Folder 5. 052 Polish–Russian Relations (1)
Sec. 2. 23 July–18 December 1944.

Box 1

Map Room
Box 31

1

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[redacted] TOT

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: 70104 18 December 1944

To MILID sr nr 70104.

Press Saturday and over weekend reflects British publics dismay and depression after Commons debate on Soviet Polish relations. Newspapers all advocate Polish acceptance Curzon Line as necessary amicable relations with Russia. Considerable pro Polish sentiment expressed in Parliament by non Ministerial members all parties and many people here feel Poles getting raw deal. Conservative Daily Mail only London newspaper finding Polish compensation in East Prussia and Danzig satisfactory solution. Times only other paper commenting this part Churchills speech. Times condemns East Prussian transfer as unnecessary for Russian security and impractical especially in view of millions displaced persons who already must be repatriated after war. Sees such scheme delaying European reconstruction for years. This consistent with Times opposition proposals dismember Germany. Shinwell, prominent labor MP, speaking Sunday said Commons debate on Poland filled him with apprehension and foreboding and that future wars were being sown in filching territory and transferring populations. All sections press disappointed no Churchill Stalin Roosevelt meeting scheduled early date and say problems facing Allies over Poland Greece and elsewhere call for conference. Strong feeling such conference should be here out of respect Churchills age and previous visits America and Russia but meeting desired

CM-IN-17922 (19 Dec 44)

[redacted]

42

Polish Russian

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Col Park

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[redacted] TOT

From: US Military Attache, London, England

Nr: 70104 18 December 1944

at all costs regardless place. Churchills and Edens speeches, Greek trouble and seeming lack accord with us on all political matters have produced gloomy attitude here.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF
OPD
COL PARK
LOG

CM-IN-17922 (19 Dec 44) 0003Z mcs

[redacted]

42

COPY NO.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ "IVI"

PRIORITY

From: CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England.

To: War Department.
CG, US Army Air Forces, Graveilles, France.

Nr: UX 68849 3 October 1944

~~TOPSEC~~ to Arnold from Spaatz UX 68849 cite WARX 40175 Oct 2nd.

Started planning on 27th Sept for the second relief flight to Warsaw known as FRANTIC 8, after consultation with Mr. Winant. On 30th Sept clearance was received from the Russians, however at no time since 27th Sept has weather been suitable. As of 30th Sept, evacuation and packing of ESCOM was in an advanced stage, however emergency measures were taken to receive the task force on two bases until 5th Oct, which is the latest date Walsh feels it practical to hold open the bales due to the approach of winter weather.

On 1st Oct, we were notified that the flight plan for 2nd Oct had been disapproved by the local Soviet at ESCOM, giving as reasons that the Warsaw partisans had been evacuated. We suspended the operation and asked Deane for confirmation of the Soviet Government's attitude. His answer today indicates:

A. That Russians were disappointed in FRANTIC 7 because it was estimated that over 50 per cent of the supplies fell in German hands.

B. A week ago he had been informed by the highest

CM-IN-2963 (4 Oct 44)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Adm Leahy

011 Russian Politics

COPY NO. 9.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ "IVI"

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

From: CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England.

Nr: UX 68849 3 October 1944

Soviet authorities that not more than 3,000 partisans in isolated small groups remained fighting in Warsaw.

C. He has not yet received confirmation of the Soviet attitude but that he feels that it will not change.

D. Any pressure on our part might result in the Russians making approval conditional on our flying low enough to insure success of the dropping.

Approval on conditions such as these would weaken our favorable position of wanting to run the mission but being unable to because of disapproval. If unfavorable conditions are attached, we are put in the position of not doing everything possible for the Poles as well as losing face with the Russians. Information just received this afternoon from the London Poles indicates that the centers of resistance in Warsaw and its north and south suburbs have been largely overcome or evacuated but that there are two centers of resistance outside the city which need chiefly arms. These are located at Wlosczowa, approximately 100 miles south of Warsaw, and Proszowice, just north of Krakow. It would appear that the degree of urgency is much lower than

CM-IN-2963 (4 Oct 44)

~~TOP SECRET~~

9

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-75724

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ "IVI"

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England.

Nr: UX 68849 3 October 1944

for the relief of Warsaw, since these areas have been in existence for some time and have previously been supplied by the RAF from the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill, Bottomley and Mr. Winant have been notified of developments.

End

ACTION: Gen.Handy

INFORMATION: Adm.Leahy
Gen.Arnold
CofS

CM-IN-2963 (4 Oct 44) 0325Z es

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 44-75724



DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
no answer to
Max 39143
?

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Operations Division, WDGS
Executive Office 2904 TTH 3E[illegible]8

30 September 1944

WB

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number: WARX 39143

TOPSEC to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from General Marshall and General Arnold.

It is highly desirable that at least 1 more mission to Warsaw to provide aid to the Poles be carried out if it is possible. Indication is that the situation there is still very serious and resistance forces are in urgent need of food and ammunition. More detailed information can be made available by the Poles in London. The Polish Ambassador indicates that there is still resistance in Warsaw and information here tends to confirm this. Advise promptly of action taken.

End

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-72

NOV 1 1972

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, General Arnold, C of S

OM-OUT-39143 (30 Sep 44) 1432Z ekk

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

GPO 10—[illegible]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Copy

SECRET

September 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

The President has forwarded to me your memorandum of September 28, 1944, referring to the request of the Polish Ambassador that at least one more flight of American planes be made for the relief of the Polish Resistance Forces in Warsaw.

A message has been sent to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz informing them that it is highly desirable to carry out this mission if it is possible and requesting to be advised as to the action taken. It is not known here at the moment whether they can comply with this directive. The U. S. bases in Russia which are necessary to the accomplishment of this mission are being closed and it may be that they already have been abandoned to such an extent that they can no longer be used.

You will be informed as to the action taken upon receipt of advice from General Eisenhower.

/s/ W. D. Leahy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
NOV 1 1972
By L. J. Stewart Date

(Undated)

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Reference is made to your memorandum of September 29 inclosing a memorandum from the Department of State for the President, dated September 28, 1944, on the subject of aid to the Poles in Warsaw.

A message has been dispatched to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz stating that it is highly desirable that at least one more mission be flown in aid of the Poles in Warsaw if it is possible and advising them of the urgent need for food and ammunition in Warsaw.

Attached is a draft memorandum reply for the Secretary of State which is self-explanatory.

/s/ Joseph T. McNarney

Acting Chief of Staff.

Inclosure
Draft of memorandum
to Secretary of State.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has forwarded to me your memorandum of September 28, 1944, referring to the request of the Polish Ambassador that at least one more flight of American planes be made for the relief of the Polish Resistance Forces in Warsaw.

A message has been sent to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz informing them that it is highly desirable to carry out this mission if it is possible and requesting to be advised as to the action taken. It is not known here at the moment whether they can comply with this directive. The U.S. bases in Russia which are necessary to the accomplishment of this mission are being closed and it may be that they already have been abandoned to such an extent that they can no longer be used.

You will be informed as to the action taken upon receipt of advice from General Eisenhower.

Incl 1.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Marshall:

Admiral Leahy has directed me to forward the attached memorandum from the Department of State for the President, dated September 28, 1944, on the subject of aid to the Poles in Warsaw with the request that you prepare a draft memorandum reply for the Secretary of State.

Respectfully,

/s/ J. V. Smith
J. V. SMITH
Commander, U.S.N.
Aide

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

To take up at once with the Joint Staff. I want it done if possible.

F.D.R.

Enclosure

(written)
Army prepare a draft
memo in reply to Sec State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Polish Ambassador, who is in Montreal at the UNRRA Conference, has just informed the Department by telephone that he had received an urgent telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk regarding the situation of the Polish forces in Warsaw.

The Polish Premier stated that the situation in Warsaw is still very serious and that the resistance forces are in urgent need of food and ammunition. Although Premier Mikolajczyk realizes that many difficulties are involved in dropping supplies from American planes to aid the Warsaw garrison, he expressed the urgent hope that at least one more flight by American planes could be made and asked that his request be brought to your attention.

C.H.

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER — EXTENSION NUMBER — ADDRESSEES — PRECEDENCE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 24 SEPT 1944

TOR CODEROOM: 240602

DECODED BY: BALDWIN

PARAPHRASED BY: BALDWIN

ROUTED BY: BALDWIN

ASTERISK (*) MARGRAM ADDRESSEE

FOR ACTION: CNO

INFORMATION: MR-OUT-431

241345 Z.

PRECEDENCE: URGENT PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

INFORMATION: PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND BE ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 1 OF 3 — 232314Z — NCR 7551

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

FOR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

I ASKED STALIN THIS EVENING WHETHER THE BATTLE FOR WARSAW WAS GOING TO HIS SATISFACTION. HE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE EXPLAINING THAT IT HAD PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO GET TANKS ACROSS THE VISTULA ON ACCOUNT OF THE HEAVY GERMAN SHELLING. THE CITY COULD ONLY BE TAKEN BY A WIDE ENCICLEMENT. IN THE MEANTIME ON GENERAL BERLINGS INSISTENCE AGAINST THE BETTER JUDGMENT OF THE RED ARMY 4 POLISH INFANTRY BATTALIONS HAD CROSSED THE RIVER. THESE HAD SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES AND UNFORTUNATELY WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN. HE SAID THAT THE INSURGENTS WERE STILL FIGHTING BUT WERE CAUSING MORE DIFFICULTY THAN ASSISTANCE. THERE WERE GROUPS IN 4 DIFFERENT ISOLATED PARTS OF THE CITY WHO WERE ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES WITHOUT OFFENSIVE ABILITY. IN ALL THERE WERE SOME 9,000 WITH ARMS BUT MANY SYMPATHAZERS WERE GIVING ASSISTANCE WHERE THEY COULD. THE INSURGENTS WERE INTERMINGLED WITH

ACTION

F-0	
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F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67

Paraphrase to 232314Z
J.C.S. and Sec of State per Ad. Leahy.

Pub 5742 + 1945 P-A-P

NAVY DEPARTME

MESSAGE

	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY:		FOR ACTION: CNO	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED
DATE: 24 SEPT 1944			
TOR CODEROOM:		INFORMATION:	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED
DECODED BY:			
PARAPHRASED BY:			
ROUTED BY:			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

PAGE 2 OF 3 232314Z NCR 7551

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE GERMANS AND THEREFORE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BOMB OR SHELL THE GERMANS POSITIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME STALIN SPOKE WITH SYMPATHY FOR THE INSURGENTS. HE SAID THAT THE RED ARMY WAS IN CONTACT WITH EACH OF THE GROUPS BOTH BY RADIO AND BY MEN GOING BACK AND FORTH. IT WAS NOW UNDERSTOOD WHY THE INSURRECTION HAD BEEN STARTED PREMATURELY. THE GERMANS HAD THREATENED TO DEPORT ALL OF THE MALE POPULATION FROM WARSAW AND IT BECAME NECESSARY FOR THE MEN TO FIGHT. THEY HAD NO CHOICE AS THEY FACED DEATH EITHER WAY. THE MEN THEREFORE WHO WERE ORGANIZED HAD STARTED RESISTANCE AND THE OTHER MEN HAD GONE UNDER GROUND HIDING THEMSELVES IN SEWERS. STALIN NEVER MENTIONED THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BUT SAID THEY HAD NOT FOUND GENERAL BOR WHO HAD EVIDENTLY LEFT THAT CITY AND WAS "COMMANDING A RADIO STATION", IN SOME UNKNOWN PLACE. CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO GENERAL DEANE HE SAID THAT THE RED ARMY HAD DROPPED SMALL ARMS INCLUDING

ACTION	
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F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67

ESSAGE NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER | ADDRESSEES | PRECEDENCE

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 24 SEPT 1944

TOR CODEROOM:

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

ROUTED BY:

FOR ACTION: CNO

INFORMATION:

PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

PAGE 3 OF3 232314Z NCR 7551

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MACHINE GUNS AND MORTARS AND AMMUNITION AS WELL AS FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. RECEIPT HAD BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED.

THIS WAS DONE BY SMALL TRAINING PLANES AT AN ALTITUDE OF 300 FEET400 METERS. HE OBSERVED THAT OUR PLANES AT

AN ALTITUDE HAD PARACHUTED SUPPLIES FROM SUCH HIGH ALTITUDE THAT THE WIND HAD TAKEN MUCH OF THEM AWAY FROM

THE TARGETS. SUPPLIES HAD LANDED IN SOME INSTANCES AS MUCH AS 30 KILOMETERS AWAY. WHEN PRAGA WAS LIBERATED

THE RED ARMY FOUND THE POPULATION STARVING. THE GERMANS HAD TRIED TO DEPORT ALL THE MEN AND USED POLICE DOGS TO

HUNT THEM OUT. STALIN SHOWED UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERN FO FOR THE POLES IN WARSAW AND NONE OF HIS PREVIOUS VINDI-

CATIVENESS. HE EXPLAINED THAT AFTER PRAGA HAD BEEN TAKEN IT WAS POSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE SITUATION MORE CLEARLY.

NAVAIDE....ACT

ACTION

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F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67

24 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

At the direction of Admiral Leahy there is forwarded herewith two messages, one a paraphrased copy, from Ambassador Harriman to the President both dated 23 September 1944.

These are the messages about which Commander Smith phoned you this morning, and which I understand you are expecting.

Very Respectfully,

Richard Park Jr.,
Colonel, GSC

2323142✓
2320217

24 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

At the direction of Admiral Leahy there is forwarded for the information of the Secretary a paraphrased copy of a message for the President from Ambassador Harriman which was received this date in the White House Map Room.

Very Respectfully,

Richard Park, Jr.,
Colonel, GSC

23 2314 Z. ✓

FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 232314Z NCR 7551, 24 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Further assistance to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-431.
2. By direction of Admiral Leahy, copies to Sec State and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Not answered by the President.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

AFTER EXT.

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY: 23 SEPT 1944

DATE: 231051

TOR CODEROOM: BALDWIN

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY: BALDWIN

CHECKED BY: BALDWIN

TYPED BY: BALDWIN

ROUTED BY:

ADDRESSEES

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

FOR ACTION: CNO

INFORMATION:

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY: RRRRRRR

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

230911Z NCR 6701

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

#69

NAVY 221639 IS REFERENCE. IN SPITE OF THE SOVIETS GOVERNMENTS OFFER TO CONCERT PLANS FOR SUPPLYING INSURGENTS IN WARSAW GENERAL DEANE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. ONLY INFORMATION HE HAS SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM RED ARMY STAFF IS THAT THE SOVIET HAVE FOR 5 OR 6 NIGHTS DROPPED UNSTATED QUANTITIES OF FOOD ONLY NO ARMS. SOVIET OFFICER INDICATED THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO BRITISH AND AMERICANS CONTINUING TO UNDERTAKE SUPPLY OF ARMS IF WE CONSIDERED THIS ADVISABLE. HE STATED THAT RED ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE RIVER BELOW PRAGA BUT COULD NOT ESTIMATE TIME OF LIBERATION OF THE CITY

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAIDE(#1-2).....ACT

By direction Adm Leahy, copies to Sec State and Chief of Staff.

Rcvd 231155Z. To Pres via Gray (K)

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-[illegible] OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" [illegible] contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

230911Z

OPNAV 19-76

23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Additional Air Operations for Assistance to Warsaw.

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the attached message from Ambassador Harriman to the President, dated 23 September 1944, is forwarded for information. This message replies to the cable sent to Mr. Harriman yesterday by the President, copy of which was forwarded to you by memorandum dated 22 September 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Additional Air Operations for Assistance to Warsaw.

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the attached message from Ambassador Harriman to the President, dated 23 September 1944, is forwarded for General Marshall's information. This message replies to the cable sent to Mr. Harriman yesterday by the President, copy of which was forwarded to you by memorandum dated 22 September 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1944

YOUR MESSAGE OF 22 SEPTEMBER. INSPITE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO CONCERT PLANS FOR SUPPLYING THE WARSAW INSURGENTS, GENERAL DEANE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. SO FAR, THE ONLY INFORMATION HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THE RED ARMY STAFF IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED UNSTATED QUANTITIES OF FOOD, BUT NO ARMS, FOR 5 OR 6 NIGHTS. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION, A SOVIET OFFICER INDICATED, TO BRITISH AND AMERICANS CONTINUING TO UNDERTAKE SUPPLY OF ARMS, IF THIS WERE CONSIDERED ADVISABLE BY US. THE SOVIETS, HE STATED, ARE ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE RIVER BELOW PRAGA, BUT COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE TIME OF LIBERATION OF WARSAW.

HARRIMAN

FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE 2309113 NCR 6701, 23 Sept 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

Further assistance to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-HARRIMAN #69, 22 Sept 44.
2. To President on breakfast tray.
3. By direction of Admiral Leahy, copies to SecState and Chief of Staff. See attached memorandums.
4. No reply to Harriman.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS;

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECURITY~~
~~INFORMATION~~
PRIORITY

22 September 1944

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 69. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Replying to your 191210, we are informed that the Soviet has carried out supply dropping missions to Warsaw since September 13.

Whether or not additional operations for assistance to Warsaw will be undertaken by American planes is dependent upon date of relief of Warsaw and assistance given by Soviet in the meantime.

Do the best you can.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1210, EWT, 22 September 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

22/639 NCR 6249

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

September 22, 1944

#69

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

Replying to your 191210, we are informed that the Soviet has carried out supply dropping missions to Warsaw since September 13.

Whether or not additional operations for assistance to Warsaw will be undertaken by American planes is dependent upon date of relief of Warsaw and assistance given by Soviet in the meantime.

I am therefore unable at the present time to give you the information requested.

Do the best you can.

FDR

Copy to General Marshall

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

Subject: Additional Air Operations for Assistance to Warsaw.

Careful study has been made of the message from Ambassador Harriman to the President and the Secretary of State which you enclosed with your memorandum of September 19th. I have received a similar message from General Deane who further states that it is urgent that he be notified as soon as possible as to whether an additional supply dropping mission to Warsaw is contemplated since a reduction in our bases in Russia must be effected soon. He states, however, that they are prepared to receive another mission.

Unconfirmed reports have been received that the Russians have been carrying out supply dropping missions to Warsaw since the 13th of September.

In view of the foregoing consideration, the cost of these missions to our offensive effort in Western Europe and the losses which our Air Forces may suffer on this project, it is advisable to discontinue further effort to drop supplies to the Poles. Accordingly, the President's authority to discontinue these missions is requested.

Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
DoD Letter, 5-3-72
NOV 1 1972

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Additional Air Operations for Assistance to Warsaw.

The President directs that the attached message from the President to Ambassador Harriman, dated 22 September 1944, be forwarded to General Marshall for his information.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
#69

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Additional Air Operations for Assistance to Warsaw.

Admiral Leahy directs that the attached message from the President to Ambassador Harriman, dated 22 September 1944, be forwarded to the Secretary of State for his information.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.
#69

[redacted]

FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman
SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 69, 22 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT:
Dropping supplies to Warsaw

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN-PRES/SECSTATE 191210Z, 19 Sept 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-425.
2. By direction of Admiral Brown, copy of 191210 to Gen Marshall "for information and for any comments which he might wish to pass on to the President."
3. By memo of 21 Sept 44, from Gen Marshall to Admiral Brown, Gen Marshall recommended that the "President's authority to discontinue these missions be requested."
4. Harriman's 191210, with Gen Marshall's memo, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor change by the President 22 Sept 44. Copy to SecState and Gen Marshall for information.
5. Answered by HARRIMAN-PRESIDENT 230911Z, 23 Sept 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Sec State	22 Sept 44	Adm Leahy
Gen Marshall	22 Sept 44	The President

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

9:00 A.M., 22 September 1944

INVASION COMMUNIQUE NO. 167

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force--The Allied

WIRE SERVICE BULLETIN

Prepared from wire service news reports received by

ANALYSIS BRANCH

War Department Bureau of Public Relations

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY *TELEPHONE Ext. 4759*

2445
1955
21 Sept
Top Sec.

drive northward through Nijmegen continued yesterday against increasing enemy opposition.

Our armored forces, having captured the bridge at Nijmegen in conjunction with airborne troops, crossed to the north bank of the Waal and pushed on north.

The town of Nijmegen has been cleared of the enemy.

The base of the Allied salient has been widened on both sides of Eindhoven. We have reached Someren on the east and are fighting in the area of Wintelre on the west.

Fighters and fighter-bombers supported operations in Holland. Some enemy aircraft was encountered, principally in the areas of Nijmegen and Lochem. Twenty enemy aircraft were shot down for a loss of four of our fighters.

In the Schelde estuary we have captured Terneuzen and are steadily mopping up the southern bank east of the Leopold Canal.

In the Boulogne area the enemy has been confined to the high ground southwest of town. An enemy strongpoint in the Forest de la Creche, on the outskirts of the town, was attacked by medium and light bombers.

Troops crossing into Germany from southern Holland have advanced to within three miles of Geilenkirchen, in the Stolberg-Busbach area east of Aachen. Mopping up is in progress and we are engaged in house to house fighting in Stolberg.

East of the town our troops have gained high ground.

Farther south Allied troops are clearing the Hurtgen Forest against moderate artillery fire and are also mopping up in the area of Lammersdorf.

Numerous counterattacks have been repulsed near Diekirch and one unit has destroyed 28 enemy tanks.

South of Metz our forces advanced to within six miles of the city.

Along the Meurthe River we have cleared Luneville and troops have taken the high ground along the west bank five miles to the southeast.

Other units are in the vicinity of Flin, on the Meurthe River five miles northwest of Baccarat.

Railway centers at Ehrang, Gerolstein and Pronsfeld in Germany were hit yesterday by medium bombers. AP(8:01A)

NAZIS SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES IN FIERCE TANK BATTLE

With the U.S. Third Army in France--Lt. Gen. Patton's armor, fighting the greatest tank battle of the invasion campaign, inflicted new losses upon the Germans today in a swaying action across the woods and plains northeast of Nancy which already has cost the enemy more than 100 tanks. Third Army infantrymen crossed the Sille River northeast of Nancy, but were thrown back by a German counterattack. AP(7:24A)

SOVIETS JOIN GEN. BOR'S FORCES IN WARSAW

London--Gen. Bor, Commander of Polish partisans fighting inside Warsaw, declared in a communique today that Russian units had crossed the Vistula and established contact with his embattled forces. AP(8:29A)

OVER

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RIMINI CAPTURED

Rome--British Eighth Army troops captured Rimini today and entered the southern edge of the Po Valley to outflank the Gothic Line and begin a sweep up the corridor between the Apennine Mountains and the Adriatic Sea to northern Italy. Simultaneously, American Fifth Army troops, pouring through the breached central sector of the Gothic Line, captured the important road junction of Firenzuola and pushed on to take several dominent hills to the north. The Americans also occupied the village of Santa Lucia, three miles southwest of Firenzuola, and advanced to within a mile of Futa Pass, gateway through the Apennines. Rimini was captured by Greek troops of the Eighth Army, while Canadians operating two miles east of the coastal city took San Fortunato village and an adjoining ridge which had been bitterly contested for days. The Eighth Army's Indian Division captured the town of San Marino, capital of the tiny, ancient republic of San Marino, and continued to advance northward. UP(7:38A)

SOVIETS WITHIN ARTILLERY RANGE OF TALLINN

Moscow--Soviet armored forces swept to within artillery range of Tallinn today and swung in toward the Baltic coast below the Estonian capital in a crushing two-way offensive that pinned tens of thousands of Germans into a narrowing coastal strip between the Red armies and the waiting guns of the Russian fleet. The vanguard of Marshal Leonid A. Govorov's Leningrad Army drove in from the east along the Narva-Tallinn railway and unlimbered its giant field guns on the capital after a swift overnight advance from Kadrina, 48 miles from the city. (The dispatch did not locate the nearest Soviet column, but it was indicated the Russians had driven almost 30 miles in the past 12 hours to 20 miles or less of Tallinn.) Simultaneously, the Russian Third Baltic Army drove hard for the seacoast northwest of Valga in an effort to close off the coastal highway linking Tallinn and Riga and seal the trap on the German forces in Estonia. UP(7:25A)

JAPS CAPTURE WUCHOW

Chungking--A Chinese Army spokesman announced today that Japanese forces have captured Wuchow, important port on the Siang River in eastern Kwangsi Province. Wuchow is about 180 miles west of Canton and about 170 southeast of Kweilin. AP(8:32A)

DEATH OF FIVE MORE JAP ADMIRALS ANNOUNCED

New York--Five more Japanese admirals have died in action, according to a Tokyo broadcast reported today by U.S. Government monitors. Quoting an announcement made by the Yokosuka Naval Station, Tokyo identified them as Vice-Admiral Tei Monzen and Rear Admirals Tei Seki, Kan Mori, Tsuneo Orita and Shin Okubo. Circumstances of their deaths were not disclosed. AP(6:40A)

ALLIES ADVANCE TWO MILES NORTH OF NIJMEGEN

London--British armor and American parachute troops were reported today to have fought their way at least two miles north

of the captured Nijmegen Rhine bridge toward Arnhem, eight miles from Nijmegen where a second Allied airborne force was declared holding a bridge over the north branch of the river. AP(7:33A)

MANILA RAIDS REPORTED CONTINUED FOR SECOND DAY

New York--The Japanese-controlled Manila radio said today that U.S. carrier-plane raids against the Manila area were continued for the second day by several waves of fighters and bombers. AP(8:10A)

END

NEW YORK TIMES, 19 SEPT 1944

SHUTTLE FORTS AID WARSAW PATRIOTS

U. S. Bombers Drop Arms, Fly On to Russia—Gain Seen in Soviet-Polish Relations

NAZI FIGHTERS PUNISHED

Escorts Returning to Britain Destroy Seven—Our 'Heavies' From Italy Hit in Balkans

By E. C. DANIEL

By Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Sept. 18—With Soviet consent the supplying of arms and food to the beleaguered underground garrison of Warsaw was stepped up considerably today when United States Eighth Air Force heavy bombers from Britain started a shuttle delivery service to the Polish patriots in the city.

The Flying Fortresses that made the trip landed at bases in Russia and part of their escort of Mustangs went there also. The rest of the P-51 fighters turned back over Warsaw and shot up ground targets in Germany on their return to Britain. They shot down four Nazi planes in combat and destroyed three on Reich airfields. All the fighters returning here reached their bases safely.

[redacted]

Polish Government in London.

[redacted] their stricken capital, but until now permission had not been received for our bombers on this work to land in the Soviet Union.

Although the Warsaw underground fights under the orders of the London Polish Government, with which the Soviet Union has broken relations, Red Air Force planes last week also started making parachute droppings over Warsaw and the Red Army established contact with the command of the underground garrison. British authorities are hopeful that this collaboration will contribute to clarification of all Polish-Russian relations.

General Bor Reports Gains

Giving thanks for the support of Soviet artillery, a communiqué today from General Bor, commander of the Polish forces in the city, reported that Warsaw's underground fighters were [redacted] compensating aid to the Red Army in its efforts to break through the German lines from the eastern suburb of Praga into the center of Warsaw.

The communiqué said the Poles won ground in attacks on the Germans on the west bank of the Vistula, which prevented the enemy from consolidating a defense line on the river. The Germans suffered heavy losses, the communiqué said.

In the suburb of Czerniakow, General Bor stated, the Poles are fighting bitterly to hold part of the river bank. Nazi attacks elsewhere in the city were repulsed.

Until the American and Russian air forces joined in delivering arms to Warsaw about 100 tons of supplies had been dispatched there by planes from the Mediterranean theatre under British control. A revision of Russia's opinion on the strength of the Polish underground forces, not only in Warsaw but

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[redacted]

[redacted] "AMUG"

PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Moscow, Russia.

To: War Department.
CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
London, England.

Nr: MX 21018 19 September 1944

To General Marshall information to General Spaatz from Deane. [redacted] MX 21018.

USSTAF Mission to Warsaw yesterday highly successful. Because of the political implications in the matter, Harriman has cabled the President informing him of the success of the mission and asking him for information as to whether an additional mission is to be carried out. Eastern Command (VI in Soviet on Franks)

It is urgent that ESCOM be notified as soon as possible as to whether an additional mission to Warsaw is contemplated. ESCOM is prepared to receive another mission, but it should be sent soon as reduction program must be completed prior to winter conditions.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
CofS

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 23 1974

CM-IN-17857 (19 Sep 44) 1933Z bjm

[redacted]

Col Park

052 - Polish - Russian

COPY NO. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER | EXT. | ADDRESSEES (ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE) | PRECEDENCE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 19 SEPT 1944

TOR CODEROOM: 191257

DECODED BY: COOK

PARAPHRASED BY: COOK | CHECKED BY | DITTOED BY: COOK

ROUTED BY: COOK | COOK

FOR ACTION: THE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF STATE

INFORMATION:

PRECEDENCE: URGENT / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM / PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

191216 NCR 3384

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOPSECRET AND PERSONAL TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HARRIMAN.

REFERENCE USNAVCOM 122231. REPORTS INDICATE SHUTTLE MISSION YESTERDAY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN DROPPING SUPPLIES TO THE INSURGENTS IN WARSAW. AS ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL AT OUR BASES IN RUSSIA ARE BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING DECISION ON WHETHER AN ADDITIONAL OPERATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO WARSAW IS TO BE UNDERTAKEN, INFORMATION ON THIS QUESTION IS URGENTLY REQUESTED.

To President at Hyde Park as
HR-OUT-425
Copy to Gen Marshall by direction
Admiral Brown, 19 Sept 44.

NAVAIDE.....(#1 - #2) ACTION

SECRETARY OF STATE.....(#3)

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO. 42

OPNAV 19-78

TOP-SECRET

19 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

The attached message from Ambassador Harriman to the President and the Secretary of State is forwarded for information and for any comments which you might wish to pass on to the President.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
Harriman's 191210,
September 1944.

FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President/~~Sec State~~

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 191210Z, 19 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

Dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Further reply to PRES-HARRIMAN #63, 12 Sept 44.
2. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-425.
3. By direction of Admiral Brown, copy to General Marshall "for information and for any comments which he might wish to pass on to the President."
4. By memo of 21 Sept 44, from Gen Marshall to Admiral Brown, Gen Marshall recommended that the "President's authority to discontinue these missions be requested."
5. Harriman's 191210Z, with Gen Marshall's memo, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor change by the President 22 Sept 44; sent to Harriman as PRES #69, 22 Sept 44.
6. Copy to Gen Marshall for his information.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Gen Marshall	19 Sept 44.	Adm Brown

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

SECRET

HS.

18 September 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number None Filed 181410Z

To the President from Winant.

Immediately following your directive that a mission to drop supplies on Warsaw was authorized clearance was obtained from Moscow and the project organized. Bad weather has delayed the mission. I thought you would like to know that I just received a message which was flashed back stating that one hundred and seven ships today in clear weather had dropped supplies over Warsaw.

End

SECRET

To President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-420.

File Copy

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 1814102, 18 Sept 44.
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-420, 18 Sept 44.
2. No answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION: CNO	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM
DATE 14 SEPT 1944			
TOR CODEROOM 0132			
DECODED BY LTCOMDR REEGAN		INFORMATION	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY REEGAN	CHECKED BY REEGAN		
ROUTED BY REEGAN	DITTOED BY REEGAN		

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES) 132130/Z NCR 8302

Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

To President at Hyde Park as GR-OUT-401.

OUTGOING DISPATCH PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

CABLE NR 122231 WH 63 FROM MR HULL REGARDING AID TO THE INSURGENTS IN WARSAW REACHED ME ONLY LATE TONIGHT. ON THE BASIS OF AN EARLIER MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE MILITARY MISSION FROM GENERAL SPAATZ I SPOKE TO MOLOTOV LAST NIGHT REGARDING AN OPERATION BY OUR AIR FORCE WHICH MOLOTOV APPROVED AFTER TELEPHONING TO RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF. TODAY GENERAL DEANE TALKED TO AN OFFICER OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF INQUIRING WHAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO DO ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT. HE REPLIED THAT THE RED ARMY HAD NOTHING PLANNED. GENERAL DEANE AND HEAD OF BRITISH MILITARY MISSION WILL JOINTLY

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

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File Copy

132130/Z

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER | EXT.

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE 14 SEPT 1944

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY | CHECKED BY

ROUTED BY | DITTOED BY

ADDRESSEES — ASTERISK (*) DAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

FOR ACTION: CNO

INFORMATION:

PRECEDENCE

FOR ACTION: PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM

INFORMATION: PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

(PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES) 132130/Z NCR 8302

Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

APPROACH RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF TOMORROW TO PRESS FOR THE CARRYING OUT BY THE RED ARMY OF THE PROMISE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO RENDER ASSISTANCE ITSELF. I WILL SEE MOLOTOV IF A SATISFACTORY ANSWER IS NOT OBTAINED.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAIDE(#1-#2)....ACTION

Rec'd 14/0255Z

Sent as OOT 401 at 14/0259Z

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

132130/Z

OPNAV 19-78

FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 132130Z NCR 8302, 14 Sept 44.
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-HARRIMAN #63, 12 Sept 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-401.
3. No answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

12 September 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA MOSCOW

TOP SECRET FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM SECRETARY HULL. WH Number 63.

The President has directed General Marshall to send immediate instructions to Deane to explore with the appropriate Soviet military authorities in conjunction with his British military colleagues the urgent possibility of utilizing the Soviet offer to cooperate in assistance to Warsaw. (Your 3413, September 10). The President likewise desires that you lend every support to Deane's efforts and you should inform Molotov that this Government is prepared to do its utmost towards working out jointly with the British and the Russians the question of immediate aid to the Warsaw garrison. While it is of course possible that this Soviet decision comes too late if the physical situation of the garrison in Warsaw has been so reduced as to make the dropping of supplies impractical that is a factual question which will emerge in the negotiations for the actual despatch of aid.

From the political point of view we feel that it is of the highest importance that there should be no hesitation on our part in initiating the implementation of the Soviet promise, in order to avoid any possibility of our being blamed in the event that the aid does not arrive in time. This is particularly important since the President today received a further urgent appeal from Premier Mikolajczyk for assistance to the Warsaw garrison.

HULL

Released from the White House Map Room at 1805 E.W.T. 12 September 1944

HENRY W. PUTNAM, Capt.,A.C.

File Copy
122231

FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. #63, 12 September 1944
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Supplies to Warsaw

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN's 3413, 10 Sept 44 (State Dept), which was sent to the President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference as MR-OUT-380.
2. In MR-OUT-385, 11 Sept 44, Mr. Hopkins suggested that the President (1) send message to PM Mikolajczyk, (2) send a msg to Gen Marshall asking him to have Gen Deane explore matter fully with British and Russian military people, and (3) have State Department reply to Harriman's #3413 coordinating whatever they may say with Marshall's instructions to Deane.
3. Draft of PRES #63 prepared by State Dept; sent to White House Map Room 11 Sept 44 with instructions not to send it until given ok by Mr. Hopkins.
4. MR-IN-145 repeated msg sent by Gen Marshall to Gen Deane. By direction of Mr. Hopkins, #63 dispatched to Harriman, 12 Sept 44.
5. Answered by HARRIMAN-PRES/SECSTATE, 132130 NCR 8302 (Navy), filed herein.
6. Also see Harriman-President 191210, 19 Sept 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

From: General Eisenhower

To: AMSSO for Chiefs of Staff

Info: SHAEF MAIN
JSM USSTAF
AIR MIN - AEAF MAIN FWD
30 MISSION MOSCOW

Date: 12th September 1944.

Reference AMSSO telegram 5157 of 10 September.

Operation to drop supplies on Warsaw is being planned by USSTAF to take place on 13 September. The operation is being co-ordinated with the Russians by USSTAF and a confirmation of details from Moscow is awaited.

T.O.O. 121305B

Distribution
Restricted
U.S. Secretariat (2)

(Repeated to OCTAGON)

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Handy, Adm King, Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, CofS

CM-IN-11343 (13 Sep 44) 04357 bjm

TOP SECRET

33

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

MR-IN-145 (QUEBEC to WASHINGTON) 12 SEPTEMBER 1944

FROM: COLONEL PARK
TO : COMMANDER TYREE

The following message was sent via War Department channels. Admiral Leahy directs that a paraphrase of this message be furnished the State Department for information:

"U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, for Deane from Marshall.

"Conditions of Polish Patriots in Warsaw so critical that urgent action essential. In order to take advantage of Soviet agreement for aid desire that you in conference with representatives from Spaatz headquarters and from RAF prepare plan without delay and secure coordination of Soviet authorities as to arrangements and details of operation. Plan must take into consideration present location of Patriots so as to insure maximum amount of supplies being dropped to Patriots rather than to Germans. Risk to airmen must be kept to minimum while endeavoring to secure maximum relief of Patriots. Spaatz and Portal have been given copy of this message and will send names of representatives to you. Spaatz has been instructed to contact you re clearance for plane into Russia, details as to destination and other operational information. Present condition of Polish Patriots in Warsaw such that delivery of supplies must be accomplished at earliest possible date."

The above message was also sent to General Spaatz for his information and the following was added:

"Contact Deane without delay giving him name of your representative and arranging details for above mission. RAF representative will go to Moscow with your representative. Keep this office informed as to progress."

TOP-SECRET

12 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of Admiral Leahy, the following paraphrase of a message sent via War Department channels from General Marshall to the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, for General Deane, is furnished for your information:

"The situation of the Polish Patriots in Warsaw is so critical that it is essential urgent action be taken. In order to take advantage of Soviet agreement for assistance, desire that you together with representatives from Spaatz' Headquarters and from the Royal Air Force without delay prepare a plan and secure coordination of Soviet authorities as to arrangements and operational details. The present location of Patriots must be taken into consideration by the plan so as to insure maximum amount of supplies being dropped to them rather than to the enemy. While endeavoring to secure maximum relief of Patriots, risk to airmen must be kept to a minimum. Copies of this message have been given to Spaatz and Portal and they will send names of representatives to you. Spaatz has been instructed to get in touch with you regarding clearance for plane into Russia, details as to destination, and other information on operations. Existing conditions of Polish Patriots in Warsaw such that delivery of supplies must be accomplished at earliest possible date."

The message quoted above was also sent to General Spaatz for his information with the addition of the following:

"Without delay, contact Deane giving him your representative's name and arrange in detail for mission described above. Representative of RAF will go to Moscow with him. Keep this office informed as to progress being made."

Mr. Hopkins has seen this message and instructed that your message to Ambassador Harriman on the same subject be released. It was released from the White House Map Room at 122205Z. Your message had been

File Copy

TOP-SECRET

held in accordance with the instructions contained in your memorandum dated 11 September 1944 which accompanied the message to Mr. Harriman.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A.C.,
White House Map Room.

Bud 1701 R-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Sept. 11, 1944.

The Map Room,

The White House

Please do not send this telegram until released by Mr. Hopkins.

Shown to Mr. H. at 1710

Instruct to hold till answers read in affirmative from Pres on items in Out #385.

Opt receipt of MR-IN-145 12 sept at 1220 43Z - Mr. H gave OK to release atchd.

CH

RETURN TO STATE
RM 383.

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X SECRET X
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

Collect { Full rate / Day letter / Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
$

Department of State

Washington, SECRET

NO DISTRIBUTION NO STENCIL VIA ARMY WIRE

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW

TOP SECRET FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY.

The President has directed General Marshall to send immediate instructions to Deane to explore with the appropriate Soviet military authorities in conjunction with his British military colleagues the urgent possibility of utilizing the Soviet offer to cooperate in assistance to Warsaw (your 3413, September 10.) The President likewise desires that you lend every support to Deane's efforts and you should inform Molotov that this Government is prepared to do its utmost towards working out jointly with the British and the Russians the question of immediate aid to the Warsaw garrison. While it is of course possible that this Soviet decision ~~will come~~ comes too late if the physical situation of the garrison in Warsaw has been so reduced as to make the dropping of supplies impractical that is a factual question which will emerge in the negotiations for the actual despatch of aid. crss

From the political point of view we feel that it is of the highest importance that there should be no hesitation

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ... 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate / Day letter / Night letter }

Charge Department: Full rate / Day letter / Night letter

Charge to

$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED

X SECRET X

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

CLEAR

AIRGRAM

SECRET

-2-

VIA ARMY WIRE

on our part in initiating the implementation of the Soviet promise, in order to avoid any possibility of our being blamed in the event that aid does not arrive in time. This is particularly important since the President today received a further urgent appeal from Premier Mikolajczyk for assistance to the Warsaw garrison.

EE:CEB:LIS

EUR
HFH

9/11/44

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... *M.*, ... *19*.....

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

11 SEPTEMBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER WH 61. FOR PRIME MINISTER MIKOLAJCZYK OF POLAND FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I want to assure you that we are taking every possible step to bring Allied assistance as speedily as possible to the Warsaw garrison. I realize fully the urgent importance of this matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1905, EWT, 11 September 1944:

Robert W Bogue
ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

TOP-SECRET

File Copy

FROM President Roosevelt TO Prime Minister Mikolajczyk

SERIAL or FILE NO. #61, 11 September 1944
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

Dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Answers 2 messages from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to President Roosevelt, of 10 Sept and 11 Sept, both sent to the President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference.
2. Answer drafted by Mr. Hopkins; sent to President as MR-OUT-385, 11 Sept 44.
3. President approved with minor change in MR-IN-144, 11 Sept 44.
4. All correspondence on this subject filed herein.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

OF POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

The Ambassador of Poland has today received from London a telegraphic communication addressed to the President by Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, which the Ambassador has the honor to submit for immediate transmittal to the President:

FROM: PRIME MINISTER MIKOLAJCZYK

TO : PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The Soviet Government, having now agreed to collaboration in the so urgent matter of aid to Warsaw, I appeal to you, Mr. President, to issue a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for immediate air operations in support of the defenders of Warsaw.

Should the Soviet Government begin to discuss the plan of aid and raise reservations, so much time would elapse that it might be too late to save Warsaw.

Signed: Stanislaw Mikolajczyk

Washington, September 11, 1944.

Delivered to Mr. Hopkins. Sent to President at Quebec as MR-OUT-388.

File Copy

FROM Prime Minister Mikolajczyk TO President Roosevelt

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE Unno, 11 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Delivered by Polish Ambassador to Mr. Hopkins. Sent to the President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference as MR-OUT-388.
2. Reply received in Map Room as MR-IN-144, 11 Sept 44.
3. To Prime Minister Mikolajczyk (via Alusna London) as PRESIDENT's #61, 11 Sept 44.
4. All correspondence on this subject filed herein.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

MR-OUT-385 (11 September 1944)

FROM: MR. HARRY HOPKINS (WASHINGTON)

TO : THE PRESIDENT (QUEBEC)

Have discussed all of the cables relative to Poland with the State Department and Marshall. On the basis of these conferences, would suggest that you send substantially the following messages:

1. TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND. "This will acknowledge your very urgent wire and I want to assure you that we are taking every possible step to bring Allied assistance as speedily as possible to the Warsaw garrison. I realize fully the urgent importance of this matter."

2. That you send a message to General Marshall asking him to have Deane explore this matter fully and urgently with the British and Russian military people.

3. That the State Department will reply to Harriman's wire to you and the Secretary coordinating whatever they may say with Marshall's instructions to Deane.

HARRY

111725Z.

TOP-SECRET

11 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached messages are forwarded to you for your information by direction of Mr. Hopkins.

J. A. Tyree, Jr.,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl, w/incls.

TOP-SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 1005, 10 SEPTEMBER 1944

The three attached messages have been received today from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy in Moscow. The first two were received by me this morning and the third this noon. They have just been given to me by Eden and they have been forwarded to the Prime Minister. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and have telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asked him to plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw. It is my understanding that copies of this message have been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Military Mission in Moscow and to General Spaatz. In the order of their receipt, the three messages are attached.

WINANT

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR CLARK KERR

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 1944

My immediately preceding telegram.

In his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743. He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assistance to damaged British or American aircraft. "It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention.

CLARK KERR

TOP-SECRET

INCL. #1

TOP-SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR CLARK KERR

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 1944

Your telegram No. 2855.

Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty's Government:

Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5th, 1944.

The Soviet Government on September 5th received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.

The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish Emigre Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military command, and in violation of the latter's operational plans.

The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American, can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organising a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who

had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.

Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However itis necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility "from a sick head to a clear one." The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government's position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had

taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish Emigre Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn? It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.

As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.

CLARK KERR

TOP-SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR CLARK KERR

TO : FOREIGN OFFICE

DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 1944

My telegram No. 2379.

Following for Secretary of State.

Personal.

This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and American Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.

I am in touch with United States Ambassador.

CLARK KERR

INCL #3

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET - AMUG

URGENT

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department
CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

Nr: MX 20918 10 September 1944

Joint Chiefs of Staff info Spaatz from Deane MX 20918.

Soviet Government informed British Government today that if the British insist the Soviets are prepared with reluctance to act jointly with the Americans and the British in a plan to be concerted for dropping weapons, food and medical supplies for the assistance of the Insurgents in Warsaw. Soviet message is reported more fully by the Ambassador in his cable number 3413 September 10th, 2 P.M., to the President and Secretary of State. No action will be taken here unless instructions are received from you. You will undoubtedly hear from the British on the subject.

And

FOOTNOTE: This has been relayed to OCTAGON

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-9103 (10 Sep 44) 1955Z jb

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 23 1974

49

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ WE.

URGENT

From: Chiefs of Staff, London, England

To: Quebec, Canada (Relayed from WAR as no. 29923)
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward on Continent
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England
Joint Staff Mission, Washington
CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
US Military Mission, Moscow

No: 101535Z 10 September 1944

OZ 5157. Following for General Eisenhower from Chiefs of Staff. Reference AGWAR telegram W 80785 of 15th August.

British Ambassador to Moscow reports Russians state that if we remain firmly convinced that dropping of supplies to Warsaw will be of real assistance to Poles and we insist that Russians cooperate with British and Americans in organizing such assistance, Soviet Government is prepared to agree provided this aid is rendered in accordance with prearranged plan. His Majesty's Government earnestly desire that no opportunity of aiding Poles in Warsaw be missed.

Request you consider possibility of mounting operation to drop supplies on Warsaw at earliest possible date. Our representatives in Moscow are aware of Russian decision, and we have requested them to do all possible to make necessary arrangement with Russians.

Presume you will inform General Deane of your

OCTAGON-IN-95 (14 Sept 44)

Published in FRUS - Quebec Conf. 1944, pp 205-06

Admiral Leahy

052 Russian-Polish SECRET COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

From: Chiefs of Staff, London, England

No: 101535Z 10 September 1944

decision and of your requirements from Russians through your usual channels.

End

CONFERENCE DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King General Arnold, General Handy, Admiral Cooke, General Bissell.

OCTAGON-IN-95 (14 Sept 44) 0038Z jck

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SENT TO PRESIDENT AT QUEBEC AS
MR-OUT-380. 10 SEPT 44.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via Army

Dated September 10, 1944

Rec'd 10:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3413, September 10, 2 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

The British Ambassador has shown me a message from the Soviet Government which he has been asked to transmit to his Government in answer to the War Cabinet's message regarding aid to Warsaw. You will undoubtedly receive this in full. Briefly, however, after a lengthy recital of the circumstances and a statement that the really effective aid will come from the advance of the Red Army, the message states in paraphrase as follows:

"In addition there is the form of assistance to the people in Warsaw which can hardly be considered effective; namely, the dropping by airplane of weapons, food and medical supplies. We have dropped both weapons and food for the insurgents in Warsaw on several occasions, but each time we have received information that these supplies have fallen into German hands. If you are so firmly convinced, however, of the efficacy of this form of assistance and if you insist that the Soviet Command organize jointly with the Americans and British such aid, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to it. It will be necessary, however, to render this aid in accordance with a prearranged plan."

The message ends by implying that the British were partly to blame for the fact that the Soviet Command was not informed in advance of the Warsaw uprising. Reference is also made to British failure to prevent the Poles from their action in connection with the Katyn incident.

This message is obviously an extremely shrewd statement for the record, and places the responsibility now on the British and us for the decision whether the dropping of supplies should be attempted at this late date. I have no recent information as to the size of the area still held by the Insurgents in Warsaw and whether it is practicable to parachute supplies from a sufficiently high altitude to avoid unconscionable losses to our flyers. I assume urgent instructions will be given General Deane or myself on what our position now is and whether or not negotiations with the Red Army staff are to be entered into to render aid.

HARRIMAN

File Copy

FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 3413 (State), 10 September 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

Supplies to Warsaw

ACTION:

1. To President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference as MR-OUT-380.
2. In MR-OUT-385, 11 Sept 44, Mr. Hopkins suggested that the President (1) Send message to PM Mikolajczyk, (2) send a msg to Gen Marshall asking him to have Gen Deane explore matter fully with British and Russian military people, and (3) have State Department reply to Harriman's #3413 coordinating whatever they may say with Marshall's instructions to Deane.
3. Draft message from Sec State to Amb Harriman prepared by State Dept; sent to White House Map Room 11 Sept 44 with instructions not to send it until given ok by Mr. Hopkins.
4. MR-IN-145 repeated msg sent by Gen Marshall to Gen Deane. By direction of Mr. Hopkins, the message prepared by State was dispatched to Harriman, thruough Navy channels, as PRES-HARRIMAN #63, 12 Sept 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

SENT TO PRESIDENT AT QUEBEC AS
MR-OUT-380. 10 SEPT 44.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated September 10, 1944

Rec'd 12:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

97, September 10, 4 p.m.

FROM SCHOENFELD.

Premier Mikolajczyk has requested me to transmit to the President the following urgent message dated September 10:

"MR. PRESIDENT.

"The reports which the Polish Government receive from Warsaw show that the situation is desperate and that the fight against the overshelming German power may cease at any moment, unless sutained from outside.

"Our urgent appeals for a large scale operation which would combine the bombing of German concentrations with the dropping of supplies at the home Army in Warsaw are still under consideration by the British Government and no decision has been taken so far. This decision if favorable may come too late.

"I therefore beseech you Mr. President and you Mr. Prime Minister to take a bold and immediate decision which could save Warsaw and its inhabitants from total destruction and at the same time give new hope to millions of Poles to whom the fight in Warsaw is a symbol of Poland's will to live.

"I also feel obliged to stress that should the Warsaw rising be crushed by the Germans without a last minute attempt at succor from Poland's mighty western allies, the tragedy of Warsaw may cast a deep and lasting shadow on the Polish nation's attitude towards its traditional friends. I beg you to weigh this in your minds, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, when taking your decision at this fateful hour.

"(Signed) St. Mikolajczyk."

An identical message is being given the British Foreign Office for transmission to Mr. Churchill.

WINANT

File Copy

FROM Prime Minister Mikolajczyk TO President Roosevelt

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE State 97, 10 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

Dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. To President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference as MR-OUT-380, 10 Sept 44.
2. Suggested reply by Mr. Hopkins to the President as Para 1, MR-OUT-385, 11 Sept 44.
3. Mr. Hopkins' draft approved by President with minor change; received in Map Room as MR-IN-144, 11 Sept 44.
4. To Prime Minister Mikolajczyk (via Alusan London) as PRESIDENT's #61, 11 Sept 44.
4. All correspondence on this subject filed herein.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

TOP SECRET

sent as
MR-ort-379
10/1830 Q
in 4 parts

10th September 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 1005 Filed 10/1715Z

Winant to President Roosevelt.

The following three messages have been received from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy Moscow today, the first two this morning and third this noon. They have been forwarded to the Prime Minister and have just been given to me by Eden. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asking that he plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw. I understand that copies of this cable have been forwarded to General Spaatz, to the British Military Mission in Moscow and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three messages follow in the order of their receipt.

Number one begins:

My immediately preceding telegram.

In his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743. He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assistance to damaged British or American aircraft. "It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention."

Message number two begins:

Your telegram No. 2855.

Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty's Government. (Begins):

TOP SECRET

File Copy

TOP SECRET

Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5th, 1944.

The Soviet Government on September 5th received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.

The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish Emigre Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military command, and in violation of the latter's operational plans.

The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organizing a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.

Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both weapons and food for Warsaw insurgents but we have each time received information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However it is necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility"from a sick head to a clear one". The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government's position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish Emigre Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn? It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.

As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.

Message number three begins:

My telegram No 2379.

Following for Secretary of State.

Personal.

This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and Amer ican Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give

TOP SECRET

fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.

I am in touch with United States Ambassador.

End

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 1005, 10 Sept 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT:
Supplies to Warsaw

ACTION:

1. To President at Quebec OCTAGON Conference as WR-OUT-379.
2. By direction of Mr. Hopkins, copy to Sec State.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Sec State	11 Sept 44	Mr. Hopkins

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 619, 5 SEPTEMBER 1944

Replying to your 779, 780 and 781, I am informed by my office of Military Intelligence that the fighting Poles have departed from Warsaw and that the Germans are now in full control.

The problem of relief for the Poles in Warsaw has therefore unfortunately been solved by delay and by German action and there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them.

I have long been deeply distressed by our inability to give adequate assistance to the heroic defenders of Warsaw and I hope that we may together still be able to help Poland be among the victors in this war with the Nazis.

ROOSEVELT

COPY

TOP SECRET

4th September 44

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of The United States

Unnumbered Filed 04/2325Z

For The President from Winant.

This evening the Prime Minister is sending you three cables:-

1. A combined Cabinet message which is being sent to Clark-Kerr in Moscow for delivery to Stalin;

2. A message sent by the women of Warsaw to the Pope, a copy of which was given the British Minister to the Vatican for forwarding to the British Government here;

and 3, a message from the Prime Minister to you explaining the first two messages and the action taken by the British Government.

I telephoned Eden after they reached the Army Signal Office here tonight and asked if they were also sending the Vatican message to Clark-Kerr. He told me they were not doing so but only repeating it to you. It is my guess that a similar message was given Tittman for transmission to the State Department.

TOP SECRET

To H.P. as Red 372
050139Z.

File Copy PLS

I believe a personal message from you to Stalin using selected parts of the Vatican message would be most helpful in the present situation. If you thought Stalin would be unwilling to send Russian planes to deliver needed supplies to the people of Warsaw or to move his troops forward in that area, I am sure it would be possible on short notice to reestablish the daylight mission planned by the U.S. Air Force, provided airfields were made available on the Russian side. We have a definite agreement with the Russians to clear our targets with them wherever Russian airfields are used for landings. I know the Russians realize that we have respected this agreement.

Eden also told me in my conversation with him tonight that since sending the message forwarded to you by the Prime Minister, he has heard that Mikolajczyk has become less secure with his government. On the other hand, the British intend to make it clear that they will continue to recognize him and no one else. General Sosnkowski has further complicated the situation this evening by delivering what Eden described as an anti-Allied broadcast from London to the people of Warsaw. This will not help in persuading the Russians to help the people of Warsaw.

Winant

Red 371
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 781, 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

Following is text of message from women of Warsaw referred to in my number 779:

"Most Holy Father, we Polish women in Warsaw are inspired with sentiments of profound patriotism and devotion for our country. For three weeks while defending our fortress we have lacked food and medicine. Warsaw is in ruins. The Germans are killing the wounded in hospitals. They are making women and children march in front of them in order to protect their tanks. There is no exaggeration in reports of children who are fighting and destroying tanks with bottles of petrol. We mothers see our sons dying for freedom and the fatherland. Our husbands, our sons and our brothers are not considered by the enemy to be combatants. Holy Father, no one is helping us. The Russian armies which have been for three weeks at the gates of Warsaw have not advanced a step. The aid coming to us from Great Britain is insufficient. The world is ignorant of our fight. God alone is with us. Holy Father, Vicar of Christ, if you can hear us, bless us Polish women who are fighting for the Church and for freedom."

PRIME

Red 370

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 780, 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

Following is text of telegram sent to Moscow this evening mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:

"1. The War Cabinet at their meeting today considered the latest reports of the situation in Warsaw which show that the Poles fighting against the Germans there are in desperate straits.

"2. The War Cabinet wish the Soviet Government to know that public opinion in this country is deeply moved by the events in Warsaw and by the terrible sufferings of the Poles there. Whatever the rights and wrongs about the beginnings of the Warsaw rising, the people of Warsaw themselves cannot be held responsible for the decision taken. Our people cannot understand why no material help has been sent from outside to the Poles in Warsaw. The fact that such help could not be sent on account of your Government's refusal to allow United States aircraft to land on aerodromes in Russian hands is now becoming publicly known. If on top of all this the Poles in Warsaw should now be overwhelmed by the Germans, as we are told they must be within two or three days, the shock to public opinion here will be inclaculable. The War Cabinet themselves find it hard to understand your Government's refusal to take account of the obligations of the British and American Governments to help the Poles in Warsaw. Your Government's action in preventing this help being sent seems to us at variance with the spirit of Allied cooperation to which you and we attach so much importance both for the present and the future."

COPY

RED 369

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 779, 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

1. The War Cabinet are deeply disturbed at the position in Warsaw and at the far reaching effect on future relations with Russia of Stalin's refusal of airfield facilities.

2. Moreover as you know Mikolajczyk has sent his proposals to the Polish Committee of Liberation for a political settlement. I am afraid that the fall of Warsaw will not only destroy any hope of progress but will fatally undermine the position of Mikolajczyk himself.

3. My immediately following telegram contain the text of a telegram which the War Cabinet in their collective capacity have sent to our Ambassador in Moscow and also of a message which the women of Warsaw have communicated to the Pope and which has been handed by the Vatican to our Minister.

4. The only way of bringing material help quickly to the Poles fighting in Warsaw would be for United States aircraft to drop supplies using Russian airfields for the purpose. Seeing how much is in jeopardy we beg that you will again consider the big stakes involved. Could you not authorize your Air Forces to carry out this operation, landing if necessary on Russian airfields without their formal consent? In view of our great successes in the west, I cannot think that the Russians could reject this fait accompli. They might even welcome it as getting them out of an awkward situation. We would of course share full responsibility with you for any action taken by your air force.

PRIME

RECD 0500402

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 August 1944

POLAND: Mikolajczyk to Confer with Churchill.

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

Polish Premier Mikolajczyk's Chef de Cabinet (Adam Romer) has stated that Mikolajczyk was due to confer with Churchill on 30 August concerning immediate aid for Warsaw. Romer asserts that the Polish Cabinet in London will resign if the conference does not produce desired results.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 30 August)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SP Date MAY 9 1975

052 Polish-Russian

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~RESTRICTED~~ "IVI"

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: 14056 31 August 1944

Sr nr 14056.

TIMES leading editorial Thursday discussing Soviet Polish difficulties criticizes Russians for failing help Warsaw insurgents and British and US Govts allowing Polish crises continue. Recommends Poles immediate acceptance Curzon line as bad relations between Russia and Poland considered inevitable long as frontier undecided. Believes Polish acceptance now would clear way agreement with Moscow. Considers Russia entitled controlling voice in area affecting her security as US and Britain have desired dominate no resented interference other powers in regions they regard vital. Except couple left Journals British press generally critical Russia for failure aid Warsaw insurgents or cooperate with Britain and US Air Forces in dropping supplies.

Vernon Bartlett in NEWS CHRONICLE rebuts statement Russians knew nothing of plans Warsaw uprising and says Stalin promised Mikolajcxyk Red Army would help insurgents hold out till city fell. Bartlett thinks some trouble has arisen since Polish premiers interview with Stalin 9th August. Warsaw affair strengthening pro-Polish sentiment here. Discussions situation recall contribution Polish flyers in Battle of Britain and soldiers at Tobruk and fact Britain declared war as result Polish guarantee.

Ministry of Labor reports today British workers wages almost doubled since 1938.

CM-IN-118 (1 Sep 44)

~~RESTRICTED~~

Carl Berger

42

057 Russia - Poland

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

FOR : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 606, 26 AUGUST 1944

Your 769. In consideration of Stalin's present attitude in regard to relief of the Polish Underground in Warsaw as expressed in his messages to you and to me, and his definite refusal to permit the use by us of Soviet air fields for that purpose, and in view of current American conversations in regard to the subsequent use of other Soviet bases, I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to U.J.

I have no objection to your sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so.

ROOSEVELT

COPY

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

26 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 50, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your 241705 and 242200. It is my understanding that the Soviet has refused to permit our planes to use Russian air fields for the purpose of dropping supplies for the Poles in Warsaw and that our use of the fields in the future for any purpose is doubtful.

In view of current American-Soviet conversations that promise success in the subsequent use of air fields, I do not believe it would be good for our long range general war prospects to make a further endeavor to induce Stalin to reverse his present attitude in regard to the use of Soviet air fields to assist Warsaw. If the Russian campaign to take Warsaw proceeds rapidly, which present indications promise, the problem of relief supplies should soon be solved. We are all distressed about the tragedy in Warsaw and are searching for means to be of assistance.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1145, EWT, 26 August 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

File Copy

FROM The President TO Ambassador Winant

SERIAL or FILE NO. #50, 26 Aug 44.
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. Answers Winant's 241705 and 242200. (For complete file on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.")
2. Both of above messages referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
3. #50 drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes on 26 Aug 44.
4. No answer by Winant.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATION; 530 JAPAN.

August 25, 1944

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT TO WINANT: #50

Your 241705 and 242200. It is my understanding that the Soviet has refused to permit our planes to use Russian air fields for the purpose of dropping supplies for the Poles in Warsaw and that our use of the fields in the future for any purpose is doubtful.

In view of current American-Soviet conversations that promise success in the use of air fields for the prosecution of the war ~~for our war effort subsequent to the defeat of the Nazis~~, I do not believe it would be good for our long range general war prospects to make a further endeavor to induce Stalin to reverse his present attitude in regard to the use of Soviet air fields to assist Warsaw. If the Russian campaign to take Warsaw proceeds rapidly, which present indications promise, the problem of relief supplies should soon be solved. We are all distressed about the tragedy in Warsaw and are searching for means to be of assistance.

FDR

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 769, 25 AUGUST 1944

Uncle Joe's reply adds nothing to our knowledge and he avoids the definite questions asked. I suggest following reply:

"We are most anxious to send American planes from England. Why should they not land on the refueling ground which has been assigned to us behind the Russian lines without enquiry as to what they have done on the way. This should preserve the principle of your government's dissociation from this particular episode. We feel sure that if wounded British or American planes arrive behind the lines of your armies, they will be succoured with your usual consideration. We do not try to form an opinion about the persons who instigated this rising which was certainly called for repeatedly by radio Moscow. Our sympathies are, however, for the 'almost unarmed people' whose special faith has led them to attack German guns tanks and aircraft. We cannot think that Hitler's cruelties will end with their resistance. On the contrary, it seems probable that that is the time when they will begin with full ferocity. The massacre in Warsaw will undoubtedly be a very great annoyance to us when we all meet at the end of the war. Unless you directly forbid it, therefore, we propose to send the planes."

If he will not give any reply to this I feel we ought to go and see what happens. I cannot conceive that he would maltreat or detain them. Since signing this, I have seen that they are even trying to take away your airfields at Poltava and elsewhere.

PRIME

COPY

SECRET

24 August 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered Filed 242200Z

To The President from Winant.

Before receiving your number 49 I had forwarded to you today a suggestion in my 241705Z. I did not consider Stalin's answer a direct refusal. It is our planes that would be involved as only a daylight flight has any reasonable chance of dropping supplies successfully. In order to carry out this project because of distance it is necessary to use Russian airfields. I realize the time for further argument and joint formal cables is over: but we know Stalin is human and I believe if you would send him a really personal message stating that this meant much to you and asking only that we make a single shuttle landing that he would not refuse you. If he did no harm would be done.

I wish I could be of more help: but I used up all the credit I had in that direction explaining your good reasons for giving the Chinese a summary of the surrender terms.

SECRET

End

File Copy

Recd 25/0023

TPVU.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Answered by
no. 50 on 26 August.
FDR

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 242200Z, 24 August 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES #49 to Winant. (For complete file on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.")
2. Further to Winant's 241705Z, which was sent to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply. 242200Z also sent to Admiral Leahy for reply.
3. Draft reply answering both 241705 and 242200 prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes; sent to Ambassador Winant as PRES #50, 26 Aug 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 241705Z, 24 Aug 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. To President via Colonel Park. (For complete file on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.")
2. By direction of the President, to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.
3. Winant's 242200Z also received and referred to Admiral Leahy in connection with 241705.
4. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with minor changes; sent to Ambassador Winant as PRES #50. (Answers both 241705Z and 242200Z.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 605, 24 AUGUST 1944

Thank you for the information in regard to the appalling situation of the Poles in Warsaw and the inhuman behavior of the Nazis described in your 767.

My information points to the practical impossibility of our providing supplies to the Warsaw Poles unless we are permitted to land on and take off from Soviet airfields, and the Soviet authorities are at the present time prohibiting their use for the relief of Warsaw.

I do not see that we can take any additional steps at the present time that promise results.

Stalin's reply of August 23 to our joint message about the Warsaw Poles is far from encouraging to our wishes to assist.

ROOSEVELT

241630 NCR 1550

COPY

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

24 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 49, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR WINANT.

Your 978 subject message from Uncle Joe.

I do not see that this message gets us much further and I do not see the use of any further argument with him.

I do not know at this distance what is being done about further dropping of supplies to the Warsaw Poles. Uncle Joe does not mention the use of Russian airfields for our relieving planes to land on. What is your thought?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1150, EWT, 24 August 1944.

RP.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

TOP-SECRET
- 1 -

File Copy 241619 NCR 1549

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

To take up with me tomorrow (Thursday) morning.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

DRAFT

49 WINANT:

WAL

Your 978 subject message from Uncle Joe.

I do not see that this message gets us much further and I do not see the use of any further argument with him.

I do not know at this distance what is being done about further dropping of supplies to the Warsaw Poles. Uncle Joe does not mention the use of Russian airfields for our relieving planes to land on. What is your thought?

FDR ROOSEVELT

FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE 49, 24 August 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

POLISH-RUSSIAM RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. Answers Winant's #978, 23 Aug 44. (For complete file of correspondence on this subject, see "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.")
2. Written by the President, referred to Admiral Leahy with notation, "To take up with me tomorrow morning."
3. Reply sent unchanged, as written by the President.
4. Answered by Winant's 242200Z. Also see Winant's 241705Z, which crossed this message (PRES #49) in transmission.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

TOP-SECRET

23 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

By direction of the President, the attached copy of a message from Winant to the President, dated 24 August 44, is forwarded for preparation of reply.

The President suggested, as a thought, that instead of requesting overall permission to drop supplies by plane to Warsaw, we ask for one specific and detailed mission.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

TOP-SECRET

SECRET

24 August 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number: None Filed 241705Z

To the President from Winant.

The messages exchanged between you and the Prime Minister in relation to Warsaw and those which have been received from Stalin to you and the Prime Minister have been read by me. You will also have seen Schoenfeld's message of midnight last night (Polish series number 80) and his telegram number 83 Polish series of August 24, 6 P.M. I have also been constantly in touch with General Spaatz and his planes to carry out a shuttle mission to Warsaw are still on the alert. My message to you of last night forwarding Stalin's message to you and the Prime Minister does not finally reject the possibility of dropping material in Warsaw on a shuttle operation. The Polish Ambassador, Count Raczynski, called on me at 1:30 P.M. today begging that this operation might be accomplished. He told me he believed that the future of Polish-Russian relations was dependent upon a favorable decision by the Russians to permit assistance

SECRET

File Copy

by us to the people of Warsaw. I felt certain that he had been shown parts of Stalin's message to Churchill by the Foreign Office. I have since seen Eden who, due to the absence of both Churchill and Attlee, is acting as Prime Minister. He hoped you might be willing to send the following message to Stalin:

"I have your telegram. I note your views about those who authorized rising in Warsaw. I also note, however, that you do not refuse our request for facilities. I am, therefore, instructing our air forces to carry out operation and count upon you to provide facilities which are needed."

Last night I talked at considerable length with General Spaatz. As you know, our arrangements with the Soviets when we established the shuttle program which permitted us to land at Russian aerodromes called for mutual agreement on targets prior to each mission. Since the Warsaw incident the Soviets have refused to clear our targets for missions initiated in Great Britain that would permit us to include dropping of material at Warsaw. Similar action has been taken in regard to missions originating from our Mediterranean bases. This has seriously handicapped the offensive long-distance operations of our daylight

striking force. It is probably true that the premature risings in Warsaw, which might have permitted the Poles to share the recapture of that city, have been both a political and military embarrassment to the Russians. I have wondered whether you could make a personal appeal to Stalin to permit action by our air force that would at least permit us to give assistance to the great majority of people in Warsaw who were acting in good faith.

I do not think that the operation contemplated could possibly draw undue attention to this sector of the eastern front and I am deeply disturbed by the possibility of the aftermath of failure on our part in this crisis which involves the lives of innocent people in Warsaw.

I have made no commitments to either the Poles or the British here.

End

TOP SECRET

August 23, 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : Unnumbered Filed 23/2128Z

To President from Winant TOP SECRET and most personal

Sr Nr 978.

I have been asked to forward you the following message. Number 10 is telegraphing it to Prime Minister message follows:

From Premier J. V. Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill and President F. Roosevelt.

1. I have received the message from you and Mr. Roosevelt about Warsaw. I wish to express my opinions.

2. Sooner or later the truth about the group of criminals, who have embarked on the Warsaw adventure in order to sieze power will become known to everybody. These people have exploited the good faith of the inhabitants of Warsaw, throwing many almost unarmed people against the German guns, tanks and aircraft. A situation has arisen in which each new day serves not the Poles for the liberation of Warsaw, but the Hitlerites who are inhumanly shooting down the inhabitants of Warsaw.

3. From the military point of view, the situation which has arisen, by increasingly directing the attention of the Germans to

TOP SECRET

File Copy

TOP SECRET

Warsaw, is just as unprofitable for the Red Army as for the Poles. Meanwhile the Soviet troops which have recently encountered new and notable efforts by the Germans to go over to the counter-attack, are doing everything possible to smash these counter-attacks of the Hitlerites and to go over to a new wide scale attack in the region of Warsaw. There can be no doubt that the Red Army is not sparing its efforts to break the Germans round Warsaw and to free Warsaw for the Poles. That will be the best and most effective help for the Poles who are anti-Nazis.

Prime

Rec'd 23/2020 Φ - (24/00202)

T.P.V.O.

TOP SECRET

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE #978, 23 Aug 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher. (See "MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS" for complete file of correspondence on this subject.)
2. Message quoted in this dispatch sent directly to President by Stalin, 22 Aug 44.
3. Reply written by the President, referred to Admiral Leahy with notation, "To take up with me tomorrow morning."
4. Reply sent unchanged to Winant as PRES-WINANT #49, 24 Aug 44.
5. Also see Winant's 2417052, which crossed PRES #49 in transmission.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS; ~~530 SHUTTLE BOMBING~~.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: A. F. H. Q.
MAAF
Joint Staff Mission

Nr: COSMED 174 23 August 1944

From Chiefs of Staff for General Wilson reference COSMED 173.

Following is text of Polish appreciation.

(A) The Military Situation.

1. The predominant characteristic of the military situation in Warsaw up to the present moment is a tremendous disparity of equipment as possessed by the two fighting sides.

2. The Germans, besides fully equipped infantry, are using tanks - 150/200 inside the city, armoured cars, 2 armoured trains, artillery - 10 batteries, bomber aircraft, gunboat on the Vistula, flame throwers.

3. The Poles are in overwhelming majority armed with simple infantry weapons, home-made grenades and anti-tank devices - even these being in insufficient quantity for the total number of men available.

4. In spite of these unfavourable conditions and lack of adequate and regular supplies, the Polish Home Army is fighting for 22 days already, decided to continue the struggle until the arrival of the Soviet Armies.

CM-IN-22701 (25 Aug 44)

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS memo, 1-12-73,
State Dept letter, 5-24-73
By RHP Date APR 23 1974
COPY No. 33

052 Polish THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET -

TOP SECRET

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nr: COSMED 174 23 August 1944

5. An indispensable condition, however, to keep fighting going on is to secure regular supplying Warsaw with ammunition, arms, medical supplies and some food.

6. Several large portions of the city, covering 1-3 sq. kms. each, are in the hands of the Polish units.

7. It results from reports from the field that the Polish Home Army in spite of heavy odds holds the ground.

(B) The Strategical Significance of the Warsaw Battle.

8. The action of the Polish Home Army in Warsaw, undertaken to free the Polish capital from the invader through combined efforts of own units supplied by air within the city and of the approaching Red Army, has a real importance for the operations in the Central Sector of the Eastern Front.

9. The outbreak of the fighting in Warsaw coming at the time when the German counter-offensive was developing has interfered seriously with the enemy communication lines running through the city towards the only bridges across the Central Vistula.

10. The Poles engaging the Panzer units in Warsaw have delayed and weakened the German counter-attack against the Soviet forces. Fighting in Warsaw ties important enemy forces and does not allow their use on the Eastern Bank of

CM-IN-22701 (25 Aug 44)

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS memo, 1-12-73,
State Dept. letter, 5-24-73
By DAP Date APR 29 1974

COPY No. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-75784

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nr: COSMED 174 23 August 1944

the Vistula. It constitutes also a permanent threat to enemy communications.

11. The final success of the Polish units, if supported by the Allies, will have a strong heartening effect on other underground forces outside Poland. Violent adverse reactions are bound to come as a result of the eventual fall of Warsaw through lack of adequate assistance.

(C) Immediate Needs.

12. Warsaw needs ammunition, arms, medical supplies and also some food. If these are supplied, Warsaw will continue fighting until the Russians relieve the city.

13. Minimum requirements are seven dropping operations every flying night, consisting of four drops in the city and three in the suburban areas.

14. This requires a double number of aircraft taking off, i. e. 14 aircraft every flying night.

15. In their letter of 21st August S. O. E. state that 1586 Flight has only 6 aircraft available at present, some always unservicable, e.g. only 4 were available on 19th August.

16. It is therefore requested:-

CM-IN-22701 (25 Aug 44)

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS memo, 1-17-73,
State Dept. letter, 5-24-73
By RAP Date APR 23 1974

COPY NO. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-78784

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(TOP SECRET)

TOP SECRET

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nr: COSMED 174 23 August 1944

(i) That the Polish crews should be allowed, indifferently of losses sustained, to fly to Warsaw and Poland and used exclusively for operations to Poland.

(ii) That the Polish Flight should be supplied with sufficient number of aircraft to enable them to fly 14 sorties every flying night.

(iii) That the British crews and aircraft of 148 Squadron should continue their assistance in spite of Polish crews being used for Poland alone, by carrying out operations to Southern Poland.

(iv) That the above night operations to relieve Warsaw should be attempted independently from American daylight operations from this country.

End

Note: COSMED 173 is CM-IN-22468 (24 Aug 44) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS memo, 1-17-73,
State Dept. letter, 5-24-73
By RHG Date APR 23 1974

CM-IN-22701 (25 Aug 44) 0128Z mlm

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 33
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-75784

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

To: A.F.H.Q.

From: Chiefs of Staff

Rptd: M.A.A.F. Joint Staff Mission.

Dated: 23rd August 1944

No: COSMED 173

Following from Chiefs of Staff for General Wilsor.

At meeting yesterday between British representatives, including Foreign Secretary, Secretary of State for Air and V.C.A.S., and Polish Authorities in London, latter expressed strong desire that their appreciation of situation in Warsaw should be made available to you.

Text of Polish appreciation is contained in our immediately following telegram.

T.O.O. 231500Z

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo SM522-71
By BHP Date 11-2-72

CM-IN-22468 (24 Aug 44) 2112Z mlm

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 33

052 Russia

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-76724

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 767, 23 AUGUST 1944

The following is an eye witness account of the Warsaw rising. A copy has already been given to the Soviet Ambassador in London.

1. 11th August. The Germans are continuing despite all efforts of AK, their ruthless terror methods. In many cases they have burnt whole streets of houses and shot all the men belonging to them and turned the women and children out on to the street where battles are taking place, to find their say to safety. On Krolewska Street many private houses have been bombed out. One house was hit by 4 separate bombs. In one house, where lived old retired professors of Polish Universities, the SS troops forced an entrance and killed many of them. Some succeeded in escaping through the cellars to the other houses. The morale of AK and the civilian population is of the highest standard. The watchword is "Death to the Germans."

2. 12th August. The German Tank Forces during last night made determined efforts to relieve some of their strong points in the city. This is no light task however, as on the corner of every street are built huge barricades mostly constructed of concrete pavement slabs torn up from the streets especially for this purpose. In most cases the attempts failed, so the tank crews vented their disappointment by setting fire to several houses and shelling others from a distance. In many cases they also set fire to the dead which litter the streets in many places and have begun to smell rather badly. The German Tank Corps have begun to have a great respect for the Polish barricade, for they know that behind each one waits determined troops of AK with petrol bottles. These petrol bottles have caused great destruction to many of their comrades.

3. 13th August. The German Forces have brutely murdered wounded and sick people, both men and women who were lying in the hospitals of SS Lazarus on Nmska Str., N. 18, and Karol and Marsa hospitals on Prxejaxd Str, N. 5.

On Aleje Jerozelimskie, when the Germans were bringing supplies by tank to one of their outposts they drove before them 500 women and children to prevent the troops of AK from taking action against them. Many of them were killed and wounded. The same kind of action has been reported from many other parts of the city.

Despite lack of weapons, the Polish forces continue to hold the initiative in the battle for Warsaw. In some places they have broken into German strongholds and captured much needed arms and ammunition. On August 12th, 11,600 rounds of rifle ammunition, 5 machine guns, 8,500 small arms ammunition, 20 pistols, 30 anti-tank mines and transport were captured. The German forces are fighting desperately. On Aleje Jeroxolimskie, when AK set fire to a building which the Germans were holding as a fortress. Two German soldiers tried to escape to the Polish lines with a white flag, but an SS Officer saw them and shot them dead. During the night of the 12th/13th August AK received some weapons from Allied aircraft.

COPY

weapons from Allied aircraft.

4. August 15th. The dead are buried in backyards and squares. The food situation is continually deteriorating, but as yet there is no starvation. Today there is no water at all in the pipes. It is being drawn from the infrequent wells and house supplies. All quarters of the town are under shell fire and there are many fires. The dropping of supplies has intensified the morale. Everyone wants to fight and will fight but the uncertainty of a speedy conclusion is depressing.

5. August 16th. Fighting continues to be very bitter in Warsaw. The Germans fight for every inch of ground. It is reported that in some places whole districts have been burnt and the inhabitants either shot or taken to Germany. The inhabitants continue to repeat "When we get weapons we will pay them back."

Fighting for the electric power station began on August 1st at 5:10 p.m. Twenty-three soldiers of the Polish Home Army were stationed in the works before that hour because they were employed in the normal course of things, expecting the outbreak of the rising. The Germans had on the day before raised the strength of the garrison to 150 militarized police stationed in concrete pill boxes and block houses, also in all the works buildings. The signal of action was the explosion of a mine under one of the buildings. After 19 hours of fighting the electric power station was fully in Polish hands. The Polish losses were 17 killed and 27 wounded. The German losses were 20 killed and 22 wounded with 56 taken as prisoners of war. The detachment which captured the station consisted solely of manual and metal workers of the works. In spite of the fact that the buildings of the station are daily bombarded with 75 MM shells by the Germans, the personnel has succeeded in maintaining the supply of current to the civil population without the slightest interruption.

PRIME

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

23 AUGUST 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 47, PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 201610 approved.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1230, EWT, 23 August 1944.

Henry W. Putnam
HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.

2317 ϕ6 NCR 1364

TOP SECRET

(47)

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN.

Your 201610 approved.

Roosevelt

FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. #47, 23 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Polish-Russian relations; dropping supplies to Warsaw.

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN's 201610, 23 Aug 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 340.
2. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 23 Aug 44.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

23 AUGUST 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 603,

Your 759, 761 and 762. We must continue to hope for agreement by the Soviet to our desire to assist the Poles in Warsaw.

ROOSEVELT

COPY

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT/PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

22 AUGUST 1944

I have received your and Mr. Churchill's messages regarding Warsaw. I would like to express my considerations.

Sooner or later but the truth about a handful of criminals, who for the sake of seizure of power undertook the Warsaw adventure, will be universally known. These people have used the trustfulness of the Warsawites, having thrown many almost unarmed people under German guns, tanks and aviation. A situation has been created when every coming day is used not by the Poles for the task of liberation of Warsaw but by the Hitlerites, who are inhumanly annihilating the citizens of Warsaw.

From a military point of view the created situation which is attracting increased attention of the Germans to Warsaw is extremely unprofitable for the Red Army as well as for the Poles. Meanwhile the Soviet troops having met lately with new significant attempts of the Germans to develop counterattacks, are making everything possible to crush those counterattacks of the Hitlerites and develop a new broad offensive at Warsaw. There can be no doubt that the Red Army will not spare any efforts in order to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate Warsaw for the Poles. This will be the best and real help to Poles -- Anti-Nazilsts.

FROM Marshal Stalin TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. DATE Unno, 22 August 1944

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ACTION:

1. Answers joint message to Stalin from Churchill and Roosevelt, 20 August 1944.
2. This message also sent to the President by Winant, 23 Aug 44, No. 978.
3. President referred to Admiral Leahy, 28 Aug 44, with notation: "I do not think this needs an answer. Do You?"
4. Returned to Map Room for file, 28 Aug 44, by Admiral Leahy with notation: "No reply necessary."

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

NCB-549
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Moscow via Army
Dated August 21, 1944.
Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.
PRIORITY
3091, August 21, 2 p.m.

SFSEC FROM HARRIMAN

Reference your No. 1974, August 19, 3 p.m.

From information received from our air officer in London and Italy, it appears impossible for the United States Air Force to render any assistance to the Polish underground in Warsaw except by the use of shuttle operations and as a result of the prohibitive losses the British have suffered, they will probably have to abandon further attempts, particularly since the Soviets will not give approval to their crippled planes to land on Soviet territory. The decision of the Soviets therefore, to withhold Soviet facilities from our planes engaged in this mission in fact prevents our doing so, and I do not see the value of our having an admission on the Soviets' part that they "could not object" to our furnishing supplies as long as Soviet bases here not used. I believe further that Vyshinski's and Molotov's

remarks

remarks carry an inference of Soviet displeasure if we should attempt to render this assistance.

As far as our shuttle bombing generally is concerned, the Soviets after weeks of negotiation, have declined to approve our winter program for necessary expansion and winterization to make winter operation possible. A senior officer of the Red Air Staff told General Walsh two days ago that full cooperation will be given for carrying on the largest number of operations possible as long as the weather (????)

HARRIMAN

Note: A portion of this message is indecipherable.
Repetition has been requested.

LMS
MRM

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION: CNO	ROUTINE
DATE 21 AUGUST, 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM Ø328/21			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY TALMAN		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY TALMAN	CHECKED BY TALMAN		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY TALMAN	DITTOED BY TALMAN		DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

SHEET 1 OF 2 2Ø161Ø NCR 72Ø

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

AFTER FULL DISCUSSION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WE HAVE VENTURED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CHANGESOF A FEW WORDS IN THE TEXT OF THE JOINT MESSAGE TO STALIN OF AUGUST TWENTY WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL AVOID A MISUNDERSTANDING. WE HAVE ALTERED THE SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE OR YOU WILL AGREE TO OUR PLANES AND SO FORTH UNQUOTE TO READ QUOTE OR YOU WILL AGREE TO HELP OUR PLANES IN DOING IT VERY QUICKLY UNQUOTE.

WE FELTTHIS CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO FORESTALL STALINS READY ANSWER THAT MOLOTOV HAD ALREADY MADE IT PLAIN TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD NOT OBJECT TO OUR AIRCRAFT DROPPING SUPPLIES ON WARSAW WE WO ULD STILL THEN HAVE NO ANSWER FROM STALIN ON THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF SOVIET BASES FOR THIS OPERATION. FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE RECEIVED I BELIEVE I AM CORRECT IN INTERPRETING YOUR DESIRE THAT STALIN SHOULD RECONSIDER HIS

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Recd. 21.0645 Z
T.P. as Ref 339-2112002. RLB

"Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations. COPY No.

OPNAV 19-78

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

LETTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED 2ND DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

SHEET 2 OF 2 — 2Ø161Ø — NCR 72Ø

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

OBJECTION TO OUR PLANES LANDING ON SOVIET BASES AFTER FULFILLING THEIR WARSAW MISSION. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR AIR OFFICERS THAT IT WOUDD BE UNJUSTIFIABLY HAZARDOUS OPERATION TO ATTEMPT TO SEND OUR BOMBERS TO WARSAW WITHOUT FIGHTER COVER AND THAT OUR FIGHTERS CANNOT MAKE THE LONG TRIP TO WARSAW AND BACK TO ENGLAND OR ITALY, WHEREAS THEY CAN OF COURSE PROCEED TO OUR SOVIET BASES. I AM ALSO INFORMED THAT BECAUSE OF THE STAGGERING AND PROHIBITIVE LOSSES ALREADY SUSTAINED BY THE BRITISH PLANES EQUIPPED TO DROP SUPPLIES ON WARSAW, AIR MARSHAL SLESQOR HAS RECOMMENDED AGAINST ITS FURTHER ATTEMPTS WITHOUT SOVIET COOPERATION. FROM THE ABOVE IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT IF THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION TO REFUSE US THEIR FACILITIES THEY WILL IN FACT PREVENT US FROM BRINGING AID TO WARSAW. IF TIME HAD NOT BEEN OF THE ESSENCE AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR CABLE I WOULD HAVE CONSULTED YOU BEFORE TAKING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING A CHANGE IN YOUR TEXT. IN TAKING THIS ACTION I BELIEVE I AM CORRECTLY INTERPRETING YOUR WISHES.

NAVAIDE (#1, #2) .....ACTION.
FILE

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

2Ø161Ø

OPNAV 19-78

FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE 201610, 21 August 1944

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:
Changing of wording of joint message to Stalin, re dropping supplies to Waraaw.

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park as RED 340.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 23 Aug 44; to Harriman as PRES-HARRIMAN #47, 23 Aug 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 762, 20 August 1944

The message in your Number 601 has been sent on to U.J. over our two signatures. Our thoughts are one.

Following telegram received from our Ambassador in Moscow, dated 17 August:

"United States Ambassador and I are asking urgently for interview with M. Stalin. If his instructions do not arrive in time he will support me on his own responsibility.

"You should, however, know that last night Vyshinski asked the United States Ambassador to call, and, explaining that he wished to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding about what he had said to us the previous afternoon, read out the following statement. Begins:

"'The Soviet Government cannot, of course, object to English or American aircraft dropping arms in the region of Warsaw since this is American and British affair. But they decidedly object to American or British aircraft, after dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw.'"

PRIME

COPY

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

DATE: 20 AUGUST 1944

We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, ~~or will agree that our planes should do it very quickly~~ or you will agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly.[1] We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance.

CHURCHILL. ROOSEVELT.

1. ~~will agree~~ = as originally drafted but deleted by Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Kerr. See Harriman's 201610 August 1944.

will agree = addition by Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Kerr.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency concerning Mikolajczyk's trip to Moscow.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
State Department

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006697
By SR Date MAY 9 1975

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 August 1944

POLAND: Mikolajczyk's Trip to Moscow

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following summary of his interview with Premier Mikolajczyk on 17 August following the latter's return from Moscow.

Stalin seemed to Mikolajczyk to be sincere in his desire to achieve unity among the various Polish groups and to effect the restoration of the Polish state.

However, Mikolajczyk feels that Stalin has been seriously misinformed by the Polish Communists. The latter for some time have represented to Stalin that the anti-Soviet articles by such nationalist and extremist Polish writers as Ignacy Matuszewski and Zygmunt Nowakowski are official pronouncements of the Polish Government-in-exile whereas, according to Mikolajczyk, these persons have no connection with the Government and their views are not compatible with those of the Government.

(OSS Washington comment: Colonel Matuszewski writes for the extremist-nationalist Polish newspaper Nowy Swiat, published in New York. Nowakowski edited the Wiadomosci Polskie, a paper published in London until the British closed it because of its extreme anti-Soviet tone.)

Mikolajczyk said Stalin at first was adamant with regard to the Curzon line, but later indicated an inclination to review the boundary question, especially with regard to Lwow and Vilna. Stalin promised Mikolajczyk to recognize the underground army everywhere west of the Curzon line and to permit volunteers to join it, but opposed formal recruiting.

Stalin promised aid with regard to Warsaw. He explained frankly that the failure to take Warsaw in the recent drive was due to the fact that the Germans had inflicted two serious reverses on Rokossovsky's forces. The latter has now been ordered to regroup his forces west of Siedlce and to resume the drive on Warsaw as soon as he was ready.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 9 1975

SECRET

Stalin referred Mikolajczyk to the Moscow Polish Committee on all issues relating to Polish internal administration. Except for Wanda Wasilewski, whom he found openly and idealistically a Communist, Mikolajczyk formed a very unfavorable impression of these Moscow Poles. He is convinced that the entire Polish Committee of National Liberation is under Communist control. The Committee proposed that he should become the new Polish Premier and bring into this new Government two others now in the London Government. Mikolajczyk believes this is merely an attempt to use him as a facade to create an impression of legality.

Mikolajczyk has devised a counter-proposal which has not yet been submitted to or approved by the Polish Government in London; he is confident, however, that his Government will give such approval. Mikolajczyk's proposal calls for the establishment in liberated Warsaw of a totally reconstructed Government based upon the four political parties now in Poland. It would include persons who for five years have actively engaged in the struggle against the enemy in Poland. Extreme leftists from the Moscow Committee would also be represented in order to assure protection of Stalin's interests. If the Polish Government sanctions this proposal, Mikolajczyk will transmit it to the Poles in Moscow and will seek British and American support for it.

The OSS representative reports that there is some possibility that Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, President of the Polish Government-in-exile, may resign in favor of his successor-designate, Tomasz Arciszewski, in which event General Kazimierz Sosnkowski would automatically resign as commander of the armed forces.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 17 August)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

19 August 1944

From: Opnav
to : Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND SECRET, NUMBER 601, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

Your 760. The following is suggested as a joint message to U.J. which if you approve you may send over both our signatures.

QUOTE. We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or will agree that our planes should do it very quickly. We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

COPY

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 761, 19 August 1944

Further to my 760.

You should see the following telegram which I have just received from Foreign Secretary.

"The Polish Government have reminded me that Soviet broadcasting stations have for a considerable time past repeated appeals to the Polish population to drop all caution and start a general rising against the Germans. As late as July 29th, i.e., three days before the Warsaw rising began, the Moscow radio station broadcast an appeal from the Union of Polish Patriots to the population of Warsaw which, after referring to the fact that the guns of liberation were now within hearing, called upon them as in 1939 to join battle with the Germans, this time for decisive action. 'For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.' After reference to the German plan to set up defense points which would result in the gradual destruction of the city, the broadcast terminated by reminding the inhabitants that 'All is lost that is not saved by active effort' and that 'By direct active struggle in the streets, houses, etc., of Warsaw the moment of final liberation will be hastened and the lives of our brethren saved.'"

PRIME

COPY

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 760, 18 AUGUST 1944

The refusal of the Soviet to allow the U.S. aircraft to bring succour to the heroic insurgents in Warsaw added to their own complete neglect to fly in supplies when only a few score on miles away constitutes an episode of profound and far reaching gravity. If, as is almost certain, the German triumph in Warsaw is followed by a wholesale massacre no measure can be put upon the full consequences that will arise. I am willing to send a personal message to Stalin if you think this wise and if you will yourself send a separate similar message.

2. Better far than two separate messages should be a joint message signed by us both. I have no doubt we could agree on the wording.

3. The situation in Europe is being vastly changed by the glorious and gigantic victories being achieved in France by the U.S. and British forces and it may well be that our armies will gain a victory in Normandy which far exceeds in scale anything that the Russians have done on any particular occasion. I am inclined to think therefore, that they will have some respect for what we say so long as it is plain and simple. It is quite possible Stalin would not resent it but even if he did we are nations serving high causes and must give true counsels towards world peace.

PRIME

COPY

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 759, 18 August 1944

The Prime Minister has asked that this telegram which he has received from Marshal Stalin should be repeated to the President.

"Para 1. After the conversation with M. Mikolajczyk I gave orders that the Command of the Red Army should drop arms intensively in the Warsaw sector. A parachutist liaison officer was also dropped who, according to the report of the Command, did not reach his objective as he was killed by the Germans.

"Further, having familiarized myself more closely with the Warsaw affair, I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet Command had been informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it.

"In the situation which has arisen the Soviet Command has come to the conclusion that it must dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure as it cannot take either direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action.

"Para 2. I have received your communication regarding the meeting with Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Subasic. I thank you for the communication.

"Para 3. I am very pleased at the successful landing of Allied Forces in the south of France. I wish success from my heart."

PRIME

COPY

SECRET

18 August 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

For: The President of the United States

Number: None Filed 1815502

To the President from Winant.

Eden showed me Stalin's message to the Prime Minister which has been forwarded to you. In transmitting this cable to the Prime Minister Eden recommended to the Prime Minister that he continue to urge Stalin to aid the Poles in Warsaw. He also told the Prime Minister that he thought that the Poles here were accepting the situation with patience hoping that relief would be forthcoming but also realizing that their case would have the sympathy of world opinion.

The Poles understand that we wanted to help them using a shuttle service which required our landing planes in Russian territory and that to do this it was necessary for us to get permission from Moscow. They do not yet know that that permission has been refused.

Rec 18 1800Z
To Miss Tully

File Copy

SECRET

SECRET

Please see Schoenfeld's number 75 Aug 18 Polish series and my 6672 Aug 18 to the State Dept.

Prime

SECRET

FROM Ambassador Winant TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.
DATE Unno, 18 Aug 44. Filed: 181550Z.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

ACTION:

1. To President via Miss Tully.
2. Information only; no reply or further action.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

RED 328 16 August 1944

FROM: SECRETARY HULL

TO : THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Harriman has telegraphed the Department that he feels it would be helpful, in any possible discussions on the Polish question with the Soviet authorities, if he could have a copy of the message Stalin sent to you on August 9, outlining the results of the Mikolajczyk talks and proposing Lange as director of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Committee.

If you have no objection, we will send a paraphrase of Stalin's message to the Ambassador.

BLUE 128 16 August 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : SECRETARY HULL

Your RED 328. I agree. Please send copy to Harriman.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

[redacted]
Joint Chiefs of Staff
2405 77500

15 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Number: WAR 80785

[redacted] to Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Poles have made appeals for aid for their forces fighting in Warsaw. Messages from Spaatz and Baker to Arnold show that the distances involved and the conditions under which supplies would have to be dropped to be of any assistance make American aid almost impracticable. The United States Chiefs of Staff do not propose to make any definite commitments on this matter. They believe that aid to the Poles is of importance and that the U. S. Air Forces should do their best to give aid consistent with our other operations and with the operating conditions which may be anticipated in the Warsaw area. However, all such operations must be tied in with the Russians.

End.

ORIGINATOR : Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: Adm, Leahy, OPD, Gen. Bissell,
Gen Arnold, Adm. King , C of S

CM-OUT-80785 (15 Aug 44) 1318Z by

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 23 1974

33

300 Poland [redacted] COPY No.

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RED 317 (Hawaii-Alaska) 12 August 1944

FROM: ACTING SECRETARY STETTINIUS

TO : THE PRESIDENT

The following message (in paraphrase) to you has just been received from the President of Poland:

"The struggle of Poland's underground army in Warsaw against the Germans facing the advancing Soviet forces which started on August first, continues unabated.

"During these twelve fateful days I grieve to say that the support, the need of which the Polish Government has been constantly urging, has not yet materialized. I am sure, therefore, you will understand the anxiety with which I am appealing to you, Mr. President.

"Some scores of thousands of half-armed Polish soldiers of the home force are in this struggle and are defying single-handed between two and three strongly armed Nazi divisions with strong air support and tanks.

"An ultimatum was issued by the Germans on August 10 announcing that all civilians who remain in the city will be massacred. On the eve of liberation the United Nations and their leaders cannot tolerate that the heroic capital of Poland should succumb unaided in its decisive fight for freedom. Mr. President, I appeal to you to order the United States Air Force in the European Theatre to give immediate support to the Warsaw garrison by dropping ammunition and arms, bombing objectives held by the enemy in one area of Warsaw, and transporting Polish paratroop units to take part in the battle for the capital of Poland.

"To delay offering help to Warsaw spells disaster. The people of Poland could never understand why the Warsaw uprising should fail at the present moment when the common cause of the United Nations is championed by unexampled strength and military power."

If it is militarily feasible, I feel that we have moral and other obligations to do what we can to help get aid to the Polish underground in full battle against the Nazis.

STETTINIUS.

Alue 119, 13 Aug 44 — "Adm Leahy to Colonel Park. Red 317, refer to State Department for reply and advice."

BLUE 112 12 August 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : MARSHAL STALIN
NO : 42

I am most grateful for your telegram of August 9 in which you were good enough to give me a resume of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's conversations in Moscow both with you and with the Polish Committee.

As you know it is my earnest hope that some solution satisfactory to all concerned will emerge out of these conversations, which will permit the formation of an interim legal and truly representative Polish Government.

In regard to Lange, I am sure you will recognize the difficulty of this Government of taking official action at this stage. Of course he as a private citizen has every right under our law to do what he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. You will, I am sure, understand why, under the circumstances and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations between Premier Mikolajczyk, whose government we still recognize officially, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States does not want to become involved in nor express any opinion concerning the request of the Polish Committee that Professor Lange join it as head of the Section on Foreign Affairs.

Blue 120 – The President to Under Sec of State –
"I think the gist of our telegram to Stalin ought to be got in some way to the Polish Committee of National Liberation. How to do it, I don't know." Aug 14, '44.

Copy to State Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

12 August 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: No. 30 Mission

Rptd: SACMED
J.S.M.

No: OZ 4380

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Most recent information from Warsaw indicates that unless support is immediately forthcoming the Polish underground army will collapse in a few days. This information coupled with fact that we have only been able to achieve supply dropping operations from Mediterranean on a comparatively small scale has resulted in repeated and intensified pressure from Polish Authorities for further immediate support.

2. They ask for:

(A) Increased deliveries of arms and ammunition.

(B) Bombing of specified objectives in Warsaw.

(C) Dropping of Polish parachutists.

3. C.A.S. has telegraphed Air Marshall Slessor emphasising importance of dropping increased supplies by night by special duty squadrons on Warsaw, and requesting that every effort should be made to provide substantial British contribution as soon as possible. Extra Polish and British crews are being sent out to increase capacity of supply dropping units; nevertheless, there are close limitations on quantites of supplies that can be delivered in this manner from the Mediterranean.

4. Poles have now asked that arms and ammunition for

CM-IN-12316 (14 Aug 1944)

[redacted]

390 Poland

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APR 23 1974

adm Leahy

32

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Number: OZ 4380 12 August 1944 Page 2

3,000 men be dropped on an additional area in Kampinos Forest ten miles north of Warsaw. This is a large area and revives possibility of obtaining assistance from U. S. XVth Air Force previously considered impracticable on grounds that they could not drop supplies from high altitude imposed by daylight operations by heavy aircraft with sufficient accuracy to ensure their reaching Poles who hold relatively small areas in the city.

5. We are, therefore, asking U. S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the possibility of delivering supplies by U. S. XVth Air Force: It being understood that such assistance will depend on forces which can be made available after meeting essential requirements of operations in the Mediterranean.

6. We have also informed U. S. Chiefs of Staff that we would have no objection to American flying in captured enemy equipment from U. S. bases in Russia. Operations under Paras. five and six are difficult and may not be practicable at short notice involved.

7. Poles have asked that following targets be bombed:

Okecie and Bielany Airfields
The Citadel
The Physical Training Institute
Fort of Bem

They say all these are large and easily identifiable targets but that owing to presence of Polish troops in immediate vicinites, precision bombing is essential.

8. These objective are obviously quite unsuitable for night operations and, therefore, the employment of R.A.F. Bomber Command is out of question. Bombing by U. S. Forces by day would have to be from high altitude, and would not be

CM-IN-12316 (14 Aug 1944)

[redacted]

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Number: OZ 4380 12 August 1944 Page 3

sufficiently accurate to ensure safety of Polish Forces in vicinity of targets. Americans require at least 2,000 yards clearance when carrying out such operations in support of their own forces. For these reasons we consider only practicable method of providing bomber support of necessary accuracy and continuity is for it to be undertaken by Russian Air Forces particularly tactical Air Forces operating at short range if the Russians are prepared to do this.

9. Poles have also pressed for despatch of Polish paratroops from this country and from Italy. We have rejected this request because other commitments preclude provision of very large number of Transport Aircraft that would be required. Moreover, losses over distances involved would almost certainly have been very heavy.

10. It appears that Russians are now going to help Warsaw. You should tell them what we have been able to do, what we hope to do, and what we have been unable to do, as set out in the preceding paragraphs, and should say that we should be most grateful to know what action they themselves are taking.

End

T.O.O. 121820Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King, C of S

CM-IN-12316 (14 Aug 1944) 0117Z emh

[redacted]

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APR 23 1974

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RED 315 (Hawaii-Alaska) 12 August 1944

FROM: STETTINIUS

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : SPECIAL STATE TELEGRAM NO. 11

SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS.

Harriman reports on a talk with Molotov who said he would summarize information Stalin had sent to you. His remarks agree with the comments in Stalin's message to you.

Molotov stated Stalin viewed the situation as a definite step forward. He said Soviets very anxious to see consolidation of the two groups. Molotov said he considered Mikolajczyk "A wise man," that latter had made a good impression, and both groups desired him to be Prime Minister.

Molotov confirmed impression Harriman had received from Mikolajczyk that 1935 constitution, which neither group apparently likes, stumbling block to Mikolajczyk. Molotov seemed to feel London group could work out better representation in a new government than the four places in Committee's proposal.

Molotov referred to Lange matter and Harriman expressed personal feeling this government would not want to become involved.

Molotove confirmed Stalin's promise to help in Warsaw. He stated resistance had started prematurely without Soviet knowledge.

Only discordant note in conversation was Molotov's comment Poles have always been too late and will be too late this time unless they make up their minds promptly.

Harriman feels unquestionalby Soviets want to see agreement between Polish groups but will work with Committee regardless and delay by Mikolajczyk group will injure their interests.

RED 308 (Hawaii-Alaska) 11 August 1944

FROM: STETTINIUS

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : SPECIAL TELEGRAM #10

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

a. Ambassador Harriman reports Mikolajczyk left Moscow much more helpful of a settlement than when he arrived. Stalin agreed to undertake to drop arms to Warsaw for the underground forces. Also, Stalin finally admitted his information agreed with that of Mikolajczyk that all resisting Poles in Warsaw were united under commanding general of underground forces and that a Red Army observer was present.

. Mikolajczyk is now at least partially convinced Soviets do not have objective of communizing Poland but is apprehensive that remains the objective of majority of Council of Liberation. He feels Soviets realize they cannot attain united Polish action in support of Red Army without support of Mikolajczyk and his government. He thinks Committee for Liberation also realizes need of this cooperation in establishing constitutional government machinery. Mikolajczyk is therefore hopeful some arrangement for collaboration can be worked out but no plan agreed upon.

Mikolajczyk lays first importance upon development of basis for authority of any government to be set up and will not agree with Council on repudiation of 1935 constitution on which basis Committee proposed that a government be formed with Mikolajczyk as head but with 14 out of 18 members drawn from Committee of Liberation or those associated with countil. Finally, Molotov presided over meeting between two Polish groups and Mikolajczyk feels Molotov was impressed by lack of clarity and practicability of countil's position as contrasted with his own.

b. Harriman has also cabled text of a letter to you from Polish Committee of National Liberation in which they raise the question of Oscar Lange's assuming charge of their Section for Foreign Affairs and solicits your support in this matter.

Harriman has not acknowledged and if you approve the suggested reply to Stalin on the same matter which we are sending by separate telegram, we will acquaint him with it and advise him not to acknowledge as that might be construed as at least a step towards recognition.

* * * * *

BLUE 110

11 August 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 598

Your 751 received with its pleasing news of the Soviet-Polish conversations.

ROOSEVELT

RED 298 11 August 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 751

The following telegram received from Ambassador Clark Kerr, dated 10 August 1944, contains our latest news of Polish affairs:

"Mikolajczyk left this morning. I did not see him again after his visit to Stalin last night, but he sent me a message to say that the atmosphere at the Kremlin had been much more cordial than last time. Both Stalin and Molotov had shown marked friendliness. Stalin had answered the question I had suggested with a categorical assurance that he had no intention of communising Poland. He had emphasised the need for an alliance between Poland and the U.S.S.R. but said that the Poles must have ties with the west also 'alliances with Great Britain, the United States and France.'

"The talk had then turned on Germany. Stalin had said he would 'do everything possible and impossible' to ensure that Germany could never again reap revenge. Mikolajczyk had told Stalin that a German officer captured in Normandy had said that Germany would go communist after the war, and would find in the communist part of the world an outlet for the German capacity for organisation. To this, Stalin had replied that communism was 'no more fit for Germany than a saddle for a cow.' This had surprised and pleased the Poles, who had recalled the German origins of the communist theory.

"Mikolajczyk now felt that speed was the first essential.

"It is clear that this talk has put cheerfulness where there had been gloom in the hearts of the Poles."

Copy

RED 293 10 August 1944

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : UNNO, 8 AUGUST 1944

I wish to inform you about my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has unsatisfactory information about affairs in Poland. At the same time, I was left with the impression that Mikolajczyk is not opposed to the finding of ways to unite the Poles.

As I did not consider it possible to press any decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and colleagues should meet and themselves discuss their questions with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and, above all, the question of the speediest possible union of all the democratic forces of Poland on liberated Polish territory. These meetings have taken place. I have been informed about them by both sides. The delegation of the National Committee proposed that the 1921 Constitution should be taken as the basis of the activity of the Polish Government, and, in the event of agreement, offered Mikolajczyk's group four portfolios, among them the post of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, however, could not bring himself (literally-did not decide) to give his agreement to this. Unfortunately, these meetings have not yet led to the desired results, but they have all the same had a positive significance, inasmuch as they have permitted both Mikolajczyk and also Morawski and Bernt, who had only just arrived from Warsaw, to inform each other in a broad way about their points of view and especially of the fact that both the Polish

National Committee and Mikolajczyk expressed the wish to work together and to seek the practical possibilities to that end. One may consider this as the first stage in relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. We shall hope that the business will go better in the future.

I have information that the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin has decided to invite Professor Lange to join its body as a Director on Foreign Affairs. If Lange, well-known Polish democratic leader, could get the opportunity to come to Poland to take this post, this would be, undoubtedly, in the interests of consolidation of the Poles and in the interests of struggle against our common foe. I hope that you share this opinion, and, on your part, will not refuse the necessary support in this matter, which is of such great significance to the cause of the Allies.

RED 287 10 August 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 749

I send you the following telegram from Stalin. The mood is more agreeable than we have sometimes met, and I think that we should persevere.

"August 8, Marshall Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill.

"I wish to inform you about my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has unsatisfactory information about affairs in Poland. At the same time, I was left with the impression that Mikolajczyk is not opposed to the finding of ways to unite the Poles.

"As I did not consider it possible to press and decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and colleagues should meet and themselves discuss their questions with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and, above all, the question of the speediest possible union of all the democratic forces of Poland on liberated Polish territory. These meetings have taken place. I have been informed about them by both sides. The delegation of the National Committee proposed that the 1921 Constitution should be taken as the basis of the activity of the Polish Government, and, in the event of agreement, offered Mikolajczyk's group four portfolios, among them the post of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, however, could not bring himself (literally-did not decide) to give his agreement to this. Unfortunately, these meetings have not yet led to the desired results, but they have all the same had a positive significance, inasmuch as they have permitted both

Copy

and also Morawski and Bernt, who had only just arrived from Warsaw, to inform each other in a broad way about their points of view and especially of the fact that both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk expressed the wish to work together and to seek the practical possibilities to that end. One may consider this as the first stage in relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. We shall hope that the business will go better in the future.

RED 282 9 August 1944

SPECIAL STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM NO. 9.

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

a. Mikolajczyk's conversations with members of the Polish Committee of Liberation have thus far been largely of a background nature. A full report from Harriman is expected shortly.

b. In view of recent political developments in Poland, we asked Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 24 if they still felt ten million dollars should be made available for underground forces. In reply of August 3, Joint Chiefs suggested deferring the obligation of the funds. The Poles have been informed of this decision.

c. Polish Ambassador made an urgent appeal on August 6 for supplies for underground forces fighting Germans in Warsaw. Joint Chiefs have forwarded to Combined Chiefs as they feel this is under British jurisdiction.

* * * * *

RED 252 (Hawaii-Alaska) 5 August 1944

SPECIAL STATE TELEGRAM #7.

POLISH-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

Preliminary conversations between Stalin and Mikolajczyk gives hope of reapproachment between Poland and Russia, Polish Foreign Minister Romer optimistically reports to Harriman. Stalin said he would support Polish boundaries to the north and west but that the Curzon line must be the eastern boundary. However, the boundary question, he indicated, may be left for future settlement. He is hopeful the Polish government in London and the Committee of Liberation can reconcile their differences. Mikolajczyk thinks the only accomplishment to date has been thawing the ice.

RED 238 4 August 1944

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1944

I have received your messages of July 28.

* * * * *

As regards the Polish question, the matter depends, first of all, on the Poles themselves and on the capability of these or other persons from the Polish Emigre Government to cooperate with the already functioning in Poland Polish Committee of National Liberation around which more and more are rallying the democratic forces of Poland. On my part, I am ready to render to all Poles any possible assistance in this matter.

RED 237 (Hawaii-Alaska) 4 August 1944

SPECIAL STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM NUMBER 6:

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

a. Polish Prime Minister cabled you from Teheran, stating he attached importance to trip and expressed hope you and this government will extend "further friendly assistance and support."

b. On July 29, Vyshinski told Harriman Soviets felt it was up to the Poles to do the talking and they were prepared to listen.

c. Polish Prime Minister, during initial conversation with Harriman, was pessimistic, fearing Soviets intend to communize Poland. Harriman stressed that in his opinion difficulty lay in personalities in London government and that Soviets did not desire to communize Poland. Mikolajczyk replied that for a constructive move he could get resignation of Sosnkowski and some others, but not that of President. He was dubious, however, about bringing into government some of the personalities active in other groups and enumerated the shortcomings of several of them.

d. After seeing Molotov, he appeared in better frame of mind, feeling he was given a friendly reception. We have not received yet an account of his conversations with the Soviets.

e. Recent Soviet press dispatches confirm Embassy's impression that Lwow being regarded as integral part of Soviet Ukraine with the Bug as the boundary.

* * * * *

BLUE 69

2 August 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 593, 2 August 1944

Your 740, received at sea, indicates that we have reason to hope that the Stalin-Mikolajczyk conversations may bring about a settlement of the Polish controversy that can be accepted by all of us.

My inspection journey to the Pacific has already been fully justified by my conferences with the high command.

ROOSEVELT

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION: CNO ROUTINE	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM
DATE 1 AUGUST 1944		INFORMATION:	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED / BASEGRAM
TOR CODEROOM 1907			
DECODED BY GLUNT			
PARAPHRASED BY GLUNT / CHECKED BY GLUNT			
ROUTED BY GLUNT / DITTOED BY GLUNT			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

RED 219 ✓ Ø11515Z NCR 6468

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

IN MY TALK WITH MIKOLAJCZYK YESTERDAY I GAVE HIM YOUR MESSAGE 282350 JULY. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT HEARING FROM YOU.

Red 219 ✓
012205 Z

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAIDE(#1 & #2).....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO. #2

File Copy

RED 206, 29 July 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 740

This seems to me the best ever received from Uncle Joe:

"I have received your messages of the 25th and 27th July on the subject of the departure of Mikolajczyk. Mister Mikolajczyk and his party will be given the necessary assistance on arrival in Moscow.

"You know our point of view on the question of Poland, who is our neighbor and relations with whom have an especial importance for the Soviet Union. We welcome the National Committee which has been created on the territory of Poland from democratic forces and I think that by the creation of this committee a good start has been made for the unification of Poles friendly disposed towards Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States and for the surmounting of opposition on the part of those Polish elements who are not capable of unification with democratic forces.

"I understand the importance of the Polish question for the common cause of the Allies and for this very reason I am prepared to give assistance to all Poles and to mediate on the attainment of an agreement between them. The Soviet forces have done and are doing everything possible to hasten the liberation of Poland from the German usurpers and to help the Polish people in the restoration of their freedom and in the matter of the welfare of their country."

The message of 25th July is contained in my 736 to you. Following is text of my message to Uncle Joe of the 27th July:

Copy

"Mikolajczyk and his colleagues have started. I am sure Mikolajczyk is most anxious to help a general fusion of all Poles on the lines on which you and I and the President are, I believe, agreed. I believe that Poles who are friendly to Russia should join with Poles who are friendly to Great Britain and the United States in order to establish the strong, free, independent Poland, the good neighbor of Russia and an important barrier between you and another German outrage. We will all three take good care there are other barriers also.

"It would be a great pity and even disaster if the western democracies found themselves recognising one body of Poles and you recognizing another. It would lead to constant friction and might even hamper the great business which we have to do the wide world over. Please therefore receive these few sentences in the spirit in which they are sent, which is one of sincere friendship and our twenty years' alliance."

PRIME

BLUE 64

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 592, 28 JULY 1944

Your 737.

I have sent the following to Mikolajczyk:

"I am pleased that you are discussing the Polish problem with the Soviet government and I hope you can work out the whole matter to the best advantage of the combined allied effort against our common Nazi enemy.

ROOSEVELT

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

28 July 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow.

NUMBER 33. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET.

Please inform Mikolajczyk I am pleased that he is discussing the Polish problem with the Soviet Government and I hope he can work out the whole matter to the best advantage of the combined Allied effort against our common Nazi enemy.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1930, EWT, 28 July 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, CE

262350 NCR 6336

TOP-SECRET

File Copy

BLUE 49

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 590, 28 JULY 1944

I am sending you for your information the text of my message to Marshal Stalin.

"I have received your telegram about the Polish situation and I hear from Churchill that Mikolajczyk is leaving to call on you. It goes without saying that I greatly hope you can work this whole matter out with him to the best advantage of our common effort."

ROOSEVELT

~~RED~~ 47

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : #31, ~~26~~ 27 JULY 1944

I have received your telegram about the Polish situation and I hear from Churchill that Mikolajczyk is leaving to call on you. It goes without saying that I greatly hope you can work this whole matter out with him to the best advantage of our common effort.

Paraphrased copy to State Department by direction of BLUE 47.

FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO.

DATE 31, 27 July 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT:

POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ACTION:

COPY

1. The Prime Minister, in his #735, 25 July 44, informed the President of Mikolajczyk's going to Moscow, and stated "anything you say to Stalin that will induce him to give Mikolajczyk a good welcome... will be invaluable." This message was transmitted to the President on HAWAII/ALASKA trip as RED 180.

2. In STALIN-PRES 23 July 44, Stalin forwarded to President copy of message he sent to Churchill. Sent to President as RED 172, 24 July 44.

3. In BLUE 47, the President sent a message to the Map Room for transmission to Stalin, which answered both messages in 1 & 2 above.

4. Answered by Para 2 of STALIN-PRES 2 AUG 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

COPY

RED 185 26 July 1944

SPECIAL TELEGRAM #3 FROM SECRETARY HULL TO THE PRESIDENT

* * * * *

POLISH-RUSSIAN SITUATION

Most of the latest developments in the Polish-Russian dispute have been covered in the press. Harriman was not informed officially of the plan to set up the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

We have just received word from London that Churchill has been in communication with Stalin and the latter has agreed to see the Polish Prime Minister in Moscow and has suggested that he might later go on to discuss matters with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Eden finally convinced Mikolajczyk to make the trip after he exacted a promise from Eden that he would state in Parliament on July 26th that the British Government continues to recognize the Polish Government in London. Mikolajczyk plans to leave for Moscow by air on the night of July 26.

The Polish Ambassador called yesterday to give me a summary of a letter Mikolajczyk is sending to you.

RED 187

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 737, 26 July 1944

My number 735.

I should like to add:

"I should also be grateful for anything you could do to encourage Mikolajczyk. Perhaps you could send him a telegram to say how glad you are that he is undertaking this journey, that he has your support and that you much hope he may be able to come to an arrangement which will result in the fusion of all Polish forces."

PRIME

Copy

RED 181, 25 July 1944

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 736, 25 JULY 1944

"From Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill.

"I have received your message of July 22.

"I am writing now only on the Polish question.

"The events at our front are proceeding at an exceedingly rapid rate. Lublin, one of the big cities of Poland, was occupied today by our troops which continue to advance.

"Under these circumstances we are confronted in practice with the question of administration of Polish territory. We do not want and we will not establish our administration on the territory of Poland as we do not want to interfere with the internal matters of Poland. This should be done by the Poles themselves. Therefore, we deemed it necessary to establish contact with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently created by the National Council of Poland, which has been formed in Warsaw at the end of last year from among representatives of democratic parties and groups, about which you must already have been informed by your Ambassador from Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to take up the creation of an administration on Polish territory, and this will, I hope, be realised. In Poland we did not find any other forces which could create the Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, guided by the Polish Government in London, proved themselves ephemeral, deprived of influence. I cannot consider the Polish Committee as Government of Poland, but it is possible that in the future it will serve as kernel for the formation of

Copy

a provisional Polish government from democratic forces.

"As regards Mikolajczyk, I, of course, shall not refuse to accept him. It would, however, be better if he would get in touch with the Polish National Committee which regards Mikolajczyk favorably."

"Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, dated 25 July 1944.

"Monsieur Mikolajczyk is starting tomorrow night in response to the suggestion in the last paragraph of your message of July 23. He is bringing with him Monsieur Romer and Monsieur Grabski. His Majesty's Government are making arrangements for his transport to Teheran or Moscow as may be required. He desires a full and friendly conversation with you personally. He commands the full support of all his colleagues in the Polish Government which of course we continue to recognize.

"Our heartfelt wish is that all Poles may be united in clearing the Germans from their country and in establishing that free, strong and independent Poland working in friendship with Russia, which you have proclaimed is your aim.

"I have told the President of your telegram to me and have sent him also a copy of this. He will no doubt communicate with you."

RED 180

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 735, 25 July 1944

1. Please see Marshal Stalin's telegram to me of July 23 and the answer I have sent off after discussion with Anthony, the text of which immediately follows this.

2. We have pressed Mikolajczyk strongly to go with his ministers and to make contact with Stalin. It may well be they will receive a friendly welcome, but of course their outburst last night about "usurpers" etc., may have worsened the situation. However, we still have hope, and aim at fusion of some kind.

3. Meanwhile, it is of the utmost importance that we do not desert the orthodox Polish Government, and Anthony will give answers in the House tomorrow making it clear that our relations remain unchanged. Anything you say to Stalin that will induce him to give Mikolajczyk a good welcome and realize the importance of founding a united Polish Government, will be invaluable.[1] The great hope is fusion of some kind between the Poles relying on Russia and Poles relying on United States and Great Britain. We are sure that Stalin will be much influenced by your view of these things.

PRIME

1. See Pres. Stalin #31, 27 July 44.

Copy

RED 172

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 23 JULY 1944.

I am sending you for your information the text of my message to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the Polish question.

"Secret and personal from Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill.

"I have received your message of July 22.

"I am writing now only on the Polish question.

"The events at our front are proceeding at an exceedingly rapid rate. Lublin, one of the big cities of Poland, was occupied today by our troops which continue to advance.

"Under these circumstances we are confronted in practice with the question of administration of Polish territory. We do not want and we will not establish our administration on the territory of Poland as we do not want to interfere with the internal matters of Poland. This should be done by the Poles themselves. Therefore, we deemed it necessary to establish contact with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently created by the National Council of Poland, which has been formed in Warsaw at the end of last year from among representatives of democratic parties and groups, about which you must already have been informed by your Ambassador from Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to take up the creation of an administration on Polish territory, and this will, I hope, be realized. In Poland we did not find any other forces which could create the Polish Administration. The so-called underground organizations, guided by the Polish Government in London, proved themselves ephemeral, deprived of influence. I

cannot consider the Polish Committee as Government of Poland, but it is possible that in the future it will serve as kernel for the formation of a provisional Polish government from democratic forces.

"As regards Mikolajczyk, I, of course, shall not refuse to accept him. It would, however, be better if he would get in touch with the Polish National Committee which regards Mikolajczyk favorably."

MARSHAL STALIN

SOVIET-POLISH BORDER PROBLEM

A brief resume of Polish history will do much to explain the current situation between the Soviet Union and Poland.

Since its foundation in the 10th Century the Polish Nation has fluctuated enormously with respect to size and ethnical composition. Its greatest territorial expansion was seen in the 15th Century when it reached from the Baltic to the Black Sea, taking in much of what is now the Soviet Union. See Map I, attached. The 16th Century saw the cultural peak of Poland when Cracow (now Krakow) was one of the leading capitals of Europe.

The 17th Century witnessed the start of Poland's decline as a power which was climaxed in the period 1772-1795 when three partitions were made by Russia, Prussia and Austria. The result was that, in 1795, Poland ceased to exist as a National State. See Map II, attached. Russia received the lion's share of the spoils and, during the next 123 years of foreign rule, her oppression of the Poles was reported to be far and away the harshest. In this period were laid the seeds of Polish hatred and mistrust of the Russians. The Poles fought against the Russians under Napoleon; in World War I Pilsudski's legions served in the Austrian Army; and in 1920 the Polish army seized a portion of western Russia, aided in this by the French. (The British were opposed to this move but could do little at the time.)

At the conclusion of World War I the downfall of the three powers which had partitioned Poland in the 18th Century led to the resurrection of the Polish State. The territory given to Poland was approximately as follows:

From Russia	-	101,200 sq. miles
From Austria	-	30,900 " "
From Prussia	-	7,000 " "

The Versailles Treaty defined the western boundaries but left open the problem of frontiers with the Soviet Union, then going through a revolution. In 1919 the Supreme Council of the Allies drew the ethnographical Curzon Line, to the west of which (in territory taken from the Poles in 1939) were purely or predominantly Polish populated areas. The Polish Republic, young and nationalistic, never recognized the Curzon Line as binding and hostilities with Russia continued, under Pilsudski, leading to a full scale war in 1920. After many vicissitudes the Polish Army, with French aid, won out and imposed upon the Soviets the Treaty of Riga in March 1921, which pushed the eastern boundaries of Poland far beyond the Curzon Line, making

the country include large, non-Polish areas. The territory seized approximated 11,100 sq miles and included Vilno, or Wilna.

At this point it might be well to mention that the "Curzon Line" was not drawn by Lord Curzon and he had little to do with it other than that he, as British Foreign Secretary in 1920, signed a telegram to Moscow giving the British proposals, drafted by others, for an armistice boundary between Poland and Russia.

The substantial Ukranian minority in Poland (estimated variously at from 4,500,000 to 7,000,000) caused Poland much trouble and in 1930 there was an outbreak of serious disturbances which were put down with great severity.

In 1939 came the fourth partitioning of Poland. See Map III, attached. At this time Poland had an area of approximately 150,000 sq. miles (area of California is approx. 159,000 sq. miles). It is estimated that Germany took about 72,000 sq. miles and the Soviets about 78,000. The Gouvernment General, included in Germany's total grab, was a rump state run by the Germans as sort of a vast refugee camp. Poland was bitter at Soviet participation in the partitioning. The Soviets claimed that the territory they took rightfully belonged to them and that it served as a much needed cushion when the Germans turned on the Soviets.

In September 1939 the Polish Government-in-Exile was formed with W. Raczkiewicz as President and W. Sikorski as Premier. Sikorski was killed in a plane crash in 1943 and Stanislaus Mikolajczyk took his place. This Government-in-Exile is now in London and made an agreement on military cooperation with Great Britain in 1940. In July 1941 this government signed an agreement with the Soviets abrogating German-Russian accord on the 1939 partitioning of Poland and leaving the matter open again. However, relations between the London Polish Government and the Soviets were broken off in 1943 and, despite efforts on the part of Great Britain, have not been resumed. A "Union of Polish Patriots" has appeared in Moscow and is apparently the Government of Poland with which Stalin wishes to deal as he feels that the Government in London is cut off from the Polish people, is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviets and equally incapable of organizing an active struggle*that the London government contains some individuals whom Stalin regards as Pro-Fascist and imperialistic and that this is the real reason behind his refusal to deal with it.

Matters started to come to a head in January 1944 when Stalin offered to the Polish people a "strong and independent Poland' with the Curzon Line as a general basis for settling the eastern frontier of Poland. The Curzon Line was not much of a territorial concession from the 1939 German-Soviet partition but morally it was a considerable modi-

against the Germans in Poland itself. There is evidence which has been made public

fication as the Line was not drawn by the Soviets and it was not based on strategic considerations but on a racial division as best could be determined. As an offset for the lands Poland had wanted in the East Russia suggested that certain German lands in the West might be given to Poland. Ethnologically and morally Polish claims to these parts of Germany, presumably East Prussia and upper Silesia, seem no better than her claim to the Eastern Provinces. The single argument for such a gerrymander is that it would strengthen Russia and Poland and weaken Germany. There is much evidence that this was discussed at Teheran.

The Polish Government-in-Exile in London (evidently assuming it was the one to whom the offer was made) did not like the offer but said it would resume relations with Moscow and discuss all outstanding questions if the United States and Great Britain could sit in on the discussions and if these powers would share the responsibility for the final settlement. Both the United States and Great Britain indicated a willingness to do this.

It was public knowledge that the British Government had been trying to get the Polish Government-in-Exile to accept the proposal of the Curzon Line but that Government was evidently not willing to make any fast decisions.

In answer to the Polish Government's proposal for resuming relations, and the discussions with the U.S. and Great Britain sitting in, Moscow replied as follows:

1. The Polish Government has rejected the Curzon Line.
2. That Polish Government has no diplomatic relations with the Soviets and therefore is in no position to suggest negotiations.
3. That the lack of relations is the fault of the Poles who joined the Germans in anti-Soviet slander about the slaughter of Polish officers.
4. That the present Polish Government in London clearly does not want to establish good relations.

In effect Moscow said to the U.S. and Britain - "Stay out of this". (It was just at this time that the Pravda story was released that the British and the Germans had met 'to find out the conditions of a separate peace.')

SOVIET - POLISH AFFAIRS

The current Map Room file on this subject starts with PM-Pres., #633, 6 Jan 1944. In this the Prime seems quite hopeful of a favorable solution to the border problem on the basis of a talk he had just had with Benes. The latter is quite close to Stalin and had a map with U.J.'s pencilled notations showing what he would be willing to see the Poles get. The territory covered looked all right to Prime and he stated he was going to go all out in getting the Polish Government to accept such an offer or something close to it, on his return to England. Subsequent to this events went somewhat as follows:

1. 20 January there was a meeting of the PM and others with the Polish Prime Minister in which the latter was pressed to accept a Soviet offer on the basis of the Curzon Line with offsetting German territory held out as bait. PM pointed out that Great Britain, and certainly U.S., would not go to war over Polands Eastern Frontier. Polish PM took viewpoint that Riga Line should be basis for start of discussions and that Soviets were being most difficult. However, he agreed to consult with his cabinet.

2. PM notified Stalin of this meeting and stressed pressure put on Poles to accept. Brought up questions raised by Poles as to movements of populations which would be required under Curzon Line settlement, assurances which they would want, etc. He also mentioned that as far as Britain was concerned, any changes in the Polish Government should be made by the Poles and not under undue influence on the part of outside Governments.

3. 27 January 1944, Secretary Hull sent the President a memo from the Polish Government asking the U.S. three questions, based on meeting of Polish PM with Churchill:

   a. Does the U.S. think Poland should accept final settlement now?
      Draft reply to this - In effect, Yes.

   b. Would the U.S. help to make the settlement and guarantee any settlements?
      Draft reply to this - In principle, Yes re settlement - No re guarantee.

   c. Does the U.S. regard it possible to lend its support to Churchill's plan and to its realization?
      Draft reply to this - In effect, Yes.

(Note - Our file does not show whether the drafted replies were sent. They would have gone out through State Department channels)

4. PM to Pres, #566, 5 Feb 1944, said no answer yet from U.J. but that Kerr had had an encouraging interview. Kerr reported that Stalin told him he had no interest in the Polish Government after the war, would guarantee borders, agree to necessary shifts in population, etc. However, he did want some men (Sosnkowski, Kot and Kukiel) expelled from the present Polish Government and Kerr did not think he would deal with any Government with these men in it.

5. PM to Pres, #569, 6 Feb 1944, covered U.J.'s answer to PM's following 20 January meeting. Was politely worded and covered pretty much what he had told Kerr. Also reminded PM, in connection with statement that he cannot renew relations with the present Polish Government, that in May, 1943, PM wrote Stalin that the composition of the Polish Government could be improved and that he would (PM) busy himself in that direction.

6. Pres to Harriman for delivery to Stalin, 7 Feb 1944 - Re recent developments in Poland. Makes it plain he doesn't want to interfere with Russian interests - that public opinion here is solidly behind Moscow-Teheran Conferences - that he has carefully considered views of USSR given to Harriman 18 Jan 44 re impossibility of dealing with present Polish Govt. and Molotov's suggestion that the Govt. should be reconstituted by inclusion of Polish elements from U.S., England and Soviet Union - that if Poles accept basis for border settlement couldn't Polish PM work out composition of own Government without outside pressure - stressed point that it would be better to have Polish underground with Soviets than against them. (Note: Harriman requested approval to redraft this by omission of reference to Molotov's suggestion re bringing in U.S. citizens. Terms this as fantastic and does not wish to dignify it.) - Stalin to Pres, 16 Feb 1944, answering Pres message says that only questions are Soviet-Polish border and composition of Polish Govt. Re Border he says that 1939 line is not inalterable as far as they are concerned and that they have made considerable concession in offering Curzon Line - that the Poles should have officially stated that this was acceptable - that the Riga Treaty forced a border on Russia at a difficult moment and Poles are trying to hold to this - that there are no grounds for agreement. Re the Government says that principal role is played by Pro-Fascist elements, such as Sosnkovsky, hostile to Soviet Union, etc.

7. PM to Pres, #584, 20 Feb 1944, calls attention to #585, same date, which gives text of message to Stalin after further conference with Poles. He points out that the message achieves in its essentials, without actually saying so, the settlement outlined at Teheran. Also requests that Pres. commend its acceptance to Stalin. The message itself states that the Poles are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities and are willing, with British participation and ours, to discuss frontiers with the Soviets but that, since Western Boundaries cannot be publicly stated

at this time the announcement of a settlement of the Eastern frontier on the basis of the Curzon Line would look very one-sided and might lose all Polish support for the Exiled government. Therefore it really should wait for an armistice or peace conference. Said that the Polish underground would be given instructions to cooperate with the Russians even if diplomatic relations had not been resumed. That the Polish Government cannot admit the right of Foreign intervention in its government but that after relations were resumed that the Government would be on the basis of those friendly to the Soviets. That Britain and Soviets are to guarantee new setup.

8. PM to Pres, #585, 21 Feb 1944, states that the Polish Ministers cannot formally authorize us to proceed on lines outlined in the above but that they are ready for us to do so and will not disavow our actions. The proposals evidently do not represent the ideas of all the Polish parties and a selling job would have to be done by Mikolajczyk.

9. Pres to Stalin, 21 Feb 1944, urges favorable and sympathetic consideration of PM's message.

10. PM to Pres, #595, 29 Feb 1944, referred to cable he had received from Kerr after what was evidently a very unpleasant interview with Stalin re the PM's message. Stalin was quite sarcastic about some of the points and intimated that the Poles were trying to embroil Great Britain with the Soviets and that they might succeed. In answer to a request for constructive suggestions Stalin told Kerr that he wanted only two things the Curzon Line and a reconstruction of the Polish Government. He brought up old Molotov proposal that new Government of Poland might well include some Poles from the US and Britain. The conversation lasted for an hour and Kerr got nowhere. Stalin will answer Churchill after consulting his government.

11. Stalin to Pres 3 March 1944 - Repeats charges against Polish Govt. Added that tendencies to put under foreign control certain Soviet territories are not welcome. Even raising of such a question is considered insulting.

12. Pres to PM, #485, 3 Mar 1944 re above - Very disappointing.

13. PM to Pres, #601, 4 Mar same - Awaiting official reply before determining course.

14. PM to Pres, #604, 4 Mar 1944 same - Answer received - most discouraging. How about asking Polish Prime Minister for visit to U.S. to show hand?

15. PM to Pres, #605, 4 Mar 1944 gave Stalin's reply - in brief, No chance of normal relations with Emigre Polish Government. Their attitude impossible.

16. PM to Pres, #609, 7 Mar 1944 re answer to above. Stated that he had made some concessions on original message and pleaded with Stalin not to close the door. Shall earnestly try to prevent any rift between himself and Stalin despite difficulties being encountered in this case.

17. Pres to Hull, 16 Mar 1944 - Proposed draft message to PM re Poles suggesting that border matter be dropped by all concerned for time being on basis that more will be learned about Polish sentiment as time goes on and main thing now is to assure that Polish underground helps the Soviets when they get into Poland. (No note as to whether this was sent).

18. PM to Pres, #625, 18 Mar 1944 relatest from U.J. re Poland and strong accusation of leaks by British re negotiations. PM indicates leak probably came from Soviet Embassy. Talks on subject are at an end. Will have to make a statement in Parliament.

19. PM to Pres, #630, 21 Mar 1944 re answer to Stalin. Denies any British leaks as says info was definitely handed out by the Soviet Embassy. States that he will have to make statement in Parliament about breakdown in negotiations and that all questions of territorial changes will have to await armistice or peace conferences and that in the meantime Great Britain cannot recognize any forcible transferences of territory. Also that he was notifying the Pres re this message.

20. PM to Pres, #633, 1 Apr 1944, covered recent telegrams from Stalin including his reply to PM's message of 21 Mar. A copy of this reply was sent to the Pres by Stalin. Stalin took a very strong tone in this, charging the British with making threats against the Soviets, accuses them of changing their stand on the Curzon Line and now holding it not right, questioning whether the Teheran agreement is being wilfully broken by the British, stating that they are not fighting the Poles so there is no question of having to await an armistice or peace conference, again states he will not deal with present Polish Government-in-Exile, and finally, while making point that he cannot tell Churchill what to say to Parliament, states that if the PM makes a speech in which he accuses the Soviets of trying to take territory from the Poles by force it will be considered an insult to the Soviet Union.

21. PM to Pres, #632, 1 Apr 1944, Little use in carrying on further personal correspondence. Believes that, despite unwillingness to say anything of a reassuring nature to us on subject Russia may step carefully and that this may be great benefit to the Poles in Poland. Suggests again that the Pres ask Premier Mikolajczyk to the U.S., to show we do have an interest in what happens.

22. PM to Pres, #634, 1 Apr 1944, re proposed telegram to Kerr citing War Cabinet views. Stalins references to power politics and threats not

understood here. That PM's frankness to Stalin was due to their personal relationship. Regrets misinterpretation. No departure from Teheran agreement intended or implied. Has strongly urged Poles to accept Curzon Line but it is difficult to get a Government in Exile to agree publicly to such a thing at this time. Trying to hold cooperation of the Polish underground which is controlled by the Polish Government in London. There never was any intention that the PM's message should be interpreted as indicating that the Soviets were waging war against Poland, only practical difficulties being referred to. Would like to reach some agreement now but as long as the Soviets do not wish to, as far as England is concerned, any agreement must await peace conference, meanwhile no recognition of territorial changes since the war began other than by agreement of parties concerned. Will continue to recognize Government in London as legitimate Government of Poland. If the Soviets maintain present attitude, His Majesty's Government must retire from the ungrateful role of mediator and announce their failure. Public opinion will regret this. Nothing is further from the minds of His Majesty's Government than to insult or discredit their Soviet Ally.

23. Pres to PM, #513, 5 Apr 1944, still seems to Potus that essential consideration at this time is to get Polish Military power, including underground, into effective action against the Nazis. Also that he would consider the suggestion re having the Polish Premier come to this country. Also that reply to Stalin's blast seems correct and dont see how he can find fault with it.

TOP SECRET

7 — Received Jan 17/44

Map I

Map II

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From [illegible] Jan 17/44

Map III



TOP SECRET

Soviet to Bar London Poles In Rule of Liberated Land

Moscow May Pick Leaders Within Nation— Allies Are Not Likely to Interfere— Conciliation of Dispute Possible

enter that part of Poland west of the old Curzon Line in pursuit of the Germans, the Russians have no intention of consulting the Polish Government in London about civil administration, any more than they have already in the eastern territory they claim as their own. Furthermore, the Russians will not only attempt to find leaders for the new government from liberated Poland, but they will resist any attempt by Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to transplant his Cabinet of exiles, as presently constituted, from London to Polish soil.

These are cold, hard facts in the Russo-Polish situation that propaganda and diplomacy tend to obfuscate and conceal. They are realities that such speeches as Labor Minister Ernest Bevin made yesterday at ceremonies marking the observance of the Polish national holiday only confuse with-

Churchill had told six underground leaders of Poland that Britain saw nothing unreasonable in the Russian demand for territory up to the Curzon Line.

Now it is well understood by Mr. Mikolajczyk that he cannot cede half his country to Russia without jeopardizing his Government's future in Poland. If he does not bow to Russia's demands, or at least enter into negotiations with Moscow on the basis of the Curzon Line, he face the Russian challenge of a new rival government

There is one chance of his sal-

Army, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information Stanislaw Kot, who are persona non grata in Moscow. Politically, this is more easily said than done. If, however, he could do that, Russia might consent to renew her offer of discussions based on the Curzon Line and it is possible, though not at all certain, that Poland might save Vilna and Lwow from the Russians.

But the Poles, like the Yugoslavs, are laboring under the impression that if they can just hold on until the Allies have established a front in western Europe, they can depend upon a stronger British-American support of their position vis a vis Russia. Thus the Yugoslav Government of Prime Minister Bozidar Pooritch clings to War Minister Draja Mikhailovitch, who has lost the confidence and support of the Allies, who are now helping Marshal Tito. The Polish Government in Exile remains adamant in the face of the Russian demands and continues to try to carry Mr. Bomkowski and others to whom the Russians object.

There seems to be little evidence to support a Polish or Yugoslav hope for any change in their favor in the Allied position, but nobody has taken any very forthright steps to disillusion them.

Soviet Position Is Firm

The Russians have made up their minds irrevocably to the seizure of Poland up to something approaching the Curzon Line, and no well-meant advice from Britain or the United States seems likely to change that any more than it will swerve the Russians from their intention of absorbing Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

This does not mean that Premier Joseph Stalin wishes to absorb western Poland into the Soviet Union or even that he means to es-

a matter of fact.

Russia's long-range foreign policy is dominated by fear or a resurgent Germany and misgivings lest the Allies soften after the Nazis are vanquished. Therefore, while the Russians do not desire for the present to communize

they are going to insist on friendly neighbors and frown on alliances or federations among them and seek to prevent

they will try to impose it in the Balkans after the Germans are driven out of there. As part of their scheme for removing Germany forever as a potential aggressor, they are determined that the neighboring States shall look eastward to Moscow for security rather than westward to Berlin or even London.

Crushing Reparations Seen

As for Germany herself, the Russians are determined to exact crushing reparations, of which those demanded of Finland are a measure, and are prepared to take a large part of it out in German labor for a good many years. Their objective is the same as that of the British and Americans — to make it impossible for Germany to throw the world into war again for several generations at least.

It is only in the methods of achieving their objectives that there is a difference. Whereas Britain and the United States see the need for restrictive measures against Germany, it is felt in certain quarters that the Russians are less aware than their Allies of the importance to the rest of Europe of a stable German economy.

Also there is a difference in degree in the attitude toward the punishment of those guilty of war crimes. Sentiment here, for instance, might accept the execution of a dozen or two archcriminals but it would blanch at the thought of the mass execution of the whole German officer class, which to many Russians seems reasonable.

Underground's Havoc Reviewed

Reviewing activities of the Polish underground, the British radio said yesterday that its members to date had derailed eighty-three German trains, destroyed nearly 10,000 railroad cars and blown up nineteen stations.

Eighty-one other attacks have been made against the German Army, the police and the Gestapo, the broadcast said, and 1,163 Gestapo officials and army officers have been tried as war criminals