Folder 3. 051 Balkans—Spheres of Influence by
Great Britain and Russia,
19 May–30 June 1944.
The following references were made to British and Russian spheres of influence in Balkan countries at 
CONFERENCE between 
CHURCHILL and STALIN 
Moscow, October 9-16, 1944.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT, 
#789, 29 September 1944.

* * * * *

3. Anthony and I are seriously considering flying to Moscow very soon....There are points about Greece and Yugoslavia which we would also discuss. We should keep you informed of every point.

* * * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT, 
1011172 NCR 9892, 10 October 1944.

From my talk with the Prime Minister yesterday I believe that the British conversations here are likely to take the following course.

* * * * *

3. On matters in the Balkans, Churchill and Eden will try to work out some sort of spheres of influence with the Russians, the British to have a free hand in Greece and the Russians in Rumania and perhaps other countries. The British will attempt to retrieve a position of equal influence in Yugoslavia. They can probably succeed in the former but I am doubtful about the latter objective.

* * * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT, 
101643, NCR 124, 10 October 1944.

* * * * *

Churchill and Stalin had agreed last night to send you daily a joint telegram of their talks. Churchill prepared a draft of last nights discussions which is now being sent you with certain modifications by Stalin. The most important change Stalin made related to the Balkans.

-1-
I have not the message before me but after the sentence that tells of their talks regarding the Balkan countries Churchill had included the words "having regard to our varying duty towards them."

The implication of this phrase was clearly a recognition of a sphere of influence of Russia and Britain in the several countries. Stalin crossed this phrase out and Churchill agreed.

After lunch, talking across Churchill, I told Stalin that you would be very glad that he had eliminated this phrase as you believed that all questions should be dealt with by the three of us. Stalin said he was glad to hear this and reaching behind Churchill's back shook my hand.

* * * * *

CHURCHILL/STALIN to PRESIDENT,
#794, 11 October 1944.

* * * *

We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey.

* * * *

PRESIDENT to AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN,
#83, 11 October 1944.

Your 10164.3 received and read with much interest.

My active interest at the present time in the Balkan area is that such steps as are practicable should be taken to insure against the Balkans getting us into a future international war.

* * * *

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT,
#795, 11 October 1944.

We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. . . .It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.S. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this,
and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting-down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.

* * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT,
L11102 NCR 785, 11 October 1944.

At dinner last night I got for the first time a more definite picture of what the Prime Minister and Eden have in mind working out with the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and Hungary. In connection with this, Churchill has been using the unpopular term "sphere of influence" but as Eden describes his objectives it is to work out a practical agreement on how the problems of each country are going to be dealt with and the relative responsibility of the Russians with British.

They stated that they have explained to Stalin and Molotov that they have no authority to commit us and that whatever is worked out will be submitted to us. They consider that on the basis of the armistice terms, Russia will have a pretty free hand in Hungary since our representatives on the control commission have little or no authority. In connection with the control commission for Bulgaria and Hungary, Eden is attempting to get Molotov's agreement to greater authority for the British and our representatives. As to Yugoslavia he is attempting to obtain Molotov's agreement that the Russians should not take any independent action but should join with the British and ourselves in bringing the factions together and continue to work with us rather than independently as the Russians have in the past.

Eden feels he has made some progress with Molotov. As to Greece, the Prime Minister feels he has already obtained Stalin's approval to keep hands off and to use Soviet influence to prevent the Greek Communists from being a disruptive influence and to induce them to play a constructive part in a national government. Churchill and Eden both hope that you and Mr. Hull will be satisfied with the agreements that are worked out as they feel that unless something along these lines is done there will be political turmoil in these countries if not civil war, and the British will find most difficult situations to deal with.

* * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT,
L11102 NCR 1336, 12 October 1944.

* * * *

As to Bulgaria and Hungary, Eden has agreed with Molotov that the control commission for these countries should be set up under the direction
of the Soviet commander as in Rumania during the period of hostilities against Germany but that hereafter the control commission would be made genuinely tripartite with equal authority of each member but with Soviet chairmanship. When I get the details I will inform Secretary Hull.

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PRIME MINISTER to WH. HOPKINS,
#1022, 13 October 1944.

* * * * *

Matters improved a great deal yesterday. Balkan affairs are being straightened out.

---
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Russian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Enclosures:

1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #552
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570
FROM The President TO Secretary Hull

SECRET or FILE NO. Letter, 30 June 44.

DATE VIA

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:

1. Answers letter from Sec Hull to the President, 29 June 1944.
2. Message prepared in Admiral Leahy's office for the President's signature.
SECRET

June 29, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a telegram just received from Ambassador MacVeagh at Cairo reporting that he has been informed by his British colleague that the American Government has agreed to the proposal for an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments whereby they would respectively take the lead in Greek affairs and Romanian affairs, our agreement, according to this information, being subject to the understanding that the arrangement should not extend beyond the circumstances for which it was devised and should not lead to the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, and with the further provision that the arrangement should be subject to review after three months.

This is the project to which I referred in my letter of June 17 and which goes back to Mr. Churchill's telegram 667 of May 31. You will recall that the Department suggested a draft reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram which I think you despatched on or about June 10. On June 18 the Department delivered to the British Embassy a memorandum in the same sense, the draft of which had been submitted to you for approval, and subsequently the substance of this communication was telegraphed to the American Chiefs of Mission primarily concerned with matters of this kind.

On June 15 Lord Halifax informed me of Mr. Churchill's proposal direct to you that the arrangement be tried out for three months, subject then to review by the three powers, from information furnished to Mr. MacVeagh by the British it would appear that some change has been made in our position, although I have not been informed of your views on this new aspect of the question.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what changes have been made in our position, in order that appropriate instructions, in amendment of the telegram already despatched, can be sent to Mr. MacVeagh and the other Chiefs of Mission dealing with these questions.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Cordell Hull

The President
The White House

Enclosure: Copy of telegram no. 205, June 29, from Cairo
SECRET

LG 397

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Cairo

Dated June 26, 1944

Ree'd 9:16 P.M.

Secretary of State

Washington

GREEK

203, June 26, noon.

My British colleague has recently several times spoken to me of a proposal for what he called a "purely practical war time arrangement" between the British and Russian Governments whereby the latter would take the lead in Rumania; the former in Greek affairs. This arrangement, he said, would provide for British support of Russian initiative in Rumania and Russian support of British initiative in Greece, but there would be no question of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence. He said that the matter had been laid before the Department, since Moscow had reserved full acceptance pending agreement by the United States Government, and he promised to keep me informed of developments.

He has now read me a telegram, dated June 19, from the Foreign Office in London to its Embassy in Moscow, and at my request has confirmed this to me in a personal note dated yesterday the 24th, according to which the United States Government "after some delay has agreed to the arrangement on the understanding that "it should not extend beyond the circumstances for which it was devised and should not lead to the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence." His note adds that "to make doubly sure" it is agreed that the arrangement should be subject to revision after three months.

As his information that the United States has given its agreement runs contrary to my own understanding of the situation, derived from recent advices circulated through the Department's information service, and as the matter is of specific importance to this Embassy, I would appreciate the Department's comments and instructions.

MAGYAR

Repeated to Moscow.
FROM Secretary Hull TO The President

DATE Letter, 29 June 44.

SUBJECT Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:
1. Given to Admiral Leahy by the President for action, 29 June 44.
2. In response to the Secretary's request for information on this subject (Para 4), memo prepared by Admiral Leahy for President's signature, enclosing copies of messages between the President and the Prime Minister. See copy of memo, 30 June 44, from the President to Sec. Hull, filed herein.

COPIES TO:

FILE COPY.

DATE: ____________________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________________
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 716, 27 JUNE 1944

Your No. 570.
* * * * *

Thank you very much for what you say. You may be very sure I shall always be looking to our agreement in all matters before, during and after.

I have read your message to Stalin about Mikolajczyk. I think it will be most helpful. Every good wish.

PRIME
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 716, 27 Jun 44.

DATE

TO: MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES #570, 26 Jun 44.
2. To President via usher.
3. No reply

ORIGINAL: "MR PRES-PM FILE."

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

COPIES TO:


FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 570, 26 JUNE 1944

Your Number 712.

It appears that both of us have inadvertently taken unilateral action in a direction that we both now agree to have been expedient for the time being.

It is essential that we should always be in agreement in matters bearing on our Allied war effort.

My next following message quotes the one I sent to U.J. about the Polish Prime Minister's visit.

Oliver Lyttelton's remark reminds me of the well known old prayer that we be spared from our friends—I think that is now a dead issue that should not be resurrected.

* * * * *

ROOSEVELT
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

DATE: 570, 26 June 44.

SUBJECT: Balkans

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #715, 23 Jun 44, which was sent by the President on 24 Jun 44 to Adm Leahy for preparation of reply.
2. Draft reply prepared by Adm Leahy; approved by the President 26 June 44; dispatched 2617102.
3. Answered by PM #716, 27 Jun 44.

COPIES TO: Sec State, 30 Jun 44; See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 Jun 44.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRÉSIDENT
NO: 712, 23 JUNE 1944

Your number 565.

1. The Russians are the only power that can do anything in Roumania and I thought it was agreed between you and me that on the basis of their reasonable armistice terms, excepting indemnities, they should try to give coherent direction to what happened there. In point of fact, we have all three cooperated closely in handling in Cairo the recent Roumanian peace feelers. On the other hand, the Greek burden rests almost entirely upon us and has done so since we lost 40,000 men in a vain endeavour to help them in 1941. Similarly, you have let us play the hand in Turkey, but we have always consulted you on policy and I think we have been agreed on the line to be followed. It would be quite easy for me, on the general principle of slithering to the left, which is so popular in foreign policy, to let things rip when the King of Greece would probably be forced to abdicate and EAM would work a reign of terror in Greece, forcing the villagers and many other classes to form security battalions under German auspices to prevent utter anarchy. The only way I can prevent this is by persuading the Russians to quit boosting EAM and ramming it forward with all their force. Therefore, I proposed to the Russians a temporary working arrangement for the better conduct of the war. This was only a proposal and had to be referred to you for your agreement.

2. I cannot admit that I have done anything wrong in this matter. It would not be possible for three people in different parts of the world to work together effectively if no one of them may make any suggestion to
either of the others without simultaneously keeping the third informed. A recent example of this is the message you have sent quite properly to U.J. about your conversations with the Poles of which, as yet, I have heard nothing from you. I am not complaining at all of this because I know we are working for the general theme and purposes and I hope you will feel that has been so in my conduct of the Greek affair.

3. I have, also, taken action to try to bring together a union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia and with all adhering to the Royal Yugoslav Government, which we have both recognized. You have been informed at every stage of how we are bearing this heavy burden which at present rests mainly on us. Here again, nothing would be easier than to throw the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government to the wolves and let a civil war break out in Yugoslavia to the joy of the Germans. I am struggling to bring order out of chaos in both cases and concentrate all efforts against the common foe. I am keeping you constantly informed; and I hope to have your confidence and help within the spheres of action in which initiative is assigned to us.

4. On the other hand, I send my sincere apologies for Oliver Lyttleton's foolish remark which I fear may cause you trouble. If there is anything I can say usefully, pray let me know.

5. * * * * *
FROM: The Prime Minister  TO: The President

STAN: 712, 23 June 44.

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES #565, 22 June 44.
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Referred by memo to Admiral Leahy by the President, 24 Jun 44, for preparation of reply.
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 26 Jun 44; sent to the PM as PRES #570; 26 Jun 44.

COPIES TO: Sec State, 30 Jun 44—See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 June 44.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 565, 22 JUNE 1944

With reference to your 687 and my 560 regarding matters in the Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

ROOSEVELT
June 17, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

Just as the Department was despatching to you the Acting Secretary's letter of June 10, 1944, relating to the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, Lord Halifax handed to Mr. Stettinius a further telegram from the Prime Minister and one from the Foreign Office on this subject, copies of which are attached for your information.

Mr. Churchill's further exposition of the British case did not overcome our objections or seem to us to warrant any change in our views toward this dangerous proposal. You will be interested to note, however, that the Prime Minister refers to the British sacrifice for the Greeks in 1941 (but not the Greek sacrifice for British); that he openly applies the proposition to the entire Balkan region by mentioning Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in addition to Rumania and Greece; and that he advances our position in South America as an analogy.

The Foreign Office telegram touches upon another and extremely disturbing aspect of this matter which the Department planned to take up with you as soon as the immediate issue was disposed of. This is the fact that the British did not discuss a proposal of this nature with us until after it had been put up to the Russians and the latter inquired whether we had been consulted.

The Foreign Office, apparently realizing belatedly that Mr. Churchill's frank telegram to you had exposed Lord Halifax's failure to mention this aspect of the question to me, now describes the whole thing as the "Soviet Government's proposal" and explains unconvincingly that it "arose out of a chance remark" of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador at London. The Prime Minister's telegram clearly stated, however, that the British "suggested to the Russian Ambassador that we should agree between ourselves" and indicated that this Government would have been faced with a concluded spheres-of-influence agreement between the British and Russians if the latter had simply agreed without raising the question of our position.

The President
The White House.

You
You may want to call this to the Prime Minister's attention. A suggested draft is attached for possible use in this connection.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclousures:

1) Draft telegram to Mr. Churchill; send as PIES 565 with alterations by the Press Des. attached draft.

2) Telegram from the Prime Minister to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944; and

3) Telegram from Foreign Office to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944.
SECRET

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: NOT USED

With reference to your 697 and my ______, I believe I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that you consulted us on this matter only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. The Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.
Telegram from London dated June 8, 1944

Following from Prime Minister.

Greece and Roumania

There is no question of spheres of influence. We all have to act together but someone must be playing the hand. It seems reasonable that the Russians should deal with Roumanians and Bulgarians upon whom their armies are infringing and that we should deal with the Greeks who are in our assigned theatre, who are our old Allies and for whom we sacrificed 40,000 men in 1941. I have reason to believe that the President is in entire agreement with the line that I am taking about Greece. The same is true of Yugoslavia. I keep him constantly informed but on the whole we, His Majesty's Government are playing the hand and have to be very careful to play it agreeably with the Russians. Events move very rapidly in these countries.

2. On the other hand we follow the lead of United States in South America as far as possible as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton. On this we naturally develop strong views on account of the little folk.

3. By all means show this to Mr. Hull or anyone else you think wise if you think worth while.
Telegram from London dated June 3, 1944

Soviet Government's proposal arose out of chance remark by the Secretary of State in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. There was thus no opportunity of discussing proposal at its inception with the Americans. But as soon as the Soviet Government took up this chance remark and converted it into a formal proposal we consulted the United States Government as indeed the Soviet Government suggested we should do.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 265, 22 June 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:
1. Drafted by State Department. See memo (attached) Sec Hull to the President, 17 June 44.
2. Draft as submitted by State revised by the President; dispatched 221800Z.
3. Answered by Ps #712, 23 June 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State, 30 Jun 44—See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 June 44.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 703, 14 JUNE 1944

EXTRACT

1. Your number 560. I am deeply grateful to you for your reply to my number 700. I have asked the Foreign Secretary to convey the information to Monsieur Molotov and to make it clear that the reason for the three months' limit is in order that we should not prejudice the question of establishing post-war spheres of influence.

* * * * *

PRIME
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 703, 14 June 44

DATE: 703, 14 June 44

TO: MAP ROOM

VIA:

SUBJECT: spheres of influence in Balkans....

ACTION:

1. Answers PERG #560.
2. To President on breakfast tray.
3. FM #703 was answered by PERG #561, 14 Jun 44. However, no mention was made in this message of spheres of influence in Balkans.
4. For further correspondence, see PERG-FM #565, 22 Jun 44.

COPIES TO:

ORIGINAL: "AR PRES-FM FILE.

DATE: Sec State, 30 Jun 44—see memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 Jun 44.

BY DIRECTION OF:

[Blank lines]
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
NO : 132148 NCR 8563

EXTRACT

Your 130035 received.
* * * * *

In regard to the Greek-Roumanian difficulty, I have informed Churchill of my agreement with his proposal made in paragraph seven of his Number 700 and added that we must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war sphere of influence.
* * * * *

WINANT

Written by Admiral Leahy.
FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Winant

SECRET or FILE NO. 132148 NCR 8563, 13 June 44.

DATE: 13 Jun 44

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:

1. Answers Winant's 130035, 13 June 44.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 13 Jun 44; dispatched 132148.

COPIES TO:

ORIGINAL: "PRES-WINANT FILE."
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : Unno, Filed 1900352, 13 JUNE 1944.

EXTRACT

* * * * *

The Prime Minister was disturbed by your reply to his number 687. He has since forwarded you his No. 700. I read this message with some care and listened to his background explanation. He wants the Russians as well as ourselves to support him in Greece and to strengthen his Greek position would like us in turn to join with him in supporting Russian action in Romania. He distinguishes between long term policy and the necessity for prompt decision in the military phase. He feels that committee consultations and recommendations are ineffective in emergency situations. He wanted me to support his position. I made no objection to the content of his message as I understood from General Marshall that you wanted to be clear of Balkan entanglements.

* * * * *

WINANT
FROM: Ambassador Winant

TO: The President

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans

DATE: 130035L, 13 June 44

ACTION:

1. To President via Usher.

2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor change; sent to Amb. Winant as 130148 No. 8563.
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 560, 12 JUNE 1944

Your 700. I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph seven of subject message.

We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of influence.

ROOSEVELT

Written by Admiral Leahy.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 560, 12 June 44.

DATE

VIA

TO MAP ROOM

SUBJECT: Russian and British spheres of influence in Roumania and Greece.

ACTION:

1. Answers P4 #700, 11 June 44.
2. Written by the President; dispatched 122402.
3. Answered by P4 #701, 14 June 44.

COPIES TO:

ORIGINAL: "Mr. President-Pieces"

DATE

BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State, 30 June 44—See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 June 44.
11 June 1944

For: The President of the United States
Number 700
Prime Minister to President. Secret, personal and private. Number 700.

1. I am much concerned to receive your number 597. Action is paralysed if everybody is to consult everybody else about everything before it is taken. The events will always outstrip the changing situations in these Balkan regions. Somebody must have the power to plan and act. A consultative committee would be a mere obstruction, always overridden in any case of emergency by direct interchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin.

2. See, now, what happened at Easter when I had charge not only of the Foreign Office but of the British armed forces. We were able to cope with this mutiny of the Greek forces entirely in accordance with your own views. This was because I was able to give constant orders to the military commanders, who at the beginning advocated consililation, and above all, no use or even threat of force. Very little life was lost. The Greek situation has been immensely improved and, if firmness
is maintained, will be rescued from confusion and disaster. The Russians are ready to let us take the lead in the Greek business, which means that EAM and all its malice can be controlled by the national forces of Greece. Otherwise, civil war and ruin to the land you care about so much. I always reported to you and I always will report to you. You shall see every telegram I send. I think you might trust me in this.

3. Similarly, troubles arose in Egypt, where King Farouk wished to sack Nahas and put in his court minister to rig the elections. This might easily have led to widespread riots and disorder throughout Egypt. Here again the military advise that no action should be taken which involved the use of force. I was in a position to give the necessary orders to the military without having to consult anybody, and none is more pleased than they are at the result. Here again I kept you informed, and Lord Killearn kept your ambassador at Cairo informed. All passed off happily without the slightest struggle.

4. If, in either of these two difficulties, we had had to consult other powers and a set of triangular or quadrangular telegrams got started, the only result would have been chaos or impotence.
5. It seems to me, considering the Russians are about to invade Rumania in great force and are going to help Rumania recapture part of Transylvania from Hungary, provided the Rumanians play which they may, considering all that, it would be a good thing to follow the same leadership considering that neither you nor we have any troops there at all and that they will probably do what they like anyhow. Moreover I thought their terms, apart from indemnity, very sensible and even generous. The Rumanian Army has inflicted many injuries upon the Soviet troops and went into the war against Russia with glee. I see no difficulty whatever in our addressing the Russians at any time on any subject, but please let them go ahead upon the lines agreed as they are doing all the work.

6. Similarly with us in Greece. We are an old ally of Greece. We had 40,000 casualties in trying to defend Greece against Hitler, not counting Crete. The Greek King and the Greek Government have placed themselves under our protection. They are at present domiciled in Egypt. They may very likely move to the Lebanon which would be a better atmosphere than Cairo. Not only did we lose the 40,000 men above mentioned in helping Greece, but a vast mass of shipping and warships, and by demurring Cyrenaica to help Greece, we also lost the whole of Wavell’s conquests in
SECRET

Cyrenaica. These were heavy blows to us in those days. Your telegram to me in the recent crisis worked wonders. We were entirely agreed, and the result is entirely satisfactory. Why is all this effective direction to be broken up into a committee of mediocre officials such as we are littering about the world? Why can you and I not keep this in our own hands considering how we see eye to eye about so much of it?

7. To sum up, I propose that we agree that the arrangements I set forth in my Note 687 may have a trial of three months, after which it must be reviewed by the three powers.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

FILE or FILE NO. 700, 11 June 44.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Russian and British spheres of influence in Roumania and Greece.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRS #527, 10 June 44.
2. To the President via usher.
3. Reply written by President, 12 June 44; sent to PW as PRS #560, 12 June 44.

See State, 30 June 44—See memo, Pres to Sec State, 30 June 44.
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Rumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram No. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.

ROOSEVELT
June 10, 1944

SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith Mr. Churchill's telegram no. 587 of May 31 concerning the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, together with a draft reply.

This same matter was discussed with the Secretary by the British Ambassador on May 30, and the Department had prepared a memorandum to be handed to Lord Halifax setting forth our position.

In view of Mr. Churchill's telegram to you, the memorandum, a copy of which is also enclosed, has not yet been delivered, and I shall be grateful if you will inform me whether it is in accordance with your views.

You will of course note at once the serious political implications of the British proposal, and its pertinence to the whole question of joint participation and joint responsibility of all the Allied Governments in the conduct of the war. However, adroitly the proposed arrangement is presented, it seems really to amount to the establishment of spheres of influence, and an attempt to obtain American approval of such a policy.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. Original paraphrased message from Mr. Churchill;
2. Draft reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram; and
3. Copy of memorandum to the British Embassy.

The President,  
The White House.
DRAFT TELEGRAM

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

Send as # 557, 10 June 44.

The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Rumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram no. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.

"1/5/ Roosevelt"
the approval of this Government to the proposed arrange-
ment.

In the Department's opinion it would be preferable
to give attention to the proposals to establish adequate
machinery for frank consultation regarding the Balkan re-

don, and thus direct the policies of the Allied Govern-
ments along lines of collaboration rather than independ-
ent action. The importance which this Government attaches
to this policy is especially evident at the present time,
when special efforts are being made for concerted action
in laying the foundations of a broader system of general
security in which all countries great and small will have
their part.

Any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence
cannot but militate against the establishment and effect-
ive functioning of such a broader system.

The President has received a communication on this
subject from the Prime Minister, to which he has replied
on the foregoing lines.

Department of State,
Washington.
Russian and British spheres of influence in Rumania and Greece.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #687, 31 May 44, which was sent to the State Department by direction of the President, 31 May 44, for preparation of reply.

2. See attached memorandum from State Dept to the President, forwarding draft reply and also memorandum sent by State to British Embassy, 10 June 44.

3. President approved State Dept draft without change, 10 June 44; dispatched 110409.

4. Answered by PM #700, 11 June 44.

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE 10 June 44.

SUBJECT: Russian and British spheres of influence in Rumania and Greece.

TO MAP ROOM VIA

COPIES TO: Date: By direction of:

ORIGINAL: "PRESIDENT-PRI KE MINISTER FILE."

Sec State, 30 June 44—See memo, President to Sec State, 30 June 44.
From: U S Military Attache, London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 687  Filed: 31/1050 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret number: 687.

There have recently been disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the lead in Romanian affairs, while we would take the lead in Greek affairs, each government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation since Romania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Ambassador was told Eden on May 18th
that the Soviet Government agreed with this suggestion but before giving any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether we had consulted the United States Government and whether the latter had also agreed to this arrangement.

I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing. We do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it applied only to war conditions and did not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. The arrangement would of course involve no change in the present collaboration between you and us in the formulation and execution of Allied policy towards these countries. We feel, however, that the arrangement now proposed would be a useful device for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkans.

Meanwhile Halifax has been asked to raise this matter with the State Department on the above lines.

No Sig
SECRET

May 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The President requests that the State Department prepare a reply, for his signature, to the enclosed paraphrased message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President,
By direction.

Attachment:
Paraphrased copy PM 687.
SECRET
SECRET
PARAPHRASE

FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President
NO: 687

Disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy
between ourselves and Russia in regard to the Balkan coun-
tries and particularly toward Greece recently have appeared.
Therefore we suggested to the Russian Ambassador here in Lon-
don that we should agree between ourselves as a practical mat-
ter that the Russian Government would take the lead in the af-
airs of Roumania, while we would take the lead in the affairs
of Greece, each government giving the other assistance in the
respective countries. Since the Roumanian territory falls
within the area of the Red armies and the Greeks within the
sphere of the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General
Wilson, an arrangement such as this would be a natural develop-
ment of the existing military situation.

On May 18th, the Russian Ambassador informed Mr. Anthony
Eden that the Soviets were in agreement with this suggestion,
but before any final assurances in the matter were given, they
would like to know whether we had consulted the Government of
the United States and whether the latter was also in agreement
with this arrangement. I hope you may feel able to give this
proposal your blessing.

Of course we do not wish to cut up the Balkans into areas
of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make
it clear that it did not affect the rights and responsibilities
which the United States, Great Britain and the Soviets will have
to exercise at the peace settlement and later on in regard to
Europe as a whole, but that it applied only to war conditions.
There would of course be no change involved by this arrangement
in the present collaboration between the Governments of the
United States and Great Britain in the formulation and execu-
tion of the policy of the Allies toward these countries. How-
ever we feel that the now proposed arrangement would be a de-
vice useful for preventing any divergence of policy between
ourselves and them in the Balkan countries.

In the meantime I have requested Lord Halifax to take up
this matter with the Department of State along the lines in-
dicated above.
FROM The Prime Minister        TO The President

SUBJ. or FILE NO.       DATE  687, 31 May 44.

TOR MAP ROOM 31/13102 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Policy of Russia and Britain in regard to Balkan countries—
Romania and Greece.

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.
2. To State Department by direction of the President, 31 May 44.
   (See memo from Adm. Brown to Sec State, 31 May 44, enclosed.)
3. Answered in FPO 557, 10 June 44, which was prepared by the
   State Department and approved without change by the President.

COPIES TO:    DATE:    BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER FILE."
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (Caserta, Italy)
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: M 18783, 29 MAY 1944

EXTRACT

2. The sun is shining again on the Soviet horizon due largely to U. J.'s recent civil messages. Also he feels that his agreement to give the Soviets a free hand in Roumania in return for their hands off in Greece is leading to support by the E.A.M. of a united front among the Greek factions. He is more hopeful that a satisfactory settlement can be evolved eventually regarding Poland without seeing as yet clearly how it will work out.

HARRIMAN
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE No. 18783 29 May 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:

1. To President at Shangri-La as RED 44, 2922472.
2. Harriman's 18783 was answered by RED #301813. However, no mention was made in the President's reply to spheres of influence in the Balkans.

COPIES TO: ORIGINAL: "PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE" DATE: MY DIRECTION OF:
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 678, 19 May 1944

* * * * *

Further about the Russians. I have found it practically impossible to continue correspondence with them, but I note that after each very rude message they send to me, they have done pretty well what was asked. For instance, I do not think they have done any great harm to the Poles, and the tide seems to have turned in favor of the Polish Government here making themselves less disagreeable to the Soviets. Again, although Molotov was most insulting about Romania, they have today told us they accept the broad principle that they take the lead in the Romanian business and give us the lead in Greece. I am quite content with this. A portent of the Soviet policy is to be found in the gushing message which I have received from the Representatives of EAM gathered, with all other Greek parties, in the Lebanon. I do not think it at all impossible that we may get a united Greece which we can support in accordance with what I know are your heart-felt wishes. Your message, backing up my message, and a little firmness in putting down the mutiny, may prove to have had a salutary effect.

* * * * *
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SECRET or FILE NO.  678, 19 May 1944

DATE  19/1432

TO MAP ROOM  VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Spheres of influence in Balkans.

ACTION:

1. This message sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 16, 19 May 44.
2. PM #678 was answered by the President's #542, 19 May 44. However, no mention was made in the President's reply concerning spheres of influence in the Balkans by British and Russians.