MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 9, 1945

The logical and convenient hour for you to address the first plenary session seems to be 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25. This is not only a suitable hour from the standpoint of handling the crowd at San Francisco at the first day's meeting but it is a good radio hour, it being 7:30 in the East. Would greatly appreciate your advising me if this satisfactorily meets your schedule.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RESTRICTED 20T

From: US Military Attaché London England
To: War Department
Nr: 43339 5 April 1945

Comment recorr 077. Unless more promising atmosphere develops before 25 April large section British public will be skeptical important results coming from San Francisco conference. Moderate opinion cautioning public not expect perfect-peace plan immediately so less than full success at San Francisco will be disappointing but not too disillusioning. No sentiment for further compromise on Polish Govt discernible. Genl support here for dominions desire greater voice Internat Security Council but British careful to avoid appearance Empire bloc.

Tindall

NOTE: Reference not identified in WDMC.
ACTION: O-2
INFO: CG AAF OPD

CM-IN-4550 (5 Apr 45)  DTO 0516102 rel

RESTRICTED

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 930, 1 APRIL 1945

Your 732. I am delighted with our being in such perfect step.
I have bunged off my 929 to the Bear.

PRIME
FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO: MARSHAL STALIN  
NO: 218, 31 MARCH 1945

I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta...

* * * * *

I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form. You are, I am sure, aware that genuine popular support in the United States is required to carry out any Government policy foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own mind and no Governmental action can change it. I mention this fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov's attendance at San Francisco made me wonder whether you give full weight to this factor.

ROOSEVELT

Released 010024Z.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO: 732, 31 MARCH 1945

* * * * *

I have just received your 929, and as I concur in your proposed message I have sent mine to Stalin . . .

ROOSEVELT

Released 0100382 Apr 45.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 929, 31 MARCH 1945

Following is text of message I propose to send to Stalin. Please let me know what you think. I will not send it off till I hear from you:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

You will by now I hope have received the message from the President of the United States which he was good enough to show to me before he sent it. It is now my duty on behalf of His Majesty's Government to assure you that the War Cabinet desire me to express to you our wholehearted endorsement of this message of the President's, and that we associate ourselves with it in its entirety.

* * * * *

"The President has also shown me messages which have passed between him and you about Monsieur Molotov's inability to be present at the conference at San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of the three Foreign Ministers might have led to a clearance of many of the difficulties which have descended upon us in a storm since our happy and hopeful union at Yalta. We do not however question in any way the weight of the public reasons which make it necessary for him to remain in Russia.

"Like the President, I too was struck with the concluding sentence of your message to him. What he says about the American people also applies to the British people and to the nations of the British Commonwealth with the addition that His Majesty's present advisers only hold office at the will of the Universal Suffrage Parliament."

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- 1 -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 31, 1945


I believe it would be desirable to announce for the benefit of the participating governments and the interested public the appointments which this Government is obliged to make in connection with the preliminary arrangements for the conference.

As you know it is customary for the Chairman of the Delegation of the host country to be designated the Temporary President of an international conference and I assume therefore that you will wish me to serve in this capacity.

It is likewise incumbent upon this Government to designate the Secretary General of the conference who will be in charge of the organization and administration of the conference secretariat. I recommend that Mr. Alger Hiss, Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, be named to fill this position. With your approval, I should be glad to designate the other officers of the Secretariat upon the recommendation of the Secretary General.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Soviet representatives at the Yalta Conference indicated their desire to raise at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, the question of representation for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the White Russian Soviet Republic in the Assembly of the proposed United Nations Organization.

The American and British representatives at the Yalta Conference were requested by the Soviet representatives to support this proposal when submitted to the Conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. They agreed to do so but the American representatives stated that, if the United Nations Organization agreed to let the Soviet Republics have three votes, the United States would ask for three votes also.

The British and Soviet representatives stated that they would have no objection to the United States and its possessions having three votes in the Assembly if it is so desired.

These conversations at Yalta related to the submission of a question to the San Francisco Conference where the ultimate decision will be made.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 727, 29 March 1945

The following interchange of messages between Marshal Stalin and myself is quoted for your information.

"QUOTE. President to Marshal Stalin, 24 March 1945.

Ambassador Gromyko has just informed the State Department of the composition of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference. While we have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko's character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent his country, I cannot help being deeply disappointed that Mr. Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Stettinius, I know the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing the joint work in the same spirit at San Francisco for the eventual realization of our mutual goal, the establishment of an effective international organization to insure a secure and peaceful future for the world.

Without the presence of Mr. Molotov the Conference will be deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I very much hope that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. Since all sponsoring powers and the majority of other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I am afraid that Mr. Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world..."
as a lack of comparable interest on the part of the Soviet Government in the great objectives of this Conference. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. Marshal Stalin to President, 27 March.

We extremely value and attach great importance to the forthcoming Conference at San Francisco, call to found the international organization of peace and security for peoples but circumstances have developed in such a way that Mr. V. M. Molotov, really, is not able to participate in the Conference. I and Mr. Molotov regret it extremely but the convening, on request of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, in April, of a sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR where the presence of Mr. Molotov is absolutely necessary, is excluding the possibility of his participation even in the first meetings of the Conference.

You also know that Ambassador Gromyko has quite successfully accomplished his task in Dubarton Oaks and we are confident that he will with great success head the Soviet delegation in San Francisco.

As regards various interpretations, you understand, this cannot determine the decisions which are to be made. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 2915522.
FROM: MARSHAL J. V. STALIN
TO: PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT
DATE: 27 MARCH 1945

We extremely value and attach great importance to the forthcoming Conference in San Francisco, called to found the international organization of peace and security for peoples but circumstances have developed in such a way that Mr. V. M. Molotov, really, is not able to participate in the Conference. I and Mr. Molotov regret it extremely but the convening, on request of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, in April, of a sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR where the presence of Mr. Molotov is absolutely necessary, is excluding the possibility of his participation even in the first meetings of the Conference.

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- 1 -
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 925, 27 March 1945

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7. What also do you make of Molotov's withdrawal from San Francisco? It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out or are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based on the conception of great power unity.

If no such unity exists on Poland, which is after all a major problem of the post war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new world organization? And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

8. I believe, therefore, that if the success of San Franciscso is not to be gravely imperilled, we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin about Poland and if necessary about any other derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the world organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions.

Indeed, I am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now the deplorable impression Molotov's absence from San Francisco will cause.

PRIME
TOP SECRET
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: MARSHALL STALIN
NO: 21A, 24 MARCH 1945

Ambassador Gromyko has just informed the State Department of the composition of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference. While we have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko's character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent his country, I cannot help being deeply disappointed that Mr. Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Stettinius, I know the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing the joint work in the same spirit at San Francisco for the eventual realization of our mutual goal, the establishment of an effective international organization to insure a secure and peaceful future for the world.

Without the presence of Mr. Molotov the Conference will be deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I very much hope that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. Since all sponsoring powers and the majority of other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I am afraid that Mr. Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest on the part of the Soviet Government in the great objectives of this Conference.

ROOSEVELT

Released 250020Z.