Although the proposed statement does not actually
provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations
with the Italian Government, it reports certain
findings which have fundamental importance to any
decision to re-establish those relations. It reports,
for example, that the Italian people have rid themselves
of Fascism and have demonstrated their will to fight
with the United Nations.

In view of the great importance which the acceptance
of Resolution I by the American republics had for the
Government in 1942, and in so much as the exchange of
findings of the sort referred to in paragraph 4 were
such part of consultation regarding the resumption of
diplomatic relations, I respectfully recommend that
instructions of the proposed statement to Italy be substi-
tuted. Schedule October I in order that no confusion
in among the other American republics not to be
acted on in view of the statement of consultation.

Yours truly,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON ITALY

Having received from the British Embassy a copy of the statement on Italy which you and Prime Minister Churchill plan to issue this evening for tomorrow's newspapers, I should like to point out a problem which this statement raises in connection with the obligations of this Government to the other American republics under the Resolutions of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro, in January, 1942.

Resolution I of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting called for the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan and declared that the American republics would consult among themselves prior to re-establishing those relations. Pertinent sections of the Resolution are attached hereto.

Although the proposed statement does not actually provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Italian Government, it reports certain findings which have fundamental importance to any decision to re-establish those relations. It reports, for example, that the Italian people have rid themselves of Fascism and have demonstrated their will to fight with the United Nations.

In view of the great importance which the acceptance of Resolution I by the American republics had for this Government in 1942, and in as much as the exchange of findings of the sort referred to is normally an important part of consultation regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations, I respectfully recommend that issuance of the proposed statement on Italy be deferred until Sunday, October 1 in order to give us opportunity to inform the other American republics of the information and action to be announced in the statement and thus the agreement of those governments comply with at least the minimum requirements of consultation.

C H
EXEMPLARY FROM RESOLUTION I OF THE THIRD MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

III

The American Republics, in accordance with the procedures established by their own laws and in conformity with the position and circumstances obtaining in each country in the existing continental conflict, recommend the breaking of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy, since the first-mentioned State attacked and the other two declared war on an American country.

IV

Finally, the American Republics declare that, prior to the reestablishment of the relations referred to in the preceding paragraph, they will consult among themselves in order that their action may have a solidarity character.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 787, 25 SEPTEMBER 1944

I am now safely back. Please cancel paragraph one of my telegram number 736 as I now feel that publication should be on the 27th as originally planned.

All best wishes.

PRIME

To PRESIDENT at Hyde Park
as MR-OUT-445.

25/2/45
MR-IN-161 (H.P. TO M.R.)

FROM: MR. BLAKE
TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE MAP ROOM.

Your 440, 443 and 444 all MR-OUTs. Refer to Admiral Leahy and ask him to take up with me upon my return to Washington Wednesday Morning, 27 September.

RECD: 252310Z

Advised Admiral Leahy of above at 2325Z. He will take action in morning.
25 September 1944

MR-OUT-L44 (MR to HP)

FROM: MR. BLAKE
TO: THE PRESIDENT

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy and for your information Wright of the British Embassy telephoned me relating that he had wire from Eden giving War Cabinet OK to Italian statement and suggesting release be made for Wednesday morning papers, Sept 27.

RECD 2522372.
MR-OUT-443 (25 September 1944)

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 786, 25 September 1944

Your number 622.

I have not been able to signal you before as we were among U-Boats (German) and condemned to wireless silence. I shall be making my statement to the House on Thursday, September 28th and should like to refer to our Italian statement. Could we not synchronize publication on that date? This would enable me to add some words of condemnation of lynching in Rome which would, I think, reconcile public opinion and put that episode in its proper proportion, which is not large. If, however, the earlier date is important to you, I will, of course, meet your wishes. I do not know at the moment of signalling what has actually been settled.

We all saw Wilson's film with great interest and pleasure. It made a strong impression upon American officers and troops, but some comments were made about it being effective Democratic Party propaganda. My feeling is that it can do nothing but good to common cause. Kindest regards to all.

PRIME

RECD HP at 2521262.
The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, London, with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

MEMORANDUM FOR

His Excellency
The Ambassador from Great Britain

There is attached herewith a corrected draft of the proposed joint statement in regard to Italy which the President wishes to issue Monday.

It is believed that this draft incorporates the changes proposed by you in our conference yesterday.

Most respectfully,

/s/ W. D. Leahy
The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration
of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied Commission.'

"The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UWRRA to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy — an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.
"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain - the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

Your Vic. A detailed copy of the agreed draft of Italian manifesto prepared after discussion with Mussolini was sent all of the changes suggested by Anthony Blunt.

It is extremely important to us that our joint statement be released for publication in the Sunday Times. Please contact papers and I have so informed Bullitt.

Please give us your response to this publication decision.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 622, 23 SEPTEMBER 1944

Your 734. I believe that the present draft of Italian manifesto prepared after discussion with Halifax meets all of the changes suggested by Anthony Eden.

It is extremely important to me that our joint statement be released for publication in the Monday morning, 25 September, papers and I have so informed Halifax.

Please give us your consent to its publication Monday.

ROOSEVELT
From: U.S. Military Attache, London England
To: The President Of The United States
Nr: 784, 22 September 1944 Filmed 222215Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No
784 personal and Top Secret.

About our Italian Manifesto. Anthony has made
some valid comments which you no doubt have now seen.
The argument against publication of long armistice
terms at this stage is I feel conclusive. I do not
think the omission of words "On basis of exchange of
goods" would detract from the value of concessions.

I hear that a very bad impression has been
produced in England by the Rome lynching. It might
therefore be wise to delay a week or so before making
the announcement. This will also give time for a review
of French situation which I am anxious to go into on
my return and about which I will presently cable you.
Thank you so much for our delightful visit to your home.
Every good wish. May we soon meet again.
Rome Mob Lynches Fascist Official
After Seizing Him in Open Court

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

ROME, Sept. 18.—The former vice director of the Regina Coeli prison, Donato Carretta, was killed by a wild mob of 7,000 Romans today in a most vicious and brutal fashion while 200 Carabinieri and other Italian police looked on without lifting a finger. The lynching took place inside, and in front of the Palace of Justice, where Pietro Caruso was to have been put on trial today.

Caruso, Rome's police chief under the Germans, is accused of having handed over fifty Italian hostages to the Germans for execution. Carretta, a major prosecution witness, was attacked when a woman in the courtroom denounced him for having accepted 150,000 lire from her to save her son, one of the hostages, and then done nothing to help him, The United Press reported.

However, it was not the Government of Italy but the mob that ruled this morning. It would have lynched Caruso if it could have reached him. Lieut. Col. Harry Pollock, British police chief for the Allied Military Government, managed by a ruse to hide Caruso, who was not brought into court.

Carretta was killed in a horrible fashion—incidentally under the eyes of this correspondent, who by chance happened to be there alone. My remonstrances, naturally, got nowhere.

Government Proved Weak

The importance of this incident to Italy cannot be exaggerated, for it has demonstrated the fatal weakness of the Government, which has been proved unable to keep order. It has also proved that the Italian mob is in a state of the highest tension, that it will not permit the normal course of justice and that enough people have lost all sense of civic virtue to make an extremely ugly situation in Rome. Shortly after this had been written, thousands of persons were besieging the Regina Coeli prison in the mistaken belief that Caruso was there, while the horrified mutilated body of Carretta swung on a rope from the bars of one of the windows.

Count Carlo Sforza told me, when I described to him what I had seen, that Caruso's trial would be held tomorrow and the Government would show that it had control. But the Allies will probably advise against trying Caruso in the present state of mob frenzy.

After all, this is different from the sort of thing that I saw in Marseille, where the passions of the people were aroused to heat for just a few days. This happened three and a half months after the liberation of Rome.

Allies' Soldiers Kept Away

The mob went to court clearly determined to take justice into its own hands and Lynch Caruso. The Allies' authorities deliberately kept all their M. P. guards and soldiers away, since this was a purely Italian affair directed by the High Court of Justice.

The Government now faces the necessity of speedily asserting its authority and its ability to maintain order, administer justice and try Caruso legally. If this is not done within the next few days, it is generally agreed the Government must resign, presumably turning back the maintenance of order to the Allies' army—the last thing that the Allies want.

To be fair, one must point out that the spearhead of today's mob was composed of relatives of the victims of Caruso's police. For months these people, who had seen their loved ones die, sometimes under torture, saw Caruso, his secretary, Roberto Occetto, and others live in the safety of the prison. Hatred and passion smoldered week after week and today broke into burning flame. They did not get Caruso, but they got one who represented in their minds all that Caruso did.

But he was killed in such cowardly and vicious a fashion that none can help entertaining fears for the future of Italy. What, it is being asked, about the cities of the north, which are accustomed to more violence even than the Roman mobs, who often in history have shown their savagery?

It was obvious from the first moment that mob was high and the Italian authorities were incapable of maintaining order. Thousands of people gathered in front of the Palace of Justice in the early hours, and the inadequate and timid police were quickly broken by the mob, which pressed on, howling, to the entrance.

The big hall on the first floor was already jammed with authorized spectators and journalists. At 9:30 A. M., just as the presiding judge was about to enter the room, the correspondents heard Colonel Pollock had arranged for Caruso and Occetto to be kept in the cellars of the palace, and only the delay in bringing them into court saved their lives.

Carabinieri Run for Shelter

The crowd broke down wooden partitions, overturned tables and surged toward the judges and correspondents. By then there was no semblance of order. Everybody, including the carabinieri, sought shelter where he could. Some jumped out of the windows into the courtyard.

The mob thought that Caruso was in the anteroom, and Colonel Pollock let it think so. In vain he and Marion Beringuier, assistant high commissioner for the punishment of Fascist crimes, spoke to the crowd, trying to calm its fury. Caruso, lying on a stretcher, heard the howling of the mob above him, and those with him said that he had paled and asked for water.

After a half hour of exhortation and pleading by Colonel Pollock, some semblance of calm was achieved. He announced that the trial would be postponed. The crowd might have dispersed then if two women had not discovered Carretta among the witnesses. Some young men grabbed him and hit him violently. In a few minutes his face was streaming blood. He was dragged and kicked downstairs into the main entrance of the palace. From then on, I alone among the correspondents beheld this scene by chance a horrified witness of all that happened.

Before this account goes any farther, it will be best if I describe what I saw. Colonel Pollock's announcement that the trial would be postponed did not cause the mob as a whole to disperse. I hung around the entrance of the
palace, which faces the Umberto Bridge, and suddenly shouting was heard inside the court— that unmistakable, angry sound of mob fury.

Inside, a few Carabinieri were trying, without force and without opposing the mob, to usher out a short, stocky man with thick lips and functions literally covered with blood. This was Carretta. Near the entrance, while his back was turned, a young man jumped onto him with his feet, knocking him down, and others began kicking him. I am sure of this, yet why he did not try to stop this.

Carabinieri Watch Beating

Someone grabbed a cane from an old man and began viciously beating Carretta over the head with the cane. Carabinieri were standing around by the donuts, not more than a few yards from one another. Carretta tried desperately to get away from the blow and ran down to the end of the courtyard, where he was trapped. This went on for at least ten minutes, until the only Italian who showed any decency or courage—Lieutenant Borgomaner, a Carabiniere—asserted enough authority to get a few other police to help him rush the badly hurt but still conscious Fascist outside and into a car standing in front of the palace.

He might have been saved then, but no one had the courage to drive the car away. The mob kept pressing around it, and men reached in to hit Carretta as well as they could. Lieutenant Borgomaner then called on a dozen finance guards on horseback to clear the crowd away from the car. The crowd pushed their horses up amid the boos and whistles of the mob, but only one of them dared to draw his thin sword and hit a few men gently with the flat of it.

However, the mob kept pushing in, and finally someone opened the car door. Carretta was dragged out, thrown on the ground, jumped on, and kicked until unconscious. When I bitterly kept telling the crowd around me that this was worse than fascism and that Italy would get a black name throughout the world for this sort of thing, some shamedfacedly admitted that it was bad.

"Nothing Americans come to defend us, they will kill us all."

Lieutenant Borgomaner and another Carabinieri lieutenant dragged Carretta, now unconscious, to a command car with an American soldier at the wheel that stood a few yards away. The soldier refused to take the burden and crowd.

For a while the crowd stood around the body on the street. One young girl with white hair and sunglasses dressed well in a white summer outfit and looking like a student, had been one of the ringleaders, and she kept kicking Carretta.

The two officers made one more effort to get Carretta away. They picked him up, carried him to where a British truck stood, and asked the driver to take them and Carretta off. The Britons refused and drove away. The Carabinieri officers put their burden down helplessly, and then the last horrid act of this terrible tragedy began.

Someone shouted: "Throw him into the Tiber!" The limp body was dragged, not lifted, across the wide street to the beginning of the Umberto Bridge. Then it was lifted up and heaved into the water, some thirty feet below.

Revived by Water

The shock of the cold water apparently revived Carretta. As he was near the bank, he managed to crawl to the side and hang on half in the water, just below the bridge. Some of the mob got a rowboat, went up to where he was and pushed him back into the water. Whenever he tried to struggle to the bank they him with their oars and pushed him back.

Hundreds and then thousands of persons crowded the bridge, the embankments along both sides and then the Sant' Angelo Bridge, the next below, as Carretta floated downstream, his efforts to survive growing weaker and weaker. Many women were in that crowd. Many of the men as well as the women were middle-class or lower-middle-class. This was no mob of hooligans.

Some, of course, were horrified and ashamed, but they were few. When one woman hysterically groaned, she had to be rushed away lest the crowd mob her. Many laughed as two men next to me did gleefully when they realized that Carretta was going to be thrown into the river. I have seen many terrible things in years as a correspondent, even amid revolutions, but nothing so vicious or sickeningly brutal as this.

Dead Body Hunged

Barretta, mercifully, died just about as his body floated under the Sant' Angelo Bridge. Still that was not enough. Vengeance had to be taken on his body. Howling men dragged it out of the water and along the ground to the near-by Regina Coeli prison. There they got inside the great wooden doors somehow and strung the body up from a bar in the window.

By that time the crowd had swelled, it was estimated, to 7,000 and the situation was clearly ugly. The mob believed that Caruso was inside. Inevitably thoughts of the bastille rose in all observers minds.

However, this was not a corrupt mob. The prison police, who kept the inner doors closed, soon cut down Carretta's body and carried it off. Then the mob easily dispersed without more bloodshed.

I immediately went to see Count Sforza, who is High Commissioner for the Punishment of Fascist crimes. He had not heard anything more than the first stage of the rioting and was greatly shocked when I described what I had seen. He immediately telephoned the director general of police, Ferrari, a former high magistrate chosen for his impeccable character but lacking all police experience. Ferrari telephoned the director general of police, who had not previously heard, but he later checked and reported back to Count Sforza by telephone.

"This is inadmissible and it must never happen again," Count Sforza told him. "This is like the lynching of Negroes, and we will not have it in Italy. Make an immediate investigation to punish severely all those responsible, including the Carabinieri who were derelict in their duty."

Having been the only American witness, I then went to Col. Charles A. Poletti, I found him in conference with Colonel Pons and other Allied police officials. To them I described what I had seen and what was still happening, since at that time the mob was still around the Regina Coeli prison.

The full seriousness of the situation is realized by all concerned. There was nothing political about this and no question of class, though some are already trying to blame the lower classes of the Trastevere and Testaccio districts of the poor quarters of Rome. But it was just a Roman mob.

Sforza Admits Mistake

Count Sforza received the press after the affair, to explain the Government's position. The original mistake, he said, had been to invite the families of the hostages slain in the Ardeatine caves. They crowded into the hall while other relatives outside all created an atmosphere of "hysterical loss of control and fiendish curiosity."

"The inquiry that we made," he said, "showed that Carretta was one of the most violent and most hated jailers and in the court room this morning he was not enough to behave badly. Then the mob got out of control. Some police and other petty officials will be severely punished for failing to do their duty, but we could not arrest any of the mob because it was inside."

As a private official, I must condemn the Carabinieri for their failure, as a private individual I must recognize that men who make only enough to
NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Sept 44

ITALY SENTENCES CARUSO TO DEATH

Former Rome Chief of Police to Be Shot—Secretary Sentenced to 30 Years

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

By Wireless to The New York Times

ROME, Sept. 21—Pietro Caruso, police chief of Rome, who typified in Italian eyes all that was hateful in fascism, will be tied to a chair and shot in the back. Ro-

terto Occheto, his younger private secretary, will live in a prison under a thirty-year sentence.

"We do not think that the trial should be postponed, or held anywhere else but in Rome, because justice is necessary. However, the foolish sentimentality that led the High Court of Justice to invite the families of the victims will not be repeated. The trial will be held in a more suitable room than the hall of the Palace of Justice and only enough of the public invited to be sure that it will be a public trial. All newspaper men will be welcome. The trial will take place in the next few days, and this time we will have enough forces of Italian police to see that there is no repetition of what happened today."

"It must tell you that a terrible complication has arisen. This afternoon the Fascist radio broadcast that if the High Court sentenced Caruso to death, forty hostages or respected north Italian families would be shot. It has been suggested that we give a counter warning that we will shoot twelve, as many fascist prisoners whom we hold, but I am against that." Count Sforza was asked whether the incident was partly due to popular disgust over the slowness of the purge campaign. He replied that 2,000 persons accused of fascist crimes were now in jail and 750 trials were scheduled.

Although Caruso had been chief witness against Caruso, Count Sforza said, the trial will not be greatly affected by his death. Caruso's confession is completely incriminating. It admits everything, but says merely, "I always acted under orders." Someone asked: "Will this have any effect on the Government?"

"Not at all," Count Sforza replied. "Nobody wants to enter the Government in Italy."

SEEN AS PATTERN FOR TRIALS

The trial of the two Fascists was a military justice and from that point of view it represents the day of judgment for Europe. That is what made it so important, not the figure of Caruso, who was an obscure typical product of fascism. His attorney said, if he had not done what he did, someone else would have taken his place. It was fascism reality that was sentenced today, the fascism that corrupted ordinary men like Caruso and made criminals of them.

Today was long-drawn-out agony for Caruso, who saw his faint glimmer of hope gradually fade until the President of Court, Lorenzo Maroni, read the verdict at 8:15 o'clock this evening.

Caruso had the haggard look of one who had spent a dreadful night when he hobbled into court on his crutches at 9 o'clock this morning. But all morning his face was impassive and when Mario Berlinguer, public prosecutor, tore his case apart bit by bit one could only sense his emotions by the way he gripped his hands on a table in front of him.

During a short afternoon recess he refused to take food and even sent back a glass of water.

Weeps at Mention of Family

Only once did he show emotion, and that was when his lawyer, trying to work on the emotions of the judges, spoke of Caruso's wife and daughter, and then Caruso broke down and wept for a few minutes. The audience looked on silently and not without pity, for Italians are soft-hearted people.

For Occheto it was an almost greater strain, for he could not know until the words fell from the judge's lips whether he was to be executed or not. He had heard the Partisan leader, General Oddone, weaken his case and then the prosecutor attack it, point by point, and the only thing that seemed to give him courage was to chew incessantly a piece of American gum.

Occheto, too, had his moments of weakness when his attorney ended a three-and-a-half-hour plea.

His lawyer, Ottavio Libotto, had been earnest, eloquent and sincere. Signor Libotto's brother and sister-in-law had been arrested by the Germans and kept in Via Tasso prison, but he did his best for Occheto and did so well that he saved his life.

DELIBERATE FOR TWO HOURS

Shortly afterward the six judges retired and in two hours returned with their verdict, which Signor Maroni read. In the name of His Royal Highness Count Sforza in the Realm Prince Humbert, the High Court of the Punishment of Fascist Crimes, on the basis of Articles IV and VII of the Law of July 27, 1944, declares Pietro Caruso and Roberto Occheto guilty of the crimes with which they were charged," Signor Maroni read.

"For Occheto alone the court recognizes the extenuating circumstances and therefore condones Pietro Caruso to the death penalty and Roberto Occheto to thirty years' imprisonment. The sentence will be carried out by shooting in the back." Caruso, standing awkwardly because of his broken leg, covered his face with his hands and wept. Two carabinieri placed his crutches under his arms and assisted him out of the room.

Occheto seemed stunned, but must have been a happy man as he walked out of the court room.

Extraordinary precautions had been taken to avoid public manifestation. Before the court the champel had warned the audience that any demonstration would be severely punished. Two rows of carabinieri divided the room into three pockets. Powerful beams were turned on and when the judges entered, the audience was severely punished. Only Signor Maroni's voice broke the silence. Public Will Be Barred

Outside as the audience filed out all tongues were loud. The prevailing impression was that the Italians thought the sentence was just.

Caruso undoubtedly will die in the courtyard of a fort outside Rome. The public, including newspapermen, will be excluded. None will be there but high Italian police and army officers. The chaplain of Regina Coeli prison will visit Caruso tonight to hear his confession and will accompany him to the place of execution.
The reason, says Signor Nenni, "has little value since we are the ones who pay" although the first must be considered seriously though it overlooks the immediate desperation.

Says Hunger Does Not Wait

"Hunger does not wait," he adds, "and hunger is today a mute guest of the poor people."

The time has come to put forth concretely the problem of demobilizing the ACC. That the Allies should control the railroads and goods transport, that they should interest themselves in maintaining public order at least so long as their armies fight on Italian territory and that they have the right to keep an eye on monetary circulation is clear. But when control becomes a cape of lead then elementary good sense requires that the policy be reversed."

Leaving aside the grave ferment in Sicily it is a fact to which the Communist organ Unità calls attention this morning that hungry peasants in various parts of liberated Italy are seizing abandoned lands "to produce bread for their children and for the entire nation" as Unità's editor, Velló Spano, puts it.

In view of the great importance of the Italian Communist party, whose policies must be taken as symptomatic of what the whole of Europe can expect, Signor Spano's editorial deserves careful consideration.

Landowners Called Enemies

He accuses landowners of flaunting their opulence while the peasants starve. He calls them "cold, haggard, parasitical castes" and denounces them for calling police to "uphold their ignoble rights and to fill jails with hungry peasants."

"Landowners, who have always been among the worst enemies of the people, are today revealing themselves the worst enemies of the nation," says Signor Spano.

"How can one not understand that so long as sons of Italy lack bread the land of Italy should be taken away from parasites and given to peasants and producers?"

"While awaiting a constituent assembly we must solve the land problem by destroying vast parasitical properties, consolidating small ones and immediately distributing uncultivated lands and feudal domains of Fascists to landless peasants."

For Italy this is new and highly important. It means that while Fogliatti strictly adheres to the Bonom Government and himself maintains a conservative line, the Communists are seeking mass support both in the countryside and cities along traditional lines.

The Socialists are following parallel lines, and the two together form a powerful block, so these activities are going to affect the country's destiny profoundly. And finally, since all Communist leaders in every country maintain close relations with Moscow, what is happening in Italy will presumably happen in the rest of Europe.

Benedetto Croce, Italy's elder statesman, said today in a speech at the Eliseo Theatre attended by all members of the Government that Italy "does not feel defeated and cannot adapt herself to being considered among the defeated nations but affirms her right to be considered among the victors."

For him Italy is a victor in this war because she has won her fight against fascism.

Italy, he said, asks for two things: help to restore communications, and key industries, and prevent famine, and abolition or reform of armistice terms.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

ATTACHMENTS

RECEIVED

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TELEGRAM: FORD-RUSH 325

SITREP: HUSSEY, 1927

29 August, 1943

Interior Ministry, London

N 1.2.3.4.5

22 August 1943

To: All Chiefs of Staff

From: [Redacted]

Subject: Confidential

The following is a copy of the draft of a message for the Chiefs of Staff.

The message represents the views of the Imperial Government and is
are presented for your consideration. The Chiefs of Staff are hereby
requested to submit their comments.

Imperial Government representatives in London have been approached
for a formal meeting to discuss the matter. A meeting is scheduled for
next week, and the Imperial Government has expressed interest in
holding a meeting at the earliest possible date.

[Signature]

[Date]

[Additional Information]

[Redacted]
SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
25 August, 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 86420

To Wilson for action, SHAEF for Eisenhower and ETOUSA pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 398 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The treatment of representatives of Allied governments reference NAF 744 has been laid down in FAN 396. With regard to representatives of neutral governments acceptance of your proposals in NAF 744 would result in neutrals being treated more favorably than Allied representatives.

Our policy towards neutral representatives is therefore that while there would be no objection to neutral representatives have unofficial dealings direct with the Italian government, it should be understood that their official relations with the Italian government must be conducted through the Allied Control Commission.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Gen. Hildring

CM-OUT-86420 (25 Aug 44) 1614Z by

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
CONFIDENTIAL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

18 August 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
London, England

Commanding General
US Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 82967

To Wilson for action, SHAPE for Eisenhower and ETOUSA pass to British Chief of Staff for information, FAN 396 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Message NAF 717 is the reference.

The principle of United Nations representation in liberated Italy by consular officers has been established in TAM 125, agreed to by you in MAT 136. The various United Nations have been informed of this procedure. Consequently, M. Loret may be appointed as Polish Consul General in Rome. The Polish Government will be informed through diplomatic channels that this appears to be an appropriate solution to the question raised concerning M. Loret, and that, if considered desirable, there would be no objection to his having the personal rank of Minister.

It is desirable that all the United Nations, not represented on the advisory council for Italy, should have uniform representation in liberated Italy by consular officers. The
Belgians already have a consular representative in Italy. The government of Brazil has recently been informed by the State Department that it might appoint a consul general to Rome.

While consular officers at the Italian capital should be permitted to have informal relations with the Italian Government, their recognition and official functions should conform to the procedure already established for United Nations consular officers in liberated Italy. As in the case of M. Loret, however, consular representatives concerned may be allowed to have personal rank of Minister, if desired.

End
SECRET
URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advanced Command Post, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
War Office, London, England

No. BX 13627, NAF 716 12 July 1944

BX 13627, USFOR please pass to TROOPERS, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated UNITY, London, AGWAR for Hilldring TROOPERS AFHQ for information signed Wilson cite FHSGS. This is NAF 716.

I think it would be helpful to make clear the arrangements which have been made for dealing with the problem of Rome on the military side. These are briefly as follows:

1. An American Officer has been appointed as Military Commander of Rome. He has a British deputy and an integrated American British Staff is being established.

2. In view of its peculiar position Rome has been removed from the zone of the Armies and comes directly under Hq AAI.

3. When AFHQ has been established in Italy, the

CM-IN-12337 (15 Jul 44)

SECRET
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advanced Command Post, Caserta, Italy.

No. BX 13627 NAF 716 12 July 1944

Military Commander of Rome will come directly under APHQ.

4. It is my policy that the number of military establishments in Rome other than those required directly for the control of military personnel in Rome on leave or duty, should be reduced to a minimum.

5. Arrangements are in hand for establishing rest and recreation centers and other facilities in the vicinity of Rome so that Allied personnel can visit Rome when military exigencies permit.

6. I would like to make it clear that the policy to be pursued as regards the use of Rome is an Allied military question for which I am solely responsible through you to the 2 Governments.

End.

ACTION: CCS
INFO: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Hildring
Adm. King
Log

CM-IN-12337 (15 Jul 44) 1604Z eJv
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Advanced Command Post, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department,
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

No: BX 13627 12 July 1944

BX 13627 USFOR pls pass to TROOPERS to AGWAR for
Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs
of Staff repeated UNITY London AGWAR for Hilldring TROOPERS
APHQ for information signed Wilson cite FHSGS. This is NAF
716.

I think it would be helpful to make clear the ar-
rangements which have been made for dealing with the problem
of Rome on the military side. These are briefly as follows:

1. An American officer has been appointed as mili-
tary commander of Rome. He has a British deputy and an in-
tegrated American British Staff is being established.

2. In view of its peculiar position Rome has been
removed from the zone of the armies and comes directly under
HQ AAI.

3. When APHQ has been established in Italy, the
military commander of Rome will come directly under APHQ.

CM-IN-9868 (12 Jul 44)
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Advanced Command Post, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: AX 13627 12 July 1944

4. It is my policy that the number of military establishments in Rome other than those required directly for the control of military personnel in Rome on leave or duty, should be reduced to a minimum.

5. Arrangements are in hand for establishing rest and recreation centers and other facilities in the vicinity of Rome so that Allied personnel can visit Rome when military exigencies permit.

6. I would like to make it clear that the policy to be pursued as regards the use of Rome is an Allied military question for which I am solely responsible through you to the 2 governments.

End

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Adm. Leahy
CGAAF
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Gen. Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-9868 (12 Jul 44) 2312Z ejv

SECRET
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
To: War Department
CG Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy.

Fx 71521 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR British Chiefs of Staff repeated UNITY repeated HQ MAAF repeated AFHQ ADV CP signed Wilson cite FHGE this is NAF 744.

Concluding part of FAN 374. It is not considered either necessary or practicable to require neutral diplomatic missions to conduct their relations with Italian Government through medium of Allied Control Commission. It would be impossible to prevent them from dealing directly. Believe, however, that Italian Government should be informed that they are expected to keep Control Commission fully advised as to dealings with neutral government.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Hildring
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-10367 (13 Jul 44) 1425Z ejm

SECRET
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
   CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
   CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England
   CG, US Army Forces in Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 71444

FX 71444 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
repeated UNITY, SHAPE, HQ MAAF, APOC Adv GP, USFOR information
British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite PHGENG this is
NAF 743.

Supplementary to paragraph 2 of NAF 739 information
now received that subject to recommendation advisory council
transfer of territory proposed as follows.

(1) On 20th July provinces of Naples (with designation
of Commune of Naples as a military zone under AMG), Benevento,
Avellino, Gogia and Campobasso.

(2) On August 15 provinces Rome including Rome city,
Littoria and Frosinone.

Note: NAF 739 is CM-IN-6384 (8 Jul 44) CC/S
ACTION: CCS

CM-IN-9829 (12 Jul 44) 2153Z ejv

SECRET
SECRET

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 70842 10 July 1944

FX 70842 to AGWAR for combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff rptd Unity rptd Hq SAAF rptd AFHQ Adv CP signed Wilson cite FHGEG this is NAP 742.

Communique of 23 June by new Italian cabinet is in part as follows: "The president of the council proposed and the council approved a Draft Decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent assembly, the oath for the members of the government and the right of the government to issue laws. This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a constituent assembly to decide the new constitution of the state."

President of council assured acting Chief Commissioner, ACC, that government had not yet decided and had no present intention of discussing whether institutional question would be decided by direct referendum or by election of delegates to constituent assembly; all that government had so far decided was that Italian people should be assured that they would be free in due course to choose their form of government and that a Constituent Assembly would be elected to frame new constitution.

CM-IN-8722 (11 Jul 44)

SECRET

ITALY

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: FX 70842  10 July 1944

Acting Chief Commissioner has made it plain and caused it to be made a matter of record that the Allied governments have a considerable interest and will wish to be informed of details before any scheme for settling institutional question is adopted.

Request guidance of the governments.

In meantime acting Chief Commissioner is being instructed to avoid further discussion of institutional question or form of constitution to be adopted.

End

ACTION: CCS
INFO: Adm. Leahy
CGAAF
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Mr. McCloy
General Hilldring
Log
CM-IN-8722  (11 Jul 44)  14532  ejv
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England

Nr: FX 70394 9 July 1944

Further to NAF 739. FX 70394 to AGWAR for Combined Chief of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated UNITY, EQ MAAF, APHQ Adv Cp signed Wilson cite FHGEG. This is NAF 740.

Now agreed that militarily convenient for Italian Government to move to Rome during coming week. Planned to complete move save for service ministries by July 15th when Italian Government will function officially from Rome. Advisory council and appropriate staff ACC will move similarly. Expected Rome will continue under AMG at least until August 15th.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm Leahy
Gen Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-7296 (9 Jul 44) 23012 bjm

SECRET
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
      CG, US Forces European Theater of Operations,
      London, England
      Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
      London, England

Nr: FX 76394 9 July 1944

Further to NAF 739. FX 76394 to AGWAR for Combined Chief of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated UNITY, EQ MAAP, AFHQ Adv Cp signed Wilson cite FHGE. This is NAF 740.

Now agreed that militarily convenient for Italian Government to move to Rome during coming week. Planned to complete move save for service ministries by July 15th when Italian Government will function officially from Rome. Advisory council and appropriate staff ACC will move similarly. Expected Rome will continue under AMG at least until August 15th.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
              OPD
              Gen Bissell
              Adm King
              Adm Leahy
              Gen Hilldring
              Log

CM-IN-7296 (9 Jul 44) 2301Z bjm

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Hq Rome Area Command,

To: War Department

Nr: 275 24th June 1944

To AGWAR for Bissell from JICA/RAC signed Pumpelly.

This is weekly stability summary number one. Subsequent similar reports will be telegraphed each weekend from Rome unless situation unchanged.

Reliability B-2.

Part 1. Political small interest evidenced as yet in politics here but partial Comunists reported ruining adherents. National Liberation Committee Leaders feel left out of picture and believe Allied officials overlooking Italian political problems. They claim Allied officials besieged after office hours by Roman aristocracy who in many cases paid same court to Germans prior our occupation. All members Committee National Liberation agreed allies are not discriminating enough often allowing fascists secure positions Allied Military Government example Marchese Farace or releasing from imprisonment notorious collaborators example Bruno Casinelli. Underground antifascist forces, partisans and patriots appear much taken aback by complete lack of interest on part of Allies and Italian Government after ballyhoo by latter groups while former forces were in action. Partisans openly critical dissatisfied present treatment feeling their risks sacrifices useless. Also claim certain elements in SIM boycotted their efforts.

CM-IN-21368 (26 Jun 44)

SECRET

[Signature]
From: CG, Hq Rome Area Command,
To: War Department
Nr: 275, 24th June 1944.

Part 2. Economic Romans worried over fast growing inflation and have no faith whatsoever in the Lira. Blue Seal dollars at high premium bringing 250 Lira each. Gold crashed from 1600 to 300 lire per gram first days Allied occupation but now rapidly rising again. Food shortage critical in Rome but improving however in Umbria particularly Spoletto Peruggia plain, crops undamaged and sizable wheat crop now being harvested. Peasants succeeded hiding fowl livestock from Germans and food is generally plentiful in mountain villages.

Part 3. Security and subversive. Situation remains remarkably calm after few days zealous activity by patriots and partisans. Principal civilian security problem seen in many Italian and other foreign personalities who prior our arrival were seen in company high Herman officers and since our arrival in company Allied officers. To date 179 men 30 women confined as result subversive activity Rome area. Majority are suspected enemy agents others leading Fascist Republicans. Two parties reported reliability B-3 as centers subversive activity namely Movimento Comunista Italiano (Not recognized by Moscow and Not to be confused with Partito Comunista) and Centra Della Democrazia Italiana. Both reported hotbeds Fascist subversive elements.

CM-IN-21368 (26 Jun 44)
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Hq Rome Area Command,
Nr : 275  24th June 1944.

Part 4. Conclusion. Almost universal enthusiasm over arrival Allies continues unabated in Rome and northern liberated areas. Population here far more dignified than was case further south being willing to listen to reason and appreciating difficulties fighting running battle up Italy and bringing in necessary food for civilians.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO : CG AAF
      OPD
      Col. Park
      Log

CM-IN-21368 (26 Jun 44) 1555Z vhm
SECRET
FROM: MARSHALL BADOLLO

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: F 63007, 22 JUNE 1944 (AFHQ, Algiers, Algeria.)

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, Washington, D. C.

I desire, Mr. President, to thank you for the support and assistance which you have been good enough to give to the Italian people in particularly hard and difficult moments. My separation from the government will not interfere for a single day with my activity as sponsor of the friendship between Italy and the United States. I shall retain as one of the best of my public life, the memory of your friendship.

Signed BADOLLO.
Please see the following from U.J. which is important and good:

"As regards Italian affairs, you know of course already about the resolution of the consultative council in connection with the new Italian Government. On the part of the Soviet Government there is no objection to this resolution."

PRIME
ASSISTANT

But Badoglio's Entry Is Held Probable in Rome—Delay in Action Explained

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

ROME, June 19—Italy's unprecedented political crisis ended last night when the sanction of all the Allied powers was conveyed to Premier Iannone Bonomi.

The Government that was chosen eight days before in Rome but was not allowed to function until much negotiation and consultation with the United Nations' capitals had taken place is now in office. However, the question whether Marshal Pietro Badoglio will enter the Cabinet is still in suspense as far as Rome is concerned, but it seems likely that the Allies' suggestions and King Victor Emmanuel's pressure will bring him back.

An authoritative Allied spokesman answered Italian criticisms today for the first time. The delay had been inevitable, he said, because "It is perfectly clear that any government must have the approval of the Allied governments before it can take office. Any Italian Government functions under the conditions of the armistice and must undertake to fulfill its terms. This was well understood." Asked whether this justified the conclusion that the Atlantic Charter did not operate until the war had ended, the spokesman said that the Charter did not apply under the armistice conditions or before the peace treaty.

The spokesman said that the armistice terms had been made known to all Signor Bonomi's Ministers but they would not be publicly divulged until the Allies' Governments had given their authorization. When his attention was called to President Roosevelt's statement that there was no longer any reason to maintain secrecy, he replied that no orders to publish the terms had been received here.

As had been suspected, it is clear that the armistice terms were the basis of this week's difficulties and the Allies had not expected the formation of a government without Marshal Badoglio, who had signed the armistice.

However, the Allies' spokesman pointed out that the delay, although a little longer than expected, had not been excessive in view of the fact that all the Governments represented in the Advisory Council in Italy had to be consulted. In effect, that meant London, Washington, Moscow and Algiers. The hitch lay in London primarily.

That the Allies were trying to force Marshal Badoglio into the Government was denied, by some Italian leaders want him to take office, the spokesman said. Now that the Government has begun to function plans to bring it to Rome as soon as possible are said to be under consideration. Meanwhile Ministers and under-secretaries may travel between Rome and Salerno as much as they please.

All that remains to be settled, besides Marshal Badoglio's status, is the question of the oath of loyalty to the throne. Party leaders here refused to subscribe to the traditional oath, but evidently there has been a storm about it in Salerno and Italian circles say that a compromise has been reached. The Allies insisted that the new Government make no change in the monarchical institution, The Associated Press said.
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 563, 17 JUNE 1944

I am in agreement with your 705, but believe we should obtain advice General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff before publishing the long terms of surrender.

ROOSEVELT

171741 NCR 9280
BL1JE 11
(HYDE PARK to MAP ROOM)

17 June 1944

TO ADMIRAL LEAHY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your draft of reply (RED 63) approved for transmission.

For your consideration.

Roosevelt

"I am in agreement with your 703, but believe we should obtain advice General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff before publishing the long terms of surrender."

RECEIVED 17/1630Z.

RECEIVED 17/1542Z.
17 June 1944

(Map Room to Hyde Park)

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The following draft reply to Prime's 705 is submitted for your consideration.

"I am in agreement with your 705, but believe we should obtain advice General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff before publishing the long terms of surrender."

RECEIVED 17/1547Z.
From: U.S. Military Attaché London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 705
Filed 17/1334Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Top Secret. No. 705. Your No. 562.

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it will not be possible to press the return of Badoglio, and I am so informing U.J. We ought I think to wait for his answer before taking final action. Also matters should be regularized through the Advisory Council.

The important thing now is to make sure that all these ministers who have elected themselves to office shall be cognizant of all the engagements into which Badoglio entered. We also think the time has come to publish the long terms of surrender.

Prime

Sent to President at Hyde Park as RED 62, 17/1510Z.
Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to President as RED 63, 17/1547Z.

President approved draft reply in BLUE 11, 17/1630Z. Answer sent to PH as PRES #563, 17 June 44.
TOP SECRET

FROM:  THE PRESIDENT
TO:  THE PRIME MINISTER
NO:  562, 15 JUNE 1944.

With further reference to your telegram No. 699 and my reply No. 558, I have consulted with my advisers here and in the field and, despite some surprise here that the Deputy President of the Control Commission apparently acted without consulting the other Allied Governments, I have reached the conclusion that it would be a grave mistake for us not to permit the Bonomi cabinet to be promptly installed.

Though regretting Badoglio's withdrawal, I nevertheless feel that this may be of distinct advantage to us. Aside from allaying criticism at home and abroad of our Italian policy and pointing to the implementation of our proclaimed policy, it would seem well that the surrender terms — hitherto in the public mind associated with Badoglio's person — should become the obligation of the most representative men today available in Italy, forming a cabinet regarded as one hundred percent anti-fascist. I understand that the new cabinet have pledged themselves to assume all the commitments the Badoglio government contracted with the Allies, including both the long terms of surrender and the postponement of the institutional question until the hostilities are ended.

The broadening of the Government when Rome was reached had long been foreseen. Negotiations following Rome's fall were held with the approval of the Allied Control Commission and in constant consultation with its Deputy President and his British and American political advisers. While the parties were divided in willingness to serve under Badoglio, Bonomi was the unanimous
choice of all the parties represented in that Rome Committee of National Liberation which seems to be the best available channel existing in Italy today for the expression of popular will.

Interference on our part at this late moment in the establishment of what appears to be a representative government would have, I fear, serious repercussions both at home and in Italy, to the detriment of the military situation and the profit of mischievous elements there, and would not this be in direct violation of our announced policy to let the people choose their own government?

ROOSEVELT

Mr. Kist points out that the Italian Government has given assurance that it is bound by the undertakings given by the Badoglio Government to the Allies; that it represents to all appearances the expression of the Italian party leaders and that any obvious interference from foreign sources in this internal political situation would undoubtedly raise a question in the minds of many within and without Italy as to the real intent of Allied policy.
June 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Inauguration of the new Italian Government.

With reference to my memorandum of June 13 concerning the composition of the new Italian Government and to Captain Wood's memorandum of June 14 enclosing a paraphrase of your reply no. 558 to the Prime Minister, I am enclosing a draft telegram to Mr. Churchill for despatch, if you approve, with further reference to this urgent matter. I have now received the comments of both Ambassadors Murphy and Kirk, and I find them in substantial agreement that any attempt at this time to insist on the return of Badoglio as head of the Italian Government and the consequent repudiation of the Bonomi Government would be seriously damaging to Anglo-American prestige and would be generally misunderstood throughout the world.

Mr. Murphy suggests that the only possible course is to give the Bonomi Government a trial after it has assumed all of the obligations to the Allies undertaken by Badoglio and the former government.

Mr. Kirk points out that the Bonomi Government has given assurances that it is bound by the undertakings given by the Badoglio Government to the Allies; that it represents to all appearances the expression of the Italian party leaders and that any obvious interference from foreign sources in this internal political situation would undoubtedly raise a question in the minds of many within and without Italy as to the real intent of Allied policy.

Enclosures:
Telegram to Mr. Churchill

[Telegram text]

COPY
DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

With further reference to your telegram no. 699 and my reply no. 558, I have consulted with my advisers here and in the field and, despite some surprise here that the Deputy President of the Control Commission apparently acted without consulting the other Allied Governments, I have reached the conclusion that it would be a grave mistake for us not to permit the Sonomi cabinet to be promptly installed.

Though regretting Badoglio's withdrawal, I nevertheless feel that this may be of distinct advantage to us. Aside from allaying criticism at home and abroad of our Italian policy and pointing to the implementation of our proclaimed policy, it would seem well that the surrender terms - hitherto in the public mind associated with Badoglio's person - should become the obligation of the most representative men today available in Italy, forming a cabinet regarded as one hundred percent anti-fascist. I understand that the new cabinet have pledged themselves to assume all the commitments the Badoglio government contracted with the Allies, including both the long terms of surrender and the postponement of the institutional question until the hostilities are ended.

The broadening of the Government when Rome was reached had long been foreseen. Negotiations following Rome's fall were held with the approval of the Allied Control Commission
and in constant consultation with its Deputy President and his British and American political advisers. While the parties were divided in willingness to serve under Badoglio, Bonomi was the unanimous choice of all the parties represented in that Rome Committee of National Liberation which seems to be the best available channel existing in Italy today for the expression of popular will.

Interference on our part at this late moment in the establishment of what appears to be a representative government would have, I fear, serious repercussions both at home and in Italy, to the detriment of the military situation and the profit of mischievous elements there.

I hope, therefore, that you will agree that we should permit the new cabinet to take oath without delay and I have instructed the United States member of the Advisory Council to support this view in the council.

Announced policy to let the people choose their own government?

S/ Eleanor Roosevelt
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 561, 14 JUNE 1944

EXTRACT

Your 703.

I join with you in a hope that the Italian situation will clear up to the advantage of our military effort in Italy and elsewhere, and I regret exceedingly that is was not possible for me to be with you on your visit with our splendid soldiers who have made the first breach in Hitler's "citadel of Europe." But don't do it again without my going with you.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 703, 14 JUNE 1944

EXTRACT

2. Your number 558. Please note the remarks I had had on this question from Marshal Stalin. I share your opinion that the matter should be examined by the Joint Advisory Committee and that they should report to the three governments, who will consult together and give a united answer. Meanwhile Badoglio remains nominally in charge, and the delay in bringing the new government into office is to be explained by the needs of consulting the victorious powers. This is what Badoglio and Bonomi have, I believed, settled amicably at Salerno, whither they have both repaired. It appears that they are quite friendly and I see great difficulties in persuading Badoglio to resume the thankless task he has quitted, at his great age. I consider that is we cannot do this it will be detrimental to the interests of the Allies.

PRIME

TOP-SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
June 13, 1944

Subject: Telegram no. 699, June 10, 1944 from the Prime Minister, concerning the composition of the new Italian Government.

I have asked the views of Mr. Murphy in Algiers, as you suggested, on the Prime Minister's message of June 10 concerning the new Italian Government. As soon as his comments are received, I shall draft a reply to Mr. Churchill for your consideration.

Meanwhile Mr. Kirk in Naples comments that our adherence to a decision at this late date to discredit the Italian efforts to form a representative government under difficult circumstances appears irreconcilable with our established policy. He reports also that General MacFarlane, British Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission, and Sir Noel Charles, representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, have received messages in which the Prime Minister protests against the composition of the new Government, states that he has sought the views of the American and Soviet Governments, and directs General MacFarlane to inform Premier Bonomi that his new Government shall not be inaugurated until approval is given by the Allied Governments.

I feel that we should not be unduly influenced by Mr. Churchill's precipitate action. His alarm may be unwarranted, and his attitude toward a solution of the political problem presented by the liberation of Rome appears at variance with American policy. You have emphasized many times that we will assure the Italian people the opportunity to choose their own form of government. The Moscow Declaration regarding Italy calls for the democratization of the Italian Government by the inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism. Until all the country is liberated there appears to be no better indication of popular will than that expressed through the six parties of varying shades of political thought comprising the Italian Committee of National Liberation. Bonomi was president of the Committee in Rome.
Many members of the new Government are former cabinet ministers of the pre-Fascist era. They are men of considerable prestige and stature in the country. Our policy has been to welcome democratic political solutions worked out by the Italian people themselves with minimum interference from the Allied Governments. The present Government appears to be such a solution, evolved without civil disturbance or damage to the Allied military effort. Its anti-Fascist and democratic character, including the best elements of Italian resistance to the Germans during the long occupation of Rome, augurs well for Italy's political future and should, I feel, be welcomed and supported by this Government and the other democracies.

General MacFarlane and his American and British political advisers have been in Rome during this period and it is reported that they have obtained the necessary assurances from the various parties comprising the new Government regarding Italian obligations under the Armistice and other Allied safeguards. Any interference on our part at this time to change the complexion of a government which we have every reason to believe is friendly to the Allies and bitterly anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi, would be misunderstood generally and would appear to be contrary to the Moscow Declaration on Italy and to our general policy of encouraging the development of a truly democratic and representative Italian Government.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algeria,
Dated June 14, 1944
Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington
US URGENT
2003, June 13, midnight.
FROM MURPHY.

MacFarlane's action as Chief Commissioner of Allied Control Commission in approving the formation of Bonomi Government was taken without proper consultation with either MacMillan or myself. Your 1343, June 12, 7 p.m. What advice if any he received on this subject from either Kirk or Reber I do not as yet know. As you know the Allied Control Commission is the agency providing official contact between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government. Requests of Supreme Allied Commander are conveyed to the Italian Government by Allied Control Commission and it in turn is responsible to Supreme Allied Commander.

The question of this change of Government was not presented to the Advisory Council for Italy nor to the Supreme Allied Commander. In agreement with MacMillan I recommended to General Wilson and General MacFarlane at the time of our recent visit to Italy that the Italian Government be prevented from proceeding immediately to the city of Rome and that the political leaders in Rome be invited by Government to come to them at Salerno. MacFarlane accepted this advice reluctantly but seemed eager to facilitate the visit of the Crown Prince and members of Badoglio Government to Rome.

Whatever may have been the wisdom of course adopted I believe it would be damaging to Allied prestige now to endeavor to retrace the steps taken. Should the Allies insist on return to office of Badoglio his critics in and without Italy would be afforded tremendous ammunition and in the transaction Bonomi might well become an Italian public hero.

The only course feasible would be to give Bonomi Government a trial after it has (A) assumed the obligations of the short term armistice; (B) assumed the obligations of the long term armistice; (C) assumed the obligations which the former Italian Government has vis-a-vis the Allied Control Commission.

The delay in the official announcement of the formation of the Government could be explained on the ground that time was required for the purpose of advising the respective Governments of the assumption of these obligations.

MacFarlane is being summoned to Algiers by SAC immediately for a thorough discussion of this matter.

CHAPIN  BRANDT

NPL REP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Naples
Dated June 13, 1944.
Rec'd: 8:00 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
NIACI.

1347, June 13, 3 p.m.
SECRET FROM KIRK.

I assume Department has by now received my telegrams No's 160, June 10, 6 p.m.; 166, June 11, 11 a.m.; 167, June 11, 170, June 12, 11 p.m.; 173, June 12, 1 p.m.; 174, June 12, 6 p.m.; 175, June 12, 8 p.m.; 179, June 13 and 181, June 13.

As regards the message from the Prime Minister quoted in Department's 183, June 12, 7 p.m., I submit that in reference to his statement that the members of the proposed Bonomi Government are an "absolutely unrepresentative crew"

it may be said that the members seem to have been chosen from all parties (see my 167, June 11 and 179, June 13). Furthermore it might be said that as Badoglio's replacement was according to reports received effected by the Italian politicians themselves (see last paragraph of 151, June 9, noon) and as the proposed new Government has given assurances that it is bound by the undertakings given by the Badoglio Government (see second paragraph section two of my 157, June 10, 1 p.m.) the consequences of the Marshal's replacement, however regrettable it may be regarded, need not necessarily prove a "great disaster".

I must reaffirm the comments contained in my 172, June 12, noon. Regardless of other considerations the Bonomi Government represents to all appearances the expression of the Italian party leaders and, meager as my possibility of judging opinion here may be, indications are that an interference from foreign sources in the establishment of that Government would shift to those responsibility for possible internal disturbances in Italy and would raise a question in the minds of many within and without the country as to the intent of the United Nations to practice what they have preached.

As Reber and General MacFarlane were together in Rome during the negotiations among the party leaders I assume that MacFarlane's reports contain the pertinent available information on these matters. Communications with Rome have improved to a certain extent and as I have been compelled to postpone my visit there which was scheduled for today I have sent a message to Reber asking him to inform me if he has any further information on the negotiations in Rome.

Sent Department repeated Algiers.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Naples
Dated June 13, 1944.
Rec'd 7:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NIACT US URGENT.
135, June 13, 9 p.m.
FROM KIRK.

(See my 134, June 13, 8 p.m.).

The British High Commissioner for Italy, my colleague on the Advisory Council, has just informed me that he has received a message from London stating that he should call a meeting of the Advisory Council and that further instructions are being sent to him. This MIS message referred to his previous message on the formation of the Italian Government.

The High Commissioner added that he would attempt to call the members of the Council together for June 15 although the Greek representative who should call the next meeting and preside may be in Rome and the Soviet representative is in Algiers.

I told my British colleague that I would be unable to take any active part in the meeting unless I should receive the views of my government on the matter in question and accordingly I should appreciate advice as to whether the United States Government wishes to express its views in the premises and if so, as to when the necessary instructions may be expected here.

I consider that speed in reaching a decision in this question is of great importance and if Advisory Council must be brought in at all at this late hour, every effort should be made to reduce delay so that a government can start to function here at earliest possible moment.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Algiers.

BRANDT.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
NO: 132148 NCR 8563, 13 JUNE 1944.

EXTRACT

Your 130035 received. We do not at the present time wish to become involved in the political questions brought up by the establishment of a new Government in Italy.

I am informed that Moscow has expressed in advance no objection to any action the U.K. and U.S. may take in regard to the new Italian Government.

Your action in the matter of MacFarlane's speaking for the United States has my full approval.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
FILED: 1300352, 13 JUNE 1944

EXTRACT

Just before General Marshall and I reached Chequers Saturday night the Prime Minister had received a message from General MacFarlane telling him that Badoglio had been dropped by the Italians, and of the formation of the new control under Bonomi. He was very indignant that this had been accomplished without conference with the three powers. He made this very clear both to General MacFarlane and to Sir Noel Charles. The latter he told me with Ambassador Kirk were both at Naples. The Prime Minister did not learn until the next day that the new group had assumed the obligations undertaken by Badoglio. His first reaction was to upset what had been done but Eden whom he had summoned to Chequers persuaded him to do nothing until he had communicated with you and there had been time to consult with the Russians. In a Department message No. 4636 of June 11th which I received this morning I understand that MacFarlane speaking for the United States as well as Great Britain objected to the appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister. I called Eden this afternoon and told him of our surprise that the General should express an opinion of the United States Government without first consulting us, and that Gen MacFarlane did not correctly represent the views of the United States. I asked that no further representations of our Government be made by Gen MacFarlane without knowledge of the views of our Government. Eden assured me that this would not happen again.

***

TOP-SECRET
The President has directed that the attached paraphrased message from the Prime Minister be forwarded to the Secretary of State for information and preparation of a draft reply.

The Secretary of State has directed that the attached message be placed at the disposal of your Excellency, and the Prime Minister has been requested to prepare a draft reply.

The message is as follows:

I, H. S. O. S. N. R., to Prime Minister of Italy:

Lt. Col. O. S. N. R. L. has also been received.

Please be assured that your Excellency's cooperation in his plan of action on the part of the United Kingdom is most appreciated.

I am, with the highest regard,

O. S. N. R.
Premier Stalin has sent me the following message:

Your message concerning the departure of Badoglio has been received which to me likewise was unexpected. I did not think that the removal of Badoglio and the appointment of Bonomi could take place without the consent of the Allies — British and American. However, according to your message this evidently took place regardless of the will of the Allies. It must be assumed from this that certain Italian circles intend making an attempt to change the armistice conditions to their advantage. In any event, you can count on their being no objections from the Soviet side if circumstances suggest to you and the Americans that it is necessary to have another government in Italy and not the Bonomi government.

Your message of 10 June has also been received. Thank you for the information. The landings which were conceived on a grandiose scale, have been successful, as is evident. My colleagues and I must admit that in the history of warfare there has been no other similar undertaking from the point of view of its scale and masterly execution and its vast conception. It is well known that Napoleon in his day failed utterly in his plan to force the channel. The hysterical Hitler boasted for two years that he would effect a forcing of the channel, but was unable to make up his mind even to hint at an attempt to carry out this threat. The grandiose planning of forcing the channel has been realized only by our Allies. This deed will be recorded in history as an achievement of the highest rank.
From: M A London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 702 Filed: 123056 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal No 702.

I have just received the following from Premier Stalin.

1. I have received your message about the departure of Badoglio. To me, too, the departure of Badoglio was unexpected. It seemed to me that without the consent of the Allies, the British and the Americans, the removal of Badoglio and the appointment of Bonomi could not take place. From your message, however, it is evident that this took place regardless of the will of the Allies. One must assume that certain Italian circles purpose to make an attempt to change to their advantage the armistice conditions. In any case, if for you and the Americans circumstances suggest that it is necessary to have another government in Italy and not the Bonomi Government, then you can count on there being no objections to this from the Soviet side.

2. I have also received your message of the 10th June. I thank you for the information. As is evident, the landing, conceived
on a grandiose scale, has succeeded completely. My colleagues and I cannot but admit that the history of warfare knows no other like undertaking from the point of view of its scale, its vast conception and its masterly execution. As is well known, Napoleon in his time failed ignominiously in his plan to force the channel. The hysterical Hitler, who boasted for two years that he would effect a forcing of the channel, was unable to make up his mind even to hint at attempting to carry out his threat. Only our Allies have succeeded in realising with honour the grandiose plan of the forcing of the channel. History will record this deed as an achievement of the highest order.

No Sig
The following telegram has been received from Algiers:

FOR MURPHY,

You should inform General Wilson with reference to General Macfarlane's messages concerning Sforza (your 1932 June 10, 6 p.m.) that this Government would have no (repeat no) objection to Bonomi's appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister. Since Macfarlane represents and has acted in this matter for both Governments you must request General Wilson to direct him immediately to inform Bonomi that his (Macfarlane's) position does not represent the views of the United States Government; that Sforza's appointment to the post of Foreign Minister would be entirely agreeable to this Government. If possible you should send a personal and confidential message to Reber asking him also to inform Bonomi in this sense.

Sent to Algiers; repeated to London and Naples for Kirk. That we will in any future representations assure himself of this Government's views beforehand.

STETTINIUS,

ACTING.

STETTINIUS,

ACTING.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

SECRET

June 11, 1944.
1 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S. URGENT

AMBASSADY

LONDON

4636

The following telegram has been received from Algiers.

(Code Room: Repeat here Algiers' telegram No. 1932, June 10, 6 p.m.).

The Department has replied as follows:

(See No. 4637, June 11 1 p.m., to London for reply to Algiers as Department's No. 1839, June 11, 1 p.m.).

Please see Mr. Eden at the earliest opportunity and inform him of the developments described above. Tell him that we are surprised that General Macfarlane in representing the Allied Governments in Rome, would undertake to express the opinion of the United States Government on a question of this nature without first consulting it. Point out that the position taken by Macfarlane did not represent the views of this Government and express our expectation that he will in any future representations assure himself of this Government's views beforehand.

STETTINIUS

ACTING.
HUMBERT IGNORED BY ITALIAN CABINET

Bononi's Ministers By-Pass Fealty to the Crown—Pledge Loyalty to Constitution

KINGSHIP HELD TENTATIVE

Retention of Monarchy Termed an Issue to Be Settled at Close of Hostilities

By Herbert L. Matthews

ROME, June 10—The latest round in the fight that the House of Savoy is putting up to save the dynasty ended today in what could at best be called a draw, Prince Humbert returned to Naples with the cheers of thousands of Romans in his ears, but with a distinctly weakened political situation.

Constitutionally speaking, he should have called Premier Ivanov Bonomi and requested him to try to form a government. He did that with Marshal Pietro Badoglio in Naples, and the marshal was rejected as soon as he reached Rome. Then the Italian Liberation parties chose Signor Bonomi without consulting Prince Humbert but merely notifying him.

Most important of all, the new Italian ministers are not going to take the customary oath of fealty to the throne. Instead, they have worked out a new formula of loyalty to the fatherland, making it clear that the monarchy will be judged by a public plebiscite when hostilities end.

Another factor of importance is that republican sentiment is definitely stronger here than in Naples, although it is hard to gauge its precise strength because it lacks political organization. All authorities agree, however, that republican desires are consequential.

All the same, after the remarkable exhibition of cleverness, political acumen and strength that King Victor Emmanuel showed in southern Italy, one cannot yet write off the House of Savoy. With such a champion, it is going to be very hard to beat.

Fascist Banker Ousted

ROME, Sunday, June 11 (UP)—Dr. Vincenzo Azzolini, 64-year-old Governor of the Bank of Italy, was removed from office and placed under house arrest today amid a developing political housecleaning by AMO officials in which Prince Filippo Andreo Doria Pamphilj was appointed Mayor of Rome to replace Gen. Roberto Benivenga.

Ex Gen. Edg. E. Hume, chief of the AMO in Rome, said that Dr. Azzolini, holder of many high offices under the Fascist regime, "did not have the spirit consonant with that of a liberated Italy."

The appointment of Prince Doria, 58-year-old son of one of the oldest noble families in Rome, resulted from consultations between General Hume and Premier Bonomi and follows an ancient custom of naming a Roman prince as Mayor. General Benivenga had been appointed secretary by Marshal Badoglio to the Rome between German withdrawal and the beginning of Allied military government.

P. M. after the Cabinet had agreed to mark the anti-Fascist character of the new Government by pledging allegiance to the nation instead of the traditional declaration of fealty to the House of Savoy.

Rome's newspapers yesterday generally approved the composition of the new "pure" Cabinet under Premier Bonomi and hailed the abstaining of Marshal Badoglio and his Government.

Observers regarded as one of the most outstanding indications of the anti-Fascist character of the new Government the fact that the Ministers pledged allegiance to the nation and not to any leader or to the throne.

"This may be contrary to classic protocol," said the new Minister of Communications, Francesco Cernia, "but that's the way it should be in order not to compromise the present Cabinet with any links of Fascism."

Post-War Vote on King Seen

ROME, June 10 (AP)—The Italian Cabinet of Premier Ivanov Bonomi assumed office today without taking the customary oath to the crown, as represented by Prince Humbert.

Instead, the seventeen Ministers pledged themselves to the Premier to fulfill their duties according to the Constitution. Some of the Cabinet opposed taking the oath to the crown on the grounds the question whether Italy would continue as a monarchy would be decided at the close of hostilities.

The Government prepared to leave Rome soon, as Salerno will remain Italy's provisional capital as long as Rome is considered in the zone of military operations.

Excitement was caused by the explosion in the German Embassy as Allied soldiers searched the building and uncovered a large amount of explosives in the cellar. One case of explosives blew up, smashing windows but causing no serious casualties.
FROM: U. S. MILITARY ATTACHE, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NR: 701, 11 JUNE 1944

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TOP SECRET
AND PERSONAL NUMBER 701. YOUR NUMBER 558.
I ENTIRELY AGREE.

NO SIG.
TOP-SECRET

14 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

To: The Prime Minister
The Secretary of State

No.: 558

The attached is a paraphrase of a message sent to the Prime Minister by the President and is being forwarded to the Secretary of State for information by direction of Admiral Leahy. The paraphrased message answers the message received from the Prime Minister to the President forwarded to the Secretary of State on 11 June.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc (HW)
1. Msg. Pres to PM #558,
   11 Jun 44.
11 June 1944

From: The President

To: The Prime Minister

No.: 558

Re your 699, I should like to have a recommendation from General Wilson and the Italian Advisory Committee on this question before forming an opinion.
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 558, 11 JUNE 1944

Your 699. Before forming an opinion on this question I should like to have a recommendation from the Italian Advisory Committee and General Wilson.

ROOSEVELT
For: The President of the United States
Number 699

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 699.

I think it is a great disaster that Badoglio should be replaced by this group of aged and hungry politicians. He has been a useful instrument to us from the time when he delivered the fleet, in spite of the enemy, safely into our hands. I thought it was understood that he was to go on, at any rate till we could bring the democratic north in and have a thoroughly sound Italian government. Instead we are confronted with this absolutely unrepresentative collection. As far as I can make out, the Italian Advisory Committee have not been consulted. I have had no opportunity of bringing the matter before the Cabinet, nor I suppose have you had much time to consider it. I was not aware, at this present time, that we had conceded to the Italians who have cost us so dear in life and material the power to form any government they chose without reference to the victorious powers, and without the slightest pretence of a
popular mandate. I take a most serious view of the situation, and I hope before you take a final decision you will let me know your views and give me an opportunity of replying.

No Sig
PRINCE UNHARMED IN ROME SHOOTING

Revolver Fired While Humbert Accepts Ovation—Bonomi Cabinet Likely Today

By The United Press.

ROME, June 9—Revolver shots, which it was feared were fired at Prince Humbert, interrupted today a demonstration by 5,000 persons who cheered the new Lieutenant General of Italy after his appointment of veteran Liberal Ivanoe Bonomi as Italian Premier to succeed Marshal Pietro Badoglio.

Prince Humbert had just appeared on the balcony of the Palazzo Quirinale in response to enthusiastic shouts of “Viva Umberto,” and returned the greetings with a wave of his hand when the shots were fired. Although the shots caused considerable excitement, the prince was not hurt.

Meanwhile, Signor Bonomi—who retired from Italian politics on the rise of Mussolini in 1922 and who was one of the most active under-ground leaders during the German occupation of Italy—sought to complete his new Cabinet today.

Badoglio Not in Cabinet

The communiqué issued by Prince Humbert in naming Signor Bononi his new Premier said that Marshal Badoglio, after having conferred with representatives of the parties of the Committee of National Liberation, had declined the task of forming a new Cabinet. The unanimous selection of the parties caused the prince to charge Signor Bononi as president of the Rome Committee of National Liberation, to form a new Government.

The 71-year-old Liberal said his Government would be a 100 per cent non-Fascist regime.

Although he paid tribute to Marshal Badoglio, Signor Bononi said he had not asked the former Premier to take part in the Cabinet because “anyone with the slightest tinge of fascism” would be banned from the new Government.

He started forming the new Cabinet this morning, saying it would be made up of Rome political leaders as well as those from Naples and Sicily. He added, however, that it would be “much more democratic than the Salerno Government.”

Liberal leaders Count Carlo Sforza, Senator Benedetto Croce and Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti already have accepted invitations to participate in the new Government, he said.

Signor Bononi said he expected to have the Government formed tomorrow morning.

Will Eradicate Fascism

He said his Cabinet would consist of about eighteen ministers, although “a number of them will be without portfolio.” Asked to what party he belonged, Signor Bononi stroked his white goatee and said: “I am an independent; I do not belong to any party.”

Regarding the policy of his new Government, he said the program is simple and clear. It is to bring back democracy to Italy, to do away with everything fascist and to see that the war effort continues.

“We hope to be of real assistance to the Allies,” he said.

He made it clear that he intended to oust Fascists from all public posts and hinted that he planned to go so far as to create a special Ministry for cleaning Italy of fascism.

(The London radio, heard by United Press in New York, said Signor Bononi had declared he would break with tradition in forming a Cabinet by having the new Ministers take an oath of allegiance to the country instead of to the King, as is customary.)

Referring to Signor Badoglio, he said: “I think Badoglio has worked hard and conscientiously for his country, I have great respect and appreciation for what he has done.”

“But I am not inviting him to join the Cabinet, because I have no place in it for anybody who has been compromised by fascism or connected with fascism in any way.”

Bononi a Hunted Man Recently

ROME, June 9—Signor Bononi was a hunted man up to only five days ago, slipping from house to house, sometimes in disguise.

A member of the old Italian Socialist party, Signor Bononi lived in obscurity for the twenty years of the Fascist regime. He was not molested, but was prevented from taking part in politics by his refusal to join the Fascist party.

Late in 1942 six underground political parties, feeling the defeat of Italy and collapse of fascism near, formed an anti-Fascist coalition in Rome. They were Labor, Liberal, Christian Democrat, Socialist and Actionist groups.

Signor Bononi by this time had broken with the Socialists and was in the Democratic Labor party. On being chosen president of the coalition committee, he severed ties with the party.

On Mussolini’s downfall last summer the committee came into the open to the extent of asking Marshal Badoglio to make peace with the Allies and declare war on Germany. In September, when the Germans took control of Rome, the committee was compelled to go deeper underground than ever, and its nineteen members spent nine months eluding the Gestapo and Italian secret police.

On Marshal Badoglio’s arrival for conversations yesterday to form a new Government at Rome, the committee took a firm stand against his continuance as Premier and demanded an entirely anti-Fascist Cabinet headed by Signor Bononi. Count Sforza, Signor Croce and other anti-Fascists who had reluctantly entered the Badoglio Government in Salerno two months ago, supported them, and thereupon Marshal Badoglio withdrew from the picture.

People’s Desires Emphasized

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, June 9—Without drawing any comparison between France and Italy, President Roosevelt today reiterated his feeling that in Italy itself no government would be considered as definitely established until the Italians had a chance to register their choice.

A reported asked the President
If he would comment on the recent shifts whereby King Emmanuel apparently stepped aside by designating his son, Prince Humbert, as lieutenant general of the realm, and the subsequent resignation and immediate re-designation of Marshal Badoglio as Premier.

Mr. Roosevelt replied only that the Allies would not be satisfied until the Italian people themselves had made their choice as to the government under which they wish to live.
Badoglio's Resignation Is Sought By 5 of 6 Roman Political Parties

By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

ROME, June 8—When Prince Humbert, Premier Pietro Badoglio and other leaders representing the Government and all six political parties arrived in Rome this morning to organize a new Cabinet they found a hot situation, almost a threatening crisis, on their hands.

Five of the six Roman groups on the Committee of National Liberation are insisting that Marshal Badoglio resign as Premier in favor of Ivano Bonomi, pre-Mussolini Liberal Premier.

Among the leaders who went from Naples to Rome with the Prince and Premier were Count Carlo Sforza, Benedetto Croce and Palmiro Togliatti, Ministers of State.

Prince Humbert was enthusiastically cheered in the streets and so was Marshal Badoglio but only the Communists here are supporting the Premier, under the orders of Signor Togliatti, who is also known as Ercole. The Italians believe that the British are strongly backing the marshal.

After having met in party groups the Roman and Neapolitan representatives will hold a joint meeting with Prince Humbert, Premier Badoglio and the Ministers tomorrow.

Although Italian politics is highly complicated, the gist of the matter is that there are three really important parties with mass following—the Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats, or Catholics. The Socialists, who are weak in the south, are strong here, and there is now a sharp cleavage between them and the Communists, which will take on greater importance when the north is reoccupied.

Generally speaking, Lombardy is strongly Socialist and Piedmont Communist. Small in numbers, but influential because of the high caliber of its members are the Liberals headed here by Signor Bonomi and in the south by Signor Croce. The Action party still is an enigma and has but few important leaders.

Badoglio Exhorts Patriots

Declaring that "the decisive hour has come," Premier Badoglio has appealed to Italian patriots in the German-occupied part of Italy to take up arms against the invaders, the United Nations radio at Algiers said Thursday.

Signor Badoglio's appeal, which was broadcast by radio stations in liberated Italy, noted that "the fortress of Europe" was being attacked from every side and added: "Italians, the future of Italy depends also on your effort, on today's sacrifice on your side. * * * Do everything in your power to support the Allied armies, which are advancing while the Italian corps of liberation is fighting at their side.

The Algiers broadcast was reported to the Office of War Information.
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY

23 February 1944
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY

Memorandum from the Director, Civil Affairs Division

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. NAF 622 (Enclosure "A"), NAF 624 as corrected by CM-IN 14623 (Enclosure "B") and NAF 628 (Enclosure "C") have been referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration, recommendation and draft of reply to the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, as a matter of urgency.

DISCUSSION

2. The subject cables relate to the political situation in Italy. They point out that the six political parties standing in opposition to the Badoglio Government are now becoming active to the extent that such activities constitute a threat to military operations. The six parties have proposed an agreed program for communication to the Allied Governments which includes the accession to the throne of the Crown Prince, provided he agrees to delegate his powers to a Lieutenancy of a single individual or a group until a constituent assembly can determine the constitutional question at the end of the war. They desire the Allied Governments to inform the King of this plan and to insist that he bow to the will of his people.

3. General Wilson advises that he favors the immediate adoption of this program, pointing out the following steps as being necessary conditions precedent:
a. That we ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the premiership;

b. That we obtain from him a guarantee from all parts of the opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies.

c. That we ascertain the nominee of the opposition for the lieutenancy.

4. In view of the urgency of the situation as pointed out by the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and the strong possibility that delay will result in a less favorable proposal and will threaten military operations, it appears that authority should be granted him within his discretion, dependent upon the military situation, to notify the opposition parties that their program has his support and the support of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. However, actual notice to the King should be given by representatives of the six opposition parties who would be at liberty to state that such program had Allied approval. If General Wilson considers it advisable, he may confirm to the King the fact of such Allied support.

5. The Government of the United States, through the Department of State, has indicated its agreement in the foregoing conclusions.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

6. That with the concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom, the inclosed cable (Enclosure "D") be transmitted to the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Previous telegrams from Algiers have been outrun by political situation which is developing more rapidly than foreseen. It is indicated that opposition tactics threaten administration dislocation. Devers, MacFarland, Caccia, Reber, and Alexander have discussed the situation with me and the following is submitted by me:

1. The suggested program of action agreed upon by the opposition has been submitted to be communicated to the Allied Governments. (I told the opposition that I was accepting it for transmission forward only on condition that while it is under consideration they take no action against the Government of Badoglio.) Concisely, the six parties of opposition agreed on a program permitting the Crown Prince to ascent the throne. If he agrees, his powers are to be delegated to a single Lieutenant or to a group until the constitutional question can be decided at the war's end by a constitutional assembly. The parties request assistance of the Allies to effect this program, indicating that the action of less responsible elements cannot continue to be guaranteed by them if no action is taken. Their Executive Committee, at the same time, has issued to everyone in State Service an appeal to treat as rebels the Government and the King and to refuse participation in this rebellion against the people of Italy. As far as possible, the publicity and circulation of this appeal have been stopped. The Committee has been warned very severely and informed there can be no toleration of such action.
Any action against them for subversive activity against the Government of Badoglio can be taken only by us as their operations are from AMGOT Italy. The continuance of this sort of thing cannot possibly be permitted by us. The opposition's present attitude threatens more serious interference with our military operations than any likely repercussions following a change in the government and an abdication. We lay ourselves open to storms of protest from everywhere if we choose the obvious course in support of the administration of Badoglio or permit him to do so in Kings Italy by arresting and proceeding against the opposition Executive Committee members but continued support of Badoglio leaves us hardly any other course to adopt.

2. A clear decision cannot be delayed and made dependent on the furtherance of the Rome campaign. I am convinced of this.

3. The main alternative courses are two:
   a. The opposition to be informed that the Governments of the Allies will tolerate no change, until Rome is reached, in the political situation and that attempted interference with the Government of Badoglio will be repressed instantly.
   b. Pressure to be brought on the King for abdication in Humbert's favor whose succession in accord with the constitution should insure the Italian armed forces' loyalty in our opinion. Our intervention is now required in either case.

4. Due to situation mentioned in paragraph one, we are faced inevitably with deciding at an early date between these two alternatives and now are better placed to control consequences than immediately prior or subsequent to Rome's capture.

5. Therefore, from here, I recommend that at earliest moment the Allied Governments agree to advise the King that he insist he bow to his people's will and immediately abdicate in Crown
Prince's favor and that then the latter should be informed to summon the opposition's chosen representative to form a new government immediately. Needless to say, before initiation of any steps, we would obtain the opposition's undertaking, collectively and severally, to subscribe to Badoglio's engagements with the Allies.

6. As soon as possible, we will forward the program of the opposition in full detail and our comments.
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: APHQ
To: War
No.: NAP 624

20 February 1944

My comments on program of opposition forwarded in FARGO No. 1112 of February 19 are as follows, after consultation with MacFarlane, Caccia, Reber and Devers:

1. We are unlikely to be faced with anything more moderate than this program. Parties will undoubtedly adopt more positive action to attain their ends if answer of Allies insists on status quo until Rome or is long delayed. Arrest and subsequent martyrdom might even be welcomed by some of them.

2. If Allied governments are prepared to accept the program as foundation for discussions between the Crown and the parties several points should be clarified and possibly need negotiation which might call for our intervention.

(A) Delegation of all powers by the new King is called for in the present program. However, there is some indication that the parties might agree to some nominal powers being retained by the Crown. Possibly Humbert may be persuaded to take field command. In this event a Lieutenancy would be furnished with ample precedent.

(B) The proposal presently excludes a soldier's appointment to the Lieutenancy. Amongst others this is aimed at Badoglio; but he might possibly be included if there were more than one Lieutenant. Collective Lieutenancy of three presents obvious advantages. The parties should advise us who their Lieutenancy candidates are.

- 6 -

Enclosure "B"
(C) That the program does not specifically mention any envisaged change in the government’s composition on reaching Rome is noteworthy.

(D) The parties’ candidate for Prime Minister is not indicated in present program.

(E) Both the parties and the Crown should give explicit guarantees that there will be no attempt to revise the basic principles of any agreement now effected until constituent assembly decides future government and that they will abide by the decisions of the constituent assembly. These undertakings are necessary because the present program does not indicate its duration.

3. We are now in a very advantageous position to obtain anything desired naturally including reaffirmation of all commitments by Badoglio as the opposition requires and has requested Allied support and cannot effect a change in the present government without it. In other circumstances, or in Rome, this might not necessarily be the case to the same degree.

4. Therefore, the following action by the Allied governments’ representatives will be necessary if the decision is to support the opposition’s program:

(A) The opposition’s candidate for the Premiership must be ascertained.

(B) He must furnish a guarantee from all opposition parties subscribing to all engagements which the Badoglio government entered into with the Allied Governments.

(C) The opposition’s nominees for the Lieutenancy must be ascertained.

5. If these three points are settled satisfactorily from the Allied views and only if so settled the following steps should then be taken:

- 7 -

Enclosure "D"
(A) The King should be informed that the Allied Governments require that he abdicate thus bowing to the people's will.

(B) The Crown Prince should be advised that he must call for the formation of a government by the opposition's candidate for the Premiership.

(C) If necessary aid in persuading Humbert that he must delegate such of his powers as required by the opposition and deemed advisable to the Lieutenancy by the Allies.

No Sig
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

ENCLOSURE "C"

PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War
No. NAF 628 21 February 1944.

General Wilson's comments on program of opposition, contained in message FARGO 1112, 19 February to AFHQ from MacFarland, were conveyed by NAF 524, 20 February. Text of FARGO 1112 follows:

The following should be passed to CC for State Department and President and to London for British resident minister, Foreign Office information Civil Affairs, and Prime Minister.

For submission to the Allied Governments, the opposition program of action has been set out in a memorandum addressed to me for communication to members of the Advisory Council, translations are being forwarded via air Algiers. The Executive Giunta stated at the time of submitting its proposals that the object is to permit a postponement of the institutional problem within the framework of the constitution until the end of hostilities and an anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation has been created.

The present King should abdicate immediately, the six parties agreed, to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedemont. However, the latter must agree to delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers to a Lieutenancy either single or collective. Neither a member of the House of Savoy nor a soldier would be included in the Lieutenancy, but the Lieutenancy would have powers to proceed at once with the constitution of a representative government which would be anti-Fascist until war conditions
permit the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian people, thus delegation of power would remain effective. The Giunta points out that despite their agreement to the accession of Humbert, it cannot be forgotten that he adhered to Fascism and had responsibility for the attack on France.

The Royal powers have been delegated under the constitution to a Lieutenant before and certain Royal prerogatives have been forwarded by the present King when the establishment of the Fascist grand council was permitted and supreme command of the armed forces was granted to Mussolini so the Giunta believes there is no juridical reason why the Crown should not accept the foregoing procedure for a limited period. To maintain strong neutrality in all Italian internal political matters and to guarantee the Italian people a free choice of their own government and institutions is the expressed policy of the Allies. However, such neutrality, in fact, constitutes support for the King and as he refuses to give way stubbornly it is considered by the Giunta that if approval of its program is given by the Allies they should themselves make it clear to the King and Humbert that the proposed course of action must be followed. The blocking of the will of the Italian people can only be avoided by the Allies by taking such action. If the Allies are to maintain their principles as expressed, immediate action is required according to the Giunta for two reasons:

First, as the situation is growing steadily worse and it might not later prove possible to propose or present a moderate solution because of more serious events or the state of public opinion;

Second, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, the parties and patriots of Northern Italy might take action into their own hands of a more radical nature. The Giunta might be forced to review its present attitude because of such action.
The Giunta further states in submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments that in the fulfillment of its duty, it must point out that the Italian situation is grave and several examples are cited of friction caused by the alleged reactionary tactics of the King.

I have agreed to forward the above program to the Allied Governments and so informed the Giunta council, insisting that until a reply is received that the Badoglio Government will not be interfered with by any action taken. I have also insisted that the present situation should not be aggravated and that the press should not be advised of the proposed program which should be considered confidential. However, I am informing the press that I have received a proposed program which is being forwarded to the Allied Governments for consideration in order to forestall possible indiscreet announcements on the part of the Giunta or any of its members.

FARO 1112 message ends here.

For General Wilson's comments look at NAF 624.

Our comments are following.
If you are able to make satisfactory arrangements with respect to the points mentioned in paragraph four of NAF 622 and any other points deemed essential by yourself and your UK and US political advisers, authority is granted by Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, provided it will not, in your judgment, cause difficulty with military operations, to notify the six opposition parties that their program as outlined in your NAF 622 and NAF 624 has your support and the support of the two governments. The representatives of the six opposition parties should then inform the King of their program and they will be at liberty to state that such program has the support of the Military Commander-in-Chief and the governments of the US and UK. You may, if you find it necessary or advisable, confirm to the King the Allied support of the opposition program. It is understood that an undertaking from the opposition parties, severally and collectively, to subscribe to all engagements of the Badoglio Government with the Allies will be secured before the steps authorized above are taken. You should keep the Advisory Council for Italy informed of these developments as they progress.
FLASH