

FLASH

Map Room Files.

BOX 30. (continued)

Folder 7. Oil (North Africa) FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1) Sec. 1.

Giraud-DeGaulle Relations. January 9 - June 30, 1943.

Folder contains messages between FDR and the following persons:

Churchill, General Eisenhower, General Marshall, Ambassador  
Murphy and Sumner Welles. Also included are messages di-  
rected to Secretary of State Hull from James C. Wiley,  
James M. Barnes, Robert Murphy, as well as Eisenhower-  
Marshall correspondence re Giraud-DeGaulle relations.

SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Algiers

Dated June 30, 1943.

Rec'd 10:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1195, June 30, 7 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MURPHY

I have had conversations with Massigli, Catroux, Pleven, Diethelm, and Generals George and Juin. I also had a long conversation with Pierre Cournarie, Governor of the Cameroons, who is being proposed by Pleven as successor to Boisson. This appointment will come up before the French Committee on July 1.

I find some encouraging features in the present trend, including a growing determination on the part of members of the committee to oblige General de Gaulle to subordinate himself, alarm that he will alienate American sympathies if unchecked, and opposition to his desire to control and dominate. There is a distinct determination evinced by the members to maintain the committee and a much better understanding on their part, especially of those more recently arrived here, regarding the American position. Pleven particularly has impressed me with what I believe is a sincere desire to cooperate with us, recognizing that the committee is helpless without American support. He pleaded long and earnestly that we believe that his suggestion of the appointment of Cournarie as Governor General of French West Africa is actuated by the friendliest motives and that we can count on Cournarie's loyal support.

General William Donovan, who participated in some of our conversations, states the belief that de Gaulle has not shown intelligence in dealing with a number of problems, and expresses the opinion that the committee may well succeed in controlling him.

I have made quite clear in all my conversations the President's concern regarding the security of this area and his determination that there should be no development here endangering Allies' security and military operations.

Should the committee approve Cournarie's appointment I believe we should not offer objection at this time. Should there be later any indication of difficulty we could then insist on his immediate removal.

WILEY

SECRET

## INDEX SHEET

29 June 1943.

From: Algiers  
To : Mr. Harry Hopkins

No. #W-3758

Telegram has been handed to me personally by your friend here. From Eisenhower to Harry Hopkins. The White House, for His Eyes Only. These are his views. See Murph's telegram number 1187 June 29th 8 pm on same subject.

"On the question of Boisson's successor, it has been proposed that Cournari be appointed. From all investigations am satisfied that Cournari is essentially a technical Colonial Administrator interested only in local administration and I am convinced that this suggestion has no political significance. From what I have seen of the man and what I have learned he is animated with spirit of collaboration. Personally I consider him a good suggestion for an admittedly difficult local job. There is not in sight any other adequate justifiable candidate. I am satisfied that the essentials on the security you seek rests for some considerable time with the committee if it is helped to establish itself and with the military command now definitely in Giraud's hands.

In view of this I wish to appeal to you with my deepest conviction that not only you should have no concern but also that you can best help in achieving the object in view by accepting the view which I submit in this telegram.

No. Sig.

Original filed "100 HARRY HOPKINS"  
This for file in "011 NORTH AFRICA"

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

SECRET

Algiers  
June 29, 1943.  
Recd 11:49 a.m. 30th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1187, June 29, 8 p.m.

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MURPHY.

My 1170 June 26, midnight.

Monnet lunched with me today and spent most of the time in arguments against a visit by Giraud to the United States at this time. He gave two principal reasons: (1) That Giraud's presence as chairman of the Permanent Military Committee for the reorganization of the French army (\*) if early progress is to be made and de Gaulle's influence is not to dominate; and (2) that our preference for Giraud as evidenced by this invitation would adversely affect French public opinion as marking foreign support of a French faction. According to Monnet there is much misunderstanding in public opinion in France regarding our policy which he said is often represented as supporting Quislings. Monnet asserts that de Gaulle elements exploit this tendency to enhance de Gaulle's position as defender of French rights as compared with a weaker character who makes every concession to the Allies.

Monnet recommended that Giraud's visit be deferred for about six weeks and that at that time both Giraud and deGaulle be invited to the United States.

I could not tell Monnet that it is considered at Allied headquarters that there is military advantage in Giraud's departure at this time as it provides a cover for future military operations, I do not share the opinion that the trip will weaken Giraud. It should strengthen him certainly in the eyes of non-partisan Frenchmen who will feel honored at this mark of consideration by the President.

(Section two). Monnet also pleaded that the President offer no objection to the appointment of Cournarie as successor to Boisson at Dakar. He maintains that Cournarie is merely an able colonial administrator and colorless as a political personality. He said that Pleven is sincere in the selection of Cournarie on the basis of insuring an efficient administration of the colony and that Allied interests will be fully protected and guaranteed.

(Section three). Monnet argued also that De Gaulle is losing ground with the French. Communists, he said, have been authorized to publish a newspaper in Algiers, over De Gaulle's objection. There is no doubt that De Gaulle is seeking to bring over the conservative elements which he has discovered in North Africa but this policy of close cooperation with the communist group in France remains unchanged.

There is little evidence to support Monnet's assertion that

SECRET

De Gaulle is losing ground. In many directions he is gaining terrain and his publicity department is distinctly driving the local press in De Gaulle's favor.

Monnet is transmitting via AGIVAR today a message to Harry Hopkins making recommendations along lines of his personal conversation with me.

I discussed the foregoing this evening with General Giraud. His heart is obviously set on visiting the U.S.A. now and he hopes to leave July 2 if the President agrees.

(Section four). Giraud said that Boisson's resignation had been offered as far as he knew spontaneously to the French Committee of National Liberation and against Giraud's advice that he refuse to tender it. I am confidently informed by a reliable source that De Gaulle's emissaries visited Boisson persuading that his remaining in office would be an obstacle to French unity. The resignation was considered by the Committee during this morning's session and accepted.

Giraud states that the selection of a successor will be considered during the meeting on July 1 and that he will propose Boiboissel, recently appointed commanding General for North Africa.

Sent Department, repeated London, sections two and four to Dakar.

End message.

/s/ WILEY

SECRET

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

Extract from No. 335, 29 June 1943

Reference para 3. Following is text of Stalins telegram about recognition of Algiers committee:

"I received your message of the 23rd June in which you state that the governments of Great Britain and the USA intend to refrain for the time being from the recognition of the French committee of National Liberation created in Algiers. In explanation you say that the high command can not be sure either of actions of General De Gaulle or of his feelings toward the Allies. It seemed to us that the British Government so far was interested in General De Gaulle. Such interest appeared to be quite natural as after the capitulation of France General De Gaulle headed all the French Anti Hitler Forces and led the struggle of the French patriots united round the Fighting France.

"The subsequent events in North Africa since November of 1942 as well as participation of the French Military Forces under Generals Giraud and De Gaulle in the Anglo American operations created conditions for their unity. Such unity was considered reasonable by all the Allies and there was no doubt about it. The recognition of the French committee- the expression of this unity-should be the consequence of aspirations and efforts involved in that. Therefore when Giraud and De Gaulle on behalf of the French committee of National Liberation asked the Allies for recognition the Soviet government thought French opinion would be unable to understand any refusal to accord such recognition.

The Soviet Government has no information which would confirm the present attitude of the British Government to the French Committee of National Liberation and more particularly to General De Gaulle. Insofar however as the British Government requests to postpone the recognition of the French Committee and through its Ambassador gave assurance to do nothing in this matter without consultation of the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government is ready to meet the wish of the British Government.

"I hope that you will take into account interest of the Soviet Union in French affairs and will not refuse to supply the Soviet government with timely information necessary to take the appropriate decisions."

From: Algiers  
To : War

No. 4772, 26th June 1943.

Para 4. Political. The problem of the French High Command which for 10 days had constituted the major obstacle in the negotiations has been solved by a compromise solution. Gen Giraud retains the High Command of forces in North and West Africa. While Gen De Gaulle remains as Chief of his own forces in other theaters. The problem of reorganization in structure and personnel of French Forces is to be effected by a Staff comprising 3 Chiefs of Staff (Land Air and Sea) representing Gen Giraud and equivalent representation from Gen De Gaulles Hq both Commanders sit on th s "Permanent War Committee", no Chairman being designated. Once more an attempt at equilibrium between 2 factions may be noted.

UM-IN-17222 (27 Jun 43)

Original filed "300 North Africa."  
This extract for file in "Old North Africa."

## Major Eliot Says Military Need Favors Giraud as Chief in Africa

Asserts de Gaulle Symbolizes Resistance, but Giraud  
Heads Troops and Controls Civil Set-Up  
and Supply Lines Vital to Allies

By Major George Fielding Eliot

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As a contribution to realistic thinking, we might stop once in a while to ask ourselves just why we Americans are in French Africa at all. The answer is perfectly clear: We are there in order to set up military bases for an attack on

German-held Europe, and to open the Mediterranean Sea to the passage of Allied shipping in order to facilitate such an attack and perhaps other and more distant operations.

The safety of our bases and lines of communication is our primary consideration, because upon them depends all that our forces may accomplish against the main citadels of the enemy's power. These military considerations are and must continue to be paramount in determining our policy in French Africa while the war with Germany continues.

Naturally there are political considerations to be kept in mind. Our relations with the French authorities and with the French and native populations in French Africa are of great importance to us. Their friendship and co-operation immensely facilitate the task which our military forces must perform. French and native troops have fought gallantly beside ours against the common enemy, and may be expected to continue to do so. The French railways, ports, telegraph and telephone, form vital links in our lines of communication. Our political relations with the duly constituted authorities of French Africa are a factor

in the war, just as our political relations with Great Britain, Russia and China are a factor in the war.

What I cannot understand, however, is why there should be so much impassioned criticism of those political relationships on the ground that we do not at once and without argument give our support to everything that one French faction, that of General Charles de Gaulle, demands.

Granted that General de Gaulle was on our side when many Frenchmen were not, or were even collaborating with the enemy. Granted that the Fighting French, under his leadership, have had in their keeping the spirit and honor of France. Granted all the fine things that can justly be said of General de Gaulle as a soldier and a man. The fact still remains that our immediate concern in French Africa is a military concern; and so far our military associations in North Africa have been with General Henri Honore Giraud, who is in command of the French troops who fought with us against the Germans, and who is still commander in chief of all the French armed forces who have in their charge, in part, the safety of our

(Continued on page 2, column 3)

## Eliot Favors Giraud in Africa

(Continued from page one)

bases and our lines of communication.

General Giraud is an old and senior general. He was a general officer when De Gaulle was a major. His ideas are doubtless conservative. Some of them unquestionably annoy General de Gaulle. We have been hearing lately that De Gaulle wants to "streamline" the French Army, that he wants a small highly trained "spearhead," equipped in the most modern fashion, to lead the way in the invasion of France. But it is the arsenals of the United States which must equip that spearhead, and the allocation of materials for that purpose is a proper subject of discussion between our military authorities and those of the French government in Africa. It is not a matter to be determined by General de Gaulle, immediately upon his arrival on the scene and before he has had time, or so far as is known has sought the opportunity, of discussing the matter with our military leaders there present. It is, furthermore, a matter in which General Giraud's views must be heard, and in which he has, by his accomplishments up to this point, earned a right to be heard.

There is further to be considered, in this matter of the safety of bases and lines of communication, the question of maintenance of order and the functioning of governmental control among the native populations of French North and West Africa. Some 40,000,000 people, largely Arabs, Berbers and Negroes, are in normal

times governed by a mere handful of French military and civil officials. These are highly trained men of long experience, whom the natives have come to trust and to respect. The co-operation of the French service of native affairs is of vital importance to us in keeping order in our communications zone in Africa. It is not at all certain that the officials of this service are prepared to take orders from General de Gaulle, as they do from General Giraud. As for the so-called "purge" of the armed services reportedly demanded by de Gaulle, we might assume the proof of such puddings to be in the eating, and the men who have already fought the Germans with such gallantry and devotion are entitled to our friendship and recognition whether they fought under de Gaulle's Lorraine cross or under Giraud's command in Tunisia.

To sum up—our reason for being in our French Africa is to make war on the Axis, not to establish governments for Frenchmen. Whoever helps us make war on the Axis is our friend. Whoever hinders us is our enemy. Let the dead past bury its dead, and let the future of France be the concern of Frenchmen. Meanwhile, there is work to be done, an enemy to be beaten, a victory to be won. The measure of our present and future regard for General de Gaulle should be the measure of his willing and whole-hearted co-operation toward those ends—on which our future and that of all our Allies, France included, is completely dependent.

File 308

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington  
TO: American Consul, Algiers. For Murphy.  
DATED: June 25, 1943.

With reference to your telegram of June 23, 8 p.m. (no. 1146), the question of General Giraud's proposed visit to this country has been taken up personally with the President. Both of us believe that present and pending developments make it imperative that General Giraud remain in Algiers. In addition, the fact that the General found it possible to absent himself from North Africa at this critical point in French affairs would not be understood in this country. At a later date both the President and I will welcome him here.

Naturally, the prestige of the French Committee of National Liberation would be very greatly enhanced if one of the important problems which it dealt with successfully was that involving the citizenship of Algerian Jews. This subject was touched on in your no. 1146.

HULL

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EWES ONLY

JDJD A37  
filed 1550B/23  
BM

CWD  
25 June 1943  
1526

U R G E N T

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From Algiers  
To: War

No. W 3469; 25 June 1943.

Will you please pass the following to the President. From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only. " Upon receipt of your number 1018 I informed General Giraud that while you welcome his impending visit to the United States, it must be deferred until after July 6th. To this he readily agreed. I also informed him, through General Smith, that whoever was eventually appointed to take Boissons place must be entirely trustworthy from my viewpoint and completely acceptable to the President of the United States. In the meantime, to serve as a balance wheel in that region and to provide against any difficulty in the event of a sudden departure of Boisson I am informed that General Giraud is appointing General Boisbossel to command the French military forces in West Africa. General Boisbossel has worked with us for a long time and is entirely trustworthy and a conservative.

I had a private report yesterday that 1 of the reasons for the submission of Boissons resignation was an incident of popular agitation against him in West Africa. It was stated that about a week ago he had a most embarrassing time when he passed through a hostile crowd of civilians.

I consider that some of the general arrangements made for the French Committee for handling the military forces of the French colonies and possessions cannot have any great permanency nor are they sound organizationally. However in not taking a determined stand here we secured a continuation of the existing arrangements in the vital areas in which we are immediately interested.

(CM-IN-15872 25 Jun 43)

SECRET

*White House*  
COPY No. 1

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

From Algiers  
To: WAR

Page 2

No. W 3469, 25 June 1943.

Moreover the committee has accepted the principle that so long as important Allied Military operations are dependent upon the active cooperation of French Forces in this region and upon the preservation of peace and order throughout the territory, the requirements of the Allied Commander in Chief must be recognized as paramount.

Both MacMillan and Murphy believe that the enlargement of the original committee of 7 to 1 of 14, so as to include in it more of the conservative element, is working to our advantage. There are growing evidences that this core of conservative civilian opinion is getting somewhat weary of the individual struggles for position of the 2 leading military figures. However, official union between these 2 will appear for the moment to symbolize for most Frenchmen unity of purpose which in itself would be the greatest stabilizing influence throughout this region.

No Sig

Action: White House  
Information: C of S

CM-IN-15872 (25 Jun 43) 1854Z ems

SECRET

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1

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SECRET

SECRET

24 June 1943

SECRET

From: AGWAR

TO : ALGIERS

NO : 1018

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

REFERRING TO YOUR MESSAGE W3386 JUNE 24 IT IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT GIRAUD REMAIN IN AFRICA UNTIL THE MATTER OF BOISSON'S RESIGNATION IS FINALLY SETTLED.

IT IS MY DESIRE THAT PRIOR TO THE SELECTION OF A SUCCESSOR TO BOISSON I BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT UPON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CANDIDATES.

ONCE MORE I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE FULL CONTROL OF DAKAR IS SO VITAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS WAR THAT I SHALL OTHERWISE HAVE TO DIRECT THAT SEVERAL REGIMENTS AND SHIPS BE SENT THERE UNLESS I AM CONVINCED BEYOND A DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH LEADERS THERE ARE WITH US AND WILL TAKE OUR ORDERS WITHOUT QUESTION.

FURTHER, I AM DELIGHTED THAT GENERAL GIRAUD CAN COME, BUT IT WILL BE MUCH MORE CONVENIENT FOR ME AFTER JULY 6TH.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House  
Map Room at 1635 EWT June 24, 1943.  
(Sgd) CHESTER HAMMOND, Lt. Col, GSC

SECRET

SECRET

June 24, 1943

From the President to General Eisenhower:

Referring to your message W 3386 June 24  
it is considered highly desirable that Giraud remain  
in Africa until the matter of Boisson's resignation is  
finally settled.

It is my desire that prior to the selection of a  
successor to Boisson I be given an opportunity to  
comment upon the acceptability of the candidates.

Once more I must make it clear  
that the full control of Dakar ~~with~~  
is so vital to the United Nations  
in this war that I shall <sup>otherwise</sup> have to  
direct that several regiments and  
ships be sent there unless I am  
convinced beyond a doubt that  
the French leaders there are with  
us and will take our orders  
without question.

Roosvelt  
Further, I am delighted that Gen. Giraud can come, but it will be  
much more convenient for me after July 6<sup>th</sup>

SECRET

June 24, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Maj. Gen. Frank T. Bandy,  
Room 2E-600, The Pentagon.

Attached for your information is a copy  
of a message sent from the President to General  
Eisenhower this date. Attached for your information,  
by direction of Admiral Leahy, a copy of a message  
sent from the President to General Eisenhower this  
date.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

Message Pres-Eisenhower, June 24, 1943.  
No. 1018

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

Msg. Pres-Eisenhower, June 24, 1943.  
No. 1022

SECRET

June 24, 1943.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR

Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy,  
Room 3E-800, The Pentagon,  
Washington, D. C.

There is attached for your information,  
by direction of Admiral Leahy, a copy of a message  
sent from the President to General Eisenhower this  
date.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.  
Msg. Pres-Eisenhower, June 24, 1943.  
No. 1618

**SECRET**

*Admiral Bunn  
to file*

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin Secretary, General Staff Date June 24, 1943  
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)  
 Telephone 3542  
(Originating office)  
 Classification Secret Precedence Urgent  
(Restricted—Confidential—Secret) (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: **General Eisenhower**

PRESIDENT DESIRES THAT YOU INFORM GENERAL GIRAUD  
 paren FOR EISENHOWER FOR HIS EYES ONLY FROM MARSHALL paren  
 THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF HE POSTPONED HIS IMPENDING  
 VISIT SO AS TO ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT JULY FIVE  
 OR SIX end

*This Tully - after this message was prepared,  
 we received information that the President  
 directed admiral Leahy to call off the  
 Giraud trip for the present. Thus we did  
 not transmit the message.*

*Not to be*

*Full*

DISTRIBUTION:

*File  
WT*

Content and classification  
 authenticated by

(Signed) W. T. SEXTON

W. T. SEXTON,  
 Colonel, General Staff,  
 Secretary, General Staff.

June 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL BROWN

The President directed me to telephone General Marshall's office to please inform General Eisenhower that it would be much better if General Giraud would put off coming until the fifth or sixth of July.

G. G. T.

*Col. Sexton said above message had been killed upon learning of President's message (Freedom 1018) to General Eisenhower.*

*Christie Hammond*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B53  
24/144B  
ACM

CCMO  
24 June  
1419 Z

**EYES ONLY**

*WAS*

U R G E N T

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: AFHQ in North Africa  
To: War

No. W3386, 24 June 1943.

Will you please have the following message transmitted to the President? To General Marshall for his eyes only from Eisenhower. "General Giraud visited me this morning to say that he now thought the time propitious to accept an invitation extended to him to visit Washington. He desires to leave here next Monday, June 28. He states that nothing untoward can happen during his absence.

As I previously reported, we felt that we had so arranged things here that the Boisson question would not come up at this time. Through good work on the part of Murphy, MacMillan and others, we felt sure that discussion on this matter would be deferred until after early results of the next operation would be known. The matter was precipitated this morning by receipt of Boisson's resignation. This apparently came out of a clear sky to Giraud and we are uncertain as to whether or not the resignation was also presented to General DeGaulle. In any event, this introduces a new aspect which is exceedingly difficult to handle. Apparently Governor General Boisson is disgusted with the slowness of the French Committee in achieving any true unity and wants to quit. In this situation, the only thing I could tell Giraud was that he must urge the Committee to defer action

(CM-IN-15141 24 Jun 43)

SECRET

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*White House*

CONF. No. 1

**SECRET**  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

From: AFHQ in North Africa  
To: War  
No. W3386, 24 June 1943,

Page 2,

on the resignation, although it is entirely possible that Boisson is leaving Dakar coincidentally with the submission of his resignation. Because of Boisson's precipitous act, my former pronouncements on this point have little weight and our former success in maintaining the status quo has received a serious jolt. I understand that Glassford intends to visit here very shortly and it is possible that I can make a fuller report that will throw more light on this particular subject."

No Sig

ACTION: White House

INFORMATION: SGS  
C of S

CM-IN-15141 (24 Jun 43) 1635Z ems

**SECRET**

COPY No. 1

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SECRET

June 24, 1943

URGENT

Note on original:  
MR PRESIDENT:  
THIS IS FROM MONNET.  
H.L.H.

From: Algiers  
To: The President of the United States

No. W-3405 Filed 24/1649 Z

To AGWAR for Harry Hopkins, White House, for his eyes only from his friend here.

I understand that Boisson has resigned of his own initiative.

I know the position you have taken and understand your anxiety.

I want to assure you that there is not for the present any ground for your fears and that, as a man, Boisson represented no additional guarantee. The reality of the military situation in Dakar is entirely in the hands of Giraud as a consequence of the decision of the Committee, a decision with which you are familiar. I have not the least doubt that satisfactory arrangements can be made for Boisson's successor as well as any arrangements of other kind that General Eisenhower might wish to make with Giraud.

You can be absolutely certain that De Gaulle does not control the Committee in any way. In fact, all the troubles of the past weeks come from the fact that he realizes this keenly and has tried to break the Committee and its collective responsibility and in the process he has been defeated every time. I do not yet underwrite fully the future but you should not have one anxious thought for the present and for some considerable time to come.

Original filed "100 Harry Hopkins".  
This copy for file in "Giraud-De Gaulle" folder.

SECRET

SECRET

URGENT

page 2

From: Algiers  
To: The President of the United States

No. W-3405 24 June, 1943

I have been for a long time anxious to go to Washington but cannot leave here for a single day yet. I am dispatching long letter.

From Smith to Hopkins. The above was handed to me personally by the writer with the request that I transmit it to you.

No Sig

SECRET

From: The President  
To : The Prime Minister

No. 294, 24 June 1943

<sup>JAS 5</sup>  
Your No. 327, June 23.

I agree with you about the so-called agreement of the French Committee in Algiers. I still have my fingers crossed. I hope Uncle Joe will agree with us.

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 327 23 June 1943

I have just received the text of the so called decrees of the French Committee in Algiers. I am very doubtful whether it will work or last. Since, however, our military security in North West Africa is safeguarded by the French Army there remaining in trustworthy hands, I do not see that any action is called for from the British or the United States governments. We are not called upon to endorse the arrangements which the French Committee have made among themselves. We must see how they conduct themselves before any question of recognition can arise. As none of their troops will be engaged in the forthcoming operations, the claim made in Article 7 of the decree has no present urgency.

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 326, 23 June 1943

Following is paraphrase of my message to Premier Stalin mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:

I have heard with concern, through Monsieur Molotov, that recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation, recently set up at Algiers, is in your mind. It is unlikely that the British, and still more, the United States Governments will recognize this committee for some time, and then, only after they have had reasonable proof that its character and action will be satisfactory to the interests of the Allied cause.

Since he arrived at Algiers, General De Gaulle has been struggling to obtain effective control of the French Army. One cannot be sure of what he will do or of his friendly feelings towards us if he obtained mastery. President Roosevelt and I are in entire agreement in feeling that De Gaulle might endanger the base and communications of the Armies about to operate in "HUSKY". We cannot run any risk of this, as it would affect the lives of our soldiers and hamper the prosecution of the war.

Originally there were 7 members of the committee but the number has now been expanded to 14, and we cannot be sure of its action. General Eisenhower has therefore in the name of both United States and British Governments notified the committee that General Giraud must remain the Commander in Chief of the French Army and have effective power over its character and organization. Undoubtedly this will cause discussion in the House of Commons, as well as in the United States, and the President and I will have to give reasons, of which there are plenty, for the course we have taken. If the Soviet Government had already recognized the committee, the mere giving of these reasons and explanations would reveal a difference of view between the Soviet and the Western Allies, which would be most regrettable.

We are very anxious to find a French authority to which all Frenchmen will rally, and we still hope that from the discussions now proceeding at Algiers one may emerge. At present it seems to us far too soon to decide upon this.

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

Extract from 325, 23 June 1943

On quite a different plane [from the supplying of arms to the French North African Army] is the question of the recognition of this committee of 7, which they will certainly demand, as representative of France in some degree or other. Here I feel with you that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves until we know much more clearly than we do now how they are going to behave. In this connection I send in my immediately following telegram you a paraphrase of the message which is being sent to Stalin. The United Nations must certainly try to act together on this larger question also.

**SECRET**

JDJD B 58  
231548B  
EMK

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD  
23 June 43  
1823Z

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

No: W 3328, 23 June 43

Replying to your questions as follows: (for  
Marshall signed Eisenhower reference your 698 of  
June 20)

Question 1: The agreements referred to are the Clark-  
Darlan and Eisenhower-Boisson agreements.

Note: The French had asked for a revision of the  
Clark-Darlan agreement and considerable work has been  
done on preparing a revision. Discussions have  
been stopped until the National Committee of Liberation  
is organized and functioning. As soon as further  
progress is made I shall consult the Combined  
Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of any  
new agreement.

Question 2: The transfer of these responsibilities  
should be provided after the substitute agreements for  
the Clark-Darlan and Eisenhower-Boisson accords are  
made and when military operations permit.

Nosig.

698 is CM-OUT-8282 (19 June 43) CAD

Action: CAD

Information: OPD, Gen. Deane (JCS), Mr McCloy (AS/W), LOG

CM-IN-14718 (23 June 43) 2331Z ce

**SECRET**

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31

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD E 22  
Filed 231217B  
eva

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCD  
23 June 1943  
1114Z

EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 3298, 23 June 1943

Supplementing our message of last night on the French command situation, I have just had a long discussion with General Devinck Giraud's Chief of Staff. For General Marshall's Eyes Only from Smith. Both Giraud and Devinck are entirely satisfied with the action of the committee which they consider a definite victory. Giraud feels assured of his complete control of the French forces in North and West Africa and now feels free to consider his troops under Allied command. From every point of view we are certain that the new arrangement is all that we could ask for and I am still surprised that it was put across without a flare up.

No Sig

NOTE: WDCMC invites attention to CM-IN-14102 (23 Jun 43) General Deane (CCS).

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
SGS  
Log

CM-IN-14309 (23 Jun 43) 1210Z oms

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD C1  
Filed 22/1139B  
ecb

WDJC  
23 June 1943  
0044Z

EYES ONLY

GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

From: AFHQ in North Africa  
To: War

No. W-3293 22 June 1943

Following are texts of decrees referred to in our W-3284 June 22nd (to Marshall FOR HIS EYES ONLY from Eisenhower cite FHCOS): the decree makes the following appointments.

1. General Giraud Commander in Chief French Forces in North and West Africa.

2. General DeGaulle Commander in Chief French Forces in other territories of the empire.

3. General Juin to be Chief of Staff French Land Forces in North and West Africa.

4. General DeLarminat Chief of Staff of Land Forces in other territories of the empire.

5. It is understood that Admiral Collinet will be named Naval Chief of Staff for North and West Africa, that Admiral Aubeineau will be named Naval Chief of Staff for other than North Africa, that General Bouscat will be Chief of Air Staff for North and West Africa. General DeGaulle's Chief of Air Staff not yet selected.

Article 1. The French Committee of National Liberation assures the general direction of the French war effort. It disposes of all the Land, Naval and Air Forces. It is assisted in that task by the War Committee constituted within the French

*White House*

CM-IN-14102 (23 Jun 43)

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Page 2

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: AFHQ in North Africa

To: War

No. W-3293 22 June 1943

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

Committee of National Liberation as provided for in Article 2 of the decree of June 3rd 1943.

Article 2. A permanent Military Committee will be entrusted with the task of unifying, organizing and preparing conditioning the French Military Forces for the tasks which will be incumbent upon the Armies of National Liberation in the near future.

The first task of the committee will be to bring about the necessary fusion of French land, sea and air forces to constitute as soon as possible a single new force.

Article 3. The permanent Military Committee consists of: General Giraud and General DeGaulle, Presidents; the Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force; a permanent secretariat.

Article 4. In accordance with the ordinance and the decree of June 3rd and in carrying out the directives of the War Committee, the permanent Military Committee: will have authority over all elements constituting the French Military Forces, these measures destined to bring about their fusion, their modernization, their recruiting, their rearmament and all organizational reforms of these forces.

It allocates the credits and resources and establishes the Military budgets; it determines the status of the personnel, promotions and assignments of general officers and regimental commanders.

The military missions in foreign countries will be under the jurisdiction of the PMC.

Article 5. The Commanders in Chief exercise their command over all French Forces of the zones of their command: Consequently they orientate and control the formation and instruction of the units in accordance with their future employment as conditioned by interallied plans of operations or by plans for the defense or safety of the territories in question.

They regulate the conditions of distribution

CM-IN-14102 (23 Jun 43)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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From: AFHQ in North Africa

To: War

No. W-3293 22 June 1943

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3  
EYES ONLY

and employment of the French Forces in their respective zones of command. They allocate armament among the forces under their command and which is assigned to them by the committee.

Article 6. The Chiefs of Staffs are entrusted with the execution of the measures decided upon by the permanent Military Committee especially as regards the organization, administration and maintenance of the armies.

They are appointed by decrees by the French Committee of National Liberation.

The Commanders in Chief participate with the interallied command in the establishment of plans of operations with regard to the forces under their command.

no sig

Note: W 3284 is CM-IN-13946 (22 Jun 43) CC/S  
General Deane

Action: Gen. Deane (CC/S)

Information: OPD  
SGS  
White House  
LOG

CM-IN-14102 (23 Jun 43) 0256Z vc

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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JDJD B 70  
Filed 2110B/22nd  
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD  
22 June 1943  
3014

EYES ONLY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

No. W 3284 22 June 1943

*herewith*  
The message which follows contains the decree covering the organization of The French High Command unanimously adopted this afternoon by the French Committee of National Liberation. To Marshall for his eyes only from Eisenhower cite FHCOS. I have gone over this decree very carefully as have my Military and Political advisors. We are all convinced that it assures the conditions prescribed in the President's message number 782 dated June 22nd, as it effectively establishes Giraud as Commander in Chief of all Forces in North and West Africa with Juin as his Chief of Staff for Ground Forces. Admiral Collinet will be designated as Giraud's Naval Chief of Staff and General Bouscat as his Air Chief of Staff by decrees which will be issued in a few days. These 2 latter appointments are to be considered strictly confidential. We understand that it is the intention of the French Committee to release to the press late this evening the text of the decree and the appointments already made although this may be delayed. The text of the decrees have been officially communicated by the committee to Murphy and McMillan for transmission to The State Department and The Foreign Office. Under the terms of this decree De Gaulle cannot obtain control over the Military forces in North and West Africa. I shall constantly watch to see that this condition is not

CM-IN-13946 (22 Jun 43)

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**EYES ONLY**

From: <sup>Algeria</sup> **INCOMING MESSAGE**

To: WAR  
No. W 3284 22 June 1943

Page 3.

changed by subterfuge or otherwise except in the  
direction desired by us.

No Sig.

Note: 782 is CM-OUT-8836 (22 Jun 43) White House Message

Action: CC/S (Gen Deane)

Information: OFD  
SGS  
White House  
LOG

CM-IN-13946 (27 Jun 43) 2123Z vc

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD C 14  
Filed 221040B  
eva

22 June 1943  
0936Z

EYES ONLY

WAB

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 3234, 22 June 1943

Instructions with regard to the retention of Boisson and the control of the French Army in Africa are clearly understood and will be carried out. (For General Marshall's Eyes Only for The President from Eisenhower cite FHCOS. Reference your 782.) I do not believe the Boisson issue will come up for the present. I have presented in writing to the Committee our requirements that Giraud retain effective control of the French Army, Navy, and Air Forces in North and West Africa and that this control be sufficiently complete to insure in the future the same full measure of cooperation which we have had from him during the past 6 months. This requirement was fairly well received by the majority of the Committee which met yesterday in a rather calm session and adjourned for continued discussion today. We should know in a day or two the outcome of this discussion and the action necessary by us to insure accomplishing the purposes of the United States Government in this area.

782 is not in WDCMC files.  
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

No Sig

CM-IN-13690 (22 Jun 43) 1049Z cen

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SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 21, 1943.

From: War  
To : Algiers

*Freedom*  
# 782

From the President to Eisenhower.

In reference to your W2998 dated June 18.

It is my opinion that a demand for the removal of Boisson from West Africa by the Committee if and when it is demanded will be for the sole purpose of building prestige for the De Gaulle elements. In my opinion the retention of Boisson is not solely a question of civil administration but is a matter of high military importance to us.


In my message Freedom 531 of June 17, my attitude toward the retention of Boisson in West Africa is clearly expressed as follows: "I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar." In my message Freedom 493 of June 17 my desire in regard to control of the French Army in North Africa by any faction is expressed clearly as follows: "We will not permit at this time De Gaulle to control through his partisans on any Committee or direct himself the French Army in Africa, either in the field of operations or training or supplies."

It is expected that you will succeed in accomplishing the purposes of this Government in the area under your control.

I agree with you however in expressing the hope that the Boisson issue will not repeat not arise.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1905, EWT, June 21, 1943.

  
CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

SECRET

1753

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B 134  
filed 20/18493  
VB

CCWD  
20 June 1943  
2316Z

WJ

White # 20

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: WAR W 3146  
London USFOR Unnumbered

20 June 1943

Being handed to Generals Giraud and DeGaulle today is the following memorandum:

(To AGWAR for Marshall pass to Secretary Hull and to USFOR for Devers pass to Foreign Office and United States Embassy signed Eisenhower) "Inquiry was made by French authorities as to the position of the Allied Command regarding its relations to the French Military authorities in French North and West Africa. The Allied Commander in Chief suggested to the French Committee of National Liberation that he meet with Generals Giraud and DeGaulle.

At this meeting on June 19th the Allied Commander in Chief informed Generals Giraud and DeGaulle of the following:

The continuity of existing command in the French Forces of North and West Africa is a vital military necessity in view of continuing important military operations which make the time element a controlling and vital factor.

The Allied Commander in Chief is solely concerned with the conduct of the war from French North and West Africa and with security of the great forces under his command, the responsibility for which has been entrusted to him by the Allied Governments. It is urgently necessary

CM-IN-12927 (21 Jun 43) SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

FROM: ALEXANDER  
TO: WAR # 3146  
USFOR London Unnumbered

Page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE

20 June 1943

that the arrangements now in progress provide the best possible integration of the French Army into the Allied effort and make completely secure the bases from which the Allied Armies are to operate.

The experience of the Allied Commander in Chief during the past 6 months has demonstrated the necessity of dealing with 1 responsible commander of all French Forces in North and West Africa for operational purposes or otherwise during the period of current or projected operations in this theater.

The Allied Commander in Chief is charged with the duty of affording the French Forces the maximum material aid and rearmament compatible with overall requirements. He wishes to see plans for this rearmament go forward effectively and he is satisfied with the existing arrangements between the present French and Allied Commands and Staffs which are already integrated in operational plans. Military considerations obviously require that existing agreements entered into with the Allied Military Commanders remain in force pending the satisfactory conclusion of new agreements.

In view of the above considerations, he feels that it is essential to the success of the present phase of Allied operations that these conditions should continue so long as the French North and West African areas are necessary as bases from which further operations are projected.

Consequently, because of the pressure of continuing military operations, the Commander in Chief feels that he has no choice but to ask the assurance that there will be no important change in the command of the French forces in this area. Such change might create further \*

No Sig

\* Being Serviced

ACTION: GEN. STRONG (STATF DEPT)  
INFORMATION: OPE  
CAD (GEN. HILLDRING)  
CC/S (ADM. LEAHY)

CM-IN-12927 (21 Jun 43) 0416Z cen

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

JUJD E134  
201849B  
cvs

CCWD  
20 June  
2316Z

**S U P P L E M E N T A R Y  
C O P Y**

From: AFHQ in North Africa  
To : War W 3146  
USFOR London No Number

20 June, 1943 End of message as follows:

Such change might create further uncertainty or doubt disturbing to the allied military plans in which France is to play such an important part. It would be a serious military error to abandon or to change materially a command or an organization which has cooperated so effectively with the allies during the past 6 months and which has made a material contribution to our great victory in Tunisia. The allied Commander in Chief therefore requests assurances that the French Commander in Chief will continue to have effective control of these French forces and that this control will include the authority to move troops, to afford to the allied forces the necessary port, transportation, and supply facilities, to approve appointments and removals of senior commanders. The Allied Commander in Chief fully appreciates and concurs in what he understands is the desire of the French committee for national liberation to reorganize and revitalize these forces.

The present phase in North and West Africa is one in which military requirements dominate. Security and tranquillity are paramount. If the military effort is unsuccessful, other elements which are of first importance in normal relationships become of slight or no significance. The Allied Commander in Chief desires to reemphasize the assurance which have been given by the American and British Governments guaranteeing that French sovereignty in the

CM-IN-13660

(22 **SECRET**)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: AFHQ in North Africa Page 2  
To : War W 3146  
USFOR London No Number

20 June, 1943

French North and West African territories will be respected and maintained.

No Sig

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-12927 (21 June 43) Gen. Strong  
State Dept.

Action: Gen. Strong (State Dept)

Information: OPD  
CAD (Gen. Hilldring)  
CCS (Adm. Leahy)

CM-IN-13660 (22 June 43) 1259Z ce

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JDJD B92  
filed 1815B/20  
BM

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD  
20 June 43  
1812Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

White # 19

*MD*

U R G E N T

From: AFHQ N Africa  
To: War No. W 3145/3038  
USFOR No. #

NAF 243, 20 June 43.

Information of my proposed conference with DeGaulle and Giraud leaked on 17th June. (To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHINC. This is NAF 243.) Censorship stopped press dispatches.

My conference yesterday with these 2 Generals was immediately reported by French sources to correspondents who phrased it as "An ultimatum from the British and American Governments stating neither wished to see any changes made in French Army and that the only commander permitted would be Giraud."

As a result and to avoid misinterpretation I held an off the record press conference Saturday afternoon. I outlined how we came into North Africa by force. We have had and continue to have French Military Cooperation under Giraud. It is working well. It is unsound at this time to drastically upset these military arrangements. That with a million Allied soldiers here the command of French forces in North Africa is not a political but a purely military affair and that I dare not even for 24 hours have any doubt as to the security of my rear. As a military matter, I was deeply concerned and had indicated to the 2 French Generals my desire that the present commander remain in that position so long as my

CM-IN-12669

(20 Jun 43)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

From: AFHC N Africa  
To: War No. W 3145/3038  
USFOR No. #

Page 2

20 June 43.

vital base was in North Africa.

*Part one*  
*Part two*

I further stated I favored reorganization of the French Army and I agreed with both Generals that a modern army must be organized with young vigorous modernly trained officers.

This conference is reported to you in case you desire to have a similar explanation made for US and UK sources.

I am advised that DeGaulle himself told 1 correspondent of my remarks at this mornings meeting. Therefore it may be expected that it will reach the press shortly.

A censorship stop has been placed here on grounds of military security and giving military information to the enemy.

No Sig

ACTION: GEN DEANE CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-IN-12669

(20 Jun 43)

2004Z

ved

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**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Civil Affairs Division By:  
Operations Division WDGS  
European-North African Section  
WDOPD J.H.Hilldring Maj. Gen.  
OPD 336 France (19 Jun 43)

June 19, 1943

CG NATO FREEDOM

Number 698

Several points are not clear in your Number W-2916 of 17 June. Question 1: Referring to your statement "pending the satisfactory conclusion of new agreements", what agreements are referred to? Are they revisions of the Clark-Darland and Eisenhower-Boisson agreements or are they proposed State Department agreements with the new French Committee of National Liberation. From Marshall to Eisenhower. Question 2: At what time do you recommend that the transfer be made from yourself to civil agencies in Washington or London of the responsibility to make decisions on political, economic and relief matter.

ORIGINATOR: GAD  
INFORMATION: JCS (GEN DEANE)  
MR McCLOY AS/W  
LOG  
OPD

CM-OUT-8282 (19 Jun 43) 2334Z ved

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June 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY

The following is suggested in reply to the Prime Minister's messages Numbers 316 and 318 of June 18 (Whites Number 3 and 7). The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and General Hull, acting for General Marshall, concur in this draft.

QUOTE. From the President to the Prime Minister.

With reference to your Nos. 316 and 318 of June 18, I am happy to be reassured that you completely agree with me on the major question of the control of the military forces in Africa which includes the safety of our supply lines.

My telegram 288 was based upon the fact that the Committee of seven has now been increased to fourteen by the unpublished decree of June 7 which was not made known to Murphy or MacMillan until June 16. It would appear that the Committee now stands as overwhelmingly De Gaullist. This augmented Committee claims full authority over all the war effort of the French and French Territory. We cannot accept, and I am sure you agree, that our allied military position in North Africa can be jeopardized by an antagonistic element in such control. END OF QUOTE.

This copy for "Giraud-De Gaulle Relations" file.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

JDJDC22  
1253B/19  
EW

CCWD  
19 June 1943  
1224Z

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

URGENT

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 3024, 19 June 1943

This morning's meeting with De Gaulle and Giraud produced nothing decisive. From Eisenhower to General Marshall for Eyes Only. (De Gaulle stated that my demands could be answered, on the French side, only by the action of the French Committee, since I insist on naming the Commander-in-Chief of French North African Forces (and, in addition, demanding assurances that his command of those forces will be effective and real.) De Gaulle asked that my statements and demands be reduced to writing. I agreed to this but stated also that so far as I was concerned, General Giraud is now-as he has been since last November-the Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in North Africa and that I would continue to deal with him on this basis. I stated categorically that any attempt to deprive Giraud of his authority over French Forces in this region would require complete recasting of all plans that had been going forward under General Giraud, including commitments as to supplies and equipment made to Giraud at Anfa. My advisors, including Murphy and MacMillan, are confident that the action we want will be taken by the French themselves,

(CM-11-11912 19 Jun 43)

*(Paraphrased and sent to President as White 12.)*

Leahy added following paragraph: "It would appear that any further instructions to Eisenhower in addition to those recommended in White Number Eleven by State and War would at the present time serve no useful purpose."

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers  
To: War

Page 2

EYES ONLY

No. W 3024, 19 June 1943

thus avoiding the necessity of dictatorial action on our part, which would certainly create some antagonism.

I have discussed this matter with my Commanders-in-Chief, particularly Cunningham and Alexander. All are agreed that any unreasoned disturbances here would have most deplorable potentialities with respect to the critical operations upon which we are about to embark. We much prefer avoidance of decisive political action at this moment, so that no diversion of troops and supplies will be required or greater risks of sabotage will be incurred. Within 10 days after the launching of HUSKY, our future capabilities should become quite well clarified. We are now facing the one big question mark of the campaign and, if you think it advisable, I hope you will say to the President that I beg of him to avoid any action that could increase our local difficulties until after HUSKY is at least a week old.

In a private conversation with Giraud he assured me that his control of the French Army here was as effective as ever and that he is assured of the loyalty of the great mass, both of the Army and of the civil population.

Nosig

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: C of S  
General Hilldrin  
General Deane (for Adm Leahy)

CM-IN-11912 (19 Jun 43) 1448Z ems

10

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White 11

June 19, 1943.

LEAHY TO PRESIDENT

Referring to General Eisenhower's message W2998 of June 18 (Map Room Note: Which is White Ten) it is suggested that you send without delay a message similar to the following. Secretary Hull and General Hull acting for Marshall approve. QUOTE.

PRESIDENT TO EISENHOWER.

Referring to your W2998 of June 18.

In regard to a possible demand for the removal of Boisson from West Africa by the Committee, this in my opinion when and if it is demanded will be for the sole purpose of building prestige for the De Gaulle elements. It is my opinion that the retention of Boisson is a matter of high military importance to us and that it is not solely a question of civil administration.

My attitude toward the retention of Boisson in West Africa is clearly expressed in my message Freedom 531 of June 17, as follows: "I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar". My desire in regard to control of the French Army in North Africa by any faction is clearly expressed in my message Freedom 493 of June 17 as follows: "We will not permit at this time De Gaulle to control through his partisans on any Committee, or direct himself, the French Army in Africa, either in the field of operations or training or supplies."

It is expected that you will succeed in accomplishing the purposes of this government in the area under your control.

I am awaiting your report of results accomplished at your conference with the Committee. UNQUOTE.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

JDJD B 60  
1809B/18  
CW

CCWD  
18 June 1943  
1859Z

FOR MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

URGENT

EYES ONLY

From: Algiers  
To: War

No.: W-2998, 18 June 1943

In my number 2956 to you for The President I mentioned the Dakar question and gave briefly my reasons for refraining from injecting this matter into tomorrows conference with DeGaulle and Giraud. From Eisenhower to General Marshall for Eyes only. Actually the Boisson question seems to be acquiring a significance far out of proportion to its real importance to us. It is not control by Boisson in French West Africa that is so important to us here, but control by a Competent, liberal, cooperative official who is entirely acceptable to us. This question has not yet come up here, but if it does and we insist on specifying Boisson for this Civil Government Post, it will give DeGaulle the opportunity, in case he desires to break, to charge us with interference in details of French Civil affairs. This would probably draw a sympathetic response from Frenchmen and inspire disturbances in this area, whereas if he breaks on a question of military command with the implication of interference with the Allied War Effort, he will be placed in a most unfavorable position. I do not believe that we should insist to the last on the retention of Boisson personally but that if his relief is determined upon by the committee that we should insist on a successor who is entirely acceptable to us. My personal feeling is that it will be some time before this matter is raised officially since

(CM-IN-11548 18 Jun 43)

Paraphrased and send to President as Map White  
10, June 19, 1943.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: ~~Admiral~~  
To: ~~War~~  
No.: 2998, 18 June 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

EYES ONLY

**SECURITY CONTROL**

De Gaulle has other and bigger fish to fry at the moment but I request that you present the matter to the President at an opportune moment so that we will not be too much restricted by specific instructions in case French unity strikes a snag on this question of a personal appointment.

Delay in attaining real unity is creating certain unrest and possibilities of disturbance which is causing all of us considerable concern as the date for HUSKY approaches and since this operation will be critical in many respects. It is certain to absorb the attention of everyone of us on tactical and supply matters. We hope that the French will keep occupied during the next few weeks on constructive discussion of their own internal affairs and that these will absorb enough of their energy to insure reasonable quiet. We hope also that if DeGaulle breaks, it will be on an issue where he is probably in the wrong as on the question of military command.

After reviewing the situation here, it is my opinion, in which Smith fully agrees, that Murphy's telegram to the President gave a more gloomy picture than was justified by the facts. It does not appear that DeGaulle controls the Committee by any means. He is assured of possibly 4 votes against Giraud's 2 or possibly 3. However, the balance of power is held by a group of 6 or 7 moderate Independents including men like Catroux and Monnet and this feeling of independent thought will grow as the individual members begin to find themselves on firm ground. The fact that financial subsidies and salaries to the Free French will no longer be paid direct to DeGaulle by the British but will now be paid through the financial member of the Committee who is not a DeGaulle will also have a marked effect. MacMillan has been instructed to cooperate with me 100% and we are thus able to present a united front. I hope to give you a more encouraging report after tomorrow's conference but for the present, I am not particularly apprehensive. I hope you will inform the President that he need have no fear as to my firmness in dealing with the matter of military command in North Africa or in preserving a situation entirely acceptable to him in the West African Area if this question should raise its head. I am sure we understand his concern and his desires and there will be no deviation from his instructions. My request

(CM-IN-11548 18 Jun 43)

SECRET

EYES ONLY

COPY No. 9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR  
No. 2998, 18 June 1943

(Page 3)

EYES ONLY

for slight modification of instructions in the Boisson matter is inspired by the thought that some latitude in negotiation should be advantageous in maintaining our position and in keeping the vast majority of local Frenchmen as our firm friends. This is important to us, particularly as the enemy is trying to sabotage important installations by means of paratroopers. We cannot spare our own troops to guard all vital points.

No Sig

NOTE: 2956 is CM-IN-11246 (18 Jun 43) SGS.

ACTION: SGS

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Deane for Adm Leahy  
CAD for General Hilldring  
C of S

CM-IN-11548 (18 Jun 43) 2349Z ems

SECRET

EYES ONLY  
COPY No.

9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

**SECRET**

From: War  
To : Algiers (General Eisenhower)  
No. : FREEDOM 643, June 18, 1943.

(NOTE: This is a paraphrase  
of FM-Pres. No. 316, dated  
June 18, 1943.)

Prime Minister Churchill sent the following message dated June 18 to the President who is passing it along to you paraphrased for your confidential information. (From the President to General Eisenhower personal and secret).

QUOTE. Especially on the eve of the great operations which impend, it is imperative that the North West African French Army should be in trustworthy and loyal hands. That De Gaulle's friendship for the Allies is not subject to our confidence I agree with you. If our base and lines of communication were endangered or disturbed because of the existence of a French Army not properly subordinated to the Supreme Commander and under potentially hostile control, I could not myself be responsible to the British Nation whose armies have been placed under Eisenhower's command in North Africa. Therefore I am glad to learn the clear instructions you have given to General Eisenhower not to INNER QUOTE permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans of any committee the African French Army, either in the field of supplies, training or operations. END INNER QUOTE.

At this moment I am not in favor of forbidding the Committee of Seven to meet or of breaking it up. I should prefer that your instructions should be taken by General Eisenhower as his directive, and that MacMillan and Murphy should by whatever means they find most appropriate work towards its fulfilment. His Majesty's Government will associate themselves with this policy.

A choice will then face the Committee of either definite opposition to the two rescuing powers or accepting our decision by a majority. If they accept (as I deem probable) the decision by a majority, De Gaulle will have to decide whether he and other dissentients will resign or submit. Should De Gaulle resign he will place himself in bad with public opinion and the measures necessary must be taken to stop him from making a disturbance. We shall probably have trouble in the future if he submits, but this would be better than sweeping out a committee on which the hopes of many in France as well as among the United Nations are founded. The conditions necessary for the safety of our forces we should preserve and on De Gaulle place the onus. It would be wise to try this first at any rate.

Thru MacMillan I have already notified Massigli that from British funds no further payments will be made to the French National Committee in London and that only to the new Committee of Seven acting by a majority that any further payments will be made. The following paraphrased message I have received from MacMillan:

INNER QUOTE. Full support of Eisenhower I take to be the right interpretation of your wishes. This in order to ensure that Giraud continues in effective command of French Forces. Measures to ensure

**SECRET**

SECRET

that reorganization of appointments and personnel take place only with his concurrence must be included. Well and good if this can be achieved while French unity is preserved and De Gaulle remains on the committee. Military security must be our first requirement if this fails. END INNER QUOTE.

Because of the situation that has developed now INNER QUOTE the measures to secure that any reorganization of personnel and appointments should have Girauds concurrence. END INNER QUOTE, would not (by any division of military control between De Gaulle as Minister of Defense and Giraud as Commander-in-Chief) be satisfied. General Georges or some other officer equally acceptable to the rescuing powers should be put in the office of Minister of Defense. UNQUOTE HERE.

No Sig.

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2310, EWT, June 18, 1943.

/s/ R. Myers

ROBERT MYERS  
Lt (jg) USNR

SECRET

COPY OF TELEGRAM SENT TO ALGIERS

(In reply to attached telegram 1108 from Algiers)

June 17, 1943.

US Urgent

AMERICAN CONSUL

ALGIERS, (ALGERIA)

FOR MURPHY

Your telegram, June sixteenth

Approve your suggestion contained in paragraph third

before end PERIOD Will telegraph again

HULL

Eu: RA

S GHM:MCW

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJDB33  
181254B  
BMS

INCOMING MESSAGE

CONF  
18237  
6-18-43

EYES ONLY

Paraphrased and sent to  
The President as Map  
White No. 2, June 18, 1943.

URGENT

For General Marshall's Eyes Only

From: Algiers  
To: War

Number: W-2956 18th June 1943

I have just returned to Algiers after a short absence and have carefully studied messages 492, 493, W-2942, 511, all of 17 June, 531 of 18 June, 9 of 11 June, W-2382 of 10 June, W-2941 of 17 June (for General Marshall eyes only for delivery to the President from Eisenhower). It is my earnest belief that the local French difficulties in reaching workable agreements have been magnified in certain reports to you and in the public press. Much of the present acrimonious discussion is more indicative of French characteristics than of distinct probability that workable agreements satisfactory to us will not be reached. I am arranging a meeting with Giraud and DeGaulle for tomorrow morning to lay down in definite terms my minimum requirements effecting the command of the French African armies which must remain under the effective control of Giraud. If DeGaulle chooses to break off on this issue, it is my opinion and that of all my advisors that he will be in an indefensible position. Therefore, for the moment, this is the single issue that I am placing before the two principals. At this time there is no indication that the question of administration of French West Africa is on the agenda of the committee. Consequently, it appears wise at this particular meeting to avoid giving DeGaulle the opportunity of breaking on an issue which he might falsely publicize as interfering in French Civil Administration with generally sympathetic response from Frenchmen everywhere, when as a matter of fact the real issue will be control of French military forces in Africa. I respectfully suggest that no definite

CM-IN-11246

(18 Jun 43)

1429Z

ved

SECRET

COPY No. *Map Room*

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

9

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: Algiers  
To: War  
Number: W-2956

Page 2

**EYES ONLY**

Action regarding the local situation be initiated until I have had opportunity to report upon the success of my own efforts. I assure you Mr President that I am fully alive to the potentialities of the situation and that I will not accept any solution proposed by the local French which will jeopardize the success of the vitally important military operations scheduled soon to begin. I will make immediate further report after tomorrow's meeting.

No Sig

Note: 2382 is CM-IN-6131 (6-10-43) CC/S.  
492 is CM-OUT-7060 (6-17-43) SGS.  
493 is CM-OUT-7065 (6-17-43) White House.  
511 is CM-OUT-7258 (6-17-43) White House.  
531 is CM-OUT-7426 (6-18-43) White House.  
9 is CM-OUT-4350 (6-11-43) White House.  
W-2941 was passed directly to White House.  
W-2942 is CM-IN-10840 (6-18-43) SGS.

Action: SGS

Information: OPD  
General Deane (Adm Leahy)  
White House

CM-IN-11246 (18 Jun 43) 1429Z ved

**SECRET**

COPY No.

9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

**SECRET**

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 17, 1943.

From: War  
To : Algiers

*FREEDOM*  
*#1531*

*H.O.L. has seen*

To Eisenhower from the President. *SIGNED ROOSEVELT*

I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar or any changes in his command unless they are approved by you. Dakar is of such vital importance to the protection of the South Atlantic and South America that I should be compelled to send American troops there if any problematical changes were sought by de Gaulle. Tell this to Murphy and McMillan and if you wish you may inform Giraud and de Gaulle of my decision.

~~Roosevelt~~

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1835, EWT, June 17, 1943.

*George W. Eisey*

GEORGE W. EISEY,  
Lieutenant, (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

**SECRET**  
JUN 18 1943  
H. O. WOOD SECTION

*Shown to Gen. Marshall,  
June 17, 1943, by Colonel  
Hammond.*


**SECRET**

TO EISENHOWER

531  
June 17, 1943

I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar or any changes in his command unless they are approved by you. Dakar is of such vital importance to the protection of the South Atlantic and South America that I should be compelled to send American troops there if any problematical changes were sought by de Gaulle. Tell this to Murphy and McMillan and if you wish you may inform Giraud and de Gaulle of my decision.

ROOSEVELT



SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAL  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

JDJD B 96  
filed 17/2314B  
VE

17 June 1943  
2240Z

*Duplicate Destroyed*

SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY

*Chart Room*

URGENT

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

No. W 2942 17 June 1943

Message number 492 just received (personal and immediate for General Marshall from Smith signed CINC cite FHSGS). General Eisenhower returned to Algiers tonight. I assure you that there is no immediate cause for the concern indicated in your 492 or the Presidents message also just received number 493, De Gaulle has resumed his membership in the committee. Giraud is quite calm and stands pat on his position as Commander in Chief of French Forces. Arrangements have been made for conference by De Gaulle and Giraud with Eisenhower Saturday morning. The position of the United States had already been made quite clear to key members of the committee. The Prime Minister today sent instructions to McMillan that British subsidies to Free French Committee in London would cease after July 1 and this will have a profoundly calming effect in their ardour. Recommend most strongly that no immediate further action be taken by United States at least until after Saturdays conference. I repeat that there is no immediate possibility of control of army by DeGaulle and think it would be fatal to our plans if matter of military occupation were raised again on very eve of HUSKY. General Eisenhower will reply in more detail tomorrow.

EYES ONLY

No Sig  
492 is CM-OUT-7060 (17 Jun 43) SGS  
493 is CM-OUT-7065 (17 Jun 43) WHITE HOUSE

ACTION: SGS

INFORMATION: OPD GEN DEANE (ADM. LEAHY)

Cofs

SECRET

COPY No.

CM-IN-10840 (18 Jun 43) 0009Z cen

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

565  
6

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

*WAL*  
**EYES ONLY**

Office Chief of Staff

June 17, 1943

**EYES ONLY**

**GENERAL D. D. EISENHOWER  
FREEDOM**

Number 492

For General Eisenhower's eyes only from General Marshall. Mr. Hull is most seriously disturbed over Murphy's 1108 and 1109 of June 16th reference the French Committee. He feels that vital ground has been lost and that we may be confronted by a tragic situation in relation to the French Forces in North Africa. The Secretary of War is similarly disturbed but has more confidence in Monnet than is indicated in Murphy's messages. I have proposed to the President the following and will inform you as soon as possible of his decision:

That General Eisenhower should be directed by the President to exercise his direct influence as Commander in Chief in Africa, over the developments on the French Committee; that he be authorized to inform the Committee, if he sees fit, that in view of its action or proposed actions the United States will reconsider the matter of the armament, equipment, payment, etc., to the French Forces; that the President consult with the Prime Minister with a view to authorizing General Eisenhower to use the necessary pressure to prevent the control of the French Army from falling into the hands of De Gaulle.

The President undoubtedly will feel that he must coordinate his action with that of the Prime Minister and will probably send a message to the Prime Minister on the subject. Meanwhile I wish you to know of our attitude here, particularly Mr. Hull's, who is extremely worried that you are not now in Algiers.

**ORIGINATOR: SGS**

**INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN DEANE (ADM LEAHY)  
C. OF S.**

**CM-OUT-7060**

**(17 Jun 43)**

**1721Z**

**ved**

**SECRET**

**COPY No. 10**

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

*Wilson Brown  
to file*

*Mr. Hopkins:*

*as per your  
request.*

*A. Stone*

*1. Mailed N.L.H.*

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Subject: DeGaulle - Giraud controversy.

Attached is a message which I have dispatched to General Eisenhower. It is self-explanatory, and contains my recommendations to you regarding the DeGaulle - Giraud controversy.

I have shown the message to the Secretary of War and he is in agreement with me.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, telephoned me early this morning and urged that some action be taken from Washington to prevent an unfortunate situation developing in Africa.

Also attached are the two messages referred to from Murphy to Mr. Hull.

  
Chief of Staff.

Incls.



**SECRET**

SECRET

R A D I O

June 17, 1943

From: General Marshall  
To: General Eisenhower

Mr. Hull is most seriously disturbed over Murphy's 1108 and 1109 of June 16th reference the French Committee. He feels that vital ground has been lost and that we may be confronted by a tragic situation in relation to the French forces in North Africa. The Secretary of War is similarly disturbed but has more confidence in Monnet than is indicated in Murphy's messages. I have proposed to the President the following and will inform you as soon as possible of his decision:

That General Eisenhower should be directed by the President to exercise his direct influence, as Commander-in-Chief in Africa, over the developments on the French Committee; that he be authorized to inform the Committee, if he sees fit, that in view of its action or proposed actions the United States will reconsider the matter of the armament, equipment, payment, etc., to the French forces; that the President consult with the Prime Minister with a view to authorizing General Eisenhower to use the necessary pressure to prevent the control of the French Army from falling into the hands of DeGaulle.

The President undoubtedly will feel that he must coordinate his action with that of the Prime Minister and will probably send a message to the Prime Minister on the subject. Meanwhile I wish you to know of our attitude here, particularly Mr. Hull's, who is extremely worried that you are not now in Algiers.

SECRET

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

JDJD B 72  
Filed 1726B/17th  
efg

CCWD  
17 June 1943  
1640Z

C O R R E C T E D      C O P Y

From:        Algiers  
To:            WAR

No.    W 2916        17 June 1943

No additional terms which should be considered occur to me. (For Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FHLIA reference your 361). The Clark-Darlan and Eisenhower-Boisson agreements should be continued in force. The Commander in Chiefs responsibility to make decisions on Political, economic and relief matters in territories covered by these agreements should be retained pending the satisfactory conclusion of new agreements as indicated in your paragraph 5. Upon the conclusion of new agreements these responsibilities should be transferred to appropriate civil agencies in Washington and London. Murphy and MacMillan concur.

No Sig.

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-10720 (17 Jun 43) CAD.

ACTION: CAD

INFORMATION: OFD, Gen Deane (CCS), AS/W Mr McCloy.

CM-IN-18683 (29 Jun 43) 2332Z    ems

**SECRET**

COPY No.

31

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

011 N Africa

SECRET

June 17, 1943

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

*Number V*

FROM: War  
To: Algiers **FREEDOM # 511**

Personal and secret from the President to General Eisenhower. SIGNED ROOSEVELT.

I have sent a copy of the message I sent to you this morning to the Prime Minister. It is important that you should know for your very secret information that we may possibly break with De Gaulle in the next few days. You will understand how important it is that this information be kept absolutely secret.

I think it important that you use every proper means to prevent further meetings of the French Committee until we reach a final conclusion.

~~ROOSEVELT~~

Released from the White House  
Map Room at 1615 EWT, June 17, 1943

*G. M. Elsey*  
G. M. ELSEY  
Lt. (j.g.) U.S.N.R.

SECRET  
JUN 17 1943  
INFORMATION SECTION

SECRET

511

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

When I saw Secretary Hull this morning he thought you should send a wire substantially like the attached to Eisenhower and Murphy.

H.L.H.

encl.

JUNE 17, 1943

**SECRET**

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL  
EISENHOWER

I HAVE SENT A COPY OF THE MESSAGE I SENT TO  
YOU THIS MORNING TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT IS  
IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD KNOW FOR YOUR VERY  
SECRET INFORMATION THAT WE MAY <sup>possibly</sup> ~~probably~~ BREAK WITH  
DE GAULLE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND  
HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THIS INFORMATION BE KEPT  
ABSOLUTELY SECRET.

I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT YOU USE EVERY  
PROPER MEANS TO PREVENT FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE  
FRENCH COMMITTEE UNTIL WE REACH A FINAL CONCLUSION.

*Roosevelt*

Received by  
Capt. H. H. H.

URGENT

SECRET

June 17, 1943.

SENT

JUN 17 1943

AL. C. C. S. SECTION

From: War  
To : Algiers FREEDOM #493

Personal and secret from the President to General Eisenhower.  
SIGNED ROOSEVELT  
Mr. Murphy for information. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

Wish you would read carefully again War Department No. 9 relative to your W2382 June 10th. Murphy's telegram 1108 very disturbing.

This government's position is that we will not tolerate, during our military occupation of North Africa, the control of the French Army by any agency not subject to the direction of the Allied Supreme Commander. We must have someone whom we wholly and completely trust. Under no circumstances would we continue the arming of a force unless we had complete confidence in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations, nor are we interested in the formation of any committee or government that in any way presumes to indicate that it will govern in France until such time as the French people select a government for themselves. When we get into France the Allies will have a plan for Civil Government that is in complete consonance with French sovereignty and, finally, it must be perfectly clear that we have a military occupation in North and West Africa and, therefore, no independent civil decision can be made without your full approval.

As you know, our policy has been to encourage local officials to run their own affairs so long as they cooperate with our military interests. Our policy is to encourage an extension of this but we must not tolerate a military or civil direction which, in any way, <sup>might</sup> endanger our lines of communication, the safety of our troops or otherwise interfere in our military operations. This would include the necessity of keeping more troops in North Africa than we now plan for.

SECRET

SECRET

Pres-Eisenhower, June 17, 1943. Page 2.

For your exclusive information I want to state that we will not permit, at this time, De Gaulle to control through his partisans on any committee, or direct himself, the French army in Africa, either in the field of operations or training or supplies.

I want to assure you again that you are authorized on behalf of this government to take such action as you think best.

This message has been seen by and has the approval of Marshall and Hull.

~~Please acknowledge receipt.~~

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1250, EWT, June 17, 1943.

*C. S. Hammond*

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

493

JUNE 17, 1943

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

*Mr Murphy for information*

WISH YOU WOULD READ CAREFULLY AGAIN WAR DEPARTMENT NO. 9  
RELATIVE TO YOUR W2382 JUNE 10TH. MURPHY'S TELEGRAM 1108 VERY  
DISTURBING.

THIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE,  
DURING OUR MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NORTH AFRICA, THE CONTROL OF  
THE FRENCH ARMY BY ~~SOMEONE KNOWN TO BE UNFRIENDLY TO US~~. WE  
MUST HAVE SOMEONE WHOM WE WHOLLY AND COMPLETELY TRUST. UNDER NO  
CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE CONTINUE THE ARMING OF A FORCE UNLESS WE  
HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN OUR  
MILITARY OPERATIONS, NOR ARE WE INTERESTED IN THE FORMATION OF ANY  
COMMITTEE OR GOVERNMENT THAT IN ANY WAY PRESUMES TO INDICATE THAT  
IT WILL GOVERN IN FRANCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FRENCH PEOPLE  
SELECT A GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. WHEN WE GET INTO FRANCE THE  
ALLIES WILL HAVE A PLAN FOR CIVIL GOVERNMENT THAT IS IN COMPLETE  
CONSONANCE WITH FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY AND, FINALLY, IT MUST BE PERFECTLY  
CLEAR THAT WE HAVE A MILITARY OCCUPATION IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA  
AND, THEREFORE, NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL DECISION CAN BE MADE WITHOUT  
YOUR FULL APPROVAL.

*the allied Supreme Command*

AS YOU KNOW, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE LOCAL OFFICIALS  
TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS SO LONG AS THEY COOPERATE WITH OUR MILITARY  
INTERESTS. OUR POLICY IS TO ENCOURAGE AN EXTENSION OF THIS BUT WE  
MUST NOT TOLERATE A MILITARY OR CIVIL DIRECTION WHICH, IN ANY WAY,  
ENDANGERS OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS OR  
OTHERWISE INTERFERES IN OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

*might*

*This would include the  
necessity of keeping more troops in North Africa  
than we now plan for.*

FOR YOUR EXCLUSIVE INFORMATION I WANT TO STATE THAT WE  
WILL NOT PERMIT, AT THIS TIME, DE GAULLE TO CONTROL THROUGH  
HIS PARTISANS ON ANY COMMITTEE, OR DIRECT HIMSELF, THE FRENCH  
ARMY IN AFRICA *either in the field of operations or  
training or supplies.*  
I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AGAIN THAT YOU ARE AUTHORIZED ON  
BEHALF OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS YOU THINK  
BEST.

THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SEEN BY AND HAS THE APPROVAL OF  
MARSHALL AND HULL.

*Please acknowledge receipt*

*Roosevelt*

*W. Brown*  
*I file*  
17/6/43

U R G E N T

From: Algiers  
To: The President of the United States

No. W-2941, 17 June 1943

17/2313B

Receipt is acknowledged (for Secretary War  
Department General Staff signed Eisenhower cite  
FHSGS) of your 493 dated 17 June.

No Sig

SECRET

(Section Two Not yet Received)

GM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated June 16, 1943

Rec'd 11:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT

1109, June 16, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND  
SECRETARY OF STATE FROM MURPHY.

My 1108, June 16, 6 p.m.

Giraud's proposal for the organization of the  
French High Command follows as section 2 of this  
this telegram. I understand that De Gaulle on the  
other hand stands for the constitution of a Commissioner  
of National Defense which position he desires. He  
would exercise the prerogatives attributed to the  
military committee described in Article II and  
also some of the powers attributed to the CINC. It  
should also be noted that the full committee has the  
power to control the general conduct of the war.

After consultation with the Chief of Staff and  
Mr. MacMillan it was agreed that a joint demarche would  
be made this afternoon to Massigli asking him to inform  
all members of the Committee of National Liberation  
that the

-2-#1109, June 16, 7 p.m., from Algiers.

that the CINC would be glad of an opportunity to discuss the question of the command organization of the French armed forces personally with General Giraud and General De Gaulle and to explain clearly to them the military requirements which he feels should be satisfied in view of the large commitments and future obligations of the forces under his command. It is planned that this meeting should take place early next week as soon as General Eisenhower returns to Algiers, and should be limited to a discussion of the military position and the nature of the control of the French armed forces which is considered necessary.

Massigli has agreed to communicate this message to all members of the Committee prior to the meeting which is now scheduled to take place tomorrow morning.

WILEY.

EMB

BJR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated June 16, 1943

Rec'd 1:23 a.m. 17th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

1108, June 16, 6 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY  
FROM MURPHY

A situation has developed in which General Eisenhower and I should have guidance. Yesterday morning we were informed for the first time of the issuance of a number of decrees dated June 7 which enlarged the membership of the French Committee of National Liberation from seven to fourteen persons. The membership in our opinion insures supremacy to de Gaulle.

Giraud informs me that he signed the decrees as co-president on the recommendation of Monnet and not understanding that the enlarged committee became the repository of power over all affairs both civil and military. He believed up to this morning that the original committee of seven would automatically become the

-2- #1108, June 16, 6 p.m., from Algiers.

become the subcommittee of war which would determine all questions relating to the conduct of the war. However, there is nothing in any of the decrees signed thus far to support his opinion.

General Giraud informed me this morning that in his opinion Monnet has betrayed him. As you know I have worked closely with Monnet and he has communicated to me daily the progress he was making. During the past week he has made no mention to me or MacMillan of the fact that he had persuaded General Giraud to sign the decrees increasing the membership of the committee to fourteen regardless of the fact that this was contrary to his own commitment. I reproached him with this yesterday but the reproach left him indifferent. It is obvious to us that things have gone to Monnet's head and that he feels as strongly as possible like de Gaulle that French rights and sovereignty must be more aggressively asserted in respect of the Allies. He also seems to feel he can control the committee whereas it is increasingly clear that he is being used by de Gaulle and will probably later be discarded.

De Gaulle

-3- #1108, June 16, 6 p.m., from Algiers.

De Gaulle having withdrawn his resignation now that the committee is constituted that he is assured of a majority is insisting on a plenary meeting this afternoon at which might be discussed the question of the military establishment. I have suggested to Giraud that he refuse to permit this question to be decided until Eisenhower's return here Friday. I am recommending that Eisenhower call in de Gaulle and Giraud and state to them clearly the American position as we understand it with particular reference to our military requirements and that it be made abundantly clear that in the light of recent developments it is necessary for the U.S.A. to review its present policy of rearmament of French forces.

I have insisted with Giraud and he agrees that it would be disastrous for him to retire (\*) make a determined stand insisting that the committee agree that as CINC he remain as co-president until France is liberated. His present legal strength lies in the fact that no decree of the French Committee is valid without the signature of both president.

De Gaulle

-4- #1108, June 16, 6 .m., from Algiers.

De Gaulle and Massigli came to MacMillan late last evening and asked him whether in his opinion our rearmament policy would be affected by de Gaulle's dominance of the situation and other questions indicating uneasiness on their part. MacMillan refused, he says, to give an opinion stating that these would be questions for the CINC to answer.

WILEY

WES

(\*) apparent omission

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 311.23 CAD (6-15-43) Civil  
Affairs Division Operations Division,  
WDGS European-North African Section,  
WDCPD J.H. Hilldring, Maj. Gen.

June 15, 1943

THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 361

The creation of The French Committee of National Liberation raises the important question as to the future relationship of this committee with The United States and United Kingdom. (From Marshall to Eisenhower) following is a draft which the State Department proposes to dispatch to Ambassador Winant: "I was notified June 8th by The Representatives of The Fighting French and The North African French High Command jointly of the formation of The French Committee of National Liberation. This raises the question of relations between this government and the new committee. I see no reason why we should not be able to deal with this committee as the representatives of French interests in the territories over which they are now in control and those which may be later freed of Axis domination, subject always to military requirements. I believe that in dealing with this committee it should be made clear that relationship with this government will be subject to military considerations and other conditions which are necessary in pursuing the war against The Axis to which we are now pledged and that these considerations should be accepted and agreed to by the new committee as an earnest of their determination to take their place beside The United Nations in the prosecution of the war until the defeat of The Axis Powers. The principal considerations which suggest themselves to me are as follows: 1 That this government in considering its relationship with the committee and the military and other conditions referred to above should be fully and frankly informed with regard to any commitments or obligations which may be assumed by The Committee of National Liberation in the International Field. 2 That The Committee should not continue or name or in any sense encourage or support representatives abroad who carry on activities inimical to the interest of any of The United Nations. 3 That the facilities and

CM-OUT-6330 (16 June 43) 0009Z msh

SECRET

COPY No.

31

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

301 N. Africa

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

No 361

Page 2 (16 June 43)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

concessions desired by The Allied Military Forces in North Africa and other French territories for the prosecution of the war be granted to the extent required by the respective Allied Military Commanders. 4 That the facilities and assistance in the economic field desired by The American and British Governments with respect to communications, shipping, essential war materials and all other economic needs be granted to the extent required. 5 That pending the satisfactory conclusion of new agreements all existing agreements entered into with Allied Military Commanders remain in force. It is generally recognized that it is the operation and success of the Military Forces of The United States and Great Britain which 1 Have secured the present comparative freedom from hazard and oppression of North Africa by The Axis Forces and 2 Give promise of continuing that security and of extending these successes to the securing of the future restoration and salvation of The Republic of France. The French Committee must therefore recognize that so long as the German menace remains and so long as this necessitates the continued occupation of any portion of North Africa by these Anglo American Forces, the security of those forces must be maintained beyond peradventure and that the means and measures by which such absolutely essential security of these forces must be maintained is a matter which in the last resort must rest solely upon the determination of the commanders of those forces. You are requested to take this matter up with Mr. Eden as soon as convenient with a view to discussing with him the suggestions as outlined above and with a view to concerting the action of this government and The British Government with respect to the basis of our respective relationships with The French Committee in order that each government may conduct its dealing with the new committee on the same basis. It would be our intention to set up a separate diplomatic representation with the usual political and economic

staff near the seat of the new committee! Your comments are desired as to proposed radio for Ambassador Winant and as to other terms which should be considered in recognition of French Committee. Specific comment is desired as to agreements which could be continued in force. The existence of this committee also raises important political questions that are being considered presently by The Department of State. As Allied Commander-in-Chief, you have the responsibility at present to make decisions on some political, economic and

CM-OUT-6330 (16 June 43) 0009Z msh

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COPY No. 31

SECRET

No 361

FREEDOM DEPARTMENT JUNE 16 page 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING MESSAGE  
relief matters. Is it desirable that you retain this responsibility or should it be transferred to appropriate civil agencies of the governments in Washington and London and if so, when should this transfer of responsibility occur. You are authorized to take this matter up with The British at your headquarters. Prompt reply is desired. This is a planning project only. The purpose is merely to assemble the views of all interested parties.

ORIGINATOR: CAD

INFORMATION: OPD  
JCS (GEN DEANE)  
ASST SEC WAR ( MR MCCLOY )

CM-OUT-6330 (16 June 43) 0009Z msh

SECRET

COPY No. 31

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

WAT

From: London  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 14 June 1943

To the President from Winant. Personal and secret.

The Prime Minister was delighted with the two messages he received from you today.

I showed him a copy of the Embassy's 3879 of June 7th to the State Department as you requested. I am attaching his directive to the British Press on De Gaulle at the end of this message as I thought it would interest you.

"The Prime Minister is somewhat concerned at the apparent bias in favour of De Gaulle in the Press messages from Algiers and in their presentation at this end. De Gaulle owes everything to British assistance and support, but he cannot be considered as a trustworthy friend of our country. Wherever he has been he has left a trail of Anglophobia behind him. An interview he gave at Brazzaville in August 1941 was only the first of many attempts to play Great Britain off against the United States and vice versa. He has done his utmost to cause friction between the British and French in Syria. It is part of his policy to gain prestige in France by showing how rough he can be with the British and now with the Americans. He has undoubtedly Fascist and dictatorial tendencies. At one time he represents himself as the sole barrier against Communism; at another as enjoying Communist support.

"Nevertheless, in spite of these just grounds for complaint we have always treated him with scrupulous fairness on account of the legend which has been raised about his name in France through the publicity facilities we have given him. We still hope that he will settle down to loyal teamwork with the new committee. Up to the present he is struggling for complete mastery. Should he succeed in this very serious differences will immediately open between him and the United States. We have to be very careful that these differences do not spread to the relations between Britain and America. The President, who is the best and truest friend that Britain and Europe ever had, has strong views on the subject. The military situation in North Africa is tense and General Eisenhower

(Original filed in "Pres-Misc. Folder.")  
(This copy for file in "Giraud-De Gaulle" folder.)

SECRET

SECRET

From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Unnumbered, 14 June 1943

Page 2

has to think continually of the peace and order of the vast territories we have occupied and of the smooth working of their communications. It is from these territories that great operations will be launched and we cannot have them or the French Forces, which the Americans are arming, thrown into turmoil at this juncture.

"It is hoped, therefore, that the British newspapers will preserve an attitude of coolness and impartiality in these French quarrels and do their best to prevent them becoming an impediment to the vigorous conduct of the war."

No Sig

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-13/wlh


NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

June 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER FRESEMAN  
COMMANDER LONG:

1. In connection with my memorandum of June 10 to Admiral Leahy and to Admiral King concerning the proposed draft of a message from State to the American Embassy, London, on the subject of the French Committee of National Liberation, I am attaching herewith certain changes which have been proposed by the War Department (Mr. Stimson).
2. As the War Department has asked Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur for comments, the attached suggestions are only preliminary, and they expect to make further recommendations in the matter.
3. I am sending these to you for inclusion in the file on the subject and to show to the Admiral if you think necessary.

  
A. D. STRUBLE.

# SECRET

1. The following is proposed by General Hildring:

Alter present paragraph four to read: "That the facilities and assistance in the economic field desired by the American and British Governments with respect to communications, shipping, essential war needs, and all other economic war needs, be granted to the extent required."

2. On the last ~~change~~ <sup>page</sup> (proposed by Mr. Stimson) after item five add the following:

"It is generally recognized that it is the operation and success of the military forces of the United States and Great Britain which

(1) have secured the present comparative freedom from hazard and oppression of North Africa by the Axis forces; and

(2) give promise of continuing that security and of extending these successes to the securing of the future restoration and salvation of the Republic of France.

"The French Committee must therefore recognize that so long as the German menace remains and so long as this necessitates the continued occupation of any portion of North Africa by these Anglo-American forces, the security of those forces must be maintained beyond peradventure; and that the means and measures by which such absolutely essential security of these forces must be maintained is a matter which in the last resort must rest solely upon the determination of the commanders of these forces."

SECRET

WAT

From: Algiers  
For: The President of the United States

No W 2576, 12 June 1943

(Action AGWAR Marshall for President signed Eisenhower FHCIV, reference my W 2523.)

In delivering the oral message from me to De Gaulle last evening Murphy found De Gaulle in most amiable state of mind. De Gaulle spent half hour pleading for better understanding by the United States of himself and his movement. He deplored the poor quality of those who had represented him in the United States during past years, acknowledging that they undoubtedly had done him much harm. He said that from <sup>June</sup> 1940, when he made his first public declaration his sole thought has been that the war and France's future would hinge on the efforts of the United States as he was fully conscious that Great Britain alone could not win. He said in fact that he has used Great Britain as a convenience; that he understood that the British were traders capable of quick shifts of policy to meet their own interests and that they wished to use France for their purpose. He had expected from the United States better comprehension of the "New France" which he is certain we do not appreciate. Murphy replied that in his opinion there is little or no difference in the British and American policies toward France both of which are marked by affection for that country and whose joint efforts will succeed in restoring its liberties. De Gaulle referred repeatedly to our "exigence" regarding Boisson stating that it presented him with the gravest kind of problem on a matter of principle concerning French sovereignty. If he yielded in his opinion he was lost. He referred to Mr. Eden's conversation some time ago in which Mr. Eden desired him to take certain action regarding Admiral Muselier which he refused because it involved French sovereignty in which he could brook no interference by a foreign power. In that matter he said the British Government yielded. He would continue to assert his point of view. Boisson's retention in a place of authority, he said, is totally unacceptable. His replacement, he declared, could not possibly affect the security of our operations. Murphy suggested that after all the matter would be one presumably for consideration by the committee. He agreed but said that he could not continue as a member of a committee which would accept such interference in French affairs by a foreign power. Murphy pointed out that he must understand

SECRET

SECRET

From: Algiers  
For: The President of the United States  
No. W 2576, 12 June 1943

Page 2

that as French and Allied interests are inextricably bound together in this area that a friendly suggestion regarding personnel should not be construed as interference in French internal affairs. Military necessity and the use of this territory as an important military base for future operations entailing grave responsibility for the French as well as British and American authorities demands extraordinary latitude in our relations having no comparison to normal rules. De Gaulle gave no intimation of his retirement from the committee and dispassionately discussed a number of problems urging that his collaborators be permitted to arrive promptly from England. His approach to these matters is that of an egocentric who has no notion of working as a member of a collective body unless he can dominate it. He spoke of the vast amount of work lying ahead. The impasse on the question of French military authority continues.

SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJDB25  
1254B/12  
EW

CCWD  
6-12-43  
1149Z

*Sem by  
Adm Healy*

URGENT

From: AFHQ in North Africa  
To: War

No. W 2523, 12 June 1943

From Eisenhower for Marshall for the President

On account of language difficulties Murphy delivered orally and personally as from me message quoted in urad 9985 to Generals Giraud and De Gaulle. Giraud said "Tres Bien". De Gaulle said that this raised a grave question of French sovereignty on which he felt that he personally could not yield but that, of course, the question would be one for the committee to decide. He asked for a written copy of the message but he was informed that it was to be considered as an informal oral message only. The conversation with him which lasted for an hour will be transmitted in a later telegram.

No Sig

Note: 9985 is CM-OUT-4291 (11 Jun 43) White House

Action: White House

CM-IN-7350 (12 Jun 43) 1233Z vc

SECRET

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WHITE 5

Algiers,  
Dated June 11, 1943.  
Rec'd 3:50 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*(Original returned to State Department as instructed. This paraphrased copy, sent to the President as "White 5" is FILE COPY)*

1082, June 11, 8 p.m.

Following is paraphrase of a dispatch from Murphy for the Secretary and the Undersecretary, dated 11 June.

My June 11.

The Committee held an informal meeting this morning without General de Gaulle, who had been asked to attend but did not. The Committee discussed his letter of resignation but no action was taken. The talk then turned to the matter of the commander-in-chief. Monnet has prepared a formula which was accepted by Philip, Massigli and Catroux, based on Georges' original plan. It provides Giraud will be Commander-in-Chief of all French forces, and the Commissioner or Commissioners of National Defense will be responsible for the modernization and reorganization of the army but that supreme command will be exercised by Commander-in-Chief for the Committee of National Liberation. Giraud and Georges did not seem inclined to accept this plan at this morning's meeting, but Monnet is hopeful that after reflection they may be persuaded to agree to it. It is planned meanwhile that a delegation of the Committee will approach de Gaulle to urge him to accept the plan and consequently reconsider his resignation. Several days may possibly pass before final decision is taken.

General Eisenhower, MacMillan and I think that unless final formula is detrimental at this critical stage to Allied military effort or destructive to Giraud, we should meanwhile continue to regard present negotiations as involving primarily French responsibility. We believe that we should reserve any objections we may have until the time when it is clear either that de Gaulle is gaining control of entire situation or that our military position is not fully safeguarded. We suggest that it might be desirable to insert into the formula of recognition our conditions, whatever they may be. As soon as conditions permit we propose to submit suggestions in this respect.

If the resignation of de Gaulle is accepted now for reasons which may be publicized to appear that Giraud is against reorganization of the army, it would not be clear to public opinion both abroad and in France, and would produce constant friction, thus actually weakening Giraud's position. In spite of the fact that de Gaulle maintains he has no intention of forming an opposition party from the outside, the Committee has not yet secured enough authority to be recognized as the sole duly established French authority with whom the Allies can deal. Once the cement has hardened in the new structure, however, and it is actually in operation, de Gaulle's resignation or the resignation of any other member would appear in their true light as resignations of those who are not willing to submit to collective responsibility and would not have the same results.

White 4

Algiers,  
Dated June 11, 1943.  
Rec'd 11:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1081, June 11, 5 p.m.

*(Original returned to State Department as instructed. This paraphrased copy, sent to the President as "White 4" is FILE COPY)*

Murphy sends the following to Hull and Welles, here paraphrased, dated June 11.

I had separate conversations with Giraud and Monnet last evening. Giraud steadfastly affirmed that de Gaulle's tender of resignation as Co-President and member of the French Committee would not influence him. He said the whole affair turned on de Gaulle's determination to dominate the French military establishment. According to Giraud, de Gaulle's motive is apparent. During the early meetings he scoffed at Giraud's title as Commander-in-Chief, holding that this was but an empty title representing no substantial authority since in the final analysis the French army was under allied control and divided in separate units. He also said that Giraud was not taken into confidence by the allied high command, who did not advise him of future operations. In later meetings, though, de Gaulle changed his stand and said he would be happy to see Giraud stay as Commander-in-Chief of French troops, but demanding that he be designated Commissioner of National Defense with full authority to control and reorganize the French military forces.

Giraud stated that de Gaulle's intentions thereby became perfectly clear and that he could not give in to a situation in which de Gaulle retained the substance and he the shadow of military control.

I saw Monnet later in the evening. He denied that the Committee had any intention of allowing de Gaulle to dominate the military picture, but he then criticized Giraud's not taking steps to eliminate over age generals and improve the organization of French forces. Giraud alone, he said, was not capable of undertaking the job of reorganizing the French forces, with all his other tasks, and that a way must be arranged so that de Gaulle may participate in this task. Also, he prophesied that if de Gaulle resigns now the situation will grow steadily worse, and that Giraud will not be able to wield power for more than 2 or 3 months. Then French public opinion will demand de Gaulle.

If de Gaulle's abilities can be harnessed and used within the framework of the Committee during the next weeks, Monnet thinks, his latter quitting and departure may cause little emotion. To allow him to quit now, believes Monnet, would be premature and might cause unfavorable reactions on American and British public opinion.

At the same time, Monnet admits that de Gaulle must not be allowed to have his way with the Committee by force of threats and a system of blackmail.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The following is with reference to messages No. 9985 and 9986 from the President to General Eisenhower, and message No. 281 from the President to the Prime Minister, all dated June 10, 1943:

After the President had approved the three messages about 6:30 p.m., June 10, he directed that copies be shown to Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, and Admiral Leahy. Miss Tully earlier had said that the President wanted them shown to General Marshall also. After discussing this with Admiral Brown, it was agreed that copies should be shown by some member of the Map Room personnel to the above mentioned individuals the first thing in the morning, June 11.

I received a telephone call from General McNarney about 8:45 p.m. at my home that the Secretary of War and he had been authorized to see these messages, and would like to see them right away. Accordingly, I drove to the White House, picked up the messages, and took them to the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and General McNarney were all together in the Secretary's office waiting for them. I delivered the messages about 9:15 p.m. The Secretary of War wished a copy of the Prime Minister's message No. 281 for him to study, which was done.

At about 10:15 p.m. the Secretary decided he wished to take no action with reference to the messages, and told me to deliver an oral message to the President to the effect that after he had read the President's messages, he felt it was unnecessary for him to send any further messages during the night.

I then returned to the Map Room, delivered the Secretary of War's message to the President personally, who indicated his satisfaction with it, and returned the three messages to the Map Room.

On July 11, General Marshall was shown copies of these messages at about 9:00 a.m. The Secretary of State was shown copies of the messages at about 9:30 a.m. Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins saw the messages in the Map Room about 9:40 a.m. Mr. Welles' office was contacted, and I was advised that he would not arrive in his office until about 11:00 a.m., June 11. Mr. Wells was shown copies of the

messages at 11:10 a.m.

*Chester Hammond*  
CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

OCS  
CH

June 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

I personally delivered the Secretary of War's oral message to the President last evening at about 10:30, to the effect that the Secretary having read the President's three messages with reference to General DeGaulle, felt that it was not necessary for him to send any further messages on this matter during the night.

Upon hearing this message the President indicated that he was satisfied.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lieut. Col., G.S.C.,  
Assistant to the  
Military Aide.

Copies to: Mr. McCloy  
General McNarney

mkn

SECRET

June 10, 1943.

From: The President

To : General Eisenhower

No : FREEDOM #9

YOUR W-2382 JUNE 10, 1943.

I HAVE JUST HEARD OF DE GAULLE'S RESIGNATION. IN THE NATURE OF THINGS THIS DE GAULLE SITUATION WAS BOUND TO COME TO A HEAD SOONER OR LATER. IT MAY WELL BE BETTER TO LET HIM RESIGN NOW THAN TO HAVE AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION A MONTH FROM NOW. I WANT YOU TO REMEMBER THAT YOU ARE IN COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA AND THAT MEANS IN EFFECT THAT WHILE THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE CIVILIANS FUNCTIONS RUN BY THE FRENCH THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS ABSOLUTELY PARAMOUNT.

AS I WIRED YOU IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT ANY CONTROL\* OF FRENCH MILITARY FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA OR WEST AFRICA WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS. GO AS FAR AS YOU LIKE IN CARRYING OUT THE PEROGATIVES OF YOUR POSITION. TELL THIS TO MURPHY AND MACMILLAN.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2305, EWT, 10 June 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

\* Correction, insert "by De Gaulle". See attached message.

SECRET

PRIORITY

EISENHOWER

#9

JUNE 10, 1943

*I have just heard of De Gaulle's resignation*

YOUR W-2382 JUNE 10, 1943. IN THE NATURE OF THINGS THIS DE GAULLE SITUATION WAS BOUND TO COME TO A HEAD SOONER OR LATER. IT MAY WELL BE BETTER TO LET HIM RESIGN NOW THAN TO HAVE AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION A MONTH FROM NOW. I WANT YOU TO REMEMBER THAT YOU ARE IN COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA AND THAT MEANS IN EFFECT THAT WHILE THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS RUN BY THE FRENCH THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS ABSOLUTELY PARAMOUNT.

AS I WIRE YOU IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT ANY CONTROL OF FRENCH MILITARY FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA OR WEST AFRICA WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS. GO AS FAR AS YOU LIKE IN CARRYING OUT THE PEROGATIVES OF YOUR POSITION.

*Tell this to Murphy and Macmillan*

ROOSEVELT

*HR*

SECRET

*Get*  
SECRET

PRIORITY

SECRET

June 11, 1943.

*Number III*

FROM: War Department

*SVC 1365*

*(correction)*

TO : Algiers

To General Eisenhower from the President. *See President*

Reference my telegram War Department No. Nine to you regarding your W2382, June 10, 1943. Please make following correction: Insert QUOTE by de Gaulle repeat by de Gaulle UNQUOTE between QUOTE my judgement that any control UNQUOTE and QUOTE of French military forces in North Africa UNQUOTE.

~~Roosevelt~~

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1220, EWT, June 11, 1943.

*Chester Hammond*

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

File *nr*

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943.

Memorandum for: Admiral Leahy *WJH*  
Admiral King  
Admiral Horne

1. The attached draft was prepared in State as a basis for discussion with War and Navy and then for submission to Secretary Hull.
2. Admirals King, Horne, and Edwards have concurred in items 3, 4, and 5 (blue lined) from a naval viewpoint. The proposal has been shown to Admiral Leahy with the idea that State would be informed that the blue-lined portions were satisfactory to the Navy - no comment being made on other portions. Admiral Leahy concurred in this.
3. War has prepared despatches to Generals Eisenhower and McArthur requesting comment on this proposal. I have informed General Hildring of Navy's comment to State.
4. Mr. Atherton of State telephoned and I informed him of the Navy's concurrence in 3, 4 and 5. He then informed me that with changes in the original draft, which I have indicated in red, Secretary Hull has approved the message.

SECRET

*mf*  
A. D. Struble.

June 9, 1943.

AMEMBASSY,  
LONDON.

DRAFT-PROPOSAL

I was notified yesterday by the representatives of the Fighting French and the North African French High Command jointly of the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation. This raises the question of relations between this Government and the new Committee. I see no reason why we should not be able to deal with this Committee as the representative of French interests in the territories over which they are now in control and those which may be later freed of Axis domination. I believe that in dealing with this Committee it should be made clear that relationship with this Government will be subject to certain military considerations and other conditions which are necessary in pursuing the war against the Axis to which we are now pledged, and that these considerations should be accepted and agreed to by the new Committee as an earnest of their determination to take their place beside the United Nations in the prosecution of the war until the defeat of the Axis powers. The principal considerations which suggest themselves to me are as follows:

*subject  
always  
to military  
requirements*

1. That this Government in considering its relationship with the Committee and the military and other conditions referred to above should be fully and frankly informed with regard to any commitments or obligations which may be assumed by the Committee of National Liberation in the international field;

2. That the Committee should not <sup>CONTINUE</sup> maintain or name representatives abroad who carry on activities inimical to the interests of any of the United Nations; <sup>or in any sense encourage or support</sup> repre-

3. That the facilities and concessions desired by the Allied military forces in North Africa and other French territories for the prosecution of the war be granted to the extent required by the respective Allied military commanders;

4. That the facilities and assistance in the economic field desired by the American and British Governments with respect to communications, shipping, essential war materials, and all other economic needs, be granted to those Governments to the fullest extent compatible with the <sup>MILITARY AND</sup> economic situation in the French territories under the jurisdiction of the Committee.

5. That all agreements heretofore made with the Allied military commanders remain in force.

You are requested to take this matter up with Mr. Eden as soon as convenient with a view to discussing with him the suggestions outlined above and with a view to concerting the action of this Government and the British Government with respect to the basis of our respective relationships with the French Committee in order that each Government may conduct its dealings with the new Committee on the same basis.

It would be our intention to set up a separate diplomatic representation with the usual political and economic staff near the seat of the new Committee.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B 27  
1502B/10  
GW

CCWD  
June 10, 1943  
1526Z

From: Algiers  
To: War

No.: W-2382, June 10, 1943

I have been informally but specifically advised that this morning General DeGaulle withdrew as CO-President and member of the French committee. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. NAF number 237. The real issue at stake is apparently a struggle for control of military forces. The reasons alleged for the action were, first, the impossible administrative situation existing here which is asserted to contain a great deal of Vichy influence and, second, constant and unjustified interference by the Allies in French affairs.

Catroux later informed Murphy and MacMillan that DeGaulle had explained to him that his reasons for tendering his resignation to committee were (1) he found it impossible to function in the committee where there was so much opposition to his views particularly on military matters. (2) he felt that the Allies are not in sympathy with him as evidenced that all of his associates had not been allowed to depart from England for Algiers and (3) violent dissatisfaction with the recent declaration to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons the official text of which he has not even read.

Catroux stated that he had informed DeGaulle that having agreed to the principle of committee action, it is impossible because of French interests at stake to resign until the system has been given a fair trial. The committee is to meet Friday morning to consider the matter.

CM-IN-6131 (10 Jun 43)

SECRET

COPY No.

21

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

30 N. Africa

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers  
To: War

No.: W-2382, June 10, 1943

The stand I intend to take in case I am approached on this matter, is that my Governments have tacitly recognized the French committee as the responsible administrative body over French interests until France has been liberated and that I am not authorized to deal officially with any individual on subjects of mutual interest to the Allied Headquarters and to the French. Moreover, any request for transportation to any point controlled by the allies will be answered with the information that the approval of the particular Government concerned must first be obtained.

Murphy seems to think that some form of compromise will be reached and that the committee will continue to function. He further believes that in case DeGaulle should persist in withdrawing that at least 4 and probably 5 members to the committee will continue to serve.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM. KING  
GEN. ARNOLD  
GEN. STRONG  
LOG

CM-IN-6131

(10 Jun 43) 1756Z cen

**SECRET**

COPY No. 21

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 10, 1943.

*File  
WSTL*

From: Opnav  
To : Alusna, London

Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval Person  
Number 281.

I have just received the following message from Murphy:

QUOTE. I was told this afternoon by Giraud that de Gaulle, during this morning's session of French Committee, finally brought into the open his wish to act as Commissioner for National Defense, having the attributes of a Minister of War in the ordinary cabinet set up. He also demanded the command of French forces not actively engaged in operations which is contrary to what he has told Eisenhower, MacMillan and me with respect to his intentions.

Giraud absolutely refused to yield command of French forces. He insisted that General Georges be appointed Commissioner of National Defense. A compromise proposal submitted by Catroux very much favored de Gaulle's proposition.

Giraud told me of his determination to retire if the Committee outvoted him on this question and to inform the British and American Governments and the French people of the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. I have asked Giraud to delay any such action until there has been an opportunity to discuss this question with several members of the committee. MacMillan and I are disturbed regarding the actions of Gaston Palowski who is a personal counselor of de Gaulle. Palowski is passing around stories harmful to the Allies, such as, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected French interests since he has allowed the Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is

SECRET

SECRET

Pres-PM No. 281, June 10, 1943. Page 2.

the inspiration for the story of 7 June by Geoffrey Parsons that what is happening here is a victory for de Gaulle over Giraud and the State Department.

Giraud also told me that de Gaulle raised the subject of Boisson, demanding his removal on the ground that some of his followers such as de Bois Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result of the Dakar incident of September 1940. Giraud noted that President Roosevelt had indicated we consider Boisson a most capable administrator who had cooperated with the United States wholeheartedly. De Gaulle brushed this aside, Giraud said, as of no consequence. UNQUOTE.

Undoubtedly McMillan has advised you in similar terms.

I have just sent the following to Eisenhower:

QUOTE. I request that the following message from yourself be delivered orally to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as nearly simultaneously as possible. INNER QUOTE.

You will remember that we have conferred together for the ultimate destruction of the enemy forces and for the restoration and liberation of France as a great nation. We have been successful in the first phase of this; the second phase we have still before us. For reasons of our common cause, I feel I should continue to convey from time to time my views, both to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as frankly in the future as in the past, especially upon the happy announcement of the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation.

In this spirit may I express to you a concern over reports which have reached me, but which are happily unconfirmed, that the Council possibly may be considering the removal of Governor General Boisson from his West African post. Such action would be contrary to the very aim we

SECRET

SECRET

Pres-PM No. 281, June 10, 1943. Page 3.

have in view because of Boisson's ability as an able French Administrator. I very much hope that I may receive reassurances from the Committee that these reports as to the future of General Boisson are indeed unfounded. END INNER QUOTE.

With this I trust you will agree. In view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude, it is unconceivable to me that French West Africa should come under his domination.

Please read my dispatch to Churchill with particular regard to your ordering troops there. END QUOTE.

I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa.

This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate.

Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1830, EWT, June 10, 1943.

This message has not been paraphrased and should not be copied.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

**SECRET**

June 10, 1943.

SECRET

From: War Department  
To : Algiers

No: FREEDOM 9986

For General Eisenhower from the President.

I have telegraphed to the Prime Minister<sup>\*</sup> quoting to him gist of Murphy's June ninth telegram to me and gist of my telegram to you.

For your information, I have added the following in my telegram to the Prime Minister:

Quote: I believe the matter of the domination of Dakar by de Gaulle is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither of us can know just where he will wind up.

For this reason I find it impossible to consider any do by de Gaulle of this area.

It is so serious that if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take over things in French West Africa I should have to consider sending several regiments as well as naval vessels to Dakar. Such things would be most unfortunate.

Finally, unless Giraud has complete control of French troops in North Africa I cannot feel happy. Command by de Gaulle would cause a definitely uneasy feeling for the security of the rear of the American and British positions, our line of communications and the adequacy of our allied forces left for the protection of our rear. End Quote

My thought is that you as supreme commander in Africa

-1-

\* See Pres # 281, 10 June 43. (copy inclosed).

**SECRET**

SECRET

SECRET

President-General Eisenhower - June 10, 1943. - Page 2.

will appreciate the military implications involved in removing Boisson and relieving Giraud as Commander of all French troops.

ROOSEVELT.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943.

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER

I have telegraphed to the Prime Minister quoting to him gist of Murphy's June ninth telegram to me and gist of my telegram to you.

For your information, I have added the following in my telegram to the Prime Minister:

*Paraphrased* Quote: I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa.

This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate.

Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear UNQUOTE.

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER (continued)

It is my thought that you as Commander-in-Chief in Africa will recognize the military implications involved in the removal of Boisson and in retirement of Giraud as Commander of all French forces.

ROOSEVELT

*Copies to be shown to J. H. Hull + V. K. ...  
+ H. Lashby*

**SECRET**

SECRET

June 10, 1943.

From: War Department  
To: Algiers

No: FREEDOM 9985

For General Eisenhower from the President.

I request that you deliver the following message from yourself orally to General Giraud and to General de Gaulle as nearly simultaneously as possible.

QUOTE. You will recall that we have consulted together for the final destruction of Axis forces in North Africa and the liberation and restoration of France as a great nation. In the first phase of this we have been successful. The second phase is still before us. I feel because of our common cause, I should continue to convey my views from time to time both to General Giraud and General de Gaulle as frankly in the future as in the past, particularly upon the happy announcement of the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation.

It is in this spirit that I am expressing to you a concern over reports reaching me, but I may add, happily unconfirmed, that the Council may possibly be giving consideration to the removal of Governor General Boisson from his post in West Africa. In view of Governor General Boisson's ability as an able French administrator, such action would be contrary to the very aims we have in view, and I hope to receive reassurances from the French Committee of National Liberation that these reports as to General Boisson's future are indeed unfounded.

END QUOTE.

**SECRET**

● SECRET ●

President-General Eisenhower, June 10, 1943. Page 2.

I trust you will agree with this. It is inconceivable to me that in view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude French West Africa should come under his domination. Please read my message to Prime Minister with special regard to your sending troops there.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2830, EWT, June 10, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1943


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our conversation of last night, I am sending you herewith a suggested instruction for you to send to General Eisenhower. I also enclose copies of two telegrams which have to do with Governor Boisson. It is clear that the situation is urgent and that if action is not taken promptly Boisson may be out of the picture.

Secretary Hull is in accord with this message. He has asked me to let you know, however, that he thinks it would be advisable for you to inform Mr. Churchill of the nature of the message which you are sending to General Giraud and to General de Gaulle before it is sent to General Eisenhower with the hope that Mr. Churchill will agree to take similar action.

Believe me

Faithfully yours



Encs.  
#324 June 4, 1 p. m.  
None, 9 June, 7 p. m.  
The President,

The White House.

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

NOT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Collect ( Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

TELEGRAM SENT

Charge Department:  
Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge to  
\$

June 10, 1943

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

*I* *you desire*  
~~The President request that by the most direct approach~~  
~~you deem advisable the following message from him be~~ *yourself orally*  
~~conveyed orally both~~ to General Giraud and to General  
de Gaulle as nearly simultaneously as possible.

QUOTE You will recall that ~~at our meeting at Casablanca~~  
~~last December~~ *have* we consulted together for the *final* destruction of the  
Axis forces in North Africa and ~~at the same time we defined~~  
~~as our common cause~~ *and toward* the liberation and restoration of France  
as a great nation. In the first phase of this we have been  
successful. The second phase is still before us. I feel  
because of our common cause, I should continue to convey my  
views from time to time both to General Giraud and General  
de Gaulle as frankly in the future as in the past, particu-  
larly upon the happy announcement of the formation of the  
French Committee of National Liberation.

It is in this spirit that I am expressing to you a  
concern over reports reaching me, but I may add, happily  
unconfirmed, that the Council may possibly be giving  
consideration to the removal of Governor General Boisson

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

*NOT*  
TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Collect { Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

\$

# Department of State

Washington,

-2-

from his post in West Africa. In view of Governor General Boisson's ability as an able French administrator, such action would be contrary to the very aims we have in view, ~~as expressed in Casablanca~~, and I hope to receive ~~through the Allied High Command~~ reassurances from the French Committee of National Liberation that these reports as to General Boisson's future are indeed unfounded. **END QUOTE**

*I trust you will agree with this. It is signed*

*inconceivable that in view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude toward West Africa should come under his domination. Please read my message to Prime Minister with special regard to your sending troops there*

Eu:RA:TMT

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

JG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated June 9, 1943

Rec'd 1:46 a.m. 10th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

June 9, 7 p.m.

FROM MURPHY

SECRET FOR SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

(repeated to London)

Giraud tells me this afternoon that during  
this morning's session of French Committee,  
De Gaulle finally brought into the open his  
desire to act as Commissioner for National  
Defense having the attributes of a Minister of  
War in the ordinary cabinet set up. He also  
demanded the command~~er~~ of French forces not  
actively engaged in operations which is contrary  
to what he has told Eisenhower, MacMillan and  
me in regard to his intentions.

Giraud flatly refused to relinquish command  
of French forces and insisted General Georges  
be appointed Commissioner of National Defense.  
Catroux submitted a compromise proposal which

very

-2- Unnumbered June 9, 7 p.m., from Algiers  
very much favored De Gaulle's proposition:

Giraud expressed to me his determination that if Committee out-voted him on this question he would retire informing British and American Governments as well as French people of injustice caused by De Gaulle's ambition. I asked General Giraud to postpone any such action pending an opportunity for a discussion of this question with several members of committee includ(\*) Giraud that both MacMillan and I are perturbed regarding activities of Gaston Palewski who acts as personal counselor of De Gaulle. He is spreading stories detrimental to the Allies to effect, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected French interests allowing Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is inspiration for Geoffrey Parson's story June 7 to effect that what is happening here is a victory for De Gaulle over Giraud and State Department.

Giraud also told me De Gaulle brought up subject of Boisson insisting on his removal on ground that some of his adherents such as De Bois

Lambert

--3-- Unnumbered June 9, 7 p.m., from Algiers  
Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result  
of Dakar incident September 1940. Giraud pointed  
out President Roosevelt had indicated we considered  
Boisson a most able administrator who had cooperated  
with USA wholeheartedly. This, he said, De  
Gaulle brushed aside as of no consequence. A

WILEY

NK

(\* ) Apparent omission

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 300, 6 June 1943

Your telegram through Eisenhower of June 5th.

We had the whole French committee to luncheon on Friday and everybody seemed most friendly. General Georges, whom I got out of France a month ago and who is a personal friend of mine, is a great support to Giraud. If De Gaulle should prove violent or unreasonable, he will be in a minority of 5 to 2 and possibly completely isolated. The committee is therefore a body with collective authority with which in my opinion we can safely work.

I consider that the formation of this committee brings to an end my official connection with De Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French which was set out in the letters exchanged with him in 1940 and certain other documents of later date, and I propose in so far as is necessary to transfer these relationships, financial and otherwise, to the committee as a whole. While I consider the committee is a safe depository for arms and supplies, I feel that we should see how they conduct their business and themselves before deciding what degree of recognition we should give them as representing France. MacMillan and Murphy are working in the closest accord and will keep Eisenhower, with whom the supreme and ultimate power rests, fully informed.

I was not aware that there was any question of Boisson being dismissed from his post. I should be strongly opposed to it. To make doubly sure I am telling MacMillan to associate himself with your instruction to Murphy. I expect however he has already done so.

I agree with you that the publicity is most one-sided. This is due to the press correspondents, most of whom have a De Gaullist bias. I will consult with Anthony about what can be done to correct this. I cannot however help feeling fairly confident that things will work better now. Please note that my Godefroy has come to heel before your Robert.

I am very glad that I went to North Africa and, above all, that you sent Marshall with me. He was a tower of strength and sagacity. The concord and confidence of Eisenhower's headquarters and the ardour and conviction of the commanders actually charged with the operations was most bracing. I was nearly hung up by weather at Gibraltar but at the last moment a good report came in and we nipped through safely and comfortably. I should have liked to stay another week as the weather was delicious and the bathing was doing me no end of good.

Every good wish to you and all.

LSH  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Dakar

Dated June 4, 1943

Rec'd 7:28 a.m. 5th

Secretary of State,  
Washington,

PRIORITY

324 June 4, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My 318, June 1, 7 p.m.

From what the Governor General told me yesterday evening of his estimate of developments on the political side in the movement for the liberation of France, it would seem safe to conclude that today he considers General Gamas prognostic (please see my 137, March 26, 7 p.m.) far closer to the truth than his own earlier hopes (see my 139, March 28, 3 p.m.) He is not bitter, but fatigued by the continuing trial of seeking to make authority effective in the face of a situation dominated by the question "will Boisson be dismissed, will Boisson be retained?" No real excitement exists here over the issue, but to the extent that the administration's retention of power appears temporary so does its authority diminish. Boisson feels that the interests of good government require

-2- #324 June 4, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Dakar

require an immediate clarification.

While we talked the news of Noques dismissal was brought to him. He said that should a message come during the night that, in the interest of French unity, his resignation was desired he would tender it without harboring any resentment. He obviously feels that his chances are no better than ever, and perhaps less. It seems to be in his mind that the formula in his case may be the offer of an appointment elsewhere, perhaps a diplomatic post. He does not wish another appointment; AOF is his field and deprived of this he would seek military service as a lieutenant in the air force.

BARNES

PEG

BE  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Dakar

Dated June 4, 1943

Rec'd 6:46 a.m., 5th

Secretary of State

Washington

324, June 4, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

We sat in large office on one wall of which  
alesqpaded spot marked the place where Petain's large  
portrait had hung until only several days ago.

The Marshal's portrait that formerly confronted  
one when making the turn in the staircase leading  
to the office likewise was missing, and only shortly  
before my arrival had the Chef de Cabinet altered  
a passage on the Governor General's "devotion to  
the person of the Marshal" in an authorized press  
interview to read "loyalty to Petain until November  
8!"

The one subject that came up during our talk  
that brought back momentarily to a tired face the  
vivacity and sparkle of the Governor General's  
normal personality was mention of his reception a  
few days ago by General Eisenhower and by Murphy.  
Particularly gratifying were the words of confidence  
and approval expressed by General Eisenhower. The  
Governor General said to me that he now has two  
pages in

-20 #324, June 4, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Dakar  
pages in his book of which he could be justly proud--  
the record of successful resistance to German penetration  
and of American approval of his action since France  
has again been in the war -- and that this should be  
enough to comfort him should he have to go.

From what little can be learned here, his  
departure is by (\*) conclusion. Should it become  
necessary, an immediate effect undoubtedly would be  
loss of the momentum in the production campaign  
now under way on the basis of the material aid  
that we have thus far been able to bring to  
AOF and the further aid of which our activity gives  
promise.

REPEATED TO MURPHY

(END OF MESSAGE)

(\*) Omission

BARNES

WSB

CAM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 30, 1943

Rec'd 6 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

996, May 30, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM MURPHY

I spent last evening ~~with~~ the Prime Minister,  
MacMillan and Cunningham. We discussed the various  
ramifications of the French problem. Eden will  
arrive tomorrow at noon.

The Prime Minister said he was here to visit  
the troops and the British Navy and to contribute  
what he could to a favorable adjustment of the  
French situation which will and must, he said,  
demonstrate Anglo-American solidarity.

He arraigned De Gaulle more vehemently and  
vituperatively than at Anfa, saying that De Gaulle  
is anti-British and anti-American and that we could  
count on De Gaulle to play the fool. Prime Minister  
voiced much misgiving. He referred to the President's  
invitation to Giraud to visit the USA and said that  
he would like you to know that he believes that it

would

-2- #996, May 30, 2 p.m.. from Algiers

would be most unwise for Giraud to absent himself in the first part of June as planned, because--and he repeated this several times--in his opinion De Gaulle is fully capable of a putsch. He said he had no illusions about De Gaulle's thirst for personal power.

In resume from what he told me he plans that the British Government will cancel its present arrangements with the French National Committee which will be transferred to Algiers lock, stock, and barrell.

WILEY

JRL

BE  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 30, 1945

Rec'd 5:42 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~

~~996, May 30, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)~~

British financial subsidy, which I am told approximated about 20 million pounds annually, will cease during the month of June with possibly a lump settlement to assist the Committee in meeting certain outstanding obligations. We would then deal jointly with the central organization established in North Africa, making whatever financial, Lend-Lease and political arrangements we may see fit. The Prime Minister says that the facilities of the BBC in London will no longer be available to de Gaulle.

We discussed at great length the constitution of the new French Executive Council which, as the matter stands, will initially consist of six persons: Giraud, de Gaulle, and two members to be selected by each. de Gaulle has indicated his choice

of Massigli

-2- #996, May 30, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers of Massigli and Philip; Giraud, up to last evening, had not decided definitely except to indicate that he will insist that Jean Monnet, General Catroux and General Georges, now in Algiers, must be in the Council. He is deciding this morning which two persons he will include originally. Yesterday he thought he would select Tron and Odic and that he could persuade de Gaulle to agree to the appointment of Monnet, Georges and Catroux to make up the total membership of nine. Both Monnet and I do not at all share this opinion and are insisting that Giraud appoint in the beginning two strong men. Monnet is urging that Odic would be a grave mistake.

The Prime Minister said that he had persuaded and aided General Georges to leave France and that he believed that Georges could make a real contribution.

~~WILEY~~

WTD

CAM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers  
Dated May 30, 1943  
Rec'd 5:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~

~~996, May 30, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)~~

At any rate he has known him for many years and says that he represents a certain continuity in Anglo-French relations which is most desirable. The Prime Minister also urged that if possible Alexis Leger be induced to proceed to Algiers and I agreed that we should support him if necessary as a possible member of the Executive Committee. I believe that after several days General De Gaulle and his partisans will become aggressive. The Prime Minister said he is convinced that this is so. I asked him for his opinion regarding the Clark-Darlan accord of November 22 which is the formal basis for our operations in this area. He said that in his opinion nothing should be done about it and no concessions made for several weeks at least until we knew whether "De Gaulle would play the fool or not". He again stressed the necessity for a united front in that connection.

~~Replied to London.~~

~~(END OF MESSAGE)~~

JRL

WILEY

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

YQV B95  
Filed 0115/28  
ACM

CCWD  
May 28, 1943  
1945 Z

*WAZ*

P R I O R I T Y

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 1537, May 28, 1943.

By the 10th of June (for Marshall for eyes only for the President signed Eisenhower from Giraud) I think that the working structure of the new French Administration can be completed by us. For the kind invitation of the American Government you have my deepest thanks. Before the 10th of June I will advise you of a more definite date but I can leave for Washington between the 10th and the 15th of June. It would please me greatly to have you accept the assurances of my very high consideration and my most sincere esteem.

No Sig

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

CN-IN-18370 (29 May 43) 0129Z cen

SECRET

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

*Pres - Murch.*

May 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Hopkins requested that the attached paraphrased copy of a message from Jean Monnet, dated May 27, 1943, be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

May 27, 1943.

The following is a paraphrase of a message received from Algiers.

From Jean Monnet, signed CINC, to General Marshall, pass to Harry Hopkins.

The written reply made by De Gaulle to Giraud's letter mentioned in my last cable to you has been received. The reply is fully satisfactory. Regarding the essential points, it states: "We are in full agreement with you that the responsibility of the Executive Committee to be formed must be collective and that the duration of its functions must be limited at latest to the date at which the law of February 15, 1872, will permit to insure to the French nation a provisional representation and to constitute the government."

I have been asked by Giraud to consent to his submitting my name as one of the initial members of the French Executive Committee which is to be formed. As yet, no special function has been mentioned. I have considered it my duty to accept, in view of all circumstances. Will you inform me if and when it materializes? Will you kindly inform my wife.

*For original see  
"100 Harry Hopkins".*

JG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 24, 1943

Rec'd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

956, May 24, 7 p.m.

~~SECRET FROM MURPHY~~

*Refrs May 24*

Considerable difficulty is being experienced here with regard to the recruiting activities of the de Gaullist elements. Despite Catroux's objections (see my 906, May 18) and despite formal orders from AFHQ, Le Clerc's forces have been carrying on an active recruiting campaign in Tunisia which has gained a certain number of adherents among the French armed forces, particularly in the Corps Franc. Every advantage has been taken of the continued presence of Vichy elements in the North African forces, particularly in the air corps and navy, to demonstrate an alleged difference between the two armies, one of which is said to be composed

-2- 956. May 24, 7 p.m., from Algiers  
composed entirely of volunteers the the  
other of mobilized men under the orders of  
Vichyites. [Whereas, it has been Giraud's  
policy in the past to agree that individuals  
should be given an opportunity to serve  
either de Gaulle or the High Command,  
recruiting activities have been on such a  
scale as to make action on his part  
necessary to put a stop to this attempt  
to emphasize differences and to create  
two French armies. Consequently LE Clerc's  
army has been ordered to withdraw to  
Cyrenaica with the Eighth Army. Objections  
may be raised that the Allied commander-  
in-chief should not require French troops  
to withdraw from Tunisia and the British  
War Office has requested that an inquiry be  
made as to the necessity for such an order.

~~WILEY~~

EDA

Algiers, May 24, 1943

The recruiting activities of the de Gaullist elements are causing considerable difficulty here. Despite formal orders from AFHQ, and in spite of Catroux's objections ( see my 906, May 18th), an active recruiting campaign in Tunisia has been in progress by Le Clerc's forces. This has gained a certain number of adherents among the French armed forces, especially in the Corps Franc. Particularly in the air corps and navy, every advantage has been taken of the continued presence of Vichy elements in the North African forces to demonstrate an alleged difference between the two armies. One of these armies is said to be composed entirely of volunteers, the other of mobilized men under the orders of Vichyites. Whereas, Giraud's past policy has been to agree that an opportunity should be given to individuals to serve either the High Command or de Gaulle, action on his part has been made necessary to halt this attempt to create two French armies and to emphasize differences by recruiting activities on a large scale. As a result, the army of Le <sup>Cl</sup>erc has been ordered to withdraw with the Eighth Army to Cyrenaica. The British war office has requested that an inquiry be made as to the necessity for such an order because objection may be raised that the Allied Commander-in-Chief should not require French troops to withdraw from Tunisia.

SECRET

YQV B 91  
filed 2217A/21  
FB

CCWD  
May 21, 1943  
2244 Z

PRIORITY  
P R I O R I T Y

See attached translation.

From: Algiers  
To: The President of the United States  
No. CW 72

La destinee est avec nous. (For President Roosevelt from General Giraud signed Eisenhower). C'est <sup>actually</sup> en effet par un concours de circonstances qui va droit au coeur de tous les Francais que Le Premier defile de la victoire ou les Francais ont marche cote a cote avec les troupes Americaines et Britanniques s'est deroule a Tunis hier, jour Anniversaire De Lafayette.

No Sig

SECRET

Received M/R 21/2/110

SECRET

May 22, 1945.

May 21, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

To the President of the United States:  
THE PRIME MINISTER:

# CW 72.

Attached is a paraphrased copy of a letter by a  
message received last evening by the President from the heart  
from General Giraud which the President directed by parade, which  
be furnished the Prime Minister for his information. Anniversary Day of  
mation. Cayenne, they marched side by side with the American and  
British troops.

Very respectfully,

General Giraud

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

Incl.

CW 72.

SECRET

● SECRET ●

May 21, 1943.

To the President of the United States:

# CW 72.

Destiny is with us. It is actually by a series of circumstances, which go straight to the heart of every Frenchman, that in the first victory parade, which took place in Tunis yesterday on the Anniversary Day of Lafayette, they marched side by side with the American and British troops.

General Giraud

SECRET

## INDEX SHEET

From: Algiers  
To : War  
No. W-818, May 18, 1943.

It looks as though at last we may have reached the end of a long road on this question of French unity. For General Marshall immediate and personal attention of Mr. Harry Hopkins from Monnet signed Eisenhower cite FHSGS.

Please see cable which Murphy is sending to the President regarding offer made by Giraud to De Gaulle. I believe it affords essential basis for immediate accomplishment of French unity, for agreement between American and British views and for insuring democratic regime in France after liberation.

As explained in my letters to you, offer should enable British Government to show firmness which is essential if results are to be obtained. In this connection MacMillan telegraphing Prime Minister

Original filed "100 HARRY HOPKINS".  
This for file in "Oll NORTH AFRICA".

BJR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 18, 1943

Rec'd 10:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

906, May 18, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM  
MURPHY

General Catroux tells me today in strict confidence that he begins to despair that the tactics insisted upon by De Gaulle will lead to nothing but confusion and division among the French people. He said that he had just received a long communication from De Gaulle expressing the greatest distrust of American policy which he asserts is opposed to French union and a strong France. De Gaulle, he said, expressed fear that the United States is counting on an early Italian debacle and would be willing to make concessions to Italy at the expense of France in order to arrive at an early armistice with Italy. De Gaulle also asserted that Giraud is nothing but an American puppet who

-2- #906, May 18, 10 a.m., (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

puppet who could not be trusted with political power which must be centered in the person of De Gaulle. The latter expressed also resentment over what he considers an American maneuver to prevent his arrival in the city of Algiers, insisting that the proposition of meeting in some place outside the city such as Bou-Saada or Biskra is designed to prevent his easy communication with the French National Committee and consultation with representative elements here (this is of course absurd).

Catroux also informs me that about fifteen days ago De Gaulle ordered Generals De Larminat and Le Clercq to report to De Gaulle directly, thus relieving Catroux of his command of those troops which he had originally organized and which he commanded.

WILEY

EMB

DLA  
This telegram must be,  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone; (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 18, 1943

Rec'd 8:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

URGENT

906, May 18, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Catroux also stated that De Gaulle's pretention that De Gaulle only be considered as the chief of resistance in France due to the spontaneous support of elements there is simply a manoeuver to strengthen his position. Information coming to Catroux from sources in France contradicts this pretention. One of the reasons which encouraged De Gaulle to take the stand is a message said to have been received by De Gaulle from Herriot to the effect that he would be willing to participate in a government formed by De Gaulle. Catroux said that with all due deference to Herriot the French people today demand new men in their political leadership and that he is convinced that practically none of the old guard will be acceptable. Catroux said that Frenchmen generally understood that Giraud has no long term political ambitions and have no fear that he will endeavor to set himself

-2- #906, May 18, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO), from Algiers

set himself up as a military dictator, which would be obviously impossible:

Catroux also urged that we insist that the French forces commanded by General Le Clercq in Tunisia be obliged to leave there with the eighth army as, notwithstanding the orders of General Eisenhower, they continue to carry on an active recruiting campaign, using every means to induce members of Giraud's forces to desert and join with them. ]

Catroux recommends that the British and American Government's possibly through Admiral Stark take a definite stand, making it clear that they support fully the idea of French unity but that they oppose De Gaulle's drive for personal power. Catroux pointed out that the British Government has ample means at its disposal to insist on the termination of De Gaulle's present tactics.

Giraud and Catroux are conferring this afternoon and it is expected that later in the day Giraud will approve his reply to De Gaulle's last communication the text of which follows in a separate telegram.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WILEY

CSB

*File* 

EAM

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Algiers

Dated May 17, 1943

Rec'd 3:39 a. m. 18th

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

902, May 17, 9 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

FROM MURPHY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

Giraud has handed Mac Millan and me a copy of his reply to De Gaulle's last memorandum which reads in translation as follows: "Thank you for your letter of the 10th of May which replies to my letter and my memorandum April 27.

This latest exchange of views convinces me that our preliminary discussions have come to an end; and that the hour of action and of our common responsibilities has come. Time presses, among other questions, the rapid fusion of all the French forces in a single army of victory is urgent.

I propose that we should pass to action and immediately bring about our union.

The method is simple and can be rapid.

It is sufficient for us to form immediately the Central Executive Committee and at the same time to

record our

-2- #902, May 17, 9 p.m. from Algiers

record our agreement on its essential bases, namely that its responsibility should be collective and that its life should be limited. Thus we shall conform to the tradition and to the laws of the republic.

Thus established the Executive Committee will meet immediately at Algiers.

The formation of the Executive Committee. The Committee is the central authority. It possesses the general direction of and the responsibility for all matters at present within the scope of the national committee or of the high command, civil and military, at Algiers. It will discuss all the other questions which have been the subject of our exchange of views based on the notes which we have exchanged. In particular it will organize the national consultative council and the committee on resistance, appoint the commissioners, fix their functions et cetera.

'The responsibility of the executive committee must be collective'. All the essential decisions will be

-3- #902, May 17, 9 p.m. from Algiers

will be discussed and taken by the executive committee acting as a whole. In accordance with the proposal made by General Catroux, you and I will preside in turn; our responsibilities will be merged in the collective responsibility of the executive committee. With the commissioner or commissioners who may be responsible, we shall together sign the decrees or ordinances which may be discussed and decided in the committee.

'The duration and the functions of the committee must be limited'. In the action which we are now taking we are convinced that we are acting according to the wish of the French people. However, we must recognize that our authority derives from a situation of fact. We are not and cannot be the Government of France.

Immediately the executive committee begins its functions it should solemnly make known to the French people that it hand over its powers to the provisional Government which as soon as the country is liberated, will be constituted in France according to the law of February 15, 1872.

The application

-4- #902, May 17, 9 p.m. from Algiers

The application of this law is contemplated when the legislative assemblies have ceased to function, which is the case today, and can be adapted by having recourse to other elected bodies on the advice of the national consultative council and of the council of legislation taking into account the changes brought about by the action of the enemy or by the development of the situation in France (id est since the law of 1872 was passed).

If I have correctly represented the essential points of the opinions expressed by the national committee and by myself on this subject, I beg you to give me the agreement on these points, which is essential for the establishment of our union. At the same time we can rapidly agree upon the composition of the committee. To begin with it will consist of 2 members proposed by you and 2 members proposed by me, making the first members of the executive committee 6 in all. I suggest that 3 places should be left vacant in order that the executive committee may fill them later."

WILEY

EMB

EAM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 17, 1943

Rec'd 1:09 a. m. 18th.

Secretary of State

Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE.

902, May 17, 9 p. m.

(SECTION TWO)

We feel here that the two principles of collective responsibility and relinquishment of power preserve the essentials of French Democratic tradition and return to the laws of the Republic and unless they are accepted no unity is possible. The proposals avoid the danger that any single individual can assume dictatorial powers since the committee as a whole accepts responsibility for all actions. Care, will, however, have to be exercised in the selection of the members of the committee to preserve the balance and to prevent any individual from assuming complete control.

I hope that during the present visit of Mr. Churchill to Washington an opportunity will be found for both the British and American Governments to concert their policy as regards this proposal. If De Gaulle should refuse to accept this last offer he will have demonstrated unwillingness to achieve real unity and to preserve the fundamental rights of the

-2- #902 May 17, 9 p. m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers

of the French people. Whereas the previous discussions were primarily a matter of French concern, a refusal on De Gaulle's part to accept fundamental Democratic principles becomes of concern to the United Nations as a whole and in particular to the American and British Governments as co-authors of the Atlantic Charter. In such an event it should be made clear that De Gaulle is only interested in a personal drive for power and consequently can no longer count upon the support and subsidies furnished him by the British Government. Mac Millan is urging this course of action upon his Government.

It is anticipated that Catroux will leave immediately for London to endeavor to obtain De Gaulle's acceptance. If he fails he proposes to resign. Mac Millan may also decide to proceed to London for two or three days.

Repeated to London.

*(End of Message)*

WILEY

EMB

See note and  
paraphrase  
attached.

LSH  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated May 17, 1943

Rec'd 8:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

3412, May 17, 9 p.m.

Embassy's telegram No. 3369, 16th

Honest Senator Jusille, lifelong friend of  
Herriot, who has recently been brought out from  
France by General de Gaulle's British facilities,  
called on us this morning. He talked at some  
length of the growing spirit of resistance in  
France, of the gratitude of the French people to  
President Roosevelt and the Anglo-American liberation  
of North Africa. He was Minister of Agriculture in  
a number of French Governments and knows the  
peasant well. He was loud in his praise for  
their resistance to the Germans. He spoke also  
of the "mythique" of de Gaulle adding that while  
the French people did not know de Gaulle the man  
they called his stand in 1940 and his continuance of  
the struggle since that time. He said, however, that  
this did not mean that the French people wanted de  
Gaulle as their future leader, that once the country

was free

-2- #3412 May 17, 9 p.m. from London

was free the people would demand a return to democratic processes to which France remains devoted.

His principal plea, however, was the importance of unity between the two factions if "future troubles in France, from which the Communists alone would be the winners" are to be avoided. He urged that the American Government do what it could to bring about this union. We pointed out that General de Gaulle's recent attitude seemed calculated to render agreement more difficult and we referred specifically to the so-called message from the Council of Resistance (Embassy's telegram No. 3369, 15th). He agreed. We remarked that we had heard that the message was in fact the work of Andre Philip and he merely shrugged his shoulders. We asked him as one of the leaders of the Radical Socialist party by what procedure that party had accepted participation in this "Council of Resistance". He replied that there was no organization in France today in any way qualified to speak for the Radical Socialist Party (which as the Department will recall is the largest in France)

-3- #3412 May 17, 9 p.m. from London

France). The party is widely split, he said, and means of communication are difficult. There was a small group of former Radical Socialist Party members who meet from time to time in Lyons and he presumed that it was this little group which had delegated someone to sit on the "Council of Resistance". He implied that with the probable exception of the Communists the same situation was probably the case of the other parties Philip has collected in the "Council of French Resistance" in this connection compare the last paragraph of our telegram No. 3381, May 15, 9 p.m.

Repeated to Algiers.

WIMMINT

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A copy of this telegram was paraphrased  
this afternoon and returned to Mrs. Brady  
at approximately 4:30 P.M.

File  
10/11

*Dinant's 3412.*

EH  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1945

Rec'd 12:03 p.m., 7th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

153, February 6, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDERSECRETARY FROM  
MURPHY.

Upon his return from Turkey the British Prime Min-  
ister spent yesterday in Algiers. He asked that a  
message along the following lines be communicated to  
the President.

The Prime Minister understands how the two memoranda  
of points agreed at the Anfa conference (see my 124,  
February 1, noon) were approved by the President  
immediately prior to his departure from Anfa which  
left no opportunity for coordination with the Prime  
Minister. The memoranda include specific mention of  
the agreement on the part of the British Government and  
he considers it important that a text be prepared which  
can be accepted by the three participants of the confer-  
ence. The text in its present informal state only  
represents agreement between the President and General

Ciraud.

EH -2- 153, Feb. 5, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from Algiers.

Giraud. Mr. Churchill said that the British Government had prior commitments, notably the recognition that it was accorded to deGaulle as representing certain French interests. Having every regard for the President's direction of affairs in this area, he believed that the President would wish to modify the memorandum slightly to avoid conflict with the British Government's other commitments.

In consequence the draft which follows in sections 3, 4 and 5 of this telegram was prepared jointly by the American and British representatives. It has been approved by the Prime Minister for submission to the President and it further meets with the approval of General Eisenhower. General Giraud is in accord. We feel that the new text provides an improvement over the hastily prepared minute which was discussed at the last moment between the President and General Giraud. The result should be that the British host is equally prepared to provide more complete cooperation than might have been the case if they were to look upon the agreement as primarily bilateral in character.

In his conversation with me the Prime Minister emphasized his intention to treat Giraud and deGaulle  
upon

EH -3- 153, Feb. 5, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from Algiers.

upon an absolute plane of equality. Mr. Churchill did not want to be put in position of appearing to abandon deGaulle. In giving his full support to Giraud in this area he said he was motivated by two factors of prime importance in the successful prosecution of the military campaign; namely, the necessity of preserving tranquility in local affairs and of maintaining uninterrupted communications. He felt, however, that in building up Giraud position and striving to bring about unity between the different French factions a process which was complicated at times by deGaulle's temperament, it was nevertheless important that the latter's contribution should not be overlooked. In addition to his achievements during the past two years he had an army of 50,000 men in the field whereas, in fact it had now become necessary to withdraw French troops from the Tunisian front. It was true that this withdrawal had been necessitated by supply difficulties and lack of equipment and to avoid annihilation of French troops but the result was that allied forces destined for attack purposes are now being required to hold some former French positions. Mr. Churchill agreed that the French forces at the Tunisian front

EH -4- 153, Feb. 5, 6 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from Algiers.

front could not be expected to withstand tank attacks equipped only with light arms, many of them of antiquated manufacture. His estimate of 50,000 men in the field under General deGaulle is disputed. It is believed that the figures is closer to 30,000 and it is also true that the British have equipped deGaulle's forces with modern armament. The Prime Minister acknowledged valuable services rendered to the allies by Giraud's forces on the front and in the maintenance of the long line of communications to Tunisia.

WILEY

KLP

DES  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd 11:45 p.m., 7th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Giraud told me this morning that after his long private conversation with the Prime Minister last evening he was disturbed by the thought that this might portend a weakening of American support. He was interested particularly in paragraph four of the following text relating to his right and duty to acting as trustee for French interests. In the original memorandum of January 24 the language is broader than in the present text. He understood from his conversation with the President that the latter favored Giraud's representation of French interests in the United States and he hopes that this may be true. I told him that in my opinion the present language of the right and duty of acting as trustee for French interests military, economic and financial which are associated or become associated with the movement of liberation in the establishment in French North and West Africa and it undoubtedly represented the President's understanding. This language would seem to me

-2- 153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers

to me to care adequately for the question of representation in the United States.

The second point which troubled Giraud is the change in wording regarding military supply. The original text approved by the President in principle indicated that improved priority would be granted to the French forces in this area subject to the decisions of General Eisenhower and General Somerville. The present text refers to "priority while their military situation demands and as may be determined by the combined Chiefs of Staff". General Giraud wanted to know whether this (\*) character of the President's approval. I assured him that it did not but that the new text merely outlined more in detail than procedure which necessarily would be followed. He said that with these explanations he was prepared to accept the new text and that he was quite agreeable to the insertion in paragraph four, section two of the reference to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle. He (\*) was giving every day of good faith in a desire to arrive at a friendly and workable union with de Gaulle he hoped that the British would support him in prevailing upon the French National Committee to cease its vindictive and personal radio campaign against certain Frenchmen in North Africa who are wholeheartedly and sincerely engaged in prosecuting the war against

-3- 153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers  
against the Axis.

I urgently recommend acceptance of the text as  
now submitted it should provide a workable basis in the  
conduct of our affairs in that area.

WILEY

HPD

(\*) Apparent omission

HP  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd 1:20 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State

Washington

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The amended memoranda read as follows:

"Memoranda of points agreed at the conference at  
Algiers between the President of the United  
States of America and the British Prime Minister  
on the one hand and General Giraud on the other.

I

One. The intervention of the Anglo-American  
troops on 8th November on French territory in  
Africa, brought about at the demand of Frenchmen  
who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight  
against Germany, was an act of liberation of an  
oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

Two. The form of the relations between France  
and the United States of America, the post war  
consequences of the association of France and the  
United States in the fight against Germany, the  
military, economic and financial aid given to

France

*French African Territories*

-2- <sup>153</sup> 103, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE) From AL 10

France, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul, R. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing.

*These letters are not available*

Three. The French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government. Because it is impossible for the French motherland to pronounce freely her will, France does not now possess a recognizable government and the question of the future government of France is not capable now of final solution.

*Primer*

WILEY

WPH

DLA  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd 5:40 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Four. In the interests of the French people,  
in order to safeguard France's past, her present and her  
future, the President of the United States of America  
and the British Prime Minister attribute to the French  
Commander-in-Chief; with his headquarters at Algiers  
the right and duty of acting as a trustee for French  
interests, military, economic and financial, <sup>(in French territories)</sup> which  
<sup>(which hereafter)</sup> are associated or become associated with the move-  
ment of liberation now established in French North  
and West Africa. They bind themselves to aid him  
in this task by all the means in their power.

II

One. On the military plane it has been agreed  
between the President of the United States and the  
British Prime Minister on the one hand and General  
Giraud on the other that the French people will  
receive the equipment which is indispensable to  
them with the priority which their military situation

demands

-2- #153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR), from Algi

demands and as may be determined by the combined chiefs of staff, and that this shall be made up of the most modern material.

Two. In subsequent talks with General Marshall and General Somervell, it was agreed in principle that the delivery would amount to material for three armored divisions and eight motorized divisions as well as for a first line air force consisting of five hundred bombers, and two hundred transport planes, and that of this equipment there would be delivered during the weeks to come four hundred trucks, and the equipment for two armored divisions, three reconnaissance battalions, three battalions of tank destroyers, and the three motorized divisions and such of the aviation equipment as can come by air. The details are to be worked out with the commander-in-chief, allied forces.

WILEY

EDA

omit par Two for the reason that its accomplishment in detail is impossible at the present time and because the essentials are fully covered in the preceding paragraph

RF  
This telegram must be closely  
paraphrased before being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd 1:20 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State  
Washington

*19 March*  
*President has no objection to*  
*Dept State approving this draft*  
*WJL*

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The amended memoranda read as follows:

"Memoranda of points agreed at the conference at Anfa (camp) between the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister on the one hand and General Giraud on the other.

I

One. The intervention of the Anglo-American troops on 8th November on French territory in Africa, brought about at the demand of Frenchmen who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was an act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

Two. The form of the relations between France and the United States of America, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany, the military, economic and financial aid given to French <sup>North</sup> Africa territories, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul, R. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing.

Three. The French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government. Because it is impossible for the French motherland to pronounce freely

her

-2- 153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE) From Algiers

her will, France<sup>s</sup> does not now possess a recognizable government and the question of the future government of France is not capable now of final solution.

WILEY

DLA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd 5:40 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Four. In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present and her future, the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister attribute to the French Commander in Chief; with his headquarters at Algiers the right and duty of acting as a trustee for French interests, military, economic and financial, in French territories which are associated or which hereafter become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa. They bind themselves to aid him in this task by all the means in their power.

## II

One. On the military plane it has been agreed between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister on the one hand and General Giraud on the other that the French people will receive the equipment which is indispensable to them with the priority which their military situation demands and as may be determined by the combined chiefs of staff, and that this shall be made up of the most modern material.

Two. In subsequent talks with General Marshall and General Somervell, it was agreed in principle that the delivery would amount to material for three armored divisions and eight motorized divisions as well as for a first line air force consisting of five hundred

-2- #153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR), from Algiers

hundred bombers, and two hundred transport planes, and that of this equipment there would be delivered during the weeks to come four hundred trucks, and the equipment for two armoured divisions, three reconnaissance battalions, three battalions of tank destroyers, and the three motorized divisions and such of the aviation equipment as can come by air. The details are to be worked out with the commander in chief, allied forces.

WILEY

<sup>gmk</sup>  
Omit paragraph two for the reason that its accomplishment in detail is impossible at the present time and because the essentials are fully covered in the preceding paragraph. *OML*

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 6, 1943

Rec'd. 11:15 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

153, February 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Three. In regard to transport it has been agreed in principle with General Somervell that (\*) supplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the inter-allied pool a share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be (completed within the agreed time.) The aviation material would be sent as far as possible by air. The details are to be worked out with the appropriate allied authorities.

Four. On the political plane it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, General Giraud that it was to their common interest for all French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority and that every facility would be given to General Giraud and to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle in order to bring about this union.

Five. In this connection it has been agreed by the President whereas that the exchange would be brought to fifty francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control of General de Gaulle it being the strong hope that in the later

territories

EM-2- 153, February 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Algiers

territories the rate will be lowered from forty-three to fifty francs to the dollar.

Six. It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda from the north and the West African territory for France in the French language should be carried on by the French authorities in concert with the allied authorities and that, for this reason, conferences should be held regarding the use of short wave radio stations."

WILEY

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Corrected Copy

OPD 336 France (1-9-43)  
Operations Division, WDGS  
Theater Group WDOPD  
JEP

January 9, 1943

**FREEDOM  
ALGIERS**

Number 928

British Government has presented proposal for joint policy to be adopted by United States and British Governments in their future relations with French Empire. Following summary of their proposal is furnished for your information only and should not be discussed with French authorities pending further instruction.

(From Hull and Marshall for Eisenhower and Murphy reference our number 893 Jan 8) Establishment in Algeria on soil of a Department of France of single authority in place of both General Giraud's administration and French National Committee in London is envisaged. United States and British Governments as well as other Governments would recognize this authority as a de facto administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty over certain parts of France and over whole French Empire (except Indo-China) pending establishment of Government chosen by French people themselves. It would not be recognized as Government or even as provisional Government of France but would maintain relations abroad through informal exchange of representatives. It would be treated as an Allied power and be formally admitted to ranks of United Nations. Agreements relating to various parts of French Empire would normally be made with this central authority and not with local colonial administrations. Economic agreements might be made on Tri-Partite basis like agreements in respect of French Equatorial Africa and Cameroons at present under negotiation between British and American Governments and French National Committee.

CH-OUT-3232 (1-10-43)

**SECRET**

COPY No.

23

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2...

So far as French North Africa is concerned, special powers exercised by Allied Commander in Chief in virtue of his command of military operations would be redefined in formal agreement concluded between United States Government and Central French authority. British suggest that their agreement as concerns Madagascar might serve as model. In that agreement French sovereignty provisionally exercised by National Committee is expressly recognized and powers enjoyed by Commander in Chief are conferred upon him by National Committee. In establishment of any such arrangements as regards French North Africa, it would be regarded as Allied territory in which Allied Commander in Chief is vested with extensive powers rather than as Quasi-Occupied territory where he possesses administrative authority. Central authority should conduct itself in all respects both internally and externally as an allied administration. British point out that it is essential that all links with Vichy should be severed or at any rate any claim to unbroken succession through Darlan from Pétain should not be revived and also that return should be made to laws of French republic.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

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CM-OUT-3232 (1-10-43)

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1942.  
1943.

WMB

MEMORANDUM FOR Admiral Leahy:

Upon receipt of the attached correspondence from the Department of State I talked with General Marshall's office (The Secretary of the General Staff) and advised him that I intended to call Mr. Atherton in the State Department to tell the latter that since you would not be in the office for a number of days it would be impossible to obtain your advice or opinion with regard to the draft telegram to be sent to General Eisenhower, and that, in my opinion, the telegram should be held up, if the Department of State believed that it was necessary to secure your opinion on the advisability of transmitting the message.

The Secretary of the General Staff stated that this was also the opinion of the War Department and requested that I advise Mr. Atherton to the same effect in the name of General Marshall.

Mr. Atherton was advised accordingly in the afternoon of January 9th.

W.F.

Attached is despatch as sent to Gen Eisenhower on Jan 9th by State Dept.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

By direction of the Secretary of State there are enclosed copies of an Aide-Memoire received from the British Embassy and a proposed telegram to General Eisenhower with regard to political arrangements concerning French North Africa and the French Empire. The draft telegram is being given to the War Department to be sent if you and General Marshall approve.



A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized, cursive name.

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO BE SENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER AND  
MURPHY FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GENERAL MARSHALL.

The British Government has presented a proposal for a joint policy to be adopted by United States and British Governments in their future relations with the French Empire.

Before making reply to this proposal we should like to obtain your joint views as well as those of General Giraud to the several British suggestions which follow.

The establishment in Algeria on the soil of a department of France of a single authority in place of both General Giraud's administration and the French National Committee in London is envisaged. The United States and British Governments as well as other governments would recognize this authority as a de facto administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty over certain parts of France and over the whole French Empire (except Indo-China) pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves. / It would not be recognized as the government or even as the provisional government of France but would maintain relations abroad through the informal exchange of representatives. It would be treated as an Allied power and be formally admitted to the ranks of the United Nations. Agreements relating to various parts of the French Empire would normally

normally be made with this central authority and not with the local colonial administrations. Economic agreements might be made on a tri-partite basis like the agreements in respect of French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons at present under negotiation between the British and American Governments and the French National Committee.

So far as French North Africa is concerned, the special powers exercised by the Allied Commander in Chief in virtue of his command of military operations would be redefined in a formal agreement concluded between the United States Government and the central French authority. The British suggest that their agreement as concerns Madagascar might serve as a model. In that agreement French sovereignty provisionally exercised by the National Committee is expressly recognized and the powers enjoyed by the Commander in Chief are conferred upon him by the National Committee. In the establishment of any such arrangements as regards French North Africa, it would be regarded as Allied territory in which the Allied Commander in Chief is vested with extensive powers rather than as quasi-occupied territory where he possesses the administrative authority. The central authority should conduct itself in all respects both internally and

externally

externally as an Allied administration. The British point out that it is essential that all links with Vichy should be severed or at any rate any claim to unbroken succession through Darlan from Petain should not be revived and also that a return should be made to the laws of the French Republic.

Pending information as to your views and those of General Giraud we will postpone making any reply to the foregoing British suggestions. At the present time we feel however that the whole situation in North Africa should be regarded primarily from the military point of view and that political arrangements should be advanced only as they promote the military effort. At the present time we recognize the sovereignty of the French people over French territories and, subject solely to the necessity of the military situation, we desire wholeheartedly to support and maintain a French civil administration in North Africa on the basis of its contribution to the military effort and to the restoration of the democratic traditions of the French people. While we are sympathetic with the proposal that there should be a coordination of the efforts of all Frenchmen who desire to join in the struggle against the Axis, we believe that the military situation is all important at the moment and that political issues should be set aside until the outcome of the present critical battle in North Africa is determined.

AIDE MEMOIRE

The proposals from both sides for a rapprochement between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle (though these as yet have not gone very far) make it desirable that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government should begin to consider together what should be their future relations with the French Empire.

His Majesty's Government assume that the United States Government, no less than they themselves, wish to see the French Empire united as soon as possible under a single authority making its maximum contribution to the war effort of the United Nations, and that while this result can only be achieved by agreement reached by Frenchmen with Frenchmen, the United States Government, like His Majesty's Government, will promote the desired agreement so far as they can.

The best solution would be the establishment in Algeria on the soil of a department of France of a single authority in the place of both the French National Committee in London and General Giraud's administration in Algiers. This authority would be recognised by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government and no doubt by other governments merely as a de facto administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty over certain parts of France and over the whole French Empire (except Indo China) pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves. It would not be recognised as the Government or even as the

/provisional

REB/pmp/dkj

provisional Government of France. It would however maintain relations with foreign Governments by informal exchange of representatives. It would be treated as an Allied power and be formally admitted to the ranks of the United Nations. Agreements relating to various parts of the French Empire would normally be made with this central authority and not with the local colonial administrations. Economic agreements might be made on a tri-partite basis like the agreements in respect of French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons at present under negotiation between the British and American Governments and the French National Committee.

So far as French North Africa is concerned, the special powers exercised by the Allied Commander in Chief in virtue of his command of military operations would be redefined in a formal agreement concluded between the United States Government and the central French authority. The agreement recently concluded by His Majesty's Government with the French National Committee about Madagascar might provide a possible precedent. In that agreement, French sovereignty, provisionally exercised by the National Committee, is expressly recognized and the special powers enjoyed by the Commander in Chief are conferred upon him by the National Committee. General Giraud has recently raised the question of respect for French sovereignty with the Commander in Chief (General Eisenhower's telegram no. 3351 of December 28th) and it may be taken as certain that the Fighting French element in any new administration

/would be

would be no less sensitive on this point. French North Africa would therefore be regarded as Allied territory in which the Allied Commander in Chief is vested with extensive powers rather than as quasi-occupied territory where he possesses the administrative authority. It would be essential to require as a counterpart that the central authority should conduct itself in all respects both internally and externally as an allied administration.

It would be desirable that all links with Vichy should be severed or at any rate that any claim to unbroken succession through Darlan from Petain should not be revived and also that a return should be made to the laws of the French Republic. His Majesty's Government note from the Commander in Chief's telegram No. 3124 of December 26th that these ideas have been mooted in Algiers. The National Committee would almost certainly press for their adoption as part of any agreement for fusion.

A statement of policy issued to Reuters on December 31st by Fighting French headquarters in London is of interest in this connection. The main point made is that unification of the military effort of the French Empire must result from the creation of a central provisional and administrative organ and not vice versa. The statement points out that this new unit which will include a population of 50 million and possess huge natural resources, as well  
as/

as many vital strategic positions, would quantitatively take fifth place in importance among the United Nations.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

JANUARY 7, 1943.

FLASH