

FLASH

Box 31

Map Room Files

BOX 31. SPECIAL FILES.

Folder 1. 011 FRANCE (1) Sec. 1. Civil Affairs for France. April 8-  
September 22, 1944.

Routine military messages re civil affairs for France and  
communications between FDR and the following persons:  
Averill Harriman, William Glassford, Churchill, Secretary  
of State Hull, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General  
Eisenhower, General W. B. Smith, John G. Winant, John J.  
McCloy.

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
SUSNO ALGIERS		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	ROUTINE
DATE	22 SEPTEMBER 1944		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	2114		
DECODED BY	HENKE	COM 8TH FLT (ADM)	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	HENKE/KNAPP	NCWTF NIU *	ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
221332 NCR 6255			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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SUSNO ALGIERS SENDS ACTION COMINCH INFO COM 8TH FLT (ADM) NCWTF NIU\*

CONFUSION ALGIERS REGARDING AUTHORITY POLICIES STABILITY PARIS GOVERNMENT ALSO STATUS INFLUENCE FUTURE CONSEIL NATIONAL DE RESISTANCE. THIS CONFUSION INTERFERES WITH WORK ADMINISTRATIONS REMAINING HERE. OFFICIAL PUBLICATION RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY FEATURES VITRIOLIC ATTACK DE GAULLE SAYING CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST PREPONDER ALIEN GOVERNMENT UNREPRESENTATIVE FRENCH THOUGHT BUT CAUSED BY DE GAULLES PERSONAL PREFERENCE. DEMANDS END OF ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT AND THAT DE GAULLE DISCONTINUE DUAL POSE CHIEF STATE AND GOVERNMENT. MOHAMMEDAN SOLDIER WHO SHOT GIRAUD CLAIMS RELIGIOUS INSPIRATION.

• AS RECEIVED

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42

221332

007

011 France

## CAFFERY IS NAMED ENVOY TO FRANCE

Veteran Diplomat to Rank as  
Ambassador to de Gaulle's  
De Facto Government

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21—Jefferson Caffery, former ambassador to Brazil, was appointed by President Roosevelt today as "representative of the United States, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to the de facto French authority now established at Paris."

Mr. Caffery, who returned here from Rio de Janeiro, "will proceed to his new post in the near future," it was announced.

He will succeed Edwin C. Wilson, former ambassador to Panama and a career diplomat, who had represented the United States with the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers and resigned earlier this year because of family

reasons that required his presence in this country.

The appointment of Ambassador Caffery, it was said at the State Department, does not constitute recognition of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's organization as the Government of France or even as a provisional government. It was pointed out that since we entered France, the French Committee has taken the name of "Authority."

Nevertheless, the designation was interpreted as indicating the way the wind was blowing; that is, in the direction of some more advanced form of recognition than now exists.

It is understood that the French question was discussed at the recent Quebec conference by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill, and that tentative plans have been drawn with the Government looking to provisional recognition of General de Gaulle. These plans, however, are represented as requiring approval by higher authorities and by President Roosevelt himself to become effective.

In any event the selection of Mr. Caffery for what bears the appearance of still closer understanding and collaboration with General de Gaulle and his organization is taken as indicating that, if before long a French Government is recognized, he will be first in line for appointment as the Ambassador.

His designation follows the appointment yesterday of Ambassadors to occupied countries and governments in exile of Europe, all of which signifies that President Roosevelt is getting his diplomatic house in shape on that continent for the expected capitulation of Germany, when military problems will be succeeded by questions of diplomacy, politics and economics.

Mr. Caffery stands among the highest in the diplomatic services and is a career official of long service. At the outset of the Roosevelt Administration he was an Assistant Secretary of State and he ranks in reputation with Norman Armour, former Ambassador to Argentina; Sumner Welles, former Under-Secretary of State, and other veterans.

A native of Louisiana and 57 years of age, he entered the foreign service in 1911, and in subsequent years served as diplomatic secretary in Europe, the Middle East, South America and the Far East.

He was in the Paris Embassy in the last two years of World War I, and was attached to President Wilson during the Peace Conference. In 1925 he was Counselor of Embassy in Berlin. Two years before he had been stationed in the Embassy in Tokyo.

Mr. Caffery served first as Minister to El Salvador and then to Columbia. He was Ambassador to Cuba during the difficult period that followed the revolution early in President Roosevelt's Administration. He has been Ambassador to Brazil since 1937.

No announcement has been made of his successor in Rio de Janeiro.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
SEP 15 1944

16 September 1944

## Hull Is Opening Embassy in U.S. To De Gaullists

**It Is Emphasized Step Does  
Not Imply Recognition;  
French Fleet in Toulon**

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 (AP).— In a further move of co-operation with the French National Committee of General Charles de Gaulle, the United States government has informed the committee's representative here that he may now occupy the French Embassy. This was disclosed Thursday by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

State Department officials emphasize that this does not mean any change in this government's refusal to recognize the committee as a provisional government instead of as an administrative authority. The action was described as a gesture in the direction of co-operation.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECRET "IVI"  
PRIORITY

*[Handwritten signature]*  
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward on Continent

To: War Department

Nr: FWD 14300

9 September 1944

FWD 14300 from SHAEF FWD AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower reference W-73929 of 1st August 1944 cite SHGE.

Oppose present establishment of Sanitary and Security Zones in Allied Occupied France. Consider problems of organization and operation cannot be satisfactorily met in present phase of military operations. Also doubt that current conditions warrant any such comprehensive action. In absence of detailed formula from International Red Cross assume this matter may later be developed by considered agreements between governments.

End

ACTION: JCS

INFO : Adm Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-8479 (10 Sep 44) 0317Z jb

SECRET

40

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CONFIDENTIAL "IVI"  
PRIORITY

*J*  
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward on Continent.

To: War Department.

Nr: FWD 13895.

5th September 1944.

FWD 13895 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, info  
SHAEF Main for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower.  
This is SCAF 75.

Directive following is being issued to the various  
elements of this command:

"1. Transportation of American, British and other  
United Nations civilian personnel to places which are at the  
time in the forward zone as defined in the British-American  
agreements with the French, for the purpose of opening offices  
of various private enterprises including newspaper bureaus,  
broadcasting and other organizations will not be authorized.

2. The question of giving authority for the trans-  
portation of such personnel to places which are at the time  
within the "Interior Zones", as defined in said agreements  
and of any necessary transportation arrangements and sub-  
sequent supervision will be the subject of a further directive  
at the time "Interior Zones" are created.

3. This directive does not apply to accredited  
war correspondents or personnel of accredited civilian  
agencies, nor to French personnel of French private enter-  
prises."

While it is obviously impossible to prevent and  
desirable to encourage the reopening of United Nations private

CM-IN-5012 (6 Sep 44)

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL "IVI"  
PRIORITY

Page II.

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward on Continent.

Nr: FWD 13895. 5th September 1944.

enterprises in Paris and other liberated cities, this must be done with the personnel and materiel already in the areas concerned. No personnel or materiel for private enterprises may be transported into the forward zone of France or into Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway or Luxembourg during the first phase of the administration of those countries as defined in agreements with their governments. This decision is prompted not only to spare military transportation facilities, but also because of shortage of food and local transportation and lack of communications other than military.

When any portion of France becomes a Zone of the Interior, or when the second phase of the administration of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Luxembourg comes into being, the entrance into those countries by personnel or materiel for private enterprises will no longer be a matter of military concern, except that military transportation and communication facilities will not be available for their use.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, Gen Bissell,  
Gen. Hilldring, Adm. King, Log

CM-IN-5012 (6 Sep 44) 1940Z jb

CONFIDENTIAL

39

COPY NO.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
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TOP SECRET "AMUG" *BR*

CORRECTED COPY *J*

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward Echelon, on the Continent

To: War Department  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
CG, European Theater of Operations, US Army  
Rear Echelon, London, England  
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, (Rear Echelon), Algiers

No: FWD 13533 3 September 1944

SHAEF FWD G-5 021230 AGWAR rptd AFHQ SHAEF Main FWD  
13533. TOPSEC. AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff infor-  
mation to SHAEF Main for British Chiefs of Staff and Dunn,  
State Department rpt for information to AFHQ for Wilson  
signed Eisenhower. This is SCAF 71.

The Supreme Commander has been informed by General De Gaulle that for the present he has no intention of recommending that any part of France be declared a Zone of the Interior. He proposes to keep liberated French territory as a military zone under General Koenig who is, therefore, responsible to General Eisenhower as one of his commanders.

It is apparent that General De Gaulle is motivated by the idea of regaining a legal state of seige until the situation clarifies and he is able to reform his administration without undue interference at the present from the Algiers Committee. In these circumstances should the British and American diplomatic missions proceed to Paris they would have no functions until a civil administration is set up, and that no separate means of communication can be supplied them.

FOOTNOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-2399 (3 Sept 44) CC/S  
ACTION: CC/S  
INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell,  
Gen Hilldring, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-4858

(6 Sept 44)  
TOP SECRET

1411Z

ekk

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*011 France*

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>SUSNO ALGIERS</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		<b>COMINCH</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b>
DATE <b>SEPTEMBER 3 1944</b>	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM <b>0409</b>		<b>COM 8TH FLEET</b>	DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>J HAILE</b>	INFORMATION		<b>PRIORITY</b>
TYPED BY <b>KOTEEN/HARTZELL</b>		ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY		DEFERRED	
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<b>021613</b>		<b>NCR 204</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

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SUSNO ALGIERS SENDS. TO COMINCH. INFO COM 8TH FLEET.

POLITICAL NOTES.

WEEK MARKED BY START MOVE OF COMMITTEE TO FRANCE.

DEGAULLE REPORTEDLY WILL REQUEST GROUP RESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONERS ON ARRIVAL PARIS. BELIEVED UNLIKELY MAJORITY BE REAPPOINTED MINISTERIAL POSTS LATER POSSIBLY RECEIVING OTHER POSITIONS IN A DEGAULLE GOVERNMENT. ALGIERS PRESS ACCOUNTS INDICATE INTEREST IN EMERGENCE GEORGE BIDAULT PRESIDENT RESISTANCE HIGH COUNCIL AS IMPORTANT FIGURE IN FRANCE. REPORTED LEFTWING CATHOLIC NOT PROMINENT PREWAR. [GENERAL CHOUTEAU FORMERLY ACTIVE WITH RESISTANCE SUCCEEDS GENERAL KOENIG AS HEAD FFI AND AS FRENCH MILITARY DELEGATE EUROPEAN THEATER. CHOUTEAU CALLED CAPABLE INTELLIGENT.]

ACTION	
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FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

**SECRET**

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021613

OPNAV 10-07 011 France

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TOP SECRET "AMUG"  
URGENT

*F. W.*  
**TOP SECRET**

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.  
To: War Department.  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward Echelon, London, England.  
Headquarters, North African District, Algiers, Algeria  
Nr: FX 89381. 29 August 1944

From General Gammell personal for General Walter B Smith. NADIST for AFHQ Liaison Section Rear for information FX 89381 signed Wilson action to SHAEF Advanced information to AGWAR, TROOPERS, NADIST cite FHLIA. TOP SECRET.

Further to my FX 88580 and reference your FWD 13348 of 28th August 1944.

Your approval move of French governmental personnel noted. French, however, have meanwhile taken law into their own hands and first party of 50 left Algiers for Cherbourg in French cruiser Jeanne D'Arc night 28/29 Aug before your approval for move had been received. This, despite fact that General Testart, Deputy Chief of Staff National Defence, expressed himself, in discussion at AFHQ on 27 August, strongly against employment Jeanne D'Arc for this purpose.

Position now is that, with above 50 en route, approximately 160 high priority personnel remain to be moved to France. For this purpose six aircraft can be made available in Algiers within 24 hours of receiving your approval for movement by air and requisite flight instructions. This lift will move maximum of 120, which will include two American and one British Liaison Officers, leaving balance to proceed by sea in MKF 34.

*8/24*  
GM-IN-27150 (29 Aug 44)

TOP SECRET

*Adm Leahy*

32

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TOP SECRET "AMUG"

Page -2-

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No. FX89381 29 August 1944

Please reply most immediate giving your approval  
for air movement with destination and route to be followed.  
Much regret that Jeanne D'Arc party should have left in  
this abrupt manner but French have got out of hand again.

End

FX 88580 is CM-IN-25337 (27 Aug 44) GEN HANDY

ACTION: GEN HANDY  
INFO : CCS  
ADM LEAHY  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN BISSELL  
GEN HILLDRING  
ADM KING  
MR STIMSON  
C OF S

CM-IN-27150 (29 Aug 44) 2040Z mcs  
TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET "AMUG"  
URGENT

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Forward Echelon, London, England  
CG, North African District, Algiers, Algeria  
No. FX88580 27 August 1944

FX88580 TOP SECRET to SHAEF Advanced personal from General Gammell for General W. B. Smith information to AGWAR, TROOPERS, NADIST for AFHQ Liaison Section Rear signed Wilson cite FHLIA.

On instructions General De Gaulle, General Testart, Deputy Chief of Staff National Defense has asked assistance to move urgently approximately 200 persons of French Government from Algiers to France, ultimate destination probably Paris. Availability necessary aircraft not yet certain but proposed program is that maximum number above personnel shall fly in Dakotas party 18 persons and 40 pounds baggage per person going by route and to a destination to be indicated by you. It has been made clear to General Testart that this program is subject to your prior agreement to establishment now by General De Gaulle of a French Government in France and your willingness to receive this personnel in immediate future. If you agree, propose to emplane maximum number from Algiers on Tuesday 29 August. Balance and all additional baggage to proceed by sea in MKF 34. Details sea party later. Request most immediate reply giving concurrence together with flight instructions.

End

ACTION: GEN HANDY  
INFO : GEN MACFARLAND (CCS), GEN ARNOLD, GEN BISSELL,  
GEN HILLDRING, ADM KING, MR STIMSON,

ADM LEAHY, C OF S  
CM-IN-25337 (27 Aug 44) 2229Z mcs  
TOP SECRET

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SECRET-IVI

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DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl S. Spica*

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England

To: War Department  
CG, North African District, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: S 58507 VOG 115 26 August 1944

From SHAEF, S 58507, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee information to Hilldring and British Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to FREEDOM for NADIST for British and American Representatives signed Eisenhower. This is VOG 115.

Summary of Civil Affairs Operations for period ending 2400 hours 24 August 1944.

2. Civil Affairs Detachments now established 86 localities.

3. Civil administration continues satisfactory rear areas. Slight hold up newly liberated areas due some cases absence civil authorities others change of officials. French issuing in pamphlet form copies all decrees issued to date following up with weekly supplementation.

4. Public safety greater freedom of movement to be allowed civilians using secondary roads without detriment to military traffic. Reorganization civil police continues. Three types identity card being issued by French:

- (A) To persons resident in Communes prior to 6th June 1944.
- (B) To those about whom full details not available.
- (C) To doubtful characters.

CM-IN-24877 (27 Aug 44)

SECRET

*Carl S. Spica*  
58

COPY NO.

*011 Name*

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SECRET-IVI

(Page 2)

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England  
Nr: S 58507 VOG 115 26 August 1944

Move for greater co-operation with genuine resistance some of whom being employee as auxiliary police. All special police in future to be under control Gendarmerie.

5. Finance Villard First Vice Governor Banque de France has assumed responsibility all branches liberated areas. Cooperation between bank officials and military reported excellent. Currency stocks adequate. Further large sums uncovered. Estimated six billion Francs available circulation with further two billion Francs in notes as yet unissued issues to date 25 times less than in comparable period German occupation. Trend prices down wages up.

6. Supply First Army building stockpile civil affairs supplies rate 250 tons per day. British and Canadian areas report shortage flour and bread being dealt with. Increase number refugees necessitated issue 6000 plus rations. Coal very short with adverse effect on transportation and power. Plan for relief of Paris is progressing satisfactorily. 20000 tons food, medical supplies, and soaps being loaded from English ports will be available shipment September 1st. This quantity provides feeding Paris for approximately 10 days. Communication zone and 12th Army Group are prepared to move present stock piles on continent to Paris area. Transportation 150015-CWT trucks and 1500 trailers are being moved to continent by installments for collection and distribution of indimencous resources in the Paris area. Arrangements being completed by SHAEF communications zone and 21st Army Group for movement of coal to Paris for essential utilities. In addition,

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(27 Aug 44)

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DOB DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl S. Sprain

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SECRET-IVI

(Page 3)

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England

Nr: S 58507VOG 115 26 August 1944

arrangements completed for stock piling of 3000 tons food to be distributed in 1000 ton lots at air fields in England for lift to Paris by air on call of Commanding General, 12th Army Group if found necessary.

7. Agriculture wheat harvest reported excellent.

8. Labour recent conference recommended "6th Zone" wage schedule be adopted British area. French preparing schedules relative overtime, travel pay and wages rates for approval British and US authorities. Special identity cards to be issued each applicant for employment. Former bureau displacement at Granville now functioning as Bureau Francaise Du Travail and providing labour US zone. No labour surplus available First Army area. 30 francs per day displacement allowance being paid mobile labour pending permanent agreement with French.

9. Public works lack of power main obstacle to restoration public services and utilities. Many installations intact but no power to operate. Cisler proceeding Paris with French to investigate conditions. Road conditions rapidly deteriorating repairs in hand but equipment short. Railroad repairs being pressed at high priority. Double track now operating Cherbourg-Le Mans.

10. Communications PTT facilities remain centered in Rennes. Repairs all types facilities progressing satisfactorily. Recently recommended M Coulet be given authority establish postcard mail service area north of St Malo and De La Lande but exclusive Marigny and St. Lo.

CM-IN-24877

(27 Aug 44)

SECRET

Date- 2-13-61

Signature: Carl S. Spica 58

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SECRET-IVI

(Page 4)

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England  
Nr: S 58507 VOG 115 26 August 1944

11. Public health fairly satisfactory. 30 cases diphtheria and 20 cases typhus reported Tours being investigated. Serum distributing center established Cherbourg. Second being considered Rennes. Cooperation with French excellent.

12. Monuments and fine arts production uniform notices for "off limits" being considered. Civil affairs detachments to take all possible protective measures. Mont St Michel intact. Extensive damage Vire and Mortain.

13. Refugees large numbers uncovered past week include 20,000 under flag of truce from Brest. German Refugee Camp 7000 inmates uncovered Chanu. Anticipated further similar camps will be discovered. Coordination of movement British and US zones being carried out. Travel maps.

End

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

ACTION: CCAC

INFO: CC/S  
ASF  
OPD  
G-2

Adm King  
Col Park  
Mr McCloy  
Log

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl L. Spencer*

CM-IN-24877

(27 Aug 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECRET

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
CSP 2405 77500

23 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Force  
London, England

Number WAR 85342

To Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

You are directed to address the following letter in your capacity as Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, European Theater of Operations, to General Koenig, as Chief of the French Military Mission.

It is understood that the memoranda referred to therein will also be put into effect for the British by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Text of letter to General Koenig:

"My Dear General:

"Pursuant to instructions I have received from the United States Chiefs of Staff, I am transmitting herewith four memoranda of arrangements with respect to Civil Affairs Administration in France which have been agreed to between the French and American representatives in Washington.

"I have been authorized to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation as the De Facto authority in France, which will assume the leadership of and responsibility for the administration of the liberated areas of France. This action is taken on the understanding

GM-OUT-85342 (23 Aug 44)

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SECRET

Number WAR 85342

Page -2-

that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force must possess whatever authority he may need for the unimpeded conduct of military operations as well as in recognition of the fact that the civil administration in France, pending the full liberation of the country, should be exercised, in so far as it is practicable, by Frenchmen.

"In authorizing me to take this action, my government also understands that it is the intention of the committee that as soon as the military situation permits, the French people will be given an opportunity to select a government of their own free choice. My dealing with the committee as above outlined is based upon the support which the committee continues to receive from the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France.

"I shall be happy to carry out the arrangements contained in the enclosed memoranda in the spirit of fullest cooperation with the French Committee and its representatives in dealing with civil affairs administration during the period of military operations in France against the common enemy."

The memoranda referred to in text of letter quoted above have been forwarded by air courier.

End.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S  
INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
Gen. Arnold  
OPD  
Gen. Bissell  
Gen. Hilldring  
Adm. King  
C of S

CM-OUT-85342 (23 Aug 44) 1937Z mk

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

23 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR 85570

To Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the event you have not received the memoranda referred to in FACS 62 and WAR 85342 as being forwarded by air courier, you are authorized to use as authentic the texts brought to you by M. Alphand and bearing Mr. McCloy's initials.

End

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Gen Hilldring  
Adm King  
C of S

CM-OUT-85570

(23 Aug 44) 2349Z hrt

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SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

23 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR 85383

To SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 61 from the Combined  
Chiefs of Staff.

The following is your directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for Civil Affairs Administration in continental France.

"1. As a result of the discussions between American, British and French representatives, agreement has been reached on the practical arrangements for Civil Affairs Administration in continental France.

2. This agreement is recorded in memoranda Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive:

No. I. Relating to administrative and jurisdictional questions.

No. II. Relating to currency.

No. III. Relating to property in continental France.

No. IV. Relating to publicity arrangements.

No. V. Relating to the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in continental France.

These memoranda are being forwarded by air courier.

CM-OUT-85383

(23 Aug 44)

SECRET

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Number WAR 85383

Page 2.

3. You should act in accordance with the terms of these memoranda in all matters which concern the civil administration of France. The designation 'Supreme Allied Commander' used in these memoranda refers to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF). Memoranda 1, 3, 4 and 5 become operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted for the United States by the CG, USAF, ETO to the Chief of the French Military Mission. Memorandum 2 becomes operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted by SCAEF to the Chief of the French Military Mission.

4. In connection with your rights and powers to use or requisition war materials and other property, information has come to hand indicating that the Germans customarily requisition all useable supplies in any area before abandoning it. In exercising your right to use such supplies you should, so far as military necessity permits, give the greatest consideration to the economic interests of the civilian population and, where possible, leave at the disposal of the French authorities such transport material, food supplies and building materials as have been requisitioned by the German Armies or handed over to them under duress, and which are not needed by you in connection with military operations."

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Gen Hilldring  
Adm King  
CofS

CM-OUT-85383

(23 Aug 44) 2032Z amb

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TOP SECRET TOT

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: Allied Force Headquarters. Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department

Nr: F 85437 20 August 1944

To AGWAR signed Wilson reured W 82066 cite FHLIA  
F 85437. TOP SECRET.

Definitely enroute to northern France in B17 is  
General De Gaulle.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO: JC/S  
Gen Arnold  
Adm Leahy  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Gen Hilldring  
C of S

CM-IV-19020 (21 Aug 44) 0337Z ben

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LETTERS "IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO  
THIS MESSAGE

**TOP  
SECRET**

TOP SECRET  
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta Italy

To: War Department  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Nr: FX 84437 18 August 1944  
TOP SECRET. Signed Wilson action to AGWAR info SHAEP  
FX 84437 cite FHLIA. Personal for General Marshall from  
General Rooks in absence of General Devers. Reference your  
W 82066 of 17 August.

In personal message to General De Gaulle on 17th August, General Esker offered the use of his personal Fortress for General De Gaulle's proposed trip to France. The latter has declined the use of this plane stating that he would leave Casablanca at 2200 hours 18 August in his Lockheed Lodestar C-60 with French crew and one American pilot. In spite of this refusal General Esker sent his plane to North Africa early morning 18 August so that it will be available to General De Gaulle in the event the latter changes his mind. Message was dispatched to Algiers advising General De Gaulle that plane will be in North Africa today available to him if he so chooses. Steps have been taken to inform General De Gaulle of the instructions which AEF has given for proposed journey which specify the use of a Fortress and the route and timing and other necessary arrangements of the journey. General De Gaulle's attention is being invited to fact that any deviation from these instructions will be on his own responsibility and risk.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO: JC/S ~~Adm Leahy~~ Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Adm King  
Gen Hilldring C of S

CM-IN-16465 (18 Aug 44) 1453Z bem

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**TOP  
SECRET**

TOP SECRET - "IVI"

PRIORITY

From : CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

To : War Department  
Hqs North African District, Algiers, Algeria.  
CG North African Wing ATC, Casablanca.  
CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers.

No. FX 84597 18 August, 1944

FX 84597 TOPSEC to AGWAR action. SHAEF, NADIST for AFHQ Liaison Section Rear, Casablanca Personal Captain Murray MATS Liaison Officer for information signed Wilson cite FHLIA, Personal for General Marshall from General Rocks in absence of General Devers reference your W 82066 17th August and our FX 84437 of 18th August.

Have just been informed that General De Gaulle has decided to use B-17 for proposed trip to France. General Eaker's personal Fortress was damaged while landing at Algiers. A standard B-17 has been despatched as replacement.

End.

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO : JC/S  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Bissell  
Gen Hilldring  
Adm King  
Adm Leahy  
C of S

CM-IN-16906 (19 Aug 44) 0115Z ejm

TOP SECRET

31

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET  
URGENT

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
Nr: M 28490 18 August 1944

To AGWAR for Arnold from Eaker Hqs MAAF Caserta  
ref nr M 28490. TOP SECRET.

Re AGWAR W 82066, I offered my B17 as the most suitable aircraft to General DeGaulle for his trip to France. Last night he declined. I understand that there was not a French plane with a French crew. This morning I have sent it on to Casablanca anyhow to be available and in readiness if he changes his mind. Please advise General Marshall that I am answering this to you direct for Devers who is not here.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFORMATION: JC/S  
Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Bissell  
Gen Hilldring  
Adm King  
CcfS

CM-IN-16307

(18 Aug 44) 1113Z hrt

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Executive, OPD, WDGS 3485

17 August 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Number: WAR 82066

To General Devers personal from General Marshall.

Proposed visit of General de Gaulle to France on August 17th is reference. U.S. Chiefs of Staff advised General Eisenhower on August 16th that they considered it desirable to use an armored plane for the trip as the use of a C-54 under present conditions was inadvisable. General Eisenhower advises that he has cabled General Wilson to recommend that a B-17 be substituted for the Lockheed which General de Gaulle intended to use and that departure be postponed to August 18th to permit preparation for latter arrival.

It is desired that you insure that a B-17 is made available.

End

ORIGINATOR: General Handy

INFORMATION: JC/S

Admiral Leahy  
General Arnold  
General Bissell  
Admiral King  
General Hildring  
C of 3

OM-OUT-82066

(17 Aug 44) 1501Z

ejv

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23

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**TOP  
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TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

FROM: Supreme Hqs, Allie Expeditionary Forces, London, England  
TO: War Department  
Supreme Hqs, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward  
Echelon, London, England  
NO: S 57762 16 August 1944

S 57762 TOP SECRET AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff  
signed Eisenhower reference SCAF 63 cite SHGE this SCAF 64.

Word has just been received that General De Gaulle  
intends to take off from North Africa tomorrow, August 17,  
to arrive in Northern France at dawn 18 August. He is  
proposing to go in his Lockheed plane which we consider un-  
suitable for the journey because of range and difficulties  
of recognition as it is an unfamiliar type in this theater.  
We are consequently cabling General Wilson to recommend that  
a Bl7 be substituted for the Lockheed and that General De Gaulle  
postpone his departure 1 day in order that adequate prepara-  
tions for his arrival may be made.

With reference to a telephone conversation between  
Hilldring and Holmes this day it is our understanding that  
this is not merely a visit but that General De Gaulle in  
France intends to stay.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell,  
Gen Hilldring, Adm King, Mr Stimson, C of S

CM-IN-14845 (16 Aug 44) 2231Z jb

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*011 France*

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

TOP SECRET  
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff

16 August 1944

W  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR-81711

To Eisenhower forward from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

U.S. Chiefs of Staff are awaiting receipt of British views before replying officially to your SCAF 63. In the meantime for your advance information there is no objection from the viewpoint of the American Government to the procedure outlined in your message.

There should be no quibble about the plane to be used. An armored plane would be desirable as it is considered inadvisable to use a C-54 under present conditions.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell,  
Mr. Stimson, Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-81711

(16 Aug 44)

2141Z

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

16 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR-81710

TOPSEC to SHAEF London forward for Eisenhower, FACS 58 from  
the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The British and American Governments have no objection to the  
proposed visit by General de Gaulle reference SCAF 63. It is  
considered, however, that the signing of the agreement will  
have no bearing on the reception arrangements and that General  
de Gaulle should be received as the Commander of the French  
Army.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell,  
Mr. Stimson, Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-81710

(16 Aug 44)

2140Z

wg

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward Echelon, London, England

To: War Department  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England

No: FWD 12899 15 August 1944

FWD 12899 to AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff info British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF MAIN, SHAEF ADV from Eisenhower. TOPSEC SCAF 63

I have just been informed by General Wilson that General DeGaulle desires to fly to Northern France next Wednesday or Thursday, August 16th or 17th. He desires, presumably for patriotic reasons to land there in a French plane or a plane piloted by Frenchmen and wishes to land in France without stop in United Kingdom if operationally possible.

General Wilson states that the only French plane which could possibly make the flight is DeGaulle's Lockheed Lodestar, but it may not be adequate. General Wilson recommends a B 17 or a C 54. He infers that DeGaulle is making this journey with the view of entering Paris if it falls in time.

There is no military objection from my point of view to General DeGaulle's arrival in France prior to the signing of the French agreement which I am now informed will not take place until next week. However, since it will probably be necessary for him to make the trip in a British

CM-IN-13934 (16 Aug 44)

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011 France

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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TOP SECRET

URGENT

TOP  
SECRET

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Forward Echelon, London, England

No: FWD 12899 15 August 1944

or American plane, I should like to be informed if this rather premature arrival will in any way embarrass the British or American Governments.

If he comes prior to the signing of the agreement, I propose to receive him as the Commander of the French Army. If after the signing, he presumably will arrive as head of the Provisional Government of France.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold,  
OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-13934 (15 Aug 44) 0114Z jb

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 29

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	SEN US NAV OFF ALGIERS	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE	14 AUGUST 1944		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	2244/13		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	FORSBERG/VERKLER	NIU N2	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	HERWITZ/SOWERS	COM 8TH FLT	ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2			<input type="checkbox"/>
131115			
NCR 5526			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(SEN US NAV OFF ALGIERS SQUEEZES ACTION COMINCH INFO NIU N 2 COM 8TH FLT.)

PART 1. 131048 NCR 5435  
 PART 2. 131115 NCR 5526

POLITICAL NOTES. RD\*

REVIEW THIS WEEK SITUATION COMMUNIST PARTY IN NORTH AFRICA INDICATES RZ\* FIRMLY ESTABLISHED. 10 IN ASSEMBLY COMPARED WITH 14 RADICAL SOCIALISTS- AND 21 SOCIALISTS. PARTY HEADED BY MARTY WHOSE PRESENT PROGRAM IS TO WIN WAR PUNISH TRAITORS AND ESTABLISH POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AT EARLIEST MOMENT. PUBLICIZE THEMSELVES HERE AS MAINLY NATIONALISTIC. DESIROUS OF NATIONAL UNITY IN INTEREST OF FRENCH NATION. APPARENT DISSOCIATION BETWEEN ALGIERS RUSSIAN MISSION AND LOCAL COMMUNISTS REGARDED BY SOME AS PRETENSE. DE GAULLE REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THEY WILL BE MINORITY IN FRANCE HENCE NOT DANGEROUS.

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		26
F-07		28
F-1		29
F-2		30
F-20		31
F-3		32
F-30		33
F-31		34
F-32		35
F-33		36
F-34		37
F-4		38
FX01		39
FX30		40
FX37		41
FX40		42
IG-00		43
VCNO		44
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OPNAV-NCR-12

011 France

131115

REPORTS FROM MOROCCO THIS WEEK INDICATE GREATLY-  
INCREASED FRIENDSHIP FOR UNITED STATES DUE PROBABLY TO  
RECENT SUCCESSES OUR ARMED FORCES IN FRANCE AND ELSEWHERE ,  
GENERAL JUIN IN ALGIERS AFTER REMOVAL FROM ARMY  
COMMAND. SUCCEEDED BY GENERAL DELATTRE REGARDED  
AS BETTER SUITED TO LEAD FRENCH FORCES INTO FRANCE DUE  
TO HIS ASSOCIATION WITH RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS. JUIN  
REPORTEDLY WILL HEAD COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
REPLACING GENERAL BETHOUAYH.

\*AS RECEIVED

Originator \_\_\_\_\_ SEN US NAV OFF ALGIERS 131115 NCR 5526 Page 2 Of 2 Pages

OPNAV-10-01  
A34100

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WR

P

From: CG North African District, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

DTG: 121500B

August 1944

From JICA AFHQ Rear Nadist APO 534 to AGWAR for  
Bissell War Department Washington D C JICA out 13.

Understand General Bethouart was relieved as Chief of Staff last night. Best information available would indicate General Juin succeeds him with added responsibility as head of National Defense Committee thus De Gaulle divests himself of military powers and retains solely his post as Chief of Government. Report in pouch leaving this afternoon.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CC/S  
CG AAF  
OPD  
CAD  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-11468

(13 Aug 44)

0434Z

pa

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63

011 France

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE AUGUST 12 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1655			DEFERRED
DECODED BY KOTEEN		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY KOTEEN/KNOWLES			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES	121249	NCR 4532	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVEU SHOTS TO COMINCH.  
FOR ADMIRAL STARK FROM GLASSFORD.

(1) UNOFFICIAL AND INFORMAL FROM FRENCH NAVAL MISSION IN LONDON.  
(A) REAR ADMIRAL DARGENLIEU HAS BEEN CONFIRMED IN FOLLOWING APPOINTMENT. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, NORTH ZONE (CHANNEL AND ATLANTIC COAST) SHORT TITLE ADMIRAL NORD.  
(B) CONFIRMATION CAME BY DISPATCH FROM M JACQFINOT IN ALGIERS AND WAS OUTGROWTH OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH DARGENLIEU DURING RECENT VISIT TO LONDON AND FRANCE.  
(C) OPERATIONALLY THIS REGULARIZES A SITUATION THAT ALREADY EXISTED IN FACT.

(2) FOLLOWING IMPLICATIONS HOWEVER TO BE NOTED.  
(A) ADMINISTRATIVELY IT APPEARS TO MEAN THAT DARGENLIEU

ACTION	
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F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCND	

**SECRET**

*Adm Stark*

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OPNAV-19-67 *France*

WILL OPERATE AT AN EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY WITH LEMONNIER, CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, WHO WILL CONTROL SOUTH ZONE, AND THAT UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM WILL HAVE TO GO TO MINISTER OF MARINE FOR DECISION.

(B) DARGENLIEU IS THE ESTABLISHED FREE FRENCH ADMIRAL WHILE LEMONNIER IS PRODUCT OF THE OTHER SCHOOL.

(C) MAY REPRESENT AN EFFORT TO SOLVE ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF FRENCH NAVY. PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEEN INTENSIFIED BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL SPLIT BETWEEN MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTHERN OPERATIONS. MUCH THOUGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THESE PROBLEMS RECENTLY BY THE FRENCH ADMIRALTY.

COMINCH DELIVER TO ADMIRAL STARK.

Originator COMNAVEU D/T 421249 NCR 4532 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OPNAV-10-81  
134100

**SECRET**

WF

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNAVNAV ADMIN</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION <b>COMINCH</b>	PRIORITY <b>PRIORITY ROUTINE</b>
DATE <b>22 JULY 1944</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <b>0902</b>		FOR INFORMATION <b>COM 8TH FLEET NIU (NAPLES)</b>	PRIORITY <b>PRIORITY ROUTINE</b>
DECODED BY <b>DIEBEL</b>			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY <b>DIEBEL/Rea</b>			
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
<b>PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES</b>	<b>211718</b>	<b>NCR 8487</b>	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVNAV ADMIN SENDS ACTION COMINCH INFO COM 8TH FLEET AND NIU (NAPLES).

POLITICAL NOTES. CONTINUED FAVORABLE REACTION TO OUTCOME OF DEGAULLE ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS GENERALLY REPORTED. IT IS SAID THAT RESULTS OF THE MEETING CONSTITUTE A GREATER ACHIEVEMENT THAN THE FRENCH ANTICIPATED. COMMUNIST CIRCLES REPORTEDLY CONCERNED BY WHAT THEY ARE SAID TO REGARD AS A CONSERVATIVE TREND IN DEGAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICIES. THIS THEY ARE REPORTED TO FEEL MAY MAKE FOR AN ALTERATION IN THE HERETOFORE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH COMMITTEE. IT IS FURTHER REPORTED THAT CERTAIN FRENCH MILITARY MEN WITH DEGAULLE SINCE 1940 FEAR THAT IN ORDER TO SECURE THE BACKING OF THE UNITED STATES HE MAY HAVE FORFEITED SOME OF THE

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCN0	41
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011 France

LIBERAL PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH HE HAS STOOD. SPECULATION RIFE CONCERNING POSSIBLE IMMINENT CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP OF FRENCH COMMITTEE. REPORTS ARE SO GENERAL AS TO INDICATE THE PROBABILITY OF SOME LIMITED ALTERATION BEING CARRIED OUT. OBSERVERS ARE REPORTED TO FEEL THAT THE RUMORED CHANGES DO NOT INDICATE A SERIOUS SITUATION OR CRISIS IN THE COMMITTEE. M LETROQUER IS SAID TO BE THE PRINCIPAL FIGURE IN ANY POSSIBLE SHAKE UP AND IT IS HELD IN SOME CIRCLES THAT HIS RESIGNATION MIGHT INVOLVE OTHER MEMBERS. MANY SOURCES REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT GENERAL KOENIG WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO PREVENT LE TROQUERS GOING TO FRANCE AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AND THAT IF THIS OBTAINS LE TROQUER WILL BE FORCED TO RESIGN. IT IS RUMORED THAT M MASSIGLI COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY BE REPLACED BY LE MORIN. NO PARTICULAR POLITICAL IMPLICATION IS REPORTED AS MASSIGLI IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN GENERALLY REGARDED AS A TEMPORARY FOREIGN MINISTER. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT M GIACOBBI COMMISSIONER OF SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION MAY BE REMOVED. GIACOBBI IS SAID TO FAVOR THE CONSIDERING OF ALL TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES IN FRANCE UNDER VICHY REGIME AS VALID AND EXEMPT FROM POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION. SOME CIRCLES ARE SAID TO HOLD THAT GIACOBBI REPRESENTS CERTAIN LARGE FRENCH FINANCIAL GROUPS AND THAT HE IS ACTING IN THEIR INTEREST. SOME SOURCES REPORT THAT M DIETHELM COMMISSIONER FOR WAR MAY BE FORCED OUT OF OFFICE BY A GROUP OF ARMY

Originator COMNAVNAV ADMIN D/T Group 211718 NCR 8487 Page 2 Of 3 Pages.

**SECRET**

GENERALS WHO ARE REPORTED TO FAVOR THE INSTALLATION OF ONE OF THEIR OWN NUMBER IN THAT POSITION. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT M MONNET MAY BE RELIEVED OF HIS POST SINCE HIS MISSION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. OTHER COMMISSIONERS WHO IT IS RUMORED MAY BE DISPLACED ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIATION IS LACKING ARE THE FOLLOWING: M FRESNAY COMMISSIONER FOR PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES, M PLEVIN COMMISSIONER OF COLONIES, M MENDES FRANCE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE AND M CAPITANT COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION. ONE OF THE MEMBERS, JOSEPH SERDA, HAS BEEN EXPELLED BY VOTE FROM THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. IT IS REPORTED THAT THIS UNPRECEDENTED ACTION WAS TAKEN NOT BECAUSE OF THE COLLABORATIONIST SPEECH OF MARCH 1942 MADE BY SERDA BUT BECAUSE AS ONE MEMBER OF THE ASSEMBLY IS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPLAINED SERDA HAD NOT CHANGED HIS FORMER OPINIONS AND HAD ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THE GROUPS IN NORTH AFRICA WHO DENY THE AUTHORITY OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE LIBERAL ELEMENTS IN THE LOCAL POPULATION ARE SAID TO APPROVE THE ACTION WHILE THE WEALTHY LANDOWNERS AND COLONS REGARD IT AS UNJUST AND ANTI-THETICAL TO THEIR INTERESTS OF WHICH SERDA IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE STRONGEST POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE.

Originator COMNAVNAV ADMIN D/T Group 211718 NCR 8487 Page 3 Of 3 Pages.

OPNAV-10-51  
134100

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

To go into the Map Room DeGaulle file. This letter from J. Lemaigre Dubreuil presents the view of some patriotic Frenchman in criticism of de Gaulle's political activities. He points out to de Gaulle that the major problem should be to drive the Germans from French soil rather than to sow discord and dissention among Frenchmen.

WILSON BROWN.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


P-

8 July 1944

WJ  
File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have just received from Madrid copy of a letter written to General De Gaulle in May by Dubreuil. I have had the attached translation made for you.



William J. Donovan  
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 July 1944

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Director

**SECRET**

C O P Y

Algiers, May 1944

General de Gaulle  
Algiers

WAZ

Dear General de Gaulle:

As you undoubtedly know already, I have decided to leave North Africa. It is therefore important that my reasons for doing so be known.

At the time Marshal Petain formed the Armistice Government at the request of the President of the Republic, a considerable number of Frenchmen did not give up hope of Germany's final defeat, and believed that someday, France would take up the fight again at the side of the Allies. Some answered your call of June 18, 1940 and went to England, others, believing that France's fate would depend on the attitude of Frenchmen towards the occupying forces, remained on French soil. We were in the latter category. We were also among those who paved the way for the French Army's return as a fighting force by opening up French North and West Africa to the Allied Forces thereby creating a Second Front.

Having accomplished this we all had, it seems, but one goal: the liberation of France. As concerns us, at least, we have proved this even to the point of naiveness, by excluding all thought of Party interest. If we did not rally to your call for the campaign of November 8th, it was because the morale of the Army, a part of the population, and the low calibre of your local representatives, all contributed at the time to make this appeal both illusory and dangerous. The success of the planned operation with the lowest cost of lives, was the foremost consideration. What is more, we were not the only ones who thought thus, but also the Allies. This did not stop us from believing that unity in the Resistance would be the outcome of Africa's liberation. All events and records prove this.

On your part, General de Gaulle, you never ceased stating officially during your stay in London in command of a gallant little troop, that your activity was purely military. What is more, you seemed to think as we did, that all thought of

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- 2 -

internal political activity should be cast aside until final victory, that only the prosecution of the war could unite divided Frenchmen and serve France, so weakened by defeat. This was exactly what we ourselves thought.

Unfortunately, while the Allied victories made it possible to foresee Germany's defeat and the liberation of our country, this attitude appeared to change. This change persisted after November 8, 1942, and thereafter following your arrival in North Africa in June 1943 and finally, since you took over total power.

You have become, primarily, a political chief while as a military one, you could have brought about national unity. Your initial program consisting of a return, pure and simple, of the preexisting institutions, has been substituted by that of a "4th. Republic" and later by the "Taking over of Temporary Power" to your own profit and to the profit of those men grouped around you.

Yes, we are among those who believe in learning a lesson not only from the Armistice but also from defeat. Just the same, we believe that this cannot be accomplished except with the help of all France's spiritual families and that it cannot be the work of a war committee or that of a provisional administrative committee. A committee which organizes the future of France is no longer a provisional committee nor an administrative one - it is a political committee, and a constituent committee. One could still admit that one should give thought to the future without waiting for the consent of the French people in France, consent which would be difficult to obtain. Such a concept, bold in principle, would require a complete divorce from political party spirit. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

We have witnessed, on the contrary, the party spirit spread to the point of invading and domineering everything, while ignoring the fact that it was provoking every day more and more the disgust and disapproval of the majority of the French African people, who are not free to express their opinion openly. We have witnessed internal politics take the lead over the prosecution of the war. We have witnessed those who have joined the government in power and those who have been deprived of their civil liberties, not on account of their attitude toward Germany, but on account of their opinions, even when attributed to them without any previous investigation and for reasons that they could neither be aware of nor discuss. The general

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- 3 -

feeling was that the investigations and purges were just as much the liquidation of personal quarrels as measures of justice or security.

All this is most disturbing, and one cannot feel without serious misgivings that such a system spreading over France could only leave a path of disorder, violence and hate in its wake.

Certainly we believe that traitors should be punished. But the justified chastisement of those responsible has nothing in common with the dark and vague threats which would, if put into effect, upset the whole social order. The defeat and the Armistice are to a great extent the consequence of a house divided. To aggravate this situation and encourage this state of affairs in order to reinstate France is a program we cannot be associated with.

It is not we who have changed. We have adhered to our program, to your past program of liberation, and if I leave North Africa it is because I am loyal to this program, and not for political expediency but in order to carry on the fight. If we do have a political aim, it is that Frenchmen continue to consider the Germans their enemy in preference to other Frenchmen; that the liberation put an end and not a beginning to the fight. Most of us have always remained faithful to that state of mind of November 8th.

It is easy to foresee how my decision will be interpreted. It will be said that I have gone over to the Germans and collaboration. It will be difficult, however, to admit that having fought the battle against Germany without interruption and at a time when all seemed to point to her victory, that I changed camps at the very moment when the whole world and you yourself proclaim that Germany's defeat is assured.

I have only wanted to tell you my main reasons, and nothing else which could aggravate this debate. I have not wished to discuss whether your colleagues are worthy of the assignment they have so brashly undertaken, whether they will be capable of mastering the forces that they have so imprudently unleashed, or whether the partisan politics played at Algiers have not isolated France from the Allies from whom we solicited help in November, 1942.

I wish to remind you simply that before my departure, I have again asked to see you in order to point out that I

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- 4 -

was willing to work with everybody, with you and not against you. You have rejected this last request. In this small matter, as in many others, you have chosen and not we. You have chosen, as in the days when you came to power in Algiers you kept up an attitude of opposition in the Government. All would have rallied to you if you had so wished, but for France, because we are Frenchmen, General de Gaulle, and not de Gaullists.

With sincere regrets, etc.

Signed: J. Lemaigre Dubreuil

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With sincere regrets, etc.

Signed: J. Lemaigre Dubreuil

**SECRET**

VAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	SEN US NAV OFF ALGIERS	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE	6 AUGUST 1944		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	253		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	BAKER	INFORMATION NIU COM 8TH FLEET	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	STEARNS / <i>Wap</i>		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
		51432	NCR 9839

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 51420 NCR 9777  
 PART 2 51432 NCR 9839

SEN US NAV OFF ALGIERS SENDS ACTION COMINCH INFO NIU AND COM 8TH FLEET.

POLITICAL NOTES.

PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION ALGIERS MARKED BY CONTRADICTIONARY RUMORS OF POSSIBLE CABINET CHANGES AND ALSO BY REPORTED NEW TRENDS IN POLICIES OF GENERAL DEGAULLE AND COMMITTEE. THIS SITUATION PROBABLY DUE TO ACTIVITY OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WHO REPORTEDLY FEEL IT OPPORTUNE TO JOCKEY FOR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE NOW BEFORE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEE IN FRANCE. SOME OBSERVERS REPORT POLITICAL TREND OF DEGAULLE AND COMMITTEE IS TO LEFT. SAME POINT TO DECAULLES CLOSE RELATIONS WITH VINCENT AURIOL AND SOCIALISTS AND CITE RECENT

ACTION	
F-0	
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F-4	
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FX37	
FX40	
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**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
 OPNAV-NCR-15 51432

011 France

TRENDS OF RESOLUTIONS IN CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, SAID TO GO FURTHER LEFT THAN PRIOR SOCIALIST PROGRAMS. OTHERS CLAIM TREND DEGAULLE REGIME TO THE RIGHT. SEVERAL MILITARY MEN ACTIVE GAULLISTS SINCE 1940 REPORTED ALL REMOVED TO LESSER POSTS. THIS CONSTRUED BY SOME AS ABANDONMENT OF EARLY GAULLIST "REPUBLICAN" GROUP AND AS MOVEMENT TOWARD CONSERVATISM. SOME REPORTEDLY FEAR A SHARP CLEAVAGE BETWEEN EXTREME RIGHT AND EXTREME LEFT AMONG OLD GAULLISTS WILL RESULT. USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE STATES DE GAULLE ORDERED NO FURTHER DEATH PENALTIES IN NORTH AFRICA FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

SEN US NAV OFF  
Originator ALCIERS D/T Group 51432NCR9839 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OPNAV-10-01  
494100

**SECRET**

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNAVNAV (ADM)</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE <b>COMINCH</b>	<b>PPPPPPPP</b>
RELEASED BY	<b>29 JULY 1944</b>	FOR ACTION	ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	<b>1709</b>	INFORMATION	<b>PPPPPPPP</b>
DECODED BY	<b>MONROE</b>		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	<b>DUMMIT/WALP</b>		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>291143B NCR 4400</b>			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**COMNAVNAV (ADM) SENDS. ACTION COMINCH. INFO COM 8TH FLEET, NIU NIP\* NAPLES.**

**POLITICAL NOTES. NO CHANGES OF ANY IMPORTANCE WERE NOTED THIS WEEK IN ALGIERS. IT IS SAID THAT REPORTS SENT BY FRENCH OFFICIALS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS OF NORMANDY TO VARIOUS BUREAUS OF THE COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION HERE INCLUDE FAVORABLE OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATIONS OF ALLIED TROOPS AND AUTHORITIES WITH THE FRENCH POPULATION. IT IS FELT BY SOME SOURCES THAT THESE REPORTS ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PRODUCING IMPROVED FRENCH-ALLIED UNDERSTANDING. PREVIOUS RUMORS AND REPORTS OF IMMINENT ALTERATIONS IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE DIED OUT. IT IS REPORTED THAT A MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION ON JULY 20 GENERAL DE GAULLE APPEALED TO THE MEMBERS TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND STABILITY IN THE COMMITTEE AND TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE**

ACTION	GCT
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F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
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VCNO	

PAGE 1 OF 2

**SECRET**

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OPNAV 011 France 291143B

PREJUDICIAL TO ITS PRESTIGE AT WHAT IS REGARDED AS A CRUCIAL PERIOD. IT WAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED AT THE SAME MEETING THAT LE TROMPET, COMMISSIONER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF LIBERATED TERRITORIES, WOULD LEAVE SHORTLY FOR FRANCE. GENERAL DE GAULLE'S SPEECH CONCLUDING THE DEBATES ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED. IT IS REPORTED BY SOME OBSERVERS THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE IN REGARD TO HIS POLITICAL OPINIONS AND AFFILIATIONS IS SYMPATHETIC TO VINCENT AURIOL AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY. GENERAL DE GAULLE IS SAID TO HAVE TOLD AURIOL AND OTHER SOCIALISTS THAT THE FUTURE OF FRANCE LAY WITH THE SOCIALIST PARTY.

\*MAY BE REPETITION OF NIU

Originator COMNAVNAW (ADM) D/T Group 291143B NCR 440 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*P. W. S. E.*  
*W. R.*

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF  
LETTERS "IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO  
THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

To: War Department.  
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: S 55595 15 July 1944

S 55595 from SHAEF AGWAR to Combined Chiefs of Staff  
to Combined Civil Affairs Committee information to Hilldring  
and British Chiefs of Staff repeat AFHQ signed Eisenhower  
this is VOG 85.

Summary of Civil Affairs Field Operations for period  
ending 14th July 1944.

2. Civil affairs detachments now established at:  
Amblie, Balleroy, Baraleur, Bayeux, Beaumont-Hague, Bric-  
quebec, Caen. Carentan, Carteret, Cherbourg, Acromanches,  
Conde Sur Seulles, Cresseron, Cully, Fontenoy, Isigny, Erma-  
ville, Lefresne-Camilly, Colombier-Sur-Souilles, Les Pieux,  
Lison Meauvjines, Octeville, St Pierre Eglise, Quettehou,  
Renville, St Clair, St Croix Grand Tonne, St Jean De Daye,  
St Mgre Eglise, Treviers, Trunгы, Velonges, St Sauveur Le,  
Vicomte.

✓ 3. Local French Administration increasingly effect-  
ive. Certain mayors have requested a ruling from the Sous  
Prefet as to their authority to make expenditures for employ-  
ment of additional police. All French Liaison Officers re-  
porting to Second Army have been allocated to formations and  
detachments.

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CM-IN-13053 (16 Jul 44)

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

SECRET

Date- 2-10-61

Signature- *Carl S. Spic*

COPY NO. 50

*011 France*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECRET

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

4. Consultative assembly unanimously passed draft ordinance on reestablishment of republican legality, the first article proclaiming "The form of government of France is and remains the Republic. Legally this has never ceased to exist." A series of acts are declared null and void and this declaration had been implemented in liberated areas by action by the Regional Commissioner, M. Coulet. The Journal Official of the French Republic published 5 ordinances on 7th July dealing with political divisions, abolishing regional prefectures, organizing military tribunals, providing for provisional courts and punishment of active or retired officials who have been collaborationists. //R

On 10th July M. Coulet proceeded to Caen to install a prefect.

✓ 5. Relations between Army and Civilian population continues good. Morale of French civilians injured by Allied action is very high, no blame being attached to Allies for harm done through necessary military operations.

✓ 6. In addition to local pin-up bulletins there are 3 newspapers published in area, The Daily Presse Cherbourg-ecaise, Bi-Weekly Renaissance Du Bessin, and a single sheet paper, Liberator, in Isigny. Amplifier units meet with much enthusiasm. Radio Cherbourg, first radio station in liberated France, went on air 4th July. Cherbourg cinema officially opened. German propaganda center in Cherbourg has been taken

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Date- 2-10-61

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*Paul J. Spicci*

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SECRET

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

over by resistance movement.

7. French officer commanding military subdivision, Colonel P. De Chevigne, has issued orders instructing gendarmerie to make no arrests at request of Allied authorities unless, 1. (Such requests are received in writing), 2. Gendarmerie consider requested arrests to be justified, 3. Individuals involved are answerable to French Courts. Gendarmerie furthermore are ordered not to participate in arrests made by Allied authorities nor accept custody of those so arrested. Language of order is unfortunate in tone and intent is contrary to contemplated procedure. Otherwise public safety situation is considered satisfactory. There is no threat to public order in instances of punishment meted out to alleged collaborationists, chief trouble being with groups of young hoodlums engaged in sporadic personal reprisals against alleged collaborationists. Civilian movement and traffic is well under control. Vehicles in Cherbourg not permitted to circulate without permits. Some captured German rifles being used to Army French Police. Steps being taken to improve sanitary conditions in prisons.

8. The Tribunal D Arrondissement at Bayeux opened its sessions on 4th July. First session of Tribunal Militaire commenced on 6th July to try civilians charged with military offenses. M. Coulet issued an ordinance on 3rd July establishing a provisional court of first instance at

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Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

Cherbourg to cover former combined jurisdictions of similar courts at Cherbourg and Valonges.

9. In First Army Area adequate funds to meet current municipal and other governmental expenditures were found or made available in all communes examined, except Montebourg. Public seems to have large amounts of currency on hand and supplementary and Banque of France francs are circulating without distinction. No evidence of flight from local currency. Frozen prices restricting offerings by shops and real estate transactions. Small amounts of sterling reported in circulation in British Zone. Military personnel probably carried small amounts of currency into Normandy in spite of prohibition. Isolated but unverified reports of pound sterling notes being exchanged for 400 francs. Black market still exists in white flour and bread but has disappeared with reference to butter, eggs, cheese, milk, meat. Attributed to cessation of requisition by enemy and shipments into French Interior. There now are surpluses in these commodities and in many cases free prices are below official prices. Price data for individual commodities still inadequate. General price level declining with purchases of wine and spirits by troops conspicuous exception. No reason to believe that general purchases by troops are noticeably affective price structure.

10. Supply situation continues satisfactory. Emergency Allied supplies for civilians of food, shoes,

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Date- 2-10-61

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Signature-

*Paul L. Spicer*

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Page 5

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

blankets and POL are on hand in First Army area. In Cherbourg all building materials are blocked in hands of present holders pending inventory called for by SOUS prefet. French authorities have fixed food rations for July for consumers who are divided into 6 categories: E-1 and E-2 (children), J (young people), M (adults), T-1 and T-2 (heavy workers). Rations are only equal of inferior to Vichy allowances. Probable disappointment will be felt by people who had expected increased rations to accompany liberation; probable also that Vichy propaganda will stress maintenance of previous ration allowance.

11. Approximately 5,000 acres of land flooded by enemy now drained and made available as pasture. //

12. Civilian Employment Office has opened in Cherbourg. Both skilled and unskilled workers who have not resumed work are asked to report.

13. Refrigeration plants at Isigny, Du Pont and Les Veys are again in operation, being used both by Army Quartermaster and civilian agencies. //

14. Local postal service restored in Cherbourg. Retain stamps being used pending arrival of stamps printed in USA. //

15. French fine arts and monuments officials have //

CM-IN-13053 (16 Jul 44)

SECRET

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-19-61

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Signature- Paul L. Spica

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECRET

Page 6

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

expressed great interest and gratification in CA concern for protection and preservation of works of arts, monuments and archives. There has been less destruction of French official-ly classified historical monuments than was expected. Those at Bayeaux all intact, including famous "Tapisseries De La Reine Mathilde" which is safe at Chateau De Qourches. Archives of Bayeaux and Caen were safely stored. In Bayeaux all monuments, fine arts and archives found intact, in surrounding area 12 historic monuments intact, 16 slightly damaged, 7 seriously damaged, 3 destroyed.

16. Public health reasonably satisfactory. Allied civilian medical supplies received, processed and distribution machinery established. In Cherbourg water, sewer, gargage systems operating in normal manner, usual sanitary practices followed. Reservoirs intact, 2 out of 3 filter systems untouched. French doctors and nurses available in larger number than anticipated.

17. Refugee situation becoming stablized. From 18th June to 3rd July approximately 2700 persons passed through refugee and displaced persons assembly center near Vontenay-Sur-Mer, which now is operated by CA detachment.

18. When Caen fell on the 9th, detachment 201 immediately entered followed next day by detachments 208, 209, 219. Detachments had preloaded food and medical stores on lorries and were standing by for expected refugee situation.

CM-IN-13053 (16 Jul 44)

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Date- 2-10-61

Signature- Carl S. Sprain 50

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Page 7

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S 55595

15 July 1944

Took with them 34,000 hard rations, soap, anti-lice powder drawn from military supplies. On second day a French first aid convoy reached city. Only 25,000 of normal population of 55,000 remained. Registration of refugees underway. 8,000 homeless persons housed in public buildings, 1,300 civilian wounded in local hospitals, 2,000 civilians

End

ACTION: CCAC  
INFO: CC/S  
ASF  
OPD  
Budget Div  
Adm King  
Col Park  
Mr McCloy  
Log

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-10-61

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

CM-IN-13053 (16 Jul 44)

1228Z bem

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS  
"CUM" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

RESTRICTED

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

Nr: F 72013 14 July 1944

F 72013 pass to Sec State.

2397 13th De Gaulles departure from United States and his reception Canada given big headline treatment Algiers dailies. Little editorial treatment remained cautious "Awaiting further word from Washington on what actually took place", meaning in reality journalists awaiting tip off on official line. Editorial Alger Republican, of all Algiers dailies most acid American Policy:

"Chief of Government will soon return our provisional capital with his hands full of a fruitful diplomatic harvest. The terms of Washington arrangement not yet known. But from what President Roosevelt said press conference its indicated that French and with them all free men can rejoice disappearance important difficulties in way of inter allied cooperation in war and peace ellipsis doubtless President Roosevelt insisted on American peoples desire to see French people proclaim their will as soon as possible regular elections."

Editorialist says this will be done as soon as possible after liberation. Another critic editorialist in Derniere Nouvelles bids readers suspend judgement till definite word Washington. 3rd critic who has constantly suspected American intentions says:

CM-IN-11253

(14 Jul 44)

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*Col Park*

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RESTRICTED

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: F 72013 14 July 1944

"We have never thought that America would seriously ask us to accept anything that it would not like to accept itself even under the most difficult circumstances. We have waited confidently and the free people of the United States have replied to us."

Local political circles and public manifest great satisfaction at reported success of De Gaulle visit and appear highly pleased with presidents press statement regarding authority in France Lawton.

End

ACTION: G-2 (State Dept)

INFO : OPD

Col. Park

BPR

Log

CM-IN-11253

(14 Jul 44) 10422 1s

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNAVNAV</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	<b>PRIORITY</b>
RELEASED BY		<b>COMINCH</b>	ROUTINE
DATE <b>14 JULY 44</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <b>1807</b>		<b>COM 8TH FLT NIU (NAPLES)</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b>
DECODED BY <b>SCHMICK</b>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <b>JOHNSON/DORSEY</b>			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			

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PAGE 1 OF 2

141408

NCR 1154

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

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(FROM COMNAVNAV ACTION COMINCH INFO COM 8TH FLT NIU (NAPLES))

POLITICAL NOTES. ATTENTION SEEMED FOCUSED THIS WEEK ON WASHINGTON WITH CONSEQUENT LACK OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN ALGIERS. LOCAL POPULATION REPORTEDLY PLEASED AND GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FRENCH REGARD THE STATEMENT AS A VIRTUAL GUARANTEE THAT DE GAULLE AND THE COMMITTEE WILL BE THE ONLY GROUP DEALT WITH IN LIBERATED FRANCE AND EQUIVALENT TO ACTUAL RECOGNITION. IN REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE LARGELY SATISFIED AND NOT INCLINED PRESENTLY TO QUIBBLE OVER TECHNICALITIES. TONE OF LOCAL PRESS CONTINUES FRIENDLY LEADING SOME OBSERVERS TO REMARK THAT THE NORTH

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**SECRET**

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011 France

SECRET

TOP SECRET

AFRICAN PRESS HAS NOT BEEN SO FAVORABLE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POLICIES SINCE NOVEMBER 1942 AS IT WAS THIS PAST WEEK. MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY APPEAR TO BE GENERALLY PLEASED ABOUT THE RESULTS OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S TRIP. SEVERAL SOURCES REPORT WHAT IS CONSTRUED AS ANXIETY ON THE PART OF MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY CONCERNING WHAT THEY ARE SAID TO FEEL IS A TENDENCY OF THE COMMITTEE TO BY PASS THEM IN CERTAIN MATTERS OF A PARLIAMENTARY CHARACTER. ASSEMBLY MEMBERS REPORTEDLY FEEL THAT CONTINUED ENTRUSTING OF WHAT THEY REGARD AS EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY POWERS TO OFFICIALS SUCH AS M. COULET MAY RESULT ULTIMATELY IN THEIR GRADUAL DISASSOCIATION FROM THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP  
SECRET**

CCS  
77500

13 July, 1944

Supreme Headquarters,  
Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Allied Force Headquarters,  
Algiers, Algeria.

Commanding General,  
U. S. Army Forces,  
European Theater of Operations,  
London, England.

Number: WARX 64812

TOPSEC to Wilson for action, to SHAEF for Eisenhower and  
ETOUSA pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information,  
FAN 379 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that in general  
you should continue to act as their representative and  
spokesman in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in  
matters coming within their purview. It is difficult to  
draw the line between military and political subjects,  
but they feel that in this particular case no useful  
purpose will be served by any reply from you at this time  
to General De Gaulle's communication of 24 May, 1944.

End.

ORIGINATOR : CCS

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD  
OPD  
GEN BISSELL  
ADM KING  
ADM LEAHY  
LOG

CM-OUT-64812 (14 Jul 44) 0351Z mcs

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SECRET

Civil Affairs Division by  
European Section, Operations  
Division, WDGS, WDOPD OPD  
311.23 CAD (11 July 44) Lt.  
Bruno. 6198

11 July 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR 64500

To Eisenhower personal for Smith from Hilldring and Holmes  
signed Marshall.

French agreement. The revision of the Anglo-French draft has received the approval of the President, and it was gone over this morning with General MacCreedy, McClean of the Embassy, and Wing Commander Birley. They indicated general agreement, but stated that the changes would have to be referred to London before concurrence. It was agreed that the United States representatives should begin discussions with the French at once, and that an endeavor should be made to get general French agreement before the revised draft is submitted to London. In his last conversation with De Gaulle, the President discussed in general the terms of the agreement with special reference to the clear definition of the Supreme Commanders authority, and reports that De Gaulle was in agreement. Alphande is remaining in Washington and he and Hopenot will examine the United States revised draft with WD. De Gaulle and his party left here very much pleased and relieved. It is felt that it will not be difficult now to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the French question.

Holmes expects to finish his part of the French affair and dispose of the other matters he brought and depart on the 18th.

End

ORIGINATOR: CAD

INFORMATION: OPD Mr McCloy LOG

CM-OUT-64500 (13 July 44) 2015Z hrt

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SECRET

Office Assistant Sec. of War  
4078

July 10, 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number WAR 63059

To Eisenhower for Stimson from McCloy signed Marshall

Highest level today sent following telegram to certain naval person "re your telegram of June 25 I am prepared to accept committee as de facto authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear. First complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations and second that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General De Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared. The visit has gone off very well". Important that British now get together with us and clear agreements as soon as possible. Modifications are only designed to clear up certain equivocal definitions contained in British drafts of Eisenhower's authority.

End.

ORIGINATOR: Mr. McCloy

INFORMATION: CofS

CM-OUT-63059 (10 Jul 44) 2328Z mk

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011 France

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"We in principle, let  
us see the agreement  
first."  
F.D.R."

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER  
NO : 582, 10 JULY 1944

Re your 713, I am prepared to accept Committee as temporary de facto authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear -- first, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations, and, second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own Government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points, and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General De Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared.

The visit has gone off very well.

ROOSEVELT

CORNAVAN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

"OK in principle. Let  
me see the agreement  
first.

F.D.R."

8 JULY 1944

We should like to suggest to you a fresh approach to the French situation.

"FDR"

This new approach would be to deal with the French Committee as the "Civil Authority", "Administrative Authority", "De Facto Authority", or "French Authority" and to reach agreements on civil affairs administration along the lines of those reached with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. Those agreements, reconciled in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, were signed on behalf of the United States by General Eisenhower as U. S. Theatre Commander and on behalf of Great Britain by the British Foreign Secretary.

The agreements with the French Authority would be based on the following principles:

(1) The agreements should be essentially practical and temporary pending the selection of a French Government by the free choice of the French people. The agreed arrangements would be based on the acceptance of the French Committee as the authority which should assume leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs during the period of liberation. However, the continuing status of the Committee must be based upon the support which it has of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. The agreements would be designed to avoid prejudicing the right of the French people to choose their own government and would be so drawn as to avoid any expression of preference or political support for the Committee.

(2) The agreements must be such as will give the Supreme Commander the full authority he needs for the unimpeded conduct of military operations.

(3) With respect to currency the French Committee would become the issuing authority for the supplemental franc currency, with appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations.

If this meets with your approval, the matter will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take the necessary action.

"C.H."

SECRET

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

COMNAVNAV

RELEASED BY

DATE

9 JULY 1944

TOR ROOM

1559

DECODED BY

LYNN

PARAPHRASED BY

LYNN/STEARNS/REA

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ASTERISK (\*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

COMINCH

NIU NAPLES  
COMNAVNAV OPS.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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NCR 7615

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COMNAVNAV WHISPERS ACTION COMINCH. INFO NIU NAPLES  
COMNAVNAV OPS.

POLITICAL NOTES.

WHAT POSSIBLY MAY BE TERMED AN IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE IN ALGIERS IS INDICATED BY REPORTED INCREASE OF INTEREST OF THE FRENCH IN THE CELEBRATION OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY THIS YEAR. THE EXTREMELY FAVORABLE COMMENT ON THE DAY IN THE PUBLIC PRESS AND GENERAL DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES. THREE FACTORS ARE CONSTRUED AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENERALLY MORE KINDLY ATTITUDE OF THE LOCAL PRESS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES THIS WEEK: THE SUCCESSFUL ACTIONS OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN FRANCE, AN APPARENT DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH TO CREATE AS FAVORABLE AN IMPRESSION AS POSSIBLE FOR GENERAL DE GAULLE'S TRIP TO AMERICA AND THE FACT THAT THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

ACTION

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OPNAV-NCR-15

011 France

WORK OF M COULET IN THE SAYEUX AREA IS PROCEEDING WITH AT LEAST THE TACIT CONSENT OF THE AMERICANS.

IT IS REPORTED THAT THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED OVER CERTAIN PROBLEMS ATTENDANT ON THE ULTIMATE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM NORTH AFRICA. PRINCIPAL AMONG THESE APPEARS TO BE THE QUESTION OF DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR PRESENTLY HELD BY AMERICAN FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE FRENCH OBJECT TO USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS AS GUARDS AND AT POSTS WHERE FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION IS UNAVOIDABLE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FRENCH ARE GENERALLY ANXIOUS THAT ALL ITALIAN PRISONERS EXCEPT THEIR OWN BE REMOVED AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE.

IT IS RUMORED THAT GENERAL JUIN MAY BE RELIEVED OF HIS PRESENT COMMAND IN ITALY AND REPLACED BY GENERAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY. CERTAIN FRENCH CIRCLES REPORTEDLY FEEL THAT GENERAL JUIN IS NOT POPULAR WITH THE ALGIERS GOVERNMENT AND THAT DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, FORMERLY ACTIVE IN THE RESISTANCE, WOULD BE A BETTER MAN TO LEAD FRENCH FORCES INTO CONTINENTAL FRANCE.

SPECULATION IS RIFE CONCERNING THE FAILURE OF M LE TROQUER TO GO TO LONDON. REPORTEDLY THE OFFICIAL REASON GIVEN IS THAT THERE IS AS YET NO ZONE OF THE INTERIOR. IT IS ALSO SAID THAT M LE TROQUET HAS NOT GONE BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE TO TAKE ORDERS EXCLUSIVELY FROM GENERAL DE GAULLE AND THAT LE

TROQUER FELT THAT IF HE RESIGNED CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WOULD FOLLOW HIM. SOME REPORTS INDICATE THAT LE TROQUER WAS PERSUADED TO WITHOLD ANY SUCH ACTION UNTIL GENERAL DE GAULLE RETURNS FROM THE UNITED STATES. OTHER SOURCES REPORT THAT GENERAL KOENIG, FRENCH MILITARY DELEGATE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, DOES NOT WANT LE TROQUER TO ASSUME CHARGE OF LIBERATED TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECREE OF THE COMMITTEE AND THAT GENERAL KOENIG IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LE TROQUER'S STAYING IN ALGIERS. ANOTHER REPORT INDICATES THAT LE TROQUER WILL LEAVE FOR LONDON ON JULY 19.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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*Danger of use  
of cattle with  
hoof + man. The  
cause for dairy  
products  
& meat*

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TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England.  
To: War Department  
CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria  
Nr: S-55212 8 July 1944

From SHAEF, S55212, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee information to Hilldring and British Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to AFHQ signed Eisenhower this is VOG 78.

Summary of Civil Affairs Field Operations for period ending 8 July 1944.

2. Civil Affairs Detachments now established at:  
**Bayeux** Arromanches, Cresseron, Conde Sur Suelles, Amblie, Ranville, La Deligrande, Courselles, Les Pieux, Valonges, Lefresne-Camilly, Hejmanville, Trungy, Le Manoir, Mesuvaines, Carentan, St Sauveur Le Vicmte, Balleroy, St Clair, Fontenoy, Carteret, Quettehou Treviers, Lison-Arel, Barfleur, Isigny, St Pierre Eglise, St Mere Eglise, Octeville, Cherbourg.

3. The efficiency of civil administration officials throughout the area showed an improvement during the past week. Situation is reflected by Cherbourg where officials are turning their attention more to administrative problems than to questions of sovereignty, and minor officials are taking more pride in their ties. Some uncertainty exists among civilians as well as Allied Staffs concerning the manner in which representatives of General De Gaulle will exercise their authority. French liaison officers now attached to civil author-

//

CM-IN-7354 (10 Jul 44)

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Date-2-9-61

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*Carl J. Spier*

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*011 France*

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Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S-55212 9 July 1944

ities but performing valuable services for CA detachments.

4. Large portion of the population not yet taking a real interest in internal political affairs; have not yet sufficiently recovered from the German\*\*\*\*\* the fighting that has taken place throughout the area \*\*\*\*\* attitude towards the provisional government is not apathetic, there has been very little reaction to it so far, though among the small group of politically conscious, partism lines have begun to appear. see  
attached

5. Reaction to the occupation has on the whole been favorable, with exception of a small group sympathetic with, or tied economically or otherwise to the Nazis. On entering Cherbourg, good order was maintained by the troops, which has created an excellent impression. The accuracy of Allied bombing and shelling, avoiding unnecessary damage, has done much to further good relations.

6. Newspapers are now published at Isigny and Cherbourg; in other areas sound trucks have been used to disseminate information.

7. Law and order continues satisfactory. The efficiency of police organizations improves as members regain the self-confidence partially lost under German domination and French authorities are reinforcing staffs by recruitment. Census of strangers is being taken by French police; in Cherbourg they conducted house to house searches for unauthorized persons. Civilian traffic on highways is being kept under control. Fire fighting equipment in Cherbourg reasonable adequate.

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Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England.

Nr: S-55212 9 July 1944

8. French Director General of Military Justice proceeded to Cherbourg 6 July to supervise establishment of French military courts.

9. Cash position of municipalities in the area is good. Currency proclamations have been posted in most places. A general agreement was reached providing that supplemental francs will be accepted for all purposes, including payment of taxes, without exchange, pending final agreement regarding currency. Banks and post offices, with more than enough cash, are reopening as the fighting moves ahead. The temporary limit on withdrawals placed in calvados by the regional commissioner was not extended to Cherbourg or Manche Department, and is expected to be lifted in a few days.

10. Food supply situation continues satisfactory. Allied civilian supplies have commenced to arrive. Excepting flour, Cherbourg is reported to be well supplied with food. Effort is now being made to restore electric refrigeration in the Cherbourg arsenal where much food is located. French authorities are proceeding with reestablishment of rationing, price and distribution systems. Black market operations in the region have practically disappeared as surplus food items come on the market. There are surpluses of butter, milk and cheese; consideration being given to sending party of veterinarians in effort to bring dairy supplies up to US standards so they can be used by US personnel in area.

11. Although supplies of civilian labor continue adequate in each locality, no surpluses have been reported.

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Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S-55212 9 July 1944

Arrangements have now been made for family allowances to be paid to French labor. It has now been reported that the wage rate of 7.4 francs per hour paid by the enemy did not include \* , payments to the workers family, unemployment or security benefits reported given by the enemy.

*see attached*  
12. Public health and sanitation situation continues satisfactory. Hospitals in Cherbourg are being evacuated of German wounded. Civilian patients are being moved to the Institute Pasteur from the military hospital, which will be used by the Army. A temporary Childrens Clinic has been opened at Fontaine Henri. Prior to arrival of CA medical supplies which have now begun to arrive, the Army assisted by withdrawals from its own stocks.

13. Although normal water systems have been disrupted, minimum requirements are made available with hand pumps and auxiliary power units. Lack of power continues the serious problem in most utilities. Civilian labor is assisting in restoration of Cherbourg Harbor facilities, where damage was much less than anticipated.

14. The Ponts Et Chaussees Department is undertaking repair of road communications, priority *being* given to military highways. Reestablishment of local mail services is going ahead. Only moderate damage is reported to the rail yards in Cherbourg, where usable locomotives and passenger and freight cars were found. Some 25 serviceable German trucks

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Date- 2-9-61

Signature-

*Carl S. Spicer*

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Page 5

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England.

Nr: S-55212 9 July 1944

and 150 civilian cars were found in Le Manche.

15. It continues possible to solve refugee problems with dispersals to civilian homes leaving a few dependable persons in the area near the front lines to care for livestock. French authorities are reported as making 3 refugee teams available. 21 Armd Group has issued an order that TODT workers who are not enemy nationals or suspects will not be treated as prisoners of war; that they will not be evacuated to the UK; that when unemployed they will be treated as "displaced persons" and will be a civil affairs responsibility; when employed they will be organized as mobile labor groups and will become the responsibility for pay, clothing and administration: in the British Zone of the Directorate of Labor, in the US Zone of the Engineer Service.

16. The 4/5,000 people found in Cherbourg the 1st day of occupation grew to 14/16,000 the following evening; they now continue to return at the rate of 1,000 per day from the nearby countryside. Most civil employees are back on the job, with the newly appointed Mike Leviandier, Ingenteur Dest Ponts Et Chaussees, serving as Sous-Perfect. Early establishment of utilities, banks and post offices, is expected.

\*Being serviced.

End

ACTION: CCAC

INFORMATION: CC/S  
ASF  
OPD

CAD  
Adm King  
Col Park

Mr McCloy

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bjm

[ ] Dir. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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Date- 2-9-61

Signature- *Carl S. Spica*

COPY No. 62

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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4 July 1944

From: London

Signed Winant

Nr 5206

A secret note has been sent us for convenience by the Foreign Office which summarizes the 5 memoranda with the French and British delegations of officials agreed to concerning plans for liberated metropolitan France. We are forwarding it to you as we thought it might be of some use to you. There follows the text:

"Plans for liberated metropolitan France. The authorities concerned have submitted the summary of 5 memoranda which was agreed upon by the French and British delegations of officials:

(1) Memorandum number 1 is a draft agreement on jurisdictional and administrative questions. The document begins by recognizing that the Allied Commander-in-Chief must have complete authority in the areas effected by active military operations to ensure that everything necessary for the success of his operations be done.

(2) A division into 'forward' and 'interior' zones is to be made of the liberated territory, the forward zone consisting of those areas which active military operations affect and the interior zone consisting of all other liberated territory even though it were at one time part of the forward zone. 'Special military Zones' which cover areas which are extremely important militarily will be created inside the interior zone under a special provision. The delegate which the French Committee of National Liberation will appoint under their March 14, 1944 decree, acting with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, will designate the boundary between the interior and forward zones, complying with the Allied Commander-in-Chief's requirements according to military necessity.

CM-IN-4865

(7 Jul 44)

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Date- 2-9-61

Signature- *Paul S. Speier*

*011 France*

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From: London

4 July 1944

Page Two

Rr 5266

- (3) The French Committee's delegate will have jurisdiction over the civil administration and civil population until 'higher French authority' takes over this authority (i.e., until a recognized provisional Govt is established within metropolitan France). A French administrative organization will assist the delegate, who will also have working with him a military delegate and the liaison officers which are needed. It is set forth that the task of the delegate shall mainly be to centralize and to facilitate the relations between the French authorities and the Allied Military Command.
- (4) The French delegate will be held responsible in the forward zone for the civil administration and will have the power to make appointments to the French public services and to issue regulations, subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will have made available to him the exceptional powers of the French state of siege, acting through the French Military delegate.
- (6) (number 5 omitted) Offences which members of the Allied forces commit are to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Allied Command, and offences committed by civilians will be under the jurisdiction of the French courts. French military Tribunals will be attached to Allied military formations at the request of the Commander-in-Chief in order to ensure that the military requirements of order and law are met (in accordance with a recent French Committee decree).
- (7) Taken care of in other provisions are the immunities from French taxation of the Allied forces; the machinery for taking over facilities, supplies and services which the Allied forces in France will need, in accordance with French law.
- (8) Provisions are made in a final article for separate arrangements to be made to take care of any other questions which might arise as a result of the liberations of territory

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(7 Jul 44)

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Date- 2-9-61

Signature- *Paul L. Spicer*

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From: London

4 July 1944

Page Three

Nr 5266

in France by Allied forces (i.e., inland transport) which are not taken care of in this or any other parallel memoranda.

(9) Memorandum number 2 is an agreement in draft which relates to mutual aid and currency. Extension of the 'protocol of mutual aid' to metropolitan France is provided for in this memorandum, in regard to the French overseas empire decided upon between the French Committee and the United Kingdom on February 8, 1944, subject to the necessary adjustments and modifications which are to be separately discussed at once. Therefore, in return for the United Kingdom Govt's supply free of charge to the French forces in metropolitan France of equipment and military assistance (which includes the French 'forces of the interior') the British forces will receive from the French authorities as mutual aid all the facilities, services and supplies which they need in France which can be provided effectively there without putting any undue strain on the economy of France.

(10) The position of the so-called 'supplemental francs' which the Allied military authorities introduced into France is regularized in a separate article, by recognizing these francs as currency of France, and providing that the necessary quantities will be placed at the disposal of the British armed forces by the French authorities. It is tacitly assumed in this formula that by their own internal legislation the French Committee will declare that the 'supplemental francs' are to be regarded as legal tender of France. By this we would receive all the francs we need and full responsibility for the new currency would be assumed by the French administration at Algiers. However, quarterly, the United Kingdom Govt will set aside the sterling equivalent of francs used for the British troops' pay, for the credit in London of the French authorities.

(11) Consultation between French and British military authorities is provided for in the agreement so that there will be the least possible disruptive effect on the economy of

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From: London

4 July 1944

Page Four

Nr 5266

France by the local procurement of the British forces' requirements. A provision is also made which provides that a separate agreement shall be concluded at the appropriate time governing monetary arrangements between the 2 countries, in order to facilitate the financial settlements between France and the United Kingdom.

(12) There is a broad similarity in these arrangements to those which the Govts of Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands have accepted in principle and which are expected to be terminated shortly. Retroactive to D Day would be the draft agreement with the French.

(13) Memorandum number 3 deals with the disposal of property which falls into the Allied forces' possession. The right of the Allied Commander-in-Chief to dispose of 'war material' is recognized in this agreement, (any equipment, arms or other property which was used by or belonged to enemy forces are covered in this statement) but provisions are made that the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give over such 'war material' to the French authorities as he does not need. Provisions are made in the draft agreement, subject to the arrangements concerning war material, that all property which comes into the hands of the forces of the Allied Commander-in-Chief shall be released and full responsibility for it will then be assumed by the competent French authorities. In accordance with French law the French authorities will have custody over enemy property on the understanding that the responsibility for accounting for all such property to the other United Nations will be that of the French authorities.

(14) Memorandum number 4 covers publicity in the liberated part of metropolitan France. It provides that French authorities will again take over the powers which the French Information Commissariat exercised when the war started. Although it provides that the Allied Commander-in-Chief will

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*Paul J. Spier*

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FROM: London

4 July 1944

Page Five

Nr 5265

exercise in the forward zone strict military censorship rights over all means of publicity including radio and press and that in the zone of the interior French services will take up with the military censorship authorities of the Allies all matters involving operations, and will carry out such instructions on military censorship as the Commander-in-Chief communicates to them.

(15) Memorandum number 5 constitutes a minute which has been agreed on covering the distribution to the civil population in parts of metropolitan France that had been liberated of relief supplies. It notes the request of the French that the administration of the French have responsibility for distributing to the civilian population all supplies brought into France for that purpose. It states that the British agree in principle to this request on the condition that the detailed arrangements for such a distribution by the authorities of the French are made only after consulting the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies and on the understanding that under certain circumstances the Allied military authorities may because of military necessity insist on direct distribution. Since a large part of the supplies for civil relief will come from non-British sources, the British do not consider it appropriate that provisions on this point be included in any draft agreement between the British and the French.

Winant

ACTION: OPD

INFO: Gen Bissell  
Gen Hilldring  
C of S  
Gen Arnold

CM-IN-4865

(7 Jul 44)

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*Carl T. Spicer*  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

TOP SECRET

Civil Affairs Division  
Operations Division  
European Section, WDO  
OPD 311.23 TS CAD (7 Jul 44)  
Lt. Bruno 6198

**TOP SECRET**

7 July 1944

Commanding General  
USAF European Theater of Operations  
London, England

Number: WAR 62443

To CG ETO personal for Smith from Holmes signed Marshall.

Memorandum on French relations submitted to the President. The following memorandum initialed by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and acting Secretary of War was submitted to the President this morning:

"We should like to suggest to you a fresh approach to the French situation."

"This new approach would be to deal with the French Committee as the 'Civil Authority', 'Administrative Authority', 'De Facto Authority', or 'French Authority' and to reach agreements on Civil Affairs Administration along the lines of those reached with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. These agreements, reconciled in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, were signed on behalf of the United States by General Eisenhower as United States Theater Commander and on behalf of Great Britain by the British Foreign Secretary.

The agreements with the French authority would be based on the following principles:

1. The agreements should be essentially practical and temporary pending the selection of a French government by the free choice of the French people. The agreed arrangements

CM-OUT-62443

(8 July 44)

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**ACTION: F-1**

*011 France*

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SECRET

WAR 62443

would be based on the acceptance of the French Committee as the authority which should assume leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs during the period of liberation. However, the continuing status of the Committee must be based upon the support which it has of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. The agreements would be designed to avoid prejudicing the right of the French people to choose their own government and would be so drawn as to avoid any expression of preference or political support for the Committee.

2. The agreements must be such as will give the supreme commander the full authority he needs for the unimpeded conduct of military operations.

3. With respect to currency the French Committee would become the issuing authority for the supplemental franc currency, with appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations.

If this meets with your approval, the matter will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take the necessary action."

The President approved in principle, with the stipulation that he see the text of the agreement before it is referred to the CCS. He approved the use of the terms "De Facto Authority" in the first paragraph.

Have completed a redraft of the British-French civil administration agreement in conformity with the above memorandum and to specify more clearly the authority of the supreme commander. Shall submit this draft to the President for his approval before it goes to the CCS, where the CCAC will reconcile the draft in order that there will be identical British and American texts. This is the same procedure as followed for Belgium, Holland and Norway and will permit of the

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(8 July 44)

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WAR: 62443

Page

British signing on a governmental level and General Eisenhower signing for the United States.

Consider a satisfactory settlement of the entire French situation now probable, especially as the President has approved the proposal that the French Committee should become the issuing authority for supplemental currency. Shall keep you informed of progress.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Hilldring

INFORMATION: OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Mr. McCloy  
LOG

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NMC

PLAIN

London

Dated May 15, 1943.

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

3369, Fifteenth

This morning's issue of the independent French language paper FRANCE carries the following communique issued by de Gaulle's press service. It is not carried in the British press except the Communist DAILY WORKER which gives a prominent front page summary:

"General de Gaulle has named Monsieur X, member of the National Committee and Commissioner on mission in France.

A French Council of Resistance has been constituted through the efforts of Monsieur X domiciled on French territory. It includes delegates from the following resistance organizations: Liberation, combat, Franc-tireur in the southern zone; liberation, ceux de la resistance, ceux de la liberation, O.C.V,

Franc-tireur and partisans

-2- #3369, Fifteenth, from London

Franc-tirsur and partisans in the northern zone; delegates from the resistance syndicalist organizations, C.G.T., and the Federation of Christian workers, delegates of resistance political parties, the French Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical Socialist Party, the Popular Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance and the Republican Federation.

The French Council of Resistance has just addressed the following message to General de Gaulle:

'All resistance parties in the northern zone and in the southern zone on the eve of the departure of General de Gaulle for Algeria renew to him and to the National Committee the assurance of their entire devotion to the principles which they embody and of which they cannot abandon the smallest fraction without violently injuring French opinion.

They most firmly declare that the proposed meeting must take place at the seat of the Government General of Algeria in the full light of day and between Frenchmen.

They

-3- #3368, May 15, from London

They declare furthermore: One. Political problems cannot be excluded from the conversations. Two. The French people would never admit the subordination of General de Gaulle to General Giraud and demand the rapid installation at Algiers of a provisional government under the presidency of General de Gaulle, General Giraud becoming military leader. Three. General de Gaulle will remain for all the sole leader of French resistance whatever may be the result of the negotiations."

Repeated to Algiers.

WINANT

HPD

COPY

**SECRET**

June 27, 1944

File  
WS

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

Please transmit to General de Gaulle the following reply to his communication transmitted with your memorandum dated June 26, 1944:

The President is very pleased that General de Gaulle expresses a desire to visit America with the purpose of having conversations with the President on problems that are at this time of interest to France and the United States.

He hopes that such conversations may be of assistance in our common determination and in our joint effort to drive the Nazi invaders from the soil of France.

The President intends that there shall be no restrictions or limitations placed upon General de Gaulle during his visit to the United States.

The President has made no plans in regard to these conversations. He does not desire that any subject of discussion be excluded, or restricted as to scope. He wishes only that the limited time

**SECRET**

available be utilized to further close cooperation in our essential efforts.

The President will be pleased to see General de Gaulle between the 5th and 9th of July as suggested by the General, or at any other time between the 6th and 14th of July, which latter is the only period that he can make available in the near future.

/S/ F. D. Roosevelt

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 713, 24 JUNE 1944

Your number 567.

The conversations now proceeding with Monsieur Vienot, the De Gaullist Ambassador in London; are on an official level only, De Gaulle having declared himself unwilling to send any of his Committee members unless the United States were represented also.

The object of the conversations is to discover a basis that we might accept for the operation on civil affairs in liberated areas of France in regard to which both the United States Government and we ourselves have agreed that the French Committee of National Liberation should take the leadership. Our people have no power to conclude any agreement. Their work will be submitted to the Foreign Secretary and to me and at that time, before any agreement is made with the French Committee and before His Majesty's Government have pronounced on the result of their work or intimated to the French Committee their decision, we shall consult with you and impart to you our views.

There is of course no question of the recognition of a provisional government being raised at this Committee. You will certainly not be faced by His Majesty's Government with any fait accompli. I hope these assurances, in which Eden concurs, will be fully satisfactory to you.

PRIME

TOP-SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER  
NO : 567, 22 JUNE 1944

Your 707. I join with you in a hope that a visit by De Gaulle in Washington will have a corrective effect on what is now a very unsatisfactory situation.

We are informed by your Embassy that your Government plans discussions with the Committee prior to De Gaulle's visit with the thought of "being helpful to the Washington conversations."

I hope you will not make any agreements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon.

I should not like to be faced with a fait accompli when De Gaulle arrives in Washington.

ROOSEVELT

*Handwritten:*  
76, 22 June 44

June 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have been informed by the British Embassy that the British Government on June 19 was to have begun discussions with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation in London, looking toward the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement for Metropolitan France. According to a telegram from Mr. Eden to the British Embassy, General de Gaulle informed Mr. Eden that it might be desirable to advance the Franco-British discussions prior to General de Gaulle's visit to the United States. Mr. Eden remarked that if progress were made in the next few days the United States Government would be informed of the results and that "this in its turn would be helpful to the Washington conversations."

It is apparent from the above information that the British Government contemplates discussions beyond the scope envisaged in your directive of March 15 to General Eisenhower and that any agreement which may be reached with the French will, in accordance with the British practice in negotiations with the other governments-in-exile, be on a governmental rather than a military basis. Furthermore, should an agreement be reached between the British Government and the French Committee of National Liberation prior to consultation and agreement with this Government, we will be faced with a fait accompli and will be compelled to go along with it, or be placed in the position alone of having to object to the terms of the agreement.

I understand that the matter is the cause of concern to our military authorities and since in the past we have always felt that the British and ourselves should act along parallel lines in our relationship with the French Committee, I shall assume in the absence of anything to the contrary that you will give to the Prime Minister such comment on the matter as you desire. - see PRES #567

To President at Hyde  
Park as Req 76, 20 June 44

15/ C.H.

WE:JCHB:BS

011 France

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 707, 20 JUNE 1944

E X T R A C T

1. I hope De Gaulle will come to you because it would be a good thing all round if some sort of arrangement could be fixed. This need not involve recognizing the French National Committee as the provisional government of France. In practice, however, I think it would be found that De Gaulle and the French National Committee represent most of the elements who want to help us. Vichy is a foe and there is a large middle body who only wish to be left along and eat good meals from day to day. The energizing factor of De Gaulle must not be forgotten in our treatment of the French problem.

\* \* \* \* \*

PRIME

FILE  
WB

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1944.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Brown.

The attached original and one copy of a memorandum for the President, dated 8 June 1944, signed by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was shown to the President on June 8 and approved by him subject to the addition of a fourth paragraph to Enclosure "B", page 4, CCS-565, quoted herewith:

"General DeGaulle is expected to see the President the last week in June or about the middle of July."

The Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has been requested to deliver to you a copy of CCS-565.

Respectfully,

J. V. SMITH,  
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.,  
Aide.

*copy for map Room  
Pr*

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

8 June 1944

**TOP SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. On 20 April 1944 General Eisenhower requested authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services including civilian labor, treatment of the banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc.
2. The proposed reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended and approved by you on 3 May 1944 (page 4 of the attached paper) authorizes General Eisenhower to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee but stipulates that all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the Committee must be tentative. It directs him to make clear to the Committee that arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from other elements of the French people. It requests information as to the meaning of the term "transfer of property" as used in paragraph 1 above.
3. The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff now suggest that a reply to General Eisenhower is unnecessary in view of a recent exchange of messages on the highest level with regard to the discussions which will take place on the arrival of General de Gaulle in the United Kingdom.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that they cannot concur in the view of the British Chiefs of

Copy to:

Admiral Leahy  
White House Files ✓  
Aide to COMINCH  
OPD WDGS



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Staff and, if you concur, will press for the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the reply referred to above.

5. Your views are requested.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Encl.  
C.C.S. 565, Copy No. 66.

- 2 -

**TOP SECRET**



deplore seeing these issues prematurely forced to a decision. Not only, said the Prime Minister, are British relations with the French Committee involved, but consideration has to be given to the very close Anglo-American relations and the latter's relations with the committee. He thought that it would be better to allow the relations prevailing between de Gaulle and the United States to proceed further than to have a full-dress debate which might give great comfort to the enemy.

Various members, all on the opposition benches, endeavored to press the Prime Minister for definite answers to specific questions, such as, "had his attention been drawn to the statement of the President of the United States that the issue of French notes is backed by the British and United States treasuries?" With regard to this particular question Mr. Churchill stated that it seemed quite clear to him that, if notes are given out to the French population in return for live-stock or other services, the responsibility for meeting the notes, in the first instance at any rate, would lie with the government issuing them. He avoided answering most of the questions, but he did say that in this last week of great success he thought that more time had been given to de Gaulle and his affairs and his committee than to any other subject.

Other members then indicated the great anxiety throughout the country on this general subject, but Mr. Churchill replied that he did not agree that there is great and widespread anxiety on the subject but that it is a subject which needs the closest and constant attention.

The question of holding a debate was not pressed, and therefore a debate will not be held at the present time.

Please inform Treasury.  
to the outfit as the representative government of France. After all, the  
Germans control over 99% of the area of France.

His unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary French currency does not disturb me. My reaction to his action in the matter of currency is fully covered in my number 559 of 12 June.

\*\*\*\*\*

WINANT:  
RECORDED

WSB

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 561, 14 JUNE 1944

Your 703. I can see no objection to your action in permitting de Gaulle to visit France and feel that his visit may have the good effect of stimulating that part of the French underground over which he has authority or which he can influence to work against the common enemy.

In my opinion we should make full use of any organization or influence he may have in so far as is practicable without imposing him by force of our arms upon the French people as their government or giving recognition to his outfit as the Provisional Government of France. After all, the Germans control over 99% of the area of France.

His unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary French currency does not disturb me. My reaction to his action in the matter of currency is fully covered in my number 559 of 12 June.

\* \* \* \* \*

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 703, 14 JUNE 1944

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

3. When de Gaulle arrived here at my invitation, in my first efforts to make him friendly I held out the hopes that he would plant his foot upon the soil of France. After making as much trouble for us as was in his power, he has now expressed a great desire that these should be made good. I have therefore consented that he should visit the British Sector in France today, 14th, where he will be received by General Montgomery at his headquarters and may possibly be allowed to go to Bayeux, No demonstrations will be permitted on military grounds, as crowds might attract bombardment. He will give no addresses there, but a statement, which we shall have the power to censor, may be made on his return. I did not want to give him the grievance that we had refused him his desire to set foot on his native soil, and also I was a bit compromised myself by our first conversation. I imparted the above decision of mine, that he should go to our sector, to Eisenhower and Bedell Smith, and the responsibility for it is mine. I hope you will not think I was wrong.

4. I understand that you issued a statement last night about the currency. You may be sure I shall try to support you in every way. I am quite sure that if an old woman in Bayeux sells a cow to an American Quartermaster and is paid in these notes, when she presents them at Morgenthau's office in Washington

PM #703, 14 JUNE 1944 (Cont'd).

He will have to see that she is no loser on the transaction. My information from France last night was that the French people are taking the notes.

\*\*\*\*\*

PRIME

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : GENERAL MARSHALL, LONDON

NO : 141703 NCR 8665

Your S 53809 received.

It is my thought that we should make full use of any organization or influence that de Gaulle may possess and that will be of advantage to our military effort provided we do not by force of our arms impose him upon the French people as the Government of France. After all, over 99% of the area of France is still in German hands.

Therefore there does not appear to be any objection to de Gaulle's visit to France as arranged by the British Government without consulting the U.S.

After conferring with the War and Treasury Departments, I am not disturbed by his unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary currency which was prepared after consultation with representatives of the British Treasury and the French Committee.

If for any reason our supplementary currency should not be accepted by the French people we can use the yellow seal dollars and British Military authority notes without any adverse effect except a depreciation of the French franc for which the Committee will have to bear full responsibility.

Please convey to Eisenhower my congratulations and my best wishes.

ROOSEVELT

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**TOP SECRET**

**URGENT**

*Admiral Brown  
to file  
File #*

**TOP  
SECRET**

**From:** CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London England

**To:** War Department

**No.** S-53809 13 June 1944

S-53809 TOPSECRET for the Eyes of General McNarney  
only for immediate delivery to the President from Marshall,  
King, and Arnold.

About 5:30 London Time this evening General Eisenhower's Headquarters was notified that the British War Cabinet wished General DeGaulle to visit the OVERLORD beachhead tomorrow morning, that they were making arrangements through the British Admiralty for DeGaulle to be transported on the French Cruiser Combattant. In the absence of General Eisenhower General Smith informed Mr. Peek, British Political Officer at Supreme Headquarters, that in view of the expressed desire and action of the British Cabinet, General Eisenhower would interpose no objection to the visit, but that the visit must be confined to the British beachhead and to General Montgomery with arrangements all being made by the British Ministry through their Admiralty and General Montgomery; that DeGaulle must not make any broadcast or public statement while he is in France and that the Prime Minister was to inform the President of the visit.

General DeGaulle had previously requested General Eisenhower's permission to visit the beachhead and had been informed that his request should be made through the British Ministry and that General Eisenhower would interpose no objection if the Prime Minister desired the visit to be made,

CM-III-10743 (14 Jun 44)

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TOP SECRET

URGENT

TOP  
SECRET

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London England Page 2  
To: War Department  
No. S-53809 13 June 1944

since he was the guest of the British Government.

Today and at dinner with DeGaulle this evening, Mr. Eden is endeavoring to develop a working agreement with the French that might be acceptable to the United States and the British.

Presumably DeGaulle's visit to France tomorrow will evoke demonstrations favorable to him there and later in the press.

The situation at the moment in the OVERLORD operation is critical and growing increasingly complicated. DeGaulle has refused to permit over 100 French specially trained liaison officers to report to the beachhead, which leaves a serious deficiency in the adequacy of arrangements made by military commanders who are beset by the burdens of a furious battle. General Bradley yesterday, without knowledge of circumstances, expressed his serious concern over the dilemma in which he finds himself. Furthermore, it now appears that DeGaulle's people are labelling the prepared currency as counterfeit, etc. The issue from the point of view purely of military operations is that General Eisenhower finds himself as an Allied Commander without specific directive and with the two governments he serves in effect in disagreement. The Prime Ministers support of your position is understood, but in this matter he dominates neither the Cabinet nor the Foreign Office. The situation is serious and its effect on military operations unhappy at best, and may be dangerous in view of possible reactions of the French Underground and resistance groups, who have generally

CM-IN-10743 (14 Jun 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 1

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**TOP SECRET**

**URGENT**

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London England Page 3  
To: War Department  
No. S-53809 13 June 1944

expressed their allegiance to DeGaulle.

DeGaulle now enjoys a strong tactical position which he will undoubtedly exploit to the limit.

After the result of Edens efforts of today and DeGaulles trip to the beachhead are known, we will discuss the matter with Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Phillips and give you our further views of the effect of the situation on conduct of operation.

End

ACTION: Col Park

CM-IN-10743 (14 Jun 44) 0153Z bjm

**TOP SECRET**

1

**SECRET**

COPY No.

FROM: CG, Allied Force Hq, Algiers, Algeria.

TO : War Department

No : F 58883, 13th June 1944

From AFHQ F action USFOR, AGWAR F 58883 PWB to PWE and OWI signed  
Wilson cite FHPWO.

Summary of french political intelligence report No 30 for week ending  
June 11.

\* \* \* \* \*

News of de Gaulle's arrival in London not released in Algiers until after first invasion communique. Seeming coincidence of arrival and D-day plus fact he broadcast to Europe along with heads of European Governments-in-exile were received with pleasure by French official circles. French here gained impression discussions with Eisenhower, Churchill and others were going smoothly though some were puzzled selected commissaires had not gone to London, especially Le Troquer. Finally France Afrique announced no agreement concerning administration liberated territories. This bitter despatch implied British ready come to understanding but American Government refused treat with de Gaulle and intended Allied civil administration for France until people could elect own Government. Eisenhower's two statements this week have not dispelled this interpretation in French minds. French object these statements made no reference to de Gaulle and implied continued Allied control liberated territory until people could choose own government whereas ordinance of April 21st providing provisional government during interim period had been publicly approved by Churchill. Thus French increasingly resent U.S. Government and wearily welcome de Gaulle projected visit to Roosevelt as only possible remaining means of arriving satisfactory solution. De Gaulle believed returning Algiers for June 18th celebrations and to report on London talks before going Washington.

In interview with France Afrique de Gaulle protested Eisenhower's two declarations to French people which he said "appear to foreshadow a king of seizure of power in France by the Allied military command." He also mentioned another subject causing bitter comment in Algiers namely special currency for Allied troops in France. The Algiers government greatly resent printing billions of notes in U.S. without any guarantee agreement or consultation with the French and French financial officials fear serious economic complications. French authorities also unsuccessful in efforts persuade U.S. to restrict purchasing power of troops in France. Mendes France just returned from Washington seems to have achieved no material results.

French find Allied attitude regarding use of term "Provisional Government" inexplicable. Whereas PWB live broadcasts from Algiers or elsewhere must avoid new title even when quoting French text the Frenchman hears BBC London

frequently speaking of the "Provisional Government " on its French service. Further complication is that PWB relays these BBC broadcasts. Ban on use of term in leaflets dropped over France from Algiers has caused French authorities to withdraw cooperation with PWB in their production.

All diplomatic missions in Algiers now officially informed of change of title. Communique says that "According to diplomatic usage this notification does not necessitate a reply." Radical socialist party held congress in Algiers Saturday and Sunday first since war began. M Marc Rucart presided assisted by Professor Cassin Senator Astier and M Paul Anzionnaz, all three assembly members. Party representatives within the government MM Queuille, Giacobbi and Mendes France did not attend. Tone of motions adopted reflected conservatism of radical socialists. Rucart De Astier provided bitterest opposition in assembly to plan for post liberation provisional government. Rucart described role of party by quoting Gambetta: "Our mission is to prevent putting the clock back to the French Revolution." Congress unanimously resolved expulsion from party of MM Camille Chaumps, Lucien Lamoureux, Chichery, Georges Bonnet and Jean Mistler. Members agreed next congress be held Paris.

\* \* \* \* \*

CM-IN-11170 (14 Jun 44) 1246Z jb

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON

NO : 132148 NCR 8563

E X T R A C T

\*\*\*\*\*

The French political controversy also interests the American Press. I have advised Churchill that we will continue to use the supplementary French currency exactly as we have planned in agreement with the British Treasury and which was understood by representatives of the French Committee in Washington.

General De Gaulle is expected here for a visit within a month and I will try then to direct his attention toward our war effort for the liberation of France. I do not feel that it would be helpful to a solution of De Gaulle's difficulties for Eden to come to Washington at this time.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 130035Z, 13 JUNE 1944

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

The French situation is welling up in the press here. Please see Embassy messages 4684 of June 11th, and 4686, 4689 and 4690 all of June 12th. The news and radio situation here would not bother me if it were not for the division in the Commons and the sharp differences of opinion in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is trying to support your position, with Eden, the Foreign Office and a number of ministers in opposition. On this particular issue the men who are uniformly in support of United States collaboration do not see eye to eye with us on De Gaulle. I realize that on a showdown the United States would stand back of you almost to a man against French leadership that showed ingratitude to the great contribution that we are making in men and materials to free France. And yet the proximity of France to Great British and four years of build-up of De Gaulle is a force to be reckoned with here and in France. Collaboration with Great Britain and Cabinet support of Churchill by ministers normally friendly to the United States are important to us. So far I have been able to prevent an open clash between Eden and Churchill but it has not been easy. The issuance of French currency without consultation with and an underwriting by the Free French Committee have been the immediate cause of controversy. At present Eden is trying to explore a working agreement with the French that might be acceptable to them and to us. This is being approached on a less than Cabinet level. You will be kept informed.

I have felt that it might be helpful for Eden to go to Washington and explain the British position to you. It would clear the political situation here but it might make your conversations with De Gaulle more difficult. If you approve of this idea it would be well to keep the Russians informed.

\* \* \* \* \*

WINANT

copy for map Room  
Rm

TOP SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR  
ROOM 4E-886, PENTAGON BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I telephoned to General Eisenhower's Headquarters the gist of the Press Conference on the French currency matter and they were very well pleased with it.

They told me that a Civil Affairs officer had just returned from a survey of the entire sector - British and American - and reported that while he was there the money was well received and a good bit of it was already in circulation. This, however, was prior to any general dissemination of General de Gaulle's denunciation. The reception by the civil population was extremely good everywhere. There seemed to be plenty of food but there were shortage of medical supplies, which we were filling. We were building up reserves of food to take care of larger centers of population as they came within the liberated areas. The whole situation in the civilian areas was better than we had anticipated so far as food and other supplies were concerned. The local authorities seemed to be cooperating fully but acted as though they were rudderless. They all want to know "what is the French Government." This officer's estimate was that de Gaulle seems

Personal note:

Xc01.

I think the President should certainly see this at once.

XLS

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

to be generally accepted as the coming leader. They ask frequently "when is he coming" and General Holmes advised me that, according to the report he had heard today, Mr. Churchill is arranging for de Gaulle to go to Normandy tomorrow. So far General de Gaulle has not lifted the ban against the balance of the French officers going to France.

General Marshall and the other Combined Chiefs of Staff are having a meeting tonight to determine whether or not they should make any recommendations regarding the civil situation.

General Eisenhower takes the position that he does not care which way we move so far as the French are concerned but he is greatly concerned about the advertised divergence of view between the United States and British Governments. The press is emphasizing it and Eisenhower says it is almost an intolerable situation for him as long as the British and American Governments cannot give him common instructions.

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY  
J.J.McC.

Penned note:  
McCl.

I think the President should certainly see this at once.

HLS

COPY

NMC-148

COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers

Dated June 13, 1944.

Rec'd 9:53 a.m., 14th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

US URGENT. 13, midnight.

2004, June 13, midnight. This morning with Massigni I asked if there was any news with regard to de Gaulle's visit to United States (Department's FROM MURPHY, 8 p.m.) Massigni replied he had received a cable from de Gaulle instructing him to send a message to Hopper not expressing appreciation for the (Repeated to London) Your 4065, May 22, 9 p.m., to London (Department's 1589 to Algiers) and related exchange of telegrams regarding NWE by PWB of AFHQ of title "Provisional Government" in reference to the FCNL.

The Foreign Office telegraphed MacMillan on June 10 that in all of its individual output OWI will not mention "Provisional Government" as such under any circumstances. However, according to Foreign Office it is Sherwood's feeling that OWI cannot impose its policy unilaterally on PWB and that Sherwood suggested that this highly delicate matter should be discussed with MacMillan and Murphy for adjustment of PWB policy.

Both MacMillan and I feel, and he is telegraphing Foreign Office accordingly, that in light of the stricture laid down in the Department's 1589 and of the instructions from the President referred to in AGWAR W-45518 of June third PWB must necessarily be guided by American wishes in this matter. While it is true that PWB is an Anglo-American organization it is a staff section of AFHQ and responsible to wishes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In such a partnership arrangement the wishes of one of the principal partners must be respected if the partnership is to continue. The maintenance of the partnership involves far broader considerations of greater importance than this particular problem for which undoubtedly a mutually satisfactory solution will eventually be found. Therefore, MacMillan and I are advising the Supreme Allied Commander that PWB will be guided strictly by spirit of AGWAR telegram above-mentioned as read in light of Department's 1589, May 22 to London. Nevertheless it is obvious that the final solution of this matter cannot be help up indefinitely and I hope Department may be in a position to telegraph me shortly some comment on suggestions made in my 1886, June 7, 8 p.m.

CHAPIN

REP NPL

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Rn*

COPY NMC-148

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

COPY  
DSH-11

Algiers  
Dated June 13, 1944.  
Rec'd 8:51 a.m., 14th.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State  
Washington  
US URGENT  
1997, June 13, midnight.

Algiers,  
Dated June 13, 1944.

Secretary of State,

In course of my conversations this morning with Massigli I asked if there was any news with regard to de Gaulle's visit to United States (Department's 1849, June 12, 8 p.m.) Massigli replied he had received a cable from de Gaulle instructing him to send a message to Hoppenot expressing appreciation for the opportunity to visit the United States. He said the matter would be discussed at a special meeting of the Committee this afternoon, but it was not necessary to take a vote of the Committee on de Gaulle's visit.

Massigli appeared greatly concerned that there was little likelihood of laying the groundwork of an over-all political agreement between the United States and French authorities prior to General's visit to the United States, a prerequisite in his opinion to a successful visit. He feared that without such a basis the differences between President Roosevelt and de Gaulle might even be widened.

I stated my conviction that the General's visit would be most useful particularly in apprising the latter of our war effort and of general trend of public opinion in the United States not only as regards conduct of the war in Europe but of the Far East and as respects postwar plans. I suggested that in any case we should not cross bridges before we came to them and expressed hope there would be no further declarations with regard to allied currency for time being and that a period of tete-a-tete might elapse until the visit to the President took place.

an over-all political agreement with the French authorities was through its injurious effect upon French public opinion also harmful to the general war effort.

CHAPIN

As I knew that Mendes France had told Murphy (our 1921, June 12, midnight) NPL that he did not feel it worthwhile to go to London at this stage, I asked Massigli REP the General was returning shortly and could discuss currency matters with Mendes France. He replied that he was returning within the week.

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Rm*  
*copy for map Room  
Rm*

CHAPIN

*copy for map room*

COPY  
DSH-11

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Dated June 12, 1944.  
Rec'd 10:56 a.m., 13th.  
Algiers,  
Dated June 13, 1944.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.  
US URGENT  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.  
MOST IMMEDIATE.

1995, June 13, 7 p.m. this evening. He was in a very depressed state of mind. Although Murphy had discussed with Massigli informally last night the recent French utterances on currency matters (Department's 1840, June 11, 7 p.m.), I called on Massigli this noon and made more formal representations. I stated that I could not hide the concern and shocked surprise of the Treasury and of the Department of State at the statements made in London, particularly since we had been given to understand that no publicity was to be given to the matter. Some of the statements were in fact a reflection upon the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. At a time when military operations were paramount, it was regrettable that the currency issue which was only incidental to those operations should receive such prominence as a point of disagreement. I added that this attitude if persisted in might adversely affect operations and hence have unfortunate results not only for the United States and Britain but for France itself.

Massigli stated that never was there the slightest question of arrest or Massigli who took notes of these statements and said that he would transmit the substance thereof to London appeared very much worried. He attempted rather half-heartedly I felt to defend the position and suggested that the continued refusal by the United States Government to enter into an over-all political agreement with the French authorities was through its injurious effect upon French public opinion also harmful to the general war effort.

Massigli added that de Gaulle would make every effort to get out of France. As I knew that Mendes France had told Murphy (our 1981, June 12, midnight) that he did not feel it worthwhile to go to London at this stage, I asked Massigli if the General was returning shortly and could discuss currency matters with Mendes France. He replied that he was returning within the week.

He did not at all like the manner in which the invitation had been transmitted. Hopenot should have been the channel of communication and not Admiral Fenard. He had reached the conclusion that the whole matter had been the invention of Fenard. When Fenard had been in Algiers he had called on him (Massigli) and had

LMS  
EJH  
Massigli said he had telegraphed Hopenot to see Fenard immediately on the latter's return to Washington in order to get full information on the reasons for Fenard's journey. Fenard apparently had failed to keep Hopenot informed. He, Massigli, had frequently discussed with the manner in which French affairs in Washington were handled what with Monnet and Fenard always interfering with what are Hopenot's functions.

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Rm*

Massigli then asserted that unless something practical could be worked out before de Gaulle left for the United States he feared the trip might have the opposite effect from that so much desired. He did not mean by this that the United States must recognize the French Committee as the Provisional Government but something satisfactory to both sides must be worked out on civil administration in France. A compromise should be worked out on all financial questions also. He appealed for my support in this matter.

SB-RR

CHAPIN

DEPARTMENT

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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COPY LC-812

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers

Dated June 12, 1944.  
Rec'd 10:56 a.m., 13th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.  
US URGENT  
1982, June 12, midnight.  
FROM MURPHY.  
Your 1840, June 11.

I dined with Massigli this evening. He was in a very depressed state of mind. He stated that he felt that everything was in a hopeless mess. He had worked day and night for months to try and improve relations between the United States and French Committee and just as he felt he was beginning to make some progress everything has taken a turn for the worse. He said that it was all well and good if we did not want to recognize the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France but he thought it was brutal at a moment when all of France was looking forward to liberation after four years of slavery and starvation for the United States Government to have prevented leaders of French resistance in North Africa to use the United Nations radio simply because the words "Provisional Government" were contained in a speech. He obviously was referring to Emmanuel Astier de la Vigerie's speech which was cancelled because it referred to the "Provisional Government" of France.

When the subject of the issuance of the special currency for France was brought up Massigli stated that never was there the slightest question of Monnet or anyone else approving anything. He could not believe Monnet has done so and if he did he had exceeded his authority.

Massigli went on to say that some people in the British Government were still hopeful for some sort of compromise being worked out on the questions of the issuance of currency and of civil administration in France. In this connection he remarked ironically that the Allies had gotten off to a "good" start in France by retaining as Mayor of Bayeux the notorious Vichyite appointee.

Massigli added that de Gaulle would make every effort to set foot on French soil (probably Bayeux) before returning to North Africa. In any event he did not expect de Gaulle to return to Algiers before the end of this week. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs then went on to discuss the projected journey of de Gaulle to the United States. He said that he was frankly disturbed. In the first place he did not at all like the manner in which the invitation had been transmitted. Hoppenot should have been the channel of communication and not Admiral Fenard. He had reached the conclusion that the whole matter had been the invention of Fenard. When Fenard had been in Algiers he had called on him (Massigli) and had apprised him of the purpose of his quick trip to North Africa. Massigli said he had telegraphed Hoppenot to see Fenard immediately on the latter's return to Washington in order to get full information on the reasons for Fenard's journey. Fenard apparently had failed to keep Hoppenot informed. He, Massigli, was frankly disgusted with the manner in which French affairs in Washington were being handled what with Monnet and Fenard always interfering with what are normally Hoppenot's functions.

Massigli then asserted that unless something practical could be worked out before de Gaulle left for the United States he feared the trip might have the opposite effect from that so much desired. He did not mean by this that the United States must recognize the French Committee as the Provisional Government but something satisfactory to both sides must be worked out on civil administration in France. A compromise should be worked out on all financial questions also. He appealed for

my support in this matter.  
BB-RR

CHAPIN

~~DEPARTMENT~~  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

LFG-430

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated June 12, 1944

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

4689, June 12, 2 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY

Vienot, London representative of the French  
Committee of National Liberation, called at the  
Embassy at noon today to suggest that the President  
be informed of plans for de Gaulle's visit to  
Washington. General de Gaulle is asking Massigli to  
send a message via Hoppenot expressing appreciation  
for the opportunity to visit Washington and confer  
with the President, but also indicating that de  
Gaulle wishes first to return to Algiers for further  
discussions with the committee. On arrival in Algiers  
he will send information as to the exact date  
proposed for his visit to Washington.

Vienot made it clear that de Gaulle's visit  
would fall within the period suggested by the President.

The reason

-2- #4689, June 12, 2 p.m., from London

The reason Vienot gave for asking me to transmit this message was that de Gaulle felt his formal reply now being sent via Algiers might be delayed in transmission

WYNANT

BB RR

COPY

DHM-385

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers

Dated June 11, 1944.

Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

US URGENT  
1949, June 11, 4 p.m.

FROM MURPHY.

I have learned from a member of De Gaulle's secretariat that a further report has been received from General De Gaulle for information of FCNL. It appears that when De Gaulle saw Churchill and began to explain French position with regard to various matters including the financial question Churchill said he regretted that there had been no agreement made with the French but now that the battle was beginning for the liberation of France all efforts should be concentrated on the battle and the various questions on which there was no agreement could be taken up later on. De Gaulle apparently went into a rage.

Later on De Gaulle saw Eden alone. Eden was most sympathetic according to De Gaulle and could not have been more kind. He went on at great length to explain how much he deplored France's present situation how he and his colleagues in the Foreign Office had tried to do everything they could with House of Commons, with the press, et cetera, to be of assistance to French Committee. He reminded De Gaulle that as he had stated in House of Commons Great Britain needed France now more than ever before and he intended to see to it during his administration as Foreign Minister that everything possible was done to restore France to her former position and prestige. Eden asserted that as for himself he had done everything he could to be of assistance to the French but that the Prime Minister and the President of United States of America did not feel anything more could be done than had been done up to the present time.

De Gaulle then went on to say in his report that Eden had counselled him (De Gaulle) to sit down patiently in London with him and try to work out something which represented at least some progress. If De Gaulle would do this, his hand for his conversations in Washington would be considerably strengthened and his position would be much improved vis-~~vis~~ the United States. De Gaulle said he derived impression from Eden that there was a possibility of working out some sort of a compromise on the issuance of bank notes.

The Secretary General of the FCNL stated last evening that in spite of the bad beginning of the De Gaulle visit to London he was convinced from reports he had seen that the trip will turn out to have been useful and he is certain the General's position will have been considerably strengthened.

CHAPIN.

EJH  
JRL

Copy for Map Room  
Rigdon.

COPY HM-232

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET).

Algiers,  
Dated June 10, 1944.  
Rec'd, 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

1923, June 10, 2 p.m.  
SECRET FROM MURPHY.

A reliable source in the French administration, who prefers that his name be not mentioned, said this morning that two telegrams had been received in Algiers from General de Gaulle. De Gaulle was in a very bitter state of mind. He had telegraphed French Committee on the details with regard to his arrival in London and briefly outlined his conversations with Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, et cetera. He complained that he had been tricked into coming to London and had been presented with a fait accompli. Everything had been prepared for the invasion. The British had even had the impertinence to tell him he would be expected to make a speech over the radio on morning of D Day immediately following Eisenhower. This he refused to do on the ground that he had not wanted to give the impression that he approved of everything (repeat everything) that Eisenhower was doing with regard to France. Consequently he did not make his speech until the afternoon of D Day.

De Gaulle was furious over the question of the issuance of what he terms "counterfeit currency" (see our 1894, June 8).

Our friend went on to say that General de Gaulle had permitted his technical liaison officer to accompany Allied armies which went into France, but had refused to permit his administrative liaison officer to go in with the Allied troops and thus create the impression that he condoned the acts of American and British military commanders in connection with civilian affairs. General de Gaulle did ~~not~~ report to French Committee that he was satisfied with military preparations for invasion and indicated confidence that invasion would be a success. In one of the two messages which had thus far arrived in Algiers from London de Gaulle sought to give impression to members of French Committee that General Eisenhower was most apologetic with regard to the arrangements which had been made for handling of civilian administration in France; that he preferred not to have anything to do with it; that he was a soldier and not a politician; and that none of the present arrangements was his doing. In this connection de Gaulle asserted to his commissioners that when General Eisenhower left North Africa last December he had called on him, de Gaulle, to say Goodbye and that Eisenhower had admitted that he did not have a good grasp of the situation in North Africa and that he was sorry there had been so much difficulty and even apologized for the many mistakes which had been made. De Gaulle ended his comments on his conversation with Eisenhower with statement that Eisenhower was a good soldier who was being made to do something he did not want to do.

CHAPIN

EH  
JT

*copy for map Room  
Pony*

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

9 June 1944.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Interim civil affairs directive  
(France).

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm that he will be responsible for coordinating civil affairs planning as between northwest and southern France and also confirm to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the terms of the interim directive issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The enclosed draft of a cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is submitted to you for your approval prior to submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDI DIR 5200.9 (9/27/56)

Copy to accompany original. Date- 2-13-61

Signature: *Carl S. Spicer*

~~TOP SECRET~~

*6-13-44  
This was approved by the  
President on 6-10-44  
and has been  
submitted to the  
Combined Chiefs of Staff.  
This copy for mdp Room  
Rigdon  
files.*

TOP SECRET

PROPOSED CABLE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO SUPREME  
COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND SUPREME ALLIED  
COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. The responsibility of SCAEF for coordination of civil affairs planning as between northwest and southern France is confirmed. Also confirmed is responsibility of SACMED for civil affairs planning subject to approval by SCAEF in areas of southern France designated by SCAEF.
2. For use only until the basic civil affairs directive for France is issued by CCS the interim civil affairs directive for France issued by SCAEF to SACMED is approved with the addition of the following basic principles which do not appear to have been sufficiently covered:
  - a. There will be no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.
  - b. So far as possible, there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has willfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the Allies.
  - c. No recourse should be had to French authorities for legislative enactments until there has been established a provisional French government accepted by both US and UK. However, recourse may be taken to local French authorities for punishment under existing legislation of civilians committing offenses of concern to the Allied authorities.
  - d. The responsibility of SACMED for the initial provision and distribution of relief supplies for those areas of southern France under his jurisdiction will not include areas or territories outside the combat zones or lines of communication if it is determined that conditions within such areas or territories are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the provision of relief supplies therein.
3. It is assumed the word "French" in last line of paragraph 5 of SCAEF's transmitting letter to SACMED should be "British".

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DEC 1958

Doc. No. 5200.9 (1/27/58)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl S. Spivey

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
Office of the Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET

(SHAEP/G5/1001)

14 May 1944

SUBJECT: Interim Directive for Civil Affairs Operations  
in FRANCE

TO: Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

1. Under the authority conferred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in FAN 318, dated 8 January, 1944, this Directive is issued to you for coordinating operations in FRANCE. The interim directive attached hereto and marked Enclosure "A" is forwarded for your guidance in planning Civil Affairs activity in Southern FRANCE.
2. The Annex has been framed to cover all possible operations in Southern FRANCE and is intended to cover operation ANVIL whenever, or if ever, it is staged, as well as operations arising out of RANKIN conditions.
3. Copies of the Interim Directives on Civil Affairs shortly to be issued to Commander in Chief 21 Army Group, will be sent to you, in order that your plans may, to the fullest possible extent, conform to those which will govern operations in FRANCE mounted from this theater.
4. The directives, on the basis of the latest available political information, assume that extensive reliance may be put by SCAEF and you upon French authorities for the conduct of civil administration in FRANCE. If the basic assumption of the directives proves to be mistaken, supplementary directives will be issued. You are, of course, authorized in the absence of such directives, to exercise to the fullest extent necessary in the military interest supreme powers throughout the area of your responsibility. It is believed, however, that direct control of Civil Affairs will be unnecessary and that the full enforcement of the policy of the present directives will be in the military interest.
5. Throughout the attached directive frequent use has been made of the words "French Authorities." This term is intentionally vague and is intended to cover those authorities

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DDP 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

in FRANCE (be they local, departmental or national) which we shall make use of for civil administration whether or not they have received formal recognition by the French and U.S. Governments.

6. Excluding of course Vichy, the Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) is, at present, the only French authority in the field with which we can do business. It is possible, however, that you may find it necessary, after your entry into FRANCE, to make use of the leadership afforded by local authorities which are not specifically associated with the FCNL. You are authorized to take such action so long as the authority so made use of is not a Vichy organization.

7. You will, from time to time, receive copies of the detailed orders and instructions on Civil Affairs issued from this headquarters to Commanders and Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments serving in Northern FRANCE. In view of the ultimate responsibility of SCAEF for the whole of FRANCE, it will obviously be desirable if policies and procedures established in those orders and instructions are to the fullest extent practicable followed in Southern FRANCE.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/

W. B. SMITH  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Chief of Staff.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl L. Speer*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(SHAEF/G-5/1001)

May 1944

Enclosure "A"

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs, Southern France.

TO: Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

1. This directive is issued to you under the powers conferred by CCS in FAN 318, and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs in the six administrative Regions of which the capital cities are MONTPELLIER, MARSEILLES (excluding Corsica), CLERMONT-FERRAND and LYONS and in the whole of the Departments of HAUTE-GARONNE, TARN, GOTE D'OR and DOUBS. Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN conditions which may develop.
2. Within boundaries established by this Headquarters (HQ), you will have, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. However, Military Government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be controlled by the French themselves. In order to secure uniform civil administration SCAEF will utilise the leadership of French authorities (other than Vichy) in national administration and will maintain communications with you regarding policy and decisions in such matters. If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such executive action as the security of the forces or the success of the military operations may require is authorised. Appropriate redelegation of powers to subordinate Commanders is further authorised.
3. Through a liaison mission to be sent to this HQ or by direct channels if more practicable, you will collaborate in the formulation of policy and the preparation of the basic civil affairs plan for the "OVERLORD" area. Upon the issuance of that plan you will prepare detailed plans for the enforcement of the policies established, throughout the total area of your responsibility, by means of those procedures which may be practicable in your command. Such plans will be reviewed by this HQ.

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Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Case L. Spicer*

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4. In the operational phase the mission referred to in the preceding paragraph, will, with such changes in personnel as may seem to you to be appropriate, be maintained at this HQ.
5. You will, in coordination with this HQ, prepare phased estimates of and requisitions for civilian supply and relief needs in that portion of liberated FRANCE which is your responsibility. These needs will be assessed by an appreciation of the extent to which failure to fulfill civilian claims to relief might interfere with military operations or with broader objectives as defined by SCAEF or CCS.
6. At such time as you believe that considerations of security permit, you will obtain from the FRENCH Authorities in NORTH AFRICA the assignment of personnel to your command for planning and field duties in Civil Affairs.
7. Security consideration permitting, and within the framework of policy announced by SCAEF or CCS, you are free in urgent matters relating to the technical problems in the area of your responsibility, to consult with the members and representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation or other groups.
8. There will be BRITISH and AMERICAN participation, in such proportions as you deem desirable, in the administration of civil affairs in the area of your responsibility.
9. You will, to the fullest extent consistent with the security of the troops and the prosecution of the war, assist French Authorities to secure, or if military necessity requires, yourself take steps to secure:
  - a. The preservation of public health.
  - b. The restoration and supervision of public services.
  - c. The maintenance of public order.
  - d. The supervision of economic institutions, practices and controls including those relating to banking and other financial functions.
  - e. The regulation of the movements of civilians within the whole of your area.

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl J. Spier

f. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments and works of art.

10. a. Initial recourse shall be had to French Authorities for necessary legislative enactments and for the punishment of civilians committing offences of concern to the Allied Forces. It is not, therefore, contemplated that any Proclamations, Ordinances or other enactments (except the initial Proclamation establishing your powers as in Para 2 above) will be issued, or that military courts will be established.

b. If issuance of military enactments should become necessary such enactments may be issued by subordinate Commanders only if:

(i) They conform to the general policies laid down by this HQ, and

(ii) They are of a character and application purely local to the area of the Commander's responsibility, and

(iii) They have been specifically authorized by you or by a Commander to whom you have delegated area responsibility, unless military or other exigencies make such authorization impracticable.

You may delegate authority to issue such enactments when and as experience reveals the necessity for such delegation. All military enactments other than those referred to above, will be issued only within the policies laid down by this HQ, on your authority.

c. No allied Military courts will be established until an order authorising such action has been issued by you, within policies laid down by this HQ. After the issuance of such order, such courts may be established as required by Commanders having area responsibility. They may delegate such power to establish courts when and as experience reveals the necessity for such delegation.

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Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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NSAID

346. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl S. Jace

d. Allied service and naval courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied Forces respectively and over all persons of non-French nationality not belonging to such Forces who are employed by or who accompany those Forces and are subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, or British naval courts. SCAEF may from time to time by subsequent directives or orders extend such immunity from jurisdiction of French courts to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Forces, as may be designated therein.

11. The French Authorities will be charged with the duty of reorganizing or re-establishing French administrative and judicial services insofar as may be necessary to facilitate the discharge of Civil Affairs responsibilities. The suspension and appointment of French administrative and judicial services and officials will be effected, upon request and after consultation, through the agency of French officers from the French Authorities. Subordinate Commanders may effect, by their own direct action, such suspensions and temporary appointments only when and as specifically authorized by the Force Commander or Commanders of L/Z of C, who may delegate such authority when and as experience may reveal the necessity for such delegation.

12. You will advise this HQ of the time, when and extent to which you believe that civilian relief agencies should be permitted to function in your area, but will not admit them without prior consultation with and authorization of this HQ.

13. Upon the liberation of any given locality you will take all appropriate steps, in accordance with the directives of SCAEF and in conjunction with the French Authorities, for the full utilisation of its industrial, natural, and other economic resources for the support of your forces, the needs of United Nations Forces in other areas, and the basic needs of the French people.

14. Requisitioning of civilian labor, billets, and supplies, and the use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for military needs, will be effected,

~~TOP SECRET~~

where possible, through French authorities. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of the attached French officers.

15. Except in areas directly important to military operations you will permit orderly political assemblies and meetings to be conducted to the end that when it is possible for elections to be held, the people may express their free choice.

16. You will so administer civil affairs in your area that when it is transferred to the immediate command of SCAEF the policies and procedures which have been followed and utilised will, to the greatest extent possible, conform to those in the rest of liberated FRANCE.

For the Supreme Commander:

W. B. SMITH,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Chief of Staff.

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DDP DR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature-

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TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 556, 9 JUNE 1944

NO : 9 JUNE 1944

Your 694 received. It appears that de Gaulle is performing in accordance with his previous record of lack of cooperation in our effort to liberate France.

He may visit Washington at the end of this month or about mid July but there is no indication yet that he will be helpful in our efforts in the interest of his country. I will do my best to attract his interest to the Allied war effort.

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON  
NO : 9 JUNE 1944

Replying to your message of June 8, I have read Phillip's message  
to Secretary of State.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

WDCC  
8 June  
1428 Z

From: M A London England

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered

Filed: 081413 Z

To the President from Winant.

Please see Ambassador Phillips' message to Secretary Hull  
"SecState Washington 4582 June 8th, 4 P M". You will have already  
seen the Prime Ministers message number 694 forwarded to you  
early this morning. Phillips has not seen this message.

No Sig

SECRET

COPY

BE-406

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated June 8, 1944

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

*WTL*

Secretary of State

Washington

U. S. URGENT

4582, June 8, 4 p.m.

TOP SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM PHILLIPS

Since his arrival on D minus two, General de Gaulle has proved a difficult and non-cooperative guest of the British Government. There has been constant friction and no one has been more annoyed than the Prime Minister himself. The first impasse arose in connection with the Eisenhower proclamation to the people of Western Europe and with regard to de Gaulle's own broadcast. He took exception to parts of the Eisenhower message and General Koenig indicated to the Chief of Staff that therefore de Gaulle might not deliver his broadcast and furthermore might forbid the participation of the French liaison officers (who had been in training in England for a year at the expense of the British Government) to accompany the invasion forces. However, late in the afternoon of "D" day, de Gaulle made his broadcast, the text

-2- #4582, June 8, 4 p.m. from London

the text of which was passed on a technical level without formal approval yesterday, de Gaulle permitted twenty French liaison officers to participate in the invasion and today, in reply to a question it was stated that the remainder of the five hundred will not be allowed to go.

The issuance of the scaef (repeat scaef) currency proclamation, which was approved by the combined Chiefs of Staff, has been delayed in the hope that de Gaulle would issue, at the same time, a supporting statement since it was felt here that some French recognition should be given to the presence in France of our currency notes. The General has refused to do so on the ground that France was being treated in this respect, precisely like Italy and that he alone, as President of the FCNL has the right to issue such a proclamation. Our proclamation, therefore, will be issued at midnight tonight, without his support and with as little publicity as possible.

I have learned that in spite of his non-cooperative attitude, the sentiment in Parliament and in the press is growing more and more in his favor on the ground that he is not being given proper consideration.

It seems

-3- #4582, June 8, 4 p.m. from London

It seems possible that he may be invited, as President of the FCNL to agree to the plans which have been worked out for the administration of civil affairs in France.

WINANT

WWC

TOP SECRET

*adm. leaky -*  
*WST*

7 June 1944

From: US Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 694

Filed 072354Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and top secret.

Number 694.

1. You will have seen from Eisenhower's No. SH. 2511 part of General De Gaulle's activities over here. He has arrived without the three commissioners, Massigle, Le Troquer, and Dastier, whom we understood he was going to bring. This is to make clear his position that he will not discuss the civil administration of France only with us, and that an American representative fully charged must be present.

2. You have probably been informed of his attitude in refusing to allow the French liaison officers to go with our forces into France until the civil administration question has been settled. Under severe pressure from the Foreign Secretary he consented at last to broadcast, though not in Eisenhower's series. You will no doubt read the broadcast for yourself. It is remarkable, as he has not a single soldier in the great battle now developing. Further, he has also modified his attitude about

TOP SECRET

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-2-

the liaison officers and will allow some of them to go. It is probable that all would go in any case, whatever he said if called upon by General Eisenhower and their British and American comrades.

3. I can assure you that every courtesy and personal attention was lavished upon General De Gaulle. After a full discussion with his two generals and Monsieur Vienot, his representative here, we have had luncheon in my train, and the Foreign Secretary and I then took him personally to see General Eisenhower at his headquarters in a woodland camp. General's Eisenhower and Bedell Smith went to the utmost limit in their endeavour to conciliate him, making it clear that in practice events would probably mean that the Committee would be the natural authority with whom the Supreme Commander would deal. It was after this that he proceeded to London and acted in the sense of my Paras 1 and 2.

4. We are still persevering. We have told De Gaulle that if he sends for three or four of his commissioners, we will then begin conversations designed to clarify and smooth the difficulties about the civil administration in France. Meanwhile, I have assured General Eisenhower that we will certainly support him in making the necessary proclamation about currency.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3-

5. It is not impossible that the commissioners will differ from De Gaulle and may show themselves disposed to make friendly arrangements with the American and British Governments. There might even be a sort of isolation of De Gaulle.

6. If he refuses to send for the commissioners, we shall suggest he had better go back to Algiers. If he accepts, I hope you will consider whether Winant might not sit in in order to give you an American slant on the talks. After this we will let you know what our view is. I have repeatedly told De Gaulle and he acknowledged it without irritation that failing an agreement, I stand with you.

7. Supposing all this fails, we shall express the hope that he will return to Algiers and then later proceed to Washington as the result of your message sent through Admiral Fenard or if he cares he can stay here and proceed by the dates named. I think it would be a great pity if you and he did not meet. I do not see why I should have all the luck.

No Sig

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 551, 6 June 1944

Thank you very much for your 688, 690, and 692.

In view of today's stupendous events the subjects already seem like ancient history. I have sent word to De Gaulle that in view of his expression of hope that I will see him over here, I shall be very glad to do so if he will come to Washington between June 22 and 30 or else between July 6 and 14. Fenard has gone to London this morning with the above.

\* \* \* \* \*

ROOSEVELT

FROM: GENERAL EISENHOWER  
TO : THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
NO : SCAF 47, 5 June 1944

Yesterday General de Gaulle agreed to broadcast a message on military line to the people of France following the statement by the Supreme Commander transmitted to you in SCAF 33. He requested a copy of this statement on which to base his own broadcast. Today he submitted a redraft of the Supreme Commander's statement which he requested be substituted for the text given you in SCAF 33. This redraft rearranged the text previously approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and in particular modified paragraph 9 thereof generally to the effect that French authorities would reestablish civil government.

General de Gaulle's representative was informed that time did not permit these proposed changes to be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or to be recorded and reprinted if approved. This afternoon word was received from General de Gaulle that while he understood and appreciated the reason why we were unable to change the original statement, he felt that in these circumstances he was unable to make a statement following that of General Eisenhower.

We have accordingly given up the idea of including a statement by De Gaulle in the broadcast program, and will proceed without it as originally planned. It is probable that de Gaulle will broadcast later.

CM-IN-4045 (5 Jun 44)

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 552, 4 JUNE 1944

E X T R A C T

3. Your #692. All good luck in your talks with prima donna. Admiral Fenard is just back in Washington from De Gaulle with a very important message to me. I will see the Admiral on my return to Washington Monday afternoon. I will let you know at once.

4. In your paragraph 4, please for the love of Heaven do not tell De Gaulle that I am sending him a "friendly message to come over to see me." The whole point of it is that I decline absolutely as head of the state to invite him to come over here. My message via Admiral Fenard was that if he asked me if I would see him if he came over I told Fenard that I would reply in the affirmative most cordially. The distinction is a very important one.

\* \* \* \* \*

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 692, 4 JUNE 1944

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

3. De Gaulle's Committee by a large majority decided that he should accept my invitation to come here. He hemmed and hawed, but Massigli and several others threatened to resign if he did not do so. We expect him on D minus one. If he arrives, Eisenhower will see him for half an hour and explain to him the position exclusively in its military aspect. I shall return to London during the night of D-day.

4. We will then take on De Gaulle. I do not expect that very much can be done, but I still hope the word "Leadership", which I am told you approved in Hull's speech, may prove serviceable. I do not expect we shall get more than a certain number of miles from the beaches, and probably what we get will be a depopulated area wearing the aspect of a battlefield. This I can explain to De Gaulle safely here when he arrives. I will also deliver him your friendly message to come over to see you. I shall keep you constantly informed.

\* \* \* \* \*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following urgent telegram has just been received from London and is given below in paraphrase:

"Phillips refers to his telegram of June 1 and states that he has just been informed that General De Gaulle is scheduled to reach an air field close to London about 6 a.m. Sunday, June 4. The General will be conducted at once from the air field straight to a designated place of meeting where he will be with Eisenhower, the Prime Minister and Eden. The question of General De Gaulle's broadcast will be the first item for discussion. WINANT"



*To Charlottesville as  
Red 50.*

TOP SECRET

1 June 1944

From: US Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number 688

Filed 012045Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 688. Your 546.

1. The War Cabinet feel that De Gaulle and some of the principal representatives of the FCNL should be told about OVERLORD before it happens. Otherwise it may become a very great insult to France. The only safe place to inform them is here. The following programme will, I think, meet all security obligations. I have invited him to come as soon as he will. I have not yet had an answer from him, but I have offered to send my own York airplane to fetch him. This would reach him on D minus 3 and he could be here by D minus 1. He will then be taken to Eisenhower's Headquarters and told what is necessary and brought into the show. Eisenhower agrees with this plan.

2. Eisenhower thinks it important that De Gaulle should broadcast to France in the camouflage series. Eisenhower's proclamation would be followed by King Haakon

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

From: US Military Attache, London, England

Number 688

Filed 012045Z

then Queen Wilhelmina and now De Gaulle. To leave a broadcast from France out of the series would be to destroy the confusing effect we wish to establish by leaving one gap. I have very little doubt De Gaulle can be persuaded to say the right thing. Thereafter on D plus 3 or 4 we will have discussions with him and his people in London, and I must explain to him that there will be no French territory worth speaking of for a good many days, only the bombed and shell-torn beaches. I will do the best I can with him during the week D 2 to 8 or 9. I will tell him what you say, namely, that if he sent you a message asking if you would see him, you would answer an immediate and cordial affirmative. Meanwhile, I shall have explored the ground as far as possible with him beforehand. If he comes, he comes. If he won't, he won't, and that is the moment when we may be able to take a further decision.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: US Military Attache, London, England

Number 688

Filed 012045Z

3. I am delighted to hear that Marshall will be with us about D plus 4 and I will certainly bring him in to discussions with De Gaulle with me on the military field alone or, as you say, he can have them singly on the military field alone. I will report to you the upshot.

4. Besides the Eisenhower-Wilhelmina series of broadcasts to the Continent on D day, the King proposes to broadcast to his people at 9:00 P.M. that day and I presume you will be doing the same to yours. It seems to me that this can all be fitted in to a programme on D day. Would you let me have your wishes.

5. I am indeed sorry to hear the long time that must elapse before we meet on your programme. When the immediate situation in OVERLORD clarifies I would make an effort to meet you at Quebec or Bermuda. The former seems easier if this were agreeable to you. It would probably be better for me not to come in to the United States as you approach the election crisis or our enemies might try to make mischief.

No Sig

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 546, 31 MAY 1944

Your 684 and 685 received.

I do want to make this de Gaulle matter clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

Less than a week ago, on May twenty-fifth, Admiral Fenard said goodbye on his way to see deGaulle in Algiers. We had a very satisfactory talk and I think he is a first class man in every way, besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy.

He asked me if I had any message for deGaulle. I told him that I had been hoping for a message from deGaulle to me asking if I would see him if he came over here and that he could tell deGaulle that if I received such a message my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to him, as I thought I had made the whole matter clear to many people before, that as the head of the Government and the head of the State I could not well invite deGaulle to come, as the latter is only the head of a Committee and is not the head of the French Government or the French State. Fenard was in complete accord, and that message ought to have been delivered to deGaulle by now.

I feel very strongly that in his position he, in person and through nobody else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and the reply would be expressed in cordial terms.

Now as to your 682, in further reply, of course you and I must do everything possible to encourage the French national spirit and to get it working with us at top speed in the immediate future.

We do not know definitely what the state of that French spirit is and we will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

Marshall will be with you about D plus 4. We cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with deGaulle singly or with you and deGaulle jointly, because this is wholly a matter in the political and not in the military field. Marshall can, of course, talk about all military matters.

My suggestion is that after you talk with deGaulle that he should ask me whether I would see him if he came here direct from London. Meanwhile you could send me a summary of your talks with him and we can be in complete accord by the time he reaches here.

PRES #546 (Cont'd)

As a matter of practical fact, the French military strength could not be used on OVERLORD until then anyway. All plans are for later than D-day.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the deGaulle conversations with you.

\*\*\*\*\*

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (CAIRO, EGYPT)

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 301650Z, 30 MAY 1944

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

Greatest admiration is expressed for the French under the command of General Juin whose resourcefulness and determination are considered outstanding among the corps commanders. Generals Wilson and Devers want to use him as the French commander for the next operation whereas, because of his association with Weygand, De Gaulle has so far refused to allow him to enter France. They intend to make an issue of this as they consider no other French general is equal to the tasks.

\* \* \* \* \*

HARRIMAN

TOP SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (CASERTA, ITALY)

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : M 18783, 29 MAY 1944

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The Prime Minister promises he will faithfully follow your line regarding De Gaulle but warns that the Foreign Office and some members of his Cabinet are insistent on going further, in fact so is the House and the British public. He really feels the need of help in coping with him and his own associates and hopes you will send Stettinius over or someone else of equal position in Washington.

\* \* \* \* \*

HARRIMAN

TOP SECRET

Sent as Red 40  
to Shanghai Lia  
at 28/19452  
A

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 685, Filed 28/1723Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt TOP SECRET  
and personal.

1. Cabinet and I are most grateful to you for your number 543 about my 680.

2. I still think that a short visit is, above all things, desirable for the Staffs and above all for you, but any time after D+14 might be convenient to you, and would be received with rejoicing by us. I am delighted at what you say and that you are keeping this in view. Doctor Churchill informs you that a sea voyage in one of your great new battleships would do you no end of good.

3. Your number 544 and the fact that you will not be here at the time, make it all the more necessary that you should send someone who will express your views. I do not think it is impossible that De Gaulle will subscribe to the last two sentences of 544, but of course there

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TOP SECRET

-2-

ought to be a responsible United States representative at all the discussions. I will help all I can to act in harmony with our long association on this subject, but the situation and my sentiment are somewhat changed by the substantial fighting of the French troops in these Italian battles.

4. Finally I am hoping that Alexander will turn his battle into left-handed hook so as to get as many as possible.

No Sig

Rec'd 28/19102  
JN

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 684, 27 MAY 1944

I do not propose to invite De Gaulle who is bringing three members of his Cabinet with him till D-day at dawn. I would earnestly ask you to send over someone of the rank of Stettinius to express your point of view. I see the growth of opinion very powerful here and the feeling that France should be with us when we liberate France. Naturally, there is a great wave of sentiment for France on account of the bravery and success of French troops mainly African but well led by French officers, in our Italian battle. There is also the sense that they should share in the work we have in hand. No one will understand their being cold-shouldered. I feel I ought to let you know how things are moving. The word "leadership" in Hull's speech has been very helpful here.

\* \* \* \* \*

Prime

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 544, 27 MAY 1944

Your 682 received. I am in complete agreement with you that the French National Spirit should be working with us in OVERLORD to prevent unnecessary loss of American and British lives.

You are fully informed in regard to my belief that Allied military power should not be used to impose any particular group as the Government of the French people.

At the present time I am unable to see how an Allied establishment of the Committee as a Government of France would save the lives of any of our men.

Any assistance that the Committee or any other Frenchmen can give to our Army of liberation is of course highly desirable from our point of view as well as in the interest of France.

I am hopeful that your conversations with General de Gaulle will result in inducing him to actually assist in the liberation of France without being imposed by us on the French people as their Government. Self-determination really means absence of coercion.

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

WAL

From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No: 682, Filed 26/1615Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and TOP SECRET.

1. You will have seen what has passed about De Gaulle coming here and what I said in Parliament on the subject. There is a very strong feeling here after their recent fighting in Italy in favour of the French. We are going to liberate France at the cost of much British and American blood. The feeling is that she should be with us in this. But who is "She"? When this works out in the person of De Gaulle, all those difficulties which you and I know so well, emerge.

2. I feel, however, that we should be in a difficulty if it were thought that more British and American blood was being spilt because we had not got the French national spirit working with us. There is a strong French movement here and of course they do not know, nor can we tell them, all the faults and follies

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

-2-

of De Gaulle. This is only another reason why you and I should consult together in the near future. Of course I shall keep you informed every day about any talks that may occur with De Gaulle. He has lately shown some signs of wishing to work with us and after all it is very difficult to cut the French out of the liberation of France. I should be grateful for a full expression of your views and any other points.

No Sig

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 542, 19 May 1944

Replying to your 678 it seems to me that your proposed course in handling the De Gaulle visitation after D-day is the most promising solution.

Whether or not Koenig or Vienot should be permitted to send code messages from U.K. to Algiers can be safely left to your discretion.

I have no objection to the Committee's sending agents to France after D-day as Eisenhower now has authority to utilize their services at his discretion for the advantage of our military effort. I also have no objection to the Supreme Commander Mediterranean consulting with the Committee about the battle of Italy.

I have no official information in regard to the self constituted provisional government of France alleged in press reports to have been announced in Algiers. We will have to take a joint interest in that when and if it officially comes to our attention. I hope we and the Soviet can come to a common agreement before action is taken by any one of us. You are familiar with my repeated announcements that in America's opinion the French people in France should have a free choice of their own government and I really cannot go back on my oft repeated statement that the Committee and De Gaulle have aimed to be recognized as the provisional government of France without any expression or choice by the people themselves and that I could not recognize it.

\* \* \* \* \*

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 678, 19 May 1944

E X T R A C T

In your No. 538 you assented to my idea of asking De Gaulle over here. On further reflection I think the following course would be better: Namely, once D-day has started, I will send him a cordial invitation to come and talk things over. There will then be no chance of his making difficulties about going back with any entourage he has brought with him, or sending back individual members, or demanding, as head of a considerable Empire, Free French cypher communication with them. Our ban will be off and anybody can cable or come and go as they please.

In the meantime, I recommend that we allow Koenig or Vienot to send a few messages in their own cypher, subject to their giving us the substance of these messages and giving their word that they do not refer to military affairs other than those specifically affecting French troops. Neither will be informed of D-day or anything military.

There will be plenty of time after De Gaulle arrives here (if he designs to come) when the show has started, to settle up the French collaboration in their own country. It seems probable to me that for a week, or perhaps a fortnight, it will be a shot-torn, bomb-crumbled battlefield, and I cannot see any question of a civil government arising there. If you agree with me I will hold to this decision. At the same time if you agree, I will telegraph to General Wilson to take the French more into their confidence about the battle in Italy. Considering the fine performance of the two French Corps they deserve to be consulted. There would, I think, be feeling here that we were treating them roughly if we do not act in comradeship with them in this Italian battle.

I do not think we are called upon to notice at all the Algiers declaration that they are the provisional Government of France unless or until the Committee inform us officially. We will of course consult you then. Meanwhile, our action remains regulated by the terms of recognition we, in unison, have already given them. It may be that the Russians will recognize them as what they now call themselves. In this case it is important that we should be together. Personally I do not think the Russians will dare to draw such dangerous lines of demarcation, but I may well be wrong.

\* \* \* \* \*

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
W.S.  
7

5/16/44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Smith's answer to our request for the text of the proposed British draft to the Supreme Commander in reference to relations with the French is attached.

Staff, Supreme  
England.

  
Chief of Staff.

Proposed American and British texts of directive to Supreme Commander have only been shown to me informally and confidentially. However, only major difference is that the American text provides that General Eisenhower may deal with the French Committee for National Liberation or with any other non-Vichy group of Frenchmen whereas British text indicates that dealings will be exclusively with French Committee for National Liberation.



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COPY

From: General W.B. Smith, Chief of Staff, Supreme  
Headquarters, AEF, London, England.

To: General Marshall

S. 51907

Proposed American and British texts of  
directive to Supreme Commander have only been shown  
to me informally and confidentially. However, only  
major difference is that the American text provides  
that General Eisenhower may deal with the French  
Committee for National Liberation or with any other  
non-Vichy group of Frenchmen whereas British text  
indicates that dealings will be exclusively with  
French Committee for National Liberation.

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**TOP-SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

From: General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, Headquarters, AEF, London, England. May 16 1944

To : General Marshall.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Smith's answer to our request for the text of the proposed British draft to the Supreme Commander in reference to relations with the French is attached.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

**TOP-SECRET**

**TOP-SECRET**

From: General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, London, England.

To : General Marshall.

S 51907 for General Marshall's eyes only from Smith.

Proposed American and British texts of directive to Supreme Commander have only been shown to me informally and confidentially. However, only major difference is that the American text provides that General Eisenhower may deal with the French Committee for National Liberation or with any other Non Vichy group of Frenchmen whereas British text indicates that dealings will be exclusively with French Committee for National Liberation.

...to relations with the French  
which I think you would see. In communicating  
with the Prime Minister please make no reference  
to Smith's views or in his communicating directly  
with me in this matter, as it would probably dem-  
onstrate the usefulness at a very vital moment.

We have not received the alternative British  
formula for dealing with France to which Smith re-  
fers. He is being asked to send this to us.

**SECRET**

Chief of Staff

**TOP-SECRET**

W/B  
To File  
JWC

From: General Smith, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, London, England  
To: General Marshall  
Subject: [Faint]

During the past few days the following has taken place. [Faint]

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

May 15, 1944

There is attached hereto a somewhat personal message from Smith (Eisenhower's Chief of Staff) to me in reference to relations with the French which I think you should see. In communicating with the Prime Minister please make no reference to Smith's views or to his communicating directly with me in this matter, as it would probably destroy his usefulness at a very vital moment.

We have not received the alternative British formula for dealing with France to which Smith refers. He is being asked to send this to us.

**SECRET**

*[Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

[Faint background text, mostly illegible]

[Faint background text, mostly illegible]

TOP SECRET

W.B.  
10 File  
J.M.

From: General Smith, Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England

To : General Marshall

S 51841 Personal for General Marshall's eyes only from Smith.

During the past two days the following has taken place. Yesterday, as the result of our direct request the Prime Minister authorized General Koenig to send one message in French cipher to Algiers in an effort to explain to French National Committee of Liberation the necessity for the suspension of French cipher communications and reestablish some basis for future military discussions. As an indication of the strength of French feeling Koenig refused to submit this perfectly innocuous message to any Englishman for censorship but was willing that it be censored by an American. I censored it personally. No reply has yet been received.

Last night after receiving the President's message above referred to the Prime Minister called me and read it to me. He said that he intended to invite DeGaulle here, but would now do so only on condition that DeGaulle remained here until after D Day and during his stay would not communicate with Algiers. I am certain that any such invitation would be indignantly refused and advised against it. As far as I know, the invitation will not be extended at this time but will be extended for some date near but after D Day.

With regard to the entire matter of dealing with the French, General Eisenhower of course is in complete agreement with the President's statement that questions relating to the future government of France are political and not military. His attitude with respect to the French Committee has been to deal with it on a military basis and to use it and its representatives in planning matters of civil administration in order to assist the military operation. So far we have dealt only with the Committee as it is the sole organized body of Frenchmen available. General Eisenhower is alive to the fact that the use of the Committee will tend to enhance its political prestige but we have felt that the military advantage to be gained from the Committee's assistance justifies dealing with it on a military basis, bearing in mind the importance of keeping such political advantage to a minimum. Our association with the Committee would have the single purpose of helping military operations. Any attempt by the committee to use that association to intrench itself as the government of France would, of course, be repudiated nor would our dealing with the Committee prevent us from dealing also with any other non-Vichy group of Frenchmen which could be of use to us in fighting Germans.

Perhaps we are too close to the practical aspects of the problem to understand clearly the position of our government. We have had the text of the President's formula in dealing with France and the text of the alter-

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native British formula but as you know we have not received any formal directive. Consequently we have been working within the framework of the American text as represented by the Secretary of State's public statement on foreign policy of April 11th. However we have only just learned that Mr. Hull's remarks regarding relations with the French do not represent the President's views.

I am sure that nothing would suit General Eisenhower better than to have his responsibility rigidly confined to matters of purely military concern, but no one who has dealt with a foreign government, at close range as we have, can fail to realize that when a military commander is operating on foreign soil there is no clear cut line of demarcation between military and civil or political questions. Finally, there is one other difficult condition, and a delicate one, which affects us in the absence of a formal directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander receives an unilateral directive on such vital matters as those covered in the President's telegram he is placed in a very difficult position. In order faithfully and effectively to carry out the mission which has been assigned to him he must constantly be aware of his responsibilities to both governments and he is scrupulous in the discharge of those responsibilities. In dealing with matters of high governmental policy as affecting the two governments which he represents he can not act as an American theater commander since these matters are inseparable from his role as Supreme Allied Commander. The Prime Minister always says, as he told me again last night, that he stands with the President on all questions dealing with the French. This statement, of course, can be taken for what it is worth but it must always be remembered that the one ministry which the Prime Minister does not control is the Foreign Office.

The time is so short and the implications of the problem are so great that I think this lengthy message is justified to explain, from our viewpoint, the great importance of obtaining for the Supreme Commander if possible a clear cut combined directive on relationship with the French.

CM-IN-10806 (15 May 44)

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TOP-SECRET  
PRIORITY

12 May 1944

12 May 1944

*WST*

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

*NR WAR 38059*

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

TO: SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, LONDON

NO : 538,

ORIGINAL AND TOP SECRET FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM

\* \* \* \* \*

Your 674. I have no objection whatever to your inviting De Gaulle and others of the French Committee to discuss your association in military or political matters; however, you must consider in the interest of security keeping De Gaulle in the United Kingdom until the OVERLORD landing has been made.

It is my understanding that General Eisenhower now has full authority to discuss with the Committee all matters on a military level. I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level and I am unable at this time to recognize any government of France until the French people have an opportunity for a free choice of government.

ROOSEVELT

I HOPE MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE WAS WHOLLY CLEAR TO YOU. I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT ANY MATTERS RELATING TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE ARE A POLITICAL AND NOT A MILITARY MATTER.

SENT  
13 MAY 1944  
WAR OFFICE

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TOP-SECRET  
PRIORITY

12 May 1944

WAL

FROM: WAR

NR WAR 36054

TO: SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, LONDON

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM  
THE PRESIDENT.

I HAVE TODAY SENT THE FOLLOWING QUOTED MESSAGE TO PRIME  
MINISTER CHURCHILL.

QUOTE. YOUR 674. I HAVE NO OBJECTION WHATEVER TO YOUR  
INVITING DE GAULLE AND OTHERS OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS  
YOUR ASSOCIATION IN MILITARY OR POLITICAL MATTERS; HOWEVER, YOU  
MUST CONSIDER IN THE INTEREST OF SECURITY KEEPING DE GAULLE IN  
THE UNITED KINGDOM UNTIL THE OVERLORD LANDING HAS BEEN MADE.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER  
NOW HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS WITH THE COMMITTEE ALL MATTERS  
ON A MILITARY LEVEL. I DO NOT DESIRE THAT EISENHOWER SHALL  
BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE COMMITTEE ON A POLITICAL LEVEL AND I  
AM UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO RECOGNIZE ANY GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE  
UNTIL THE FRENCH PEOPLE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FREE CHOICE  
OF GOVERNMENT. UNQUOTE

I HOPE MY PREVIOUS DIRECTIVE WAS WHOLLY CLEAR TO  
YOU. I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT ANY MATTERS RELATING TO  
THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE ARE A POLITICAL AND NOT A  
MILITARY MATTER.

SENT  
13 MAY 1944  
W.D. CODE CENTER

TOP-SECRET

**TOP-SECRET**

THE AMERICAN POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN FIRM ON THIS POINT.

WE MUST BE CERTAIN THAT THE WORDS QUOTE FREE DETERMINATION UNQUOTE, WHICH DATE BACK TO THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, SHALL BE PRESERVED IN SUBSTANCE AND IN SPIRIT. THEREFORE, NO EXISTING GROUP OUTSIDE OF FRANCE CAN BE GIVEN THE KIND OF DOMINATION OVER THE FRENCH PEOPLE IN FRANCE WHICH WOULD DOMINATE THE FREE EXPRESSION OF A CHOICE.

THE FRENCH COMMITTEE DENIES THAT IT HAS ANY SUCH INTENTION BUT SO MANY INSTANCES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS THAT I AM UNABLE TO ACCEPT THEIR DECLARATION WHOLEHEARTEDLY.

THAT IS WHY YOU AS SUPREME COMMANDER MUST ASSUME THIS ADDITIONAL TASK.

WE MUST ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT THE FRENCH POPULATION IS QUITE NATURALLY SHELL-SHOCKED JUST AS ANY OTHER PEOPLE WOULD BE AFTER SUCH SUFFERINGS AT THE HANDS OF GERMAN OCCUPATION. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR THEM QUIETLY AND NORMALLY TO THINK THROUGH THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE. WE AS THE LIBERATORS OF FRANCE HAVE NO RIGHT TO COLOR THEIR VIEWS OR GIVE ANY GROUP THE SOLE RIGHT TO IMPOSE ONE SIDE OF A CASE ON THEM.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND MY DESIRE THAT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THEM SHALL BE OUR TRUE AIM.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 2100 E.W.T. 12 May 1944

*Robert W. Bogue*  
Robert W. Bogue  
Lt (jg) USNR

**TOP-SECRET**

**TOP-SECRET**

*Paraphrase for  
Sec State*

12 May 1944

outside of France can be permitted to dominate the free  
From: The President  
expression of a choice by the French people in France.  
To: General Eisenhower  
Although any such intention is denied by the French

Committee. The following message was today sent by me to Prime  
Minister Churchill: We wholeheartedly to accept their

declaration. Your 674. To your invitation to De Gaulle and others  
of the French Committee for a discussion of your association  
in Military or Political matters, I have no objection whatever.  
However, in the interest of security, you must consider holding  
De Gaulle in England until after the Overlord assault.

As I understand it, General Eisenhower now has full  
authority to discuss all matters on a Military level with the  
Committee. I am unable at this time to recognize any Government  
of France until the French have an opportunity for a free choice,  
and I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with  
the Committee on a political level."

It is my hope that my previous directive was entirely  
clear to you. You will understand I know that any matters relating  
to the future government of France are Political and not Military.  
On this point the American position has always been firm.

The preservation both in substance and in spirit of  
the words " free determination " which date back to the Atlantic  
Charter, must be made certain. Therefore, no existing group

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**TOP-SECRET**

outside of France can be permitted to dominate the free expression of a choice by the French people in France.

Although any such intention is denied by the French Committee, so many instances have occurred in the last two years that I am unable wholeheartedly to accept their declaration.

For that reason you as Supreme Commander must assume this additional task.

It must always be remembered that the French People are quite naturally shell-shocked from sufferings at the hands of German occupation, just as any other people would be. Some time will be required for them to think through the matters relating to their political future quietly and normally. As the liberators of France we have no right to color their views or to give any group the sole right to impose on them one side of a case.

I know that you will understand my desire that self-determination for them shall be our true aim.

**TOP-SECRET**

100-113152

100-113157

See Dites 4 and 6

TOP SECRET

12th May 1944 ✓

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 674

Filed 12/1116Z

To President Roosevelt from Prime Minister personal  
and TOP SECRET number 674.

As the hour approaches we feel it indispensable to have some kind of understanding with the French National Committee. Owing to the restrictions we have found it necessary to put on cypher communications and on comings and goings from this island, which gained your approval, we find it impossible to allow any French who have come or may be permitted to come to this island in order to join in the Eisenhower-Koenig conversations, to leave it again before the event. De Gaulle and his committee refuse to accept these conditions and state that no reasonable discussion is possible.

Para 2. In these circumstances we must presently be faced with a public complaint that no kind of arrangement has been made with the French National Committee for the employment of French forces outside or inside France. We could quite well dispense with French aid from outside in

Recd 141315Z

Send 141345Z

See Whites 4 and 6.

answered by Black "B" 5/14/44

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-2-

the operation, because the LeClerc Division does not reach the scene until D plus 90, and as the FNCL will have no troops till then the military aspect would not be involved. However General Eisenhower says that he attaches great importance to the action to be taken by the French resistance groups on and after D-Day, and undoubtedly we must take care that our joint troops do not suffer heavier losses owing to the fact that no agreement has been made for the employment of the French resistance groups. The French Committee state that the resistance army numbers 175,000 men and they intend to incorporate them officially in the French Army under the name of French Forces of the Interior.

Para 3. I therefore propose to you that General De Gaulle, together with one or two of his committee, should be invited to come here on say May 18th in the utmost secrecy: That you should either entrust your case to General Eisenhower or send over someone specially to meet them: That we should discuss outstanding matters affecting military and political collaborations together face to face, showing all our substantial reasons against any extreme demands but endeavouring to reach a working arrangement. The Foreign Secretary or I would conduct the discussion with De Gaulle and any of your

TOP SECRET

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-3-

representatives you may choose. We will make the best proposals we can to you without agreeing to anything until we have heard from you. It may be that no agreement will be reached because they are unreasonable, in which case we have done our best, and he will have put himself hopelessly in the wrong. In any case we shall have done our duty by the soldiers and you will have the fullest opportunity of seeing the best lay-out we can get for you to consider.

Prime

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET  
URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S 51678, 11 May 1944.

S 51678 to AGWAR TOP SECRET for Combined Chiefs  
of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is SCAF number 24.

The limitations under which we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous. We began our military discussions with the French representatives here in the belief that, although we had no formal directive, we understood the policies of our own governments well enough to be able to reach a working way with any French body or organization that can effectively assist us in the fight against Germany. For the present there is no such body represented here except the French Committee of National Liberations. We have been in collaboration with its Military and Naval Representatives, attempting to arrive at a solution of such pressing problems as the formation of security battalions to guard lines of communication, matters affecting supplementary franc currency, military security and civilian police arrangements, billeting, the furnishing of local resources in goods and services especially to provide for labor requirements, distribution, of civilian supplies, and most important of all, the initial approach to the French population. We also count on the influence of the French Committee to explain to the French people and reconcile them to the necessity of our bombing program.

CM-IN-8367 (11 May 44)

TOP SECRET

011 France

Col Park

33

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

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T O P S E C R E T

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces, London, England

Nr: S 51678, 11 May 1944.

The suspension of diplomatic privileges, including the use of foreign codes, which we our selves urged for security reasons, has had one unfortunate effect in that it has produced a condition under which none of the above questions can be dealt with. The French Committee has directed its senior military officer, General Koenig, not to communicate with Algiers except by French code, and not to proceed further in his discussions with us. I am aware that General Koenig feels very keenly the fact that he is denied even the most general knowledge of forth coming operations although French Naval, Air and Airborne Units are to be employed, and much is expected from French resistance, both active and passive. The sum total of these delays and resentments is, in my opinion, likely to result in acute embarrassment to the Allied Forces, and it will be too late, after the event, to correct them all.

There seem to be only 2 possible solutions, both of which involve divulging certain general information to a very few French officers in London only and on the highest level. The 1st, and probably the most effective, would be for General De Gaulle himself to come to London, on the invitation of 1 or both governments. I would then be able to deal with him direct on the most immediate and pressing problem of the initial approach to the French people and their organized resistance groups. The other

CM-IN-8367 (11 May 44)

T O P S E C R E T

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**TOP  
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T O P S E C R E T

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces, London, England

Nr: S 51678, 11 May 1944.

alternative is to arrange for General Koenig to communicate with General De Gaulle and the French Committee, in French cipher, if necessary, so as to remove the present block to our plans and preparations. I repeat that either of these alternatives implies the necessity of taking at least 1 or 2 senior French officers into our confidence to some extent, and relying upon them not to communicate any military information to Algiers until authorized by me to do so. From a military point of view coordination with the French is of over riding importance. I request that this matter be treated as of the utmost urgency, and that it be considered, as far as possible, on its military aspects.

ACTION: CC/S

No Sig

INFO : Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-8367 (11 May 44) 2300Z jb

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**TOP SECRET**

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

U R G E N T

CCAC DISTRIBUTION

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces London, England

To : War Department

No : S51235 4th May 1944

TOPSEC from SHAEF to AGWAR, S51235, for Combined  
Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee  
information to Hildring and British Chiefs of Staff from  
Holmes signed Eisenhower this is [VOG 32].

1. Preliminary discussions with French Military  
Mission indicates that they consider that the financial  
problem could best be met by solution on following lines:

A. French authorities will organize or provide  
financial services and facilities to be expected in  
any well ordered administration.

B. SCAEF should rely on French authorities to  
operate economic and fiscal system.

C. French authorities will make necessary  
advances to public authorities and to banking  
systems through established French channels.

D. To meet inflation situation, French plan  
to continue price control and rationing systems  
and to soak up purchasing power by use of so-called  
"Corsican scheme" applicable both to currency in  
circulation and bank deposits.

E. To carry out above, it would be necessary  
for French to use our supplemental francs.

CM-IN-2965 (4 May 44)

T O P S E C R E T

*Colonel  
Park*

41

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**SECRET**

*Hold for President  
OII France*

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl L. Spear*

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Page -2-

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces London, England

No : 351235 4th May 1944

2. All of above would be subject to over-riding power for emergency action by Allied commanders in absence of, or failure of French authorities.

3. Following policy indicated by intended extension of Lease-Lend arrangement with FNCL to include metropolitan France, we are prepared to agree in principle to the above programme. We feel that definite plan with some French authority is necessary, and that FNCL is the only body with which satisfactory arrangements can be made prior to arrival. // 1/5

4. Consider that there are strong psychological arguments against SCAEF alone declaring supplemental francs legal tender. We should prefer that FNCL should issue primary declaration and that SCAEF should support this by statement for information if necessary. Thus French would be fully responsible for success of their financial programme. SCAEF would retain such notes as he requires against proper accounting, though the whole issue would be the responsibility of FNCL.

5. In our view, these arrangements would achieve the essential purpose of putting the French authorities in a position adequately to carry out the financial functions of civil administration.

6. The only alternative is of SHAEF directly to undertake in the initial period all financial arrangements, which we should in any case adjust as far as possible to procedures desired by French, and emphasizing that our intervention is temporary. This could be done in a limited operational area, but once hiatus areas develop to any important size, control by SHAEF would not be

Franklin D. Roosevelt (4 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED

T-O-P- S-E-C-R-E-T

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl S. Spivey*

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

**TOP SECRET**  
Page 1

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary  
Forces London, England

No : 851235 4th May 1944

possible and French authorities must operate. It is most desirable that there should be one uniform authority and that this authority should operate from the commencement, undertaking full financial administrative responsibilities, subject to our requirements. Your approval is urgently requested.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Hilldring

INFO : CCS  
Gen Somervell  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
Mr McCloy  
Log

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl J. Spier*

CM-IN-2965 (4 May 44) 1946Z mcs

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

41

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24-75724

25M

TOP SECRETC.C.S. 5654 May 1944COPY NO. 65

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFARRANGEMENTS AS TO THE PROVISION  
OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN FRANCE

Reference: SCAF 15 (CM-IN 15260 (21 April 1944))

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

In reply to the message from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force contained in SCAF number 15 (Enclosure "A") the United States Chiefs of Staff propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and forward the draft message contained in Enclosure "B".

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EOD 111. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

ENCLOSURE "A"

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England

To: War Department

No. S50531, 20 April 1944

Top Sec S50531 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff  
signed Eisenhower cite SHSGS. This SCAF number 15.

An Aide Memoire handed to General Koenig, head of the  
French Military Mission to SHAEF, here follows the text follow-  
ing a conversation between him and the Chief of Staff on 19 April:

"Record prepared by Lieutenant General A. E. Grasett  
of a conversation between General W. Bedell Smith, Chief of  
Staff Supreme Allied Headquarters, and General Koenig Chief  
of French Military Mission, London, which took place on the  
19th April 1944. General Bedell Smith stated as follows:

"The Supreme Commander, AEF, is solely concerned  
with operations to bring about the defeat of Germany and  
the liberation of France. In these operations the  
collaboration and assistance of the French authorities,  
both civil and military, is essential.

"It is therefore the wish of this headquarters to  
open at once discussion with a French Military Mission in  
London with General Koenig as its head. As all problems  
which concern the immediate future, even those involving  
civil matters, are the intimate concern of military  
operations, it is desired to deal with all problems on a  
military basis and with a military mission.

"It is fully realised that the French Military  
Mission will require certain advice and assistance from  
French civil experts, and that the French Committee have  
appointed a delegate charged with responsibilities for the  
problems concerning liberated France.

"Although the immediate necessity is to consider  
the military aspect of the situation, the position of the

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Date- 9-13-61  
Signature- Carl E. Spivey  
(9/27/58)

civil delegate is fully realized and appreciated. It is emphasized, however, that in the first stage operational requirements being paramount, all discussions will be on a military basis through a military mission which it is assumed, will be reinforced by such technical civil elements as are required in order that the best possible advice may be rendered on all questions.

"It is the Supreme Commander's intention to take the head of the French Military Mission into his full confidence regarding plans for the employment of French forces in operations in France well in advance of their being committed to these operations."

General Handy's letter S 4139 of 11 April with its enclosures indicates that the French Committee has been given information with respect to our tentative civilian supply program for France. A telegram (9235) from the Secretary of State to Philip Reed dated 13 April, 11 PM reports that in an exchange of letters agreement was reached with the French Committee on the plans of entering into a Lend Lease agreement, and that pending further advice it is understood with the French authorities that the agreement of September 25, 1943 applies not only to French colonies under the authority of the Committee but should govern also in the supply and financial plans which are authorized to be made for France.

In the light of these steps which have been taken in dealing with the French Committee and as it is urgently necessary that many matters affecting the civil administration of France be settled in advance, authority is requested to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services including civilian labor, treatment of the banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution

Date- 2-13-61  
Signature- Carl S. Spivey

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Dec 1999 (EEO 12800.9 (9/27/88))

TOP SECRET

of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc. These working agreements would in no case go beyond the limitations set forth in the formula approved by the President and transmitted in telegram 324, 17 March as interpreted by the Secretary of State in his public address on 9 April.

The time remaining to reach agreement on these questions is very short, and urgently request immediate action.

ACTION: CC/S

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Date- 2-13-61

Signature- *Cecil L. Spivey*

CM-IN-15260 (21 Apr 44) 0846Z vh

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ENCLOSURE "B"

PROPOSED REPLY TO SUPREME COMMANDER,  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Subject is your SCAF 15. Until there is combined agreement on the civil affairs formula for France, all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the French Committee must be tentative.

It must be made clear to the French National Committee that your arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from the other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France.

On this basis you are granted authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working arrangements on the matters mentioned in your SCAF 15. In this connection, we desire clarification on what is intended by the term "transfer of property" in paragraph 9, SCAF 15.

BLACK 95  
(Hobcaw trip)

3 May 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL MARSHALL.

Your proposed reply to SCAF 15 transmitted to me in WHITE 153 is approved with the following modification:

Change paragraph two as follows: "It must be made clear to the French National Committee that your arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from the other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France."

Sec State and Gen Marshall  
informed, 3 May 44.

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DOD BRN 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
May 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

May 2, 1944.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of May 2, 1944, transmitting a copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Acheson to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy in regard to an agreement with the French Committee of Liberation on the principle of entering into a general Lend-Lease agreement, please keep me fully informed and obtain my personal approval before completing any agreement with the Committee of Liberation in regard to Lend-Lease in the colonies or in Continental France. You will observe that the last sentence of this letter was misunderstood in London, probably as a consequence of garbling in cable transmission. The letter does not state that we have made any agreement or had any understanding with the French Committee of National Liberation about supply and financial plans for France itself. It gave for the guidance of officers in the War Department the principles of financial liability and supply responsibility which should be followed in the plans which they might make for France.

Enclosure:

Mr. Acheson's letter of  
April 4 to Mr. McCloy.

CH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of the letter sent by Mr. Acheson to Mr. McCloy in order to clarify working arrangements and relations on French supply and financial questions pending the completion of our lend-lease agreements with the French. You will observe that the last sentence of this letter was misunderstood in London, probably as a consequence of garbling in cable transmission. The letter does not state that we have made any agreement or had any understanding with the French Committee of National Liberation about supply and financial plans for France itself. It gave for the guidance of officers in the War Department the principles of financial liability and supply responsibility which should be followed in the plans which they might make for France.

Enclosure:

Mr. Acheson's letter of  
April 4 to Mr. McCloy.

CH

April 4, 1944

Dear Jack:

This will inform you that in an exchange of letters, we have agreed with the French Committee of National Liberation on the principle of entering into a general lend-lease agreement covering, on a uniform basis, all territory subject to its authority. In fulfillment of this understanding, we have submitted to the French representatives in Washington a draft of such an agreement, which closely follows the form and substance of the Modus Vivendi Reciprocal Aid Agreement of September 25, 1943, between the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation.

Pending further advice, it is our understanding with the French authorities that the Agreement of September 25, 1943, applies in fact for all the French colonies under the authority of the Committee. It should govern also in the supply and financial plans which are authorized to be made for France.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson,  
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable

John J. McGloy,

Assistant Secretary of War,

War Department,

Washington, D.C.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*White 153*  
**TOP SECRET**

29 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the conversations held at Supreme Allied Headquarters with the Chief of the French Military Mission to SHAETF, as recorded in General Eisenhower's message, SCAF 15, dated 20 April 1944.

2. a. In paragraph 8 of SCAF 15 reference was made to two communications. The first of these pertained to a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which authorized the Chairman of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to make available to the French Committee of National Liberation preliminary estimates of supply requirements for French civilians for the initial six months period after German collapse. These estimates were based on the maximum utilization of all indigenous resources within France. A definite statement was made that the estimates were not in any sense to be regarded as commitments but merely an estimate of the need as best it can be judged at the present time. The foregoing decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was furnished General Eisenhower by the War Department for his information. The above estimates have not as yet been transmitted to the French Committee.

b. The second communication, a telegram from the Secretary of State to Mr. Reed in London dated 13 April, quotes a letter which the State Department sent to the War Department 4 April 1944 and circulated to other departments of the government. The letter quoted states that the State Department has reached an understanding with the French Committee which will in effect extend the lend-lease arrangements, presently pertaining to French West and North Africa, to include French colonies under authority of the Committee, and also to govern supply and financial planning authorized for metropolitan France.

**TOP SECRET**

*Answered by Black 95*


**TOP SECRET**

3. The exact meaning of the reference to "transfer of property" as used by General Eisenhower in paragraph 9 of SCAF 15 is not known, and our proposed reply queries him on this point. We assume, however, that General Eisenhower is anticipating the necessity for making arrangements in advance for the requisition of various properties, labor, services and supplies from the French which will undoubtedly be required when Allied forces invade that country.

4. With respect to the working agreements with the French Committee requested by General Eisenhower, it will be made perfectly clear to him that any authorization granted for further discussions does not preclude arrangements with other elements of the French people whose help may be found advantageous or necessary while American forces are in France.

5. Accordingly we have had prepared, in consultation with the State Department, a proposed reply to SCAF 15 which is appended hereto. If you approve we will present this message to the British as our proposed reply to General Eisenhower.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Enclosure:  
Proposed reply  
to SCAEF.

**TOP SECRET**

PROPOSED REPLY TO SUPREME COMMANDER,  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, TO SCAF 15  
(CM-IN-15260, 21 Feb 44)

Subject is your SCAF 15. Until there is combined agreement on the civil affairs formula for France, all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the French Committee must be tentative.

It must be made clear to the French National Committee that your arrangements with them do not preclude assistance from the other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France.

On this basis you are granted authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working arrangements on the matters mentioned in your SCAF 15. In this connection, we desire clarification on what is intended by the term "transfer of property" in paragraph 9, SCAF 15.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

27 April 1944

**TOP SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Admiral Leahy~~ ✓  
Admiral King —  
General Arnold .

Subject: Military Arrangements  
made at SHAEF for dealing  
with the French Committee  
of National Liberation.

Reference: SCAF 15.

Enclosure: Proposed memorandum for  
the President transmitting  
proposed reply to SCAF 15.

At the request of the Chief of Staff,  
U. S. Army, the enclosed draft of a memorandum for  
the President is submitted as a matter of urgency  
for your concurrence or comment.

*McFarland*  
McFARLAND

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_



**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

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Incl.  
Proposed reply  
to SCAEF.

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PROPOSED REPLY TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,  
TO SCAF 15, (CM-IN-15260, 21 Feb 44)

Subject is your SCAF 15. Until there is combined agreement on the civil affairs formula for France, all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the French Committee must be tentative.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL LEAHY.

For your information.

Send copy to whoever you let know  
about General DeGaulle.

F. D. R.

*Action taken.  
See Black 68 to  
Sec. State*

*Rm*

WDC  
P.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
April 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of General de Gaulle.

With reference to my memorandum of April 18 on the above subject I have now been furnished by the British Ambassador with a copy of the Prime Minister's telegram to you no. 653 of April 20.

Wholly apart from what seems to me to be unwarranted interference by the British in a question of direct concern to ourselves and the French, I am not at all convinced that this is an appropriate time for General de Gaulle to come to this country. In principle I am in favor of the idea of a visit and if properly timed I can conceive that it would be extremely useful. At the moment, however, we are on the verge of discussions in London between General Eisenhower and the French from which we may get a better idea of the degree to which they are going to be willing to cooperate with us. Also it seems to me that it might be better at this late date, and more consistent with our policy, to see a little bit how the situation develops in France on the heels of our armies. The Prime Minister's intervention is rather clearly designed to get us definitely and irrevocably tied to de Gaulle prior to the landing, so that we will be committed to him even if events do not turn out as anticipated.

C.H.

FROM: ADMIRAL LEAHY  
TO : GENERAL MARSHALL

NO : BLACK 64, 24 April 1944 (Hobcaw trip)

Referring to Eisenhower's message SCAF #15 dated 20 April, the President through lack of information does not understand the implications therein and desires specific information on the following points:

(1) In paragraph 8 information regarding the letters in which agreement was reached with the French Committee.

(2) Brief of Lend-Lease agreement showing the specific areas to which it is to apply.

(3) Referring to paragraph 9 it is his desire that in conversations by our military authorities regarding the civil administrations of France, the discussions should not be so confined to the French National Committee for Liberation as to effectively eliminate other elements of the French people whose help may be found advantageous or necessary while American troops remain in France.

He does not understand what is intended by the phrase "Transfer of property."

The President desires that action on SCAF #15 be not taken without his approval.

Please consult with State Department in preparing reply to this message.

Copy to Sec State.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Chiefs of Staff 71469

April 24, 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR-27363

For Eisenhower London, FACS 18, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The United States and British Governments have been approached by the French Committee of National Liberation with the suggestion that a special meeting should be held in London of representatives of the United States and British services and of the French Committee of National Liberation, to consider the question of increasing the flow of military equipment to resistance groups in France. Since there already exists in London a special committee working in cooperation with SHAEF for this purpose with United States, British and French representatives, we are of the opinion that there is no need for a special meeting as proposed by the French Committee.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: General Arnold  
OPD  
General Bissell  
Admiral King  
Colonel Park ✓  
Log

CM-OUT-27363 (24 Apr 44) 2106Z mem

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*011 France*

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OPD 311.23 CAD TS (22 Apr 44)  
Civil Affairs Division  
By Operations Div. WDGS.  
European Sec., WDOPD  
Lt. Bruno (6198)

April 22, 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

Number: WAR 26948

To Eisenhower personal for Smith from Hilldring signed  
Marshall

There follows the U S views of a proposed reply to your  
SCAF 15 dated April 21 which has been submitted to the  
British in Washington for clearance prior to submission  
to the CCS: "Subject is your SCAF 15. Until the U S  
and U K governments have agreed on a civil affairs for-  
mula for France, all conversations, working arrangements  
and agreements with the French committee must be tenta-  
tive. On that basis you are granted authority to begin  
conversations with representatives of the French commit-  
tee to arrive at working arrangements on such matters  
mentioned in your SCAF 15." Efforts being made to get  
CCS approval at the earliest practicable time.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: Gen Hilldring

INFORMATION: OPD  
Mr. McCloy  
Log

CM-OUT-26948                      (22 Apr 44)                      2359Z                      hrt

T O P   S E C R E T

*011 Frank*

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P R I O R I T Y

Date- 1-15-61

Carl S. Spaci

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
London, England

To: War Department

No. S50531, 20 April 1944

Top Sec S50531 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff  
signed Eisenhower cite SHSGS. This SCAF number 15.

An Aide Memoire handed to General Koenig, head of  
the French Military Mission to SHAEF, here follows the text  
following a conversation between him and the Chief of Staff  
on 19 April:

"Record prepared by Lieutenant General A. E. Grasett  
of a conversation between General W. Bedell Smith, Chief of  
Staff Supreme Allied Headquarters, and General Koenig Chief of  
French Military Mission, London, which took place on the  
19th April 1944. General Bedell Smith stated as follows:

"The Supreme Commander, AEF, is solely concerned with  
operations to bring about the defeat of Germany and the  
liberation of France. In these operations the collaboration  
and assistance of the French authorities, both civil and  
military, is essential.

"It is therefore the wish of this headquarters to  
open at once discussion with a French Military Mission in  
London with General Koenig as its head. As all problems  
which concern the immediate future, even those involving  
civil matters, are the intimate concern of military opera-  
tions, it is desired to deal with all problems on a military  
basis and with a military mission.

CM-IN-15260 (21 Apr 44)

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From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England Page 2

Number S 50531, 20 April 1944

5 "It is fully realized that the French Military Mission will require certain advice and assistance from French civil experts, and that the French Committee have appointed a delegate charged with responsibilities for the problems concerning liberated France.

6 "Although the immediate necessity is to consider the military aspect of the situation, the position of the civil delegate is fully realized and appreciated. It is emphasized, however, that in the first stage operational requirements being paramount, all discussions will be on a military basis through a military mission which it is assumed, will be reinforced by such technical civil elements as are required in order that the best possible advice may be rendered on all questions.

7 "It is the Supreme Commander's intention to take the head of the French Military Mission into his full confidence regarding plans for the employment of French forces in operations in France well in advance of their being committed to these operations."

8 General Handy's letter S 4139 of 11 April with its enclosures indicates that the French Committee has been given information with respect to our tentative civilian supply program for France. A telegram (9235) from the Secretary of State to Philip Reed dated 13 April, 11 PM reports that in an exchange of letters agreement was reached with the French Committee on the plans of entering into a Lend Lease agreement, and that pending further advice it is understood with the French authorities that the agreement of September 25, 1943 applies not only to French colonies under the authority of the Committee but should govern also in the

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Signature- Carl S. Speer

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From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England Page 5

Number S 50531, 20 April 1944

supply and financial plans which are authorized to be made for France.

9.

In the light of these steps which have been taken in dealing with the French Committee and as it is urgently necessary that many matters affecting the civil administration of France be settled in advance, authority is requested to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services including civilian labor, treatment of the banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc. These working agreements would in no case go beyond the limitations set forth in the formula approved by the President and transmitted in telegram 324, 17 March as interpreted by the Secretary of State in his public address on 9 April.

The time remaining to reach agreement on these questions is very short, and urgently request immediate action.

ACTION: CC/S

No Sig

INFO : Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm. King  
Col. Park  
Gen. Hilldring  
Log

CM-IN-15260 (21 Apr 44)

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Date- 2-13-61

Signature- Paul J. Spicer

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DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-10-61

P R I O R I T Y

Signature-

*Carl J. Spicer*

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England

To: War Department

No. S50531, 20 April 1944

Top Sec S50531 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff  
signed Eisenhower cite SHSGS. This SCAF number 15.

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basis and with a military mission.

CM-IN-15260

(21 Apr 44)

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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*011 France*

*Ch. Pak*  
COPY No. <sup>35</sup>

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England Page 2

Number S 50531, 20 April 1944

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(21 Apr 44)

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-10-61

SECRET

*Paul S. Speer* COPY No.  
Signature

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

**TOP  
SECRET**

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England Page 5

Number S 50531, 20 April 1944

supply and financial plans which are authorized to be made for France.

In the light of these steps which have been taken in dealing with the French Committee and as it is urgently necessary that many matters affecting the civil administration of France be settled in advance, authority is requested to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services including civilian labor, treatment of the banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc. These working agreements would in no case go beyond the limitations set forth in the formula approved by the President and transmitted in telegram 324, 17 March as interpreted by the Secretary of State in his public address on 9 April.

The time remaining to reach agreement on these questions is very short, and urgently request immediate action.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold  
CPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm. King  
Col. Park  
Gen. Hilldring  
Log

No Sig

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-10-61

CM-IN-15260 (21 Apr 44) 0846Z

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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COPY No 5

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TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 521, 13 APRIL 1944

Your 643. The questions therein presented necessitate consultation with the State Department and my Chiefs of Staff when I return to Washington, but at this distance all seems well.

I have no objection to a visit from De Gaulle but I should like to have your opinion of the action of the Committee in dismissing General Giraud. Some time ago I was asked if I would receive De Gaulle in Washington if he came over and I replied in the affirmative. I think it should remain in this situation. I would be glad to see him if he asks to see me but I will extend no formal or informal invitation.

In addition to a probability of compromising the security of our plans for operations which might have disastrous effects, it does not appear to me that any military advantage could result from divulging confidential information to the Committee.

I agree with you that no reply should be made to the unwarranted demand for Italian ships.

ROOSEVELT

**SECRET**

*Sent at 130245Z  
as White 22*

*77AP*

*12 April 44*

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 643

12/NFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt private  
personal and most secret.

Your number 518.

Para 1. I was very glad to read Hull's references to the French Committee of National Liberation in which I observed your guiding hand. His Majesty's Government will take an early opportunity of making clear that we are in full accord with this declaration. I take it that it modifies in some respects, though not in principle, the form of the enclosure to your letter of March 21st, which presented some difficulties here. These might be talked over between the Foreign Office and State Department before issue.

Para 2. In the first phase of OVERLORD there will be no opportunity for the French Civil Government to function, as the ground captured by our troops will be the battlefield, and it may be some time before we have advanced far enough to be clear of what was called in the last war

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*Answered by Black 13.*

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-2-

by the French "The Zone of the Armies" and often extended some 50 miles from the front. I agree cordially with you that nothing must hamper the freedom of action of the Supreme Commander and that no disturbing political agitation should be allowed until we have got well inland.

Para 3. I am becoming very hard set upon OVERLORD. On Good Friday I gave a talk to all the Generals, British and American, who were gathered at General Montgomery's Headquarters, expressing my strong confidence in the result of this extraordinary but magnificent operation. I understand that you will have received some account of this from General Eisenhower, Mr. McCloy and General McNarney who were present. I do not agree with the loose talk which has been going on on both sides of the Atlantic about the undue heavy casualties which we shall sustain. <sup>pt II</sup> In my view it is the Germans who will suffer very heavy casualties when our band of brothers gets among them.

Para 4. I agree that the FCNL should not be made a party in any way to the details of OVERLORD. I have tried to further their earnest wish to have the Leclerc armoured division included in the forthcoming battle. But the presence of this single division will not give them any

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

right to be informed of our secrets, and they should be told so without delay. A different situation might arise if ANVIL were to materialize at the new date. In this operation I believe 6 or 7 French divisions were to be employed, in fact they would be more than half of the Allied Army. There I think they should be made full partners. The 74,000 men they have already in Italy have fought very well and have a very small proportion of missing to killed. These facts give them claims to be taken into our confidence in that theatre with of course proper restrictions and safeguards such as we ourselves impose at home. I suggest an answer on these lines. Shall I draft for your agreement or vice versa?

Para 5. You will also have received the demand of the FCNL about our giving them a portion of the Italian fleet. If they had brought their own fleet over, as Badoglio did, they would not be short of ships. I am inclined to think it would be best to leave their unwarrantable demand unanswered, at any rate for some weeks to come.

Para 6. Your number 516 last sentence. I think it would be a very good thing if De Gaulle came over to see

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

you but obviously you must know where you are with a man like this before you send an invitation. I have asked Ambassador Duff Cooper to put the point to him in the following way: <sup>PH III</sup> "Mr. Churchill is worried about the danger of bad relations growing between you (De Gaulle) and the United States Government. He (Mr. Churchill) thinks that after Mr. Hull's important speech which has been welcomed by the FCNL it would be a very good and important thing for you to pay a short visit to the President and make a personal contact there. This would be helpful also to our British relations with the FCNL for you (De Gaulle) will readily understand that it is the foundation of our British policy to keep in step with the United States with whom we are sharing such great war schemes. If you felt like making this visit and would let me (Duff Cooper) know, Mr. Churchill would suggest to the President that he send you a formal invitation".

Prime

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TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 518, 8 APRIL 1944

I am a good deal concerned by the French National Committee's demands in regard to military matters. The tone of these communications verges on the dictatorial, especially when we consider the simple facts.

Personally I do not think that we can give military information to a source which has a bad record in secrecy. The implied threat to stay out of operations in France would, if carried out, do the Committee and its leader irreparable harm.

If De Gaulle wants to come over here to visit me I shall be very glad to see him and will adopt a paternal tone, but I think it would be a mistake for me to invite him without an intimation from him that he wants to come.

ROOSEVELT