11 April 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 742, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE PREMIER [NAME]

Your 944. I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting.

We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1202132 April 1945

HENRY W. PUTNAM, Major, A.G.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
1. Anwears PM #944, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MB-OUT-404, 11200172.
2. President wrote this message; sent to the Map Room as MB-IN-197, 1200122; dispatched to London at 1202312.
To: The President of The United States.
Nr : 945 File 112100Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and TOP SECRET Number 945.

The private message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram follows:

Personal and Secret. Premier J. V. Stalin to The Prime Minister Mr. Winston Churchill.

I have received your message of April 1st on the Polish question. In my message on this subject to The President, which I am also sending to you, I answer all the main questions connected with the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland. As regards the other questions which you raise in your message, I have the following remarks to make:

(1) The British and American Ambassadors who are members of The Moscow Commission are unwilling to take account of The Provisional Polish Government and insist on inviting Polish personalities for consultation.

TOP SECRET
without regard to their attitude to the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and to The Soviet Union. They absolutely insist on summoning to Moscow for consultation, for instance, Mikolajczyk, and this they do in the form of an ultimatum: in this they take no account of the fact that Mikolajczyk has come out openly against the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland. However, if you think it necessary, I should be ready to use my influence with The Provisional Polish Government to make them withdraw their objections to inviting Mikolajczyk if the latter would make a public statement accepting the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and declaring that he stands for the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and The Soviet Union.

(2) You wonder why the Polish theatre of military operations must be wrapped in mystery. In fact there is no mystery here. You ignore the fact that if British observers or other foreign observers were sent into Poland, the Poles would regard this as an insult to their national dignity, bearing in mind the fact, moreover, that the present attitude of The British Government
to The Provisional Polish Government is regarded as
unfriendly by the latter. So far as The Soviet Govern-
ment is concerned, it cannot but take account of the
negative attitude of The Provisional Government to the
question of sending foreign observers into Poland.
Further, you are aware that The Provisional Polish
Government puts no obstacles in the way of entrance
into Poland by representatives of other states which
take up a different attitude towards it, and does not
in any way obstruct them; this is the case, for instance,
in regard to the representatives of The Czechoslovak
Government, The Yugoslav Government and others.

Prime.

FXR: MVB

Reid 11/2252
OUR 408 at 22452 (This is the same as OUR 2384 - W.S. was too"
this reserve was
not repeated.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL or FILE NO.</td>
<td>#745, 11 April 1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Quotes to the President a message received by Churchill from Stalin. This same message was previously quoted to the President by Stalin in STALIN-PRES 7 Apr 45.
2. For "immediately preceding telegram" see PM-PRES #744, 11 Apr 45.
3. Not answered by the President. PM #944 was answered by PRES #745, 11 April 1945.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 944, 11 APRIL 1945

Your 739.

1. Stalin sent me a copy of his reply to your message on Poland. He also sent me an additional private message, of which the last sentence in Para 1, if seriously intended, would be important. I send this message in my immediately following. Please let these personal introductions to his official messages be guarded absolutely as between you and me.

2. I have to make a statement in the House of Commons next Thursday and of course I should like to know your views about how we should answer Stalin as soon as possible. I have a feeling that they do not want to quarrel with us, and your telegram about CROSSWORD may have seriously and deservedly perturbed them. Our angle of approach and momentum remain exactly what they have been in both the matters under dispute as set forth in our telegrams.

End

RECD 11/2005Z.
To President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-404, 11/2017Z.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. #944, 11 April 1945

DATE

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answered PRES-PW #739, 10 April 1945.
2. (See also PM-PW #944, which is a continuation of this message.)
3. To the President at Warm Springs as MB-JUT-404, 112017Z.
4. Copy to Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy.
5. Answered by PRES-PW #944, 11 Apr 45, which was written by the
President at Warm Springs and transmitted to the Map Room as MB-1H-197,
120012Z.
6. Further answered by President Truman on 13 April 1945, in his
#2 to the Prime Minister.

COPIES TO:
MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ORIGINAL: PRES-PW FILE

DISTRIBUTION:
052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Stalin's Replies on Poland

We are giving most careful consideration to Stalin's replies on Poland. We have asked Ambassador Harriman, to whom you authorized the Map Room to repeat these messages, to give us his comments and suggestions. We will send you shortly our views and recommendations as to the next step. In the meantime the Prime Minister will probably communicate with you in regard to the attitude of the British Government.
10 April 1945

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER 739, TOP-SECRET AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

I assume Stalin repeated to you his reply to my message on Poland, since he sent me his reply to yours. We shall have to consider most carefully the implications of Stalin’s attitude and what is to be our next step. I shall, of course, take no action of any kind, nor make any statement without consulting you, and I know you will do the same.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1017232 April 1945:

BOYCE P. PRICE, CAPTAIN, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
10 April 1945.

1. At the receipt of the above message to be sent to the Prime Minister to discourage him from making a hasty speech in Parliament on breakdown of Polish negotiations.

2. Suggested message sent to the President at Warm Springs as WJ-OUT-389, 101512; approved by the President in MS-18-193, 101630Z.

3. Dispatched at 101723Z.

4. Answered by PM-PRES #944, 11 Apr 45.
MR-OUT-382 (1015142) 10 April 1945

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO: THE PRESIDENT

In view of the statement in the Prime Minister's message to Stalin that he might have to make a public announcement in the House of Commons on a breakdown of the Polish negotiations, we feel that it would be wise for you to send, if you approve, the following cautionary message to the Prime Minister to make sure that he does nothing along those lines without consultation:

QUOTE: I assume Stalin repeated to you his reply to my message on Poland, since he sent me his reply to yours. We shall have to consider most carefully the implications of Stalin's attitude and what is to be our next step. I shall, of course, take no action of any kind, nor make any statement without consulting you, and I know you will do the same. UNQUOTE.

MR-IN-121 (1016302) 10 April 1945

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

MR-OUT-389 approved.
NUMBER 227, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBAS-
SADOR HARRISON.

The following messages are quoted for your information:

QUOTE. FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 7 APRIL 1945.

In connection with your message of April 1, I consider it necessary
to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.

Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambas-
sadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow
Commission have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and
have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Con-
ference.

Namely: (a) At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the
Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at
the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve
as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of
the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle, ignore
the existence of the Provisional Polish Government, do not notice it, at the
best—put a sign of equality between singletons from Poland and from London
and the Provisional Government of Poland. Besides, they consider that the
reconstruction of Provisional Government should be understood as its liquida-
tion and formation of an entirely new government. Besides, the matter reached
such a state when Mr. Harriman stated in the Moscow Commission: "It is possible that no member of the Provisional Government will be included in the composition of the Polish government of national unity."

Naturally, such a position of the American and British Ambassadors cannot but cause indignation on the part of the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot agree with such a position, as it would mean direct violation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference.

(b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

(c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this as blood of the Soviet troops abundantly shed for the liberation of Poland and the fact that in the
course of the last 30 years the territory of Poland has been used by the enemy twice for attack upon Russia—all this obliges the Soviet Government to strive that the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland be friendly.

But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow do not take this into consideration and strive that Polish leaders should be invited for consultation regardless of their attitude towards the decisions of the Crimea Conference and the Soviet Union.

Such, in my opinion, are the reasons hindering the solution of the Polish question on the basis of mutual agreement.

In order to leave the dead end and reach a harmonious decision it is necessary in my opinion to undertake the following steps:

1. To agree that the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government means not its liquidation but just its reconstruction by way of broadening it, bearing in mind that the kernel of the future Polish Government of National Unity should be the Provisional Polish Government.

2. To return to the projectings of the Crimea Conference and to summon only eight Polish leaders, five of whom should be called from Poland and three from London.

3. To agree that, under any conditions, a consultation with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government should be carried out, bearing in mind that this consultation with them should be carried out first of all as the Provisional Polish Government is the greatest force in Poland as compared to those singletons who will be called from London and from Poland and whose influence on the population of Poland cannot be compared with the tremendous influence which the Provisional Polish Government enjoys in Poland.

I draw your attention to this point as, in my opinion, any other decision on this point can be perceived in Poland as an insult to the Polish
people and as an attempt to force upon Poland a government formed without
taking into consideration the public opinion of Poland.

(4) To summon for consultation from Poland and from London only such
leaders who recognize decisions of the Crimes Conference on Poland and are
really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet
Union.

(5) To carry out the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Govern-
ment by substituting some of the present ministers of the Provisional Govern-
ment by new ministers from among Polish leaders not participating in the
Provisional Government.

As regards the numerical correlation of old and new ministers in the
composition of the Polish Government of national unity, there could be estab-
lished approximately a similar correlation which was realized in respect to
the Government of Yugoslavia.

I think that, taking into consideration the above-stated remarks, a
harmonious decision on the Polish question can be reached in a short time.

UNQUOTE.

The following message was an enclosure to Stalin's message to the
President:

QUOTE. FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL.

I have received your message of April 1 on the Polish question. In
my message to the President on this question, which I am also sending to you,
I am answering to all principal questions connected with the work of the
Moscow Commission on Poland. As regards other questions, which you touch
upon in your message, I have to say the following:

(1) The British and American Ambassadors—members of the Moscow Com-
mision do not want to regard the Provisional Polish Government and insist on
inviting for consultation Polish leaders regardless of their attitude toward the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and toward the Soviet Union. They insist on obligatory invitation to Moscow for consultation for instance Mikolajczyk, doing this even in an ultimative form, not taking into consider- ation that Mikolajczyk openly spoke against the decisions of the Crimea Con- ference on Poland. However, if you consider it necessary, I would be ready to influence the Provisional Polish Government to remove its objections against the invitation of Mikolajczyk, provided the latter would make a public statement about the recognition by him of the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and that he supports the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

(2) You wonder why the Polish theatre of military events should be secret. In reality there is no secret. You overlook the circumstance that sending to Poland of British observers or other foreign observers is con- sidered by the Poles as insult to their national dignity, and if one bears in mind, that the present attitude of the British Government to the Provisional Polish Government the latter considers as unfavorable. As regards the Soviet Government, it cannot but take into consideration the negative attitude of the Provisional Polish Government toward the question of sending foreign observers to Poland. Besides, you know, that when a different attitude is shown to the Provisional Polish Government it is not hindering entry into Poland of represent- atives of other nations and does not create any obstacles for them as it is in the case with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the Yugoslav Government and others.

(3) I had a pleasant talk with Mrs. Churchill. She made a great im- pression on me. She has transmitted to me your gift. Permit me to thank...
you from the bottom of my heart for the gift. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 10:10:42 April 1945:

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant, USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
1. Quotes to Harriman for his information the message from Marshal Stalin to the President, 7 April 1945, with its enclosure, STALIN-CHURCHILL, 7 Apr 45.

2. In MR-OUT-387, 101514Z, Admiral Leahy requested that the President authorize him to send copies of Stalin's messages of 7 April to Harriman for his information. President approved in MR-IN-192, 101630Z.

3. Dispatched to Harriman at 101804Z.
SECRET

The Chinese Ambassador to the United States

The following statement was made by the Chinese Ambassador to the United States:

"The Chinese Government has always maintained that the question of the representation of China in the United Nations is a matter of vital importance for the maintenance of peace and international justice. It is our hope that the United Nations will continue to recognize the interests of all nations, and that China will be represented in this body.

Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Wang, has conducted himself in a manner that is consistent with the principles of international law. We believe that his representations to the United Nations should be given serious consideration.

In conclusion, we hope that the United Nations will continue to uphold the principles of international justice and that China will be represented in this body."
Official notification. Requested assistance of their attache, based on the decision of the Chinese Con- 3
ference. The decision is consistent with the interests of both parties. The request should be handled for
the Ambassador of the United States and Britain in Moscow do not take

Union and Poland be friendly?

the decision of the Soviet government so that the relationship between the two
countries is not affected. The Soviet government has been made aware of the
situation. Discussions on the matter have been held in the course of the last 20 years. The
Soviet government intends to continue friendly relations with Poland and the Soviet Union.

Concerning the decision on the Chinese issue, and security, the reality
be invited for consultation on the decision of the Chinese Conference and Poland under
the mandate of the decision of the Chinese Conference. The decision should
be considered and carried out in accordance with the mandate of the Chinese
Conference. The Soviet government could not agree with this view.

Therefore, the Soviet government could not agree with the
request to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London

(b) If the Chinese Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five
person from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation.

Referred the Soviet Union to the earlier cables, which we felt was not a position, but
Such, in my opinion, are the reasons hindering the solution of the Polish question on the basis of mutual agreement.

In order to leave the dead end and reach a harmonious decision it is necessary, in my opinion, to undertake the following steps:

1) To agree that the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government means not its liquidation but just its reconstruction by way of broadening it, bearing in mind that the kernel of the future Polish Government of National Unity should be the Provisional Polish Government.

2) To return to the projectings of the Crimean Conference and to summon only eight Polish leaders, five of whom should be called from Poland and three from London.

3) To agree that, under any conditions, a consultation with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government should be carried out, bearing in mind that this consultation with them should be carried out first of all as the Provisional Polish Government is the greatest force in Poland as compared to those singletons who will be called from London and from Poland and whose influence on the population of Poland cannot be compared with the tremendous influence which the Provisional Polish Government enjoys in Poland.

I draw your attention to this point as, in my opinion, any other decision on this point can be perceived in Poland as an insult to the Polish people and as an attempt to force upon Poland a government formed without taking into consideration the public opinion of Poland.

4) To summon for consultation from Poland and from London only such leaders who recognise decisions of the Crimean Conference on Poland and are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.
5) To carry out the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government by substituting some of the present ministers of the Provisional Government by new ministers from among Polish leaders not participating in the Provisional Government.

As regards the numerical correlation of old and new ministers in the composition of the Polish Government of national unity, there could be established approximately a similar correlation which was realized in respect to the Government of Yugoslavia.

I think that, taking into consideration the above-stated remarks, a harmonious decision on the Polish question can be reached in a short time.
I have received your message of April 1 on the Polish question. In my message to the President on this question, which I am also sending to you, I am answering to all principal questions connected with the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland. As regards other questions, which you touch upon in your message, I have to say the following:

1. The British and American Ambassadors -- members of the Moscow Commission do not want to regard the Provisional Polish Government and insist on inviting for consultation Polish leaders regardless of their attitude toward the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and toward the Soviet Union. They insist on obligatory invitation to Moscow for consultation for instance Mikolaiczyk, doing this even in an ultimative form, not taking into consideration that Mikolaiczyk openly spoke against the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland. However, if you consider it necessary, I would be ready to influence the Provisional Polish Government to remove its objections against the invitation of Mikolaiczyk, provided the latter would make a public statement about the recognition by him of the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and that he supports the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.
TOP SECRET

2. You wonder why the Polish theatre of military events should be secret. In reality there is no secret. You overlook the circumstances that sending to Poland of British observers or other foreign observers is considered by the Poles as insult to their national dignity, and if one bears in mind, that the present attitude of the British Government of the Provisional Polish Government the latter considers as unfavorable. As regards the Soviet Government, it cannot but take into consideration the negative attitude of the Provisional Polish Government toward the question of sending foreign observers to Poland. Besides, you know, that when a different attitude is shown to the Provisional Polish Government it is not hindering entry into Poland of representatives of other nations and does not create any obstacles for them as it is in the case with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the Yugoslav Government and others.

3. I had a pleasant talk with Mrs. Churchill. She made a great impression on me. She has transmitted to me your gift. Permit me to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the gift.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

April 9, 1945

My dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding herewith a message from Marshal J. V. Stalin on the Polish question. I have also instructions to forward to you a copy of Marshal Stalin's message to Prime-Minister Churchill on the Polish question.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ A. Grumyko
Ambassador

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
FROM MANSHEAL STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 7 April 1945

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answered PRES-STALIN #218, 31 Mar 45.
2. (Note that this message was also sent by Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill, with an additional message to Churchill which was repeated to the President.)
3. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-383, 10 Apr 45.
4. In MR-OUT-387, 1015142, Admiral Leahy informed the President that copies of Stalin's message of 7 April to the President and to Churchill had been given to the State Department for urgent consideration, and requested permission to send them to Harriman for his information. President approved in MR-IN-192, 1016302.
5. Quoted to Ambassador Harriman in PRES-HARRIMAN #227, 10 Apr 45.
6. (See also MR-OUT-389, 1015142; MR-IN-193, 1016302; and PRES-PM #739, 10 Apr 45.)
7. In MR-OUT-391, 1023302, State Department informed the President that they were giving most careful consideration to Stalin's message, that they were requesting comments and suggestions from Harriman, and that the Prime Minister would probably communicate his views in near future.
8. For Prime Minister's views, see FM-PRES #944 and #945.
9. Stalin's message of 7 April 1945 was never answered by the President. The President died on 12 April 1945.
10. Answered by message from President Truman to Marshal Stalin, #266, 16 April 1945.

COPIES TO:
MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-STALIN FILE

IN BLANK:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 930, 1 APRIL 1945

Your 732. I am delighted with our being in such perfect step.
I have bunged off my 929 to the Bear.

RECD 011555Z.
MR-OUT-320, 011642Z.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

FILE No. #930, 1 April 1945

TO MAP ROOM 011555Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PW #732, 31 Mar 45.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as WR-CUB-320, 011642Z.
3. No reply.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

ORIGINAL: PW-PRES FILE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
31 March 1945
01002AZ

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 218, TOP-SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL
STALIN.

I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development
of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta. The decis-
ions we reached there were good ones and have for the most part been welcomed
with enthusiasm by the peoples of the world who saw in our ability to find a
common basis of understanding the best pledge for a secure and peaceful world
after this war. Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that these
decisions raised, their fulfillment is being followed with the closest at-
tention. We have no right to let them be disappointed. So far there has
been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the
world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference
particularly those relating to the Polish question. I am frankly puzzled as
to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many
respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having under-
stood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and
will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend,
therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the prob-
lem as I see it.

Although I have in mind primarily the difficulties which the Polish
negotiations have encountered, I must make a brief mention of our agreement
embodied in the declaration on liberated Europe. I frankly cannot understand

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

TOP-SECRET
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
why the recent developments in Rumania should be regarded as not falling within the terms of that agreement. I hope you will find time personally to examine the correspondence between our Governments on this subject.

However, the part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimean decisions. In order that there shall be no misunderstanding I set forth below my interpretation of the points of the agreement which are pertinent to the difficulties encountered by the Commission in Moscow.

In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. It is equally apparent that for the same reason the Warsaw Government cannot under the agreement claim the right to select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance and invitations be sent out accordingly. If
this could be done I see no great objection to having the Lublin group come first in order that they may be fully acquainted with the agreed interpretation of the Yalta decisions on this point. It is of course understood that if the Lublin group comes first no arrangements would be made independently with them before the arrival of the other Polish leaders called for consultation. In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for the consideration of the Commission. We have not and would not bar or veto any candidate for consultation which Mr. Molotov might propose being confident that he would not suggest any Poles who would be inimical to the intent of the Crimean decision. I feel that it is not too much to ask that my Ambassador be accorded the same confidence and that any candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission be accepted by the others in good faith. It is obvious to me that if the right of the Commission to select these Poles is limited or shared with the Warsaw Government the very foundation on which our agreement rests would be destroyed. While the foregoing are the immediate obstacles which in my opinion have prevented the Commission from making any progress in this vital matter there are two other suggestions which were not in the agreement but nevertheless have a very important bearing on the result we all seek. Neither of these suggestions has been as yet accepted by your Government. I refer to (1) that there should be the maximum of political tranquility in Poland and that dissident groups should cease any measures and countermeasures against each other. That we should respectively use our influence to that end seems to me so eminently reasonable. (2) It would also seem entirely natural in view of the responsibilities placed upon them by the agreement that representatives of the American and British members of the Com-
mission should be permitted to visit Poland. As you will recall Mr. Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it.

I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form. You are, I am sure, aware that genuine popular support in the United States is required to carry out any Government policy foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own mind and no Governmental action can change it. I mention this fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov's attendance at San Francisco made me wonder whether you give full weight to this factor.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date

TOP-SECRET
In his #925, 27 Mar 45, Churchill suggested that he and the President send a message to Stalin re Poland, and he submitted a rough idea of the message in his #926. The President, in his #729 of 29 Mar 45, agreed that a message should be sent, and submitted his proposed message in #730. Churchill replied in his #928, concurring in the President's message, but suggesting that certain additions be made. He also submitted in his #929 the message which he proposed to send to Stalin endorsing the President's message.

2. Prime's #728 sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-308, 3020082. President referred this message to Adm Leahy (MR-IN-165, 3023482) for whatever action he deemed necessary. Adm Leahy consulted State; draft of message to Stalin was revised to incorporate changes suggested by Churchill. President was informed in MR-OUT-315, 210010Z, which contained draft of message to Churchill telling him what changes had been made in original draft of message to Stalin. President approved in MR-IN-169, 010010Z.


TOP-SECRET

31 MARCH 1945
010038Z NCR

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 732, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Thank you for your 928 of March 30 in regard to my proposed message to Stalin. I am very pleased to find that we are in such substantial agreement. I have carefully considered the helpful suggestions that you have made, and I am making the following three additions to cover the points you raise.

In regard to the point raised in your paragraph 2 I am adding immediately after the words QUOTE Yalta decisions on this point UNQUOTE the following sentence: QUOTE It is of course understood that if the Lublin group comes first no arrangements would be made independently with them before the arrival of the other Polish leaders called for consultation. UNQUOTE.

In your paragraph 3 after the words QUOTE accorded the same confidence UNQUOTE, I am adding the phrase QUOTE and that any candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission be accepted by the others in good faith UNQUOTE.

In regard to your point 4 after the words QUOTE permitted to visit Poland UNQUOTE, I would add the following sentence: QUOTE As you will recall Mr. Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it UNQUOTE.

I have just received your 929, and as I concur in your proposed
message I have sent mine to Stalin with the foregoing additions.

ROOSEVELT
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #928 and #929, 31 Mar 45.
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President at Warm Springs as MS-OUT-313, 3120102. President approved in MS-IN-169, 0100102. Dispatched to Churchill at 0100301.
3. For the President's dispatch to Stalin mentioned in this message, see PRES-STALIN #218, 31 Mar 45.
4. Answered by PM-PRES #930, 1 Apr 45.

COPY TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 929, 31 MARCH 1945

Following is text of message I propose to send to Stalin. Please
let me know what you think. I will not send it off till I hear from you.
Text begins:

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and TOP SECRET.

1. You will by now I hope have received the message from the Pres-
ident of the United States which he was good enough to show to me before he
sent it.

It is now my duty on behalf of His Majesty's Government to assure you
that the War Cabinet desire me to express to you our wholehearted endorsement
of this message of the President's, and that we associate ourselves with it in
its entirety.

2. There are two or three points which I desire specially to emphasize.
First, that we do not consider we have retained in the Moscow discussions the
spirit of Yalta nor indeed, at points, the letter. It was never imagined by
us that the commission we all three appointed with so much good will would not
have been able to carry out their part swiftly and easily in a mood of give
and take.

We certainly thought that a Polish Government "new" and "reorganized"
would by now have been in existence, recognized by all the United Nations.
This would have afforded a proof to the world of our capacity and resolve to
work together for its future. It is still not too late to achieve this.
3. However, even before forming such a new and reorganized Polish Government, it was agreed by the commission that representative Poles should be summoned from inside Poland and from Poles abroad, not necessarily to take part in the government but merely for free and frank consultation.

Even this preliminary step cannot be taken because of the claim put forward to veto any invitation, even to the consultation, of which the Soviet or the Lublin Government do not approve. We can never agree to such a veto by any one of us three. This veto reaches its supreme example in the case of Monsieur Nikolajczyk who is regarded throughout the British and American world as the outstanding Polish figure outside Poland.

4. We also have learned with surprise and regret that Monsieur Molotov's spontaneous offer to allow observers or missions to enter Poland has now been withdrawn. We are therefore deprived of all means of checking for ourselves the information, often of a most painful character, which is sent us almost daily by the Polish Government in London.

We do not understand why a veil of secrecy should thus be drawn over the Polish scene. We offer the fullest facilities to the Soviet Government to send missions or individuals to visit any of the territories in our military occupation.

In several cases this offer has been accepted by the Soviets and visits have taken place to mutual satisfaction. We ask that the principle of reciprocity shall be observed in these matters, which would help to make so good a foundation for our enduring partnership.

5. The President has also shown me messages which have passed between him and you about Monsieur Molotov's inability to be present at the conference at San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of the three Foreign Ministers
might have led to a clearance of many of the difficulties which have
descended upon us in a storm since our happy and hopeful union at Yalta. We
do not however question in any way the weight of the public reasons which make
it necessary for him to remain in Russia.

6. Like the President, I too was struck with the concluding sentence
of your message to him. What he says about the American people also applies
to the British people and to the nations of the British Commonwealth with the
addition that His Majesty's present advisers only hold office at the will of
the Universal Suffrage Parliament.

If our efforts to reach an agreement about Poland are to be doomed to
failure, I shall be bound to confess the fact to Parliament when they return
from the Easter recess. No one has pleaded the cause of Russia with more
fervour and conviction than I have tried to do. I was the first to raise my
voice on June 22, 1941.

It is more than a year since I proclaimed to a startled world the
justice of the Curzon Line for Russia's western frontier, and this frontier
has now been accepted by both the British Parliament and the President of the
United States.

It is as a sincere friend of Russia that I make my personal appeal to
you and to your colleagues to come to a good understanding about Poland with
the western democracies and not to smite down the hands of comradeship in
the future guidance of the world which we now extend.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 31 Mar 45.

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. Continuation of PM #928, 31 Mar 45. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-311, 3114032.
2. President replied in MR-IN-166 to Admiral Leahy (3119045), stating "I think this is all right."
3. Draft reply to both PM #928 and #929 prepared by Admiral Leahy and State Department; sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-315, 3120102. President approved in MR-IN-169, 0100102.
4. Answer sent to Churchill as PM #772, 31 Mar 45.

Copied To: MA 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Original: PRES-PM FILE

By Direction Of:

Date:

Signature:
FROM:  THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO:    THE PRESIDENT  
NO : 928,  30 MARCH 1945

1. Thank you for your 729 and 730. I am glad you agree that the time has come for us both to address Stalin directly. We consider the draft in your 730 is a grave and weighty document and, although there are a few points in which it does not give full expression to our own views, we will whole-heartedly accept it and I will also endorse it in my parallel message to Stalin, the text of which I will send you before it goes.

2. Perhaps however before deciding on your final text you would consider the importance of making it clear that we shall not enter into any arrangements with the Lublinites before the arrival of our own Poles. There is no harm in discussing with the Lublinites, but I am sure that Mikolajczyk for instance will stipulate that the field shall be open when he arrives. We should be glad if you would provide for this in your draft.

3. More important still is to get rid of Molotov's veto on our candidates. You indicate this in a most polite manner, but would it not be well to emphasize the point by adding a sentence at the appropriate place to the effect that none of the three of us should veto each other's candidates? Otherwise he will simply veto every one that the Lublin Poles wish him to.

4. Finally, could you not mention in the last paragraph of your draft that it was Molotov himself who originally made the suggestion of observers?

5. I do not ask you to delay the dispatch of your draft on account of these desired additions by us. We leave it in your hands. Meanwhile I agree
that our two Ambassadors should give Molotov the redraft of the latter's basic principles, making it clear in doing so that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 19th and will revert to them at a later stage.

PRIME
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

Date: 928, 30 Mar 45.

Filing or File No.: 302392

For Map Room: 302392 Via Army Code Room

Subject: Poland

Action:

1. Answers PRES-PH #722 and #730, 29 Mar 45. (Also see PM #929, which is continuation of this message.)

2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-308, 3020082.

3. President replied in his WH-IN-165, 3023382, referring PM #928 to Admiral Leahy for whatever action he deemed necessary.

4. Admiral Leahy took up with State Department; suggested changes proposed by Churchill were incorporated in President's draft message to Stalin (See PRES-PH #730). A message was drafted to be sent to Churchill, informing him of the changes. This message sent to the President for approval as WH-OUT-315, 3120102. President approved in WH-IN-169, 0120102 Apr.

5. Answer sent to Churchill as PRES #732, 31 Mar 45. Message to Stalin (as drafted in PRES #730, and amended in accordance with PM #928) dispatched to Moscow as PRES-STALIN #218, 31 Mar 45. PRES #732 also approved PM #929, 31 Mar 45.

Copies To:

MR 052 Polish-Russian Relations

Original: PRES-PH File

Date:

By Direction Of:
To: War Department
No: 43258
30 March 1945
Signed Tindall to MILID sr nr 43258.
Info rated B 2.

Word from Moscow indicates British have informed Soviet authorities of report that Russians have told Provisional Govt in Poland it would receive certain part of Silesia.

Molotov reminded that any such arrangement would have to be discussed and agreed by Yalta signatories.

Comment: Russian action looks like effort to strengthen Lublin Govt.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: OG AAF; OPD; Col Park; C of S

CM-IN-32013 (30 Mar 45) DTG: 301610Z ejo
SECRET

Copy No. 42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
However, the part of our agreement at Yalta which has aroused the greatest surprise and comment in the West, refers to the decision to end the war in the Far East as early as possible. This decision was made in the interests of the peoples of the East who have long suffered under the yoke of Japan, and in the interests of world peace. The United States are fully prepared to support this decision by all the means at our disposal, and to reinforce it by prompt action. The United States will not allow the Japanese war to continue any longer than is absolutely necessary to achieve our objective.

Following is my suggested message to Stalin:

QUOTE: I cannot conceal from you the concerns I have about the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta. The decisions we reached there were good ones and have for the most part been welcomed with enthusiasm by the peoples of the world who saw in your ability to find a common basis of understanding the best pledge for a secure and peaceful world after this war. Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that these decisions raised their fulfillment is being followed with the closest attention.

We have no right to let them be disappointed. So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference particularly those relating to the Polish question. I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it.

Although I have in mind primarily the difficulties which the Polish negotiations have encountered, I must make a brief mention of our agreement embodied in the declaration on liberated Europe. I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Rumania should be regarded as not falling within the terms of that agreement. I hope you will find time personally to examine the correspondence between our Governments on this subject.
However, the part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimian decisions. In order that there shall be no misunderstanding I set forth below my interpretation of the points of the agreement which are pertinent to the difficulties encountered by the Commission in Moscow.

In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. It is equally apparent that for the same reason the Warsaw Government cannot, under the agreement, claim the right to select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance and invitations be sent out accordingly. If this could be done I see no great objection to having the Lublin group come first in order that they may be fully acquainted with the agreed interpretation of the Yalta decisions on this point. In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names.
for the consideration of the Commission. We have not and would not bar or veto any candidate for consultation which Mr. Molotov might propose being confident that he would not suggest any Poles who would be inimical to the intent of the Crimean decision. I feel that it is not too much to ask that my Ambassador be accorded the same confidence. It is obvious to me that if the right of the Commission to select these Poles is limited or shared with the Warsaw Government the very foundation on which our agreement rests would be destroyed. While the foregoing are the immediate obstacles which in my opinion have prevented the Commission from making any progress in this vital matter there are two other suggestions which were not in the agreement but nevertheless have a very important bearing on the result we all seek. Neither of these suggestions has been as yet accepted by your Government. I refer to (1) that there should be the maximum of political tranquility in Poland and that dissident groups should cease any measures and countermeasures against each other. That we should respectively use our influence to that end seems to me so eminently reasonable. (2) It would also seem entirely natural in view of the responsibilities placed upon them by the agreement that representatives of the American and British members of the Commission should be permitted to visit Poland.

I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimean will face us in an even more acute form. You are, I am sure, aware that genuine popular support in the United States is required to carry out any Government policy foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own mind and no Governmental action can change it. I mention this fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov's attendance at San Francisco made me wonder whether you give full weight to this factor. UNKNOTE.
FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. #730, 29 Mar 45.

TOPIC MAP ROOM 291959Z VIA

SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:

1. Continuation of PAK-PW #729, 29 Mar 45. PRES #729 and #730 answer PW-PRES #225 and #226, 27 Mar 45, which were sent to the President at Hyde Park as DF-OUT-277 and 298. President replied in ST-IN-161, 27211112, directing Admiral Leahy "confer with JCS and Mr. Drew and prepare reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning, 29 Mar 45."

2. Craft reply prepared by State Department and Adv Leahy; approved by the President morning of 29 Mar 45; dispatched 291959Z.

3. Answered by PA-PRES #230, 30 Mar 45.

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
The President

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO: 729, 29 MARCH 1945 (2919312)

I have likewise been watching with anxiety and concern the development of Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference. I am acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present course of events not only for the immediate issues involved and our decisions at the Crimea but also for the San Francisco Conference and future world cooperation. Our people and indeed those of the whole world are watching with anxious hope the extent to which the decisions we reached at the Crimea are being honestly carried forward.

For our part (and I know for yours) we intend to shirk no responsibility which we have assumed under those decisions. I agree with you that we should not neglect any step calculated to demonstrate to the Soviet Government the vital importance of their doing likewise. It is for this reason and because of the magnitude of the issues involved that I consider it essential to base ourselves squarely on the Crimea decisions themselves and not allow any other considerations, no matter how important, to cloud the issue at this time. I have this particularly in mind with respect to the Polish negotiations.

You will recall that the agreement on Poland at Yalta was a compromise between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should merely be "quote enlarged END "quote and our contention that we should start with a clean slate and assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government. The wording of the resulting agreement reflects this compromise but if we attempt...
to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimean decision. It by no means follows, however, and on this we must be adamant, that because of this advantage the Lublin group can in any way arrogate to itself the right to determine what Poles from the other two groups are to be brought in for consultation. For the foregoing reasons I feel strongly that we should first of all bring the matter to a head on the question that falls clearly within the Yalta agreement, namely, our right to call for consultation a group of Polish leaders that are truly representative and that it is for the Commission and the Commission alone to decide which Poles are representative. Our Ambassadors in Moscow appear to be in agreement that we should proceed on the basis of their redraft, designed to reconcile our basic instructions with the points put forward by Molotov. They will at the same time make it absolutely clear that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 19 and shall revert to them at a later stage.

I do feel the other questions of procedure and the proper time for reopening the other points can be safely left to our Ambassadors. They know exactly what we think and feel on the entire question and I am personally completely confident that under no circumstances will they take any step or agree to anything which would impair the objectives we both seek. For example, I believe that if we can get Soviet agreement to the principle that the Commission and the Commission alone shall determine what Poles shall be invited for consultation and a definite list is drawn up and invitations issued then consultation with the Lublin Poles first might even afford
Certain advantages. They could be told how we interpret the Yalta decision and thus avoid the danger of having the question of interpretation become a matter of dispute between the Polish groups themselves. I feel subject to your approval that our Ambassadors should proceed along this line to bring our differences with Molotov into sharp focus without waiting for us to concert our messages to Stalin. I am ready to go ahead on this basis if we can obtain your concurrence which I earnestly hope you will give.

I agree with you, however, that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland) and my immediate following telegram will contain the text of the message I propose to send.

I hope you will let me have your reaction as soon as possible.

ROOSEVELT

[Declassified by Deputy Archivist of the U.S. on 9/1972 by W. J. Stewart Date]
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

FILE NO. #729, 29 Mar 45.

FOR MAP ROOM 29193Z VIA

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers FM-PRES #925 and #926, 27 March 1945, which were sent to the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-297 and 298. President replied in WR-IN-161, 272141Z, directing Admiral Leahy "confer with JCS and Mr. Crew and prepare reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning, 29 Mar 45."

2. Draft reply prepared by State Department and Adm Leahy; approved by the President morning of 29 March 1945; dispatched 29193Z.

3. See also PRES-FM #730, 29 Mar 45, which is continuation of this message.

4. Answered by FM-PRES #928, 30 Mar 45.

COPIES TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: ____________________________ BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-FM FILE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 926, 27 MARCH 1945

1. My immediately preceding telegram.

Could we not both tell him that: We are distressed that the work of the Polish Commission is held up because misunderstandings have arisen about the interpretation of the Yalta decisions. The agreed purpose of those decisions was that a new Government of National Unity was to be established after consultations with representatives of Lublin and other Democratic Poles which both our governments could recognize.

We have not got any reply on the various Polish names we have suggested, pleading lack of information. We have given him plenty of information. There ought not to be a veto by one power on all nominations. We consider that our nominations for the discussions have been made in the spirit of confidence which befits allies; and of course there could be no question of allowing Lublin to bar them. We will accept any nominations he puts forward, being equally confident that the Soviet Government will not suggest Pro-Nazi or Anti-Democratic Poles.

The assembled Poles should then discuss the formation of a new government among themselves. The Commission should preside as arbitrators to see fair play. Monsieur Molotov wants the Lublinites to be consulted first. The Communiqué does not provide for this. But we have no objection to his seeing them first.
We cannot authorize our representatives to do so since we think it contrary to the spirit of the Communique. Also, to our surprise and regret Molotov, who suggested at an earlier stage that we might like to send observers, has now withdrawn the offer.

Indeed, he appeared to suggest that it had never been made; and has suggested that we should apply to the present Warsaw Administration. Stalin will understand that the whole point of the Yalta decision was to produce a Polish Government we could recognize and that we obviously cannot therefore deal with the present administration.

We feel sure he will honour the offer to send observers and his influence with his Warsaw friends is so great that he will overcome with ease any reluctance they may show in agreeing.

2. Also, Stalin will surely see that while the three great allies are arranging for the establishment of the new Government of National Unity, those in power in Poland should not prejudice the future. We have asked that the Soviet Government should use their influence with their friends in temporary power there. Stalin will, we feel confident, take steps to this end.

3. Stalin will find all this set out in most reasonable terms in our communication of the 19th March. Will he cast his eye over it and judge whether our suggestions are not all in line with the spirit of the Yalta decision, and should they not all be met by our ally in order that the aim of the Yalta settlement of Poland, viz the setting up of a representative government which Britain and the U.S.A. can recognize, may be carried out without further delay.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
DATE: 27 March 1945

TO: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. (Continuation of PM #925, 27 Mar 45.) To the President at Hyde Park as MB-OUT-298, 2719302.
2. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request, 2719452.
3. MB-IN-161, 2721142, from the President to Admiral Leahy, stated, "Refer to MB-OUT-297 and 298. Confer with CCS and Mr. Grew and prepare reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning."
4. Dr. P. reply prepared by State Dept. and Admiral Leahy. To the President by Admiral Leahy on his return from Hyde Park on 29 Mar; approved by the President; sent to Churchill as PRES-PM #720, 29 Mar 1944. Also see PRES-PM #720.

COPied To:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 Polish-Russian Relations

Original: Gen-Pm #6

052 Polish-Russian Relations
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 925, 27 MARCH 1945

1. I am extremely concerned at the deterioration of the Russian attitude since Yalta.

2. About Poland, you will have seen that Molotov in his reply to the agreed communication made to him by our Ambassadors on the 19th March, and in their discussion on the 23rd March, returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with and ignored others.

   He persists in his view that the Yalta Communique merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first. He maintains his right to veto Mikolajczyk and other Poles we may suggest and pretends that he has insufficient information about the names we have put forward long ago.

   Nothing is said about our proposal that the commission should preside in an arbitral capacity over discussions among the Poles. Nothing on our point that measures in Poland affecting the future of the Polish State and action against individuals and groups likely to disturb the atmosphere should be avoided.

   He ignores his offer about observers and tells us to talk to the Warsaw puppets about this. It is as plain as a pike staff that his tactics are to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power.

3. Clark Kerr's proposal for dealing with this was to try by redrafting to build something on the four point formula included in Molotov's reply. We cannot see that any real progress towards getting an honest Polish settlement...
can possibly be made in this way.

It would merely mean that we allowed our communication to be side
tracked, negotiated on the basis of Molotov’s wholly unsatisfactory reply and
wasted time finding formulæ which do not decide vital points. We therefore
instructed Clark Kerr that he should not proceed on this basis, and that we
are discussing matters with you.

4. As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution
on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia, both Eden and I are pledged to
report the fact openly to the House of Commons. There I advised critics of the
Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to
the House, the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong.
All the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a set up there on
the new Roumanian model.

In other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the
terms of the declaration of liberated Europe and you and we shall be excluded
from any jot of influence in that area.

5. Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing
on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of
democracy? (You no doubt saw Vyshinsky’s public explanations in Roumania of
this doctrine.) There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing
our total failure. That alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the
Yalta declaration.

But I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with
Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us
both on Poland to Stalin? I will send you our rough idea on this in my
immediately following. I hope you can agree.

6. I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If we are rebuffed, it will be a very sinister sign, taken with the other Russian actions at variants with the spirit of Yalta; such as Molotov’s rude questioning of our word in the case of CROSSWORD, the unsatisfactory proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the coup de’etat in Roumania, the Russian refusal to allow the declaration on liberated Europe to operate, and the blocking of all progress in the EAC by the Russians.

7. What also do you make of Molotov’s withdrawal from San Francisco? It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out or are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based on the conception of great power unity.

If no such unit exists on Poland, which is after all a major problem of the post war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new world organization? And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

8. I believe, therefore, that if the success of San Francisco is not to be gravely imperilled, we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin about Poland and if necessary about any other derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the world organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions.

Indeed, I am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now the deplorable impression Molotov’s absence from San Francisco will cause.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE #925, 27 March 1945.

TO MAP ROOM 271820Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park as WR-OUT-297, 271930Z.
2. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request, 271945Z.
3. (See also PM #926, which supplements this message.)
4. WR-IN-161, 272111Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated, "Refer to WR-OUT-297 and 298. Confer with JCS and Mr. Grew and prepare reply for my approval on my arrival Thursday morning."
5. Draft reply prepared by State Dept and Adm Leahy. To the President by Admiral Leahy on his return from Hyde Park on 29 Mar; approved by the President; sent to Churchill as PRESP-M1 #729, 29 March 1945. Also see PRES-PM #720.

COPY TO: DATED: BY DIRECTION OF:


FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER 19th MARCH 1945
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 916

Your number 719.

I have now read the text proposed. I am delighted we are in full agreement. We will send an identical message to Clark Kerr forthwith.

PRIME

FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: The President

DEAL or FILE NO.: #916, 19 Mar 45.

FOR MAP ROOM: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PM#712, 18 Mar 45.
2. To President via Miss Tully.
3. Copy to Admiral Leahy for State Department.
4. No answer. See further PM-PRES #925, 27 Mar 45.

COPIES TO:

DATE: ____________________________

BY DIRECTION OF:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ORIGINAL: PM-PRES FILE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
18 MARCH 1945

FROM: OPAHAV
TO: ALJUSA, LONDON 1815562 SGR 6506

NUMBER 719, PERSONAL AND TOP-SECRET; FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your No. 912.

The State Department and your Embassy have prepared instructions to our Ambassadors in Moscow closely following the draft suggested by Clark Kerr and have agreed upon a text which I have approved and which I believe meets both our views. I hope that you will concur.

ROOSEVELT

Released 1815562.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE: #719, 18 March 1945

TO: mbp room VIA

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answered P4-Press #916, 16 Mar 45, which was sent to State for preparation of reply, 17 Mar 45.
   2. Draft reply prepared by State; to President via Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President; dispatched to Churchill at 1815562.
   3. Answered by P4-Press #916, 19 Mar 45.

COPY TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: P4-Press PM FILE

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 912, 16 MARCH 1945

1. Thank you for your No. 718 of 16 March. I am most relieved that you do not feel that there is any fundamental divergence between us and I agree that our differences are only about tactics.

You know, I am sure, that our great desire is to keep in step with you and we realize how hopeless the position would become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were not in full accord.

2. Just before getting your telegram, I received from Clark Kerr the draft of the communication he thinks we should make to Molotov. This was drawn up after long talks with Averell but, of course, does not commit him.

We are instructing Halifax to show Clark Kerr's proposed communication immediately to Stettinius and if possible to you. I like Clark Kerr's draft and must earnestly beg you to consider whether you cannot accept our proposals in this modified form. I hope that when Stettinius has been through it with Halifax you will see your way to instruct Averell to put in the same, or at least a very similar, communication.

3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views upon the various points the inclusion of which I still consider essential. I welcome your agreement on point (A).

With regard to point (B), what happens if Molotov vetoes every one of our suggestions? And secondly, what is the use of anyone being invited who has no freedom of movement and communications? We had in fact not understood that Molotov had disputed this latter point when it was raised
TOP-SECRET

with him earlier but Nikolajczyk has made it a condition of going to Moscow and I greatly doubt whether we could persuade him to leave unless we had some definite assurance to convey to him.

Equally it is in order to reassure the anti-Lublin Poles whom we want to see invited that I should like to come to an agreement with Molotov in regard to the character of the discussions and the commission's arbitral capacity (my point (C)).

If you feel strongly against mentioning the matter of the presidential function at this stage I will give way although it is a matter of great practical importance which the Poles must not be debarred from discussing.

In regards point (D) I fear I cannot agree that your truce plan would achieve the desired result. How can we guarantee that nothing will be said or done in Poland or by the Polish Government's supporters here, which the Russians could not parade as a breach of the truce?

I fear that the truce plan will lead us into interminable delays and a dead end in which some at least of the blame may well be earned by the London Polish Government. I fear therefore that it is impossible for us to endorse your truce proposal, for we think it actively dangerous.

I beg you once more most earnestly to consider whether you cannot accept the revised version of (D) included in Clark Kerr's draft. This would give us something on which to base the work of our observers (point (E), on which I am very glad to see that we are in agreement.)

4. At present all entry into Poland is barred to our representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn across the scene. This extends even to the liaison officers, British and American, who were to help in bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to our information the American
officers as well as the British who had already reached Lublin have been requested to clear out.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is going on in Poland. It may be that apart from the Poles they are being very rough with the Germans. Whatever the reason, we are not to be allowed to see. This is not a position that could be defended by us.

END
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

By direction of the President, there is forwarded herewith attached, for preparation of a draft reply, Prime Minister's message No. 912 in reply to President's message No. 718 of 16 March which was drafted by the Secretary of State.

/s/ WILLIAM E. LEARY

COPY FOR MAP ROOM
The Prime Minister  

TO

The President

Date:  

FILE No.  

#912, 16 March 1945.

TO

Map Room  

1621502

VIA

Army Code Room

SUBJECT:  

Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #718, 15 March 1945.
2. To the President in Doctor's office.
3. To Secretary of State, 17 Mar 45, by memo signed by Adm Leahy, for preparation of reply.
4. Draft reply by State; to President via Adm Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched to Churchill as PRES-PM #719, 19 Mar 45.
15 March 1945

PRIORITY

FROM: GPHAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER 718, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

I cannot but be concerned at the views you expressed in the second paragraph of point 5 of your 910. I do not understand what you mean by a divergence between our Governments on the Polish negotiations. From our side there is certainly no evidence of any divergence of policy. We have been merely discussing the most effective tactics and I cannot agree that we are confronted with a breakdown of the Yalta agreement until we have made the effort to overcome the obstacles incurred in the negotiations at Moscow. I also find puzzling your statement in paragraph 4 that the only definite suggestion in our instructions to Averell is for a political truce in Poland. Those instructions, of which you have a copy, not only set forth our understanding of the Yalta agreement but they make the definite point that the Commission itself should agree on the list of Poles to be invited for consultation and that no one of the three groups from which the reorganized Government is to emerge can dictate which individuals from the other two groups ought to be invited to Moscow. I must in all fairness point out that while fully aware that time is working against us Averell has had his instructions since March 9 but has not acted on them at your request in order that other points could be included. Our chief purpose at that time was and remains without giving ground to get the negotiations moving again and tackle first of all the point on which they had come to a standstill. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the vital importance of agreeing without further delay.
on instructions to our Ambassadors so that the negotiations may resume.

The need for new instructions to our Ambassadors arose out of the unwillingness of Molotov to accept our proposal concerning the list of Poles to be invited in the first instance. Since our Ambassadors informed him that the matter was being referred to their Governments, the negotiations are held up pending those instructions. With this in mind I have examined the points which you propose to submit to Stalin in your 905 and have the following comments to make:

We are in agreement on point (a) and this is covered in our instructions to Averell.

I cannot believe that Molotov will accept the proposal contained in point (b) that any Pole can be invited unless all three members of the Commission object and I am opposed to putting forward such a suggestion at this time as it would, in my view, almost certainly leave us in a stalemate which would only redound to the benefit of the Lublin Poles. I also think the demand for freedom of movement and communication would arouse needless discussion at this state in the negotiations.

On point (c) we are agreed that the Poles invited for consultation should discuss the composition of the Government among themselves with the Commission presiding in an impartial arbitral capacity so far as possible. Harriman has already been instructed to this effect but feels, and I agree, that this might be pressed later.

I have covered your point (d) in my previous message and continue to feel that our approach would be better calculated to achieve the desired result. With reference to point (e) you will recall that this had been agreed to by Molotov who took fright when Clark-Kerr revealed that you were thinking...
of a large special mission. I am willing to include in Averell's instructions the wording you propose in point (e).

Please let me know urgently whether you agree that in the light of the foregoing considerations, our Ambassadors may proceed with their instructions.

I heartily agree that we cannot invite the Lublin Poles to San Francisco and the State Department is coordinating a reply to the Soviet note with your Foreign Office.

Harry is getting along well. There is nothing seriously wrong with him and he is getting a good rest.

ROOSEVELT.
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #910, 13 March 1945, which was sent to the State Department on 14 March (Adm Leahy to Mr. Bohlen) for preparation of reply.

2. State's reply received by memo dated 15 March 1945; approved without change by the President; dispatched 1516472.

3. Answered by PM-PRES #912, 16 March 1945.
March 15, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Churchill’s
Message on Polish Settlements

In accordance with your instructions I am enclosing here-
with a draft of the suggested reply to the Prime Minister’s 910
of March 13. I have asked Mr. Biddle to explain to you the
considerations which we had in mind in drawing up this reply.
Draft Message from the President to the Prime Minister
that other plans could be finalized. The other papers
at that time was not known without rising official to act.
I cannot but be concerned at the views you expressed
in the second paragraph of point 5 of your 910. I do not
understand what you mean by a divergence between our
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that other points could be included. Our chief purpose at that time was and remains without giving ground to get the negotiations moving again and tackle first of all the point on which they had come to a standstill. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the vital importance of agreeing without further delay on instructions to our Ambassadors so that the negotiations may resume. The need for new instructions to our Ambassadors arose out of the unwillingness of Molotov to accept our proposal concerning the list of Poles to be invited in the first instance. Since our Ambassadors informed him that the matter was being referred to their Governments, the negotiations are held up pending these instructions. With this in mind I have examined the points which you propose to submit to Stalin in your 905 and have the following comments to make: We are in agreement on point (a) and this is covered in our instructions to Averell.

I cannot believe that Molotov will accept the proposal contained in point (b) that any Pole can be invited unless all three members of the Commission object and I am opposed to putting forward such a suggestion at this time as it would, in my view, almost certainly leave us in a stalemate which would only redound to the benefit of the Lublin Poles.
I also think the demand for freedom of movement and com-
munication would arouse needless discussion at this state
in the negotiations.

On point (c) we are agreed that the Poles invited for
consultation should discuss the composition of the Govern-
ment among themselves with the Commission presiding in an
impartial arbitral capacity so far as possible. Harriman
has already been instructed to this effect but feels, and
I agree, that this might be pressed later.

I have covered your point (d) in my previous message
and continue to feel that our approach would be better
calculated to achieve the desired result. With reference
to point (e) you will recall that this had been agreed to
by Molotov who took fright when Clark-Kerr revealed that
you were thinking of a large special mission. I am willing
to include in Averell's instructions the wording you pro-
pose in point (e).

Please let me know urgently whether you agree that
in the light of the foregoing considerations, our Ambassadors
may proceed with their instructions.

I heartily agree that we cannot invite the Lublin Poles
to San Francisco and the State Department is coordinating
a reply to the Soviet note with your Foreign Office.

Harry
Harry is getting along well. There is nothing seriously wrong with him and he is getting a good rest.
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States

Nr: 910, 13 March 1945 Fld: 131932Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
TOPSECRET. Number 910.

1. Your numbers 713, 714 and 715.

I thank you for your full and considerate replies to
my various messages on Poland. We can, of course, make no
progress at Moscow without your aid, and if we get out of
step the doom of Poland is sealed.

A month has passed since Yalta and no progress of any
kind has been made. Soon I shall be questioned in Parliament
on this point and I shall be forced to tell them the truth.
Time is, of course, all on the side of Lublin, who are no
doubt at work to establish their authority in such a way as
to make it impregnable.

2. I am willing to defer addressing Stalin directly
for the time being on this subject. But, in that case, I
must beg you to agree that the instructions to our Ambassa-
dors should deal with the points which I have proposed to put
to Stalin in (A) to (E) of paragraph 7 of my number 905.

You say that some of these might have the opposite effect to what we intend. I wonder which you have in mind. We might be able to improve the working. But I am convinced that unless we can induce the Russians to agree to these fundamental points of procedure, all our work at Yalta will be in vain.

3. When the discussions following Yalta began at Moscow, we had a perfectly simple objective, namely, to bring together for consultation representative Poles from inside Poland and elsewhere and to promote the formation of a new re-organized Polish Government sufficiently representative of all Poland for us to recognize it.

A test case of progress in this direction would be the inviting of Mikołajczyk and 2 or 3 of his friends who have resigned from the London Polish Government because they realize that a good understanding must be reached with Russia.

4. I fear that your present instructions to Averell will lead to little if any progress on all this, as the only definite suggestion is that there should be a truce between Polish parties. Here we should enter ground of great disadvantage to us both. The Russians would almost at once claim that the truce was being broken by the Anti-Lublin Poles and
that Lublin therefore could not be held to it.

I have little doubt that some of the supporters of the Polish Government in London and more particularly the extreme right wing underground force, the so-called N.S.Z., are giving and would give the Russians and Lublin ground for this contention.

As we are not allowed to enter the country to see what the truth is, we shall be at the mercy of assertions. After a fortnight or so of negotiations about the truce, we shall be farther back than in the days before Yalta when you and I were agreed together that anyhow Mikolajczyk should be invited.

5. At Yalta also we agreed to take the Russian view of the frontier line. Poland has lost her frontier. Is she now to lose her freedom? That is the question which will undoubtedly have to be fought out in Parliament and in public here.

I do not wish to reveal a divergence between the British and the United States Governments, but it would certainly be necessary for me to make it clear that we are in presence of a great failure and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta, but that we British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further and that the limits of our capacity to act have been reached.

The moment that Molotov sees that he has beaten us
away from the whole process of consultations among Poles to
form a new government, he will know that we will put up with
anything. On the other hand, I believe that combined dogged
pressure and persistence along the lines on which we have
been working and of my proposed draft message to Stalin,
would very likely succeed.

6. We are also in presence of the Soviet memorandum
of March 9 about inviting representatives of the Lublin Poles
to San Francisco. This would amount to a de facto recogni­
tion of Lublin. Are we not both pledged not to recognize the
Lublin Government until it has been re-organized in accordance
with the declaration and spirit of Yalta, and consequently to
continue to recognize the London Polish Government as the only
one in existence.

The only possible course if no agreement is reached is
to invite neither of the present Governments. This is in
fact the line agreed upon between us. On the other hand, this
very invitation question is well-suited to bring matters to a
head at the Moscow conference and make the Soviets see that
they must reach a fair and honourable conclusion in accordance
with the decisions of Yalta.

7. I trust Harry is progressing. It is very disap­
pointing that he should have had so serious a setback. When
he first arrived in London he was better than I had seen him for years.

Kind regards.

EH/cl End.
FROM THE Prime MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

RECEIVED or FILE NO. #910, 13 March 1945

DATE: 140240

FOR MAP ROOM Via Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers Field-PW #713, #714, and #715.
2. To the President via ushers.
3. By direction of the President, copy to Secretary of State (via Bohlen) for preparation of reply.
4. State's draft reply forwarded to the President by memo, dated 15 Mar 45, via Mr. Bohlen. Approved by the President without change; sent to the PW as Field-PW #718, 15 March 1945.

COPY TO:

DRAFT: O52 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-PRES FILE

12 March 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALBANY, LONDON

NUMBER 715, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your No. 909 points directly to an urgent necessity of our
taking every practicable means of accomplishing the corrective measures
in Poland that are envisaged in the agreements reached at Yalta.

The Yalta agreement, if they are followed, should correct most
of the abuses alleged in your 909.

In my opinion as expressed in my 714, we should leave the first
steps to our Ambassadors from which we may hope to obtain good results.

When and if it should become necessary because of failure of the
Ambassadors we may have to appeal to Marshal Stalin for relief for the
oppressed inhabitants of Poland.

ROOSEVELT
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SPECIAL or FILE NO. #715, 12 March 1945

TO MP HRM VIA

SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:

1. Answered PM-PRES #903, 10 March 1945, which was referred to Adm Leahy for preparation of reply in collaboration with State Department.

2. Reply prepared by Adm Leahy and Mr. Bohlen; approved by the President with minor change; to the Prime Minister at 122017.

3. Answered by PM-PRES #100, 13 Mar 45.
FROM: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 909, 10 March 1945

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt No. 909. Personal and TOP SECRET.

Following is summary of "information received from Poland" transmitted to me by Polish Prime Minister here. It will show you how situation is viewed by Poles in this country, and seems to me to be stated with restraint.

Of course we cannot guarantee any of this information which comes from the Polish Governments Agents in Poland who are not likely to minimise these things nor do we know what opportunities they have of checking their information, as they must be living underground. All this emphasises the need for sending our observers into the country.

(Summary begins) Summary of the more important information sent from Poland in the period 17th January to 1st March.

17 January 45. Kielce Province: The Lublin Committee has assumed civil authority. Arrests of members of the Home Army and the underground administration have begun. Enforced
registration of all males in the age groups (question) 19-59.

22 January 45. Cracow Province: On 18th January, groups of the Home Army were fighting the Germans in the western suburbs. Public utility buildings were preserved, thanks to the action of Home Army units. The population greets the Red Army and units of Berlings Army now marching in coldly. The command of Berlings Army is strictly controlled by the NKVD. According to a statement made by one of Berlings officers about 70 percent of the soldiers are in favour of the Government in London.

24 January 45. Cracow Province: Two orders of Marshal Koniev have been posted up on the walls: One regarding right of mobilization, which empowers the Lublin Committee or the Red Army, when so authorized by the committee, to effect mobilization, and a second regarding the surrender of weapons and radio sets, and the registration of typewriters, printing presses and duplicators. Registration of males in the age groups (question) 16-65.

The NKVD has been functioning in Cracow since 21st January. At present they are reading denunciations and observing. Delegates from Lublin speak against the London Government at meetings, and make sharp attacks on the Home
Army. The same is evident in the Lublin press, which is already being issued in Cracow and in the soldiers papers.

24 January 45. Miechow District: A number of members of the Home Army have been shot in Miechow and Słomniki. Radziwill was arrested in Balice, and 40 landowners and farmers in Miechow district for belonging to the Home Army or approving it. The Polish Workers party is undertaking the work of denunciation.

27 January 45. Piotrkow District: On the river Pilica in Opoczno District, strong units of the Home Army took part in fighting the Germans. They captured weapons, and destroyed and captured cars. After completing their tasks, these units of the Home Army had to disperse. The Soviet authorities only managed to catch one of the company leaders, and he succeeded in escaping.

The population is treating the new authorities with great reserve. Soviet paratroops are hunting for leaders of the Home Army. Two have already been shot. Soviet officers have announced that the Home Army is to be exterminated as Fascist. Orders have been issued for the surrender of arms, radio sets, typewriters and duplicators.

30 January 45. Piotrkow, Miechow, Częstochowa Districts: In Miechow District, 16 officers of the Home Army have been
arrested: In Piotrkow, a number of agents of the underground movement. The food and fuel situation is desperate. The withdrawal of Cracow zloties has produced a complete lack of currency.

Soviet and Lublin agitation against Great Britain is noted. At Czestochowa during a manifestation on 25 January, a banner was carried with the slogan "Down With England".

1 February 45. Cracow Province: The Soviet military authorities take no account of the Lublin Committee and act independently. The Lublin Committee slavishly comply with all their demands. A visa from the Soviet Ambassador and the permission of the peoples commissariat of foreign affairs is necessary in order to travel to Lwow.

The Soviet armies rely on the food stocks of the Polish population for their food supplies. The shops are shut, and there is no bread, water, gas or electricity.

As President of Cracow, an agent of the Committee with the pseudonym of Michalski has been sent from Lublin. So-called Socialists, members of the Peasant Party and Democrats, unknown to anyone have appeared on the town and province councils.

In towns, judges and advocates are the first to be arrested, in the country landowners.
6 February 45. Lodz Province: The situation is similar to that prevailing in other parts: Chaos in administration and the villages have to give up their last remaining food supplies. The NKVD has already begun arresting former members of the Home Army. In Lodz, two officers have been arrested. Zymierski's Army is coldly received by the population.

7 February 45. Warsaw Province: Meetings at which demands for the transformation of the Lublin Committee into a temporary government were adopted here have been organized in villages and small towns by the Soviet Military Commandants on a pattern laid down in advance.

People were compelled by force to attend. Members of the NKVD were mingled with the audience in uniform and in civilian clothes, and they took careful note of the audiences' behaviour. Members of the Polish Workers' Party, also mixed with the audience, cheered and clapped at the appropriate moments, so as to give an appearance of unanimity and enthusiasm.

9 February 45. Warsaw Province: Dearth everywhere in this area. Shoes cost 2500 zloties, a suit 50,000 zloties, butter 500 zloties a pound. Private people are not allowed to use the postal services. It is not allowed to travel even in...
your own district without a permit.

Steps are being taken to effect the complete extermination of the Home Army.

14 February 45. Warsaw Province: Public security is under the direction Radkiewicz who is dependent on the NKVD and not on the Lublin Committee. The militia in the villages is similarly situated. The Polish Workers Party is controlled by the NKVD and used for political investigations. The population is required to give personal data on every possible occasion.

16 February 45. Warsaw Province: The Sovietisation of Poland is proceeding apace. Agrarian reform is being carried out in great haste in the territories taken by the Soviet Armies. The land allotted is usually much less than four hectares and may not be built on.

The nationalisation of industry and trade is being prepared by the annulling of the stocks of ready cash which may only be changed for Lublin zloties by individuals in person. The Lublin Committee is granting short term credits and in case of non payment the businesses are taken over by the committee.

A totalitarian organization of society is gradually being introduced and is based on enforced one party organiza-
tions. Such an organization for the villages is the Peasants Mutual Aid Association and for workers the appropriate trade union. The Supreme Councils of the trade unions and Mutual Aid are dominated by the Polish Workers Party.

The cooperative movement is in the hands of the one party central cooperative "Spolem". Cinemas and films are in the hands of a cooperative for the exploitation of films taken over by the Lublin Committee from the Germans. The publication and sale of papers, journals and books is concentrated in the hands of one institution, organized to have the appearance of a readers cooperative.

20 February 45. Radom District: The NKVD is taking systematic steps to discover the whole organization of the Home Army and to arrest its members. In Kielce Province, about 20 percent of the former members of the Home Army have been arrested. In Sandomierz, more Poles have been arrested during the few months of Soviet occupation than during the whole five years of German occupation.

The local and state authorities are constantly changing, as they cannot cope with the situation: In Kielce, the Wojewoda is the fourth and the Mayor the sixth in succession. The attitude of the population to the new authorities is indifferent or hostile. Even the enthusiasts change their views
in a short time.

Members of the Home Army are grieved that, after so many years of fighting and difficulties, they still have to hide like criminals.

22 February 45. Lwow Province: In January, mass arrests took place, in which 60 percent of those arrested were Poles, among them 21 university professors, priests and all classes of society. The prisons are full to overflowing. In August, 1944, and January, 1945, two trainloads of arrested persons, each containing about 2,000 people, were sent to forced labour camps in Russia.

In connection with these arrests the possession of an old envelope bearing a postage stamp with Hitler's image, or of an old German newspaper is considered sufficient proof of collaboration with the Germans. From 5th February Poles in important positions (professors, doctors and so on) have been forced to sign a memorandum condemning the Polish Government in London and Home Army and praising the Lublin Committee.

22 February 45. Bialystok-Lomza Province: Between 8th and 15th November, 1944, 143 cattle trucks packed full of arrested Poles left Bialystok and Grodno in an easterly direction towards Russia.

Up to first January 1945 the total number of Poles
arrested and deported to Russia was about 5,000 in Grodno and about 10,000 in Bialystok.

Levies for Berlings Army, carried out by means of man-hunts, continue. Up to first February, there were arrested 6 District Chiefs of Staff, 5 inspectors, 3 local commandants, about 1,000 officers 400 non-commissioned officers and some hundreds of soldiers of the Home Army together with their families. The people are unwaveringly behind the Government in London.

East of the Curzon Line, the NKVD are organizing hunts for Poles, and are deporting them to forced labour in Russia. Sometimes they are forcibly expelled on the Lublin side. The Byelorussian population expresses sympathy for the Polish Government in London and wishes these territories to be Polish.

The situation is similar in Vilno and Novogrodek Provinces.

24 February 45. Radom Province: A former inspector has been arrested. The NKVD demanded that he should reveal the whole organization of the Home Army and underground administration.

25 February 45. Lublin Province: In Lubartow, there is a camp for officers of the Home Army and for those officers of Zymierskis Army who have been convicted of belonging to the
Home Army or of other "political" crimes. This camp is under the control of the NKVD and contains about 6,000 officers and soldiers. Every few days groups are deported to Russia to an unknown destination.

During the first days of February, the Vice-Wojewoda of Kielce and some officials of the government delegation were arrested.

There is great anxiety at the Crimea decisions. The hostile attitude towards the Lublin Committee is increasing. Nevertheless belief in another more favourable solution of Polish affairs has not been shaken.

26 February 45. Warsaw Province: The wife of Premier Arciszewski was arrested on 20th February. She was working in the Polish Red Cross. Further arrests of members of the Polish Red Cross are taking place. Please inform the British. Allied intervention necessary.

1 March 45. Bialystok Province: The population in Bialystok strongly supports the Legal Polish Government in London. Byelorussians also support the Polish Government in London and wish to be Polish citizens. The minority question simply does not exist in these areas, as there is complete agreement. The population faithfully believes that a better solution of Polish affairs will be found.
They have now become hardened, changed from what they were before the war, they are suffering, but they are fighting on and show no weakness.

In the province of Bialystok, the NKVD are carrying out arrests of former soldiers of the Home Army and of loyal-minded Poles without pause.

In February 1945, 125 cattle trucks from Grodno Province and 242 from Bialystok Province, containing arrested Poles, were sent off to Russia.

The NKVD are keeping those arrested in cellars, air raid shelters and in every possible place. Those arrested sit in darkness, without any bedding or warm clothes. In the course of interrogations, the NKVD beat prisoners, torture them morally, keep them in the cold without clothes. They accuse those arrested of espionage on behalf of the British and of the Polish Government in London, and of collaboration with the Germans. There is a high rate of mortality among the prisoners.

Leaders of the Home Army are carried off into the heart of Russia or perish without any trace.

The NKVD often "work" in the uniforms of Polish officers. Spies and collaborators with the Gestapo were at first arrested by the NKVD—later, however, they were set free and the NKVD employed them as their own spies.
In towns and bigger villages, special posts have been set up to help in the hunt for former soldiers of the Home Army.

1 March 1945. Lodz Province: During the last days of February, the NKVD arrested 23 officers of the Home Army, who formerly worked on the District Staff.

The attitude of the population towards the Lublin authorities is unfavourable. Most people in Poland consider the present state of affairs as Soviet occupation.

Note: The dates given are approximately those of the despatch of messages from Poland. (Ends)

EH/cl

END

Rec'd 11/05/202
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE:  #907, 10 March 1945.

FOR MAP ROOM: Via Army Code Room

SUBJECT: POLAND

ACTION:

1. See Ps #905, Ps #907, Psrd #713, Psrd #714.
2. To President via Jim Fally.
3. To Adm Leahy for reply in collaboration with State Department.
4. Reply prepared by Adm Leahy and Mr. Bohlen; approved by the President with minor change; sent to the Prime Minister on Psrd #715, 12 March 1945.

COPY TO:

AR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:

OriGiNAL: PS-PSRD FILE.

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
11 March 1945

From: Oppen
To: Alenka, London

NUMBER 713, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PREMIER MINISTER.

Your 907.

I had drafted and released for transmission my reply to your 905, March 8, before I had received your 907 of March 10. I did not hold up on my first message as I don't believe that the main issues in that reply are basically affected by the points you raise in your 907.

With reference to your observations on the last part of the instructions to Ambassador Harriman in regard to a political truce in Poland, I can assure you that our objectives are identical, namely, to bring about a cessation on the part of the Lublin Poles of the measures directed against their political opponents in Poland to which you refer and vice versa. The only difference as I see it is one of tactics. You would prefer that the demand in regard to the Lublin Poles be put squarely to the Soviet Government as such whereas we feel that the chances of achieving our common objective would be immeasurably increased if it were done under the guise of a general political truce. You will recall at Yalta that Stalin made quite a point of the "quot; terrorist "quot; activities of the underground forces of the London Government against the Red Army and the Lublin Poles. Whether or not these allegations have any foundation in fact is beside the question since it is definitely the position of the Soviet Government. In view of Stalin's attitude we feel we would be inviting certain refusal if we merely demanded that the Lublin Poles alone be forced to cease
their persecutions of political opponents. Furthermore, we must be careful not to give the impression that we are proposing a halt in the land reforms. This would furnish the Lublin Poles with an opportunity to charge that they and they alone defend the interests of the peasants against the land lords. However, in view of your feeling on this point we have made sure that Harriman will not deliver those instructions until Clark Kerr has received his. I would also be very glad to consider any suggestions which you may have in order to strengthen this point bearing in mind the considerations which I have set forth above.

The question of sending in observers is being pressed by Harriman under other instructions. We feel, however, that more would be accomplished by pressing for low level observers at this point who would certainly see as much if not more than some more spectacular body. If you feel strongly that some reference to observers should go into the present instructions to Harriman, I will have no objection. Since we wish to get on as speedily as possible with the business of the Commission in Moscow, I would appreciate your letting me have urgently your views on my two messages so that instructions can be issued to Harriman and Clark Kerr for transmission to Molotov.

ROOSEVELT

Released 111630E.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO.: #713, 11 March 1945

DATE: 11 March 1945

SUBJECT: POLAND

ACTION:

1. Answers PA-Pre#907, 10 March 1945, which was given by Admiral Leahy, by direction of the President, to Mr. Bohlen for Secretary Stettinius for draft reply.

2. State Department's reply received by memo to the President, dated 10 Mar 45; approved by the President and sent to London at 1116302.
   (See STATUS SLIP attached to PA #907 for further details on this msg in relation to PA #905, PA #907 and Pre#712.)

3. Answered by PA-Pre#912, 11 Mar 45.

COPIED TO: MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: ____________

BY DIRECTION OF: ____________

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
11 March 1945

From: Oppen
To: Alusca, London

NUMBER 714, CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 905.

I have of course had very much in mind the considerations in regard to Rumania and to the Polish question raised in your 905, March 8, and share your concern over these developments. I am fully determined, as I know you are, not to let the good decisions we reached at the Crimea slip through our hands and will certainly do everything I can to hold Stalin to their honest fulfillment.

In regard to the Rumanian situation Averell has taken up and is taking up again the whole question with Molotov invoking the Declaration on Liberated Europe and has proposed tripartite discussions to carry out these responsibilities. It is obvious that the Russians have installed a minority government of their own choosing, but apart from the reasons you mentioned in your message, Rumania is not a good place for a test case. The Russians have been in undisputed control from the beginning and with Rumania lying athwart the Russian lines of communications it is moreover difficult to contest the plea of military necessity and security which they are using to justify their action. We shall certainly do everything we can, however, and of course will count on your support.

As to the Polish negotiations in Moscow I most certainly agree agree that we must stand firm on the right interpretation of the Crimean decision. You are quite correct in assuming that neither the Government nor the people of this
country will support participation in a fraud or a mere whitewash of the Lublin Government and the solution must be as we envisaged it at Yalta. We have recently sent instructions to Harriman, a copy of which has been given to your Embassy here, to address a communication to Molotov making this clear and in general very much along the lines of the Foreign Office's suggestions contained in the telegram to Halifax to which you refer. I understand that Clark Kerr will be instructed along similar lines. In the circumstances I feel that it would be much better to await the result of these steps by our Ambassadors before either you or I intervene personally with Stalin particularly since there is no question of either of our Governments yielding to Molotov's interpretation. I feel that our personal intervention would best be withheld until every other possibility of bringing the Soviet Government into line has been exhausted. I very much hope, therefore, that you will not send any message to Uncle Joe at this juncture—especially as I feel that certain parts of your proposed text might produce a reaction quite contrary to your intent. We must, of course, keep in close touch on this question.

ROOSEVELT

Released 1116342 March 1945.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

FILE NO. #714, 11 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Poland; Romania

ACTION:

1. Answer PM-PRESS #905, 8 Mar 45, which was referred informally by the President to Admiral Leahy to take up with State Department.
2. State Department's reply received by memo to the President, dated 10 Mar 45; approved by the President and sent to London at 1116 162. (See STATUS SLIP attached to PM #905 for further details on this map in relation to PM #905, PM #907 and PRESS #713.)
3. Answered by PM-PRESS #713, 13 Mar 45.
March 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Replies to Prime Minister Churchill's Messages on Rumania and Poland

I am enclosing herewith for your consideration suggested replies to the Prime Minister's messages No. 905 of March 9 and No. 907 of March 10.
I have of course had very much in mind the considerations in regard to Romania and to the Polish question raised in your 906, March 9, and share your concern over these developments. I am fully determined, as I know you are, not to let the good decisions we reached at the Crimea slip through our hands and will certainly do everything I can to help Stalin to his honest fulfillment. In regard to the Romanian situation Averell has taken up and is taking up again the whole question with Molotov invoking the Declaration on Liberated Europe and has proposed tripartite discussions to carry out these responsibilities. It is obvious that the Russians have installed a minority government of their own choosing, but apart from the reasons you mentioned in your message, Romania is not a good place for a test case. The Russians have been in undisputed control from the beginning and with Romania lying athwart the Russian lines of communications it is moreover difficult to contest the plea of military necessity and security which they are using to justify their action. We shall certainly do everything we can, however, and of course will count on your support.

As to the Polish negotiations in Moscow I most certainly agree that we must stand firm on the right interpretation of the Crimea decision. You are quite correct in assuming that neither the Government nor the people of this country will support participation in a front or a more whitewash of the Inblin Government and the solution must be as we envisaged it at Yalta. We have recently sent
instructions to Harrison, a copy of which has been given to your
Embassy here, to address a communication to Molotov making this clear
and in general very much along the lines of the Foreign Office's
suggestions contained in the telegram to Halifax to which you refer.
I understand that Clark Kerr will be instructed along similar lines.
In the circumstances I feel that it would be much better to await the
result of these steps by our Ambassadors before either you or I
intervene personally with Stalin particularly since there is no question
of either of our Governments yielding to Molotov's interpretation. I
feel that our personal intervention would best be withheld until every
other possibility of bringing the Soviet Government into line has been
exhausted. I very much hope, therefore, that you will not send any
message to Uncle Joe at this juncture—especially as I feel that certain
parts of your proposed text might produce a reaction quite contrary to
your intent. We must, of course, keep in close touch on this question.

Roosevelt
I. The decision to proceed with the war in the Middle East.

The situation is complex and multifaceted. The international community has expressed concern over the potential for conflict and the ramifications for regional stability. It is essential to ensure that any military actions are in line with international law and respect human rights.

II. The role of the United Nations in mediating the conflict.

The United Nations has a mandate to maintain international peace and security. It is crucial that the UN continues to play an active role in facilitating dialogue and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

III. The impact on international relations.

There are significant implications for international relations. The war could escalate tensions between nations and potentially lead to a broader conflict in the region. It is imperative to work towards stabilization and reconciliation.

IV. The humanitarian implications.

The conflict has already had a severe impact on civilians. It is crucial that humanitarian aid is provided to those affected and that efforts are made to prevent further suffering.

V. The economic consequences.

The war could have economic consequences for the region and beyond. It is important to consider the potential for economic stabilization and development in the aftermath of the conflict.

VI. The need for international cooperation.

Effective international cooperation is essential in addressing the challenges presented by the conflict. It is critical that nations work together to support the peace process and ensure lasting stability.

VII. The strategic considerations.

The war could have strategic implications for nations and regions alike. It is important to consider the broader strategic implications of any military actions.

VIII. The moral imperative.

The conflict raises important moral questions. It is crucial to uphold principles of justice and human rights in all actions taken.

IX. The role of individual nations.

Each nation has a role to play in addressing the conflict. It is important for nations to contribute to the peace process in ways that are consistent with their values and interests.

X. Conclusion.

The war in the Middle East is a complex and challenging situation. It is essential that all parties work towards a peaceful resolution that respects the rights of all and promotes stability and prosperity for the region.
would furnish the Lublín Palace with an opportunity to charge that they
and they alone defend the interests of the peasants against the land
lords. However, in view of your feeling on this point we have made
sure that Harriman will not deliver those instructions until Clark Kerr
has received his. I would also be very glad to consider any suggestions
which you may have in order to strengthen this point bearing in mind
the considerations which I have set forth above.

The question of sending in observers is being pressed by Harriman
under other instructions. We feel, however, that more would be
accomplished by pressing for low level observers at this point who
should certainly see as much if not more than some more spectacular
body. If you feel strongly that some reference to observers should
go into the present instructions to Harriman, I will have no objection.
Since we wish to get on as speedily as possible with the business of
the Commission in Moscow, I would appreciate your letting me have
urgently your views on my two messages so that instructions
can be issued to Harriman and Clark Kerr for transmission to Molotov.

Roosevelt
From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 907, 10 March 1945

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
TOP SECRET. Number 907.

1. I have now read the instructions to Mr. Harriman
which were shown to our Ambassador today. I need not say
how cordially I agree with all the first part of these in-
structions, but I am distressed at the conclusion which I
fear may lead us into great difficulties.

I do not know what the answer of the London-Polish
Government would be to a request for a political truce. They
continue to assert, with a wealth of detail, that their friends
in Poland are being arrested, deported and liquidated on a
large scale. At the best they would make conditions of an
impossible character.

2. As to the Lublin Poles, they may well answer that
their government can alone ensure "The maximum amount of
political tranquility inside", that they already represent
the great mass of the "Democratic Forces in Poland" and that
they cannot join hands with emigre traitors to Poland or
fascist collaborationists and landlords, and so on according
to the usual technique.

3. Meanwhile we shall not be allowed inside the country or have any means of informing ourselves upon the position. It suits the Soviet very well to have a long period of delay so that the process of liquidation of elements unfavourable to them or their puppets may run its full course.

This would be furthered by our opening out now into proposals of a very undefined character for a political truce between these Polish parties, (whose hatreds would eat into live steel) in the spirit and intent of the Crimea decision and might well imply the abandonment of all clear-cut requests such as those suggested in my last telegram to you. Therefore I should find it very difficult to join in this project of a political truce.

4. I have already mentioned to you that the feeling here is very strong. Four ministers have abstained from the divisions and two have already resigned.

I beg therefore that you will give full consideration to my previous telegram number 905 and will suspend the delivery of the latest Harriman instructions till I have received your reply and can reply to it.

EH/ol

END
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Poland.

DATE: 907, 10 March 1945

YOR MAP ROOM 1003582 VIA Army Code Room

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.

2. For "Instructions to Mr. Harriman" mentioned by the Prime Minister in first paragraph, see telegram from State to Ambassador, Moscow, dated 8 March 45 (copy here) which was given to the British Embassy in Washington for transmission to London.

3. See also F4's #905, 8 March 45, which was sent to the State Department for preparation of reply. Attached message (F4 #907) also sent to State for preparation of reply.

4. Replies to both F4 #905 and #907 drafted by State; sent to the President via seso dated 10 Mar 45; approved by the President without change. Reply to F4 #905 sent as F4 #908; reply to F4 #907 sent as F4 #911. (NOTE: Map Room numbering resulted in answer to F4 #907's being sent before reply to F4 #905.)
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 905, 8 March 1945.

1. I feel sure that you will be as distressed as I am by recent events in Roumania. The Russians have succeeded in establishing the rule of a Communist minority by force and misrepresentation. We have been hampered in our protests against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognised that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Roumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him.

Peace has now been restored in Greece and, though many difficulties lie before us, I hope that we shall be able to bring about in the next few months free, unfettered elections, preferably under British, American and Russian supervision, and that thereafter a constitution and government will be erected on the indisputable will of the Greek people, which remains our supreme ultimate objective in all cases, and with which I know you are in sympathy.

2. Stalin is now pursuing the opposite course in the two Black Sea Balkan countries, and one which is absolutely contrary to all democratic ideas. Since the October Anglo-Russian conversations in Moscow Stalin has subscribed on paper to the principles of Yalta which are certainly being trampled down in Roumania. Nevertheless I am most anxious not to press this view to such an extent that Stalin will say "I did not interfere with your action in Greece, why do you not give me the same latitude in Roumania?"

This again would lead to comparisons between the aims of his action and those of ours. On this matter side would convince the other. Having regard to my personal relations with Stalin, I am sure it would be a mistake for me at this stage to embark on the argument.

3. Again I am very conscious of the fact that we have on our hands the much more important issue of Poland, and I do not therefore want to do anything as regards Roumania which might prejudice our prospects of reaching a Polish settlement. Nevertheless, I feel that he should be informed of our distress at the developments which led to the setting up by force of a government in Roumania of a Communist minority, since this conflicts with the conclusions of the declaration on liberated Europe upon which we were agreed at the Crimea Conference.

More especially I am afraid that the advent of this Communist Government may lead to an indiscriminate purge of Anti-Communist Roumanians, who will be accused of Fascism much on the lines of what has been happening in Bulgaria. This is as good as foretold in the Moscow broadcast of yesterday, the text of which I have telegraphed to our Embassy.
I would suggest, therefore, that Stalin should be asked to see
to it that the new government does not immediately start a purge of all
political elements which are in opposition to their views on the ground that
they have been encouraged to do so by the Yalta declaration.

We will, of course, give you every support, and if you will show
me the text of any message you feel inclined to send Stalin, I will also send
one to him supporting it. There is, of course, complete agreement between
our representatives on the spot and yours.

4. The news from Moscow about Poland is also most disappointing. I
must let you know that the government majorities here bear no relation to the
strong current of opinion among all parties and classes and in our own
hearts against a Soviet domination of Poland.

Labour men are as keen as conservatives, and Socialists as keen as
Catholics. I have based myself in Parliament on the assumption that the words
of the Yalta declaration will be carried out in the letter and the spirit.
Once it is seen that we have been deceived and that the well-known communist
technique is being applied behind closed doors in Poland, either directly by
the Russians or through their Lublin puppets, a very grave situation in British
public opinion will be reached.

How would the matter go in the United States? I cannot think that
you personally or they would be indifferent. Thus just at the time when every-
things military is going so well in Europe and when the Japanese policy is also
satisfactorily arranged, there would come an open rift between us and Russia
not at all confined, in this country at any rate, to government opinion, but
running deep down through the masses of the people.

5. After a fairly promising start Molotov is now refusing to accept
any interpretation of the Crimea proposals except his own extremely rigid
and narrow one. He is attempting to bar practically all our candidates for the
consultations, is taking the line that he must base himself on the views of
Barut and his gang and has withdrawn his offer that we should send observers
to Poland.

In other words, the clear wants to make a farce of consultations
with the "Non-Lublin" Poles—which means that the new government in Poland
would be merely the present one dressed up to look more respectable to the
ignorant and also wants to prevent us from seeing the liquidations and depor-
tations that are going on and all the rest of the game of setting up a
totalitarian regime before elections are held and even before a new government
is set up. As to the upshot of all this, if we do not get things right now,
it will soon be seen by the world that you and I by putting our signatures to
the Crimea settlement have under-written a fraudulent prospectus.

6. I am in any case pledged to Parliament to tell them if the business
of setting up a new Polish government etc. cannot be carried out in the spirit
of the Yalta declaration. I am sure the only way to stop Molotov's tactics is
to send a personal message to Stalin and in that message I must make clear that
are the essential things we must have in this business if I am to avoid
telling Parliament that we have failed.

I think you will agree with me that far more than the case of
Poland is involved. I feel that this is the test case between us and the
Russians of the meaning which is to be attached to such terms as Democracy,
Sovereignty, Independence, Representative Government and free and unfettered
elections.

I therefore propose to send to Stalin a message on the lines set
out below. It is as you will see based on the ideas in Eden's telegram to
Halifax number 2078 which has been communicated to State Department. I hope
you will be ready to send Stalin a similar message containing the same min-
imum requirements. I shall not send my message till I hear from you.
Message begins:

7. "I am sorry to say that the discussions in the Moscow commission
on Poland show that M. Molotov has quite a different view from us as to how
the Crimea decisions on Poland should be put into effect. As you know, nobody
here believes that the present Warsaw administration is really representative
and criticism of the decision in Parliament to the line that the discussion
in Moscow would not result in a really representative government being set up
and that, if this was so, all hope of free elections disappeared: All parties
were also exercised about the reports that deportations, liquidations and other
oppressive measures were being put into practice on a wide scale by the Warsaw
administration against those likely to disagree with them.

"Feeling confident of your cooperation in this matter, Eden and I
pledged ourselves to Parliament that we would inform them if the fears of our
critics were fulfilled. I am bound to tell you that I should have to make a
statement of our failure to Parliament if the commission in Moscow were not
in the end able to agree on the following basis:

"(A) M. Molotov appears to be contending that the terms of the
Crimea Communique established for the present Warsaw administration an absolute
right of prior consultation on all points. In the English text the passage of
the communique in question, of which was in American draft, cannot bear this
interpretation. M. Molotov's contention therefore cannot be accepted.

"(B) All Poles nominated by any of the three governments shall be
accepted for the consultations unless ruled out by unanimous decision of the
commission, and every effort made to produce them before the commission at the
earliest possible moment; The commission should ensure to the Poles invited
facilities for communicating with other Poles whom they wish to consult whether
in Poland or outside and the right to suggest to the commission the names of
other Poles who should be invited to its proceedings. All Poles appearing before
the commission would naturally enjoy complete freedom of movement and of com-
munication among themselves while in Moscow and would be at liberty to depart
whether they chose upon the conclusion of the consultations. M. Molotov has
raised objections to inviting M. Nikolajczyk but his presence would certainly
be vital."
(C) The Poles invited for consultations should discuss among themselves with a view to reaching agreement upon the composition of a government truly representative of the various sections of Polish opinion present before the commission. The discussions should also cover the question of the exercise of the presidential functions. The commission should preside over these discussions in an impartial arbitral capacity.

(D) Pending the conclusion of the commissions discussions the Soviet Government should use its utmost influence to prevent the "Warsaw" administration from taking any further legal or administrative action of a fundamental character affecting social, constitutional, economic, or political conditions in Poland.

(E) The Soviet Government should make arrangements to enable British and American observers to visit Poland and report upon condition there in accordance with the offer spontaneously made by M. Molotov at an earlier stage in the commissions discussions.

6. "We must not let Poland become a source of disagreement and misunderstanding between our two peoples. For this reason I am sure you will understand how important it is for us to reach an early settlement on the basis of the Yalta decision, and it is because I am confident that you will do your utmost to bring this about that I am now telegraphing you." Ends.

9. I should be grateful to know your views. Pray let this telegram be between you and me.

10. Many congratulations on your statement to Congress. Every good wish.
FROM  THE PRIME MINISTER  TO THE PRESIDENT

Oathal or File No.  #905, 8 March 1945

TO  MAP ROOM  081800L  VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT:  POLAND; ROMANIA; GREECE.

ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. Referred informally by the President to Admiral Leahy to take up with State Department.
3. Before State had drafted reply, Pa #907 was received, which was also referred by the President to the State Department.
4. Replies to both Pa #905 and #907 prepared by State, to President by memorandum 10 Mar 45; approved by the President without change.
5. Reply to Pa #905 to Churchill as P:No. 711, 11 Mar 45; reply to Pa #907 as P:No. 713, 11 Mar 45. (Note: Map Room numbering resulted in answer to Pa #907 being sent before reply to #905.)

CONT'D TO:

052 POLAND-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE:

DIRECTED TO:

052 POLAND-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 051 ROMANIA; 051 GREECE.
SECRET TELEGRAM SENT TO AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW.

March 8, 1945

The following instructions have been shown to the British Embassy here for transmission to London. It is expected that Clark-Kerr will receive instructions along the same general lines. Please communicate to Mr. Molotov in the manner and at the time you deem best the following views of the United States Government in connection with the current negotiations on the Polish question:

QUOTE The United States Government is concerned at the difficulties which the Moscow Commission has encountered in its first efforts to carry out the terms of the Crimean decision on Poland. It is felt that a clear statement of the understanding of this Government not only as to the intent and purpose of the decision but also the role of the Commission itself would be of value in overcoming these difficulties which appear to be in large measure a question of interpretation.

The decision on Poland reached by the three heads of Government in the Crimea was based on the common declared policy of the three countries to facilitate in every way possible the emergence after this war of a strong, independent, and democratic Poland with the free and unfettered right of the Polish people to choose for themselves the Government and institutions under which they are to live. This common objective was seriously prejudiced by the fact that there was a divergence in the policies of United States and U.K. on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other as to what constituted the governmental authority of Poland. In addition the dangers to Allied unity inherent in such a situation were fully recognized by the three heads of Government at the Crimea. The problem confronting the three Governments at the Crimean Conference was thus related to the question of the provisional governmental authority of Poland during the interim period pending the establishment of conditions which would permit the holding of free elections inside Poland. The Crimean decision in the first place was designed to afford a practical solution of the problem of the provisional authority of Poland. The discussions in the Crimea made it obvious that neither the

United States
United States Government nor the British Government considered the provisional governmental authority now functioning in Poland as sufficiently representative to consider according it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. The Soviet Government for its part made it equally clear that it would not consider recognizing in that capacity the Polish Government in London. In the circumstances the only solution was the one reached, namely, that the three Governments would agree to assist in the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity SINGLE QUOTE which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland END SINGLE QUOTE. This new Government of national unity was to be made broadly representative of democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the existing provisional authority functioning in Poland with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad. An essential feature of the Crimean decision was that this new provisional government should be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three larger powers. In order to facilitate the formation of this interim government the Commission in Moscow was created. It would appear obvious that the Commission could not discharge responsibility placed upon it nor could the basic objectives as set forth above of the Crimean decision be achieved if any one of the three groups of Polish democratic elements from which the reorganized government is to emerge were permitted to dictate to the Commission which individuals from the other two groups were to be invited to Moscow for consultation. It would, therefore, appear logical that in the discharge of its responsibilities the Commission in Moscow should as a first step reach a mutual agreement as to what Polish representatives should be invited to come to Moscow to consult on the formation of the new provisional government of national unity. Agreement on such a list would, of course, not involve any commitment on the actual composition or basis of the new Provisional Government.

In the opinion of the United States Government, as an essential condition for the successful negotiations in Moscow for the formation of the new Provisional Government as well as for the eventual carrying out by that new Government of its pledge of the SINGLE QUOTE holding of free and unfettered elections END SINGLE QUOTE as provided in the
communique, there should be the maximum amount of political tranquility inside Poland during the period of negotiations. The United States Government, therefore, suggests that the Commission request the rival political groups to adopt a political truce in Poland and to refrain reciprocally from any activities or actions which might hamper the unity of all democratic Polish elements both within and without Poland. The United States Government believes that if in the first stage the Commission would adopt as a basis the considerations suggested above, the negotiations would begin in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Crimean decision. The execution of the agreement on Poland reached by the three heads of Government at the Crimea will be watched by the entire world as an indication of the reality of the unity there so successfully established between the three principal Allies. END QUOTE.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: F 37952 5 March 1945

F 37952 signed McFarrey cite MACOS for General Marshall. TOP SECRET.

In absence of General McFarrey, who is now in London, answer to your W 46244 of 2 March reference attitude of Polish troops in Italy and significance of General Anders appointment as Polish CINC has been prepared by General Lemnitzer.

Attitude and reaction of Polish soldiers in Italy to Yalta decisions regarding Poland has been one of extreme disappointment. They have however remained loyal to their officers and to their duties as soldiers. General Clark visited Eighth Army and II Polish Corps several days ago to determine what probable attitude of officers and soldiers would be in combat. As result of his visit he feels that their future attitude will depend largely on what General Anders has to say to them when he returns from London in the near future. Field Marshall Alexander, General McCreery and all senior American and British officers familiar with situation in II Polish Corps concur with General Clark's view.

The influence which General Anders has on the Polish troops in Italy cannot be overemphasized. Seldom have the personality and views of a commander dominated his troops so completely. General Anders has organized the Polish Corps from the beginning and has played the role of a father to his troops in handling their many national and domestic

TOP SECRET

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problems for them as well as being their military leader. The amount of inspiration and encouragement which General Anders will be able to give them on his return is a principal factor which will probably determine the future attitude of Polish troops in Italy.

In this connection the attitude of General Anders when he visited this Headquarters 2 weeks ago enroute to London may be of interest. In his conference with Field Marshall Alexander, General Anders stated that the Yalta conference constituted a major tragedy for Poland and that in spite of much thought he was completely at a loss to find a solution to his problem of what to tell his troops and how to maintain their morale. He felt that conference had sold Poland to the Soviet by putting his country almost entirely in their power. He stated that under their constitution Polish troops had given their oath of allegiance to the President and his Government. This President is the one who heads the Polish Government in London which is the only legal Government recognized by his troops. This Government he feels has now been displaced, the constitution annulled and all treaties made by the Allies with that Government have been abrogated. Impression is that General Anders was far more concerned with the composition of the Lublin Government, of which he took a very low view than he was with alteration of the eastern Polish frontier. He considered this the graver question for him and his troops because it affected their oath of allegiance and their honor. He felt that the agreement reached at Yalta legalized the Lublin Government which

CH-IN-5369 (5 Mar 45)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET TOT
PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Sr: F 37952 5 March 1945

consists chiefly of naturalized Russians.

When the Yalta decision was first announced he wrote a letter to General McCreaery, Eighth Army Commander, asking that Polish troops be taken out of the line. However, when he was told that there were no troops available to relieve them, he agreed to carry on and assured General McCreaery that they would all do their duty. Before leaving Italy General Anders gave orders to his troops to carry on as they had been doing and to maintain complete calm and discipline.

It appears that the appointment of General Anders as acting CINC Polish forces signifies that he has decided to throw in his lot with London Polish government as opposed to the Lublin Government. It also signifies the termination of his appointment as commander of II Polish Corps in Italy (see following paragraph).

Plans regarding General Anders return to Italy are not clear at present. Information just received from War Office indicates that they have had little contact with General Anders or with the London Polish Headquarters since the order was issued appointing him acting Polish CINC. It is believed that he will return to Italy shortly in capacity of acting CINC of all Polish armed forces. He is expected to explain Polish situation to his troops and to appoint successor to command II Polish Corps. Thereafter he is expected to return to London to set up his Headquarters as acting Polish CINC. It is hoped that his talks with Prime

CN-IN-5369 (5 Mar 45)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
Nr: F 37952 5 March 1945

Minister Churchill and other officials in London will have raised his morale and altered the views he held before leaving Italy.

His return is awaited with interest in view of profound respect his visit will have on future morale of Polish forces here. The fighting capabilities of the Polish troops in Italy are extremely important to conduct of future operations in this theater. Fifteenth Army Group plans for future operations depend to a large extent on offensive capacity of Polish troops which has previously been excellent. Any marked deterioration in their offensive capacity as result of General Anders attitude and remarks on his return from London will make it necessary to recast those plans. The purpose of General Clark's recent visit to the Polish troops was to determine what their fighting capabilities were. As the result of that visit he estimates their capabilities in a defensive role as being satisfactory. He believes their capabilities in an offensive role are still to be determined and will depend to a large extent on attitude of General Anders when he returns here from London.

End

ACTION: Gen Hull
INFO: Gen Bissell

GM-IN-5369 (5 Mar 45) DTO 051510A bmf
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 901

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 901.

1. Accept my deep sympathy in your personal loss through the death of General Watson. I know how much this will grieve you.

2. You will probably see the accounts of our three days' debate which began yesterday. Today 21 Conservatives are moving a hostile amendment in favour of Poland, and Greendoow, who speaks for the Labour Party, made a foolish and hostile speech. We shall no doubt defeat the amendment by an overwhelming majority. Nevertheless there is a good deal of uneasiness in both parties that we are letting the Poles down, etc.

3. In these circumstances it is of the utmost importance that as many representative Poles as possible should be invited as soon as possible to the consultations in Moscow and, above all, that Mikolajczyk who is the leading test case should be invited. The London Polish Government is of course trying to prevent any Poles leaving here for Moscow or Poland, and is playing for a breakdown.

Copy
4. Clark Kerr telegraphs that Molotov spontaneously offers to allow British and American observers to go into Poland and see what is going on for themselves. I think this is of the highest importance. Nor can I feel that the acceptance of the offer would imply any recognition of the Lublin Government. There are many stories put about of wholesale deportations by the Russians and of liquidations by the Lublin Poles of elements they do not like, and I have no means of verifying or contradicting these assertions.

5. I do hope you have benefited by the voyage and will return refreshed. The battle seems to be going well and I propose to visit the front at the weekend, seeing both Eisenhower and Montgomery. I cannot help feeling there might easily be a good break through in the west. Every good wish to you and all. I hope Harry is recovering.

END
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SECRET or FILE NO. #901, 28 February 1945

DATE

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.
2. No answer.
3. See PM-PRES #905, 8 Mar 45, for next message on this subject.

COPIES TO:

MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

DISTRIBUTED:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
SECRET  TOT

To: War Department  
Sr: 214304  
26 February 1945  

To MILID from Morgan sr nr 214304.  
Expect announcement Tuesday Anders made Acting  
Commander in Chief of Polish Army under London Government.  

Yesterday's Sunday Times said such a move would  
certainly not ease matters in regard to Russia where  
General Anders is distinctly persona non grata.  

End

ACTION: G-2  
INFO: CG AAF, OPD, Adm. King, C of S, Col. Perc

CM-IN-27473 (27 Feb 45)  DTO 26/1725Z  nlc.  
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
REPORT OF CINERE CONFERENCE
12 FEBRUARY 1945

*******

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimene Conference:

*******

POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present provisional government of Poland, and the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

*******
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

To: War Department
Nr: 24155 14 February 1945

To MILD from Morgan er nr 24155.

Following declaration made by Polish government that it would not accept the terms of the agreement made at Yalta conference, an order to prevent any break in the Polish military effort against Germany signed by General Kukiel, Polish Minister of National Defense and General Kiparski, Chief of Staff was issued to Polish forces on 13 February.

This order stated that the Polish army had been fighting against the Germans from the start and would continue to fight alongside its British and American allies until the end.

A similar order is to be published today by M. Raczkiewicz, President of the Polish Republic.

Tindall

ACTION: 0-2
INFO: CG AAF, OPD, Colonel Park, Log
CM-IN-14193 (14 Feb 45) DTO 141706Z 7/7

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
No: 564 18 January 1945
Number 564 to MILID Washington DC.

Claim by Radio Moscow that Poles in Turkey have
sent a telegram jointly to Lublin pledging support is
completely false according to my Polish Colleague. Such
a telegram was sent by a Pole in Istanbul named Buczynski
who came to Turkey solely to represent Lublin interests.
Society of Polish Engineers and Technicians in Turkey
representing over one hundred Poles in this country has
countered by signing and dispatching a similar message
of support to London Government in Exile.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: GO AAF
CONFIDENTIAL

CM-IN-18188 (19 Jan 45) DTG 181600Z bjm
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SPLIT OVER LUBLIN

Soviet Recognition Given
After Washington and
London Are Consulted

STALIN ACTS ALONE

U.S., Britain Reaffirm
Backing of Polish
Exile Regime

By CLAYTON DANIEL

LONDON, Jan. 5—The Soviet extended diplomatic relations to the self-appointed Provisional Government of Poland today, despite appeals by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt to defer this action until it could be considered in a joint meeting of all three great powers.

The British and American Governments had exchanged correspondence with Moscow on this question ever since the Lublin Committee of National Liberation had constituted itself a government. It is presumed that since the Big Three had previously been personally concerned with the Polish question the correspondence would be between Moscow, Churchill and Roosevelt and Premier Stalin themselves.

The correspondence produced no agreement and the Soviet Union decided to act alone. Its decision was known in advance in both Washington and London.

Washington and London reacted promptly to the Moscow announcement, reaffirming their recognition of the Polish Government in exile.


The coup d'etat in Poland Thursday was the "unhappily spectacular" liquidation of governments in Poland, dominated by the Soviet Union and the other by the Western Powers," of which Mr. Churchill warned against in his speech September 28 urging the Poles to accept Russia's frontier terms, has now come to pass.

The Soviet recognition of Lublin was no surprise, however, to any one. It was inevitable, since, as almost every one here conceives, the Lublin Government was the creation of Communist party agents in Poland.

Moscow's decision is significant mainly for its bearing on international relations, for the fact that it represents one more unilateral action in a series that seems to grow longer each week that a Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting is delayed.

It is the general opinion here that the Polish question will top the political agenda of the Big Three meeting, which Mr. Roosevelt indicated today would be after Jan. 20. Hope that the Big Three may agree to a common policy on Poland was encouraged by the fact that Moscow recognized the Lublin regime as the "provisional government." This seems to leave the way open for a broadening of the Lublin Government, its amalgamation with elements of the Polish Government in exile.

Meanwhile the policy of the British and American Governments remains unchanged. They still recognize the Polish Government here, although since the retirement of Stanislaw Mikołajczyk as Premier they find its composition distasteful.

Julius Polak, weekly organ of the Polish Peasant party in London, is publishing an article this week by M. Mikołajczyk that looks forward to a meeting of the Big Three. The former Polish Premier, who condemns both the Lublin and London Governments, says in it: "The Polish Presidium has not only to take decisions but also to assume responsibility. First of all, it must be agreed and decided whether the frontier questions are to be solved now or after the war. It there is no agreement on this among the great powers, the Polish Presidium cannot sign an Instrument which it has not accepted before its people without being forced to do so. The signature would only be the initial ing of a weakness in Poland and an early capitulation." In addition, M. Mikołajczyk says that the Polish border must be ad-jured simultaneously in the east and west, and that Poland, in addition to a territorial guarantee of her independence, "must be factually confirmed of real help in guaranteeing her freedom and independence.

The border issue and Poland's independence are the two main questions between Moscow and the London Poles. The Lublin regime accepts Moscow's views on both questions and has been rewarded with arms and recognition.

Exiles Regret Rift

LONDON, Jan. 5—The Lon-don Poles officially expressed regret from the point of view of United Nations unity," at the Soviet decision, but said they were not surprised at the development. Their spokesmen said the Soviet action "makes more difficult our position and any hopes of reaching a settlement."

Diplomatic and military observers here believe that the Poles are now ready to discount their bargain for offensive in Poland.

The Soviet Union several relations with the Polish Government in April, 1943, in a dispute over the execution of a thousand Polish officers in the forest, and again in November of 1943 accused the Germans of having killed the officers, but the London Poles asked the International Red Cross to investigate a denunciation by the Germans that the Poles had committed the atrocity.

Pravda, official organ of the Communist party in Moscow, anticipates recognition of the Lublin Government in an editorial today in which it said the Poles in five months had "emancipated" itself and that its activities had "won approval not only of the Polish people but of the people of the Soviet Union and also progressive elements in Britain, the United States, France, Czechoslovakia and Rumania."

The Lublin group's most immediate aim is the distribution of more than 800,000 in 250,000 landless Polish families.

Moscow Informed Washington

Said to The New York Times

The Department reaffirmed today its policy of
United American recognition of the
Polsk Government in exile in Lom
and in the face of Soviet negotia-
tions of the Lublin committee as
the Provisional Government of Pol-
land.

The equally prompt British an-
nouncement of its continued sup-
port of the Government in exile
followed consultation between
Washington and London. Not only
had Moscow's action long been an-
ticipated but the Soviet Govern-
ment, a State Department spokes-
man said, informed us in advance
of its step.

No formal statement was made
and officials maintained an atti-
dude of reserve in estimating the
new situation, but it will come as
no surprise if President Roosevelt
issues it in his annual message
to the Congress tomorrow. He
plans to deal comprehensively with
foreign affairs and war issues in
his report on the state of the
Union.

While on the surface the Soviet
recognition of the Lublin Govern-
ment might be regarded as an
open breach between the British,
Americans and the Soviets, this
view was not shared by many dip-
nocrats, at least for the present.

Further developments must be
left to the diplomatic correspon-
dence that can be reached.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 694, 8 JANUARY 1945

Your 876...received.

Released 0816222 Jan 45
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<td>Poland</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Acknowledges PA-PRES 6876, 6 Jan 45, which was sent to Adm Leahy for reply.
2. Prepared by Adm Leahy; approved by the President; dispatched 0816222.

**CONTROL TO:**

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FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 376, 6 JANUARY 1945

Your number 691.

Thank you for the information and it is interesting to see that the "Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" has now been brought up into the line.

Stalin has communicated to me your message to him, of which you sent me a copy in your number 691. We have not ourselves communicated with him on this subject since you sent us a copy of your original message to him (No. 675) but had already made it clear in earlier telegrams, and I in fact mentioned it in Parliament, that we continue to recognize the London Poles as the Government of Poland. I have now replied to Stalin as follows:

"Naturally I and my war cabinet colleagues are distressed at the course events are taking. I am quite clear that much the best thing is for us three to meet together and talk all these matters over, not only as isolated problems but in relation to the whole world situation both of the war and the transition to peace. Meanwhile our attitude as you know it remains unchanged. I look forward very much to this momentous meeting and I am glad that the President of the United States has been willing to make this long journey. We have agreed, subject to your concurrence, that the code-name shall be called "ARKONAUT" and I hope you will use that in any messages that may be interchanged by the staffs who will be consulting about the arrangements."

You may rest assured of our entire support.

PRIME

RECD 0618502
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

Serial or File No. 876, 6 Jan 45.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 061850Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; ACHONAUT MEETING.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-PM #876, 6 Jan 45.
2. To the President via usher.
3. To Admiral Leahy for action.
4. Acknowledged in PRES-PM #694, 8 Jan 45.

COPIES TO:

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS; 210 (2)
FROM: OPRAY
TO: ALIUNA, LONDON

4 JANUARY 1945

NUMBER 691. CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

There is quoted herewith following for your information Stalin's reply to my message in regard to the Polish situation, my No. 684. I am not replying to Stalin, but we may discuss the matter at the meeting:

"I January 1945. I have received your message of December 31.

"I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the emigre Government in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.

"Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is perfectly understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appropriate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as it is formed. This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish.

"Let me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success."

I have not told Stalin that my message to him was shown to you.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

Released 01/14/62
FROM    PRESIDENT    TO    PRIME MINISTER

Serial or File No.    691, 4 January 1945

TOR MAP ROOM    Via

SUBJECT:    Poland

ACTION:

1. Quotes to Churchill a message received by the President from
   Stalin, dated 1 Jan 45.

2. Answered by PA-PRES. #876, 6 Jan 45.
SECRET

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
Unnumbered, 1 January 1945

I have received your message of December 31.

I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the emigre Government in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.

Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is perfectly understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appropriate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as it is formed. This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish.

Permit me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success.

STALIN

SECRET
3 January 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

COMMANDER SMITH:

Last evening the President directed that the attached message from Stalin be given to Admiral Leahy to send a copy to the Department of State for preparation of a reply, if a reply is thought necessary.

ROYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

1 Incl.
STALIN-PRES, Yenno,
1 January 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

The attached message from Marshal Stalin to the President, received 2 January 1945, on the subject of recognition of the Lublin Government is, by direction of the President, referred to you for preparation of a reply, if a reply is considered necessary.

[Signature]

Copy for Map Room
FROM MARSHAL STALIN  TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE 1 January 1945

TO MAP ROOM  VIA Russian Embassy

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PKRE-STALIN 30 Dec 44.

2. By direction of the President, to Admiral Leahy to send copy to Department of State for preparation of reply, if reply is necessary.

3. Sent to Sec State by memo, Adm Leahy to Sec State, 3 Jan 45.

4. See PRES-P4 #691, 4 Jan 45, in which the President quotes above message to Churchill, and comments, "I am not replying to Stalin, but we may discuss the matter at the meeting."

5. No reply
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT
NO: 154, 1 JANUARY 1945

Thank you for your messages, Numbers 2027 and 2028.

ROOSEVELT

Released 0119162 Jan 45
TO
15!!, 1 Jan.

The President

TO
Ambassador Winant

FILE NO.

154, 1 January 1945

DATE

FOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT:

Poland.

ACTION:

1. Acknowledges Winant-PERS 2027 (and 2028).
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 870, 31 DECEMBER 1944

1. * * * * *

2. I have read your 684 to Anthony, and he and I are in entire agreement with it. It will be most valuable to see what Stalin's reaction to it is. We shall of course send a supporting message at any moment you tell us it would be useful. The reason for delay is that you do not state in your 684 whether you have told Stalin that you have shown your message to me.

3. It is very satisfactory that we seem to be getting into step on both these tangled questions.

4. * * * * *

Recd 01/0030Z
TOP-SECRET

1 January 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following messages are, by direction of the President, forwarded to the Department of State for action as indicated:


2. PRIOR TO PRESIDENT, 666, 31 Dec AA: for information.

3. WILKINS to PRESIDENT, 2028, 31 Dec AA: for information and appropriate action.

4. PRIOR TO PRESIDENT, 665, 30 Dec AA: for information.

RICHARD PEARL, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

Indis.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 870, 31 December 1944

DATE: 01/00302 VIA: War Department

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers File-PW #684.
2. To Secretary of State for preparation of reply, 1 Jan 44, by direction of the President.
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 2027, 31 DECEMBER 1944

* * * * *

When I saw your 684, I felt it was one of the ablest messages
I had ever read. Two hours later Eden called me to tell me that both
the Prime Minister and he were "tremendously impressed" by it.

* * * * *
FROM AMBASSADOR WINANT TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 2027, 31 December 1944

TOR MAP ROOM: 3121002 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

EXTRACT ONLY OF WINANT #2027.
1. Comments on PRES-PN #164, 30 Dec 44.
2. Shown to the President in Doctor's office by Capt Price.
3. On 1 Jan, after seeing President, Admiral Leahy directed this message be acknowledged. Message prepared by Col Park; sent to Winant as PRES-WINANT 154, 1 Jan 44.

COPIES TO: ORIGINAL: PRES-WINANT FILE

DATE: __________ BY DIRECTION OF: __________
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: MARSHAL STALIN
NO: 153, 30 DECEMBER 1944

I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position.
of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of
the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever
convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution
of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in
abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a
government of Poland. I cannot, from a military angle, see any great
objection to a delay of a month.

ROOSEVELT

 Released 3019532
FROM The President TO Marshal Stalin

DATE 153, 30 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland; recognition of Lublin Committee

ACTION:

1. Annexes STALIN-PRNE 27 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-712, 29122002.

2. At 291355Z, in WH-OUT-713, Adm Leahy sent the following message to the President: "Referring to Stalin's message dated 27 Dec (WH-OUT-712) permission is requested to send it to State Department for preparation of a draft reply.

   "It would seem appropriate or necessary to send Stalin's message to Churchill before replying to U.S."

3. WH-IN-252, 291655Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: "Reference your WH-IN-713 and 712. For State Department for consideration of reply." This, however, did not answer Adm Leahy's request in WH-OUT-713 that message be sent to Churchill.

4. To straighten out above point, Adm Brown sent the following mag to the President at 291838Z as WH-OUT-716: "Does your WH-IN-252 to Admiral Leahy authorize sending a copy to Churchill, or shall we hold until your return?"

5. President's reply to Admiral Brown, WH-IN-253, 292003Z, stated: "No your WH-OUT-716. Message to Churchill may go."

6. Stalin's message sent to Churchill as PRNE-PA #681, 292017Z, with notation, "I should like your comments before making a reply."

7. FM replied in his #864, received 301727Z. Shown to Mr. Bohlen by Admiral Leahy's office.

O. K. B.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 664, 30 DECEMBER 1944

Your 864. I have today sent the following to Stalin. You will see that we are in step.

QUOTE. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the
Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By N. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of
the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military
angle see any great objection to a delay of a month. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 301957Z

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 684, 30 December 1944

TO Whom

VIA

SUBJECT: Poland; recognition of Lublin Government.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PR6 4864.

2. Quotes to the Prime Minister a message sent by the President to Marshal Stalin (PR6-STALIN 153, 30 Dec 44). See STATUS SLIP on this message.

3. Answered by PM-PR50 6870, 31 Dec 44.

4. Also see WINANT-PR50 2027, 31 Dec 44, for Winant’s comments on this message.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 864, 30 DECEMBER 1944

* * * * *

2. Your Number 681 enclosing Stalin's reply about Poland shows how serious will be the difficulties we shall have to face. I have consulted the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet about it and their clear view is that we shall continue to press Stalin not to recognise the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland and tell him plainly that we shall not do so. The matter should be reserved for the coming conferences.

PRIME
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 864, 30 December 1944

DATE

TOR Map Room 301727 Via Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

EXTRACT

1. Answers FINS-Pk 421, 29 Dec 44.
2. Answered by FINS-Pk code, 30 Dec 44, which quotes to Churchill a message from the President to Stalin.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 681, 29 DECEMBER 1944

I have today received the following message from Marshal Stalin, dated 27 December, in reply to the message quoted to you in my 675. I should like your comments before making a reply.

QUOTE. I have received your message on Polish matters on December 20.

As regards Mr. Stettinius' statement of December 18, I would prefer to express myself about this during our personal meeting. In any case the events in Poland have considerably moved ahead than it is reflected in the said statement.

A number of facts which took place during the time after the last visit of Nikolajczyk to Moscow and, in particular the radio-communications with Nikolajczyk's government intercepted by us from arrested in Poland terrorists—underground agents of the Polish emigre government—with all palpability proves that the negotiations of Mr. Nikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Nikolajczyk's back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland. We cannot reconcile with such a situation when terrorists instigated by Polish emigrants kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead a criminal fight against Soviet troops which are liberating Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they in fact are. The substitution of Nikolajczyk by Araysehevsky and, in general, transpositions of ministers in the Polish entire government
have made the situation even worse and have created a precipice between Poland and the entire government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made serious achievements in the strengthening of the Polish state and the apparatus of governmental power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion and activity strengthening of the Polish army, in carrying into practice of a number of important governmental measures and, in the first place, of the agrarian reform in favor of the peasants. All this has led to consolidation of democratic powers of Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Committee among the wide masses in Poland and among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want and are capable to work together with it and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government will not have any serious ground for postponement of the question of its recognition. It is necessary
to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of Poland but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security of the Soviet Union. To this we have to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependent on the presence of peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance while the emigre government and its underground agents by their terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of the latter. On the other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy of support of the emigre government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable for our common cause if the governments of the Allied countries as the first step have agreed on an immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a certain time it would be recognized as the lawful government of Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into a provisional government of Poland. Otherwise I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish People in the Allied powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests
of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Reed 2920172
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

File No. 681, 29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. Quotes to Churchill message received by the President from Stalin, dated 27 Dec 44. (See NYT on Stalin-FDR 27 Dec 44.)
2. Answered by NA-PRAS #263, 30 Dec 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

FILE

BY DIRECTION OF:
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN
TO: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
Unnumbered, 27 December 1944.

I have received your message on Polish matters on December 20.

As regards Mr. Stettinius' statement of December 18, I would prefer to express myself about this during our personal meeting. In any case the events in Poland have considerably moved ahead than it is reflected in the said statement.

A number of facts which took place during the time after the last visit of Mikolajczyk to Moscow and, in particular the radio-communications with Mikolajczyk's government intercepted by us from arrested in Poland terrorists—underground agents of the Polish emigre government—with all palpability proves that the negotiations of Mr. Mikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Mikolajczyk's back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland. We cannot reconcile with such a situation when terrorists instigated by Polish emigrants kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead a criminal fight against Soviet troops which are liberating Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they in fact are. The substitution of Mikolajczyk by Arzayevsky and, in general, transpositions of ministers in the Polish emigre government have made the situation even worse and have created a precipice between Poland and the emigre government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made serious achievements
in the strengthening of the Polish state and the apparatus of governmental power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion and strengthening of the Polish army, in carrying into practice of a number of important governmental measures and, in the first place, of the agrarian reform in favor of the peasants. All this has lead to consolidation of democratic powers of Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Committee among the wide masses in Poland and among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want and are capable to work together with it and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government will not have any serious ground for postponement of the question of its recognition. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of Poland but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security.
of the Soviet Union. To this we have to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependent on the presence of peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance while the emigre government and its underground agents by their terrorist actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of the latter. On the other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy of support of the emigre government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable for our common cause if the governments of the Allied countries as the first step have agreed on an immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a certain time it would be recognised as the lawful government of Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into a provisional government of Poland. Otherwise I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish People in the Allied powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London.
Poland.

FROM Marshal Stalin TO The President
SERIAL or FILE NO. Unnumbered, 27 December 1944
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 2904052 VIA Russian Embassy
SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:
1. Answers PRES-STALIN #136, 16 Dec 44, (Here referred to as “message of Dec 20. See HARRIS’s 2108596, which explains delay in delivery of message to Stalin.)
2. To the President at Hyde Park as MS-OFT-712, 291200Z.
3. At 291355Z, in MS-OFT-713, Adm Leahy sent the following message to the President: “Referring to Stalin’s message dated 27 Dec (MS-OFT-712) permission is requested to send it to State Department for preparation of a draft reply.

It would seem appropriate or necessary to send Stalin’s message to Churchill before replying to U.S.”
4. MS-IN-252, 291655Z, from the President to Adm Leahy, stated: “Reference your MS-OFT-713 and 712. For State Department for consideration of reply.” This, however, did not answer Adm Leahy’s request in MS-OFT-713 that message be sent to Churchill.
5. To straighten out above point, Adm Brown sent the following msg to the President at 291838Z as MS-OFT-716: “Does your MS-IN-252 to Admiral Leahy authorize sending a copy to Churchill, or shall we hold until your return?”
6. President’s reply to Admiral Brown, MS-IN-253 292003Z, stated: “Be your MS-OFT-716. Message to Churchill may go.”
7. Stalin’s message sent to Churchill as Floto-Fd 681, 292017C, with notation, “I should like your comments before making a reply.”

COPIES TO: ORIGINAL PRES-STALIN FILE
DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
OP SECRET DISPATCH

RAFTED: EXT. ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE

FROM: MR. HARRIMAN
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 21 DECEMBER 1944, 1237/21
TOR CODE: GLUNT
PARAPHRASED: TALMAN
ROUTED BY: GLUNT

PRIORITY
THE PRESIDENT

INFORMATION

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

216655Z NOR 75F

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP

USE C.C.T.

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

PERSONAL AND TOP-SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

REFERENCE WHITE HOUSE CABLE NR. 136.

YOUR PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE TO MARSHAL STALIN REGARDING PODAND WAS EVIDENTLY RELEASED BY YOU ON DECEMBER 16 BUT IT DID NOT REACH THE EMBASSY UNTIL YESTERDAY DECEMBER 20.

I PROMPTLY DESPATCHED IT TO MARSHAL STALIN EXPLAINING THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN DELAYED FOUR DAYS IN TRANSMISSION APPARENTLY BY METEOROLOGICAL INTERFERENCE. IN THE MEANTIME OF COURSE THE STATEMENT ON POLAND TO WHICH YOU REFERRED IN YOUR CABLE HAD BEEN ISSUED BY STETTINIUS. AS THERE WERE CERTAIN DIFFERENCES OF CONTENT BETWEEN THE SUMMARY CONTAINED IN YOUR CABLE AND THE PUBLIC STATEMENT I TRANSMITTED TO MARSHAL STALIN ONLY THE TEXT OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPLAINING THAT YOUR CABLE HAD CONTAINED

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

MARCH 9, 1972

TOP-SECRET

FILE COPY

To President, YTEX.
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: MR. HARRIMAN

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 21 DECEMBER 1944.

TOR CODEROOM:

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

ROUTED BY: GLUNT

PRIORITY:

THE PRESIDENT

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW:

Page 2 of 2

213855Z MOR 758

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

An outline of its substance.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By: Date: MAR 0-3772

Nayaide(#18#2)......ACTION

Top Secret

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-78
23 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

By direction of Admiral Leahy the following paraphrase of a message received by President Roosevelt on 21 December 1944 from Ambassador Harriman is supplied for your information:

"Although it was evidently released by you on 16 December, 1944, your secret and personal message to Marshal Stalin in connection with Poland did not reach the Embassy until 20 December. It was sent immediately by me to the Marshal together with an explanation that it had been delayed four days in transmission apparently by meteorological interference. Of course the statement on Poland to which you referred in your communication had been issued by Stettinius in the meantime. In view of the fact that public statement and the summary given in your cable differed somewhat, I sent Marshal Stalin only the text of the public statement explaining that an outline of its substance had been contained in your cable."

H. W. PUTNAM,
Major, A.C.
FROM  Ambassador Harriman  TO  The President

SUBJECT:  Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers press—Stalin #136, 16 Dec 44, explaining that this message was delayed four days in transmission because of meteorological interference.
2. Shown to the President with evening news by Commander Tyree.
3. 23 Dec 44, Admiral Leahy directed that copy be sent to the Secretary of State for information.
4. No reply.

COPIES TO:

INQUIRED: "HARRISAN FILE"  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

[Blank lines for copies to be filled in]
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)

TO: MR. HARRY HOPKINS

Unnumbered, 19 DECEMBER 1944

This evening I listened in on Stettinius's statement on United States' policy toward Poland. I am grateful for the radio as I am largely dependent upon it for actions taken in the United States that affect foreign policy here. I have not received your promised letter and little else has come through from the State Department since my return to London.

In reading the daily summaries of press reports from the United States two omissions stand out; one, the failure of commentators to point out the fact that the President's delay in leaving the United States to meet with Churchill and Stalin is undoubtedly due to a sense of obligation to the American people to complete necessary changes in reorganization of the government incumbent upon him in reassuming office after reelection and, two, that the reason for his not committing the United States on Polish frontiers was due to a scrupulous adherence to the limitations of executive power under the Constitution.

Yesterday afternoon I talked with the Prime Minister. He had planned to make a radio address, as he explained to you in his message. When I spoke with him he was undecided and we both agreed that further statements at this time were unnecessary.

* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date MAR 9 1972

COPY
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins

SERIAL or FILE NO.: Unnumbered, 19 Dec 44.
DATE:

TOR MAP ROOM:

SUBJECT: Poland.

ACTION:

1. Included for information only.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT (LONDON)

TO: MR. HARRY HOPKINS

17 DECEMBER 1944

Yesterday I forwarded to the State Department the complete text of Mr. Churchill's statement on Poland and also Mr. Eden's statement (Embassy's 11120 and 11161). I have also seen the President's message to the Prime Minister (Number 574) which referred to his letter to Mikolajczyk dated November 17 which Harriman delivered for him after showing it to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's answer of this evening (Numbers 853 and 854) which were approved at a War Cabinet meeting held this evening.

You will probably have seen Embassy's 11118 summing up the debate on the Polish situation and Embassy's 11165, 11166, and 11171 covering press comment and including British correspondents reporting from the United States to British newspapers. You also have undoubtedly received my letter to you dated December 11.

* * * * *

I had no warning of the Prime Minister's intention to refer to the United States in his speech on Poland. It was an oblique reference to us and carefully worded nor do I think it was in contradiction to the President's letter to Mikolajczyk's but I can't help but feel that it was an effort to offset Russian intervention in Greece and I also realize that it raised internal political problems for us.

* * * * *
FROM  Ambassador Winant  TO  Mr. Harry Hopkins

Subject or File No.  Unnumbered, 17 December 1942.

Date:  

TOR Map No.:  VIA  

Subject:  Poland  

Action:  

1. Included for information only.

Copies To:  

Date:  

By Direction Of:  


Stettinus' Statement

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28 (AP)—

The text of Secretary Stettinus' statement on Poland situation:

The United States Government's position as regards Poland has been consistently guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the Polish people. This position has been formulated on previous occasions to the interested Governments, including the Government of Poland.

It may be summarized as follows:

1. The United States Government stands unconditionally for a new state with the unhampered right of the Polish people to ordain their internal existence as they see fit.

2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 8, 1924, "this does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conferences and agreements." In the case of the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United States directly or indirectly, this Government would have no desire to impose such a settlement as might make an unnecessary contribution to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy.

If, as a result of such an agreement, the Government and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer national groups, the United States Government, in cooperation with other Governments, will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such transfers. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of not giving guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States, together with other member states, would assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.

3. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legislative authority, to secure the countries liberated from the enemy in requiring the devastation of war and thus to bring to their people the opportunity to live as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other countries.

The policy of the United States Government outlined above has as its objective the achievement of the aforementioned principles of the United States foreign policy.
U.S. VIEW CALLED BLOW TO CHURCHILL

Statistical Statement on Poland
Held Mere Reiteration of Previous Position

By RAYMOND DANIELL

LONDON, Dec. 18—If Prime Minister Churchill was hoping that his speech on the Russo-Polish crisis would evoke a statement from Washington that would knock the props from under Premier Tammis Amati's collapsed Government, the announcement by Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. must have been disappointing.

Of course, the Foreign Office can be expected to report comments in conventional phrases saying that the British Government welcomes signs of closer agreement, but the truth is that Stettinis's statement said more about the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet Union's official policy for Poland's Government than it did to turn with Russia in the shape of a peace agreement. They have no objection to the idea of the Soviet Union's being recognized as the equal of the United States but the United States does not want to save Poland for the Bolsheviks in mediation with Russia.

Feared Implied Yielding

That memorandum led indirectly to Mr. Molotov's resignation because his supporters in the Government feared that, if the American offer of mediation were accepted it would imply a tacit recognition of the Russian-instigated puppet government of Russia. The position of Mr. Amati's Government is that it is about to resign and that the new government would be a coalition between Poland and Russia and not because they have been strengthening their internal affairs as well as their frontiers.

That Mr. Stettinis declined to give such guarantees, while not necessarily disfavoring them, was disappointing. The British are willing to make guarantees, but history has shown that Russian assistance is not always within the reach of Western nations. It is not the policy here likely to be reflected in any guarantees that they have been asked for in the resulting German aggression in 1939. Those who heard Mr. Churchill's speech noted that it has been a high note of urgency that has been absent, from his speeches against heavy odds. Only in September 1939 did he emphasize the idea that the failure of the Polish Government to reach an agreement with the U.S. Government was a matter of deep concern and that the future peace of the world would depend on its agreement to an unmediated, open settlement with Russia.

That is interesting. One explanation of the urgency in Mr. Churchill's mind and the interpretation that has been put on it is that Russia has not yet been able to form an agreement with the United States on the subject is that the United States decision to send General MacArthur to the Far East to take command of the Philippines. The reason is that the United States has decided to send General MacArthur to the Far East to take command of the Philippines.

The Fear of Military Obstacles

According to the report, the British establishment of a puppet Government in Poland has been a matter of deep concern to the United States, and the possibility of such a Government is a matter of deep concern to the United States.

That Mr. Stettinis has not mentioned the possibility of a puppet Government in Poland is not because they have been strengthening their internal affairs as well as their frontiers.

The British are willing to make guarantees, but history has shown that Russian assistance is not always within the reach of Western nations. It is not the policy here likely to be reflected in any guarantees that they have been asked for in the resulting German aggression in 1939. Those who heard Mr. Churchill's speech noted that it has been a high note of urgency that has been absent, from his speeches against heavy odds. Only in September 1939 did he emphasize the idea that the failure of the Polish Government to reach an agreement with the U.S. Government was a matter of deep concern and that the future peace of the world would depend on its agreement to an unmediated, open settlement with Russia.
Both as the leader of the Polish government, they suspect a Soviet
union treaty does not result in the decision reached between Gen. Charles de Gaulle and
Premier Stalin in Moscow. They would not be surprised if, in the
event that Moscow recognized the Lublin Committee, General de
Gaulle was compelled to follow the
U.S. VIEW ON POLAND

Stettinius Says We Will Accept Settlement on Border if Mutual
BACKS NATION'S FREEDOM

Secretary Explains Exception to Policy of Referring Any Disputes on Boundaries

BY LANSING WARREN

 Washington, Dec. 18-Statement today by the United States Government on the Polish question, backed mutual action in favor of a treaty of peace in the present territory of Poland. He asserted that, "subject to Congressional authority, it was the aim of the United States to aid in reconstruction and in bringing the liberated peoples to full partnership in the future world organization.

The position of the United States, as thus defined, would appear to disassociate the United States from any attempt to form a territorial settlement on Poland. It could conceivably give rise to disposition of the other great powers on the following points:

The declaration that the United States supports a free and independent Poland could possibly conflict with the policy that Russia is understood to maintain regarding the setting up of friendly democratic governments in neighboring states.

It also indirectly expresses opposition to the recent friendly negotiations in Europe for agreements, treaties, and alliances that are, in the phrase under complex, a piece of world policy by the United States to work together for general security.

Diplomatic circles also raised the question what the attitude of this country would be toward any settlement negotiated with the Russian-sponsored Polish committee of national liberation and the Polish Government in London, recognized by both Great Britain and the United States.

The State Department's policy is clearly defined as consisting in the Polish question to be solved by the Polish people in the way they see fit. This would mean the recognition of the Polish regime by outside powers.

Commander With万博水游城·LV白金会·LV白金会-Maxwell and Law

Secretary Stettinius, just before leaving his statement, had conferred with the Earl of Halifax, the British Ambassador, Mrs. Milan Pfeiffer, Assistant Secretary, and the British Ministry of War. He also had the benefit of a discussion on the court of the United States.

While the talks with Mr. Law were confidential and the Ambassador's visit was described as routine, the latter indicated that the present difficulties between the United States and Poland are not likely to arise. The statement is expected to be approved.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 856, 17 DECEMBER 1944

Your Number 675. I am most grateful to you for sending this telegram to U.J. It can do nothing but good.

PRIME
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

密件 or FILE NO. 856, 17 December 1944

DATE

TO MAP ROOM 17140EZ VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: State Department release to press re Polish situation.

ACTION:

1. Answer PRES-PM #675, which quotes to the PM a message sent by the President to Marshal Stalin.
2. To the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-577, 17 Dec 44.
3. No reply.

COPIED TO:

ORIGINAL: "PRES-PM FILE"

DATE: ____________________________

BY DIRECTION OF: ____________________________
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

FILE NO. 854, 16 December 1944

TO MAP ROOM 171210X VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Nara Springs as 48-047-673, 171210X.
2. By direction of Admiral Brown, sent to Secretary of State for information, 17 Dec 44.
3. This is "fuller account of views" promised by the Prime Minister in his #053.
4. No reply.
MR-IN-229

16 December 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Your MR-OUT-673 approved.

RECD 1/03/72 - snc

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H. R. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Press Statement on Poland.

Reference is made to proposed statement on Poland by the Secretary of State, transmitted through the Map Room to the President yesterday as MB-OUT-673 for his approval.

The following message has just been received from the President:

"FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

"Your MB-OUT-673 approved.

"Roosevelt."

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

There is attached the statement which it is proposed I make to the press regarding Poland. I am reluctant to trouble you with this matter before your return here but the pressure from the press is becoming so great that I feel it will be necessary to make a statement not later than noon on Monday. If we put it off until a later date I feel we would have to say more. If you approve this draft it will be released on Monday.

Approved by the Secretary

Charles E. Bohlen
PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The United States Government's position as regards Poland has been steadfastly guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the Polish people. This position has been communicated on previous occasions to the interested governments, including the Government of Poland. It may be summarized as follows:

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 9, 1944, "This does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conference and agreement." This is particularly true when the settlement of outstanding disputes by mutual agreement is essential in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. In the case of the eastern, western and northern frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations directly concerned, this Government would not oppose such an agreement. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with other member states would assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.

3. Recognizing the desirability of contributing in so far as possible to the attainment of general tranquility and security in the post-war world the United States Government, in cooperation with other Governments, will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in the transfer and resettlement of national groups provided the Government and people of Poland desire to bring about such transfer and resettlement.

4. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legislative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in repairing the devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other United Nations.

The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of United States foreign policy.
16 December 1944

FROM: OPNAY
TO: ALJUSKAN, MOSCOW

NUMBER 156, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN,

In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

QUOTE. 1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general peace settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.

3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have no objection if the Government and the people of...
Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.

UNQUOTE.

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present
form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

Released 1701162 Dec 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM: The President
TO: Marshal Stalin

SECRET or FILE NO. 136, 16 December 1944

TO: MAP ROOM 1701162 VIA

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. See F4-F553, 16 Dec 1944, in which the Prime Minister suggests that the President send a message to Stalin. PM #553 sent to the President at Yalta Springs as NR-001-566, 16151042; also sent by Adm Brown to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

2. In NR-14-236, 16151042, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given NR-14-236. He requested, however, that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen NR-14-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as NR-001-670 (16151042). At 162232Z, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as NR-001-670: "My suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (NR-001-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (NR-14-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."

4. In NR-14-236, 162232Z, the President approved Stettinius' draft messages. "Your NR-001-670 approved. Please notify the PM in my name."

5. Message sent to Marshal Stalin in this message, F553-Stalin #136; 9-V-5-3

COPIES TO:

ORIGINAL: PRES-STALIN FILE

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:
TOP-SECRET

16 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: CORDAY
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER 673, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your Number 653. I have today sent the following message to U.J.: In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

QUOTE. 1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general postwar settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.

3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have no objection if the Government and the people of...
Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.

UNQUOTE.

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present...
form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

Released 170119Z Dec 1944.

ORDEN S. COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 854, 16 DECEMBER 1944

In your telegram Number 674 you asked for my estimate of the possibility of Mikolajczyk returning to power with enough authority to carry out his plans.

When he resigned it looked to us for the time as though efforts by other Poles to form a government might fail and Mikolajczyk be called back soon. Now that Arciszewski's government has established itself, we no longer see any immediate prospect of this. The majority of the Poles here appear to have accepted Arciszewski faute de mieux, and to be in a fatalistic mood of waiting for something to turn up. But with the Poles these moods do not last. In London Mikolajczyk has the support of all his own Peasant party and of important elements of the Socialist and Christian Labour parties. We have indications that the people in Poland are unhappy about Mikolajczyk's absence from the government. I am hopeful therefore that Mikolajczyk's return to power will still be possible in the new year.

You also asked about the Lublin Committee. We do not regard it as in any way representative of Polish opinion and whatever developments there may be in the Soviet Government's attitude we do not, at present, intend to recognize it. We shall maintain our recognition of the London Government, which is the legal government of Poland and the authority to which the large Polish forces fighting under British command owe allegiance. We hope that we can keep in step and consult beforehand on all this.

TOP SECRET

COPY
MR-out. 675
17/2/44 Z.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

DATE: 675, 16 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PH. 385, 16 December 1944, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-666, 161510Z; also sent by Adm. Brown to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.

2. In WH-IN-236, 162104Z, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given WH-IN-236. He requested, however, that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen WH-IN-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-OUT-670 (162118Z).

3. At 162329Z, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-OUT-672: "My suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."

4. In WH-IN-238, 16235Z, the President approved Stettinius' draft message—"Your WH-OUT-672 approved. Please notify the PA in my name."

Dated: __________

CODERS TO: __________

ORIGINAL: Files-PH FILE

DATE: __________

BY DIRECTION OF: __________
17 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The message relating to U.S. statement on the Polish controversy, drafted by the State Department for transmission to Marshal Stalin, was approved by the President and sent last night. A copy was also sent to the Prime Minister.

J. A. THORNE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Asst. Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your MR-OUT-672. Approved. Please notify the PM in my name.

RECD 162355Z

16 December 1944

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972

COPY.
See Status Slip on MR-OUT-672, 16th Sec. for full details.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

My suggested message to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (MR-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (MR-IM-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply.

RECD 162232Z - mac
TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.  (MAP ROOM
NOTE: Secretary of State has not yet seen the President's message
MR-IN-236.)

On your request I am attaching a draft of a suggested message to
Marshal Stalin in accordance with your exchanges with the Prime Min-
ister on the subject.

We feel that it is necessary for me to make a statement reempha-
sizing and perhaps clarifying our position on the Polish matter along
the lines of your letter to Mr. Mikolajczyk. I feel also that the gen-
eral statement of position will in truth be welcomed by Marshal Stalin,
and you will note that it is very much in harmony with the sentiments
expressed by the Prime Minister yesterday in the House of Commons.

I believe that by giving Stalin advance notice of this statement
the chances would be increased of his withholding any sudden move in
regard to the Lublin Committee pending the meeting.

If you approve of this message it can be sent right off and repeated
to the Prime Minister and thus constitute an answer to his S53 of Decem-
ber 16.

The full text of the proposed statement on Poland will be sent to
you as soon as it is drafted. (See MR-OUT-672, 16 Dec 1944.)

Suggested message from the President to Marshal Stalin follows:

"In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime
Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yester-
day and the strong pressure we are under to make known our
position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in
the next few days for this government to issue some statement
on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our
attitude somewhat along the following lines:

"1. The United States Government stands unequivocally
for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

"2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of
Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable
that territorial questions await the general postwar settle-
ment, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in
the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no
objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish
situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany,
were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly
concerned.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature]
Date MAR 9 1972
"3. Recognising that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquillity in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have no objection if the Government and the people of Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

"4. In conformity with its announced aim this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations."

"The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the result of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

"I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point."
FROM The Secretary of State TO The President

DATE MR-OUT-670, 16 Dec 1944

TO MAP ROOM 1621182 VI

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:

1. See FM-PRES #353, 16 Dec 44, which was sent to the President at War Springs, and also sent to the Secretary of State by John Brown for preparation of draft reply.

2. In MR-IN-236 the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared the attached message to the President MR-OUT-670 which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given MR-IN-236. He requested, however, that the attached memo be sent to the President with a note stating that the Secretary had not seen MR-IN-236. Dispatched 1621182 to War Springs.

3. At 162232Z, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as MR-OUT-672: "My suggested telegram to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefor (MR-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (MR-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."

4. In MR-IN-236, 162339Z, the President approved Stettinius' draft messages—"Your MR-OUT-672 approved. Please notify the PA in my name."

5. Message as drafted by Stettinius sent to Marshall Stalin as PRES-GRAL #134, 1701165; repeated to Churchill as PHL-P-075, 1701152.
16 December 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I suggest in view of the Prime Minister's Number 353, a copy of which is being sent to you by the Map Room, that I send something along the following line to Stalin. The Prime Minister seems to be in great haste.

"TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

"I think that I can get off soon after Inauguration Day, which is January 20th, proceeding by ship into the Mediterranean, and I am sure that military events before then will provide a mutually agreeable meeting place.

"I hope you will consider the possibility of Taormina in eastern Sicily. Perhaps by that time the Germans will be out of the Balkans and Aegean Islands. If you could come by rail to the Dalmatian coast, it would be simple to come by plane or ship to Taormina.

"In the meantime, perhaps we should postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together. The Prime Minister has wired me hoping that can be done. Signed Roosevelt."

If this is sent, I should also send the Prime Minister the following:

"I have wired U.S. suggesting any positive action on the Polish question be deferred until the three of us can meet. Also, that I will be able to leave soon after Inauguration Day.

"It is possible that he can come by rail to the Dalmatian coast and that we could meet at Taormina. I still do not greatly enjoy the idea of the Black Sea. U.S. still presses for Odessa, but Harriman is looking into the possibility of Batum which has a much better climate. Signed Roosevelt."

SECRET

REC'D 1620442 - sc

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9 1972
FROM  The President TO  The Secretary of State

SECRET or FILE NO.  WH-IN-236, 1620442 Dec 44.

TOR MAP ROOM  VIA

SUBJECT:  Poland

ACTION:

1. Suggested reply to PM #853, and proposed message to Stalin.
2. FM #853, 16 Dec 44, was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-666, 161510Z; also sent by AdmiralBrown to the Secretary of State for preparation of draft reply.
3. In attached message WH-IN-236 the President forwards two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Sec of State for approval. At the same time, the Sec of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given WH-IN-236. He requested, however, that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen this WH-IN-236. Stettinlins' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-OUT-670 (162118Z).
4. At 162232Z, Stettinlins sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-OUT-672: "My suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-IN-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of meeting could go as a separate message when you get Stalin's reply."
5. In WH-IN-236, 162355Z, the President approved Stettinlins' draft messages—"Your WH-OUT-672 approved. Please notify the PM in my name."
6. The draft messages, therefore, contained in attached message were...
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 853, 16 DECEMBER 1944

I thank you cordially for your telegram Number 674 about Poland. I trust you will carry out your proposal to send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together. This suggestion is most valuable and also I feel extremely urgent. Would it be possible for you to do this today, as I apprehend Stalin may make some move recognizing the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland.

We will send you a fuller account of our views on the other questions you raise as soon as possible, probably tomorrow. I can however tell you at once that the War Cabinet feel that the four points mentioned in your letter to Nikolajczyk are very much in line with our ideas, and that the publication of them could do nothing but good. I also hope to send you a statement about Greece in answer to your Number 673.

I do hope you have benefited by your brief rest at Hot Springs after so strenuous and successful a campaign.

PRIME

Sent to Pres at Warm Springs as MB-OUT-666, 161510Z Dec 44.

TOP-SECRET
16 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Reference Prime Minister's message No. 853, 16 December 1944, on the Polish situation, copy of which was forwarded to the Secretary this morning.

A correction to this message has just been received from the Prime Minister. The second paragraph of the message should be changed to read as follows:

"We will send you a fuller account of our views on the other questions you raise as soon as possible, probably tomorrow. I can however tell you at once that the War Cabinet feel that the four points mentioned in your letter to Nikolajczyk are very much in line with our ideas, and that the publication of them could do nothing but good. I also hope to send you a statement about Greece in answer to your number 673."

OGDEN KNIPPIN
Major, C.E.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of Admiral Brown, the attached copy
of Prime Minister's message No. 853 to the President, dated
16 December 1944, is forwarded for preparation of a reply
for the President's signature.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

1 Incl.
PM-FRS #853, 16
December 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 853, 16 DECEMBER 1944

I thank you cordially for your telegram Number 674 about Poland. I trust you will carry out your proposal to send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together. This suggestion is most valuable and also I feel extremely urgent. Would it be possible for you to do this today, as I apprehend Stalin may make some move recognizing the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland.

We will send you a fuller account of our views on the other questions you raise as soon as possible, probably tomorrow. I also hope to send you a statement about Greece in answer to your Number 673.2

I do hope you have benefited by your brief rest at Hot Springs after so strenuous and successful a campaign.

PRIME

1. PRES #674. Prepared by State Dept; transmitted to the President through the Map Room on 15 Dec; approved by the President without change; and transmitted to the Prime Minister on 15 Dec 1944.
2. PRES #673. Prepared by the State Dept; approved by the President without change on 13 Dec; transmitted to the Prime Minister on 13 Dec 1944.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE 853, 16 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. Answers VERS-PM 6470, 15 December 1944.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-666, 161510Z.
3. (Correction to original message was received at 1617Z and sent to Warm Springs as WH-OUT-667, 161730Z. Copy of corrected message only filled in this folder.)
4. By direction ofadx Brown, copy was sent to the Sec of State for preparation of draft reply. President was informed by footnote to WH-OUT-666. 
5. In WH-18-236, 1620UT, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Secretary of State for approval. At the same time, the Secretary of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given the President's WH-18-236. He requested that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen his WH-18-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-OUT-670 (1621Z).
6. At 1622UT, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-OUT-672: "Iy suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-18-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 853, 16 December 1944

SUBJECT: Poland

ACTION:
1. Answers VERS-PM 6470, 15 December 1944.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-666, 161510Z.
3. (Correction to original message was received at 1617Z and sent to Warm Springs as WH-OUT-667, 161730Z. Copy of corrected message only filled in this folder.)
4. By direction ofadx Brown, copy was sent to the Sec of State for preparation of draft reply. President was informed by footnote to WH-OUT-666. 
5. In WH-18-236, 1620UT, the President forwarded two suggested messages—one to Stalin, one to Churchill—to the Secretary of State for approval. At the same time, the Secretary of State had prepared a suggested message to Stalin (to be repeated to Churchill for his information) which Bohlen delivered to the Map Room. Bohlen was given the President's WH-18-236. He requested that the Secretary's memo be sent to the President with a note to the President that the Secretary had not seen his WH-18-236. Stettinius' memo, with suggested messages to Stalin and Churchill, sent to the President as WH-OUT-670 (1621Z).
6. At 1622UT, Stettinius sent the following explanatory message to the President as WH-OUT-672: "Iy suggested msg to Stalin on Poland and the reasons therefore (WH-OUT-670) was drafted and sent to you before I received your drafts (WH-18-236). If you approve the draft I sent you, I believe the substance of yours relating to the place of

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FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER
NO : 674, 15 DECEMBER 1944

I have seen the newspaper reports of your statement in the House on the Polish question. In order that we may cooperate fully in this matter I would appreciate receiving the benefit of your ideas as to what steps we can now take in regard to this question. Particularly I would like to have your evaluation of the possibility of Mikolajczyk's coming back into power with sufficient authority to carry out his plans and what action you feel we should take in the event the Lublin Committee should declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and Stalin should recognize it as such. In view of this possibility I wonder if it would be helpful if I should send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together.

You will recall the contents of the letter I sent to Mikolajczyk by Mr. Harriman which he showed to you and which outlines our policy in regard to Poland. I anticipate strong pressure here for the position of this Government to be made clear, and I may therefore have to make public in some form the four points outlining our position contained in my letter to Mikolajczyk referred to above.

Knowing that we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to Poland I want to be sure to coordinate with you any steps which I may contemplate in this matter.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 674, 15 December 1944
DATE

TO: Map Room VIA

ACTION:

1. Dispatch written by the Secretary of State, dispatched to the President with covering memorandum as 15-OCT-661 (152125 Dec 44).
2. 15-MN-232 (1523202) approved suggested message to the Prime Minister and directed it be sent. Dispatched at 152347Z OCR 982.
3. Answered by PM-PRES 5852, 16 December 1944.

COPIES TO:
ORIGINAL: "PRES-FM FILE"
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BY DIRECTION OF: 

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15 DECEMBER 1944

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO: THE PRESIDENT (Harry S. Truman)

You have undoubtedly seen the press reports on Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons regarding the Polish problem in which he emphasized his general agreement with the Soviet proposals on Polish frontiers and apparently implied that it was difficult to reach a solution to the problem since the United States Government has not clearly defined its attitude. Since I have seen only the early newspaper reports I have declined to comment on the statement.

You will recall that on November 15 you sent by Ambassador Harriman a letter to Mikolajczyk outlining our policy in regard to Poland. This letter was shown to Mr. Churchill before Ambassador Harriman delivered it to Mikolajczyk. The following is a summary of the United States position on the Polish question laid down in that letter:

1. We stand unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Poland with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. Regarding the future frontiers of Poland, this Government would offer no objection if a mutual agreement on this subject including proposed compensation for Poland from Germany was reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments. As regards a United States guarantee of any specific frontier, it was stated that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, did not give guarantees for any specific frontier. But it was pointed out that the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which we with other members of the United Nations will assume responsibility for general security which of course includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.

3. If the Polish Government and the people desire in connection with the new frontiers to bring about a transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. It was indicated that we were prepared, subject to legislative authority to assist in so far as practicable in the postwar economic reconstruction of Poland.

I am sending a full summary of these four points so that you will have them before you, since you will undoubtedly be questioned at your first press conference on your return. I hope to talk over with you the possible
necessity of some public statement making clear our position along the lines of the four points.

It is not clear from the reports we have so far received on Churchill's statement whether he is endeavoring to force a change in the present Polish cabinet and bring Mickolajczyk back or whether he may plan to follow a Soviet lead and recognize the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland. In this connection there are definite indications that the Lublin Committee is planning to declare itself as the provisional government of Poland, and other indications point to the probability that it will be recognized as such by Stalin, possibly at an early date.

In view of the uncertainty as to Churchill's plans, it is suggested you might care to send the attached telegram to him.

/s/ E. S.

1 Incl.
(Suggested telegram from Fros to PW.
Sent without change to PW as FRSS #674,
15 December 1944, filed herein.)
FROM Secretary Stettinius
TO The President (Warm Springs)

SERIAL or FILE NO. MB-007-661 (152125 December 1944)

DATE VIA

SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. statement on Poland.

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Warm Springs by Sec Stettinius.
2. MB-13-232 (1523202) from the President to Sec of State approved suggested message to the Prime Minister and directed it be sent.
3. Sent to PM as PRES-PM #674, 15 Dec 44.

COPY TO:          DATE:          BY DIRECTION OF:
**How Churchill Sees Post-War Poland**

The Polish State envisaged by the Prime Minister in his speech is shown in shading. He declared that the Poles must accept the old Curzon Line as demanded by Russia, which means the loss of Lwów and Vilna. He said they could take over all East Prussia south and west of Königsberg and also Danzig. He indicated they might expand westward. The Oder Line was suggested by the Russians as a boundary.

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**Curzon Line Basis**

Prime Minister Advises Poles to Cede Area to Moscow Now

OFFERS LAND IN WEST

No U.S. Objection Made, He Says, Calling for Early Big 3 Parley

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By RAYMOND DANIEL

December 13, 1939—Prime Minister Churchill, exposing in his address of Commons today the “new grim bone” of the Polish problem, ranged Britain at Russia’s side in her demands for that part of Poland east of the Curzon Line, including Lwów and Vilna.

Britain, like Russia, would prefer to see the Poles cede this territory, wrested from Russia after the last war, at the present time, the Prime Minister said, but if they did not do so, Britain would support the Soviet Union’s claim at the peace conference, he declared.

In exchange, he asserted, Russia and Britain would see, to it that in recompense Poland received that part of East Prussia south and west of Königsberg and Danzig, with a 300-mile frontage on the Baltic Sea.

Provision Against Fascism

In addition, he said Poland would be free to extend her frontiers westward at Germany’s expense and to develop, free of outside meddling, as long as she did not pose a threat at home and represented a location of defense, he added as a juxtaposition of ideas Mr. Churchill conveyed the impression that disagreement among the great powers over many matters was preventing that meeting of minds, Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt and that public opinion in this country and America had been demanding to achieve a common purpose in political as well as military matters.

Because no decisions had been reached on “most of the other vital matters,” quite apart from the Polish problem, the Prime Minister said a meeting had been impossible. Then, he added, “There ought to be a meeting, at least of the three great powers, at the earliest possible moment,” and he declared his willingness and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s to go anywhere, at any time and under any conditions to meet Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt.

In the dispute between Russia and Poland over the latter’s eastern boundary in the seeds of dis-...
The Prime Minister declared that the

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happiness derived from the declaration of peace in Europe, the

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independence of the Soviet Union, and the establishment of the

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of the United States had approved, but he said, "I have re-

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and the German territories Russia and Britain had stood ready to deliver to the Poles. He said he did not see how the

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would be "satisfactory." He had been concerned for

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In opening this debate I find myself in a position to read to the House again some extracts from the carefully considered statement that I made to them in February after I returned from Taharan and also in October of the present year.

When I read them over again last night in preparation for this debate, I found it very difficult to improve upon them or to alter them in any way. This may accentuate my infirmity of mind, but it also gives me some confidence that I have not misled the House or myself entirely, in all respects at any rate, by the harsh, unanswerable movement of events.

It is not often that one wishes to repeat what one has said two months ago, still less ten months ago. But I propose to do so here in a somewhat similar vein and in the same way.

I should like to refer to the situation of our allies.

The situation of our allies is the keynote of the subject I have to bring before the House today.

In the course of my right hon. and learned Friend's speech, which I am about to read, he expressed the hope, which I share, that our allies might be able to see their way to the conclusion of a peaceable and honourable settlement. It is a question of the moment, and is to be regarded as the first stage of our mission in the present war.

The issue which confronts us, as I see it, is whether we shall see our way to the conclusion of a peaceable and honourable settlement.

I have been asked what is the progress of the negotiations with regard to the cessation of hostilities.

From these papers I have to say that the situation appears to be that the armistice proposed by the French Government was accepted by the Allied Governments, and that the conditions of the armistice were signed by the allied Governments on the 12th of this month.

Mr. Churchill concluded his speech by saying:

"I have been asked what is the progress of the negotiations with regard to the cessation of hostilities.

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Respect for Polish Leaders

This, he said, at every stage, have established good relations with the Polish underground government and the arrangement of Polish settlement would have been a boon. He is not a party to the discussions which have taken place.

Mr. Grabowski. I am sure that they are uppermost in the mind of the late General Sikorski than anyone else. He was one of the leaders.

And endless discussion along these lines of which we were drawn on by the Polish underground government. In the month of Nov. Mr. Mikhalovsky and Mr. Soner and other representatives of the Polish underground government have been almost entirely in this matter, and in the region of their work.

Mr. Mikhalovsky and his friends remain in the view of the late General Sikorski and others, who have been most intimate in this matter. The Polish underground government has been almost entirely in this matter.

Mr. Mikhalovsky and his friends remain in the view of the late General Sikorski and others, who have been most intimate in this matter.
necessary to go so far in the distance and we shall go so far
ever distance is necessary to com-
plete our object, it is extremely
likely that the evil, helpful, and
Principal: the peace
conference and armistices-conferences
at which the principal
violencers will be assembled.
The prospects of final victory have
time in which the peace
might be considered for
Germany. Such a peace
might be considered for
this peace as a basis for
the future of Poland. We
shall not seek to
the armistices and armistices
with the Allies, we shall not
seek to
seem to be shapeless, itself.

There is no doubt that when
the peace is signed, the
victors will make their own
promises, and they will
make their own promises.

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Now I want to ask you all what you think of the peace. I think it is the best peace that can be signed. It is a peace that will last. It is a peace that will be fair. It is a peace that will be just. It is a peace that will be permanent. It is a peace that will be respected. It is a peace that will be honored. It is a peace that will be remembered.


dated here below from due to the

Another great war, irrespective of any ideological war, fought as it would be not only on fronts but in the heart of every land with weapons far more destructive than men have yet wielded, will spell doom perhaps for many nations. The determination as we have been able to exist since history began is to be maintained by the will that persists, according to the need judgment of this National Government of all parties, has lately renewed its faith to stand together for the duration of the war against Germany, that we have labored and are strict partly and faithfully to ward off.

Other powerful States are with us on every side, some more powerful, perhaps, than the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations. We can only trust and can only try our best, and if we cannot solve the problems, we shall be at least able to say that we have done all that is humanly possible in all the complexity and chaos that is in all the complexity and which time remains. I have spoken of failure and of disappointment, at failure to reach a Russo-Finnish

"Poland Shall Be Restored"

We have never weakened any way in our resolve that Poland shall be restored and stand erect as a sovereign independent nation, free to model her social institutions, or any institution, in any way her people choose. Provided, I must say, that those are not on parochial lines and provided that Poland stands Iply as a barrier and friend of Russia against German aggression from the East.

In the task Poland will be aided by the full by Russian and Polish guarantees and assistance and will also, I cannot doubt, be aided by the United States, acting as we have through world organization, which we are committed to and which we and the whole of the free nations are determined to preserve.


table after victory has been won, on changes to the peace table, except changes mutually agreed.

I am absolutely convinced that, it is in the historical future interest of the Polish nation that they should reach an agreement with the Soviet Government about their disputed frontier in the east before the march of Russian armies through the main part of Poland takes place. That is the great gift that they have to give Russia, a settlement now at this time which gives from title of political agreement to what might otherwise, be disputed at the conference.

I must, however, say, because I am most anxious that the House should understand the whole position of the question when we shall achieve to the line which is now unfolding to the House shall not hesitate to proceed. The Russians are justly equitably treated in this great and grave matter of the eastern frontiers along the Curzon Line as described.

The Foreign Secretary and I have labored many months. We have spared no labor or travel, no rest of political results and consequent tensions in our efforts to bring about that good understanding between the Poles, whom we still recognize, and the mighty ally which has so heavily enlisted German military power.

"Poland Shall Be Restored"

We have never weakened any way in our resolve that Poland shall be restored and stand erect as a sovereign independent nation, free to model her social institutions, or any institution, in any way her people choose. Provided, I must say, that those are not on parochial lines and provided that Poland stands Iply as a barrier and friend of Russia against German aggression from the East.

In the task Poland will be aided by the full by Russian and Polish guarantees and assistance and will also, I cannot doubt, be aided by the United States, acting as we have through world organization, which we are committed to and which we and the whole of the free nations are determined to preserve.
ARCIEWSKI LOOKS FOR SOVIET ACCORD

New Premier in London Regimes Hopeful—Lublin Leaders May Seek Recognition

LONDON, Dec. 7 (Reuters)—The new Polish Prime Minister, Tomasz Arciszewski, broadcasting to Poland from London tonight, said the new Polish Government "believes that all controversial matters between Poland and the United Socialist Soviet Republic...will be solved on lasting, just and honorable terms, safeguarding the interests of both sides."

All Poles, he declared, earnestly and sincerely desire good-neighborly, friendly relations with the Soviet Union, whose magnificent war deed in eastern Europe has decided the scale of victory to the advantage of the United Nations.

One of the main tasks of legislative bodies to be elected in Poland by free, direct, secret universal and proportional polling will be to introduce a new democratic constitution in accordance with the will of the nation, he said.

The Polish Premier emphasized the full unity between the Government and the underground movement, recalling that hardly four months ago he himself was actively collaborating in leading Polish underground forces against the Germans.

Expressing admiration for the sacrifices made by the Allies to both homelands, he stressed the effect of the Polish nation would find just and fair appreciation in the world.

Lublin Action Expected

By W. H. LAWRENCE

From New York, Dec. 7

MOSCOW, Dec. 7—A brief press announcement that Polish Premier President of the Lublin National Council, Edward R. Kukiel-Mikalski, chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and Col. Gen. Michal Rata-Rynielski, the co-chairman of the Polish National Defense, had arrived in Moscow yesterday did not give any indication of the topics they planned to discuss with the Soviet Government.

A meeting of the Polish National Council, which corresponds to a consultative body, has been held before the communists can be transformed into a provisional government—thus ending all ties with the Polish government in exile in London. Such a decision by the Lublin Premier would raise the question of recognition.

At present the Soviet Union recognizes the committee as the civil administration authority for liberated Polish territory, but does not maintain diplomatic relations with the London government, although Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who recently resigned as Prime Minister of the London government, has been here twice in recent months for negotiations with the Soviet authorities and the Lublin Police to a far safer effect to establish unity among the rival Polish groups.

Now that Mr. Mikolajczyk is out of the London government, having failed to win his government's approval of the settlement plan up during the Stalin-Churchill talks, there seems little prospect that these unity negotiations may be resumed here. The next step, as viewed from here, would seem to be for the Lublin group to transform itself into a provisional government and demand the United Nations' recognition. At present the United States and British recognize only the London government and have had no formal dealings with the Lublin group.

Moscow Source “Reactionaries”

Concerning the new London government and the proposal that the Lublin group should be established as a provisional government,源泉, organ of the Supreme Soviet, declared in an international review today:

Once again the Polish reactionaries have come before the world unmasked. They have openly and frankly turned their back on the Polish people, who in the stern conditions of the fight against the Hitlerite hordes are regenerating a policy that will bring a free, democratic Poland with the help of the brotherly Russian people. It is natural that the Polish people treats the enigmas with contempt and are determined not to allow them to return in Poland.

The mass of Polish people are becoming more and more convinced that the PCN is constantly carrying through reforms that are in accordance with their hopes and they welcome its policy of close collaboration with the U.S.S.R. The paper Rappospolotu says that the PCN has stood the test in four difficult months and has once more the authority of the State.

One of the bases that caused trouble between the London and the Lublin Governments is the western boundary question from which the Soviet Union expected a settlement based on the division lines. Some of the London group has held out for a settlement that would result in Lublin's being a Polish city rather than part of the Soviet Union. But, in accord with agreements between the PCN and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, population transfers already are taking place based on Lublin's remaining a Ukrainian city.

All Soviet papers two days ago carried a brief item from Moscow stating that the first group of Polish civilians had left Lublin for their homeland and the first group of Ukrainian nationals had come to Lublin from Polish territory. These shifts are being carried out individually or a voluntary basis, according to Soviet and Polish authorities.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 25, 1944

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resignation of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk

I assume that you have read Ambassador Harriman's report of the 23rd (No. 10326) from London, regarding his conversation with Mikolajczyk, and that you have noted that Mikolajczyk's decision to resign was because he was unable to obtain the support of his Government to his program of a settlement of the territorial issue with the Soviet Union.

Mikolajczyk's resignation will, in our opinion, render the Polish question much more acute and difficult. The Polish Government in London without him, and possibly his like-minded colleagues, will have no basis whatsoever for continued negotiations with the Government or the Lublin Committee. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Government will be quick to take advantage of Mikolajczyk's resignation in order to proceed more vigorously with the establishment of the Lublin Committee as the sole representative authority of Poland. We could easily be faced with a most difficult problem in regard to Poland. On the one hand, we would have the Lublin Committee backed by the Soviet Government but which, according to all our information, has very little support inside Poland; and on the other, the Government in London which we recognise, probably led by Polish socialists who adamantly refuse to consider the Soviet proposals.

We are following the situation with the closest attention and we recommend that for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-79
By: [Signature] Date: MAR 9 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 23, 1944

Subject: Message from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President regarding Lwow

There are attached for your files extra copies of a note left by the Polish Ambassador containing Premier Mikolajczyk's message to you of October 26.

The Polish Ambassador delivered the attached note on the evening of October 27. Since you were out of town the copy was delivered that evening to the Map Room with the request that it be delivered to you as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

From Polish Embassy, October 27, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78
By [Signature] Date MAR 9, 1972
The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk dated London, October 26th, instructing him immediately to communicate to the President the following personal appeal of Premier Mikolajczyk. Premier Mikolajczyk would greatly appreciate it if he could receive at the President's earliest convenience the reply and decisions of the President in view of the great urgency of the situation.

Text of Premier Mikolajczyk's telegram to the President reads as follows:

Mr. President,

From Ambassador Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-called Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.

I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution, as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that for the next hundred years love has been a

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By: RDC
State MAR 9 1972
this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Gov-
ernment of practical value.

In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal Stalin and Premier Churchill of the impor-
tance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great con-
ciliatory and amiable gesture on the part of
Russia towards Poland, — a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself
with the other already so great territorial sacri-
fices demanded of it, if the City of Lwow and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line "B". This line would not infringe on the principle of the Curzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.

However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained unsuccessful. I cannot, in the face
of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last, in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwow and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been dispelled even by
Mr. Molotov's one-sided version about your attitude in Teheran, which he gave me during the last conversa-
tions in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwow has been a
Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.

I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.

I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwow and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland, — such a demarche, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.

By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, — such a demarche would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an agalang merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.

I place
I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision.

Signed: MIKOLAJCEYK.

Washington, October 27th, 1944.
November 17, 1944.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have had constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and particularly the questions which you raised in your message of October 20. I have asked Ambassador Harriman, who will bring you this letter, to discuss with you the question of Lew.

While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this Government's attitude until the general postwar settlement in Europe, I fully realize your urgent desire to receive some indication of the position of the United States Government with the least possible delay. Therefore, I am giving below in broad outline the general position of this Government in the hope that it may be of some assistance to you in your difficult task.

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. In regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement on this subject including the proposed compensation for Poland from Germany is reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments, this Government would offer no objection. In so far as the United States guarantee of any specific frontiers is concerned I am sure you will understand that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific frontiers. As you know, the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organisation through which the United States together with the other member states will assume responsibility for general security which, of course, includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.
3. If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state to bring about the transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. The United States Government is prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the post-war economic reconstruction of the Polish state.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Stanislaw Nikolajczyk,
Prime Minister of Poland.
ATTACHED is the message to the Polish Prime Minister and recommendations in regard to policy on Poland about which I spoke to you today and which I hope you will discuss with Averell when you see him before his departure.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 15, 1944.

The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish question and in particular to Prime Minister Mikołajczyk's message of October 26 and recent conversations with the Polish Ambassador are predicated on the possibility that you do not expect to meet with Mr. Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill before the end of the year.

The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this Government's position on general lines is due Premier Mikołajczyk. I therefore suggest for your approval the attached letter for your signature to Prime Minister Mikołajczyk. It covers the points on which from our information we know the Polish Government is especially anxious to learn our attitude.

I suggest that Ambassador Harriman, who is shortly returning to Moscow via London, present this letter to Prime Minister Mikołajczyk in person and at the same time discuss the question of Lwow. If as a result of this discussion Ambassador Harriman is convinced of the necessity of our making a last attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to leave Lwow and the oil fields within the frontiers of Poland, I hope you will authorize him on his return to Moscow to take up orally on your behalf the question of Lwow with Mr. Stalin.

Enclosure: Suggested letter to Premier Mikołajczyk.
27 October 1944

The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk dated London, October 26th, instructing him immediately to communicate to the President the following personal appeal of Premier Mikolajczyk. Premier Mikolajczyk would greatly appreciate it if he could receive at the President’s earliest convenience the report and decisions of the President in view of the great urgency of the situation.

Text of Premier Mikolajczyk’s telegram to the President reads as follows:

Mr. President,

From Ambassador Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-called Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.

I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution, as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Government of practical value.

In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal Stalin and Premier Churchill of the importance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great conciliatory and amiable gesture on the part of Russia towards Poland—a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself with the other already so great territorial sacrifices demanded of it, if the City of Lwow and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line MM. This line would not infringe on the principle of the Curzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.

However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained unsuccessful. I cannot, in the face of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last,
in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwow and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been dispelled even by Mr. Molotov's one-sided version about your attitude in Tehran, which he gave me during the last conversations in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwow has been a Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.

I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.

I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwow and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland, - such a demarche, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.

By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, - such a demarche would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an age-long merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.

I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision.

Signed: NIKOLAJCEV.

Washington, October 27th, 1944.
It is felt that, in view of the importance of this matter, every effort should be made to comply with the Ambassador's request that the full text be sent to the President immediately.

Charles E. Bohlen
Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAP ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 27, 1944

There is attached an urgent message from Prime Minister Nikolajczyk which the Polish Ambassador has just delivered personally to the Department.

The Ambassador stated that because of the urgency of the matter he would greatly appreciate it if efforts could be made to have the full text delivered to the President as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

Message from Prime Minister Nikolajczyk.
FROM Premier Mikołajczyk TO The President

DATE 27 October 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA State Department

SUBJECT: Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION:

1. At time of receipt of this message from State Department, President was on his Philadelphia-Chicago political tour. Instructions had been left by the President that all messages were first to be given to Admiral Leahy before being transmitted to the train. Copy of this message given to Admiral Leahy.

2. Copy to State Department by Admiral Leahy for preparation of draft reply. Department of State's draft reply sent to Admiral Leahy on Oct 30 for presentation to the President for approval.

3. To President upon his return. (NOTE: Messages were not transmitted to President on train.)

4. Discussion among President, acting Secretary Stettinius, and Ambassador Harriman resulted in decision that message would not be answered.

5. Message filed without answer.

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.
TOP-SECRET

CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE
October 1944

Extracts from messages received in Map Room on CHURCHILL-STALIN Conference in Moscow, October 1944, re RUSSIAN-POLISH situation.

For complete file on Conference, see #MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT
#789, 29 September 1944.

* * * * *

2. U.J. was most expansive and friendly in a conversation with Averell and Clark Kerr the other night. He however "grumbled about his own health." He said he was never well except at Moscow and his doctors did not like his flying. Even his visits to the front did him harm and it took him a fortnight to get over Teheran, etc.

3. In these circumstances Anthony and I are seriously considering flying there very soon. The route is shorter now. We have not yet heard from U.J. in reply to our suggestions. Our two great objects would be, first, to clinch his coming in against Japan and, secondly, to try to effect a friendly settlement with Poland. There are other points too about Greece and Yugoslavia which we would also discuss. We should keep you informed of every point. We would of course welcome Averell's assistance, or perhaps you could send Stettinius or Marshall. I feel sure that personal contact is most necessary.

* * * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
0349412, MR 4529, 3 October 1944.

As prominent personage is arriving at time I had planned to leave an delaying my departure till after his visit. I would appreciate information on what he expects to discuss here and your attitude regarding these matters. I hope he will be able to find a settlement of the Polish situation which is becoming increasingly bitter and difficult of solution.

TOP-SECRET
PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT
#795, 3 October 1944.

1. Anthony and I start Saturday and hope in two or three days to reach U.S. We should like you to send a message to him saying that you approve of our mission and that Averell will be available to take part in discussions.

2. • • • •

3. Of course the bulk of our business will be about the Poles, but you and I think so much alike about this that I do not need any special guidance as to your views.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
0515236 NCR 6188, 5 October 1944.

... There is one subject on which I had been hopeful the Prime Minister might be able to come to a definite understanding with Stalin, namely, the Polish situation. It seems clear that the longer the situation drifts the more difficult a solution becomes. I assume that you will have no objection if the Prime Minister can work something out with Stalin provided you are not involved or committed to any line of policy at this time... .

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
092352 NCR 9127, 10 October 1944.

... The Prime Minister [in his talks with Stalin] hopes to be able to find some solution to the Polish question. He has Nikolajczyk on call with a plane waiting to bring him to Moscow if possible before his own departure... .

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1011172 NCR 9892, 10 October 1944.

• • • • •

2. It is impossible to foresee what will result from the talks with Poland but Stalin’s agreement last night to allow Nikolajczyk to come to Moscow at once augurs well.

• • • • •
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1011312 NCR 9876, 10 October 1944.

The following is a paraphrase of a telegram sent by the Prime Minis-
ter to Atlee in the early hours this morning.

"In our conversations tonight Marshal Stalin agreed that Mikolajczyk,
Romer, and Grabski come to Moscow immediately to join in conversations
during this visit. Party should leave for Cairo on night of 9th-10th
weather permitting and come on to Moscow by shortest route. All arrange-
ments on highest priority level should be made by air ministry."

MARPAL STALIN and PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT
#794, 11 October 1944

In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the
situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our agreement,
social and otherwise. We have invited Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski
to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish Na-
tional Committee...

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1111/02 NCR 785, 11 October 1944.

.... Mikolajczyk placed conditions on his coming to Moscow but after
a firm message from Churchill he is now on his way...

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1212992, NCR 1898, 12 October 1944.

In a series of conversations during and after dinner lasting in all
6 1/2 hours the following were the principal matters discussed:

1. POLAND. Stalin explained why Warsaw could not have been taken.
In the first drive he had hoped that the Red Army could overrun Warsaw by
the impetus of their rapid advance. In this they had failed because the
Germans put up strong opposition and the Red Army naturally ran ahead of
their supplies. Warsaw was on higher ground than Praga and this made a
frontal attack across the Vistula impossible or unjustifiably costly. To
outflank the city will require 50 divisions and it thus became necessary to
clean the Germans out of the Baltic states to protect the right flank and to
release the necessary forces. He showed his resentment of the "scribblers"
in England and the United States who had doubted Russia's good faith. After
some reassuring the Prime Minister regarding the aid to Warsaw from the air
the question of Mikolajczyk's visit was discussed. It was agreed that the

TOP-SECRET
- 3 -
TOP-SECRET

British and Russians would put the maximum pressure on both Mikolajczyk and the leaders of the Polish Committee to come to an agreement. If however agreement was not reached as the result of discussions between the Poles, the Russians and British should agree between themselves on an equitable solution. Both of them would then attempt to force the Poles to accept this solution.

* * * * *

5. During the evening Eden had a good talk with Molotov about the Poles at which time I had an opportunity to explain how important it was in our relations with Russia for the American people to be satisfied that the Russians were being generous to and patient with the Poles in their difficulties and that in the United States the Polish question was looked upon as the first real test of collaboration in dealing with world problems. Eden and I both got the impression that for the first time Molotov was really interested in understanding the public reaction in England and the United States to the Polish question.

PRIME MINISTER to MR. HOPKINS
Wash., 12 Oct 44.

* * * * *

2. Under dire threats from us we persuaded Mikolajczyk and the Poles to accept the invitation we had extracted from the Russians. We hope they will be here tomorrow.

* * * * *

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1110812 USH 2791, 13 October 1944.

Yesterday was generally a day off except for talks with the Poles by Eden with Mikolajczyk and the Russians with the Committee group, preliminary to joint meetings today...

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1110942 USH 3099, 14 October 1944.

Stalin and Churchill met with Mikolajczyk and his associates yesterday afternoon. Molotov and Eden were present. I was invited as an observer and took no part in the discussion. Mikolajczyk was first given the opportunity to outline his position. He presented the memorandum of his proposals of August 30 handed to the Soviet Ambassador in London. With some difficulty Churchill forced Mikolajczyk to allow Grabski to outline the oral statement he had made at that time to the Soviet Ambassador. I understand you have
copies of the memorandum and oral statement referred to.

Stalin stated that there were 2 great defects in the memorandum which would prevent an understanding on that basis. First of all he said that the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Second it failed to accept the Curzon line as the Soviet Polish boundary. He said that there were good points in the memorandum especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Churchill supported unequivocally Stalin's position in regard to the Curzon line as the basis for settlement. Molotov spoke of the Committee and of the government in London and that the new government would be based on the 5 democratic parties in Poland. He explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon line. The division of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill told Molotov that he must accept the Curzon line as the de facto line of demarcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table.

He warned Molotov however that he and the British Government were committed to support the Curzon line as the basis for settlement and bluntly told him that it was not time for the Poles in London and the British Government to separate.

Both Churchill and Stalin committed themselves to support the claims of Poland in the west including East Prussia and west of Konigberg and the line of the Oder including Stettin. Molotov interjected that the Curzon line had the support of the 3 major allies since at Tehran you had indicated that you considered that the Curzon line was right although you did not consider it advisable to make your position public. He added that he recalled no objection on your part to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for confirmation and I decided it would only make matters worse if I, being present as an observer, had attempted to correct his statement. I talked to Churchill about Molotov's statement afterwards at dinner. He recalls as clearly as I do that although you showed interest in hearing the views of Stalin and Churchill in the boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at Teheran. I intend to tell Molotov privately at the next opportunity that I am sure you will wish that your name not be brought into the discussions again in regard to the boundary question.

In reply to these statements Molotov said that he was not authorized to accept the Curzon line and that he understood that the members of the Committee even still hoped for Leom. Stalin said that a major adjustment of this kind could not be possible if the economic systems of the Soviet Union and Poland were different. It would cause great hardships for the people and then go back to another system. He said that the Curzon line must be the basis for settlement. He agreed that there could be minor adjustments up to say 7 or 8 kilometers when the boundary was finally fixed.

The meeting broke up with the understanding that Molotov would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden. Churchill made it very plain that his Government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by
providing a home for the Poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was the objective not only of the British Government but also the Soviet Government. Stalin unequivocally endorsed this declaration.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1116232 NCR 3717, 14 October 1944.

Supplementing my 111705. Yesterday, later in the evening, a meeting was held with the Polish Committee represented by Byrulk, President of the council. Morawski, President of the Committee, and General Zymierski, Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces. Byrulk indicated that the principal differences in the talks with Nikolajczyk two months ago had been the adoption of the 1921 constitution and the speed of the land reforms. Morawski with passion accused Nikolajczyk of encouraging terrorism in liberated Poland and sabotage of the Committee's work. There were protracted arguments on such subjects as whether there was real necessity for speed in land reforms and whether General Bor was a patriot or a criminal. Churchill gave the Committee a sound and useful drubbing along the lines that all the Allies were united to beat Hitler except for the Poles who were fighting among themselves and that if this continued it would not be long before the Poles would lose the respect of the world.

Stalin, although he supported the Committee members in the opinions they expressed, agreed with Churchill that the differences were small as compared to the major objective of a settlement being reached between the Poles. Byrulk unqualifiedly accepted the Curzon line as the proper basis for the settlement of the Soviet Polish boundary thus creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of friendship between the peoples of the two countries. He asked for the support of the Allies in the return to the Poles of their historic lands in the north and the west. Churchill stated that he and Stalin agreed to support these Polish claims. It was agreed that a meeting, presided over by Eden and Molotov, should be arranged between the two Polish factions. Eden is now trying to persuade Nikolajczyk to attend. Difficult as some of the specific issues are the strong feelings and suspicions that exist between the two Polish groups appear now to be the greatest obstacle to the formation of a partnership in the new government. On the other hand, Churchill and Stalin are determined to force a settlement if at all possible in the interests of the prosecution of the war and harmony in Europe.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN to PRESIDENT
1515212 NCR 4864, 15 October 1944.

Since the meetings with the Poles reported in my 111605, Churchill and Eden have found it impossible to obtain Nikolajczyk's agreement to any formula regarding the boundary question acceptable to Stalin. The proposed meeting therefore between the two Polish groups has so far not taken place.
Churchill has had a further long personal talk with Stalin in which Stalin expressed more clearly his conception that the Curzon line must be accepted as the basis for the boundary. He envisions certain minor adjustments up to seven or eight kilometers one way or another when the exact boundary is determined but no major change. Churchill told Stalin that although he did not know your position you acted well at the final settlement wish to make a strong appeal for generosity to the Poles by allowing the retention of Lwow. To this Stalin made no comment.

Churchill came to an amicable agreement with Stalin that if it was found impossible to reach now a settlement between the Poles both groups would return to their respective seats of government and a public statement would be issued to the general effect that useful conferences have been held and that both groups had returned to consult their associates. Thus there would be no breaking off of negotiations and further steps might be undertaken at some later time.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT,
#799, 18 October 1944.

1. I send you in my immediately following text of document to which Nikolajczyk's delegation agreed together with two amendments on which Stalin insisted. Nikolajczyk said that if he accepted the first of these amendments he would be repudiated by his own people. Stalin's position is that in this case it is not worth while proceeding to the difficult discussions arising out of the second amendment. These could probably have been surmounted had the first been accepted.

2. Both the London and the Lublin Poles will not return home to consult their colleagues on outstanding points and our commune from here will explain that progress has been made and differences narrowed. Meanwhile, only the London Poles and Russians know of this document and every endeavor will be made to prevent it leaking out, though London Poles will have to consult some of their people.

3. You will see I have not gone at all beyond the position adopted by His Majesty's Government in your presence at Tehran, though possibly the regions to be ceded by Germany have been more precisely stated. I have made it clear throughout that you are not committed in any way by what I have said and done. It only amounts to a promise on the part of His Majesty's Government to support the Curzon Line and its compensation at the armistice or peace conference, which alone can give a final and legal validity to all territorial changes. I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east, and our twenty year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Air Chief will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had
expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Teheran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasized his earnest desire for your return at the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

5. * * * * *

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT
#800, 18 October 1944

This is text referred to in Paragraph One of my immediately preceding telegram. Text begins:

"1. British and Soviet Government, upon conclusions of discussions at Moscow in October 1944 between themselves and with Polish Government, have reached the following agreement.

"2. Upon unconditional surrender of Germany, territory of Poland in west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia, West and South Konigsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and lands desired by Poland to east of line of the Odar. It is further agreed that possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by Soviet and British Governments. It is understood that Germans in said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

"3. In consideration of foregoing agreement, the Polish Government accept Curzon Line as basis for frontier between Poland and USSR.

"4. Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and repatriation of population of both countries and release of persons detained. It is agreed that necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

"5. It is agreed that a Polish Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Mikolajczyk will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian arms.

"6. The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting establishment within the territorial limits
set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with Polish Government, which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

"7. The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their invariable resolve to wage war against Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally." End of text.

Herewith amendments to text:

Paragraph Five should read as follows:

"5. It is agreed that Polish Government of National Unity in accordance with agreement (or understanding) reached between the Polish Government in London and Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian armies. (Amendment to Para Five ends)."

(Further amendment.) Note reference to second amendment. Stalin said he agreed that M. Mikołajczyk should be Prime Minister. End of amendment.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT
#331, 22 October 1944.

1. On our last day at Moscow Mšk saw Berut who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his men had been shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. Approaching winter conditions behind the front could be very hard as the Russian army moved forward using all transport. He insisted however that if Mšk were premier he must have 75% of the cabinet. Mšk proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he naming four out of the five of their best men whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

2. Later at my request Stalin saw Mšk and had one and one-quarter hours very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him and Mšk promised to form and conduct a government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

3. After the Kremalin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mšk had 50/50 plus himself the western world would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with 50/50 but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mšk had previously explained to me that there might be one announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin government and a different arrangement among
the Poles behind the scenes.

4. Apart from the above Mil is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon line including Lwow for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed.

5. * * * *

PRESIDENT to PRIME MINISTER
#632, 22 October 1944.

I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in making progress toward a compromise solution of the Polish problem.

When and if a solution is arrived at, I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You will understand.

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Paraphrases of all above incoming messages were sent to the State Department for information.