

FLASH

Map Room Files.

BOX 30. (continued)

Folder 8. Oll FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1) Sec. 2.

Recognition of the French Committee. July 1 - September 3,  
1943..

Folder contains communications between FDR and the following  
persons re recognition of the French National Committee:  
General Marshall, John G. Winant, Churchill, Secretary of  
State Hull, William Glassford, General Eisenhower and  
Robert Murphy. Also included are drafts and final state-  
ments of recognition of the committee by the U.S., British  
and Canadian governments.

*Paraphrase*  
(Paraphrased copy sent to  
the Prime Minister by direc-  
tion of the President)

KEM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 3, 1943

Rec'd 4:40 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FROM MURPHY

Following recognition by the Allied Governments  
and the consequent clarification of the committees  
position, de Gaulle has raised the issue regarding  
the control by the committee over military affairs.  
He has sent a highly confidential memorandum to  
Giraud requesting that the latter agree to a more  
clearly defined control of the committee over the  
CINC and military activities and the limitation of  
military authority to operations against the enemy  
and organization of the armed forces. The memorandum  
further states that the powers exercised by the CINC  
in accordance with French law establishing a "state  
of siege" should be turned over <sup>to</sup> the responsible civil  
administrators and that all secret services should be  
amalgated under one direction and controlled by the  
committee.

The memorandum in question was reported to me  
in the greatest secrecy and it is requested that its  
existence not be divulged.

Further

-2- #1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

Further in this connection, the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested as well as the possibility of having only one president of the committee which in this case would be de Gaulle. The divergence with respect to the military authority is being further emphasized by Giraud's insistence that he alone has the authority to speak for the army, and that the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him in his personal capacity.

The question of the organization and control of resistance movements and the authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated have been brought to the fore in the committee's discussions. It seems clear that the extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have decided that the time has come to make a further effort to reduce Giraud's power as the CINC as well as to increase de Gaulle's own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the committee. It is understood that the discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the committee meetings have led to no solution as yet.

MCBRIDE

WSB

KEM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated September 3, 1943

Rec'd 2:00 am., 5th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1526, September 3, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The moderate element of Committee insist, however, that whatever solution is reached the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is basis of its recognition by Allied Governments.

As discussions of this nature continue the fear is beginning to be expressed that unless Committee is able to eliminate the personal differences and devote more attention to prosecution of the war the people of France when liberated will have lost respect for Committee and it will lose possibility of speaking for them when time comes. It is likely, however, that until French Army is able to participate more actively in prosecution of the war the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MCBRIDE

REP

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

AUGUST 26, 1943

CAUTION: The following statement by the President MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL RELEASED.

NOTE: Release in editions of newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 8:00 O'CLOCK, P. M., E. W. T., today, (Thursday, August 26, 1943).

The same release also applies to radio announcers and news commentators.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

WILLIAM D. HASSETT

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is our expectation that the Committee will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defense of French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States.

It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until French soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.



The Citadel,  
Quebec City, August 22nd, 1943.

MOST SECRET

*Dear Mr. President*

I am sending you, herewith, a copy of our draft letter to the Delegate in Canada of the French Committee of National Liberation, which I think I mentioned to you in our conversation last night. I have given a copy of it to Mr. Churchill and am sending one to the Secretary of State.

*Yours very sincerely,*

*W. Mackenzie King*

Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The Citadel,  
Quebec.

August 6th, 1943.

DRAFT NOTE TO THE FRENCH DELEGATE IN OTTAWA

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your note of June 11th with which you transmitted the text of the Declaration adopted at Algiers on June 3rd by which the French Committee of National Liberation was established.

The government of Canada has welcomed the establishment of the Committee of National Liberation. It has been and remains the intention of the government of Canada to cooperate with all patriotic Frenchmen in freeing France and the French people from the oppression of the enemy. This government is deeply interested in the early return of France to her high place among the nations, and it regards the institution of the Committee as an important contribution to that end. It informed the Committee early in July that it was prepared to consider promptly and sympathetically any requests which the Committee might care to present for assistance in the equipment and training of the French forces under its control. It is understood that the Committee will operate on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also understood that the Committee is in accord with the view of the Canadian government that the French people themselves, as soon as they have an opportunity of freely expressing their wishes, should establish in France the government of their choice.

On this basis the Government of Canada recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering the French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-allied cooperation. It notes with sympathy the desire of the Committee to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of the Canadian government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

The government of Canada warmly welcomes the Committee's determination to carry on the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until French and Allied territories are entirely liberated and complete victory over all enemy powers has been achieved. It is understood that the Committee will afford in territories under its administration whatever military and economic facilities are required by the governments of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Secretary of State for External  
Affairs.

U. S. DRAFT FORMULA

The Governments of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in accord that the following statement in no sense constitutes recognition of a Government of France or of the French Empire. It constitutes recognition of <sup>the French Committee of National Liberation</sup> ~~Committee~~ for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France in a free and untrammelled manner proceed to select their own form of Government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

CH/NT

MS  
DRAFT FORMULA

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will deal with the French Committee of National Liberation

as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

REVISED DRAFT FORMULA OF RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF  
NATIONAL LIBERATION

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His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of co-operating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

On this understanding His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement:-

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also recognise the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation. They agree generally that the Committee is to be recognised as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests and are prepared to discuss with the Committee the different categories of interests to which this recognition should apply.

*d. Scavitt* His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close co-operation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. The Committee will of course afford whatever military and economic facilities in the territories under its administration are required by the Allied Governments for the prosecution of the war.

In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Committee of National Liberation.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCE THAT GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ACCEPT RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE MUTUAL WAR EFFORT AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS.

THIS CONSTITUTES IN NO SENSE RECOGNITION OF THAT COMMITTEE IN SPEAKING FOR THE PEOPLE IN FRANCE OR FOR A FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.

IT DOES CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF FUNCTIONING WITHIN SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON BEHALF OF FRENCH TERRITORY OUTSIDE OF FRANCE.

IN VIEW OF THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE ~~IN~~ THE COMMON WAR EFFORT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE FRENCH COMMITTEE CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT TO THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIED COMMANDERS.

THE SIMPLE PURPOSE IS COOPERATION WITH ALL PATRIOTIC FRENCHMEN WORKING FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND TERRITORIES FROM THE OPPRESSION OF THE ENEMY.

ACCORDINGLY WE WELCOME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LIBERATION. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN CONCEIVED AND WILL FUNCTION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

OBVIOUSLY, IT WILL BE FOR THE FRENCH PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT AFTER THEY HAVE HAD UNTRAMMELED OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES WITH THE UTMOST FREEDOM.

MAY THE RESTORATION OF FRANCE COME WITH ALL SPEED.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

To put in your French  
Relations Folder.

F.D.R.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND  
THE PRIME MINISTER

The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.

From the outset military equipment and assistance has been given to the French armed forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been constantly growing since the landing of British and American forces in North Africa. In recent weeks, arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the liberation of France.

It is our firm hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will demonstrate a singleminded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the overseas French. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people as a whole are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves. Only the people of France itself can determine the form of their future government and make the choice of their future leaders. In making this decision, they must be wholly untrammelled.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of liberating France from the German and Italian yokes. We trust that it will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent, at this time, in promoting this great cause we are agreeing to the conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unity itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political problems.

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has given military  
forces wherever  
the Axis. This  
the leading of our  
arrangements  
have been concluded which will insure that French forces  
have adequate military equipment effectively to  
participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation  
of Europe.

This

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a draft of statement, about which I spoke to you over the telephone this morning, for you to give out in connection with the announcement as to relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

If you reach agreement in your talks with the Prime Minister with regard to the relations with the French Committee, I do hope you will have publicity withheld long enough for us to inform the Soviet Government before announcement in order to fill out our commitments to that Government.

C H

Statement by the President on the Occasion  
of Announcing ~~Establishment~~ of Relations  
between the Governments of Great Britain  
and the United States with the French  
Committee of National Liberation.

*Continuation*

The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have today made an announcement setting forth their relations with the French Committee of National Liberation subject to certain understandings. It is my firm hope that this Committee will demonstrate a single-minded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the French <sup>OVERSEAS</sup> ~~people~~. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves.

From the outset this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.

This

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for all other matters is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French people and the United Nations and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unify itself and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objections.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO

THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The attached memorandum from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the action recommended therein, has the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*William A. Leahy*

# SECRET

## ENCLOSURE

### MEMORANDUM BY CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.ARMY

1. The State Department advises the War Department that the French Committee of National Liberation, in a communication to the United States and British Governments, requests recognition of French participation in the Armistice negotiations, deliberations, and decisions with respect to the terms of surrender to be imposed by these governments upon Italy. (See Appendix "A").

2. In connection with the above, the State Department has requested War Department approval of a proposed cable to be sent to the U. S. Ambassador in London (See Appendix "B"). Although the State Department does not favor full compliance with the French request outlined above, the Ambassador is invited to discuss this matter with Mr. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary. If the British are agreeable to some measure of cooperation with the French, it is suggested by the State Department that the military terms, to be imposed on Italy by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, be presented to Mr. Massigli of the French Committee in Algiers by Messrs. Murphy and MacMillan, the personal representatives of the President and the Prime Minister in North Africa.

3. It is the view of the War Department that the French should be informed of the military terms of surrender to be imposed upon Italy, but consideration of the action proposed by the State Department has been declined, since it is believed that the United States views in this matter should be represented to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than by the State Department. Accordingly, any discussion or subsequent

# SECRET

negotiations with the French Committee of National Liberation on these military terms should be undertaken by General Eisenhower when authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

*only*

4. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President that General Eisenhower be authorized to inform the French Committee of National Liberation of the military terms of surrender for Italy.

2. That upon receipt of the President's decision, this matter be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department informed accordingly.

APPENDIX "A"

(TRANSLATION)

Algiers, August 2, 1943.

TEXT OF THE NOTE FOR THE AMERICAN  
AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS

At the moment when the possibility of an early Italian capitulation becomes definite, which would have the widest repercussions, in occupied Europe and particularly as regards France, the French Committee of National Liberation has the imperative duty of calling the attention of the American and British Governments to the essential importance of a French participation, first in the armistice negotiations, (and) then in the deliberations and decisions of the agencies which will have the duty of assuring the execution of the terms which are imposed on Italy.

The collapse of fascism marks a first and decisive victory of the democratic powers. The French nation is proud that its military effort and its sacrifices have been able to contribute honorably thereto. All Frenchmen, those of the Empire as well as those who are still under the enemy yoke, would see with the keenest satisfaction the Committee of National Liberation associated tomorrow in the preliminary negotiations which will confirm the Italian defeat and then the restoration of a democratic regime which, with the American and British Governments, it deems indispensable. This restoration involves the total disappearance of the juridical structure of the Fascist State.

It is on this condition that one of the essential aims of the war can be realized and that it will become possible for the Italian people, by the full reestablishment of its

liberties, to find among the European nations a place worthy of it.

Allied France, which itself has been able to measure the ravages caused by the ideologies from which the war arose, has the ardent desire to see itself associated in this work.

The Allied Governments have often assailed the circumstances under which Italy entered the war against France; they do not forget, assuredly, how the Italian forces joined in the pillage of its territory. The presence of French troops side by side with the armies of occupation and the presence of French representatives on the armistice commissions must constitute, after so many trials, a first and legitimate reparation. It is certain that those who are still living under German domination will find stimulation and promise of early liberation in the news that, three years after the aggression, their flag reappears in Italy among those of the victorious armies. For the population, and for the forces supporting the Committee of Liberation, it will be an encouragement to new efforts.

Aside from these considerations, which cannot leave indifferent anyone who measures the importance of the moral values of which this war is the stake, (sic) the request of the Committee of Liberation finds ample justification in the protection of French interests. It will doubtless fall to an inter-Allied commission on which the French Command will be represented, to prepare the armistice clauses which, when the time comes, the Italian Government would have to sign. The French delegation on that commission will present the matters of concern to the Committee of Liberation. It has none the less seemed opportune to call attention to some of the French interests involved:

(a) In the first place it goes without saying that the Allied Armies must be able to use Italian territory immediately as a base for their further operations, particularly for the

liberation of France, whose territory the Italian troops will have to evacuate.

(b) The prisoners of war, not very numerous to be sure, and the French nationals sentenced for political reasons must be immediately set free, as well as French civilians who may have been the object of measures of internment.

(c) French war material as well as merchant vessels and other materials, tools and equipment of all kinds, some surrendered in virtue of the armistice of 1940 or subsequent agreements, others purely and simply seized, must be returned. These will be assigned to the war effort, increasing the French participation in that effort.

(d) The sequestration placed on French public or private property must be lifted. The large properties of the French State in Rome, confiscated in July 1940, must be returned. By these examples, the Committee of National Liberation does not in any way mean to exhaust the list of the claims which the care of the French general interests will oblige it to present at the right time and the measures in the preparation and application of which it will ask to be associated. In the ignorance in which it still is of the thoughts of the Allied Governments and of the character which the Armistice Commission will have, the Committee can not, moreover, formulate any definitive proposal. In any case, this brief enumeration of some of the questions which will necessarily have to be settled at the cessation of hostilities would suffice, taking into account the considerations discussed at the beginning of this note, to justify its request to be associated with the coming negotiations.

Besides, it can not have escaped the American and British Governments that, if it is desired to base in the future Franco-Italian relations on a firm foundation without which no enduring



MOST SECRET.

Following is text of Murphy's 1364, August 3.

QUOTE Hubert Guerin who has been appointed political director of the Commissariat of Foreign Relations called on me this morning to hand me a communication setting forth the views of the French Committee of National Liberation concerning the conditions of an armistice with Italy and French participation in any Italian settlement. He informs me that this communication has been made to both the U. S. and British Governments in Washington and London.

I made no comment and in the absence of specific instructions do not propose to reply. I should welcome any information you may be able to send me regarding discussions which may take place in Washington on this subject.

MacMillan received an identic communication and is making a similar report to London END QUOTE.

We are asking the British Embassy to have the Foreign Office furnish you with a copy of the communication referred to above.

Although full compliance with the French request for active participation in our discussions would perhaps inject an unduly complicating factor at this time, we do favor some measure of cooperation in this matter because of the legitimate French interest in the ultimate solution of the Italian problem. Please take the matter up with Mr. Eden. If the British are of the same mind, we suggest that MacMillan and Murphy be instructed to see Massigli together and furnish him with a copy of the military terms to be imposed upon Italy by the Allied Commander-in-Chief as agreed upon between the President and

SECRET

**SECRET**

Mr. Churchill. MacMillan and Murphy might add that they will be glad to receive any recommendations which the French may wish to make with regard to the Italian situation. It might also be well to remind Massigli that the immediate question before us is not the conclusion of a peace treaty but the cessation of hostilities.

Eu:JCHB:BS

PA/D

**SECRET**

DRAFT

*French Com.*

AMEMBASSY

LONDON, MOSCOW, CHUNGKING

It is understood that French Committee of National Liberation desires to adhere to United Nations Declaration. This Government proposes to address the Committee as follows, if the British, Chinese, and Soviet Governments concur:

"It was announced on January 4, 1942 that 'In order that liberty-loving peoples silenced by military force may have an opportunity to support the principles of the Declaration by United Nations, the Government of the United States, as the depository for that Declaration, will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments.'

"This Government is gratified to accept adherence of the French Committee of National Liberation to the principles of the Declaration by United Nations. It welcomes this further manifestation of the determination of Frenchmen to continue and to increase their assistance in the struggle of the United Nations for defeat of the common enemy and for freeing French and other territory from Axis bondage."

Please inform Foreign Office of above and ascertain its attitude.

<sup>CS</sup>  
GC:CS:AMH

*P. H. S.*

BJR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated August 11, 1943

Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1395, August 11, noon (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY  
FROM MURPHY

My British colleague informs me that he is recommending to the Prime Minister that as soon as British and American Governments have recognized the French Committee of National Liberation he be appointed temporarily as Chief of the British Diplomatic Mission in Algiers. This temporary assignment would cease on the day when the Allied Commander-in-Chief decides to move his headquarters forward. In that connection see AGWAR telegram FAN 136, June 28 announcing decision that Mac Millan would act as political adviser to Allied CINC during the Husky post-Husky periods.

MacMillan believes that the British Government at his departure from Algiers will appoint Cliver Harvey or someone with similar qualifications and knowledge of the French situation as permanent Chief of Mission to stay near the French Committee until a provisional Government

-2- #1395, August 11, noon (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

provisional Government is set up in France.

MacMillan however, does not wish to remain in Algiers during the interval between recognition of the Committee and the forward move of AFHQ as political adviser to the CINC on Husky and post-Husky matters and be detached from French affairs. Therefore he wishes to remain temporarily as head of the Mission in Algiers. He does feel, however, that having dealt with the French through a most difficult period it would be unwise to remain on longer than indicated.

WILEY

MRM

RF  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated August 11, 1943

Rec'd 5:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1395, August 11, midnight (SECTION TWO)

The Agwar telegram under reference states that the President and the Prime Minister agree that MacMillan and I shall occupy equal status during the husky and post-husky periods as political advisers to the CINC. Presumably this would require following the latter to his future headquarters.

As regards my position I hold myself in readiness for whatever instructions the Department may see fit to give. Subject to its wishes I am of the opinion that my departure should be timed similarly to that of MacMillan. To avoid the possibility of critics exploiting the change as a reflection on our policy it might be well to tie together American and British action in that respect linking it with future operations. The Department, of course, understands that as I have dealt with many French officials of varying political convictions in circumstances which from the French point of view may be regarded at times as uncomfortable or even humiliating to them, it would be well that they

-2- 1395, August 11, midnight (SECTION TWO) from Algiers

that they enjoy a fresh start with an American representative whom they do not consider as knowing so much about embarrassing family quarrels of the past.

I would also appreciate at a convenient moment a period of consultation in Washington.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WILEY

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                      
THE SECRETARY

August 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your attention is called  
to the attached telegram from  
London.

*CH*

RCC

PLAIN

London

Dated August 9, 1943

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

5217, ninth.

The week end press freely predicts that the American and British Governments will soon accord recognition to the French Liberation Committee. Articles from Algiers and letters in the TIMES and the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN which have been the papers taking the lead in advocating recognition express the hope that the Committee will be recognized as soon as possible in order to establish its authority and to meet what is reported to be the general desire of Frenchmen associated with the Allied cause. Brief discussion is held of the formula of expected recognition which, according to the OBSERVER and the SUNDAY TIMES, may not be either of a de jure or de facto character but will be determined in the light of current policy. The former paper, which links up the question with recent "influential attacks on the State Department", says that while the form of recognition is problematical, whatever move is made will take the United States much beyond the attitude

-2-#5217, ninth, from London.

attitude adopted by the President at the dinner to General Giraud that "There is no France". The SUNDAY TIMES states that for some time certain highly placed officials both in London and in Washington have been considering the advisability of making public facts which they have regarded as the chief obstacle to the granting of immediate recognition, but that this policy has now been abandoned.

Under the heading "De Gaulle Is Now Giraud's Superior" the diplomatic correspondent of the OBSERVER writes "The significance of the agreement reached in Algiers a week ago has become clear. General De Gaulle now presides over all political deliberations of the Committee and over the Defence Council. Further, once the French Forces are engaged in battle, he becomes the sole President of the Committee of Liberation: he presumably therefore will return to France as such. General Giraud only presides over military deliberations until that time and he is commander-in-chief under the authority of De Gaulle's Defence Council. General Giraud's political role has thus ended". The article in the OBSERVER continues "Thus, three Anglo-Saxon schools of thought are being forced to reconsider their views.

British

-3-#5217, ninth, from London.

British Left-Wingers who insisted that Giraud was politically ambitious and even menacingly formidable, 'a General Franco', must think again. Government circles in Washington and London who intended that Giraud should act as a check on De Gaulle's power have equally been proved wrong. And the idea that the civilian members of the Committee might become the masters of both Generals has been proved unrealistic." Referring to the terms of De Gaulle's order of the day of August 2 to the "Free French Forces", the diplomatic correspondent points out that thus the members of De Gaulle's movement will retain their party sign and that the movement is intended to play a leading part in post-war French politics, contrary to De Gaulle's recent assurances to Anglo-Saxon journalists. The correspondent reports that political observers returning from Algiers say that the enlarged Committee endorses De Gaulle's leadership more readily than heretofore, that since nothing succeeds like success many political "neutrals" and even former opponents of De Gaulle are today his active or passive supporters. It is pointed out that the French Parliamentarians brought to England to manifest the representative character of De Gaulle's movement have been excluded from the

Committee

-4-#5217, ninth, from London.

Committee at Algiers and that the majority of its members are men who played no part in the democratic parties of the Republic; the Committee is not a body of representatives but rather of nominees and no constitutional checks have been introduced.

The OBSERVER writes that broadcasting from London and other means of contact with France remain an essential factor in De Gaulleist politics, and that one British Government Department continues to support Gaullist political extremists of a dubious character, whose activities have long caused the gravest misgivings to French democrats. The article concludes that the responsibility of the British Government which sponsored and financed the De Gaullist movement for many years, not always happily, is great and that the future of Europe and of Great Britain will be seriously affected by the wisdom or the short-sightedness with which British responsibility is discharged.

WINANT

JRM

SECRET

SECRET  
PRIORITY

August 9, 1943

From: Opnav  
To : Alusna, London


From the President to Ambassador Winant.

In reply to your unnumbered message of July 16, 1943.

(1) We are continuing our exchange of views with the British on the subject of our relations with the French Committee of National Liberation and hope that in the near future we will be in a position to publish a statement defining the future relations between the two Governments and the Committee.

(2) I appreciate your interest in the problems of occupation in the countries of Continental Europe. However, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have already set up a Civil Affairs Committee, including representatives of the State Department and Foreign Office, which is to have the responsibility of recommending to the two Governments decisions of major policy involved in planning future operations in liberated and enemy areas.

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1615, EWT, 9 August 1943 by

  
CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. COLONEL CHESTER HAMMOND

It is suggested that the President may wish to reply along the following lines to Mr. Winant's unnumbered message of July 16.

1) We are continuing our exchange of views with the British on the subject of our relations with the French Committee of National Liberation and hope that in the near future we will be in a position to publish a statement defining the future relations between the two Governments and the Committee.

2) I appreciate your interest in the problems of occupation in the countries of Continental Europe. However, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have already set up a Civil Affairs Committee, including representatives of the State Department and Foreign Office, which is to have the responsibility of recommending to the two Governments decisions of major policy involved in planning future operations in liberated and enemy areas.

*OK* *CH*  
*read*  
*JHR*





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British Embassy has handed us a copy of Mr. Churchill's messages to you, nos. 399 and 400 of August 3, concerning a possible formula to govern our future relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

We have endeavored to harmonize the formula which you sent to Mr. Churchill on July 22 with the latest Foreign Office formula, preserving the essential parts of each. A copy of our suggested draft is attached.

We have assumed that this Government has undertaken to equip a French army of approximately 300,000 men to serve, in the first instance, under the direct orders of General Giraud and, in the final analysis, under the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. We likewise assume that this undertaking on our part was predicated on the understanding that General Giraud would have the final word with respect to the French forces which we are arming and that in military matters General Giraud would be the sole responsible French authority with whom the two Governments would deal with respect to the French armed forces.

You are of course aware that on July 31 the French Committee of National Liberation issued a new decree providing in part for the creation of a Committee of National Defense under the chairmanship of General de Gaulle and subject to the "directive" of the main Committee. The question of whether or not the present personnel of the Committee of National Defense is satisfactory appears to be irrelevant since its members are apparently subject to change at any time by the French Committee of National Liberation (which is of course dominated by de Gaulle). A copy of the communique from Algiers concerning the new set-up, as reported in the New York Times of August 1, is attached herewith.

Although General Giraud has informed Mr. Murphy that he is fully satisfied with the new set-up, we have no  
knowledge

knowledge as yet of General Eisenhower's opinion. It is our view that General Giraud has lost further ground and in view of the well-known attitude of General de Gaulle and his followers toward this country we feel it essential in our dealings with the Committee to make a clear-cut distinction between military and other questions. This distinction was not at all clear in the latest British formula which appears to us as being the same for all practical purposes as their formula of July 8.

You will also have noted that in spite of your telling the Prime Minister that you objected to the use of the word "recognition" in any form, the British have come right back with the same phrase.

In our draft we have omitted the British reference to the Committee's position in the Levant and they may wish to handle this separately with the French. We likewise consider it wise to omit reference to past agreements, since we do not know what agreements the British may have made with the Fighting French. This question can be taken up with the French under the general terms of our proposed declaration.

You may be interested in the attached note left with us jointly by General Bethouart of the French Military Mission and Mr. Baudet of the Fighting French Delegation concerning the Committee's interest in being consulted in connection with Italian developments.

I am furnishing a copy of our latest revision of the formula to the War Department for its comment with respect to the safeguarding of the position of our military command.

If the formula is approved by the British we would wish, if possible, to postpone publication for a few days in order to notify the Soviet, Canadian, and certain other interested Governments of our intentions.

Attachments:

1. Draft formula.
2. Communique from Algiers as reported in the New York Times of August 1.
3. Note from the French Military Mission and the Fighting French Delegation.

CH

DRAFT FORMULA

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will deal with the French Committee of National Liberation

as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. 403, 4 August 1943.

TAB 23

Para 4. Your number 343. On this ground also I am so glad that we are going to meet. Pressure is growing from all quarters in this country, from the Dominions, particularly from Canada, and from several of the United Nations Governments with which we are in touch to "recognize" the French National Committee. MacMillan reports that he and Murphy are agreed in favouring this and that extreme bitterness and resentment will be caused among all classes of Frenchmen by continued refusal. In accordance with your wishes however we shall take no step pending our meeting to which I am keenly looking forward for reasons far removed from all this tiresome business.

Prime

From: The President  
To : The Prime Minister

No. 343, 3 August 1943

(TAB 21) Referring to your numbers 399  
(TAB 12) and 400, I earnestly hope that nothing  
will be done in the matter of recognition  
of the Committee of National Liberation  
until we have an opportunity to talk  
it over together.

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. 400, 3 August 1943

Following is revised draft formula "Recognition" of the French Committee of National Liberation referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

"The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

"On this understanding the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement:

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. The two Governments also recognize the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war, within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation. They take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this request in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President  
No. 400, 3 August 1943

Page 2

and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

"In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United States of United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements and the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation."

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

Number 399, 3 August 1943

TAB 19

(TAB 19) I am sorry not to have answered your number 321 in reply to my 373. I thought first that your proposed formula was rather chilling and would not end the agitation there is for recognition in both our countries. Meanwhile, events have moved in our favour. The Committee have felt acutely being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, has climbed down a good deal and is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for command also seem more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock.

I have, therefore, asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. Please note especially the sentence "The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war." This gives us complete power to override or break with them in the event of bad faith or misconduct. Revised formula follows in my next. Please let me know what you think of it or how it could be improved. If we cannot agree we will talk it over at QUADRANT.

*Frank Com*

THE AMERICAN MISSION  
DAKAR, F. W. A.

August 3, 1943.

SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

I have just returned from North Africa where a week was spent with Bob Murphy in close association with those who struggle to bring French politics into harmony with the French military who face the enemy.

I come away with the conviction that there can be no French harmony in that theatre of war under the present arrangement, whereunder the MILITARY is subordinated to the CIVIL Committee of Liberation. This situation appears to me to be completely unsound at this stage of French rehabilitation. Eisenhower is set up in a war zone with the civil administrators under him. The French should be similarly organized for identical reasons and purposes. The Committee is in my opinion a premature attempt to establish a government of the French people who are not yet ready for it. They will not be ready, in my opinion, until a civil government is set up under the military to maintain order in Metropolitan France for the time necessary for forty million Frenchmen to decide in an orderly manner what sort of government they will have. Accordingly in my considered view the French should be required in the interest of the common war effort to name a Commander in Chief and to place under him the Committee of Liberation or other suitable civil administration. I believe anything that can be done to accomplish the above end will be most fruitful of results in the War Effort.

Faithfully yours,

*William Glassford*  
WILLIAM GLASSFORD

The President,

The White House.

AUG 1 - 1943

# The Text of the French Decrees on Unity

**ALGIERS, July 31 (AP)—**The text of the communiqué announcing the reorganization of the French Committee of National Liberation and the unification of all fighting forces throughout the French Empire:

The Committee of National Liberation met under the presidency of General de Gaulle.

After several days of solid study, the committee made the following highly important decisions:

**Article I—**The decree of June 3 [establishing the committee]—is replaced by the following article:

The French Committee of National Liberation is presided over by Generals Giraud and de Gaulle and affairs concerning the committee of National Liberation are divided among the commissioners.

The committee appoints the commissioners and limits their number and their powers. To assure more complete unity, the exercise of the chairmanship is settled as follows:

General Giraud directs the discussions and follows the execution of the committee's decisions in affairs concerning national defense.

General de Gaulle directs the discussions and follows the execution of the committee's decisions in other affairs and in the general policy of the committee.

**Decree on the organization of the High Command:**

**Article II—**The French Committee of National Liberation directs the general conduct of the war and disposes of all land, naval and air forces.

General Giraud, appointed under the title of Commander in Chief, is charged with the exercise of the command of all French forces. During the time when he exercises an effective operational command he will cease to exercise the functions of co-chairman of the Committee of National Liberation.

**Article III—**As Commander in Chief, General Giraud is responsible within the framework of the directive given by the French Committee of National Liberation and by the Committee of National Defense (referred to in Article V) for the organization, administration and maintenance of the army and for the distribution of the French forces in the different theatres of operation.

He participates with the inter-

Allied-command in the establishment of an operational plan.

He guides and controls the formation and training of units with a view to their utilization as foreseen either by the inter-Allied operational plans or by the plans for the defense or security of territories.

He distributes the armament.

**Article IV—**General Giraud is assisted by an Assistant Commissioner for National Defense, particularly for the organization, administration and maintenance of the Army.

The Assistant Commissioner will attend sessions of the French Committee of National Liberation. He will have a deliberative vote in the absence of General Giraud.

**Article V—**A Committee of National Defense is created. This committee includes General de Gaulle as chairman, General Giraud, the Assistant Commissioner for National Defense and the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force within the framework of the directive given by the French Committee of National Liberation. The committee decides the general conditions and the distribution of French forces in the

various theatres of operations, as well as the principal measures to insure the fusion of the forces.

It deliberates on the general plans, on organization and on armament.

For the study of a particular question in which the commissariat is interested, the Committee of National Defense may invite one or several commissioners to share in its sessions.

**Article VI—**The decree of June 22, 1943, on the organization of the armed forces, and the decree of July 1, 1943, carrying the delegation of signatures to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force, are abrogated.

The committee made the following appointments:

Assistant Commissioner for National Defense—Gen. Paul Le Gentilhomme.  
 Chief of the General Staff of the Army—General Leyer.  
 Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Army—Brig. Gen. Pierre Koenig.  
 Chief of Staff of the Navy—Rear Admiral Lemonnier.  
 Assistant Chief of Staff of the Navy—Rear Admiral Philippe-Marie Auboyneau.  
 Gen. René Bouscat remains Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Enclosure No. 3

(TRANSLATION)

Algiers, August 2, 1943.

TEXT OF THE NOTE FOR THE AMERICAN  
AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS

At the moment when the possibility of an early Italian capitulation becomes definite, which would have the widest repercussions, in occupied Europe and particularly as regards France, the French Committee of National Liberation has the imperative duty of calling the attention of the American and British Governments to the essential importance of a French participation, first in the armistice negotiations, (and) then in the deliberations and decisions of the agencies which will have the duty of assuring the execution of the terms which are imposed on Italy.

The collapse of fascism marks a first and decisive victory of the democratic powers. The French nation is proud that its military effort and its sacrifices have been able to contribute honorably thereto. All Frenchmen, those of the Empire as well as those who are still under the enemy yoke, would see with the keenest satisfaction the Committee of National Liberation associated tomorrow in the preliminary negotiations which will confirm the Italian defeat and then the restoration of a democratic regime which, with the American and British Governments, it deems indispensable. This restoration involves the total disappearance of the juridical structure of the Fascist State.

It is on this condition that one of the essential aims of the war can be realized and that it will become possible for the Italian people, by the full reestablishment of its liberties, to find among the European nations a place worthy of it.

Allied France, which itself has been able to measure the ravages caused by the ideologies from which the war arose, has the ardent desire to see itself associated in this work.

The

The Allied Governments have often assailed the circumstances under which Italy entered the war against France; they do not forget, assuredly, how the Italian forces joined in the pillage of its territory. The presence of French troops side by side with the armies of occupation and the presence of French representatives on the armistice commissions must constitute, after so many trials, a first and legitimate reparation. It is certain that those who are still living under German domination will find stimulation and promise of early liberation in the news that, three years after the aggression, their flag reappears in Italy among those of the victorious armies. For the population, and for the forces supporting the Committee of Liberation, it will be an encouragement to new efforts.

Aside from these considerations, which cannot leave indifferent anyone who measures the importance of the moral values of which this war is the stake, (sic) the request of the Committee of Liberation finds ample justification in the protection of French interests. It will doubtless fall to an inter-Allied commission on which the French Command will be represented, to prepare the armistice clauses which, when the time comes, the Italian Government would have to sign. The French delegation on that commission will present the matters of concern to the Committee of Liberation. It has none the less seemed opportune to call attention to some of the French interests involved:

(a) In the first place it goes without saying that the Allied Armies must be able to use Italian territory immediately as a base for their further operations, particularly for the liberation of France, whose territory the Italian troops will have to evacuate.

(b) The prisoners of war, not very numerous to be sure, and the French nationals sentenced for political reasons must be immediately set free, as well as French civilians who may have been the object of measures of internment.

(c) French war material as well as merchant vessels and other materials, tools and equipment of all kind, some surrendered in virtue of the armistice of 1940 or subsequent agreements, others purely and simply seized, must be returned. These will be assigned to the war effort, increasing the French participation in that effort.

(d) The

(d) The sequestration placed on French public or private property must be lifted. The large properties of the French State in Rome, confiscated in July 1940, must be returned. By these examples, the Committee of National Liberation does not in any way mean to exhaust the list of the claims which the care of the French general interests will oblige it to present at the right time and the measures in the preparation and application of which it will ask to be associated. In the ignorance in which it still is of the thoughts of the Allied Governments and of the character which the Armistice Commission will have, the Committee can not, moreover, formulate any definitive proposal. In any case, this brief enumeration of some of the questions which will necessarily have to be settled at the cessation of hostilities would suffice, taking into account the considerations discussed at the beginning of this note, to justify its request to be associated with the coming negotiations.

Besides, it can not have escaped the American and British Governments that, if it is desired to base in the future Franco-Italian relations on a firm foundation without which no enduring collaboration could be instituted, it is important that from the beginning France shall occupy her proper place in the conversations which are to begin. The Committee of Liberation does not doubt the intention of the Allied Governments as to the purpose to be attained. Neither does it doubt the reception which they will give to this communication.

From: The President  
To : The Prime Minister

No. 321, 22 July 1943

Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.

The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Government will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain have no justification whatever. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude

From: The President  
To : The Prime Minister

No. 321, 22 July 1943

that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time use the word "recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must, however, retain the right and continue the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convoy.

As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan and Murphy?

"The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.

"Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-in-Chief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principle of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements.


"They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

July 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

This memorandum is only to advise you that the attached copies of our telegrams between Algiers are true readings of one of our secret codes.

  
John F. Stone

*Adm Brown  
to file  
File  
WS*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**THE SECRETARY**

July 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I refer to your request to see the reply which was sent to Murphy's telegram No. 1273 of July 17.

No telegram referring specifically to Murphy's 1273 has been drafted. The enclosed telegram (No. 1339 of July 21), however, was sent to Murphy in reply to his No. 1281 of July 19, a copy of which is also attached for your information.

CH

TELEGRAM SENT

HB  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

July 21, 1943

2 p.m.

US URGENT

AMERICAN CONSUL

ALGIERS (ALGERIA)

1339

SECRET FOR MURPHY.

Your 1281, July 19.

This matter has been receiving the attention  
of the British Government and ourselves. No final  
decision has been reached but the exchange of  
views is continuing. The formula eventually to  
be adopted may differ materially from those  
referred to in your telegram.

The assumption contained in the final sentence  
of your message is correct.

HULL  
(JSC)

851.01/2502

EU:JCHB:BS PA/D

*incoming*  
*see State # 1281, July 19, 1943.*  
*" " # 1273, July 17, 1943.*

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 373, July 21, 1943

TAB 8

Please see My No. 348 of the 8th instant.

It seems to me that something has got to be done about this. I am under considerable pressure from the Foreign Office, from my Cabinet Colleagues, and also from the force of circumstances to "Recognize" the National Committee of Liberation in Algiers. What does recognition mean? One can recognize a man as an emperor or as a grocer. Recognition is meaningless without defining formula. We submitted to you our formula which would meet our daily practical needs. These cannot be overlooked. Until De Gaulle went to North West Africa and the new Committee was formed, all our relations were with him and his committee. I stated to Parliament on June 8 that "The formation of this committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the situation created by the correspondence between General De Gaulle and myself in 1940. Our dealings, financial and otherwise, will henceforward be with the committee as a whole". I was glad to do this because I would rather deal with the committee collectively than with De Gaulle alone. I had in fact for many months been working to induce or compel De Gaulle to "Put himself in commission". This seemed to be largely achieved by the new arrangement.

Since then we have been dealing with the new committee on a de facto basis. We are now discussing the problems of Syria (where there is much friction) with Monsieur Massigli, and are getting a good deal of help from him. The Minister of State (Casey) and General Spears are stopping off at Algiers on their way back to the Middle East in order to carry these discussions further. General Catroux has returned from Syria to Algiers and also shows a disposition to be helpful. He is a level headed man and by no means in the pocket of De Gaulle. Neither I am sure is Massigli. I am certain we shall have a smoother course in Syria, which is full of dangerous possibilities, by dealing with the committee collectively than with De Gaulle personally. Yet that is the only alternative.

Very soon will come here Monsieur Couve De Murville to wind up our financial arrangements with De Gaulle and transfer them in so far as transference is required to the new committee. What other choice have I but to do this?

A third instance is supplied by the fact that there are a number of Free French troops and establishments here and about 50 Free French vessels which are doing very useful work and all of which have to be kept under military discipline. For this purpose an act of Parliament was passed in 1940 vesting the powers of discipline for such forces in General De Gaulle. I wish to transfer this to the committee and I shall have presently to submit an amending bill to Parliament.

Besides all this there are the numerous colonies of the French Empire which came over to us or were brought over forcibly, including Madagascar, Jibouti, and the French West African and Central African colonies. With all of these we have a varying flow of business and trade to do, and at present all this is formally focused on the person of De Gaulle. I would much prefer it to be transacted with the Committee and with the particular member of the Committee charged with the administration of colonial affairs. In fact from day to day we have been inevitably drawn to recognize the Committee in the sense of doing business with it.

MacMillian tells us repeatedly that the Committee is acquiring a collective authority and that De Gaulle is by no means its master. He tells us further that if the Committee breaks down, as it may do if left utterly without support, De Gaulle will become once again the sole personality in control of everything except the powers exercised by Giraud under the armed force of the United States in North West Africa and Dakar. He strongly recommends a measure of recognition. He reports that Eisenhower and Murphy both agree with this.

I am therefore reaching the point where it may be necessary for me to take this step so far as Great Britain and the Anglo French interests set out above are concerned. If I do, Russia will certainly recognize, and I fear lest this might be embarrassing to you.

I do hope therefore that you will let me know

(A) Whether you could subscribe to our formula or something like it or

(B) Whether you would mind if His Majesty's Government took that step separately themselves.

There is no doubt whatever in my mind that the former would be far the better. There are a lot of good men on the Committee, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet, Georges and, of course, Giraud who arrived here yesterday. He will certainly raise all this and bring it to a head.



From: The Secretary of State  
To : Murphy

No. 1339 21, July 1943

Your 1281, July 19.

This matter has been receiving the attention of the British Government and ourselves. No final decision has been reached but the exchange of views is continuing. The formula eventually to be adopted may differ materially from those referred to in your telegram.

The assumption contained in the final sentence of your message is correct.

COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated July 19, 1943

Rec'd 5:48 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

IMMEDIATE

1281, July 19, 5 p.m.

SECRET FROM MURPHY

MacMillan has just received a copy of formula of recognition of French Committee of National Liberation which was sent by Prime Minister to President on July 8. MacMillan has been asked to secure General Eisenhower's and my comments with regard to this formula.

Although formula in general seems satisfactory with exception that it does not include Point One of your proposal (See AGWAR telegram number 361, June 16, from Marshall for Eisenhower) I hesitate to express concurrence or approval without some knowledge of what considerations you have in mind in regard to general subject.

British Minister's telegram is the first indication I have received that any new formula has been under discussion or that General Eisenhower's and my comments were desired. I had assumed on basis of AGWAR exchange  
of

of telegrams previously referred to that the two governments would reach an agreement regarding terms of recognition and that we should be informed as soon as this agreement had been reached and instructed accordingly.

WILEY

AMT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers  
Dated July 17, 1943  
Rec'd 5:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1273, July 17, 6 p.m.

SECRET FOR SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY FROM  
MURPHY

In my recent telegrams I have endeavored to give the impression which is based on conversations not only with nearly all members of Committee of National Liberation, but other representative Frenchmen here, that Committee continues to consolidate its own position and to move forward as a collective body endeavoring to exercise authority over French interests under its jurisdiction. In absence of any information from Department, I have also assumed from these conversations and from press reports that question of Martinique has now been regulated in a manner which Department considers satisfactory.

Under these circumstances, may I again raise question of desirability of an early recognition on our part. The civilian members of Committee are

concerned

-2- #1273, July 17, 6 p.m., from Algiers

concerned that our delay in recognition implies existency of an American policy of ignoring this body, and consequently that we are supporting an individual in contrast to support for the nearest approach to a representative group which can at present be constituted.

It is believed that Committee will continue to function with an increasing sense of civilian responsibility and that only alternative to such Committee could be assumption of control under de Gaulle in view of Giraud's disinterestedness in political matters. Therefore if we are to avoid giving de Gaulle the means of increasing his personal leadership, it would seem that an early recognition of the collective nature of Committee is implied. De Gaulle himself has now publicly admitted in his speech of July 14 that Committee of National Liberation is responsible to French people for representation of their honor and interests, and is apparently reconciled to work within its frame.

The President's message of July 14, which was widely publicized here, was interpreted as

envisaging

-3- #1273, July 17, 6 p.m., from Algiers

envisaging possibility of recognition along lines clearly consistent with our policy of allowing French people their own choice of government, but of establishing an interim trusteeship which would bring the maximum French contribution to the war effort.

I have not been informed of any recent developments in the United States or in England which might render further delay in recognition advisable, but from the situation as viewed here, there is a growing apprehension in regard to our policy which if it continues, can, as far as we can see, be disadvantageous to our own interests in the long run. I should appreciate the earliest possible indication of your views and those of the President in this respect. General Eisenhower concurs in the foregoing recommendation and urges prompt recognition.

Repeated to London.

WILEY

LMS

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

*Hold for President*  
*WAL*

Paraphrase of State Dept message for information of War Dept:

From: Dakar  
To: Secretary of State

Number 445, July 17, 1943

The following message is for Admiral King.

General de Gaulle has been informed by Vice Admiral Collinet that he refuses to serve as Naval Chief of Staff to General Giraud with Rear Admiral Aubodneak who is at present serving as an additional Naval Chief of Staff under de Gaulle. This position has been taken by Collinet as a protest against French naval disunity; he declines to be a party to such disunity. It is his contention that the entire French Navy should have only one Chief of Staff. Collinet has been informed by de Gaulle that his dismissal from the Navy may be expected. The Committee of Liberation was supposed to consider this question at its meeting on the 13th of July. If any action was taken at the meeting, we have not been informed.

In the above connection, reference should be made to my telegram of 3 p.m. June 30, no. 404.

This message has been repeated to General Eisenhower and Murphy.

Glassford

NOTE: Ref is not identified in WDCMC.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD  
SGS

*# 404 - Info. of S.D. Cables of 7/2/43*

CM-IN-13406 (19 Jul 43) 1136Z ems

M. I. S. JOURNAL NO. 136 JUL 19 1943

22

COPY No.

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

*011 M. Africa*

G2 Dist	Action	Info
MC		✓
STRONG		
KRONER		
BRATTON		✓
3IT		✓
CURR		
DISS		
AIR		
E-A		✓
FE		
NA		
LA		
COLL		
SPEC		
GEOG		
TRNG		
JSC		
EO		
FS		
PER		
CC		
FIN		
POW		
RRG		
FI		
OIG		
JIC		✓
JNI		
WE		✓

REA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

*Hub James*  
London

Dated July 16, 1943

Rec'd 9:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4631, July 16, 7 p.m.

Roger Cambon came to see us yesterday morning and said that after most careful consideration he had informed Massigli that he did not feel he could represent the committee at Washington. Cambon wanted us to know the reasons behind his decision. He said Massigli had shown in his conversation a profound distrust of the United States and American policy toward France. He had likewise not taken Cambon in any way into his confidence and had not mentioned his conversation with the Prime Minister and Eden (concerning which Cambon, had, however, heard second hand from his close friend Comert to whom Massigli had talked.) Cambon explained to Massigli that he considered American policy to be thoroughly sound and that the committee's attitude is not really in the best interests of France; therefore he feared that upon arriving in Washington he would receive a number of "absurd instructions" which he could not conscientiously

-2- #4631, July 16, 7 p.m. from London

conscientiously carry out and that the committee would soon come to regard him as simply an American agent and remove him in a few weeks time. With his mission thus branded as a failure, Cambon felt his usefulness and possible future influence would be undermined. (Cambon is not personally ambitious and in our opinion would take on any post only if he felt he could do a real job for his country.) Furthermore, he said the personnel of the committee did not inspire him with confidence. Even Monnet, for whom he has always had much admiration, he feels has gone too far in what seems to be an effort to increase his power in Algiers and is laying too much emphasis on the aspects of governmental authority and French sovereignty. Cambon believes from all indications that De Gaulle dominates the committee on all important questions.

On the other hand, he feels that efforts should be made to de-personalize the committee and emphasize it as a collective body rather than the instrument of either of the Generals. He therefore favors a limited recognition and support of it in this sense but hopes "that the United States will keep a close surveillance on all its activities" reiterating that  
its membership

-3- #4631, July 16, 7 p.m. from London

its membership inspired no confidence in him and that he fears its efforts to seize control when his country is liberated. De Gaulle's speech on Bastille Day, he said, left little doubt in his mind that the General has every intent, operating through his organized and well financed groups inside metropolitan France, to control its destinies for some time to come. He said that he had seen no indication in the speech that the proposal to call the conseils generaux for the election of a "provisional government" after liberation is seriously contemplated by De Gaulle and his followers.

WINANT

KLP

SECRET

WAT

16/7/43

From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No Number Filed: 16/2310Z

Winant to President secret and personal.

(1) Two days ago Eden asked me if I would come in and discuss the French situation with him. Our conversation had been so completely covered by the Prime Minister's messages to you, No. 348 and 349 of July 9 and by my message of the same date and on the same subject that I did not feel it necessary to make our meeting a matter for further report. However, yesterday both Eden and the Prime Minister again brought up this subject. In their separate interviews with me they both referred to Ernest Lindley's use of the Prime Minister's confidential press directive. The Prime Minister felt that the almost verbatim quotations were an unfair use of a confidential directive (I was also disturbed about our codes) and that if the matter is pressed it may create a major issue in Parliament which still has 3 weeks sitting before adjournment for the summer recess. He told me that he tried to be helpful in preventing immediate recognition of the Committee by the Russians, that certain rights granted to DeGaulle were by act of Parliament which by transference to the Committee would dilute DeGaulle's authority, that he thought it was in the general interest to dampen down the issue as a matter for press agitation, and that some limited recognition of the Committee would tend to unite the French while a complete break with DeGaulle would divide the French both outside of France and in France as well as continuing the controversy which involved Anglo-American relations.

In my interview with Eden he gave me a copy of the suggested draft formula of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation prepared by the Foreign Office which the Prime Minister had already forwarded to you (his No. 349 July 9) and on which I made certain comments in my message of even date.

(2) Today I forwarded to the Secretary and the

*See msg, President to Amb  
Winant, 9 August 1943.*

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2

16/2310Z

Under Secretary a British Aide Memoire with a covering message on problems involving the post capitulation regime in Axis countries. Aside from the subject matter of the text I could not help wondering to what extent we planned to use enemy industry in support of military needs in these areas. The difficulties in regard to coal alone in Italy as it relates to mining and shipping will be a critical part of the occupation problem.

The good news on all fronts has cheered people here as I am sure it has at home.

(3) In discussing with General Devers the various committees that are considering the problem of occupation in Continental Europe, the question of coordination and political direction has been a matter of concern to us both. I hope that you will be willing for me to take some part in this and act as his political adviser when time and circumstance permit of an invasion from the British Isles. I have never worked more happily with anyone than I have with him.

(4) Secretary Stimson's trip here has been a great success. We called on the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Government. We dined with the Prime Minister and he in turn dined with us and tomorrow the Prime Minister is taking us with General Devers to inspect the Channel Coast Area. The Secretary has also visited our own air stations and military units.

Everybody here deeply regrets Secretary Hull's decision that he will be unable to pay us a visit this summer.

No Sig

SECRET

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXX

July 17, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of a message from Ambassador Winant to the President, dated 16 July 1943, be furnished the Secretary of State for preparation of such reply as the Secretary of State might deem necessary.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Military Aide to the  
President.

1 Incl. waits the French.

Each copy is a copy of the proposed draft... of the French Occupation of National Industries... prepared by the Foreign Office and forwarded to you in the Director's No. 348 of July 8. Do you require of the draft... certain comments on this draft.

(2) I sent to the Secretary and the Under Secretary... British Aide Memoire with a covering message on the problems of... regime in Asia countries following capitulation. I could not... wondering, aside from the subject matter of the tax, to what... we planned to use many industries in these areas in support... requirements. In regard to mining and shipping of coal along... the difficulties will be a critical part of the problem of...

People here have been cheered by the good news from all... as I am sure these at home have been.

SECRET

SECRET

PARAPHRASE

From: London  
To : The President of the United States.

Unnumbered, 16 July 1943.

Secret and personal from Winant to the President.

(1) Eden asked me two days ago if I would join him in a discussion of the French situation. I did not feel it necessary to make our meeting a subject for further report, since our conversation had been so completely covered by the Prime Minister's messages to you, No. 348 and 349 of July 9 and by my message to you of the same date. Yesterday, however, both the Prime Minister and Eden brought up this subject again. They both referred in their separate interviews with me to the use of the Prime Minister's confidential press directive by Ernest Lindley. It was the opinion of the Prime Minister that if the matter is pressed it may create a major issue in Parliament which will not adjourn for the summer recess for another three weeks. He felt that the almost verbatim quotations were an unfair use of a confidential directive and I was also disturbed about the security of our codes. He said that certain rights granted to DeGaulle were by act of Parliament which by transference to the Committee would dilute DeGaulle's authority, that he tried to be helpful in preventing immediate recognition of the Committee by the Russians, and that he considered it in the general interest to dampen down the issue as a matter for press agitation. He felt that, while a complete break with DeGaulle would divide the French, both inside and outside of France, and would continue the controversy which involved Anglo-American relations, some limited recognition of the Committee would tend to unite the French.

Eden gave me a copy of the proposed draft formula of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. This is the draft prepared by the Foreign Office and forwarded to you in the Prime Minister's No. 349 of July 9. In my message of the same date I made certain comments on this draft.

(2) I sent to the Secretary and the Under Secretary today a British Aide Memoire with a covering message on the problems of the regime in Axis countries following capitulation. I could not help wondering, aside from the subject matter of the text, to what extent we planned to use enemy industries in these areas in support of military requirements. In regard to mining and shipping of coal alone in Italy, the difficulties will be a critical part of the problem of occupation.

People here have been cheered by the good news from all fronts as I am sure those at home have been.

SECRET

SECRET

(3) I have been discussing with General Devers the various committees considering the problem of occupation in Continental Europe. The matter of political direction and coordination has concerned both of us. When time and circumstances permit an invasion from Britain, I hope that you will be willing for me to act as his political advisor and take some part in this. There is no one with whom I have worked more happily than in his case.

(4) The visit of Secretary Stimson has been highly successful. We called on Ministers of the Government and on the Prime Minister. We have dined with the Prime Minister, and he has dined in turn with us. With General Devers the Prime Minister is taking us tomorrow to inspect the area of the Channel Coast. The Secretary has also inspected our own military units and air stations.

The decision of Secretary Hull that he will be unable to visit us this summer is deeply regretted by everyone here.

SECRET

JKZA NR 47  
16/1620Z  
HH

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD  
16/July/43  
0339Z

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

CORRECTED COPY

From: Accra  
To: WAR

No. SC 311 15th July 1943.

Subsequent Boissons resignation and departure for North Africa with his wife his secretary Meile and wife and General Barrau (to MILID from Keller Milobserver Dakar) the new Governor General French West Africa, Pierre Cournarie, former Governor Free French Corercons arrived Monday 12 reception Tuesday and at French National holiday parades yesterday he was cheered loudly by the Free French minority while most old regime stood by silently. Holiday parade included French American and English soldiers, with resentment on part of English because placed last in parade though first in war. Among much cheering Americans received some boos and General crowd. Am investigating. Later Free French parade civilians and blacks while passing our American HQ broke into chant of "OK Americans OK OK". Military personnel changes are rapid now 50 higher staff officers leaving for Algiers immediately. Replacing General Barrau General Falvy and General Bergeret New Four Star General De Boibolisset commands both Army and air forces here now. His chief staff Col La Fitte. New Admiral Ronarch replaces Admiral Collinet commanding Naval Forces here working under British Admiral Rawlings at Freetown. Our 4 July extensively celebrated here by flags ceremonies. General enthusiasm. The requested base censor Captain Goodall arrived 12th Dakar area.

Jack Garber

Corrected copy of CM-IN-11255 (16 Jul 43) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD, SEC. GEN. STAFF, GEN. DEANE (CC/S)

CM-IN-11722 (17 July 43) 0353Z msh

**SECRET**

COPY No. 32

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*011 N. Africa*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B 29  
filed 1209B/07  
SCM

CCWD  
9th July  
1045Z

URGENT

From : Algiers  
To : WAR

No. W-4435 - 9th July 1943

There is no thought here of announcing the recognition of the French Committee. Action AGWAR Marshall for President signed Eisenhower cite FHKXV Murphy. Our W 4242 of July 6 and 1217 of July 5 to State Department are merely recommendations for your consideration. We fully understand that any announcement of recognition would be a matter of joint action of the American and British Governments.

No Sig

W-4242 is CM-IN-3980 (6 July 43) OPD

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION: C of S

CM-IN-5960 (9 July 43) 1141Z med

SECRET

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

011 H. Africa

SECRET

9 July 1943

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed 08/2320Z

To the President from Winant.

A bad impression is being created in this country by what is widely considered to be a deliberate attempt of the United States Government to discredit DeGaulle. This unfavorable reaction has been caused largely by the recent Associated Press dispatch from Washington on Eisenhower's powers to intervene in French affairs and by yesterday's United Press and New York Times stories about the secret oath allegedly taken by DeGaulle's agents.

If these stories had been published while DeGaulle was causing difficulties in Algiers, they would have passed without criticism. Now, however, when everything appears to be going smoothly in North Africa, they create the feeling that the United States is persecuting DeGaulle while trying to build up Giraud. The net effect is to arouse sympathy for DeGaulle, to destroy what prestige Giraud enjoys, and to cause misgivings regarding American policy among the British people and the Allied Governments here.

Whatever may be DeGaulle's faults, I think we should not take action against him at a moment when he appears to be behaving properly and when the Algiers Committee seems to be working in cooperation with our military forces. In view of Eisenhower's and Murphy's recommendation, it would seem wise to recognize the Committee within stated limits,

Duplicate filed in "Eisenhower" folder.

SECRET

SECRET

Unnumbered 8 July 1943

Page 2

giving it a chance to work, thereby diluting military control by civilian membership, and show no hostility or favoritism toward any of its members.

This would put us in a strong position. Then if DeGaulle raised difficulties we could take effective action against him and public opinion would understand and support us. It would also put the British under obligations to carry out their promise to us to transfer any arrangements they had made with DeGaulle to the Committee. Nor does it seem to me a wise time to disturb the North African situation.

In considering the formula recommended by the Foreign Office and forwarded to you by the Prime Minister today through special Army channels, I would suggest an additional statement making clear your determination that in Continental Europe the French people themselves, after the liberation of France, are to be the sole judges of their own government. Another point that I believe is important is that the direction of the resistance groups in France should be under Allied military control.

I thought that Commander Kettridge who has been working with Admiral Stark and who has recently visited North Africa and is now in Washington had a balanced view of this problem.

I would appreciate your advising Mister Hull of the contents of this message.

no sig

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

*Paraphrased*

Copy of this message was enclosed  
with this memorandum.

P A R A P H R A S E

From: Ambassador Winant

To : The President

Date: 9 July 1943.

In this country a bad impression is being formed by what is considered widely to be a deliberate attempt to discredit De Gaulle by the government of the United States. This unfortunate reaction has been brought about by yesterday's United Press and New York Times stories regarding the secret oath allegedly taken by De Gaulle's agents and by the recent Associated Press dispatch from Washington dealing with Eisenhower's powers to intervene in French affairs.

If these reports had been printed while De Gaulle was causing difficulties in Algiers, they would not have fomented criticism. At this time, however, when affairs seem to be moving smoothly in North Africa, they give the impression that the United States is persecuting De Gaulle while trying to enhance Giraud's position. The net result is to destroy what prestige Giraud has, to build up sympathy for De Gaulle, and to cause doubts about American policy among the Allied governments here and among the British people.

I think we should not take action against De Gaulle, whatever may be his faults, at a time when he appears to be acting properly and when the Algiers Committee seems to be working cooperatively with our military forces. It would seem wise, in view of Eisenhower's and Murphy's recommendation, to recognize the Committee within stated limits, to show no hostility or favoritism toward any of its members, and to give it a chance to work, thereby diluting military control by civilian membership.

We would be put by this in a strong position. If De Gaulle then raised difficulties, effective action could be taken against him by us which would be understood and supported by public opinion. The British would also be put under obligation, as they promised us, to transfer to the Committee any arrangements they had made with De Gaulle. It seems to me, moreover, that this is not a wise time to disturb the situation in North Africa.

I would suggest, in considering the formula recommended by the Foreign Office and forwarded to you by the Prime Minister today through special army channels, a statement in addition making clear your determination that the French people themselves in continental Europe are to be the sole judges of their government after the liberation of France. An additional point I believe to be important is that the direction of groups of resistance in France should be under Allied military control.

I would appreciate your advising the Secretary of State of this message.

Commander Kittredge, who has been working with Admiral Stark, has a balanced view of this problem. He is now in Washington and has recently visited North Africa.

From: The President  
To : The Prime Minister

No. 306, 8 July 1943

Your number 348.

Following is paraphrase of message I have just sent to Eisenhower and Murphy: (SEE TAB 10)

Quote, From London it is reported that recognition of the French Committee is being considered by you and Murphy. You are not to recognize the committee under any condition without full consultation and approval of the President. Of course it will be necessary to have joint action by British and U. S. end quote.

SECRET

8 July 1943

From: AGWAR  
To : Freedom, Algiers  
No : 2016

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO EISENHOWER AND MURPHY.

IT IS REPORTED FROM LONDON THAT YOU AND MURPHY ARE CONSIDERING RECOGNITION OF FRENCH COMMITTEE. UNDER NO CONDITION ARE YOU TO RECOGNIZE THE COMMITTEE WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT. JOINT ACTION OF BRITISH AND U.S. WILL OF COURSE BE NECESSARY.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
8 July 1943 at 1150 EWT.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

SECRET

It is reported from  
London that you  
& Murphy are  
considering recognition  
of French committee.  
Under no conditions  
are you to recognize  
the comm. without  
full consultation &  
approval of the  
board action of Federal  
~~Board~~ - O.S. will  
of course be necessary.  
F.D.P.

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 349, 8 July 1943

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is formula for recognition of French Committee suggested by Foreign Office.

His Majesty's Government are happy to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those parts of the French Overseas Empire which acknowledge their authority, and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. They also recognise it as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of Inter-Allied cooperation as well as, in principle, the administration and defence of French interests. The practical application of this principle to the different categories of French interests must be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

His Majesty's Government have taken note of the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. They count on the Committee to afford such facilities in the military and economic sphere in the territories under their administration as may be required by the governments of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war. In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the British or United States authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and pending their revision all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, will remain in force.

From: The Prime Minister  
To : The President

No. 348, 8 July 1943

1. I hear from MacMillan that Eisenhower and Murphy propose immediate recognition of French Committee. This is rather sudden. I should like to know your reactions. Our Foreign Office would also like to go ahead and recognise. My chief desire in this business has been to keep in step with you.

2. It is, however, essential that we should act together and that we should agree the extent and moment of our recognition. My immediately following telegram contains formula for recognition suggested by Foreign Office.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJDC 9  
0915E/6  
EW

CCWD  
6 July 1943  
0934Z

Priority

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 4208, 6 July 1943

In the absence of Massigli who departed yesterday for Londonn Murphy informed Pleven temporarily in charge of foreign affairs for the French Committee of National Liberation of the Presidents concurrence in the appointment of Pierre Cournarie as governor general of French West Africa. AGWAR action Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FHCIV. Reference AGWARS 1746 July 4. Pleven was also informed of the Presidents concern regarding the security of this area and his determination that there should be no development endangering security and military operations. Pleven gave the assurance that the President could count on the loyal cooperation not only of Cournarie but of the French Committee. He readily agreed that if reasons for dissatisfaction developed the Committee itself would wish to effect a change and put in Cournaries place a man acceptable to the United States. He said that he fully understood the importance of the military reasons governing this matter. Pleven added that according to a message he had received from Boisson the latter is fully reconciled with the change. I am confident that the present solution will prove satisfactory.

FOOTNOTE: 1746 is CM-OUT-1823 (4 July 43) White House  
ACTION: White House

INFORMATION: Combined Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff

CM-IN-3804 (6 July 43) 1217Z jb

SECRET

*White House*  
COPY No. 1

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SECRET

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

4 July 1943

From: AGWAR


To : Freedom, Algiers # 1746

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO EISENHOWER AND MURPHY.

IN VIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT DISPATCH FROM MURPHY, NUMBER 1195, FROM ALGIERS, AND BY VIRTUE OF THE GENERAL APPROVAL IN NORTH AFRICA FOR APPOINTMENT OF PIERRE COURNAIE AS GOVERNOR OF WEST AFRICA, I CONCUR IN THIS APPOINTMENT. DUE TO THE UNUSUAL MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF DAKAR TO THE DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE AND THE CONTROL OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING POINT SHOULD BE MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE FRENCH COMMITTEE: IF AT ANY TIME DURING THE REST OF THE WAR THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS A CHANGE IN COURNAIE'S COMMAND, SUCH A CHANGE WILL BE EFFECTED BY PUTTING IN HIS PLACE A MAN TOTALLY AGREEABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. THE FACT THAT THIS PROPOSED MEASURE IS FOR MILITARY REASONS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
4 July 1943 at 1610 EWT.

  
CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

SECRET

SECRET

Pres to Eisenhower and Murphy

~~I suggest sending Eisenhower for himself and Murphy the following, In view of the State Department dispatch from Murphy, Number 1195, from Algiers, and~~

By virtue of the general approval in North Africa for appointment of Pierre Cournarie as Governor of West Africa, I concur in this appointment. Due to the unusual military importance of Dakar to the defense of the American hemisphere and the control of the South Atlantic, however, <sup>the following</sup> ~~but~~ points should be made absolutely clear to the French Committee: ~~If~~ If at any time during the rest of the war the United States requests a change in Cournarie's command, ~~immediately~~, such a change will be effected by putting in his place a man totally agreeable to the United States.

~~(2) That the United States is contemplating sending to Dakar a fairly large force for training purposes in connection with the protection of the air fields and also for the protection and use of the port facilities and harbor. The fact that <sup>these</sup> ~~these~~ proposed measures <sup>is</sup> ~~are~~ for military reasons in the conduct of the war should be emphasized.~~

~~Before sending the above, please consult Secretary Hull and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let it go forward if they have no (repeat no) serious objections.~~

President approves  
W.A.L.

Signed ROOSEVELT

SECRET


SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

July 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I recommend that the second point (numbered 2) in the President's proposed message regarding the "fairly large training force" be eliminated. It may give the DeGaullists the ammunition they apparently seek to advertise United States efforts to dominate French affairs. In view of the imminence of impending operations and the effect of a strong DeGaullist reaction at this particular moment, including the possibility it would offer Axis propagandists to offset our Italian propaganda, the inclusion of the second point appears inadvisable to me.



Chief of Staff.

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SECRET

Copy telegram sent by  
General Marshall  
to the President  
July 3, 1943.

July 3, 1943.

July 4, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

GENERAL MARSHALL

ADMIRAL KING

I recommend that the second point (numbered 2) in the President's proposed message regarding the "fairly large training force" be eliminated. It may give the DeGaullists the ammunition they apparently seek to advertise United States efforts to dominate French affairs. In view of the imminence of impending operations and the effect of a strong DeGaullist reaction at this particular moment, including the possibility it would offer Axis propagandists to offset our Italian propaganda, the inclusion of the second point appears inadvisable to me.

A copy of State Department message No. 1198 from Mr. Murphy in Algiers is attached. Your attention is invited to the fact that this message No. 1198 is not a paraphrased copy, and so it is requested that you return this copy, without distribution, with your above recommendation.

Chief of Staff.

*Admiral Leahy*

*I concur in  
above recommendation  
of the C. of S.*

*W. H. Arnold*

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July 3, 1943.

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
GENERAL ARNOLD

Admiral Leahy requests that you submit at your earliest convenience, but not later than 11:00 a.m., July 4, your comments with reference to the attached message from the President.

Admiral Leahy further requests that these comments be addressed to him at the Map Room, The White House.

A copy of State Department message No. 1195 from Mr. Murphy in Algiers is attached. Your attention is invited to the fact that this message No. 1195 is not a paraphrased copy, and so it is requested that you return this copy, without distribution, with your above mentioned comments.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

2 Incls.

SECRET

SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Algiers

Dated June 30, 1943.

Rec'd 10:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1195, June 30, 7 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MURPHY

I have had conversations with Massigli, Catroux, Pleven, Diethelm, and Generals George and Juin. I also had a long conversation with Pierre Cournarie, Governor of the Cameroons, who is being proposed by Pleven as successor to Boisson. This appointment will come up before the French Committee on July 1.

I find some encouraging features in the present trend, including a growing determination on the part of members of the committee to oblige General de Gaulle to subordinate himself, alarm that he will alienate American sympathies if unchecked, and opposition to his desire to control and dominate. There is a distinct determination evinced by the members to maintain the committee and a much better understanding on their part, especially of those more recently arrived here, regarding the American position. Pleven particularly has impressed me with what I believe is a sincere desire to cooperate with us, recognizing that the committee is helpless without American support. He pleaded long and earnestly that we believe that his suggestion of the appointment of Cournarie as Governor General of French West Africa is actuated by the friendliest motives and that we can count on Cournarie's loyal support.

General William Donovan, who participated in some of our conversations, states the belief that de Gaulle has not shown intelligence in dealing with a number of problems, and expresses the opinion that the committee may well succeed in controlling him.

I have made quite clear in all my conversations the President's concern regarding the security of this area and his determination that there should be no development here endangering Allies' security and military operations.

Should the committee approve Cournarie's appointment I believe we should not offer objection at this time. Should there be later any indication of difficulty we could then insist on his immediate removal.

WILEY

SECRET

SECRET

I suggest sending Eisenhower for himself and Murphy the following, in view of the State Department dispatch from Murphy, Number 1195, from Algiers:

"By virtue of the general approval in North Africa for appointment of Pierre Cournarie as Governor of West Africa, I concur in this appointment. Due to the unusual military importance of Dakar to the defense of the American hemisphere and the control of the South Atlantic, however, two points should be made absolutely clear to the French Committee: (1) If at any time during the rest of the war the United States requests a change in Cournarie's command, immediately, such a change will be effected by putting in his place a man totally agreeable to the United States. (2) That the United States is contemplating sending to Dakar a fairly large force for training purposes in connection with the protection of the air fields and also for the protection and use of the port facilities and harbor. The fact that these proposed measures are for military reasons in the conduct of the war should be emphasized."

Before sending the above, please consult Secretary Hull and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let it go forward if they have no (repeat no) serious objections.

Signed ROOSEVELT

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1943.

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Hakar*

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
GENERAL ARNOLD

Admiral Leahy requests that you submit at your earliest convenience, but not later than 11:00 a.m., Sunday, July 4, your comments with reference to the attached message from the President.

Admiral Leahy further requests that these comments be addressed to him at the Map Room, The White House.

A copy of State Department message No. 1195 from Mr. Murphy in Algiers is attached. Your attention is invited to the fact that this message No. 1195 is not a paraphrased copy, and so it is requested that you return this copy, without distribution, with your above mentioned comments.

*W. T. Brown*

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

2 Incls.

*Adm. Leahy: I can see no objections to the attached draft message to Eisenhower and Murphy - King*

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1943.

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**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
GENERAL ARNOLD

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*W. T. Brown*

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

2 Incls.

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**SECRET**

● SECRET ●

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~~Before sending the above, please consult Secretary Hull and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let it go forward if they have no (repeat no) serious objections.~~

*President's approval received 2:45 pm 4 July 43*

Signed ROOSEVELT

*WSZ*

SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD  
1 July 1943  
2009

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. W 3903, 1 July 1943

Following up the information given you by Murphy in reference to numbers 1171 of 27 June, 1187 29 June and 1195 of 30 June on proposed successor to Boisson we are informed that the French Committee met today and unanimously selected Cournari as Governor to replace Boisson in his civil functions only. To General Marshall for His Eyes Only from Eisenhower cite FHCOS. Giraud has just called on me. He states that Cournari is entirely acceptable to him, is an able administrator and will function only in a civil capacity. General Boisboissel who is Giraud's subordinate has been appointed Military Commander of the area and is in complete charge of all Naval and Military matters. Everything we can ascertain confirms the view that Cournari is a professional Colonial Administrator of ability, a good friend of the Allied cause and of no political partisanship or extreme views. Murphy and MacMillan both feel that his selection was actually based on his excellent record and that no other suitable candidate of the necessary qualifications for the Civil Administration for this important economic zone was immediately available.

(CM-IN-578 1 Jul 43)

SECRET

COPY No. 14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

To President  
01/21/45 via  
Usher - WFB

*Handwritten signature*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

From: Algiers  
To: War

EYES ONLY

No. W 3903, 1 July 1943

As a further indication of Giraud's effective control of the local situation it was agreed at the first meeting of the Military Committee this afternoon that all French air matters throughout the Colonies would be centered under Bouscat who is Giraud's nominee and Chief of Staff for air. This is the first step towards practical Military Union. I repeat that General Giraud is highly pleased at the outcome as outlined above. An additional safeguard lies in the fact that Cournaris principal assistant is Boisson's present number 2 man and is known to be quite dependable. The Committee acted on the matter because of Giraud's insistence as he is extremely anxious to leave for the United States. He intends to depart tomorrow via Dakar and wanted the matter stated in accordance with our requirements. It was necessary to take the decision today in order to allow Giraud to be back here by July 20th which he considers the latest possible date for his return in view of important Military decisions and plans in connection with French Army reorganization. From the local viewpoint the arrangements outlined are completely satisfactory and the Military situation in North and West Africa is left completely in the hands of Giraud who is not only cooperative but acknowledges the overriding influence of the Allied Commander. In view of the President's messages numbers 1018 of 24 June, 782 of 22 June, 531 of 18 June, 9986 of 11 June, 9985 of 11 June and Svc 931 of 4 June, request you convey the above information to him as soon as possible. I have an engagement in Tunisia tomorrow but expect to return Saturday. No Sig.

NOTE: ✓ 531 is CM-OUT-7426 (18 Jun 43) White House.  
✓ 9986 is CM-OUT-4290 (11 Jun 43) White House.  
✓ 9985 is CM-OUT-4291 (11 Jun 43) White House.  
✓ 782 is CM-OUT-8836 (22 Jun 43) White House.  
✓ 1018 is CM-OUT-10488 (25 Jun 43) White House.  
✓ WDCMC invites attention to CM-IN-15872 (25 Jun 43) White House.

ACTION: White House  
INFORMATION: SGS, C of S

CM-IN-578 (1 July 43) 2248Z ems

SECRET

COPY No.

14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

FLASH