Folder 2. 011 France (1) Sec. 2—Civil Affairs for France, 27 September 1944–7 April 1945.
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM: COM 8TH FLEET</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMINCH</td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE: 7 APRIL 1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DEFERRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEBOOK: 1724</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BASEGRAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY: DORSEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY: DORSEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DEFERRED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.**

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)**

---

**THIS IS TOP SECRET. FROM COM 8TH FLEET ACTION COMINCH.**

**Proposals of NAF 955 are in accordance with plans jointly agreed with CINCMED. Turnover can go forward gradually as French become ready to take over. Recommend approval.**

**YOUR 62622 refers.**

**COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.**

**ACTION: F-1**

---

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 53735 NAP 910

2 April 1945

FX 53735 to AGWAR for CCS pass to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE Pwd for info AGWAR for AMPB and AMSSO for Ministry of Fuel and Power signed Alexander cite PHFET. This is NAP 910.

Subject is civilian petroleum requirements in French North Africa reference CCS signal CAL 1124 dated 19 January 1945.

Suggest slating, importing, allocation, and accounting for civil requirements be passed to normal commercial procedure in steps as follows:

(A) Civil requirements for first six months 1945 as prepared by French and allocations as approved by Petroleum Board Mediterranean in conjunction with NAJEM to remain firm.

(B) Provision action covering this period was completed on submission of February slate.

(C) OSC or such agency as may be nominated to take provision action for requirements subsequent to 30 June, but if shipping does not permit segregation on separate French account, OSC will advise Petroleum Section APHQ of requirements to be included in Mediterranean slate for subsequent release to French.

(D) Pending advice as to quantities to be slated and allocated, Petroleum Section will make provisional bid based on April/June allocations.

CM-IN-1830 (3 April 45)
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
No: PX 53735 NAF 910 2 April 1945

(E) Petroleum Section AFHQ will obtain quantity receipts for products released to groupements forwarding to OSC for financial settlement.

Civilian group has been trained within the framework of Petroleum Section AFHQ to carry out necessary consolidation for Morocco, Algiers and Tunisia from slating onwards. To this civil programme purely military requirements for internal consumption by United States, British and French territorial forces will be added by Petroleum Section AFHQ and later under direct arrangement between using service and groupements.

Whilst military operations in Mediterranean require the continued use of French North Africa ocean terminals storage for theatre reserves and ullage cushions, such operations will continue to be the responsibility of Petroleum Section AFHQ.

Desire concurrence in principle outlined above so gradual release the Petroleum Board Mediterranean responsibilities in North Africa may be initiated.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy; CG AAF; Gen Somervell; OPD; Gen Bissell; Gen Hildering; Adm King; Mr McCloy; Log

CM-IN-1830 (3 April 45) DTG: 021435B eje
SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500 Col. C.R. Peck
31 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims France

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D.C.

Number: WARX 61883

To SHAPE Rheims for Eisenhower for action, to AMESO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 169 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SCAP 122, SCAF 221 and SCAF 255 are the references.

1. In accordance with SCAF 221, and upon completion of April loadings, you are relieved of responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for France, except as to POL and coal. You should make appropriate arrangements with the French to assure smooth transition from military to civilian responsibility.

2. However, you may and should, with respect to operational areas, as defined in MEL 641, import such supplies needed for relief as you consider necessary to accomplish your military mission.

3. It is believed that the steps which will be taken by the Provisional French Government and the U. S. and U. K. civilian agencies and shipping authorities will provide a reasonable assurance that the French can meet the conditions specified in Paragraph 3 of SCAF 221.

4. It is assumed that termination of military responsibility will make it necessary for the French to obtain shipping. Shipping which you would have used to carry G-5 supplies for France would presumably be made available to the French for this purpose.

CM-OUT 61883 (Apr 45)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED JCS 34-71
RHO 5-18-71

011 France

COPY NO. 46

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Number: WARX 61883 Page 2 31 March 1945

5. Text of public announcement concerning above now under urgent consideration and further instructions will follow. In meantime, you should give no press publicity whatever.
End

NOTE: SCAP 255 is CM-IN-30226 (23 Mar 45)
SCAP 122 is CM-IN-2962 (3 Nov 44)
SCAP 221 is CM-IN-5191 (6 Mar 45)
MEL 641 is CM-IN-20010 (19 Mar 45)

ORIGINATOR: CC/S
INFORMATION: Gen Somervell, Adm Leahy, CG AAF, OPD,
Gen Bissell, Gen Hilldring, Adm King, Mr. McCoy
of S

CM-OUT 61883 (apr 45) DTC 010120Z mte

COPY NO. 46

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.
To: War Department
Nr: FX 52973 NAF 905 31 March 1945

TOP SECRET. References are to EWAN 474. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE Forward for information signed Alexander FX 52973 cite FHCOS. This is NAF 905.

1. Subject is transfer of ports and command in the western Mediterranean to the French.

2. The French have now agreed to all the requirements in paragraphs three and four. The stage should therefore be to forward the detailed plan of transfer for your approval, as directed in paragraph two.

3. As minor details of the plans for transfer of North African ports have still to be worked out, this action can not yet be taken. I am satisfied, however, that these details can be settled locally between British and United States authorities and the French Admiral.

4. In view of lapse of time since matter first broached, and the general military situation, it appears most desirable to complete transfer of the ports and command to the French at once, without waiting for the delay which compliance with your procedure would involve.

5. I would like to make the transfer for these on the basis of the French acceptance of your stipulations.

CM-IN-33251 (31 Mar 45)

TOP SECRET
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Mr: FX 52973 NAF 905 31 March 1945

Your authority to do so and to adjust any minor differences locally is therefore requested.

6. The detailed agreement, when available, would be forwarded for your information.

End

NOTE: PAN 474 is CM-OUT-87017 (5 Jan 45) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leisy
      Gen Arnold
      OFD
      Gen Bissell
      Adm King
      C of S

CM-IN-33251 (31 Mar 45) DTG 311726A rel

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN.
War Department
Classified Message Center

Outgoing Classified Message

Secret

Int'l Div., ASF-SPLIA R&A Br
Country Program Section
Major Hoover 3632

30 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims France

Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Headquarters, Communication Zone, European Theater of Operations, Paris, France

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main Echelon, Versailles, France

Number: WARX 61879

To Eisenhower for SHQ&S info WTCUSA, COMZONE, ETOUSA and SHAEB Mission France for Locom signed Somervell from Shingler cite SPLIA.

In view of critical food supply situation in US, every effort should be made to have French Government meet obligation of repayment in kind from local French or French Colonial resources. Reur Ted FWD 17743 of 10 March. If this is not feasible due to supply or transportation difficulties and it is considered essential that agreement be terminated, such termination should be basis for strong representations that French resources be utilized to maximum extent in support of French Military.

Information requested as to whether it is now possible to reduce French ration scale being supplied from US for French Military since French now have access to food produced in France which they did not have at time Scale was established.

End

Note: FWD 17743 of 10 Mar is CM-IN-10945 of 11 Mar

Originator: ASF-Int'l

Information: ASF-QMG-Mat-Trans-Dist; OED; G-4; C of S

CM-OUT-61879 (Apr 45) DTG: 010112Z ow

Secret

Copy No. 071 France

The Making of an Exact Copy of This Message is Forbidden
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims, France

To: War Department

No: FWD 18300 SCAF 255

29 March 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff Personal for McCloy for information repeat for information to AMESSO for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower, FWD 18300, this is SCAF 255.

Termination of military responsibility for import of relief supplies for France is subject.

SCAF 221 refers.

1. A decision on the recommendation made in SCAF 221 Paragraph 4 is urgently requested.
2. If an immediate decision cannot be made, request information as to date when decision may be expected.

End.

Footnote: 221 is CM-IN 6191 (6 Mar 45) CO/S

ACTION: CO/S
INFO: Adm Leabey; CG AAF; ASF; OFD; Gen Bissell; CAD; Mr McCloy; Adm King; C of S

CM-IN- 30926 (29 Mar 45) DTG: 291700A ev
SECRET
Combined Chiefs of Staff
Col C. R. Peck 77500

8 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims, France.

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D. C.

Number: MARK 49694

Book message to SHAEF Rheims for Eisenhower for action, to AMSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Of the total of 28,320 wagons referred to in paragraph 4 of SCAF 182, approximately 4,920 have already been shipped, and the remainder are now available in the U. S. A. for shipment.

2. Any increase in the rate of shipment of these wagons must depend upon the priority accorded them by you within your monthly allocation of shipping.

3. There are a number of additional demands for wagons to be manufactured, and information available to military authorities indicates that if the 75,000 wagons for French civil needs are procured from U. S. sources, they could not be placed in production prior to the last quarter of 1945, production probably being spread over 12 months. Thus far the FEA has initiated action looking toward procurement of only 38,250 wagons for French civil needs. It is hoped that the production of locomotives for French civil needs can be begun in September 1945. Completion date of the 700 presently on order will be contingent primarily on the availability of materials.

CM-OUT-49694 (Mar 45)
4. It is however not possible to predict the possibility of providing shipping for this railway equipment so far in advance. So long as hostilities in Europe continue shipping deficiencies will exist, and even after that may be anticipated. The British Chiefs of Staff indicate that the supply of wagons from United Kingdom to assist in meeting French civil requirements is difficult but under examination. Consultation is also taking place between United Kingdom and French technical experts for meeting, from United Kingdom, most urgent needs of materials, components and tools, to enable French to increase their rate of repair of damaged locomotives and wagons.

5. On the cessation of hostilities in Europe, redistribution of the wagons now impounded by the Axis will reduce the present deficiency in liberated areas. There will, moreover, be at such time a reduction in the military use of wagons which will further relieve the civilian transport situation.

End.

NOTE: SCAF 182 is CM-IN-21938 (23 Jan 45)

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Somervell; Adm. Leahy; CG AAF, OPD; Gen. Bissell; G-4; Gen. Hilldring; Adm. King; Log.

CM-OUT-49694 (Mar 45) DTG 082001Z hrw

SECRET
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France
To: War Department
Nr: 17600 SCAF 221 6 March 1945

Fwd 17600 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff from SHAEF forward from Eisenhower. This is SCAF number 221.

Termination of military responsibility for import of relief supplies for France is subject.

The French Provisional Government has made a formal request through the Four Party Committee that military responsibility for the importation of relief supplies, excepting coal and petroleum products, be terminated with March shipments and that from 1 April the French Government assume full responsibility for the procurement and shipment of civilian supplies for France. Military responsibility would continue, however, for imports of coal and petroleum products, for the supply of relief items for operational areas, and for the military production program.

Within the limits of port capacity and clearance specified in SCAF 122, the French authorities have developed a program of civilian imports for which procurement and shipping will be arranged by themselves.

This headquarters considers it desirable that the French undertake full responsibility for their civilian imports at the earliest possible date (refer MEL 250 and SCAF 122) and this would relieve us of a great responsibility.

CM-IN-6191 (6 Mar 45)
SECRET
However, it is essential, regardless of where the responsibility lies, that relief supplies flow into France in at least the minimum quantities necessary to insure against unrest and civil disturbance in our rear areas. Consequently the specific date of termination of military responsibility for relief supplies is necessarily conditioned on reasonable assurance that the French can:

A. Procure supplies in quantities sufficient to meet at least the relief requirements specified in the military civil affairs program for months subsequent to April, assuming that April C.A. military requirements are met by March shipments,

B. Obtain shipping required to import at least the quantity of relief supplies needed to safeguard against disease and unrest as estimated in the military civil affairs program.

It is recommended by this headquarters that subject to the provisions in paragraph 3 above that the military responsibility for G 5 program for France be terminated with April loadings.

End

SCAF 122 is CM-IN-2922 (3 Nov 44) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Somervell Gen Bissell Mr McCloy
CG AAF OFD

CM-IN-6191 (6 Mar 45) DGQ 061200A bjm
SECRET

COPY NO. 24
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Official French

Subject: FRANCE - Military Mission for German Affairs.

Creation and Organization of the French Military Mission for German Affairs.

(Also known as the Koeltz Military Mission for German Affairs)

At the present time this mission is growing in importance and may further do so. It is suggested that this serial may be of possible interest and value to the Naval representatives on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Naval Aides to the President, Command Op-13, the Western Central European Sections of the Division of Naval Intelligence and to the Department of State.
DEPARTMENT

1. The "Bureau d'Etudes de l'Amitié", created within the General Staff of National Defense, headed by Lieutenant-General KOELNE, in fulfilment of Decision No. 27/ON/IP, dated 10 May 1944, will in the future be called "Military Mission for German Affairs".

2. The General, Head of the Military Mission for German Affairs under the high authority of the General, Head of the General Staff of National Defense, is responsible for the following:

a) Centralisation of all questions and coordination according to the instructions of the President of the Government, of all measures concerning the safeguard and the exercise of French rights and interests in GERMANY, the application of which requires the approval of the Allied High Command;

b) Contribution to the researches being made; he is kept informed of all negotiations through diplomatic channels, concerning the German capitulation within the frame of an Amistice Convention or of the "de facto" situation resulting from operations having ceased; he also prepares the organisation of the corresponding French services;

c) He is to take the necessary measures to set into effect, in agreement with the Allies, French participation to the Military Administration of GERMANY.

3. By virtue of these various duties, the General, Head of the Military Mission for German Affairs attached to the General Staff of National Defense:

- has authority to decide, in agreement with the French ministries and the Allied High Command, the organisation, the composition and the setting up of French liaison missions attached to the Allied Armies, and the French Military Administration Corps in GERMANY.

- is the only approved intermediary between the various ministries and the Allied High Command, for all questions coming within his jurisdiction.

General De GAULLE
President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, Head of the Armies

6 FEBRUARY 1945
Signed: de Gaulle

GENERALSTAFF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

1st Section

No. 62/ON/IP

DECESSION
ORGANIZATION OF FRANCHE MILITARY MISSION FOR GERMAN AFFAIRS

General KOPPEL

and Personal Staff

(Cheif of Staff)

Colonel HARRI

Air Section

(Major MEYER)

War Section

(Vice Admiral NIVELIER)

Navy Section

(Economic Section

(Monsieur LANGON)

Political Section

(Majer de GIOCH)

Personal Section

(Majer MAZARD)

IC AJ STAFF

(Majer DAMAN)

Sub-Sections:

- Finance
- Commerce
- Industrial Production
- Transport and Communications
- Agriculture

Sub-Sections:

- Legal
- War Criminals
- Prisoners
- Deportees and Refugees
- Welfare
- Press
- Labour

Control and administers all French Mission and Mission personal with Allied formations.

Internal administration of the French Military Mission for German Affairs.

Military & Operational Matters

Present strength of French Military Mission for German Affairs: 35 officers (including 4 CIVILIANS)

66 EN/FR (including 30)

Total 124 All ranks (including 3)

It is anticipated that this strength will rise to about 100 officers and 2/3 of 60 EN/FR

Operating agencies which receive instructions from French Military Mission for German Affairs:

(a) Administration Francaise en Allemagne Training French Civil Affairs personnel. Located in Paris

(b) Service des Maisons Trains and provides French personnel who may be required to be sent forward on liaison or Mission duties with the Allies. Located in Paris.

DEC. (b) to CombinedFrance

Top Secret Serial 62-85 of

15 February 1945

TOP SECRET

6 February 1945

COPY

TOP SECRET
URGENT

From: War, Washington
To: ARGONAUT
No.: 25  DTG 080218Z  8 Feb 45

TOPSEC for the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.

I am quoting below texts of instructions which we had prepared to send to Caffery and Wadsworth. I believe you will find them useful in connection with your ARGONAUT-52, February 7:

1. To Caffery: "The potentially explosive situation in Syria and Lebanon resulting from the intransigent conflicting attitudes of the French and local governments toward remaining unsettled issues connected with Syrian and Lebanese independence is a source of continuing concern to this Government. All outstanding questions seem to us susceptible to settlement by friendly negotiation or arbitration in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which the United Nations have adhered. We therefore desire both sides to show moderation and should look with disfavor on French use of military force in present impasse, whether in form of French troops or French-controlled native levies. We hope the French Government will instruct its representatives in the Levant states to seek friendly agreement, and are urging the local governments likewise to show moderation and to enter into amicable negotiations with a view to the conclusion of mutually acceptable accords defining the relations between France and Syria and Lebanon.

If the French intend sincerely to implement their promises of independence we can see no reason why they should refuse to:

1. Transfer the Troupes Speciales to the local governments, subject only to such overall supervision by the French and British military authorities in the theater as may be considered necessary by these authorities for the duration of the war in Europe and accepted by the local governments.

ARGONAUT-IM-144 (continued)
2. Agree to the reasonable equipment of the Syrian and Lebanese Gendarmeries. (We understand that the plan approved by General Holmes involves the transfer of only 100 automatic weapons and 33 reconnaissance cars).

3. Replace their Delegation Generale at Beirut and delegation at Damascus by diplomatic missions.

At the same time we appreciate the desire of the French to obtain assurances regarding the protection of the reasonable rights and interests of France and French nationals in the independent Levant states. We are accordingly instructing Wadsworth to urge the Syrian and Lebanese authorities to alter their present negative attitude and to enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of mutually acceptable accords with the French, defining the relations between them, which do not infringe the rights and interests of others, including the United States.

In this connection, we regret to state that a preliminary examination of the draft "Convention Universitaire" which the French are seeking to conclude with Syria and Lebanon indicates that its terms contemplate discriminatory privileges for France and that its conclusion would seriously injure American educational and cultural interests in the two states. We are now making a study of that convention and will be prepared shortly to present our views in greater detail. We assume, however, that the French are not seeking to promote their own interests at the expense of others and that they would be glad to make appropriate modifications in the proposed terms.

Please discuss foregoing urgently with the Foreign Minister, making it clear that we are interested in seeing an early solution reached which, while adequately assuring the protection of French interests, will confirm and ensure the full independence of Syria and Lebanon. You should also make it clear, if the need arises, that we regard our policy toward the independent Levant states as entirely distinct and separate from our policy toward France and the French Empire. Keep Department closely informed. Sent to Paris. Repeated to Beirut."

ARGONAUT-IN-144

(continued)
2. To Wadsworth "Having itself concluded executive agreements with Syria and Lebanon providing for the recognition and protection of the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals, this Government is clearly not in a position to support the local governments in their present refusal to enter into negotiations with the French for the same purposes.

The Department is repeating to you its telegram to Paris instructing the Ambassador there to discuss this matter urgently with the French authorities. In acquainting the local authorities with the nature of these representations you should urge them to adopt a more moderate and realistic attitude, and specifically to enter into negotiations with a view to securing treaties with the French which would be consistent with their independence and non-discriminatory as regards third powers and which would still provide the reasonable assurances which the French justifiably desire with respect to the protection of the considerable rights and interests of France in the Levant states.

This Government wishes to be helpful in every possible way and has no intention of diminishing or retracting its recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence. In this spirit the Department was glad to advance informally for the consideration of the local governments the suggestion that their objective might be served by the submission of acceptable treaty proposals simultaneously to France and to the major allied powers. However, we are not prepared to put this suggestion forward as an official proposal. The explosive potentialities of the situation reside in the relations of France and the Levant governments and in the last analysis this is the major problem which must be solved, whatever developments there may be as regards the relations of Syria and Lebanon with other governments. Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris." (ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.)

(continued)
The British, Saudi Arabs, Iraqis, and Egyptians are all seeking our help in this matter and we had planned to inform them of our views and actions as set forth above.

This question may be brought up during conversations of sovereigns with the President.

Conference Distribution:
ACTION: Mr. Stettinius
INFO: None
To: War Department.
Mr: 69858 24 November 1944.
Serial number: 69858 signed Peabody.

Substance as reported our embassy Anglo French talks during Churchill Eden Paris visit follows:

Conversations covered current questions and no binding agreements made. Conversations reported cordial and Churchill received good impression De Gaulle and his present standing in France. De Gaulle seemed more assured now that he is back in metropolitan France. Also Bidault impressed British visitors favorably. To French request equipment for eight divisions Churchill said SHAEF felt it difficult to use more French troops present operations and likely Germans will be defeated before these divisions could be ready. Prime Minister said limited amounts munitions could be spared French. Churchill reported sympathetic French desire to participate in occupation Germany especially Rhineland and favors granting them part British occupied zone although told French USA would have to agree and Russia be informed.

During British visit question arming Syrian and Lebanese gendarmeries with Bren and Sten guns and light armored cars in addition to rifles already furnished by British discussed. British favor additional armaments for gendarmeries so use French troops to suppress any future disorders will be necessary. French reluctant to agree and also hesitating transferring "Troupes Speciales" to control Levant governments as

Nr: 69858 24 November 1944.

They represent bargaining point in forthcoming treaty negotiations. British suggested transferring part these troops if French not agreeable to total transfer. British anxious position French in Levant states be settled before withdrawal British troops as otherwise dispute over French status anticipated. British are opposed any special privileges for French in treaties with Levant states but agreeable French governmental advisor.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
OPD
COL PARK
LOG

CM-IN-23994 (24 Nov 44) 2346Z mos
SECRET

COPY NO.
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Headquarters 6th Army Group

Nr: S 66446 MEL 303 11 November 1944

SHAPE Main signed Eisenhower 112130 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff Civil Affairs Committee repeat for information to CG 21st Army Group Rear for G-5; CG 12th Army Group Rear for G-5; Central District UK Base for * and ETUSA Rear; SHAPE Rear for G-5; CG 6th Army Group Rear for G-5; War Office for DCA and DE CA ref nr S 66446. This is MEL 303.

The following is personal report number two of Lt Colonel A E Palmer.

1. Following dispatch of SCAF 122 there have been two further meetings with French and US and UK economic representatives to follow up the necessary steps for implementation of the French import program.

2. The first meeting on 9th November was conducted by General Grasset to confirm the plan formulated in SCAF 122 and to establish the Four-Party Working Group for consideration of French assurance that SCAF 122 did not purport to limit military imports of CA supplies to the needs of forward areas but permitted the needs of all of France to be used as a measure of import requirements. It was explained
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, 
Main, Versailles, France

Nr: 36846 11 November 1944

that the apparent limitation in SCAF 122 was based on a 
qualitative estimate of probable needs and was not an arbit-
ary rule based on geographical considerations.

4. The French also advised that because of finan-
cial exchange considerations they believed that Combined 
Board decisions as to sources of supply for items in the 
import program being established by the French should be 
reached only with French agreement. It was agreed by all 
present that this question was not a problem for the mili-
tary authorities.

5. The French advised that the current revision of 
their import program would include all supplies to be 
imported through June 1945. In order to provide guidance 
for the Four-Party Working Group in examining the French 
program to be presented it was agreed that for planning 
purposes it would be assumed that military responsibility 
for landing CA supplies in France would end on 1st March 
and that thereafter the French would be responsible for all 
civilian supply imports.

6. The exact treatment of coal and POW in connec-
tion with the planning date of 1st March was agreed to raise 
questions which should be examined further by the Four-Party 
Working Group.

7. The French (Monnet) also wished to have it 
clearly understood that the planning date of 1st March should 

CM-IN-11750 (12 Nov 44)

SECRET
not be permitted to jeopardize the continued arrival of CA supplies in the categories covered by the military program. M. Monnet was advised that this objective was agreed and that the matter would be reviewed when information became available as to the status of the French procurement and shipping program.

3. The second meeting on 10th November constituted the first meeting of the Four-Party Working Group conducted by General Lewis of the SHAEF Mission, France. The French presented an import program for the eight months through June 1945, prepared in consultation with interested French ministries and based on the present forecast of port and clearance facilities. The program consists of 6,750,000 tons of supplies as listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Commodities</th>
<th>B Tonnages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>493,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats for soap</td>
<td>392,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural products</td>
<td>995,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical products</td>
<td>(small)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and leather</td>
<td>294,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paste</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products</td>
<td>64,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals and metals</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel products</td>
<td>510,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CM-IN-11750 (12 Nov 44)
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: S 66446

Date: 11 November 1944

Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Tonnages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining equipment</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials</td>
<td>29,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various equipment</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and pitch</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67,488,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was agreed that the first step was for the military to submit a statement of the supplies to be included in the military CA import program for arrival by 1st March. It was also confirmed by the French that a target date for the end of military supply responsibility was advisable and that 1st March was an appropriate date. It was agreed that the military program for supplies to arrive by 1st March would be subject to military contingencies and that the arrival date would be extended as necessary so long as the total quantities nominated by the military would be delivered in due course. This will require additional supply allocations to SHARP.

On this basis it is possible for the French and the US and UK economic advisers to determine what quantities of each category of supplies must be purchased by the French to complete the French program.

10. In order to initiate a French shipping program the French are at the same time preparing a statement of supplies purchased by or for the account of the French and

CM-IN-11750 (12 Nov 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET - AMUG

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

Mr: S 66446 11 November 1944

now available for shipment from:
A. French Empire
B. US and
C. UK together with statement of French
shipping available. This will form basis of French aid to
Combined Shipping Board for allocation of ships for December
sailings consistent with present forecast of available port
capacity.

11. The French will continue to work with the
civil agencies of the US and the UK to develop a program of
procurement, sources of supply and shipping for the balance
of the French program and the military will be kept advised
of plans and furnish such information as may be necessary
with respect to port and clearance capacities.

* being serviced

SCAP 122 is CM-IN-2922 (3 Nov 44) CCS

ACTION: CCAC

INFO:
CCS
ASP
OPD
G-4
GAD
ADM KING
COL PARK
LOG

CM-IN-11750 (12 Nov 44) 1856Z mcs

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
6 November 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 58337

Book message to SHAEP Versailles for Eisenhower for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 106 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Participation by French in military government prior to Germany's defeat should be limited to individuals forming part British or American military government machine. Military government teams and detachments referred to in paragraph two SCAF 85 should be American or British controlled.

2. You should avoid discussion area of occupation with De Gaulle but if he raises the question himself he should be told to refer it through diplomatic channels.

3. You should continue to welcome and encourage any contribution by French in pure fighting manpower for defeat of Germany in either British or U. S. zones, such French units to be under British or U. S. command

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Bissell, Gen Hilldring, Mr McCloy, Adm King. CCAF, OPD, Log

CM-OUT-58337 (6 Nov 44) 21572 pjs

COPY NO. 40

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
To: War Department
Nr: S 65213 SCAF 122 3 November 1944

Ref no S 65213, AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to SHAHEF Rear for G-5; War Office for CA; Central District UK Base for British Chiefs of Staff; CG 21st Army Group; AFHQ for Wilson signed Eisenhower this is SCAF 122.

Plans for assumption of civilian supply responsibility by French Government is subject.

1. French government pressing strongly that for political, social and economic reasons France urgently requires raw materials and productive civil supplies. This type of relief for the French economy is not, however, considered a military responsibility under existing directives.

2. In view of French presentation of urgent needs of France for French procured civilian supplies SHAHEF is making a careful survey of probable port and transportation capacity for French civilian imports and presents the following forecast, subject to certain conditions in connection with Antwerp.

A. 5,000 tons daily between Mediterranean ports of Marseilles, Sette and Fort Vendres, commencing 1st December, but with provision that civil imports through
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
Nr: S 65213 SCAF 122 3 November 1944

Marseilles shall involve no clearance by rail.

B. 5,000 tons daily between Sveine ports of Havre and Rouen commencing 15th January, but to be cleared only by inland water transport.

C. A possible capacity of 4,000 tons daily in coasters through Pas de Calais ports commencing 15th January.

D. Possibility of the entire capacity of Bordeaux which may be opened by February.

3. Foregoing tonnage is in addition to Military Civil Affairs program of direct relief items which will not exceed port capacity of 3,000 tons per day in northern ports.

4. Inasmuch as a Zone of the Interior has been turned over to the French authorities, SHAPE favors the establishment in the near future of a French civilian import program (as distinct from a military civil affairs program) under which the French can import whatever supplies they wish. Execution of such a program will be dependent upon possible shipping allocations to France, the port capacity SHAPE can make available, and existence

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-2922 (3 Nov 44)

Date- 2-13-41

Signature- Carl S. Speig

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: S 65213 SCAF 122 3 November 1944

of adequate port clearance facilities.

5. Present proposal is that military program of direct relief items will continue concurrently with such program, but that military program will gradually diminish in scope until there is complete termination of military responsibility. Consideration will be given to fixing a date on which the gradual termination of responsibility can be made complete. For the present it is intended that military responsibility will be limited to the direct relief items of food, soap, medical, fuel and clothing in amounts considered a matter of military necessity and intended primarily for forward areas, and French government will be responsible for all other imports, French government responsibility to begin as soon as shipping and port capacity can be definitely committed to French civilian authorities.

6. Available port and clearance capacity can be determined by SHAPE. Procedure whereby France can secure ship tonnage allocation should be established as a matter of urgency. Considered here that shipping program should be presented to proper authorities by French with some form of certificate of SCAF with respect to port and inland clearance facilities.

It is further considered that tonnage allocations

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSEDE

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-13-61

Signature: Carl J. Speer

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: 8 65213 SCAF 122 3 November 1944

should be made direct to French government.

7. In order to carry out the foregoing plan, a special four party committee has been established in Paris to assist and guide the transition from the military to the civilian period. This committee, which will function in cooperation with SHAPE Mission to France, will consist of SHAPE, French, and American and British economic advisors.

8. Intention is that French will discuss their programs of civilian requirements with the four party committee prior to formal presentation in Washington and London. After approval by competent authorities French would themselves procure (or intensify procurement program already in course), thus creating a bank from which supplies could be ordered forward in conformity with considered joint estimates of port and inland movement capacities.

9. Initial program being presented by the French will cover civilian imports through June 1945. This program will be an objective assessment of French needs in the light of probable port capacities, and port clearance.

The program will be divided between military civil affairs requirements and French procured civilian

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-2922 (3 Nov 44)

Date- 2-10-44

Signature- Carl T. Spaatz

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Date: 2-13-44

Nam: 65213
SCAF 122 3 November 1944

Import needs in accordance with Para 5 above. Military Civil Affairs requirements will be considered by SHAPE Mission subject to approval of SHAPE Committee will incur that there is no duplication between the two sets of requirements.

10. Monnet expects to have draft program ready next week. After necessary consultation with committee, Monnet will proceed to Washington via London to discuss all relevant matters with appropriate authorities, including CSAB on subject of allocation of tonnages for French-secured supplies.

Monnet fully understands that items under combined Board jurisdiction will be subject to allocations of quantities and supply source, but intention is that for all other items French should exercise buyer's choice subject only to shipping limitations. Understood that goods in short supply and those involving lend-lease will require full justification, but for all others it will be for the French to determine what they want to import within limits of civilian port capacity and shipping.

11. In view of the importance of immediate formulations of definite plans by all concerned, early reply is requested. Will keep you advised as discussions still proceeding clarify further. Monnet has seen and agrees that foregoing presents French understanding of proposed action of all concerned.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Admiral Leahy, CG AAF, General Somervell, OPD,
General Bissell, General Hilldring, Admiral King, Log.
CM-IN-2922 (3 Nov 44) 18572 m/m

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 808, 25 October 1944

Your 635.

I like it all.

Reed 25/12002.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET "AMUG"
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
CG, 6th Army Group, France
Headquarters, Communications Zone, North African
Theater of Operations, Advanced, Caserta, Italy

No: S 63763 24 October 1944

SHAEB Main signed Eisenhower SHGCT 241200A for action
AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd Central District
UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEB Mission
France, Sixth Army Group, Twelfth Army Group, EXFOR, Com Z,
Adv Com Z NATOUSA for General Larkin S 63763 SG 605. This
is SCAF number 112. Following SCAF 109 and SCAF 111.

General De Gaulle has signed decree establishing
Zone of Interior as delimited in paragraph one of SCAF 109.

Decree is being published this morning.

End.

ACTION: CCS
INFO: ADM LEAHY
CG AAF
GEN HULL
GEN BISSEIL
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-22966 (24 Oct 44) 2031Z mcs

COPY No. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 635, 24 October 1944

Your 804. Regarding the Provisional Government mix-up, I hope it has now cleared to a satisfactory conclusion (see my 633).

* * * * *
Text on Recognition of De Gaulle

United States
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (SP)—The text of the State Department announcement of recognition of the De Gaulle regime as the Provisional Government of France:

The Government of the United States has today recognized the French de facto authority established in Paris under the leadership of General de Gaulle as the Provisional Government of the French Republic. A communication in this sense has today been addressed to the Provisional Government. Mr. Jefferson Caffery will, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, assume the duties of Ambassador to France.

This action on the part of the United States Government is in harmony with its policy toward France as publicly enunciated from time to time by the President and the Secretary of State.

As the Secretary of State in his speech of April 9, 1944, stated, it was always the thought of the President and himself that Frenchmen themselves should undertake the civil administration of their country and that this Government would look to the organization then known as the French Committee of National Liberation to exercise leadership in the establishment of law and order. In accordance with this policy agreements were entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the de facto French authority headed by General de Gaulle covering the administration of civil affairs in France and other related subjects.

In accordance with the procedure envisaged in the civil affairs agreement, an “interior zone” has been established to include a large part of France, including Paris. The agreement provides that in the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefore will be entirely a matter for the French authorities.

Today the vast majority of Frenchmen are free. They have had opportunity during recent weeks to demonstrate their desire to have the duties and obligations of Government assumed by the Administration which is now functioning in Paris and which has been reconstituted and strengthened by the inclusion of leaders of the valiant forces of resistance within France.

The intention of the French authorities to seek an expression of the people’s will at the earliest possible date, following the repatriation of French prisoners of war and deportees in Germany, has been made known on different occasions. Pending the expression of the will of the French people through the action of their duly elected representatives, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, in its efforts to prosecute the war until final victory and to lay the foundation for the rehabilitation of France, can count on the continued, full and friendly cooperation of the Government of the United States.

Soviet

The text of the statement issued by the Soviet Union on Russian recognition of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, as transmitted in English by the Soviet Tass agency and recorded by the Federal Communications Commission:

On Oct. 23 the representative of the Soviet Union in France [Alexander E.] Bogomoloff, made the following statement to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to inform you of the following:

"The Soviet Government has been informed by the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain that the said Governments came to an agreement with French authorities on the establishment of an internal zone of France, including Paris, under the control of the French Administration.

"The Soviet Government has also been informed by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that simultaneously with this, both the said Governments would make a declaration on the recognition of the Provisional Government of France.

"The Soviet Union, invariably maintaining a friendly attitude toward democratic France, welcomes the above-mentioned decisions of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain. In this the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact of the consolidation of the democratic foundations of the Provisional French Government, as well as from the fact that the recognition of the Provisional Government of France by the three Allied powers will contribute to the still closer unification of French people and mobilization of its forces for further struggle against the common enemy — Hitlerite Germany.

"The Soviet Government hereby announces its decision to recognize the Provisional Government of the French Republic and its wish to appoint a representative of the Soviet Union, Bogomoloff, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in France."

Simultaneously with this the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America also made statements on the recognition of the Provisional Government of France.
French Provisional Regime Acknowledged by the Allies

By LANSING WARREN

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23—Official American recognition of the French Provisional Government, raising France to a high place among the United Nations and preparing the way for rapid reconstruction, was accorded today to the de facto authority under Gen. Charles de Gaulle. This action, announced at the State Department by Edward R. Stettinius Jr., acting Secretary of State, was accompanied by similar announcements by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada. It coincided with the assumption of authority in the French interzone by the de Gaulle Administration as agreed upon with the Allied Supreme Commander, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

[Texts of American and Soviet statements on recognition, Page 4.]

News of the United States decision was received with rejoicing in French circles in Washington. At the French Embassy, in the absence of Henri Hoppenot, head of the delegation, it was said that the State Department announcement was received “with warmest satisfaction.” The general opinion among Frenchmen here was that it had come in time to be of exceptional service to France.

Mr. Stettinius in his announcement said that “if acceptable to the provisional government,” Jefferson Caffery, American representative in Paris, would assume the duties of Ambassador to France. A French Ambassador to Washington will be appointed. In the meantime, M. Hoppenot will take his rank as minister.

Other consequences of the diplomatic change in status that the Allies have conferred on France will be:

The official recognition of France as one of the leading United Nations.


Greater authority for the French Provisional Government in its task of rebuilding the French Republic and in its dealings with the other nations of Europe.

Probable place on the regular advisory council which sits in London and directs Allied policies in the war and post-war peace.

[Short article discussing the recognition of the French Provisional Government, with emphasis on the willingness of the French to return to their previous position among the Allied nations.]

Backed by People Insured

By these phrases the American Government makes reservations insuring both the institution of a democratic regime in France and the ultimate endorsement of that regime by popular expression.

A question that remains subject to juridical decision is whether the large amounts of gold held in the United States in the name of the Government of France can justifiably be released to the Provisional Government. It is necessary to await establishment of a permanent regime.

Today’s announcement comes as a triumph for General de Gaulle’s diplomacy. It will unquestionably strengthen his administration in its difficult task of organization and unity in France and will go far toward restoring France to a position of prestige in the ranks of the nations.

A week ago Mr. Stettinius insisted that the appointment of a large diplomatic personnel in Paris and the ceding of the interior zone to the de Gaulle Administration would not necessarily entail recognition. It is understood that all information on the subject was assembled by Mr. Stettinius toward the end of last week and that the final decision was made after an interview between him and President Roosevelt in New York on Saturday.

Move Refused in Algiers

This case was a climax to long deferred negotiations for recognition, which was refused while the de Gaulle Government remained in Algiers.

With the visit to Washington of General de Gaulle last July, events began to turn in his favor. The Allied Supreme Command accepted his Administration in the Normandy district after D-Day, and shortly accorded permission to transfer the seat of Administration from Algiers to Paris. Then the French mission in Washington was informed to reopen the embassy and Mr. Caffery, with a large diplomatic and consular force, was sent...
DE GAULLE SCORES
A DOUBLE TRIUMPH

Recognition Strengthens Hand
at Home and Abroad—
General Is Pleased

By HAROLD CALLENDER

PARIS, Oct. 23.—Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s greatest diplomatic victory, one for which he has striven more than a year, came today when the Allies formally and fully recognized his regime as the Provisional Government of France.

It was a double victory. Its inevitable consequence in the foreign field is expected to be the admittance of France’s representatives to the concert of Allied powers in which the future of Europe and the world is being decided; in the domestic field it will strengthen General de Gaulle’s hand against the forces of disorder and dissent, which have prevented the extension of the authority of his Government to all France.

On the one hand the Allies have in effect recognized France as a great power. On the other they have given the de Gaulle Government their stamp of approval at a moment when it needs an increase of authority to wield under its sway a country divided by broken communications and the ambitions of certain local groups into whose hands power has fallen in the revolutionary situation resulting from the breakdown of Vichy and German authority.

Dramatic Scene Enacted

It was a dramatic scene at the Quai d’Orsay this afternoon when the diplomatic envoys of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada called on Foreign Minister Georges Bidault to hand them similar notes of all four Governments finally giving the de Gaulle regime the recognition it had struggled for vainly in the diplomatic field for months.

The Soviet Ambassador, Alexander E. Bogomoloff, dean of the Allied diplomatic corps, spoke first. The Canadian Ambassador, Maj. Gen. George C. Vanier, though next in seniority, ceded his place to Jefferson Caffery, United States Ambassador, who followed. Each of the others expressed his satisfaction, then M. Bidault responded:

When he met Allied correspondents later M. Bidault spoke with emotion of the sufferings of France, whose honor, he said, General de Gaulle had defended, and of his expectation that France would now “enter with her head high, as she ought, the concert of great nations.”

To him that entry obviously symbolized France’s rise from defeat to victory in the revolutionary situation to self-respect. By Frenchmen generally the Allies’ recognition will be regarded as a belated view to which they had come as a result of French heroism in combat and resistance which had washed out the stain of defeat in the 1940 phase of the war.

In his speech M. Bidault emphasized that full recognition abroad would back up the French Government at home and strengthen its hand in the maintenance of order in the now-widened zone of its authority in France.

The widening of authority was explained in the Allied notes as a logical counterpart of the creation of a civil zone in France for the French Government to take over.

Two Closely Related

So intimately were the two questions related in the minds of Allied officials that they had planned to announce the demarcation of a civil zone and recognition simultaneously today. But the French Government acted on its own Friday by announcing a civil zone without waiting for Allied agreement to that announcement. Thus recognition seemed to follow the creation of the civil zone.

Bidault explained his “pleasure and relief” that “the French Government now is to be treated as the French Government, without equivocation.” He said the Government “never had doubted” that it would ultimately be recognized, nor that it ever entertained the idea that victory and honor humiliates national territory any authority but that of the French Government.” He was glad, however, that the new civil zone consummated this French authority on French soil.

General de Gaulle made no comment on the recognition action.
When correspondents asked. Bidault how General de Gaulle felt about it, he said, "He has waited so long, it was not a great surprise."

Two Months After Paris Entry

Despite his silence, General de Gaulle was understood to be highly pleased by the Allied action, which came almost two months after his triumphal entry into Paris. There has been ample evidence in the last few days that he considered that this form of Allied support would be valuable to his regime in establishing its authority in all parts of France.

M. Bidault emphasized France's role in the war and said she would furnish as many men as could be armed.

To the almost identical Allied notes the French will reply tomorrow in a formal note.

Mr. Caffery is now Ambassador, but cannot present his letter of credence until his appointment has been confirmed by the Senate.

ACTION ON FRANCE HAIRED IN BRITAIN

Recognition Held Long Overdue

— Eden Backed Step—Timing Left to Eisenhower

By JOHN MacCORMAC

wireless to the New York Times.

LONDON, Oct. 23—Recognition of the French Provisional Government was hailed in Britain tonight as a measure long overdue and its unanimity was regarded as partly a triumph for British foreign policy, which has long pressed for such a consummation.

It was Britain that first recognized Gen. Charles de Gaulle as leader of the Free French movement, which was formed in 1940. He received British support until the North African landing two years later when for a time Prime Minister Churchill, influenced, it is thought, by President Roosevelt as well as by his own temperamental difference from General de Gaulle, cooperated in the effort to command Gen. Henri-Honoré Giraud instead of the French people.

Long before Washington, however, London became convinced that this effort was fruitless. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was the first to reach this conviction. He persuaded his leader and for most of this year it has been known that Britain wanted the Provisional Government recognized. When General de Gaulle returned to France, was acclaimed there and reformed his Government to make it as representative in the circumstances, British public opinion began to grow impatient.

It is believed that Mr. Churchill urged the case for recognition at the Quebec Conference and that it was decided there and confirmed by Mr. Churchill and Premier Stalin recently in Moscow, although the timing of recognition was left to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The criterion was to be the Allied Supreme Commander's belief that the de Gaulle Government commanded the necessary authority and support in liberated France.

Britain's recognition formula lacked the safeguarding phrase in the American announcement dealing with a French election. The British announcement asserted that General Eisenhower had agreed to transform the part of France from a forward to an interior zone and that the Central French authority now effectively exercises the powers of government in this area. It continues:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided that this circumstance makes it appropriate that they should recognize the present French Administration as the Provisional Government of France and henceforth treat with it on that basis.
MR-OUT-496

23 October 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 804

Filed 23L552Z

1. I am bewildered by the reference in your No. 632 to recognizing the provisional government in France. Matters have already moved far beyond the stage mentioned in your third sentence from the end. However I am in full agreement with the result which is to be announced tonight at five thirty GMT.

2. *** ***

Rec'd in MR 23L815Z
23 October 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 633.

Replying to your 803, I am informed that Moscow as well as
London had timely information as to time of release of announcement
regarding Provisional Government of France.

I regret that my absence from Washington resulted in more
precipitate action by State Department than was contemplated in my
631 to you.

I hope that the final result will be beneficial.

ROOSEVELT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>633, 23 October 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Recognizing French Provisional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1. See STATUS REPORT attached to PS-PRSS #803 for full report on this message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Announcement released to press at 12:00 noon, GMT, 23 Oct 44.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COPIES TO:</th>
<th>DATE:</th>
<th>BY DIRECTION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
MR-OUT-495

23 OCTOBER 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The following draft reply to Prime's 803 is forwarded for your consideration.

NOTE: Replying to your 803, I am informed that Moscow as well as London had timely information as to time of release of announcement regarding Provisional Government of France.

I regret that my absence from Washington resulted in more precipitate action by State Department than was contemplated in my 631 to you.

I hope that the final result will be beneficial. UNNOTE.

We think that a prompt reply to 803 is indicated.

I am informed by Mr. Hopkins that the Russians will make an identical announcement at the same time as we make ours.

LEAHY

2315476

---

MR-OUT-496

23 OCTOBER 1944

FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY FROM THE PRESIDENT

Draft of reply to Prime's 803 contained in your MR-OUT-495 approved for transmission.

ROOSEVELT

2316532
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 803
(Filed 22/18152)

23 OCTOBER 1944

In view of your number 631 in reply to my number 798 I
was naturally surprised at the very sharp turn taken by the State
Department and on arrival here I find the announcement is to be
made tomorrow. We shall, of course, take similar and simultaneous
action. I am sure the Russians will be very much offended.¹ I think
it likely that the Russians will be offended.² Molotov in conver-
sation said that he expected they would be made to appear the ones
who were obstructing, whereas they would have recognized long ago
but had deferred to American and British wishes. I hope therefore it
has been possible to bring them in.

PRIME

1. As originally transmitted; see footnote 2 for correction.
2. As corrected by Prime Minister.

To President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-433.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 803, 23 Oct 44.

DATE

TO THE ROOM 2319552 VIA Army Code room

SUBJECT: Recognition of Provisional Government of France.

ACTION:

1. Original message #803 received in Map Room at 2219552. This message was being transmitted to the President at Hyde Park when a phone call was received from Army Code Room informing that a message from Milatitch, London, requested it be held and not shown to the President until corrected text was received. Message to Hyde Park was cancelled.

2. A corrected text of #803 was received in the Map Room at 2303172. One sentence only was changed, as indicated on file copy of #803. Hyde Park notified of change in message.

3. This message caused considerable confusion in the Map Room. No previous information had been received in the Map Room that the US and UK would make announcement recognizing the Provisional French Govt. at 12:00 noon, 23 Oct 44. Mr. Hopkins phoned James Dunn in State Dept. at 2315032. Informed that Mr. Stettinus had met with President in New York on Saturday evening, 21 Oct 44, and that President had given his approval to recognition of Provisional Govt. The text of announcement, together with release time, had been sent via State to London and Moscow. (Mr. Dunn said at 2315032 that statement had been in Moscow for 36 hours.)

4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown in Map Room. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as HW-OUT-495 (231547). President's approval received as HW-IN-176 (2316552). Reply sent to HW as file #633.

COPY 1 01 DATED BY DIRECTION OF
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN
TO: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1944

I received your message of October 21 about the intention to recognize the existing French authorities as a Provisional Government of France and to create an internal zone under the French Administration's control. The British Government has also informed the Soviet Government about its desire to recognize the Provisional Government of France. As to the Soviet Government, it welcomes the decision to recognize the Provisional French Government, and has already given an appropriate instruction to its representative in Paris.

STALIN

Received in Map Room 230309.
FROM: Marshal Stalin  
TO: The President

DATE: 22 October 1944

SUBJECT: Recognition of Provisional French Government

ACTION:

1. Answers PRESS-STALIN 20 Oct 44, Sent via State Department.
2. To President at Hyde Park as AB-OUT-258, 232042 Oct 44.
3. No reply.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NI-8218-2
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department

No. S 63111 20 October 1944

S 63111 to AGWAR for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower cite SHOOS reference W 47959.

From the military point of view the existence of a strong central authority in France is essential, particularly in view of the difficult economic and supply situation which faces us this winter. The only French authority with whom we can deal is the present Council of Ministers and we urge that every support be given to it including formal recognition as the Provisional Government of France.

It would be helpful if the announcement of American recognition could be made simultaneous with the announcement of the Zone of the Interior. We anticipate the latter announcement will be made within a few days as soon as the French plans for a Military Zone along the Atlantic Coast can be clarified.

ACTION: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: ADM LEAHY
       GEN ARNOLD
       GEN HANDY
       GEN BISSELL
       ADM KING
       C OF S

CM-IN-19234 (20 Oct 44) 1728Z mcs
SECRET

011France

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
AMBASSADOR

SECRET

MOSCOW 20 OCTOBER 1944

SECRET FOR THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal
Stalin:

QUOTE. PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition
of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France.
The recent enlargement of the Consultative Assembly has made these
authorities more representative of the French people. It is expected
that in the very near future the French, with the agreement of General
Eisenhower, will set up a real zone of the interior which will be under
French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate
time to recognize the French authorities as the Provisional Government of
France. I am informing you in advance of our intentions in this regard
in case you wish to take some similar action at the time the zone of the
interior is set up under French administration. END QUOTE.

10/20/44
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

MILE or FILE NO.: Unno (State Dept msg), 20 Oct 44.

DATE: 20 Oct 44

SUBJECT: Recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION:

1. Draft message sent to President by SecState by memo, 19 Oct 44. (Copy attached). The “reply to Prime Minister” referred to in memo 1a FDR-PM #631, 19 Oct 44.

2. President approved without change. Sent to Marshal Stalin thru State Department channels.

3. Answered by Stalin-PM, 22 Oct 44.

COPIES TO:

OIL FRANCE

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

OIL FRANCE

COPY
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET  TGT
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
     Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department

No. S 63111 20 October 1944

S 63111 to AGWAR for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from
Eisenhower cite SHCOS reference W 47959.

From the military point of view the existence of a
strong central authority in France is essential, particularly
in view of the difficult economic and supply situation which
faces us this winter. The only French authority with whom
we can deal is the present Council of Ministers and we urge
that every support be given to it including formal recognition
as the Provisional Government of France.

It would be helpful if the announcement of American
recognition could be made simultaneous with the announcement
of the Zone of the Interior. We anticipate the latter
announcement will be made within a few days as soon as the
French plans for a Military Zone along the Atlantic Coast
can be clarified.

ACTION: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: ADM LEAHY
      GEN ARNOLD
      GEN HANDY
      GEN BISSELL
      ADM KING
      C OF S

CM-IN-19234 (20 Oct 44) 1728Z mcs
SECRET

011 France

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 33
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 19, 1944

With reference to your reply to Prime Minister Churchill on the question of recognizing a Provisional Government of France, I believe you may wish to consider the desirability of also informing the Soviet Government of your intention. I believe it is safe to assume that the British Government will promptly inform the Soviet Government. I therefore attach a suggested draft message which you may wish to send to Marshal Stalin.

Enclosure:

Draft message.

[Signature]
We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. The recent enlargement of the Consultative Assembly has made these authorities more representative of the French people. It is expected that in the very near future the French, with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up a real zone of the interior which will be under French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate time to recognize the French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. I am informing you in advance of our intentions in this regard in case you wish to take some similar action at the time the zone of the interior is set up under French administration.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

No: 631, 19 October 1944

Replying to your 798. I think until the French set up a real zone of interior that we should make no move towards recognizing them as a provisional government. The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly which has already been extended and made more representative is almost as important and I should be inclined to hang recognition on the effective completion of both these acts. I would not be satisfied with De Gaulle merely saying that he was going to do it.

I agree with you that there must be no implication, if and when we do recognize a provisional government, that this means a seat on the European Advisory Council, etc. These matters can be taken up later on their merits.

I am anxious to handle this matter, for the present, directly between you and me and would prefer, for the moment, that the modus operandi not become a matter of discussion between the State Department and your Foreign Office.

Let me know your views upon this message.

Harriman's messages indicate that you have had a good and useful conference and I shall be anxiously waiting to get a final summation from you.

I do hope you are free of the temperature and really feeling all right again.

ROOSEVELT
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 631, 19 Oct 44.

DATE 1940

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Recognition of Provisional French Government

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES, #798, 14 Oct 44.
2. See STATUS REPORT attached to PM-PRES #798 for complete data on this reply.
3. See PM-PRES #803, 23 Oct 44, for next message on this subject.

COPIES TO: OIL FRANCE (1) Sec 2

DATE: ________________________ BY DIRECTION OF: ________________________

______________________________ ________________________________
______________________________ ________________________________

OIL FRANCE: 210 (2); 100 CHURCHILL.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 19, 1944

I have your memorandum of October 18 and your enclosed redraft of a reply to Prime Minister Churchill on the question of recognizing a Provisional Government of France. I have only one suggestion to make with regard to your redraft. By French decree published on October 12 the Consultative Assembly was enlarged by increasing its membership by 143 additional seats, thereby broadening its base to make it representative of democratic resistance elements within France. I therefore suggest that the second sentence of the first paragraph of your reply be made to read:

"The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly which has already been extended and made more representative is almost as important and I should be inclined to hang additional recognition on the effective completion of both these acts."
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

October 18, 1944.

From all I hear, I think it would be a mistake to go ahead at this particular moment with recognition of the Provisional Government of France. Practically all of France is today directly under General Eisenhower, who, I think, is about to set up "an Interior Zone". When this is done, and it should be shortly, I think we should recognize the Provisional Government of France because then they will have something to administer, which they have not got now.

At the same time, we should not bind ourselves yet to give France a seat on the European Advisory Council. I am having a terrible time on the military and naval operations because the French want to join in every staff conference and are making a nuisance of themselves. There is little they can contribute for the moment in a military or a naval sense. Questions such as these can come up later on their merits, but the moment is not ripe.

Also, I think it a mistake to bring these matters into an exchange of notes between the State Department and the British Foreign Office.

What do you think of this draft which I have just dictated?

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

I am attaching:

1. The reply which you asked the State Department to draft to Churchill's message to you about French recognition, and

2. My own draft on the same subject.

cc:

encls.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 4 1972
By V. J. Stewart Date
October 18, 1944.

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

REPLYING TO YOUR 798. I THINK UNTIL THE FRENCH SET UP A REAL ZONE OF INTERIOR THAT WE SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE TOWARDS RECOGNIZING THEM AS A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY IS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AND I SHOULD BE INCLINED TO HANG THE ADDITIONAL RECOGNITION ON THE EFFECTIVE COMPLETION OF BOTH OF THESE ACTS. I WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH DE GAULLE MERELY SAYING THAT HE WAS GOING TO DO IT.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THERE MUST BE NO IMPLICATION, IF AND WHEN WE DO RECOGNIZE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, THAT THIS MEANS A SEAT ON THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COUNCIL, ETC. THESE MATTERS CAN BE TAKEN UP LATER ON THEIR MERITS.

I AM ANXIOUS TO HANDLE THIS MATTER, FOR THE PRESENT, DIRECTLY BETWEEN YOU AND ME AND WOULD PREFER, FOR THE MOMENT, THAT THE MODUS OPERANDI NOT BECOME A MATTER OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND YOUR FOREIGN OFFICE.

LET ME KNOW YOUR VIEWS UPON THIS MESSAGE.

HARRIMAN'S MESSAGES INDICATE THAT YOU HAVE HAD A GOOD AND USEFUL CONFERENCE AND I SHALL BE ANXIOUSLY WAITING TO GET A FINAL SUMMATION FROM YOU.

I DO HOPE YOU ARE FREE OF THE TEMPERATURE AND REALLY FEELING ALL RIGHT AGAIN.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 4 1972
OCTOBER 18, 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

REPLYING TO YOU 798. I THINK UNTIL THE FRENCH SET UP A
REAL ZONE OF INTERIOR THAT WE SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE TOWARDS
RECOGNIZING THEM AS A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE ENLARGEMENT
OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY IS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AND I SHOULD
BE INCLINED TO HANG THE ADDITIONAL RECOGNITION ON THE EFFECTIVE
COMPLETION OF BOTH OF THESE ACTS. I WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH
DE GAULLE MERELY SAYING THAT HE WAS GOING TO DO IT.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THERE MUST BE NO IMPLICATION, IF AND
WHEN WE DO RECOGNIZE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, THAT THIS MEANS
A SEAT ON THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COUNCIL, ETC. THESE MATTERS
CAN BE TAKEN UP LATER ON THEIR MERITS.

I AM ANXIOUS TO HANDLE THIS MATTER, FOR THE PRESENT, DIRECTLY
BETWEEN YOU AND ME AND WOULD PREFER, FOR THE MOMENT, THAT THE MODUS
OPERANDI NOT BECOME A MATTER OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT AND YOUR FOREIGN OFFICE.

LET ME KNOW YOUR VIEWS UPON THIS MESSAGE.

I DO HOPE YOUR HEALTH HAS NOT BEEN UNDERMINED.

HARRIMAN'S MESSAGES INDICATE THAT YOU HAVE HAD A GOOD AND
USEFUL CONFERENCE AND I SHALL BE ANXIOUSLY WAITING TO GET A FINAL
SUMMATION FROM YOU.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 4 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with the request made in your memorandum of October 16, 1944, I am attaching herewith the draft of a reply which you may wish to send to Prime Minister Churchill in reply to the latter's cable no. 798 of October 14.

Enclosure:
Draft.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1944

For Secret

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-17-72
By J. Schaible Date
date 1972
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

We have been following the French situation very closely and have kept actively under consideration the question of recognition of the French Provisional Government since we have always felt that this recognition should be extended as soon as the situation in France warranted in the light of the policy which we have consistently followed.

I share the opinion expressed in your 798 that the situation in France has developed to a point where the extension of recognition to the Provisional Government of the French Republic is justified and desirable.

I believe that either the occasion of a vote of confidence to the administration by an enlarged Consultative Assembly or the establishment of the Interior Zone would provide a useful peg on which to hang our action. Of the two alternatives, I share your preference for the latter.

I will have the State Department get in touch with the Foreign Office, and they can work out the necessary details together, and notify the Soviet authorities who might wish to take concurrent action.

I fully
I fully agree that our decision in this matter need not involve such separate questions as that of French membership in the European Advisory Commission.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500
17 October 1944

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Number: WAR 47959

Please inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff by telegraph of your opinion from the military point of view as to the advisability of giving formal recognition to the De Gaulle Committee as the "Provisional Government of France" in place of its present status as "De Facto authority."

End.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, MLR, Date APR 23 1974

ORIGINATOR: JC/S
INFORMATION: General Arnold
Adm Leaby
General Handy
General Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-47959  (17 Oct 44)  2128Z  ncb

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 33
Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500
17 October 1944

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Number: WAR 47959

...to Eisenhower from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Please inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff by telegraph of your opinion from the military point of view as to the advisability of giving formal recognition to the De Gaulle Committee as the "Provisional Government of France" in place of its present status as "De Facto authority."

End.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date
APR 23 1974

ORIGINATOR: JC/S
INFORMATION: General Arnold
Adm Leary
General Handy
General Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-47959 (17 Oct 44) 2128Z ncb

011 France

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

By direction of the President, the attached message from the Prime Minister (No. 798) is forwarded for preparation of a draft reply.

Telegram No. 623, referred to in the attached message was forwarded to the Secretary of State on 28 September 1944.

F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD

Enc. (HW)
1. Msg Prime Minister to President, #798, 14 Oct 44
14 October 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 798

The question of the recognition of the French Provisional Government is still under consideration. I believe that the situation has developed to a point where a decision on the matter could be taken consistent with my latest statement in Commons and with your own policy.

You made the statement in your telegram No. 623 that we should not take action until France was rid of the Germans and you implied that De Gaulle must, in any case, first demonstrate that he is qualified to accept from Eisenhower complete responsibility in administering an interior zone, a part of France. In Parliament, I took the view that recognition should be preceded by the reorganization on a more representative basis of the consultative assembly.

According to my information, the French have already asked that a large part of France be constituted into an interior zone, and Eisenhower is anxious to comply with the request. Good progress is being made in negotiations between the French and Supreme Headquarters, and it seems we may very shortly expect about three quarters of France to become a zone of the interior.

Good progress is also being made in the enlargement of the consultative assembly. According to a report from Duff Cooper, the French have discovered it impracticable to go ahead with the original Algiers plan of having members of an expanded assembly confirmed in their mandates by elections held in liberated departments, because of the very genuine difficulties of French communications. Instead they plan to add selected delegates from Parliamentary
groups and from the resistance movement. My understanding is that they plan
to solve this question soon and to publish a new decree giving the reformed
assembly increased powers over the executive and defining its attributions. By
the end of this month it is believed that the reformed assembly should be able
to meet.

Without a doubt, the French Provisional Government has the support of the
majority of the French people and the French have been cooperating with Supreme
Headquarters. Therefore I suggest that with safety we can now recognize as the
Provisional Government of France, the administration of General De Gaulle.

One method of stating our position might be to say to the French now that
as soon as the enlarged assembly has met and has given a vote of confidence to
the De Gaulle administration, we will recognize the government.

Recognition as soon as the zones of the interior has been established
formally might be an alternative procedure. Since this would connect recogni-
tion with what will be a symbol of good cooperation between the Allied Expedi-
tionary Force and the French authorities in the common cause against the
enemy, I am disposed to favor this alternative.

I would like to hear what you think. If one of the procedures mentioned
above meets with your approval, the State Department and the Foreign Office
might compare at once their views upon the actual terms we should employ in
granting recognition. Although we need not necessarily use the same wording,
it is important that we should take the same line. The Soviet Government should,
of course, be informed of our intentions.

The separate matter of French membership in the European Advisory Commission
or similar organizations need not be involved in the giving of recognition.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 798, 14 October 1944.

I have been reflecting about the question of recognition of the French Provisional Government. I think events have now moved to a point where we could take a decision on the matter consistently with your own policy and my latest statement in the House of Commons.

In your telegram number 623 you said that you thought that we should wait until France was cleared of the enemy and you implied that in any case De Gaulle must first show himself ready to take over from Eisenhower full responsibility for the administration of part of France as an interior zone. I for my part took the line in Parliament that the reorganization of the consultative assembly on a more representative basis ought to precede recognition.

I understand that Eisenhower is anxious to comply with the request he has already had from the French to constitute a large part of France into an interior zone. Negotiations between Supreme Headquarters and the French are making good progress and it appears that we may expect about three quarters of France to become an interior zone very shortly.

The enlargement of the consultative assembly is also making good progress. Duff Cooper reports that owing to very real difficulties of communications in France, French have found it impracticable to proceed with the original Algiers plan of getting members of an enlarged assembly confirmed in the 8 mandates by elections in liberated departments. They propose instead to add selected delegates from the resistance movement and parliamentary groups. I understand it is hoped to settle matters shortly and publish a new decree defining the attributes of the reformed assembly and giving it increased powers over the executive. It is thought that the enlarged assembly should be able to meet at the end of this month.

There is no doubt that the French have been cooperating with Supreme Headquarters and that their Provisional Government has the support of the majority of French people. I suggest therefore that we can now safely recognize General De Gaulle's administration as the Provisional Government of France.

One procedure might be to tell the French now that we will recognize as soon as the enlarged assembly has met and has given De Gaulle's administration a vote of confidence.

An alternative procedure would be to recognize as soon as the interior zone has been formally established. I am inclined to think that this alternative is preferable as it would connect recognition with what will be a mark
of satisfactory cooperation between the French authorities and A.E.F. in the common cause against Germany.

Please tell me what you think. If you agree that we should settle the matter by one or other of the procedures suggested above, the Foreign Office and State Dept might at once compare their ideas upon the actual terms in which we should give recognition. It is important that we should take the same line although we need not necessarily adopt exactly the same wording. We should have of course also to inform the Soviet Government of what we intend.

Recognition would not of course commit us on the separate question of French membership of the European Advisory Commission or similar bodies.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SIGNED or FILE NO. 793, 14 Oct 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 1501472 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Recognition of French Committee.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.

2. By direction of the President, a paraphrased copy sent to State Department for preparation of reply, 16 Oct 44.

3. Draft reply, approving recognition of French Committee, to President dated 16 Oct 44. This, however, was forwarded to the President by memo from Mr. Hopkins, 18 Oct 44, who also attached his draft reply disapproving recognition of Committee.

4. The President forwarded Mr. Hopkins' draft message to State with memo, "...I think it would be mistake to go ahead at this moment with recognition of Prov Govt of France...What do you think of this draft?"

5. SecState replied in memo, 19 Oct 44, suggesting change of one paragraph of the message. Change approved by President. Message as drafted by Mr. Hopkins and changed by SecState sent to PM as PRES-PW #631, 19 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: Sec State

DATE: 16 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF: The President

OIL FRANCE.

COPY
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 625, 30 SEPTEMBER 1944

Your 789.

* * * * *

In regard to the French problem I will give it further consider-
ation when the Huns are out of France or when "Zones of the Interior" are
established.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 789, 29 September 1944

* * * * *

4. Your number 623. You may be sure that we shall not take any action with the French except after full consultation with you. I hope nothing I said yesterday embarrassed you. I see you use the expression "French Provisional Government" in your 623. It seems to me there would not be much harm in this phrase coming into use without any formal instrument being agreed between the Governments. After all they are the French Provisional Government and it is fully admitted even in the Boniface series that they represent all France.

* * * * *
Following is extract from speech by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons, 28 September 1944, which refers to the French situation:

* * * * *

I turn from the Italian scene. Nothing has given the British nation and the King's dominions all over the world more true joy than the wonderful spectacle of the rescue of France by British and American arms—than the rescue of France from the horrible oppression of the Huns, under which she withered or languished four hideous years.

It now is nearly forty years since I first became convinced that the fortunes of Great Britain and France are interwoven and their military forces must be combined in the most effective manner by alliance and agreement and plans.

I think I can claim to have pursued this object through all the changing scenes we have witnessed, not only before and during the last war but in the uneasy interval between the two wars, and not only in the years of success but during the periods of blackest disaster and also through periods when there was friction of other kinds between the two countries.

Bearing in mind some mistakes in our own policy between the wars, bearing in mind also the failure of the League of Nations, in consequence largely because of the falling out of America, and other weaknesses for which other powers are responsible in the failure to give general security to the world; bearing in mind the withdrawal of the United States from the Anglo-American guarantee against German aggression promised by President Wilson, on the strength of which France relinquished her claim to the Rhine frontiers; bearing in mind above everything else the loss of nearly 2,000,000 men which France with her small and declining population sustained in bearing the brunt, as she bore it in the last war, and the terrible effects of this unexampled bloodletting upon the whole life of France—remembering all this and much else, I have always felt the liveliest sympathy for the French in the years when we watched supinely the dreadful and awe-inspiring growth of German power.

It will be remembered that we told the French Government that we would not reproach them for making a separate peace in the fearful circumstances of June, 1940, provided they sent their fleet out of the reach and power of the Germans. The terms of the Cabinet offer to France in this tragical hour is also on record.

I have therefore never felt anything but compassion for the French people as a whole who found themselves deprived of their power of resistance and could not share the good fortune of those who from our shores and in the French Empire had the honor and opportunity of continuing the armed struggle.

What can a humble, ordinary man do? He may be on the watch for an opportunity, but he may be rendered almost powerless. The Maquis have shown
one way in which, at the end and after much suffering and after overcoming all difficulties in getting weapons, free men may strike a blow for the honor and life of their country.

But that is given to few—to the young and active and to those who can obtain weapons. For my part, I have always felt in my heart that the French nation was sound and true, and that they would rise again in their greatness and power, and we should be very proud to have taken a part in aiding them to recover their place in the van of the nations and at the summit of the cultural life of the world.

Long have we looked forward to the day when British and American troops would enter again the fields of France and regardless of the loss and sacrifice drive the foe before them from the towns and cities famed in history and often sacred to us for their memories of the last war and of the dear ones whose memories abide with us who rest in French soil.

Often have we longed to receive and dreamed of receiving the gratitude and blessings of the French people as our delivering armies advance. This has been given us in unstinting measure. It has indeed been a glorious experience to witness, and a glorious experience for the Army to enjoy, this marvelous transformation of scene and for us to feel that we have acted up to our duty as a faithful ally to the utmost limit of our strength.

I have repeatedly stated that this is the aim, policy and interest of the British Government and this country, Great Britain, to see erected once more, and of the whole Commonwealth and Empire to see erected once more at the earliest moment, a strong, independent and friendly France.

I have every hope that this will soon be achieved. The French people, working together, as they must do for their lives and future, and in unity of purpose and with sincerity and courage, have a great chance of building a new and undivided France which will take her rightful place among the leading nations of the world.

In my last statement to the House, I spoke of the importance of including representatives of France in all discussions affecting the Rhine frontiers and the general settlement of Germany.

Hitherto, by force of circumstances, the French Algiers Committee could not be a body representative of France as a whole. Now, however, progress has been made to enlarge that body with new elements, especially among those who form the Maquis and Resistance movement and among those who raised the glorious revolt in Paris which reminded us of the famous days of the revolution, when France and Paris struck blows to open the path broadly for all the nations of the world.

Naturally, we, and I believe, the United States and Soviet Union, are most anxious to see emerge an entity which can truly be said to speak in the name of the people of France, the whole people of France.
It would now seem possible to put into force the decree of the Algiers stage the Legislative Assembly would be transformed into an elected body reinforced by the addition of new elements drawn from inside France.

To this body, the French Committee of National Liberation would be responsible. Such a step, once taken, would be seen to have the approval of the French people, would greatly strengthen the position of France in the circle of the principal Allies.

It would render possible that recognition of the Provisional Government of France and the consequences thereof which we all desire to bring about at the earliest moment. I close no more upon the situation, which is in constant flux and development. The matter is urgent, however, for those, of whom I am one, who desire to see France take her place at the earliest moment in the high circles of the Allies.

We are now engaged in discussing these matters, both with the French and with other Allied Governments, and I am hopeful that in the near future a happy settlement will be reached to the satisfaction of all concerned.

* * * * *
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 623, 28 SEPTEMBER 1944

Your 788. I am pleased to know that our Italian announcement went well in the U.K. It seems also to have been well received here.

In regard to the "French Provisional Government" I believe it would be wise to delay any action on our part until the German troops are expelled from all of France including Alsace and Lorraine.

I have no information as yet that General de Gaulle has expressed any desire for the setting up of any "Zones of the Interior" which would be the first change from a military to a civilian administration of the government.

ROOSEVELT

COPY TO STATE DEPARTMENT.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 623, 28 Sept 44

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Further recognition of French Provisional Government.

ACTION: COPY

1. Answers PM #788, 27 Sept 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy for action.
2. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change, 28 Sept 44.

COPIES TO: State Department

DATE: 28 Sept 44

BY DIRECTION OF: Admiral Leahy

011 FRANCE; 011 ITALY

COPY
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 783, 27 September 1944

I find on arrival here a very strong feeling that we ought to go a bit further than we have done towards recognizing the French Provisional Government. Our Italian announcement has gone well but of course people ask "What about the French?" I hope you will not mind my saying tomorrow that we are carefully studying the question from week to week in the light of changing events. I shall not of course commit you in any way.

PRIME

COPY TO STATE DEPARTMENT.
Further recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION:
COPY

1. To President with morning gews.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President 28 Sept 44; sent to PM as PRES #623, 28 Sept 1244.

FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 788, 27 September 1944
DATE
VIA
SUBJECT:

FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 788, 27 September 1944
DATE
VIA
SUBJECT:

Further recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION:
COPY

1. To President with morning gews.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President 28 Sept 44; sent to PM as PRES #623, 28 Sept 1244.

FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 788, 27 September 1944
DATE
VIA
SUBJECT:

Further recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION:
COPY

1. To President with morning gews.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President 28 Sept 44; sent to PM as PRES #623, 28 Sept 1244.

FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. 788, 27 September 1944
DATE
VIA
SUBJECT:

Further recognition of French Provisional Government

ACTION:
COPY

1. To President with morning gews.
2. Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved by the President 28 Sept 44; sent to PM as PRES #623, 28 Sept 1244.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 784, 22 September 1944

* * * * *

This delay in announcement of Italian Manifesto will also give
time for a review of French situation which I am anxious to go into on
my return and about which I will presently cable you.

PRIME