FLASH
Folder 9. Oil FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1) Sec. 3. December 22, 1943
- June 27, 1944.
Folder contains communications between FDR and the following persons re actions of the Committee: Secretary of State Hull, General Marshall, Churchill, General Eisenhower,

Map Room Files.
BOX 30 (continued) Ambassador Kirk, Averill Harriman, John J. Winant and Edwin C. Wilson. Also Military Intelligence reports on the operations of the French Committee.
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

No. FX 65175 27 June 1944

From AP HQ to for action AGWAR, USFOR FX 65175. PWB to OWI and PWE signed Wilson cite FHPWI.

Summary of French political intelligence report no 32 for week ending June 25th.

Invasion excitement now quieted to calm confidence. French success on Elba or activities French Forces of Interior as described by SHAEF communiques seem to interest Frenchmen here more than gradual liberation by Anglo American arms. Desire exists for information life in liberated territory and great importance is ascribed role M Coulet, regional commissioner of Republic. Communists in Algiers violently attacked him for recent declaration to foreign press concerning relative innocence Vichy appointed sub prefect M Rochat and possibility his reappointment elsewhere. Article written for Communist weekly "Liberte" suppressed by French censors was to be headed "The scandalous declaration of M Coulet protector of the prefects and the mayors of Vichy". It seeks to prove Coulet justifying double-Sey policy. Tone of article suggests writer had no knowledge of facts prompting Coulet's statement and represents M Bonte as most explosive like his earlier speeches in consultative assembly. Gaullist weekly "Combat" however, praises Coulet for conduct affairs in Normandy and for showing not intention of new authorities to shoot all Vichy appointed officials. Communists strong line regarding treatment Vichy officials may be first signs recrudescence party

CM-IN-22921 (28 Jun 44)

SECRET
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No. FX 65175 27 June 1944

members in North Africa ever since 2 appointed commissaires last April. Fact they have something to say and demanding public platform also evident in letter addressed by assembly communist delegation to President Gouin expressing astonishment at postponement 5th session which was to be debate on liberation of France. Debate originally set for 21st now postponed to Monday 26th.

Communists letter circulating in leaflet form says "A postponement which looks like and obstruction". Fact is De Gaulle advised against such public discussion at moment negotiations still in progress in London. This hurt assembly AMOUR PROPRE and feeling kept in dark they sent De Gaulle formal request for declaration on governments position and statement on situation in liberated territory. De Gaulle believed to have acceded reluctantly and his Monday declaration may only be formal one.

Reverse of this communist leaflet bears manifesto saying "National rising for liberation of France is spreading from hour to hour all over French territory. Hence Communist party demands:

1. Immediate massive despatch of arms munitions to French patriots.

2. Intensive organization military training for all young Algerians regardless race religion from age 15.

3. Maximum increase war effort in Army industry and agriculture.

4. Reshaping provisional government to be image of France at war." Communists may make first and fourth

CM-IN-22921 (28 Jun 44)
SECRET

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From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. FX 65175 27 June 1944

demands their battle cry during coming weeks. First is familiar certainly won't be dropped. Demand for government reshuffle may become louder. Communists want participation in administration of united forces of patriotic youth (organization claiming to combine all youth movements in France) and of CGT and AMY also desire resignation of some of present commissaires.

Noteworthy is difference between tone of Communist references to resistance and that in communiques from commissariat A L Interieur. Where communists announce "National rising'spreading from hour to hour" commissariat declares for example in Friday communiqué that "The forces Francaises D L Interieur are fight on French soil a battle which will finally develop into the national rising which is the last stage of the struggle of the French people for their liberation". Divergence of views is clear between those who desire every Frenchman be given weapon and sent into action at once without reference to Allied strategy and those who prefer that resistance conserve its trained armed force not seek combat except in self defense and carry out assigned program of sabotage. This conflict exists among resisters in assembly.

French officials accompanying De Gaulle to Normandy seem very please with results and report welcome reassuringly fervent though relatively few Frenchmen knew what De Gaulle looks like. Event was considered not only historic but as supreme test of De Gaulle's popularity largely built up from outside France. De Gaulle's task in Normandy was to turn legend and symbol into flesh and blood. Pleasure now felt in official circles probably not unmixed with relief at what they feel is corroboration their faith in De Gaulle's leadership.

CM-IN-22921 (28 Jun 44)

SECRET

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Frenchmen here believe civil administration liberated areas is working satisfactorily through French liaison officers and public see no reason regret administration by G 5. Also widely believed that London technical conversations between French and British experts will shortly conclude in agreement. Authoritative quarters here however suggest De Gaulle unwilling commit himself before going Washington except to accept terms in principle which if accepted by Americans would then be signed simultaneously by the three powers. President Roosevelt's recent press conference statement that more of France to be liberated before any discussions civil administration has not dispelled suspicion in high quarters provision that US has no intention ever committing self to any agreement with De Gaulle's "Provisional Government".

Current issue "Marseillaise" (now simply vehicle for Quilici's weekly article) features open letter to Mr Roosevelt by Quilici saying "May the United States remain what they are the country of Washington of Lincoln and of honest men". In heavily sarcastic style article attributes to Mr Roosevelt post war plan for four power council of nations excluding France and then discusses American designs on French possessions with quotations from recent article in "United States news". Quilici concludes that by not recognizing De Gaulle America intends make France one of guilty nations after war and so justify cutting off pieces her empire. This elaborate argument not widely heard and not worth reporting except that Quilici's articles reputed inspired by influential quarters close De Gaulle.

Assembly 5th session to open Monday 26th. Principal subjects for debate: Haurois project for reestablishment Republican legislation and "Provisional Governments" projected
ordinate for courts to deal with collaborators. Another ordinance by De Menthon elaborates exact legal definition of collaboration. Session may be stormy as each party wants appear strongest most vigorous prior to assembly's anticipated transfer to France.

Last Friday assembly's finance commission heard Mendes France on his negotiations with US Treasury on issue liberation currency. Any delegate allowed attend and meeting took form of small secret session. Mendes France at onset offered give any information desired answer any questions invited interruptions. Main question was what he had done to prevent issuing liberation France and what consultation if any American authorities had held with him. Other questions chiefly lease lend. While Mendes France apparently convinced commission his mission difficult apparently not yet successful dissipating doubts concerning his dealings with authorities issuing liberation currency. Hearing will continue Monday.

Combined metropolitan and extra metropolitan resistance groups have written assembly president demanding dissolution Algerian conseil general and resignation M Serda parliamentary delegate to assembly and deputy for Bone. Serda an Algerian colony owner of large estates and one of foremost wine and tobacco merchants in Algeria has taken leading part in colony's opposition to native reforms and was involved in conseil general recent attacks on the provisional administration. With other influential colony's and M Mallarme recently arrested Serda is believed been member opposition group declaring no allegiance to De Gaulle Government which they consider illegally constituted. This colonial group also propose Algeria have status of dominion with complete independence from French government for internal affairs.

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From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No. FX 65175 27 June 1944

During week Communist Socialist and Resistance groups in assembly and all but rightist elements outside it united in attacking M Giacobbi Commissaire A La Production et Ravitaillement and senator for Corsica who has been bitterly criticized by colleagues and by press for inefficiency especially regarding cereal stocks crop estimates and stock piling for France. News of possible famine in Paris has made many realize France's needs and inadequacy of relief preparations is deeply felt.

Giacobbi also criticized for signing contracts with large food producers entailing payment heavy sums. Critics feel requisition orders not contracts best also charge he is sympathetic with Algerian councils views due to his relations with great colonists especially M Borgeaud whose release from detention he allegedly solicited. Another charge is he refuses surrender property confiscated from Jews under Vichy racial laws. His predecessor Diethelm had drawn up order cancelling confiscations and Giacobbi allegedly disposed of it naturally incurring hostility of immense Jewish and part Jewish population in North Africa. His opposition to demands for internment wealthy colonists and merchants charge with trafficking with enemy under Vichy regime has also drawn fire of Communists. Moreover, Giacobbi allegedly removed fairly competent personnel in Commissariat left by Diethelm and replaced them with fellow Corsicans for political reasons to detriment efficiency.

M Le Troquer nominated April Commissaire Delegue A L Administration Des Territoires Metropolitains Liberes still remains Algiers. On De Gaulles return from London Le Troquer reportedly requested permission proceed to England complaining also of not being kept informed of activities CM-IN-22921 (28 Jun 44) SECRET
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. FX 65175 27 June 1944

officials in Normandy technically under him. De Gaulle reportedly abruptly refused travel permission and scene ensued. At moment Le Troquer seems unlikely to take up post.

General Chadebec De Cavalade one of military judges Pucheu trail nominated French representative at Rio De Janeiro with rank ambassador. Customary formal request for his acceptance sent Brazilian Government. De Cavalade was chief French military mission to Brazil 1938 to 41 was instructor military school at Rio and is acquainted with most leading officers of Brazilian Army. Nomination not yet published officially (see PPIR number 12 for biographical note).

END

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)

INFO: OPD
   Gen Hilldring
   Col Park
   Log

CM-IN-22921 (28 Jun 44) 1216Z 1s

SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT WEEK ENDING 2400/16.

POLITICAL VOTES FRENCH GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IN ALGIERS
REPORTEDLY INCREASINGLY FEARFUL OF EXCLUSION FROM MAJOR
ROLE IN ADMINISTRATION OF LIBERATED AREAS IN FRANCE AS
A RESULT OF US POLICY TOWARD SELF CONSTITUTED PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. REPORTS OF RETENTION OF VICHY
OFFICIALS IN LIBERATED TERRITORY APPEAR TO HAVE HEIGHT-
ENED THESE FEARS AND RECENT ARTICLES IN LOCAL PRESS
CONTRAST WITH BITTERNESS THE MORE FAVORABLE BRITISH
ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION WITH THAT OF
THE U.S. GENERAL DEGAULLE'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19871 France
IN LONDON HAVE ALSO BEEN REITERATED HERE IN PRESS AS WELL AS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS. ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL NON MILITARY RELATIONS ARE GENERALLY DESCRIBED AS "VERY LOW" THE FRIENDLINESS OF THE PEOPLE HAS INCREASED APPARENTLY WITH THE REALIZATION OF THE SACRIFICES INVOLVED IN THE AMERICAN LIBERATION EFFORT. HOPES ARE WIDESPREAD THAT DEGAULLES VISIT TO THE US WILL SETTLE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.
To: War Department
Nr: 13328 15 June 1944
Sr Nr 13328.

Seems doubtful if Churchill can long postpone some further declaration on British policy toward De Gaulle. Only his prestige in Commons and vague promise of settlement of relations with FNCL staved off strong demand Wednesday from many members for specific statement.

Times today again joins other papers in asking extended recognition of De Gaulle and calls present impasse perilous to British interests.

Most labor and Liberal MPS believed in favor recognition French committee as provisional government while conservatives divided. Many conservatives share Prime Minister's alleged dislike of De Gaulle and resent press campaign to force issue in US and here. De Gaulle not believed to have accomplished much in London with British Government.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
            CAD
            Col Park Log

CM-IN-12381 (15 Jun 44) 2155Zbjm

RESTRICTED
Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
4686, Twelfth

Following is complete text of interview given by General de Gaulle to French Independent Agency in English translation by agency;

"Question: Is General de Gaulle informed of President Roosevelt's declaration regarding an eventual visit to the United States?

Answer: Yes, I have seen his declaration. Needless to say I would be very honored to go the United States, and visit the President Roosevelt.

On May 31st the President was good enough to ask Admiral Fénard, who was going to Algiers on a service trip, to tell me that he would be pleased to see me in Washington if I so desired. I immediately answered that I would be glad to go and talk over with the President the problems of common interest to the
to the United States and France, President Roosevelt then informed me of the dates, now published, on which this visit would be possible.

**Question:** Are you satisfied with the development of military operations in Normandy?

**Answer:** The first part of the battle consisted of a direct landing of a great number of troops and a vast quantity of supplies on the Norman beaches. I consider that this very difficult operation has been carried out perfectly in spite of both the unfavorable sea and weather conditions, and enemy resistance. As for the following developments, we must wait. For the time being, one must be calm, ready for any emergency, and confident.

**Question:** What is the state of negotiation between the Allies and France concerning French Administration in the liberated territories?

**Answer:** At the present there is unfortunately no agreement between the French Government and the Allied Governments concerning the cooperation of Administration with the Allied armies in liberated French metropolitan territory. Furthermore, the proclamation addressed to the French people by General Eisenhower on June 6th and the one published today seem to foreshadow a sort of taking-over power.
power in France by the Allied Military Command.
This situation is obviously not acceptable for us,
and it might provoke in France incidents which, it
seems to us, must be avoided. On the other hand, the
issue in France of a so-called French currency with­
out any agreement and without any guarantee from the
French authority can only lead to serious complica­
tions.
At a moment when the battle is being joined
on the soil of France, the French Government is eager
in the common interest to see an end to such confusion
and infringement.

Concluding the interview the General de Gaulle
said:

France wages war like her Allies, and with her
Allies. She brings into the great battle for the
liberation of the world a contribution of all the
internal and external forces and her disposal, and
she endures a great deal of suffering for the sake
of the common victory. Tomorrow she will contribute
to the settlement of the conflict; but it is obviously
in full sovereignty that she intends to wage war
today, and tomorrow to make the peace."

WINANT

RR
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
No: F 55803
6 June 1944

Summary of French Political Intelligence from APO
FWB to for action AGWAR, USFOR F 55803 report no 29 for week
ending June 4. FWB to OWI and FWE signed Wilson cfr PHFNO.

Detente due to De Gaulle's impending London trip reported last week soon dissipated by New York Time story published here that no special American Plenipotentiary would go London. This followed by Reuter Diplomatic Observer report that Eisenhower had accepted responsibilities administration liberated France and that Civil Affairs officers will choose between Vichy collaborators and secret patriots. Mayors prefects will be maintained in office if can prove have not collaborated. Accepting this at face value French officials were dismayed that French authorities not to control appointments.

Question French sovereignty thus raised again. Rumor said De Gaulle would delay journey unless American representative designated. De Gaulle in fact never stipulated conditions merely intimated among others desiderata he would like tripartite conversations. French briefing of foreign correspondents suggested De Gaulle might well delay indefinitely if alleged conditions not met. Perhaps two reasons for taking this line. Either French press service honestly mistakenly believed De Gaulle set conditions or attempted trial balloon test Allied reaction. But some evidence De Gaulle reprimanded press service so line taken perhaps pre-

CM-IN-5410 (7 Jun 44)
From: Allied Forces Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No: F 55803 6 June 1944

Dust of imputation. Meanwhile Algiers daily is prominently quoted British American and even Argentinian press to show popular demand abroad for opening conversations with French Provisional Government. Finally inspired article throughout France Afrique saying journey still envisaged was found necessary. Article blamed foreign press for wrongly suggesting visit postponed or abandoned (in fact French press services probably originally inspired these suggestions) and went on to say question of recognition no longer subject for discussion.

Some French quarters inclined to blame White House for delay opening France Allied discussions and allege British government at variance with United States on policy toward France. These who maintain America not intending consult France concerning future Europe or would find fresh evidence in Hull's plans for discussions between four great powers: Great Britain, Russia, US and China. France noted with great satisfaction that Churchill in recent speech called France fourth great power.

De Gaulle left for London Saturday June 3 not accompanied by Commissaires originally designated. One General Bethouard Colonel Billette M. Palewski his Chef de Cabinet M. Seusselle Directeur des Services Speciaux and members of personal entourage went. Larger party including at least three Commissaires originally planned when De Gaulle thought tripartite conversations would require various expert advisers. He now considers scope of conversations may

CM-IN-5410 (7 Jun 44)

SECRET

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From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No: F 55803 6 June 1944

be narrower than anticipated. Selected Commissaires will go Lunden if needed.

Conseil General Dalgar continued subject violent attacks in 6 consecutive leading articles in Alger Republican. Left daily. Main criticism of Conseil General is that although its members now champion Third Republic and 1875 Constitution they were less articulate when Vichy violated same constitution thus implying republican conscience of Algerian Counsellors is only stirred when find own right privileges tampered with. Many French men feel it no time dislocate delicate provisional government or appear disunited before the world. Conseil General apparently included a powerful Anti Communist group, recognised by Algiers Communist Party who have protested in letter to De Gaulle against intrigues of Fifth Column. Communists allege attempt discredit provisional government and undermine war effort. In defense President Freger and Conseil General's best known member M. Serda Deputy for Borne and member consultative assembly declared that CFLN had frequently acted unconstitutionally especially in arbitrary evacuation measures and protested against arrest on political grounds. Reply to this provided by arrest and internment of M. Mallarme announced Saturday evening. Senator for Algiers and until Allied landing considered Petain's personal adviser on North African affairs Mallarme is accused of anti national acts familiar and conveniently vague charge. Many Frenchmen especially resistance delegates of Assembly have frequently express astonishment that such a self confessed collaborator...
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No: F 55803  6 June 1944

still at liberty and even prominent in Algiers public ceremonies. Some circles believe his duties connected with recent activities Conseil General and believe he took leading part behind scenes. Nallarmes sympathizers complain government opponents invariably accused of Petainisme and anti national activities.

Direct result of Conseil General political discussions was dismissal of Muscatelli who as prefect of Algiers had prerogative known as question pretable to step discussion questions he judges outside province of Conseil General. CILN considers Muscatelli failed in duty by not stepping discussion of government policy and criticism of assembly members.

News widespread throughout Algiers this week though not allowed in press that MM Lemaigre Dubreuil and his former secretary Rigaud Secretary of Interior under Darlan had escaped from Morocco into Spain and Rigaud for some time living in residence Surveillée in Morocco. Lemaigre Dubreuil was allowed circulate freely in North Africa. Warrant was issued for Rigaud's arrest before escape became known. Apparently forewarned he took steps leave country with wife and crossed frontier Clandestinely during first week in May. Lemaigre Dubreuil followed about fortnight later. MTs pass issued by Giraud authorizing visits to property in Morocco recently countersigned by General Bethouard. Latter believed reprimanded. Lemaigre Dubreuil had no authorization cross Moroccan border where he was stopped and turned back. He

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From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No: F 55803 6 June 1944

returned Rabat but few days later reached Spanish Morocco. Search of his house in Algiers revealed most papers taken with him. Believed to have travelled with Rigaud to Spain.

Their flight followed by circulation rumors there is gathering in Spain of French personalities such as Besset de Menzie, Negues and Pietri allegedly arranging establish French government of former ministers, generals and ambassadors they hope more acceptable to Allies that CFLN and name of Chatemps and Alexis Leger also rumored for this shadow government. Latest elaboration of tale is that Negues Lemaigre Dubreuil and Rigaud have arrived London.

Two important decrees issued this week. First makes Forces Francaises de L'Interieur integral part of French Armed Forces with same legal right privileges. FFI includes all fighting units and services on metropolitan territory whose organization and leaders are recognized by the government. As territory is liberated every claim to FFI membership will be verified by appointed authority.

Second decree was ordinance of June 2nd changing title of CFLN to Provisional Government of French Republic. Delay in publishing ordinance (new 3 weeks since Assembly action) believe due to disagreement among CFLN members as to wisdom of adopting new title. Massigli reportedly argued strenuously for retaining original name. Ordinance makes clear no chance in powers originally allocated to CFLN nor in constitution of provisional government after liberation.

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From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No: F 55803  6 June 1944

as provided in ordinance of April 21. No intention of changing Commissaires to Ministers. Thus change conforms to will of Assembly but apparently makes no difference whatever and there is little public interest.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-5410 (7 Jun 44)  1254Z  bjm

SECRET
From: *Admiral Hewitt (Mag)*

**ACTIVITY WITH ENEMY:**

5 DD SUB HUNT ORAN AREA. SUB SUNK 19/720 BY 19/859 REFERS.

SPEED WITH CUG-40 ON 24TH ATTACKER. HIGH SPEED RADAR TARGET OFF ORAN BELIEVED E-BOAT. TARGET ESCAPED.

PC 626 CAPTURED ENEMY SPEED BOAT NIGHT 23-24TH OFF ANZIO.

NO PRISONERS.

PTS WITH COASTAL FORCES. 5 LANDING PROJECTS 3 SUCCESSFUL.

2 OFFENSIVE PATROLS.

NIGHT 23RD-24TH. VADA ROCKS AREA 2 CORVETTES ATTACKED,

1 SUNK OTHER DAMAGED, 25 PRISONERS. NO CASUALTIES TO 6

PTS INVOLVED.

YMS 36, 251, 355, SWEPT 4 MINES OFF ANZIO 24TH.

**POLITICAL SITUATION:**

OUTSPoken DIssatisfaction with ALLIED POLICY IN OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL FRENCH POLITICAL CIRCLES. THEIR GENERAL FEELING RELATIONS ARE AT WORST HOWEVER THEY HOPE DE CAULLE'S VISIT LONDON WILL IMPROVE SAME. CRITICISM OF COMMITTEE BY GENERAL COUNCIL OF NORTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENTS AND FORMATION OF NEW "REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC LEFT" PARTY COMPOSED OF GENERAL COUNCILLORS AND RADICAL SOCIALISTS EQUALLY CRITICAL OF COMMITTEE INDICATES SAME LOSING PRESTIGE IN NORTH AFRICA. REPORTS CIRCULATING IN FRENCH POLITICAL CIRCLES INDICATE PROMINENT OUTspoken ANTI CAULLISTS ESCAPED BEFORE ARREST FROM HERE TO LISBON TO JOIN OTHER NON CAULLIST ANTI VICHY PERSONS CAUSING...
RESENTMENT AGAINST AMERICANS DUE RUMORED HELP GIVEN BY U.S. OFFICIAL. POSSIBILITY LOUIS WARIO WILL REPLACE MASSICH.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria  
To: War Department  
Nr: F-51120  
26 May 1944  

F-51120 from Switzer for Bissell signed Wilson.

Noted industrialist Lemaigre Dubreuil accused of being sympathist who was instrumental in bringing Giraud to North Africa escaped clandestinely across Spanish Moroccan frontier night of 1920 May with Rigaud former Commissioner of Interior under Giraud before De Gaulle's arrival in North Africa. Dubreuil had been turned back from border 12 May because papers were not in order. At that time he carried pass to circulate freely in North Africa signed by General Bethouart. Dubreuil bags were picked up at border and taken to Tangiers by an American Officer.

Too late to apprehend them the French Surete Nation-
al issued warrants for arrest of both Dubreuil and Rigaud on grounds of Alleged Conspiracy against De Gaulle Government. Rumors circulating in French Government circles in Algiers say Dubreuil and Rigaud are in Lisbon where they have seen Bonnet De Monzie and Nogues. Are reported to be trying to reach London or United States to see Chautemps and Alexis Leger.

Americans are accused of having helped their escape from Morocco and of seeing them in Lisbon this has caused resentment especially as Bonnet De Monzie and Chautemps are among former Vichy group whom De Gaullist French fear Allies may deal with after Liberation of France rather than with

CM-IN-20463 (27 May 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: F-51120 26 May 1944

French Committee. Bethouart connection also viewed seriously in French circles.

Far reaching consequences of incident believed possible in as much as Allied relations with French are already at low ebb further details contained in JICAMA report 13352 subject weekly report on political trends in North Africa sent in number 102 pouch.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-20463 (27 May 44) 0653Z bjm

SECRET

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From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department
    Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
    London, England
    CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations
    London, England

Nr: F 46812 16 May 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff. Repeated USFOR for British Chief of Staff, Unity London, Hq MAAF, CINC Med Naples, Fairbanks, signed Wilson cite FHQCT. F46812 TOP SECRET.

Ensuing is MAF 701

1. The French Committee of National Liberation has submitted comments on the terms of agreement between the FCNL and the CCS. Following are observations of this Hq on the French comments which have been forwarded to you through the State Department.

2. Paras 1, 2 and 3 of French note appear to deal with a matter of political rather than military importance. No comments on these paras.

3. Reference para 4 of French note. It is felt we should accede to some extent to French demands. Extent however should be strictly limited by security requirements. We should be obliged to pass to the French High Command only the general plan for conduct of operations together with an outline of the command organization and the French troops who are to participate. Moreover, this agreement should stipulate that only specific individuals of the FCNL are to be given this information and that they should be found to hold it secret. It is unacceptable from a security standpoint to have our plans for future operations.

CM-IN-12559 (17 May 44)

TOP SECRET

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COPY No. 36
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: F 46812       16 May 1944

discussed by the FCNL as a body. We should limit the persons to receive this information on the government side to the president of the committee and those vitally concerned with the particular operation.

Subpara. The agreement should stipulate that while the head of the FCNL has a right of appeal this should be considered a military matter and the appeal should be made to the CCS. This is exactly in conformity with the procedure in effect as regards the US and British Forces in this theater. It is considered indispensable that in the agreement the French should be bound to proceed with the implementation of any plan decided upon pending the decision in any appeal they should make. Otherwise, we should have no assurance that any plan we make will not be shot down in the last moment. It should be pointed out in connection with fourth subpara of para 4 that the responsibility for the security of L and C and the maintenance of internal order is that of the CINC in the theater of operations. Under this conception the French role will be to undertake such administrative and security measures as were delegated to them by the theater commander.

Subpara. The statement in subpara 3 of 4 that the FCNL could not release operational control of unarmed units is not in accordance with current practice. In this theater, the operational control of all French naval units, rearmed and otherwise, is exercised by the allied naval commander in accordance with CCS 358 (revised). This allied control and command of French Naval Units is considered indispensable to efficient naval operation in this theater.

CM-IN-12559       (17 May 44)

TOP SECRET
From: CG Allied Forces Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: F 46812 16 May 1944

Subpara. The French up to now have not insisted upon any control in regard to the employment of rearmed French Air Units. In the past when a French Air Unit was ready, the French Air Commander in Chief has notified MAAP. MAAP has then assigned the unit to duty and assumed operational control of the unit. This informal arrangement has worked well in the past but a more formal agreement would be advantageous. It should, however, avoid definition as to the manner in which rearmed French Air Forces should be organized, or we may be faced with a demand to define the program for the development of a French tactical air force more clearly than we have done up to now. This might prove embarrassing at this stage.

Subpara. The French statement that the FCNL does not allow control of rearmed units to pass to Allied Command is true in this theater with regard to ground forces. This lack of allied control of ground forces has on several occasions led to confusion and has reduced the military efficiency of allied operations.

Subpara. Finally, the question of allied command and operational control will become more important. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that a written agreement similar to the naval agreement be entered into with the RNCL which will insure that all French land, sea and air forces that are rearmed by US or Great Britain should automatically come under allied operational control.

P. 4. With reference to para 5 of the French note. This theater is prepared to make certain concessions toward the French in this matter. For example, it is expected that a French officer will command the ground forces of the forthcoming allied Operation against Elba, and the question of French command in any operation involving large numbers of French troops is always considered. It is felt, however, that

CM-NH-12559 (17 May 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

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From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: F 46812 16 May 1944

that the employment of a French Commander in any particular
operation should be considered with reference to that operat-
on rather than covered by a general policy.

5. Reference Para 6 of the French note. The
French view here is acceptable.

6. Reference para 7 of the French note. In res-
pct to secret communications in this theater we should
agree to the highest French formation present having its own
secret radio communications with the French High Command.
However, this secret channel should only be used for political
and administrative matters. It should never be used for oper-
ational matters.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/3
INFO: Gen. Arnold
       Adm. King
       Col. Park
       OPD
       Log
       Gen. Bissell

CH-IN-12559 (17 May 44) 0829Z vhm

TOP SECRET

SECRET
COPY No. 36
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
28 April 1944

THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL MAREHAL.

Replying to your memorandum of 25 April reporting insistence by the French Committee in Algiers that military matters be handled on a political level as between government, it is my desire that at the present time military questions which involve the French Forces be handled directly between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the French Military authorities and not as between one sovereign government in full possession of its sovereignty and another government which has no de facto sovereignty. Signed F. D. R.
April 28, 1944.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL MARSHALL.

In a recent secret despatch from Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, to the War Department, General DeGaulle is quoted as saying in part: "Arms supply to French resistance greatly improved last three months, thanks to British."

The President would like a brief memorandum giving your comments on the accuracy of the above alleged statement.

Regards from all,

WATSON.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 15, 1944

A telegram from Chapin at Algiers, dated April 13, reports a call he received from a member of General Giraud's staff. The latter heard from a friend in the Committee that at Tuesday's meeting the Commissioner of War took the position that his (Giraud's) refusal to accept the post of Inspector General in time of war constituted insubordination. In the circumstances General Giraud has asked whether (a) this Government would agree to his proceeding to the United States in the event that he is refused permission to go to England and (b) whether this Government would make representations to General de Gaulle in his behalf in the event that he is placed under restricted residence.

Chapin adds that he considers both possibilities remote but he feels that we have an obligation to give an early reply.

With your approval I suggest that Chapin be instructed to reply informally and orally; that he bend every effort toward having Giraud go to England rather than the United States if he leaves North Africa; that he make known to Giraud however that he would be welcome in this country at any time; that we cannot believe de Gaulle or the Committee would go so far as to place Giraud under restricted residence and that consequently we cannot give a definite decision on a question which we regard as purely hypothetical.

BLACK 40, 18 Apr 44 (President, Hocaw, to Sec Hull, Washington).

Re your memo of April 15 in re General Giraud, your recommendation meets with my approval.

[Handwritten note by President] Approved by
Telegram to
Sec. State
H. 18 44
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your memorandum of 21 April, General Giraud's presence in England in such a capacity might cause General Eisenhower difficulty or embarrassment at a time when he should be free to deal with major problems. A message has been sent to Eisenhower asking him for his comments on General Giraud's assignment to his staff in an advisory capacity. As soon as General Eisenhower's views are received they will be transmitted to you.

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your memorandum of 21 April, General Giraud's presence in England in such a capacity might cause General Eisenhower difficulty or embarrassment at a time when he should be free to deal with major problems. A message has been sent to Eisenhower asking him for his comments on General Giraud's assignment to his staff in an advisory capacity. As soon as General Eisenhower's views are received they will be transmitted to you.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Employment of French Forces.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are aware of your desire that all military matters be handled directly between the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and the French Military authorities, and not on a government or committee basis.

Guided by this policy, the United States Chiefs of Staff, during Combined Chiefs of Staff consideration of an agreement proposed by the French Committee concerning the employment of French military forces in future operations, insisted that the instrument be accomplished on a military level. As a result of the United States stand, the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched an amended draft agreement to General Wilson who was instructed to negotiate the agreement with the French Committee.

Subsequently, the Secretary of State was informed by the American Mission at Algiers that the French Committee insists that this agreement be consummated between the Committee and the United States and British Governments. On receipt of this information the British Chiefs of Staff informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they now believe the matter should be handled on the political level as between governments, and that the Foreign Office agrees with this view. The British Chiefs of Staff are, therefore, examining the comments of the French Committee in detail and will forward their views to the Foreign Office.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
No: F 37225 25 April 1944

Hall PWB F-37225 to OWI and PWE signed Wilson cite FHPWO ALMD 25851.

Summary of French political intelligence report number 23 for week ending April 23.

Friday afternoon De Gaulle held press conference a very rare event in Algiers. In preliminary statement he declared that on eve of important perhaps decisive military operations he judged several points concerning French affairs needed clarification in public mind. In answers to questions he said that:

(A). He welcomed Hulls speech of 9th and agreed Atlantic Charter not in itself solution to postwar European problems.
(B). France interested in closest ties with a democratic and anti fascist Italy.
(C). CFIND has considered question of armed forces voting for constituent assembly should be decided by representative assembly successor of present consultative assembly.
(D). Frenchmen will accept no administration that is not French.
(E). Arms supply to French resistance greatly improved last 3 months thanks to British.
(F). Time to talk of French Army's liberation role will come after liberation.
(G). Differences of opinion between CFIND and Assembly normal in democratic regime, natural and desirable that all Frenchmen should not think exactly alike.
(H). Natural Franco Soviet bond exists without formal treaty.
(I). France is directly interested in Pacific war on account Indo China and other possessions. Though France at moment must concentrate forces on Europe she does not yield right to any Pacific possessions and intends fullest possible participation in common struggle.

CM-IN-18835 (25 Apr 44)

S-E-C-R-E-T
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria  
No: F 37225  
25 April 1944

(J) It is unfortunately true many bombs fell on France and certain many more will in future. One can only hope raids are prepared as expertly as possible.

(K) The fear of CFLN and its President establishing dictatorship in France was an old story. Some said De Gaulle wanted to be dictator others that he wished re-establishment of Third Republic with men of past. Still others declared he was ready hand over France to communism. These contradictions not worth answering. France will never accept dictatorship French or any other.

(L) Organization of Allied High Command did not justify post of French Commander in Chief unless the government had delegated certain of its own responsibilities regarding conduct of war. The government wished able utilize General Girauds great experience in advisory capacity. (There followed eulogy of Girauds military career and assurance he would head troops entering Metz). No particularly embarrassing questions were asked. De Gaulle answered with great composure and assurance.

This weeks "Liberte" publishes speech by Andre Marty to Communist party members in Algiers designed to explain communists role in CFLN reiteration no compromise on terms by which communists first agreed enter Committee and claiming party chose moment and laid down conditions namely that communists choose men for post and that selected men act under party orders. Marty attacked "Fifth Column" declaring it responsible for campaign against entrance of "Maison Carree" communists into CFLN. But De Gaulle accepted nomination of Billoux and communists accepted his proposition to choose second commissaire from those more recently from France in person of Fernand Grenier. Marty said only communists had entered government with clear precise program and he regretted same not true of other democratic parties. While declaring communists representation in CFLN not proportionate to party's strength influence in France he deplored absence from government of representatives of CGT, Front National and
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No.: F 37225 25 April 1944

Forces Unies De La Jeunesse. Marty went on to criticize ordinance for post liberation civil and military powers, failure to unify army and manner in which radio and press presented suppression post of Commander in Chief. He urged communists to support France Combattante increase discipline and redouble efforts.

This week's "Combat" published replies by BBC French Section and Pierre Maillaud API director to article entitled "Les Dissidents" already criticized by Frenay as sectarian.

Reorganization of France Afrique has made it a government mouthpiece. Example this week was favorable comment on CFLN ordinance of April 14 not yet published concerning organization of provisional government in France.

Mederic resistance delegate returned to France after last session of assembly. Shortly after his arrival he was arrested by French and is presumed dead. His arrest would suggest treachery or lack of security. The CRA is criticized by some. Mederic however spoke rather indiscreetly in Algiers about his departure.

Recent security measures in England welcomed here as sign imminent Allied landing, though considerable official displeasure at application of restrictions also to CFLN. Vigorous but unsuccessful demarches understood made with Allied authorities. French naturally feel under special necessity maintain constant communication between London and Algiers. First exception in favor of M Andre Philip received with publicized pleasure. General public more interested in coming operations than annoyed inconveniences to official communications.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO: OPD, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-18835 (25 Apr 44) 2330Z mlc
S-E-C-R-E-T

No Sig

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
To: War Department
Nr: F 35477, 21 April, 1944
Wilson.

Latest report for information only is that refusal to accept inspector generalship by General Giraud now a certainty. General Giraud left today for a small villa at Mazagnan outside Mostaganem in Department of Oran with daughter and Lieutenant De Rosen, his aide. Major Poniatowsky to join him shortly if transportation back from England is made available. Giraud reliably reported to be in complete retirement.

NoSig.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
Log
CM-IN-15684 (21 Apr 44) 2049Z bjm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters Algiers, Algeria  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in European Theater of Operations  
London England.

No: F 33877 18th April 1944.

Summary of French Political intelligence report number 22 for week ending April 16th. F 33877 Hall PWE to OWI and PWE signed Wilson site FHPWO ALWAD 828.

During 6 days between General Giraud's appointment as Inspector General of the Armies and press announcement Saturday morning April 15th that he had been placed on reserve list, there was no official pronouncement nor any unofficial comment of the press but it is believed every effort was made urging him to accept post created for him. Giraud apparently considered the appointment an indignity was equally determined not to resign as Commander in Chief and may have expected Allied support. His Staff attempted to frighten AFHQ into supporting Giraud by telling Allied Senior Officers serious trouble and demoralization in Army would result if he were forced out. Situation deadlocked several days, while General Bethouard new Chief of Staff is believed to have showed great tact and discretion as mediator, persuading Giraud to accept virtual retirement on active reserve. Latter means he may be called to active service and is honor restricted to Commanders in Chief who have been in action against enemy. Also talk of giving him Medaille Militaire, rarely awarded Senior Officers.

Sunday April 16th press published General Giraud's General Order Number 19 taking leave of his men, a pathetic document indicating deep sorrow and depression. He recalls bringing them back into fight November 9th, 1942 how he liberated Tunisia and Corsica, how he obtained American arms enabling them fight gloriously in Italy how he regrouped Navy squadrons around admiralty at Algiers and how he sacrificed every-
thing for union all Frenchmen. He denies "any feeling of bitterness" and concludes "men may pass on but France remains."

Thus ends conflict started November 1942 with Giraud's arrival in North Africa. The small French Army would inevitably be split up and under Allied-Command in any major operation so function of Commander in Chief was swiftly becoming obsolete. DeGaulle assumed wartime powers of Premier and title of "Chef Des Armees" and as such made 2 day tour of inspection of French units unaccompanied by General Giraud.

Though many Frenchmen regret rather tactless and undignified treatment of Giraud few feel Army suffers much loss. Giraud represented old school French military tradition, had no great victories to his credit, and was celebrated mainly for sensational escape from Koenigstein April 1942. Although he protested he was a soldier not concerned with politics, he expressed definite ideas on social and political problems popularly considered reactionary.

One of first clashes between Gaullists and Giraudists concerned the intelligence services. When De Gaulle arrived North Africa he established his own intelligence service linked with his London office. Giraud already has his Deuxieme Bureau. Suspicion of each other's activities defeated all attempts to fuse the 2 services. Securite Militaire under Commandant Paillolle appear to have adjusted themselves to Giraud's departure and seem confident they will not suffer any reorganization.

Giraud's testimony at Pucheu trial seriously undermined his prestige among his closest supporters. Pucheu's opinion Giraud had disgraced himself was shown by several Senior Officers of French Army. Those around De Gaulle if any who discreetly worked to remove Giraud must have felt...
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters Algiers Algeria Page 3
No.: F 33877 18th April 1944.

greatly assisted by his performance at Puecheu trial. While Giraud's evidence at trial did nothing to improve his reputation that given by General Bethouard was considered creditable. Bethouard's appointment well received in most quarters. He will apparently have more power than Giraud ever had. His relations with Allies are good. Above all Bethouard is not a London Gaullist so will never differentiate between Gaullist Divisions and rest of Army. While on intimate terms with De Gaulle he may be strong enough to check concentration of civil and military power in hands of 1 man.

Rumors of effect of Giraud affair on CFLN members include that Jacquinot Commissaire A Le Marine arranged to be absent when decree appointing Giraud Inspector General was signed. Also that Communists protested strongly in favor of Giraud. General feeling of disgust believed in committee. Billouez repeatedly protested treatment of Giraud and Queuille was apparently most deeply distressed by Giraud's departure. Unlikely, however, that any enduring split within CFLN.

March 14th ordinance concerning CFLN:

March 14th ordinance concerning civil and military powers in course of liberation has provoked strong criticism from Communists and from independent resistance group in assembly. In letter to Gouin, President of Assembly, Communist request that CFLN be asked for explanation of ordinance at next session saying it should have been submitted to Assembly for approval before adoption. Communists complain ordinance establishes a French AMGOT with no reference to resistance plans and cooperation and ask what is meant by "Teams of Experts" with which committee committees are to "reinforce" local administrations. The letter dated April 12th is signed by the 6 Communist members of Assembly.

CM-IN-13605 (19 Apr 44)

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN.
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters Algiers, Algeria
To: F 33877 18th April 1944.

Letter of April 15th from Independent Resistance Group follows same line asking that liaison between committee delegates and resistance organizations be clearly specified in the ordinance but does not protest that measure should have been submitted to assembly before adoption.

Secretary Hull's speech received wide press coverage here and was well received by most Frenchmen dispelling uncertainty and misgivings aroused by powers reported given to General Eisenhower. People had already adjusted to non-recognition of CFLN but were greatly encouraged that committee is to have every opportunity to take charge of civil administration. One press comment said that motive of speech was to show American people that State Department had definite foreign policy. There is tendency among Frenchmen to regard such statements now as election speeches.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO: OPD
Col. Park
Log

Copy IN-13605 (19 Apr 44) 06042

SECRET

COPY NO. 23

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

Nr: F 30551

11 April 1944

Hall FWB to OWI and FWE signed Wilson cite FHPWO F 30551.

Sequence of events follow concerning Gen Giraud:

Tuesday 4th.

Wednesday 5th.
Communicated his intention to Generals Eisenhower, Juin and Delattre De Tassigny. Juin returned to Algiers.

Thursday 6th and Friday 7th.
Deliberating with Generals and British Ambassador. Decided not to resign.

Saturday 8th.
Nominated by decree to post of Inspector General of the Armies. Refused to accept the post.

Sunday 9th.
Decree published North African Press with letter from De Gaulle to Giraud. British Ambassador visited both

CM-IN-7658 (11 Apr 44)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
Nr: F 30551

11 April 1944

Generals, Giraud sends letter to De Gaulle protesting against decree, declining post of Inspector General and refusing to resign.

Monday 10th.
Giraud has so far made no official statement and has not resigned post of Commander in Chief which technically no longer exists, as post abolished by decree of April 4th. Until further developments officially released by Giraud, De Gaulle, Comite or Brit/American Circles, UFR abstaining any coverage based on above report which though authentic contain elements which if commented on from here might prejudice negotiations still proceeding.

No sig.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO: CC/S

CM-IN-7658 (11 Apr 44) 1725Z ejm

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET
PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT MESSAGE FOR INFORMATION OF
WAR DEPARTMENT

From: Algiers
To: Secretary of State
Number: 1184 April 9, 1944

Since General Devers is in Italy and Murphy is away, having left for Italy on April 7, I communicated the gist of Department's telegram number 1055 dated April 7, 10 p.m. to General Barr, and to General Rocks when he returned last night.

Yesterday De Gaulle returned. In the meantime he saw Giraud and the post of Inspector General was formally offered to him by De Gaulle. The offer was later confirmed in writing by an official letter which followed this verbal offer. A personal letter also was sent to Giraud by De Gaulle. According to a source near to Giraud the conviction was expressed in this personal letter that Giraud would accept knowing that the country was invaded and being aware of the difficulties of those who must direct the state in the midst of foreigners.

It appears that Giraud's decision not to resign as CINC remains firm, that he has even drafted a reply to the above-mentioned official letter and will await action by GDNL.

This morning General Gammell and General Rocks attended a conference at which General Wilson, being informed of the attitude of the Department, remarked that he was not now personally opposed to loss of Giraud especially if report of General Bathourdi's succeeding as Chief of Staff were true. The British Counselor Rocker, he admitted, had personally urged Giraud, with his knowledge, to take no precipitated action regarding his resignation and Colonel Dostert of Liaison Section, I also learned, apparently received instructions.
from his chief, Colonel Higgins, to give General De Vinck similar advice.

General Wilson agreed as a result of this morning's conference that British should make no further representations regarding Giraud's acceptance of Inspector General's post and that I should inform British Ambassador in his behalf that Giraud's resignation would not be likely to cause any serious adverse military reaction. While I would volunteer no information regarding attitude of our Government to Giraud or his staff, it was agreed that I had full liberty to give them gist of Department's cable referred to in the event I should be approached. I have advised Duff-Cooper at request of General Wilson regarding this morning's conference decisions.

General Rooks, who is on General Wilson's staff, did not feel entirely free to report this morning's conference in view of delicate situation in which he finds himself. It is therefore requested that our military authorities be informed by the Department.

Repeated to London as 140; sent to Department as 1184

Chapin

ACTION: OPD
INFO: General Arnold
       General Bissell
       Colonel Park

CM-IN-7410 (11 Apr 44) 0900Z med
From: Algiers
Action: Secretary of State
Number: 1193 April 9, 1944

Following is a translation of official letter addressed by Giraud to De Gaulle today:

"After having summoned my Chief of Cabinet last night and having proposed to him a basis of understanding with me and after having received this morning a reply to your proposals you caused to be published in this evening's press the decree which relieves me of the duties of Commander-in-Chief and grants me the title of Inspector General of the French Armies.

I regret that I am unable to accept. Your decision is contrary to the provisions of law of July 11, 1938, as well as to those of the many ordinances which since your arrival in French North Africa have regulated the separation of the civil and military powers and the organization of the High Command.

According to our French custom the office of Inspector General is a peace time one. The post of Commander-in-Chief is effective in time of war with well defined attributes and prerogatives. It happens that we are at war.

Admittedly at present there is no theater of operations where a Frenchman is in command in the strict sense of the word. There is, however, a battle-field where French soldiers are dying. It is indispensible that their Chief should have
the necessary authority to participate usefully with the Allies in the preparation of the operations wherever French forces are engaged.

Moreover, who can say that another theater of operations may not be opened where a Frenchman will have the honor to command. I believe that I am still qualified to hold such a command. In these circumstances I do not submit my resigna-
tion. I do not accept the principle of the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in the midst of a war, nor do I accept the honorary post which you have chosen for me."

Repeated to London.

Sent to Department as 1193. Repeated to London as 143.

Chapin

ACTION: OPD
INFO: General Arnold
      General Bissell
      Colonel Park
      Log

CM-IN-7411 (11 Apr 44) 0902Z med

RESTRICTED
April 8, 1944

To: To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff.

Info: UNITY London and HQ MAAF and MIDEAST for Admiral Cunningham.

From: FREEDOM

No: NAF 669

Cite PHOOS F29518

1. The French Committee of National Liberation yesterday reported a decree defining the duties of the Inspector General of French Armies. General Giraud was offered this position today by General de Gaulle. The text of the decree is substantially as follows:

   Article One. General of Army Giraud is designated Inspector General of French Armies.

   Article Two. The Inspector General of French Armies will have the following duties:


   2. Carry out such inspections and missions as are assigned to him by the President of the French Committee of National Liberation.


   4. Be consulted on important matters relating to the organization, armament and employment of French forces as well as on the duties and assignments of officers to the High Command.

CM-IN-5970 (9 Apr '44)
2. General Giraud is now considering this offer.

T.O.O. 081940B

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold
     OPD
     Gen Bissell
     Adm King
     Col Park
     LOG

CM-IN-5970 (9 Apr 44) 0203Z amr
TOP SECRET

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
To: War Department
No. F28034 NAF 665 5th April 1944

F28034 TOPSEC to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and UNITY and to AAI pass to Eaker, Gammel, and MacMillan from Freedom signed Wilson cite FHDCS. This is NAF 665 further to NAF 661 and NAF 662.

1. In conversation with Ambassador Duff-Cooper, Giraud maintained his determination to resign but agreed to withhold action pending conferences with Juin and political advisor Murphy who returned from US this afternoon, 5th April.

2. Juin, who arrived here for conference with Giraud, is reported to have view that despite fact Girauds departure would lose to Army a stabilizing influence, there would be no appreciable loss of morale and no diminution of war effort. Appears to feel that a Chief of Staff over a General Staff within the framework of the Ordinance of the Committee of National Liberation would prove a satisfactory institution for the conduct of operations.

ACTION: CCS
INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING
COL. PARK
LOG

CM-IN-3533 (5 APR 44) 2124Z CNG

No Sig
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department

Number F 27771, NAF 662, 5 April 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated for information to UNITY London for Eisenhower, Headquarters MAAF pass to AAI and MacMillan, from Wilson cite FBGS F 27771. TOPSECRET. This is NAF 662.

1. At conference this morning, 5th April, it was decided that Mister Duff Cooper would at once interview Giraud in the interest of persuading him not to act precipitantly. This is further to my NAF 661 of 4 April. Mister Duff Cooper will offer friendly advice that Giraud has no real case for resignation on account of the ordinance passed by the Committee of National Liberation, other than the fact of its adoption without consultation with Giraud which fact is not known to the general public. The action of the CNL sets up a governmental control similar to that of the great democracies and Giraud in taking a stand against it will place himself in a position which will not be sympathized with by the people of these democracies.

2. Juin left Italy for Algiers 050930B for meeting with Giraud.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

Number F 27771, NAF 662, 5 April 1944

3. Will keep you advised of any further developments.

No Sig.

NAF 661 is CM-IN-2990 (4 Apr 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS
INFO: Gen Arnold
       OPD
       Gen Bissell
       SGS
       Col/Park
       Log

CM-IN-3239 (5 Apr 44) 1236Z mcs
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO: 518.

I am a good deal concerned by the French National Committee's demands in regard to military matters. The tone of these communications verges on the dictorial, especially when we consider the simple facts.

Personally I do not think that we can give military information to a source which has a bad record in secrecy. The implied threat to stay out of operations in France would, if carried out, do the Committee and its leader irreparable harm.

If De Gaulle wants to come over here to visit me I shall be very glad to see him and will adopt a paternal tone, but I think it would be a mistake for me to invite him without an intimation from him that he wants to come.

ROOSEVELT
PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE.

From : Algiers
To : State Department
Dated : 4 April, 1944
Number : 1109

I went with Duff-Cooper this evening to see Massigli, who gave us three documents, the most important being an answer to the proposed agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set out in AGWAR's 1913 (FAN 343) of 11 March. Reference is made in this document to a letter of 30 December 1943 to MacMillan and Wilson, and the text of the draft agreement of 27 December which accompanied it (Wilson's despatch No. 40 of 1 January), and the French note then makes the following points:

a. The French Committee should make an agreement with the Allied Governments, and not with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and a suggested preamble along these lines is submitted.

b. The proposal in article 3 of the draft of the CCS is rejected with the statement that the mere fact of the French forces being rearmed does not of itself (?) a general procedure directive of the CCS assuming that the original reservations in the document of 27 December are observed. The French Committee says it must be given full information about operations plans before it can consent to French forces being employed therein, and that no satisfaction on this point is afforded by the CCS draft, which, carried to a logical conclusion, would not even allow the French Committee to dispose of its forces to secure communication lines and preserve internal order.

c. Regret is expressed that the CCS draft contemplates that only one representative to ESC is provided for to present the French Committees views, instead of an arrangement for complete cooperation with that organization. The same objection applies to the fact that there would be only one liaison officer with the High Command of the Allies, and therefore article 3 in the 27 December proposal is insisted on in its entirety.

d. There are insufficient guarantees in the CCS proposal for the keeping intact of the French divisions.

*Commission being serviced.

CM-IN-4949 (7 Apr 44)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Number: 1109   4 April 1944   Page 2

6. Objection is particularly made to deferring provision for secret methods of communication between independent commands of the French and higher echelons, both Navy and Army, and it is agreed that the present arrangement in Italy that the French High Command use Allied channels for sending all communications is bad.

Summing up, the Committee insists that its proposal of 27 December be accepted without change, and past agreements are referred to, particularly those which de Gaulle made with Churchill and Oliver Lyttleton on 7 August and 25 July 1941, and urges that Britain and the United States reconsider the 27 December proposal, because plans are presently being made to employ French forces, the execution of which will be postponed if there is any delay in an agreement being reached.

It is requested by General Devers that CCS be informed. This message has been repeated to London as no. 136.

The other two notes Massigli presented deal with ancillary matters, one of them a protest against the insistence that aviation of the French be integrated under MAFF, and the other a protest against stopping, through a one-sided decision, the movement of forces of the French from one place in the Empire to another. It was admitted by Massigli that the reason for this last note was the objection by APNC to recent arrangements by the French to "replace" effective in the Levant.

Chapin

FAN 343 1a CM-OUT-4344 (10 May 44) CCS

ACTION: JCS
INFC: CG AAF
    G-2
    Log
    OPD

CM-IN-4949 (7 Apr 44) 17462 mca
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
To: War Department
Nr: F 27715 4 April, 1944

F 22715 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, Unity London for Eisenhower, HQ MAAF and FILPET for AAI pass to Gammell and MacMillan for information from Wilson cite FHCIC. This is NAF 661. TOPSEC.

Para 1. Action of French Committee of National Liberation in passing and publishing ordinance without consultation with Giraud arrogating to President CNL final authority in matters relating to organization and employment of French armed forces has led Giraud to declare his firm decision to resign office and retire to private residence in United Kingdom. He has signalled Juin urgently to come Algiers for conference between 1200 and 1500 hours tomorrow, 5 April, with announced intention of counselling continuation in battle in Italy and collaboration with Allies.

Para 2. Devers, on my request, saw Giraud at 041930E hours in effort to persuade him to defer decision at least until after seeing Juin but Giraud indicated decision was irrevocable. He did, however, agree to withhold telegram to Eisenhower asking assistance in securing approval of British Chiefs of Staff to his residence in United Kingdom until after seeing Juin.

Para 3. Indications are that action of CNL dictated in part by dissatisfaction at degree of political recognition accorded and partly by dissatisfaction with the terms of PAN 343 which in their view failed to take sufficient account of French sovereignty as represented
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
Nr: F 27715 4 April, 1944

by CNL.

Para 4. I do not anticipate any immediate serious repercussions since I depend upon Giraud loyally to use his influence in favor of continuation of the present collaboration. Devers and I are conferring with Duff Cooper and Chapin tomorrow morning and I will keep you advised of developments.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: General Arnold
       CPD
       General Bissell
       Admiral King
       Colonel Park
       log

CM-IN-2990 (5 Apr 44) 0302Z med
SECRET
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
To: War Department
No. F 27602 4 April, 1944

F 27602 Hall FWB to OWI and FWE signed Wilson cite FHPWO.

Summary of French Political Intelligence report number 20 for week ending April Second.

Principal measure approved by assembly in third session was project for Provisional Government after liberation. Debates showed assembly's evolution into more dignified still critical but constructive body. Four parties have developed, Right headed by Senator Astier, Independent Resistant under Mauriac, Socialists under Auriol and Communists usually led by Fernand Grenier.

As expected article 19 was heavily attacked by those favoring cooptation rather than election. Grenier's amendment which would double resistance and parliamentary groups of present assembly was defeated 38 votes to 32 with only Socialists supporting Communists.

Important amendment by Ribiere, Resistance delegate, altered project's plan to reinstate all Senators whose terms have not expired and who have not compromised themselves with Vichy or enemy. Ribiere argued French people oppose
re-establishment of Third Republic and that reinstating former senators would hamper constitutional reform. Senator Astier warned amendment was step toward Coup Detat opening way to Fascism. Amendment carried by 32 votes to 30.

Next motion carries was Grenier's additional article number 30 BIS making members armed forces eligible to vote also hold office. Also provides for absentee voting especially for Merchant Navy and prisoners and deportees.

Debate on provisional government ended with short speeches by Aurélien Grenier Hauriou and Astier. Astier has indicated last ditch opposition to changes in constitution of Third Republic. The 4 votes against adoption were cast by Astier, Azais, Rucart and Sarda.

On Monday final day of debate De Gaulle made short speech urging assembly be guided only by what they thought the will of the French people. "France in making decisions as to the manner in which liberty will be restored to her, does not need to consult the opinions of those beyond her frontiers." Many believe tone of speech inspired by press announcement regarding Eisenhowers powers to treat with any group he sees fit.

Next debate concerned reform of the press. Report of measures proposed was presented by Rene Perrier, President of the Resistance Group and Rapporteur of Commission for information and propaganda. He stressed giving earliest
facilities to clandestine press to operate openly, suggested press officers accompany allied forces to effect this, also proposed funds be given only those papers organizing themselves on cooperative basis. All papers continuing after January 1st 1943 will be suspended, and no titles of former co laborationist papers may be revived. Press would be controlled during transition to post liberation by committee for press and information including Commissaire of Information or his representative, Commissaire of Interior or representative, 3 members National Resistance council or their representatives, and 3 members elected by Union of Journalists.

Project also requires all articles be signed, and names of editorial and administrative staff must be published at regular intervals. A press agency to be formed as cooperative society including any paper as member and shareholder, but not to have monopoly and to be under control of Counsell De Surveillance to ensure independence and impartiality. This Agency Indépendante D information is to begin operations immediately under directorship of Géraud Jouve.

Assembly then discussed for 2 days a draft ordinance of project for reform of press. Perhaps most important article declares no director of a daily having ever ten thousand circulation can exercise any other industrial, commercial, agricultural or administrative function. Attacked by conservatives as threat to private property and liberty of press the article passed 51 votes to 12. Whole project comes into force immediately in North Africa.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers  
No. F 27602  
4 April, 1944  

This debate is first discussion of plan to become law at once, and first occasion for assembly to approach being legislative not merely consultative body. Bonnet came through debates unscathed, his speech well received and his replies to questions apparently satisfying to assembly.

In this weeks, "Fraternite", Henry Hauck attacked M. Bret former director France Afrique, hailing his resignation as beginning epuration of the press and accusing him of engineering Pierre Maillauds resignation of spreading seditious rumors and campaigning against CFLN. A director of, "Fraternite", reportedly asked Bonnet to censor the article but Bonnet allegedly urged publication.

Following several interviews with De Gaulle the Communists are believed preparing enter CFLN perhaps displacing Diethelm and another. Communist willingness to compromise over nominating non candidates would seem consistent with their recent conciliatory attitude in assembly. Grenier is steadily gaining ground as leader North African Communists would certainly be 1 nominee. Inclusion of Communists would strengthen CFLN claim to represent all Milieux French opinion.

General Koenig will probably be appointed French General officer for North of France in command any French troops participating there. He will also be military delegate of CFLN to Supreme Allied Command in London. Generals Mathenet and Dastier De La Vigerie have been recalled and French Military Mission there reportedly

CM-IN-3057 (5 Apr 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
No: F 27602  4 April 1944

Dissolved. Reliable circles also say Colonel Passy may
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British opposition to appointment.

Le Troquer and Mendes France still believed here
about to be replaced. Diethelm may take Commissariat
Aux Finances to make way for Communist in present post.

North African press Sunday April 2nd published text
of CFLN ordinance adopted March 14 concerning exercise of
civil and military powers in France during liberation.
Ordinance provides for appointment of CFLN delegate for
each theatre of operations with full powers to act for
CFLN assisted by administrative committee and a general
officer acting as military delegate.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO: OPD
      Col. Park /
      Log

CM-IN-3057 (5 Apr 44) 0454Z jb
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

No: F 27602  4 April 1944

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No Sig

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)

INFO: OPD
Col. Park ✓
Log

CM-IN-3057 (5 Apr 44) 0454Z jb
(RECEIVED FROM ARMY BY HAND)

REFERENCE LOYBO 2 AND 3.

1. CCAC. C CONSIDERED AT THEIR 2ND MEETING ON MARCH 20TH PARA 2(A) AND (B) OF LOYBO 2 AND AGREED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS SET OUT BELOW. IT WAS DESIRED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT

(A) ADDITIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE MADE AT LATER DATE TO SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED BOTH BY AGREEMENTS AND DIRECTIVES

(B) MANY OF SUBJECTS RAISED COULD BE COVERED IN ONE SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT OR DIRECTIVE

(C) AS REGARDS DIRECTIVES IT WAS NOT KNOWN TO WHAT EXTENT IF ANY SUBJECTS RECOMMENDED WOULD BE INCLUDED IN BASIC DIRECTIVES MENTIONED IN LOYBO 3.

2. ITEMS RECOMMENDED TO BE COVERED BY SUPPLEMENTARY

SECRET PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
AGREEMENTS:

(A) JURISDICTION OVER BRITISH SEAMEN AND ALLIED SEAMEN ON BRITISH CONTROLLED SHIPS AND OVER CREWS OF ALLIED SHIPS OTHER THAN U S OR U K (SEE PARA 8 OF AGREEMENTS).

(B) DISPLACED PERSONS INCLUDING (1) ACCEPTANCE BY ALLIED COUNTRIES OF THEIR NATIONALS FOUND IN OTHER LIBERATED AREAS; (2) MAINTENANCE IN COUNTRY WHERE FOUND OF PERSONS OF DOUBTFUL NATIONALITY.

(C) CENSORSHIP WHICH WILL BE COVERED BY THE COMMITTEE SET UP UNDER PARAG 19.

(D) FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS.

(E) FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES BROUGHT INTO ALLIED COUNTRIES.

(F) DISPOSAL OF ALLIED SHIPS AND CARGOES OTHER THAN U S OR U K (SEE PARA 9 OF AGREEMENTS).
US AND UK FOUND IN LIBERATED AND CONQUERED TERRITORIES.

(C) FURTHER CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION OVER BRITISH CIVILIANS AND ALLIED CIVILIANS WITH THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES.

3. ITEMS RECOMMENDED TO BE COVERED BY DIRECTIVES:
(A) ECONOMIC DIRECTIVE TO INCLUDE: (1) EXTENT TO WHICH THERE SHOULD BE REHABILITATION OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE WHICH MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY SAVE IMPORTS AND SHIPPING, (2) TREATMENT OF LABOUR.
(B) POLITICAL DIRECTIVE FOR EACH COUNTRY TO INCLUDE ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRADE UNIONS.
(C) FINANCE
(D) WITHDRAWAL OF GERMANS INCLUDING POLICE AND

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15
PARA-MILITARY FORCES. SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE THAT TO AVOID CHAOS IN CERTAIN AREAS, E.G. LUXEMBURG AND ALSACE LORRAINE IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME TEMPORARY USE OF GERMAN POLICE. COMMITTEE THOUGHT THIS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. IF A DECISION IS MADE TO PROHIBIT THE EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN POLICE IN LIBERATED COUNTRIES IT APPEARS DESIRABLE THAT A DIRECTIVE BE FURNISHED TO COVER THESE POINTS CATEGORICALLY.

(E) LIABILITY FOR RELIEF IN HIATUS AREAS

(F) AREA RESPONSIBILITIES OF SHAEF IN RELATION TO AFHQ AS REGARDS FRANCE, AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY.

(G) RELATIONSHIP OF SHAEF TO UNRRA AND VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES AND PROCEDURE FOR EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES.

(H) DISPLACED PERSONS
(1) DISPOSAL OF SHIPS AND CARGOES INCLUDING METHOD
OF LIAISON WITH WAR SHIPING ADMINISTRATION AND MINIS-
TRY OF WAR TRANSPORT.

(J) PROPERTY CUSTODIANSHIP

(K) FINE ARTS MONUMENTS AND ARCHIVES.

T.O.O. 23163\#Z

CM-IN-19253 (27 MAR 44) 1551Z

SECRET
From: Supreme Allied Command, London
To: War
Nr: B 15 19th January 1944

To Marshall for CCS, CCAC info AFHQ and British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower.

It is essential that immediate crystallization of plans relating to civil affairs in metropolitan France be accomplished. This requires conferences with properly accredited French authorities. I assume, of course, that such authorities will be representatives of the Committee of National Liberation.

I therefore request that General DeGaulle be asked to designate an individual or group of individuals with whom I can enter into immediate negotiations in London. The need for prompt action cannot be over-emphasized, since we will desire to turn over to French control at the earliest possible date those areas that are not essential to military for operations. In areas essential to military operations military control will, of course, apply.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal, USN) No Sig
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Hillyer
White House
LOG

CM-IN-12460 (19 Jan 44) 2011Z jb
CORRECTED COPY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W9307/23731, 4 January 1944 NAF 578

To AGWAR for Combined Chief's of Staff and to USFOR for British Chief's of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHDCS. This is NAF 578.

In response to a request by General DeGaulle a meeting was held on the 27th of December to consider the letter, the text of which is given in NAF 548.

As a result of this meeting Monsieur Massigli addressed the following letter to Mr. Wilson dated December 30.

"1. During the course of a conference held the 27th of December at General DeGaulle's Office at which you, the representative of Great Britain and the Chief of Staff of the Allied Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were present, you, as well as Mr. MacMillan, were given the text of a draft agreement between the Government of the United States and the British Government, on the one hand, and the French Committee of National Liberation, on the other hand, concerning the conditions under which the Allied Command will be able to use, in operations against the common enemy, the French land, sea and air forces which will be put at its disposition by the Committee.

The Committee considers it most important that such an agreement should be concluded with the briefest possible delay; I should, therefore, be obliged if you would without delay submit our proposal to your Government for examination.

2. At this same Conference, General Smith made
known the fact that the plans of the Combined Chief's of Staff anticipates, in the coming operations on French soil, the participation of all the French land and air forces re-equipped with American equipment as well as all the French Air Forces re-equipped with British equipment which will be available at that time, having regard to other operational needs. The greatest part of the French Forces would be employed as a French Army in an operation of which General Smith gave the general outline and the approximate vicinity.

3. In addition, in a letter of the same date to General Giraud, General Smith, at the direction of the Commander in Chief, informed us that General Eisenhower shares the opinion of the French Committee of National Liberation, as well as that of General Giraud, of the great importance of the presence of French Forces in the northwestern part of France whenever that shall be practicable and especially at the time when the Allied Armies are approaching the Paris area; with this object in mind, General Eisenhower will make the necessary representations to the Combined Chief's of Staff to insure the inclusion of a token French Force, preferably a Division.

4. These communications satisfy the essential anxieties of the French Committee of National Liberation, and I am, therefore, happy to advise you that the Committee has decided to put the French Forces mentioned above at the disposition of the Combined Chief's of Staff, to be used by the Allied Commander in Chief, in consultation with the French Command, for the execution of the operations of which the broad outlines have been given.

5. Without hindering the execution of the intended operations, the Committee of Liberation nevertheless reserves the right to intervene with the American and British Government and right of the French Command to intervene with the Allied Commander in Chief so that the allotment of the Forces thus put at the disposition of the Commander in Chief shall take our interests into account as completely as possible.

CM-IN-3128 (6 Jan 44)
Mr. Wilson sent the following reply to Monsieur Massigli on December 31st.

"I have to thank you for your letter of December 30, 1943, dealing with the conference held on December 27 in General DeGaulle's Office. I understand that you have sent a letter in the same terms to my colleague, Mr. Harold MacMillan, British Resident Minister.

You will appreciate that Paragraph 1 of your letter refers to a draft agreement dealing with the use of French Forces in all Theaters of War. I shall be happy to transmit this at once to my Government for its consideration. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 deal with arrangements for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. I am glad to inform you that after consultation with General Eisenhower, who is in full accord, I am in a position to accept these Paragraphs as accurately setting out the agreement reached at our meeting.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration. Signed Edwin C. Wilson."

A reply in exactly similar terms has been sent by Mr. MacMillan.

The equipment of French Forces is continuing and the solution is regarded as satisfactory.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-2949 (5 Jan 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: GEN STRONG GEN ARNOLD ADM KING WHITE HOUSE OPD

CM-IN-3128 (6 Jan 44) 00372 es
QUESTION NAVAL ATTACHE YOUR 230901 AWAITING DECISION JOINT CHIEFS STAFF CONCERNING NAVAL MISSION TO FRENCH COMMITTEE. COPIES GCS 338 AND JCS 597 ON SUBJECT HAVE BEEN SENT EISENHOWER AND YOU. EISENHOWER REQUESTED TO OBTAIN AND FORWARD YOUR COMMENT WITH HIS.

13...ORIG
COMING...GCS...16...JCS...BUPERS...NAVPAIDE...
20OP...CNO...

SECRET
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15
241515 French Committee
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 1583

THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND THE FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE

December 1943

If and when this study outlives its usefulness to you, kindly return it to:

Office of Strategic Services
Director, Research and
Analysis Branch
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

(29164)
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
The meeting in Algiers of the French Consultative Assembly represents a significant step in the evolution of a new government for France. The following article, written by an able political observer on the spot, presents an unusually reliable view of recent developments, though in no sense an exhaustive analysis of the Assembly.
THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND THE FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE

The convocation in Algiers on 3 November of the French Consultative Assembly marked not only an important step in the development of the Committee of National Liberation, but also provided some measure of the configuration of future French politics. General de Gaulle, in his address at the initial session, asserted that the occasion signified in fact, "neither more nor less than the beginning of the resurrection of French representative institutions." As the delegates gathered from various parts of the French Empire and from within France itself, Algiers took on the aspect of a provisional capital. The session opened in an atmosphere reminiscent of parliamentary days. In his introductory address, General de Gaulle showed a deference of manner less characteristic of a military figure than of a statesman habituated to laying his program before the people's representatives and seeking their accord.

From Committee to Government

The formation of the Assembly is a step in the evolution of the National Committee from an administrative group led by two generals, to a governing body provisionally charged with interests as broad as the French nation. It will be recalled that in the prolonged negotiations which preceded the establishment of the Committee last June, the fundamental disagreement between de Gaulle and Giraud was upon the scope to be assigned to the political and military powers. Giraud maintained that, until France was completely rid of the enemy, the military should control the police and prefectoral authorities. De Gaulle insisted on provisional civil rule. The matter was not settled by the constituent decree of 3 June, and the Committee's record since then, with its succession of internal crises, has been in large part the gradual liquidation of this conflict. De Gaulle's demonstrated gifts of political leadership had already suggested that his concept would prevail, when the decrees of 27 September appreciably clarified the situation. Their effect was to define de Gaulle's authority as head of the government, though he and Giraud continued to act jointly in a capacity which may be compared to head of the state.

The arrest of General Bergeret, former head of the French air forces in North Africa, marked another defeat for the military, who had offered strong resistance within the Committee. As the Assembly met, moreover, decrees before the Committee proposed the establishment of a central direction of the Sûreté Nationale, charged with maintaining public order in the liberated portions of France and with protecting the authority of the provisional governing power. The passage of these decrees, and the appointment of Charles Chevreux to the new post, reinforced the impression that the Committee is in process of consolidating its position and affirming its political role.

The pace of events evidently stimulated these developments, and accounted for a certain haste and improvisation which attended the Assembly's opening. After the Moscow conference, and more particularly after the exclusion of France from a place in the Council of London, the leaders in Algiers recognized that if French influence in shaping post-war Europe
was to be felt, their claim to speak for the interests of France must be rapidly substantiated. They hoped that the backing of a popular Assembly would have this effect.

A Legislative Assembly

The function of the Assembly is to debate either those questions upon which the Committee has asked for advice or which have been submitted on the initiative of two-thirds of its members. It is obligated to express its opinion on the general budget and on individual expenditures involving more than 500 million francs, and also to advise the Committee in regard to the constitution of a provisional government. The Assembly's duration is limited to the period prior to the convening of a constituent body.

Critics both of the Right and Left have found the Assembly lacking in adequate power. Henri de Kérillis, rightist deputy known for his anti-Pétain stand, in a letter addressed to the Fighting French parliamentarians, has vigorously assailed De Gaulle for conjuring up a body which he terms as impotent as any that served the absolute monarchs of France. Professor Capitant, ardent follower of De Gaulle, has likewise disapproved the Assembly's subordinate role and has urged that the Committee be made collectively responsible before it. Yet the present status of the Assembly would seem accurately to reflect certain concepts which De Gaulle himself has maintained, even against the pressure of close advisors.

The role of the National Committee, in De Gaulle's view, is not to embody the sovereignty of France but rather to provide the conditions which will enable French sovereignty and democracy to reassert themselves as liberation is achieved. Jacques Maritain, noted Catholic philosopher, has expressed this idea by saying that although De Gaulle can not himself incarnate the "new elite" arising within France, he can nevertheless, by his sensitivity to democratic currents, ensure the ultimate accession of this elite to power. A French official devoted to republican institutions has declared in the same vein that a quasi-dictatorship may be necessary during the period when the new democratic forces of France, still half silent and obscured, are making themselves felt. In his speech of 5 November De Gaulle intimated that the French themselves, despite the good will of their Allies, must direct this transition. He described these Allies, who would participate with the French in the first stages of reconstruction, as "friends surely, but strangers; and with a psychology which, inevitably, must sometimes not coincide exactly with our own."

As a means of implementing this concept of the Committee's role, the Assembly would seem to have been effectively designed. Without laying claim to strictly legal foundations, or seeking to legislate for a nation still enchained, it can nevertheless hope to give to those who are defending French interests the sanction of a broad and representative popular backing.

The Assembly as a Representative Body

To fulfill this function, the Assembly was evidently intended to represent as faithfully as war conditions would permit, the emerging elements of French public opinion. As
though to emphasize that the new would predominate over the old, the architects of the Assembly limited the representatives of the last Parliament of the Third Republic to a mere quarter of the seats -- 20 out of 80. For the same reason, the Resistance movements were given a clear majority, 40 for the Resistance within France, 12 for the extra-Metropolitan Resistance. Furthermore, a certain number of seats were specifically assigned to those who had originally rallied the colonies to the support of De Gaulle. The remaining seats offered a far broader representation to the colonies than had existed under the Third Republic.

The result has been at least as great a variety of personalities and viewpoints among 80 representatives as could be found among 600-odd in the old Chamber. The Resistance committees of Egypt delegated the Dominican Father Carrière. For the Algerian Resistance, the strongly leftist Professor Capitant sat alongside the royalist D'Astier de la Vigerie. The Conseil Général of Constantine was represented by Senator Cuttolli, mayor of Philippeville, along with the Communist Moslem leader Dr. Ben Djelloul. From inside France, the Franc-tireurs et partisans sent Claudius, professor at a local lycée. By the end of the first week of November, about 25 Resistance delegates of the most varied backgrounds had reached Algiers in safety.

Obviously no regular method of election was possible, at least within France. Even outside the metropolis, certain irregularities aroused criticism -- notably at Algiers, where a minority in the Conseil Général publicly protested the elections from that body. And it is notable that in the elections from the Empire, the vast native majorities had no representation proportional to their size.

Inside France, the method of selection was more pragmatic than formal. Many of the Resistance delegates were former Parliamentarians designated by the clandestine committees of the reconstituted political parties. The Popular Democrats, who were evidently unable to send one of their number out of France, chose instead Professor Viard, of the University of Algiers. Others were ostensibly the emissaries of the clandestine Council of Resistance. A large proportion were certainly intellectuals. In perhaps a majority of cases, the leader delegated appears to have been someone who had rendered outstanding service to the Resistance, and who for one reason or another had been obliged to leave France. Some had escaped from prison; others knew that the Gestapo was close on their track.

Can an Assembly elected in so informal a manner be considered truly representative? The answer depends on the extent to which the Assembly can succeed in voicing the aspirations of the new France.

The Assembly and the Future of France

The composition of the Assembly -- particularly of its bloc of 20 Parliamentarians -- has lent some color to the allegation that it is simply a revival of the "discredited" Popular Front. Indeed, the assignment of seats in proportion to the representation of parties in the last French Parliament made it inevitable that the Left would predominate. Certain peculiarities of the Assembly's organization confirmed this
trend. While the three parties of the old Popular Front re-
erceived an individual assignment of seats (Radicals, 5; Social-
ists, 5; Communists, 3), the "moderate" parties of the Center
and Right were lumped together with seven seats. The result
appears to have been a certain difficulty in the selection of
this latter group: when the Assembly convened, only two
moderates were in attendance. The Center and Right, never-
well organized, and weakened through the declining influence
of Giraud, seemed unable to find suitable representatives.
None of the moderates were men of real prominence -- as op-
posed to such well-known figures of the Left as Queville,
Pierre Cot, Gouin, and Marty. The real leaders of the
patriotic Right for one reason or another were unavailable:
Louis Marin was in France, and Henri de Kerillis had refused
to serve.

Furthermore, the parties of the Left were able to organ-
ize early under the aegis of Fighting France. With the So-
cialist Félix Gouin in the chair, the Fighting French parlia-
mentary group -- about 40, in number -- met on 27 October to
consider methods for choosing their representatives in the
new Assembly. From the composition of the bureau (one Rad-
cal, one Socialist, one Communist), it was evident that this
parliamentary group was practically identical with the old
Popular Front. It was to Gouin, as unofficial leader of the
majority in the future Assembly, that De Kerillis addressed
his letter of protest.

If the Parliamentarians are preponderantly of the Popular
Front, the 52 representatives of the Resistance presumably
express the emerging forces of the new France. Is there a
conflict between these two conceptions -- and will this con-
lict create an early cleavage in the Assembly? Certainly
many of the Resistance delegates are new men who played no
part in the struggles of the pre-war era and who insist on
the non-political character of the Resistance. For instance,
Duval, a young man of barely 30, at a meeting organized by
the Algiers branch of Combat, emphasized again and again
that political distinctions did not exist among his comrades.
Other speakers of the Resistance confine their political com-
ments to generalizations about the future of the nation -- a
future in which the moral regeneration bred of suffering will
play the predominant role. The emphasis is strongly unitary
and nationalistic. One senses that with the more conservative
Resistance groups at least, moral values come first and
ideologies second.

At the same time, the presence of several deputies of
the Left among the Resistance delegates creates a natural
bridge between the parliamentary bloc and the representatives
from Metropolitan France. So far as ideologies are concerned,
it is of little importance that Marty sits for the Communist
parliamentarians, while Grenier represents the Communists as
an element in the Resistance. Moreover, other delegates,
like Buisson, the dean of the Assembly, were associated with
the C. G. T. and presumably supported the Popular Front.
Numerous testimonies from within France point to the continued
prestige of Édouard Blum, and to the general insistence that the
new France must insure a substantial minimum of well-being to
its inhabitants -- that the Fraternité of the traditional
republican motto must at length become a reality.
Within France, then, ideals of the Popular Front have been revived -- but in profoundly modified form. Doctrinaire Marxism apparently arouses little enthusiasm, and pacifism is dead. There is general insistence that the executive of the future republic must have the power to act. At the opening meeting of the Assembly, the minimum program of the vast majority was voiced by General de Gaulle in a declaration that drew prolonged applause: "France desires that there should never again be a man or woman of good will who was not assured of the right to live and work under honorable conditions of pay, food, lodging, leisure, health." What the General was expressing was no mere revival of earlier slogans, but a new synthesis of socialism and national consciousness, born of a refusal to accept defeat.

If in the coming months the Assembly succeeds in expressing these aspirations, so long undefined and inarticulate, it will fulfill its representative function. It will strengthen, moreover, the National Committee's position, and help substantiate its alleged right to preside over the resurrection of France.
The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Chester Hammond

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 1583, "The Consultative Assembly and the French National Committee", Secret (1 copy)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of Research & Analysis

Enclosure
URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W-7647 15 December 1943

To AGWAR for The Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 548.

The following letter which is self explanatory was sent today to General Giraud. The President and the Prime Minister are aware of the general circumstances which have prompted this action. Letter follows.

"My Dear General,

Your letter of the 11th of December 1943 informs me that the Committee of National Defense has refused to send to Italy the Ninth Colonial Infantry Division which you nominated for service when technical difficulties precluded the use of the Division you first selected.

When you first proposed the First Motorized Infantry Division as the Third Division of the French Corps operating in Italy, I informed you that I would be particularly delighted to accept this Division if it were armed with American equipment because of its proven battle efficiency. Since, however, the Division is armed with British equipment, the supply difficulties that would result if it were sent to Italy as part of an otherwise American equipped Corps, were insurmountable. As it was found impracticable in the time available to re-equip and train the First Motorized Infantry Division with American equipment, I agreed to your nomination of the Ninth Colonial Infantry Division as replacement, and our plans were made accordingly. The decision of the Committee of National Defense upsets these plans for
the relief of American units now engaged in battle, and, from the tactical point of view, entails grave consequences.

Certain Units of the French Army are now being re-equipped by the United States in accordance with agreements which you concluded personally with President Roosevelt at the ANFA conference and in Washington. It was understood that the French forces thus re-armed would be employed, under my direction, as might be required in the war against our common enemy. This is the purpose of the rearmament program. In view of the action of the Committee of National Defense you will, I am sure understand that the rearmament program for the French forces cannot be continued unless there is definite assurance from the Committee of National Liberation that the use of these forces when re-equipped will be governed solely by military considerations and subject to the decisions of The Combined Chiefs of Staff through their representative, The Allied Commander in Chief in this theater.

I request that you inform The Committee of National Liberation of the above, and request that their assurance be given as a matter of urgency in order that there may be no delay or interference in our common war effort and in the development of an army which, it is our hope, will participate in the liberation of France.

Signed Dwight D Eisenhower General U S Army.

End of letter.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN) No Sig

INFORMATION:

OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
ADM HORNE
LOG

CM-IN-9468 (15 Dec 43) 1352Z mos

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: SEXTANT
To: AGWAR 10116
     Algiers FP30
     USFOR MP 60

4 December 1943

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, USFOR London for the British Chiefs of Staff, repeated to AGWAR, FAN 232.

With reference to letter from Giraud suggesting he attend "SEXTANT", you should reply on following lines:

General Giraud's offer to come to Cairo very much appreciated by Combined Chiefs of Staff, who feel, however, that it is unnecessary to ask the General to undertake the journey, since discussions on global strategy are of the broadest possible nature and the details of operations in France are not under consideration. Please inform him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believe that your presentation here included an accurate and sympathetic explanation of his views.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have the interest of France and of the French Armed Forces much at heart.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/B (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
            GEN. STRONG
            SGS
            GEN. ARNOLD
            ADM. KING
            ADM. HORNE
            LOG

CM-IN-2146 (4 Dec 43) 0346Z eng
SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE MAP ROOM
INFO: BLACK
RELEASE:

MATHEWSON PASS TO SECRETARY OF STATE. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE FORWARDED AS WHITE FOURTEEN. I EXPECT TO SEE PRIME MINISTER SUNDAY NIGHT AND I THINK WE SHOULD BACK UP THE BRITISH POSITION IN LEBANON AND TRY TO MAKE IT EVEN MORE POSITIVE. I WILL WIRE YOU THEN. PARA. I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO KING FAROUK. PRESIDENT SENDER.

RELEASED:

WILSON BROWN,
REAR ADMIRAL, USN.
NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: Secretary Hull (Via the Map Room)
TO: The President
INFO:

RELEASE: WHIT 16, 19 November 1943.

1. British inform us, with reference Lebanese situation, the deadline of ten AM Sunday has been postponed to the same hour Monday.

2. . . . .

Original filed Badoglio Folder
GREER FROM MATHEWSON

FOR THE PRESIDENT

BRITISH REQUEST OUR SUPPORT OF FOLLOWING POLICY WHICH THEY HAVE INSTRUCTED CASEY TO FOLLOW IN LEBANESE SITUATION. IF CATROUX HAS NOT RELEASED LEBANESE POLITICAL PRISONERS BY TONIGHT CASEY IS TO FLY TO BEIRUT TOMORROW. HE IS THEN TO INFORM CATROUX THAT IF BY SUNDAY AT TEN AM PRISONERS ARE NOT RELEASED AND HELLEU RECALLED IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR DECLARATION OF BRITISH MARTIAL LAW. THEREAFTER BRITISH GENERAL COMMANDING OR C IN C WOULD TAKE OVER, RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS AND PERMIT REASSEMBLY OF LEBANESE PARLIAMENT AS SOON AS SITUATION PERMITS. CASEY TO MAKE CLEAR TO CATROUX MARTIAL LAW DECLARED PURELY AS MILITARY NECESSITY...AND NO POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED.

KIRK THINKS IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR YOU TO SEND MESSAGE TO KING FAROUK TO WISH HIM RECOVERY FROM RECENT MOTOR ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN SLIGHT INJURY TO PELVIS AND MINOR BRUISES

HULL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I transmit herewith for your information, at the request of the British Embassy, a copy of a letter from the Embassy enclosing copies of two telegrams relating to British action in the Lebanese crisis.

November 13, 1943
URGENT

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 13th, 1943

Dear Mr. Alling,

With reference to our conversation this morning, we have now received a request from London that we should make available to the President the text of the two enclosed telegrams on the subject of Syria. I should be most grateful if you could do this. I gather that the matter is rather urgent.

Yours very sincerely,

W. G. Hayter

Mr. P. H. Alling,
United States Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
Telegram from Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax of Nov. 12th, 1943

Addressed to Resident Minister Algiers dated November 12th, repeated to Minister of State Resident Cairo Beirut and Washington.

The Cabinet met this afternoon and wholly endorsed these demands. The French Committee must understand that our future relations with them depend on whether they give us satisfaction in this matter.

Mr. Eden received this morning a clear indication that situation is grave and grave and that action must be taken.

Moreover the whole Middle East area is now in a state of growing excitement.

Please therefore make the French in Algeria understand that we cannot tolerate any interference. We expect that it make every effort to achieve our request for reconciliation with the French and release of politicians that they may have seized in the Lebanon.

You should make it plain that unless we get only complete satisfaction immediate we shall be compelled ourselves to take a line which will certainly cause disquietude among our French and to do so will result in removal of all conditions that are likely to be weak appeasement to them.
Telegram from Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax of Nov. 12th, 1943

Addressed to Resident Minister Algiers on Nov. 12th, repeated to Washington, Beirut and Minister of State, Cairo.

Telegrams received this morning show that situation is becoming worse and worse and French action more and more outrageous.

2. Moreover the whole Middle East area is now in a state of growing excitement.

3. Please therefore leave the French in absolutely no doubt that we regard their attitude and action as wholly indefensible. We expect them to comply forthwith with our request for replacement of Helleu and release of politicians whom they have seized in the Lebanon.

4. You should make it plain that unless we not only receive this satisfaction but receive it immediately we shall be compelled ourselves to take a line which will certainly imply dissociating ourselves completely from the French and which may well entail consequences that are likely to be most unpleasing to them.
13 November 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 504  Filed 130240Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Nr. 504.

1. You have, no doubt, been informed of the lamentable outrages committed by the French in Syria. These completely stultify the agreements we have made with the French and also with the Syrians and Lebanese. There is no doubt in my mind that this is a foretaste of what De Gaulle's leadership of France means. It is certainly entirely contrary to the Atlantic Charter and much else that we have declared. The situation will be most grave throughout the whole of the Middle East and the Arab world and also everywhere people will say: "What kind of a France is this which, while itself subjugated by the enemy, seeks to subjugate others?"

2. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the British and United States Governments should take this up in the strongest manner together. Already we have seen the character of the body we recognised at QUADRANT totally altered by De Gaulle's complete assumption of power. The outrages in the Levant are of a different character and afford full justification, with the support of world public opinion, of bringing the issue with De Gaulle to a head.

3. Our position should be that the kidnapped Lebanese President and Ministers should be set at liberty and permitted to resume their full function, and that the assembly should meet again as soon as conditions of law and order can be guaranteed. If he fails to do this at once, we should withdraw our recognition from the French National Committee and stop the process of arming the French troops in North Africa.
14. Meanwhile, I am enquiring carefully into the state of our forces in the Levant. At the same time, should action be taken it would be necessary to take precautions in North Africa, for I assure you there is nothing this man will not do if he has armed forces at his disposal.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1979, November 11, midnight.

FOR MORGENTHAU FROM MURPHY FROM ROYCE FROM HOFFMAN.

Following preliminary and strictly informal information on Pierre Mendes - France new Finance Commissioner of Comite may be of interest. Generally speaking, reputed to have been politician rather than civil servant, although he was said to have been associated with Finance Ministry for short time in minor cabinet position under Blum Government. Not an inspecteur de finance. Has been member of Chamber of Deputies for past twelve years, Radical socialist from Department of Eure and Mayor of Louviers. 35 years old. Jewish. Married to daughter of wealthy Egyptian merchant. Good war record. Was one of Bordeaux group who thought France should set up refugee government in North Africa after fall. Himself escaped to Morocco after armistice where he was arrested and sent to Metropolis. Escaped to Switzerland and thence to England. Is said to be enroute from London at present time.

WILEY

BB
BE
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Cairo
Dated November 11, 1943
Rec'd 9:14 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State
Washington

U.S. URGENT
2040, November 11, 8 p.m.
My 2039 November 11, 7 p.m.

Following translation of telegram received today from Egyptian Prime Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

"In the name of the Egyptian Government I address to Your Excellency an energetic protest against the arbitrary action of the French Committee of National Liberation which has just ordered the arrest of the President of the Lebanese Republic the Prime Minister and two ministers. In addressing myself to the Representative of the United States rampart of liberty and democracy I am convinced that the great power which is fighting for noble principals will exert itself to assure respect of the great Atlantic Charter to which the French Committee of National Liberation adhered.

Its violation
November 11, 8 p.m. from Cairo

Its violation of the independence of the Lebanon is an act which cannot but arouse general condemnation and it will encounter in the United States I am sure a dolorous echo.

I understand that protest also sent by Nahas to the British as military associates of Free French in occupation of Syria and Lebanon and co-guarantors of their independence. Third communication reported sent de Gaulle saying Egypt and all Arab peoples solidly behind Lebanese whom only wrong was to desire Independence Day; expressing astonishment that such an act could be committed by representatives of a France reputed as refugee of liberty; asking if such is the conduct to be expected of a France itself deprived of independence and liberty; asserting such violation of creed of United Nations is object of universal reproach; and concluding that if situation not remedied "Egypt will be led to consider its position vis a vis France in the light of events."

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Beirut and Algiers.

KIRK

RR
BJR
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Cairo
Dated November 11, 1943
Rec'd 9:04 a.m. 12th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT
2038, November 1, 7 p.m.

Afternoon press carries letter sent yesterday (repeat yesterday) by Egyptian Prime Minister to delegate in Egypt of French Committee of National Liberation echoing strong reaction to Egypt and Arab peoples as result of political developments in Lebanon. Nahas refers to previous discussions on subject with Catroux who had given impression of desiring reasonable and just solution but notes these good intentions not carried into effect, as evidenced by questionable tactics used in elections and unjustified French attitude in respect of revision of constitution of Lebanon of which independence was recognized by French and British and is of incontestable legality regarding citing of mandate as factor figuring in situation Nahas maintained mandate beginning of quotation "disappeared in fact and in law on the day when the French and British Governments..."
Governments recognized the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. At that time they admitted that League of Nations was not functioning and that Syria and Lebanon could not await its problematical resurrection in order to ratify decision of French and British. If the mandate remained in force British and French had no right to declare independence and conversely by so doing they put end to mandate.

Nahas said that by granting independence British and French were in accord with Atlantic Charter and principles of United Nations, that he did not doubt intention of British in that regard and did not desire to doubt those of French Committee. He added that he hoped situation was result of error which French would rectify in manner worthy of great French tradition.

Repeated to Beirut and Algiers.

KIRK

WSB
EPH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT
2036, November 11, 5 p.m.

My 2029, November 10, 3 p.m. and 2033, November 11, 9 a.m.

British Minister of State here informs me that although Spears was in conference with Helou until after midnight and was given impression that no (repeat no) immediate drastic action was contemplated by French, Senegalese troops at 3:30 this morning were ordered to enter private apartments of Lebanese President, Prime Minister and all other available members of government and arrest and throw them into jail. French also decreed dissolution of Parliament.

Force was used in some instances and these methods, combined with infringement of privacy, have aroused great indignation in Beirut.

Spears delivered written protest to Helou this morning and orally intimated that British might be compelled to declare martial law. Plan, however, is to refrain from taking latter step unless French so request or disorders ensue jeopardizing base at Beirut which is especially important at this moment.

Casey
Casey has cabled London that he does not (repeat not) consider that there is any use treating this crisis in Beirut as orders originate in Algiers and recommends that firm representations be made to the French Committee there preferably with the support of the United States Government.

According to reports circulating in Beirut, the French may be contemplating flying arrested members of Lebanese Government to Algiers and British are taking steps to prevent them from leaving Egypt if they pass through airports here.

Repeated to Beirut.
Repeated to Algiers.

KIRK

WTD
BJR
Cairo

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 11, 1943
Rec'd 2:13 a.m. 12th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2033; November 11, noon

My 2032 November 11, 11 a.m.

American Army intelligence here advises report received of minor rioting in Beirut this morning; that British were not advised in advance of French action; and that French refusing contact with British liaison officer.

Sent Department, repeated to Beirut.

KIRK

WSB
A MT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo
Dated November 11, 1943
Rec'd 2:14 p.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S. URGENT
2041, November 11, 9 p.m.
My 2040, November 11, 8 p.m.

The King sent for me this afternoon and protested emphatically against the French action in the Lebanon. He said that as ruler of Egypt which had in the past striven for liberty and was seeking to strengthen its independence, he was profoundly shocked by the treatment of the Lebanese and was convinced that the repercussions throughout the Arab world would be extensive. If such methods and action were allowed, the prestige of the United Nations would be seriously impaired and faith in their declarations lost. He asked me to convey the foregoing to my Government.

The King added that he would have preferred to have allowed his personal delegation to the Lebanon to proceed as scheduled but as he feared that its arrival might aggravate the situation, he proposed to withhold it for the present in order to avoid additional
additional complications which would harm the Allies and serve German interests.

I fully concur in the opinion that these events are thoroughly deplorable from the point of view of Allied prestige in the Middle East. The present crisis, however, cannot (repeat not) be judged solely on the basis of the defective French policy and methods in Syria and the Lebanon, for the problem of Anglo-French relations is also largely involved and in that it is necessary to consider the continued tortuousness of those relations in that area. An action on the part of our Government in the present crisis therefore must needs be predicated on the situation with which we are actually confronted without regard to the wisdom or folly of the parties to the development of that situation.

Not repeated anywhere.

KIRK

LMS
GEORGE E. PIKE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated November 11, 1943

Rec'd 1:01 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State

Washington

1913, November 11, 2 p.m.

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM HAS BEEN SENT TO ALGIERS.

November 11, 2 p.m.

Thanks for your 1913, November 4. In the same connection (FOR MURPHY FROM HARRIMAN) believe you will be interested in what Eden told me before he left Moscow:

Molotov told Eden the French Committee had complained to the Soviets that they were not admitted to the London Council, claiming that the British were ready to let them in but the Soviets had resisted. Eden replied that they had had a similar complaint from the French explaining that the Soviets were willing but the British were not. Eden stated to Molotov that this was a clear indication the French were playing the Soviet and British Governments against each other.

Sent to Algiers, repeated to the Department.

HARRIMAN

NPL
BJR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo
Dated November 10, 1943
Rec'd 2:51 a.m. 12th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2029, November 10, 3 p.m.
My 2000, November 8, 10 a.m.

Informal discussion of Lebanese question with officials of office of Minister of State and British Embassy reveals following general attitude: Present critical situation is results of excessive legalism a reactionary policy of French on one hand and of rampant nationalism by local population on other hand. By exhibiting greater flexibility French might have aver matter reaching such advanced stage and it now remain to be seen whether they attempt conciliation or resort to arbitrary action against Lebanese Government. If latter course adopted it is regarded as doubtful if Government would submit and serious disorders might result with consequent repercussions in other Arab countries which are attentively following development thus creating a situation endangering security of this area as military base. Such a development would, of course, involve direct interest of British who also would find
November 10, 3 p.m., from Cairo.

would find difficult to remain passive on humanitarian grounds should bloodshed result. Furthermore, British morally involved since they were co-guarantors of original Gatroux independence declaration.

Thus far British have attempted to remain aloof but London being kept fully informed and matter placed before Eden when here who, however, was too absorbed with other problems to give it serious attention.

Meanwhile some reassurance was felt regarding French intentions on belief that Helleu who passed through Cairo yesterday en route Beirut carried a conciliatory message based on decision of Algiers committee although subsequent action by Lebanese Parliament may radically alter this attitude.

Local censorship is allowing full publicity and comment provided it not over inflammatory and press strongly supporting Lebanese with obvious approval of Egyptian Government. Am informed, however, complete ban now imposed on any appeal for or suggestion of British intervention.

Reported Egyptian Prime Minister preparing statement on subject for communication to local delegate of French committee but official confirmation to that effect not yet available
-3- #2029, November 10, 3 p.m., from Cairo.

yet available.

Sent to Department, repeated to Beirut.

KIRK

KLP
From: London
To: President of the United States
Number 498 November 10, 1943
Prime Minister to President - personal.

I am not at all content with the changes in the French National Committee which leave De Gaulle sole President. The body we recognized was of a totally different character, the essence being the co presidency of Giraud and De Gaulle. I suggest we maintain an attitude of complete reserve until we can discuss the position together.

No Sig
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 11, 1943
Rec'd 4:03 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S. URGENT
1968, November 11, Noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND FOR DUNN FROM WILSON.

My 1962, November 10, Noon can now be disregarded. The situation has developed satisfactorily. The appointment before the French Committee can be made whenever you desire. I should appreciate advice as to approximate time when it will be made.

With establishment of the diplomatic mission we shall be entering on a new phase of our relations with the French Committee. It seems highly important for success of the mission that its prestige be built up adequately at the start. As you know I have no living quarters of my own nor is there adequate office space. These matters are under the control of our military authorities. I should therefore greatly appreciate it if you could see your way clear to having
1968, November 11, Noon, from Algiers.

having the War Department advise the Commanding General here of the importance attached by State Department to the mission and request that military authorities assist the mission in obtaining adequate physical facilities.

WILEY

WWC
PLAIN
London
Dated November 10, 1943
Rec'd 10:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

7817, tenth

There is no extensive comment in today's press on the changes in French Committee of Liberation. Diplomatic correspondent of the TIMES stated that Giraud's relinquishment of joint presidency is hardly surprising when read jointly with the reports from Algiers during past few weeks. Correspondent went on to describe joint presidency as compromise and said that it could only have been temporary measure. He added that Giraud was criticized for taking too many decisions with scant reference to the Committee when preparing for Corsica landing. "More sharply than before there came the demand, traditional in French constitutional life, that the military commander should be subordinate to the civil power. General Giraud, it was said, should choose between being a member of the Committee and being commander-in-chief; he could not be both."

Correspondent
-2-#7817, tenth, from London.

Correspondent continued by saying that arrival in Algiers of resistance representatives gave fresh impetus to the movement of opinion and that these representatives were dissatisfied with Giraud as he would not call Petain a traitor nor promise to dismiss all Vichy officials on his return to France. Article went on that Giraud has usually declared that he would have nothing to do with politics and that his signature of the announcement jointly with de Gaulle and his maintenance of military command suggested that changes came in friendly way. In analysing changes correspondent stated that benefits are obtained by changes because new committee is more widely representative than the old. DAILY HERALD points out that effect of changes is to increase civilian influence as there are now only two generals on Committee instead of five. Algiers correspondents of NEWS CHRONICLE and DAILY EXPRESS report that although de Gaulle pressed the Communists to join committee they refused participation therein. DAILY MIRROR says that a determined, decisive and authoritative new drive is now to be expected to purge every remaining trace in North Africa of the "Vichy mind".

WINANT

WWC
BJR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated November 10, 1943

Rec'd 6:00 a.m. 11th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1966, November 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

General Giraud informed me today that the action of the committee in announcing (from Murphy. My 1957 November 9) his exclusion from the committee both as co-president and member was taken contrary to the understanding had in the committee under the provisions of the decree of October 3 (see my 1706 October 4) that understanding was to the effect that Giraud would relinquish his position as co-president and confine himself to the functions of commander in chief of the French forces at a subsequent date which was not established and which would depend on military operations. It was understood that he himself would signify the date.

He informs me that as it appeared to him this morning that the Committee had not acted in good faith there would be three courses open to him (1) to accept the action of the committee which under the circumstances, he felt would not be dignified and would unquestionably diminish his
diminish his standing authority both with the forces as well as in the eyes of the French authorities. (2) resort to the use of force to assert his authority and defy that of the committee or (3) tender his resignation commander in chief as the only dignified solution.

He said that he decided on the latter, as the first solution appeared to him completely unsatisfactory and the second contrary to both his desire and French tradition. He felt also that it offered the possibility of resolving once and for all the issue in the event that the committee would recoil from the possibilities suggested by his resignation and its effect on the morale of the French forces as well as on French and Allied public opinion.

Giraud therefore at 10 o'clock this morning, sent his resignation to the committee. A delegation from the committee, including Cetroux, Pleven, Tixier, Mayer, Freney Jacquinax and Letroccqar, called on him at noon, stating that the committee unanimously deplored his resignation and asking that he reconsider it. He said that he stated his position very clearly to the delegation and asked them to return later in the afternoon when he said he would inform them of the conditions under which he would reconsider his resignation. He advised me that the
-3- #1966, November 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Algiers.

me that the following are the conditions upon which
he will insist, in writing, to avoid possible future
misunderstanding.

WILEY

WEP
Algiers
Dated November 10, 1943
Rec'd 3:34 a.m., Nov. 11th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1966, November 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

One. General Giraud as CINC would have complete
charge of operations and matters relating to strategy
and tactics.

Two. No general officer in the French Army is
to be brought before any investigating committee except
with the prior approval of the CINC.

Three. The appointment of general and superior
officers and their promotions will be made only on
the nomination of the CINC to the Commissioner of War
(Le Troquer).

Four. All military intelligence services are
to be directed by the CINC.

Giraud later in the day informed me that these
conditions had been accepted and that a letter will
be addressed to him signed by all the members of the
committee requesting him to reconsider his resignation
and continue as CINC.

General de Gaulle has stated to several contacts
that
-2- #1966, November 10, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers

that it is his sincere desire that General Giraud's authority as CINC of the French forces remain undis-
turbed (END OF MESSAGE)

WILEY

MK
General De Gaulle, President of the French National Committee of Liberation said that his Committee will be the governing body in metropolitan France when the German occupation forces have been driven out.

De Gaulle said that no other authority will be valid in liberated France, "Nor do I think any other would be accepted." Acceptance of his Committee by the people of occupied France has been assured, he said. The Committee, he added, is preparing long-range "measures of sovereignty" to assure practical collaboration between the French authorities and the Allied armies when the invasion of metropolitan France is launched.

De Gaulle said that communist elements in the French Resistance movement are expected to be given a place in the administration now established in Algiers. "I cannot imagine", he said, "that one or more representatives of the Communist Party will not be associated with us soon."

His comments came at a Press Conference called after a shakeup in the Committee membership which vested control of the Committee in the hands of De Gaulle and representatives of the French underground—a move which was expected to stiffen French demands for an equal voice with the U.S., Great Britain and Russia in Allied war and post-war councils.
Commanding General
USAF in North African Theater
Algiers, Algeria

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 18614

For Devers and Eisenhower from Marshall.

Considering an inquiry from COMNAVNAW expressing concern that current French purge trials might have serious effect upon the discipline and morale of the French Army and Navy when extended to military and naval officers and also might be cleverly used in enemy propaganda to produce an adverse effect upon the population in Metropolitan France. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that no action should be taken to intervene in such trials at the present time or to urge that they be deferred but that the subject of such trials should be watched and the effect on the morale of the French armed forces promptly re-examined if the trials should extend to French military and naval officer personnel. The foregoing is for your information.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: JC/3
G-2 (State Dept)
CAD
Adm. King
Log

CH-OUT-18614 (4 Apr 44) 2348Z ojv

Cal packs

300 France

SECRET

COPY NO. 51

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
PRIORITY

1 JANUARY 1944

MESSAGE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER: #6167

FROM: WAR
TO: ALGIERS #6167

FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

REPLYING TO YOUR W-6959 OF 31 DECEMBER, THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY DE GAULLE ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AS SATISFACTORY.

LEAHY

Released from the White House Map Room at 1040, EWT, 1 January 1946.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET
SECRET

January 1, 1944.

MESSAGE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER: #6167

Replying to your W-8959 of 31 December, the assurances given by de Gaulle are acceptable to the President as satisfactory.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

With reference to Eisenhower's W-8959 of 31 December copy attached, the following draft message to General Eisenhower is submitted for the President's approval. The State Department has been consulted and they concur in this action:

PROPOSED MESSAGE

The assurance given by de Gaulle, as stated in your W-8959 of 31 December 1943, is acceptable to the President.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff
SECRET PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AISNA, LONDON

SECRET AND PERSONAL, NUMBER 431, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REPLYING TO YOUR 527 I AM INFORMED TODAY BY EISENHOWER THAT MR. WILSON HAS REPORTED TO HIM THAT THE PERSONS REFERRED TO IN 527 WILL NOT BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL BEFORE THERE IS A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN FRANCE AND THAT DE GAULLE GUARANTEES THEY WILL IN THE MEANTIME BE HOUSED IN COMFORTABLE QUARTERS ON OUTSKIRTS OF ALGIERS.

ROOSEVELT
From: Algiers  
To: War  
No: W-8959, 31 December 1943

From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only.

Ambassador Wilson has just reported to me that General DeGaulle has given his solemn assurance that Beisson Peyroutin and Flandin will not be tried before the French Committee of Liberation has resigned and turned over its functions to a properly constituted national assembly in France. I request that you convey to the President my earnest recommendation that this assurance be accepted as satisfactory in the circumstances particularly in view of the fact that General DeGaulle guarantees in addition that the three men will be housed in comfortable quarters on the outskirts of Algiers and will be provided with all the necessaries including opportunities for exercise etcetera. General DeGaulle very logically states that his promise cannot extend beyond the time that the French Committee, responsibility for administration of present French territory but that so long as the Committee is operating under its present status these trials will not occur.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE  
INFORMATION: C OF S  
No Sig

Reid: 31/1230Z  
Delivered to usher: 31/1240Z

CM-IN-19134 (31 Dec 43) 1128Z mcs
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY
URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War
No: W-8959, 31 December 1943

From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only.

Ambassador Wilson has just reported to me that General DeGaulle has given his solemn assurance that Boisson Peyroutin and Flandin will not be tried before the French Committee of Liberation has resigned and turned over its functions to a properly constituted national assembly in France. I request that you convey to the President my earnest recommendation that this assurance be accepted as satisfactory in the circumstances particularly in view of the fact that General DeGaulle guarantees in addition that the three men will be housed in comfortable quarters on the outskirts of Algiers and will be provided with all the necessaries including opportunities for exercise and cetera. General DeGaulle very logically states that his promise cannot extend beyond the time that the French Committee, responsibility for administration of present French territory but that so long as the Committee is operating under its present status these trials will not occur.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION: C OF S

No Sig

Rec'd: 31/12 02
Delivered to usher: 31/12 02

CM-IN-19134 (31 Dec 43) 11282 mcs
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 527, filed 3016102

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 527. Personal and most secret.

1. Your number 425. We are instructing MacMillan to associate himself with Wilson in accordance with your message.

2. It is not only a question of trials but of detention in prison meanwhile. In my view the three gentlemen you mention should be at once accorded either parole or bail or residence surveille.

No Sig
SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: CPONAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 425, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

YOUR 517.

YESTERDAY I SENT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

"IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION SINCE DISPATCH TO YOU
OF THE INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED IN AGWAR 5456, IT IS DESIRED THAT IF NOT
ALREADY DELIVERED TO THE FRENCH COMMITTEE YOU WITHHOLD IT AND, SUBJECT
TO YOUR DISCRETION, DELIVER THE FOLLOWING WHICH Expresses MY VIEWS ON
THE MATTER. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, THE SAME ENDS CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH
INFORMAL DISCUSSION, FORMAL PRESENTATION NEED NOT BE MADE. IN ANY
EVENT WE MUST HAVE FORMAL ASSURANCE FROM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE THAT NO
TRIALS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE RESTORATION OF
FRANCE IS ACCOMPLISHED AND THEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"IN VIEW OF THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING
THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN BY PEYROUTON, BOISSON AND PIANDIN THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWS WITH Alarm REPORTS REACHING IT
TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE GENTLEMEN HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH HIGH
TREASON. IF, IN VIEW OF THE CHARGES MADE, IT IS NECESSARY
THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD STAND TRIAL, THEIR TRIALS SHOULD
NOT BE HELD UNTIL AFTER THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE AND THE ES-
TABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT."

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1130, EWT, 27 Dec 43.

- 1 -
SECRET

SECRET PRIORITY

FROM: THE WAR DEPARTMENT
TO: ALGIERS
NO: 5752

SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION SINCE DISPATCH TO YOU OF THE INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED IN AGWAR 5456, IT IS DESIRED THAT IF NOT ALREADY DELIVERED TO THE FRENCH COMMITTEE YOU WITHHOLD IT AND, SUBJECT TO YOUR DISCRETION, DELIVER THE FOLLOWING WHICH EXPRESSES MY VIEWS ON THE MATTER. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, THE SAME ENDS CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, FORMAL PRESENTATION NEED NOT BE MADE. IN ANY EVENT WE MUST HAVE FORMAL ASSURANCE FROM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE THAT NO TRIALS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE RESTORATION OF FRANCE IS ACCOMPLISHED AND THEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"IN VIEW OF THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN BY PEYROUTON, BOISSON AND FLANDIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWS WITH ALARM REPORTS REACHING IT TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE GENTLEMEN HAVE BEEN CHARGED
SECRET

WITH HIGH TREASON. IF, IN VIEW OF THE CHARGES MADE, IT IS
NECESSARY THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD STAND TRIAL, THEIR
TRIALS SHOULD NOT BE HELD UNTIL AFTER THE LIBERATION OF
FRANCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room, White House,
1345, EMW, 26 December 1943.

Robert W. Bogue,
Lt.(jg) USNR
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL J. E. HULL

At the instance of Admiral Leahy, there is enclosed herewith a copy of the dispatch, approved by the President, which has been transmitted to General Eisenhower.

A copy is also being forwarded to Mr. James C. Dunn for the State Department.

R. W. BOGUE
Lieut. (jg) USNR
Lieut. (jg) USNR

26 December 1943

SECRET
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL LEAHY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

DRAFT OF MESSAGE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER, SUGGESTED IN YOUR WHITE 14 APPROVAL.

For Transmission:

Mr. James C. Dunn

At the instance of Admiral Leahy, there is enclosed herewith a copy of the dispatch, approved by the President, which has been transmitted to General Eisenhower.

A copy is also being forwarded to General Hull for General Marshall.

Notified Admiral Leahy, 261700.

Sent Dispatch to War Department Code Room, 261745.

At direction of Admiral Leahy, gave copy of reply to Mr. Dunn and Gen. Hull.

R. W. Bogue

Lieut. (jg) USNR

1 incl.

Freedom 5752, 26 Dec 43.
TO ADMIRAL LEAHY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

DRAFT OF MESSAGE TO EISENHOWER SUGGESTED IN YOUR WHITE 14 APPROVED FOR TRANSMISSION.

RECEIVED 261700Z RWB

Notified Admiral Leahy, 261705.

Sent Dispatch to War Department Code Room, 261745.

At direction of Admiral Leahy, gave copy of reply to Mr. Dunn and Gen Hull.

RWB
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The attached draft reply to General Smith's message to the Chief of Staff, a copy of which was forwarded to the President, has been prepared in collaboration with Mr. Dunn of the State Department, in accordance with instructions from the White House that the President desired General Marshall and you to propose a message to General Eisenhower on the subject.

General Marshall has not seen the attached draft, but I believe it expresses his views.

J. E. HULL,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
White House

Linky to the President

Referring to White 13 and Black 4 the following draft of a message to Eisenhower has the approval of General Hull, Acting Assistant Chief Staff, in Marshall's absence over Christmas.

Find my in turn of State Department.

In consideration of reported probable continuing of attitude of former naval, civilian, and present attitude of State Department, his Wilson, and Bedell Smith, I am in agreement with this draft but recommend that words quoted through Ambassador Wilson can go to his paragraph on be deleted.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as White 17, 25 Dec 43.
Answered by Black 5, 26 17002.
In view of developments in the situation since dispatch to you of the instructions included in AGWAR 5456, it is desired that if not already delivered to the French Committee you withhold it and, subject to your discretion, deliver the following [through Ambassador Wilson] which expresses my views on the matter. If, in your judgment, the same ends can be obtained through informal discussions, formal presentation need not be made. In any event we must have formal assurance from the French Committee that no trials of these individuals will take place until the restoration of France is accomplished and then in accordance with the constitutional laws of the French Republic.

In view of the assistance rendered the Allied armies during the North African Campaign by Peyrouton, Boisson and Flandin the United States Government views with alarm reports reaching it to the effect that these gentlemen have been charged with high treason. If, in view of the charges made, it is necessary that these individuals should stand trial, their trials should not be held until after the liberation of France and the establishment of constitutional government.

Secret

[Handwritten note: Show to Adm. Leahy by Captain Weir to Adm. Leahy 25/10/10] Sent to HP as White 17
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SEXTON:

25 December 1943

The attached messages are being sent to you as directed by Colonel Mathewson.

F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD.

Incls:
- PM-POTUS #513, 21 Dec 43.
- POTUS-PM #423, (Freedom #5457), 22 Dec 43.
- POTUS-EISENHOWER, #5456, 22 Dec 43.
- EISENHOWER-POTUS, No #, 22 Dec 43.
- PM-POTUS, #517, 23 Dec 43.
RE YOUR WHITE 13. REFER TO ADMIRAL LEAHY AND GENERAL MARSHALL FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

Colonel Mathewson informed. He turned problem over to Colonel Sexton (Gen Marshall is out of town.) Colonel Sexton, and War advisers, with Mr. Dunn of the State Department prepared a tentative reply for Admiral Leahy's approval.
WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON  

25 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from Bedell Smith in Algiers and is quoted for your information:

"I returned to Algiers last night having stopped at Tunis for a conference with the former Naval person who showed me a message he was sending the President suggesting certain modifications in the form and manner of transmission of the President's message to the French Committee of National Liberation given us in AGWAR 5456. For this reason, and because the matter is so important, I have refrained from giving the President's message to the French Committee until General Eisenhower's return tomorrow. However, I think you should be fully informed of the probable reaction and consequences regarding which you may see fit to advise the President. Unquestionably, if this message is delivered with the wording given in AGWAR 5456, the Committee will either refuse to receive it as not having been sent through diplomatic channels or will consider it as an ultimatum and will reject it. In either event, the result is a direct slap at the President which the United States could not accept, and its only alternative would be to withdraw recognition of the Committee and to stop the French rearmament. The implications in connection with operation ANVIL are obvious. The results desired by the President can be attained by milder methods, in fact, we have already been assured that the proposed trial of Boisson and Company will amount simply to a civil investigation, which will be terminated for lack of evidence or which will be deferred until France is liberated. Ambassador Wilson has recommended through the State Department that this more indirect method of approach be used, and I am hopeful that his recommendation will be accepted. Nevertheless, in anticipation of a decision to the contrary, we are taking the necessary preliminary military measures. For your personal information, the Prime Minister was at first very angry at the arrest of Boisson, and he is still urging us to take a very positive stand, while at the same time he is communicating with the Foreign Office in the direction of milder action; his inclination is pugnacious, but he will back down in the face of Foreign Office opposition as he has always done in the past if it came to an issue. Consequently, in the event of an abrupt break with the Committee which might upset our military plans, the onus would be borne by the United States."

This was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 15, 2516152 Dec 43. Answered by BLACK 4, 251648 Dec.

PHG chkd RWB  
Both Col. Lacy & Sec. Hull have given copies to Ltr.
The War Department is not familiar with the specific wording of the original message to the French Committee. However, in view of the possible effect on ANVIL, General Eisenhower has been authorised to withhold the delivery of the message until he receives further advice on the matter.

Chief of Staff.
PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR
NR: W-8446, 24th December 1943

For Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FHDCS.

On receipt of the letter referred to in your 5492 of 23rd December, DeGaulle asked for a meeting with the Commander in Chief representative to discuss the terms of the assurance required by the Commander in Chief. As far as can be ascertained, the committee realize the reasonableness of Commander in Chief's demand and are willing to give the necessary assurance with, possibly, certain safeguards. It had been intended to arrange for the meeting to be held today, but in view of the Presidents instructions contained in cable 5456 it was decided to postpone the meeting on reequipped Divisions until about December 26th.

The matter in question was also the subject of telegram number 181 of December 18th, 11AM to the Department of State from Ambassador Wilson addressed to Mister James Dunn and to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. A telegram number 210 December 22nd, 8 PM for Ambassador Wilson from the Department of State stated that the stand taken by General Eisenhower and Ambassador Wilson and the procedure outlined in Mister Wilsons telegram under reference were approved by the War Department.

No Sig.

5492 is CM-OUT-8558 (22 Dec 43) SGS
5456 is a White House message.

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE (COL. MATHEWSON)
INFORMATION: OPD
SECRETS
COPY No. 1

CM-IN-15302 12/1/43 17522 eng
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I think this is interesting. Evidently the State Department did not like my drastic telegram and is now trying to pin it on the Prime Minister. As you know, I feel just as strongly as the Prime Minister did in his dispatch.

F.D.R.
CONFERENCE BETWEEN MR. WILSON AND MR. DUNN.
23 DECEMBER 1943 1406Z TO 1420Z

WASHINGTON PARTY
MR. JAMES C. DUNN

ALGIERS PARTY
MR. EDWARD C. WILSON

W: HELLO ED.
A: I WANTED TO KNOW IF THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN MY TELEGRAM NO. 216, DECEMBER 21, 1943 SIX PM BEFORE HE SENT HIS MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 22, TO EISENHOWER.
W: NO HE HAD NOT. I KNOW YOURS CAME IN AFTERWARD, ED.
A: WELL I THINK HE'LL HAVE TO SEE THAT. HAVE YOU GOTTEN YET MY MESSAGE 232 OF DECEMBER 22, 8:00PM?
W: NO I HAVE NOT SEEN IT.
A: WELL YOU OUGHT TO SHOW HIM THOSE AS SOON AS YOU CAN. MCMILLAN AND I ARE TRYING TO WORK THIS THING OUT. THERE ARE TWO DEVELOPMENTS I WANT TO TELL YOU ABOUT THAT I THINK THE PRESIDENT SHOULD KNOW ABOUT AT ONCE. THE FIRST ONE IS THAT MCMILLAN HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE HAS ASKED EDEN TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF THE FORMS AND MANNER UNDER WHICH THIS ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. TO LOOK INTO THE QUESTION OF THE FORMS AND MANNER. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT MCMILLAN IS GOING TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER ON SATURDAY, AND FEELS IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT NO ACTION BE TAKEN UNTIL HIS RETURN. I SUPPORT THAT STRONGLY. EISENHOWER IS NOT HERE, BUT LATER THIS AFTERNOON GENERAL SMITH RETURNS AND MCMILLAN AND I ARE GOING TO TALK WITH HIM. MCMILLAN WILL URGEE THAT NO ACTION BE TAKEN OF THE DELIVERY OF THIS MESSAGE UNTIL AFTER MCMILLAN'S RETURN FROM SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER AND I FEEL THAT THAT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED.

W: WHEN DOES EISENHOWER RETURN?

WD TC 103 (23 Dec 43)
A: I DON'T KNOW WHEN HE COMES BACK. SMITH RETURNS THIS AFTERNOON, PROBABLY IN ABOUT AN HOUR OR TWO, WEATHER PERMITTING. WE FEEL, THAT IS MCILLLAN AND I, THAT THAT PRESENTATION OF THAT MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER HE HAS A CHANCE TO TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. NOW AS YOU WILL NOTICE FROM MY TELEGRAM, HE AND I IN VERY INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE SEGRE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO WORK THIS OUT ON THE BASIS OF GETTING ASSURANCES THAT THESE PEOPLE, THESE THREE THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN, WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE TRIED UNTIL AFTER THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE AND THE RETURN OF FRANCE AND THE SETTING UP OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL GOVERNMENT. IN THE MEANWHILE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE KEPT UNDER A PRISON REGIME BUT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO BE KEPT IN THEIR HOMES UNDER CIVILIANS OR SOMETHING OF THAT SORT. NOW IF YOU HAVEN'T SEEN MY LAST TELEGRAM YOU DON'T KNOW THE DEVELOPMENTS OF LAST NIGHT. WE CALLED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON THE SEGRE AND TOLD HIM HOW SERIOUSLY DISTURBED WE WERE ABOUT THIS MATTER HOW SURE WE WERE IT WAS GOING TO CAUSE VERY PROFOUND FEELINGS ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. WE HOPE RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE HERE WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT SOME WAY THAT WOULD PREVENT A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION DEVELOPING. WE SAID WE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. WE'RE DOING IT ENTIRELY ON OUR OWN. WE ASKED THE SEGRE TO LAY THAT BEFORE THE FRENCH COMMITTEE. THEY HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING AND THE SEGRE JUST A LITTLE WHILE AGO TOLD US BOTH THAT THE JIST OF IT IS SIMPLY THIS: THAT A SPECIAL DECREE WILL BE ISSUED WHICH WILL PERMIT THE INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE TO DEFER THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER THE TRIAL SHOULD TAKE PLACE BY THE TRIBUNAL UNTIL AFTER THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HAVE NOT THE WITNESSES HERE, THE RECORDS CAN'T BE OBTAINED. NOW THIS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE IN FACT FOR THE TRIAL OF THE THREE WE ARE INTERESTED IN TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE END OF THE WAR IN FRANCE. IN THE MEANWHILE THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE THAT THE PRISONERS WERE KEPT UNDER CONDITIONS THAT WOULD NOT BE THE PRESENT REGIME. NOW OF COURSE OUR CONVERSATIONS HERE HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY INFORMAL AND PERSONAL AND SO NO ASSURANCE HAS BEEN ASKED FOR FORMALLY AND NONE GIVEN, BUT THAT IS THE LINE ON WHICH IT CAN BE APPROACHED AND I BELIEVE WORKED OUT IF IT IS DESIRED TO HAVE IT WORKED OUT. YOU OF COURSE APPRECIATE THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE CREATED HERE BY THE PRESENTATION OF THE MESSAGE IN THE FORM THAT WAS SENT TO EISENHOWER.

W: WE APPRECIATE THAT.

WD TC 103 (23 Dec 43)

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
OUTGOING MESSAGE

A: THAT IS THE STORY AS IT STANDS AT PRESENT BUT WE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DELAY ANY ACTION UNTIL AFTER MCMILLAN HAS SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER. WE'RE GOING TO TALK TO GENERAL SMITH ON THAT LINE AND I WILL SEND YOU A TELEGRAM TONIGHT WHICH WILL SUMMARIZE WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING AND WILL TELL YOU THE LAST DEVELOPMENTS IN IT.

W: MCMILLAN IS LEAVING ON SATURDAY AND YOU DO NOT KNOW WHEN HE WILL BE BACK?


A: I WISH THAT WOULD BE BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY TOO. AS WELL AS THE ONE I AM SENDING TONIGHT.

W: WE WILL DO THAT AND YOU WILL SEND A MESSAGE TONIGHT AFTER YOU HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL SMITH.

A: YES THAT IS RIGHT.

W: WELL THE SECRETARY WANTED ME TO TELL YOU THAT THIS WHOLE ACTION WAS INSTIGATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

A: I THINK YOU WILL BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT IN LINE WITH WHAT MCMILLAN WAS TOLD BY THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING WHEN I GOT THE FIGURES THAT HE WANTED EDEN TO DETERMINE THE QUESTION OF THE FORM AND MANNER, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS TO BE BACKING WATER A LITTLE, AND HE IS BEGINNING TO SEE I THINK A LITTLE OF WHAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE THAT HE HAD TO FACE, IF THIS THING WENT THROUGH THIS MORNING.

W: I SEE. SO A LITTLE FURTHER STUDY IS BEING GIVEN TO THE FORM AND MANNER.

A: VERY MUCH SO. UNTIL WE HEAR FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND FROM THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE I THINK WE OUGHT TO GO VERY SLOWLY.

WD TO 103 (23 Dec 43)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

W: I understand that and I will report that. All I can tell you is - the Secretary authorized me to tell you that this whole action was instigated and initiated by the Prime Minister by a message he sent to the President, and requested the President to act. The President took this action as requested and informed the Prime Minister. Now if you have anything further to report after your talk with General Smith or General Smith has anything to report on the part of General Eisenhower I suppose you will send those messages in this afternoon after your conference with General Smith?

A: Yes we will telegraph it tonight.

W: I am not in a position to say anything else other than to tell you where the action was initiated.

A: I understand perfectly and I think you might bear in mind that if you kill the action that was initiated by the Prime Minister, it is being done by a man who has been very ill recently, and he perhaps is giving undue attention to it on that account. I hope you see what I mean.

W: He has now placed it in the hands of Eden for further advice as to form and manner.

A: That is right.

W: I will report that immediately, and anything that you have from your conferences you will send in. The President is of course very much exercised about it particularly on the Buss case. He immediately reacted to the Prime Ministers words.

A: Well I think as I say, Prime Minister is backing down somewhat.

W: Well, I will report that immediately. We all realize very fully what the reaction would be to this particular act.

A: Well I am thinking not only of the reaction that would be caused here but the reaction that would be caused at home, I think the matter is very interesting. I will tell you how.

WD TC 103 (23 Dec 43)

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SERIOUS THE IMPLICATIONS ARE.

W: YES, WELL THANK YOU VERY MUCH IT IS GOOD TO HAVE THIS AT THIS TIME. I WILL GET IT RIGHT ACROSS TO THE PRESIDENT.

A: ALL RIGHT. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

W: FINE THANK YOU. GOODBYE.

A: GOODBYE.

ORIGINATOR: Mr Dunn (St Dept)
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 517  

Colonel Warden to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 517.

1. I have signalled my colleagues that I am in entire agreement with your No. 423 about the arrests and have every expectation that instructions will be given to MacMillan to support your action. The actual form of the demarche might be discussed by Eisenhower with MacMillan and Wilson.

2. Our case is a very strong one. Boisson saved us the cost and diversion of a major expedition against Dakar. Peyrouton returned voluntarily at the invitation of Giraud and his journey was approved and facilitated by the State Department. Flandin was, it is true, a minister at Vichy and was turned out for his opposition to the German demands. Notably he prevented an expedition from Dakar being sent to attack the Free French near Lake Chad.

3. But far above individuals, the whole question of our relations with France is raised.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 517
Filed: 23/2215Z

France can only be liberated by British and American force and bloodshed. To admit that a handful of emigres are to have the power behind this all-powerful shield to carry civil war into France is to lose the future of that unfortunate country and prevent the earliest expression of the will of the people as a whole, in fact, we should be lending ourselves to a process of adding to the burdens and sacrifices of our troops and of infringing our fundamental principle, "All governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

No Sig
From: Adv of AFHQ-Adv CP at AMILCAR near Tunis
To: The President of the United States
No. # Filed: 22/1730 A

To AGWAR for the President from Eisenhower cite FHCOS.

News of the arrest of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin has just reached me at Advanced Headquarters in Italy where I am visiting the front. I have also only this minute received copy of the Prime Minister's message to the Foreign Secretary and the Resident Minister at Algiers expressing his concern at this action of the French National Committee. I am profoundly disturbed, particularly in the case of Boisson who acted for a time as my loyal subordinate. I have radioed Murphy of my conviction that if the Committee presses this affair to its probable conclusion it can only result in the most serious consequences. Smith is flying to Algiers tomorrow morning and will confer with Murphy and MacMillan.
SECRET
SECRET PRIORITY

FROM: WAR
TO: ALGIERS #6466

SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

PLEASE INFORM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE. IN VIEW
OF THE ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN IN
AFRICA BY BOISSON, PEYROUTIN, AND FLANDIN, YOU ARE DIRECTED TO TAKE NO
ACTION AGAINST THESE INDIVIDUALS AT THE PRESENT TIME. UNQUOTE.

KEEP THE PRIME MINISTER INFORMED.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1155, EWT, 22 December 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
SECRET

PRESIDENT TO EISENHOWER

Please inform the French Committee as follows:

"In view of the assistance given to the allied armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Payrotin, and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time."

Keep the Prime Minister informed.

(State to inform Murphy)
The President has directed that Mr. Murphy be advised that he (the President) has this date directed General Eisenhower to inform the French Committee as follows:

"In view of the assistance given to the allied armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyroutin, and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time."

General Eisenhower was likewise requested to keep the Prime Minister informed.

L. Mathewson,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant Military Aide to the President.
SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: WAR
TO: FREEDOM, ALGIERS

NO: S467, 22 DECEMBER 1943.

FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL EISENHOWER OR GENERAL SMITH ONLY FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

PERSONAL AND SECRET. NUMBER 423, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

REFERRING TO YOUR 513, I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING TO EISENHOWER THIS DATE:

"PLEASE INFORM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE AS FOLLOWS:

'IN VIEW OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE ALLIED ARMIES DURING THE CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA BY BOISSON, PEYROUTIN AND FLANDIN, YOU ARE DIRECTED TO TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THESE INDIVIDUALS AT THE PRESENT TIME.'"

I HOPE YOU ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THIS DIRECTIVE AND WILL SO INFORM EISENHOWER AND MACMILLEN.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS IS THE PROPER TIME EFFECTIVELY TO ELIMINATE THE JEANNE D'ARC COMPLEX AND TO RETURN TO REALISM. I TOO AM SHOCKED BY THE HIGH HANDED ARRESTS AT THIS TIME.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1150, EWT, 22 December 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
21 December 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 513
Filed: 21/2209Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. No. 513.

1. I am shocked at the arrests reported this morning of Boisson, Peyreuton and Flandin. There are even rumours here that the first two at any rate will be shot. I consider I have a certain obligation as, in supporting your policy and that of General Eisenhower, I did undoubtedly in Algiers in February encourage these men to hold firm in their posts and aid us in our struggle for Tunis, saying also in that case, "Count on me". It seems to me the American obligation is even stronger because we were admittedly following (query) your general lines.

2. I trust, therefore, you will take what steps you can to impress upon the French Committee the unwisdom of their present proceedings. You, no doubt, will also be considering the question of offering asylum. Pray let me know if there is any way in which we could help.

No Sig
FLASH