(October 9–16, 1944)
INDEX SHEET

FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
TO: GENERAL HULL, War Department.
NO: M 21531, 27 October 1944.

"Tomorrow I am having my first meeting with General Antonov to discuss conclusions reached with Stalin during FM's visit."

CM-IN-26227 (28 Oct 44)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 210 JAPAN."
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 635, 24 OCTOBER 1944

* * * * *

I have today sent the following to U.J.

"I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19 and from reports by Ambassador Harriman of the success attained by you and Mr. Churchill in approaching an agreement on a number of questions that are of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a satisfactory and a durable peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when the three of us should come to a full agreement on our future activities and policies and mutual interests.

"We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.

"I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, or Athens, or Cyprus if my getting into the Black Sea on a ship should be impracticable or too difficult. I prefer travelling and living on a ship.

"We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Athens are satisfactory.

"I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

"Please let me have your suggestions and advice."

I would, of course, prefer to have him come to the Mediterranean which would be more convenient for all of us.

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**SUBJECT:** French Provisional Government; message to Stalin re three-power meeting; politics.

**ACTION:**

1. Answer PM-PRES #804, 23 Oct 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as MR-OUT-496, 23 Oct 44 (2318322).
2. MR-OUT-496, 23 Oct 44 (2318322) stated: "FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ADMIRAL LEAHY. Re MR-OUT-496. Take up with me tomorrow morning, Tuesday."
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with minor changes by President 24 Oct 44.
4. Acknowledged in PM-PRES #808, 24 Oct 44, which stated, "Yr 635. I like it all."
5. See also PRES-STALIN #100, 24 Oct 44, re three power meeting. This is same message quoted to PM in PRES #804.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: MARSHAL STALIN
NO: 100, 24 OCTOBER 1944

I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19 and from reports by Ambassador Harriman of the success attained by you and Mr. Churchill in approaching an agreement on a number of questions that are of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a satisfactory and a durable peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when the three of us should come to a full agreement on our future activities and policies and mutual interests.

We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held, such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.

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We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Cyprus are satisfactory.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

Please let me have your suggestions and advice.

ROOSEVELT

-1-
FROM The President  TO Marshal Stalin

SECRET or FILE NO. #100, 24 Oct 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Churchill-Stalin Conference; three-power meeting.

ACTION:

1. Answers STALIN-PRES. 19 Oct 44, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as Ww-OUT-491, 22 Oct 44.
2. Ww-18-174, 22 Oct 44, from the President to Admiral Leahy stated: "Re Ww-OUT-491. Please prepare reply for me to send Tuesday morning."
3. Admiral Leahy's draft reply approved without change by the President.
4. (See also PRES-PW #635, 24 Oct 44, which quotes this message to Churchill.)
5. Answered by STALIN-PRES. 29 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: "210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE" DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 632, 22 October 1944

Your 795, 796, 797, 800 and 801 received.

I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in making progress toward a compromise solution of the Polish problem.

When and if a solution is arrived at, I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You will understand.

Everything is going well here at the present time.

Your statement of the present attitude of U.J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting.

In regard to recognizing a Provisional Government of France, I will communicate with you on this matter as soon as Eisenhower reports having established a zone of the interior which is expected within the next few days.

The selection of a Black Sea port for our next meeting seems to be dependent upon our ability to get through the Dardanelles safely as I wish to proceed by ship. Do you think it is possible to get U.J. to come to Athens or Cyprus.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

DATE: 632, 22 Oct 44.

SUBJECT: Poles; war criminals, future of Germany; Montreux convention; Pacific war effort; Provisional Government of France; three-power meeting.

ACTION:

1. Acknowledges and answers PM's #795, #796, #797, #799, #800 and #801.
2. Draft reply transmitted to President at Hyde Park by Admiral Leach as #E-OUT-4E, 221645 Oct 44.
3. MA-IN-173, 22 Oct 44, (221902), President stated, "WH-OUT-4E6 approved with following modifications..."
4. Answered by PM-FRAS #802, 23 Oct 44. (Copy of PM-FRAS #802, not in "CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE" folder.)

COPY TO:
- 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 000 (2); 052; 011 FRANCE; 310 JAPAN; 210 (2)

COPY
To: The President of the United States
Number 801

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and TOP SECRET Number 801.

Many thanks for your number 631.

Para 1. On our last day at Moscow Mik saw Perut who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his men had been shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. Approaching winter conditions behind the front could be very hard as the Russian army moved forward using all transport. He insisted however that if Mik were premier he must have 75% of the cabinet. Mik proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he naming four out of the five of their best men whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

Para 2. Later at my request Stalin saw Mik and had one and one-quarter hours very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him and Mik promised to form and conduct a government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

Para 3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mik had 50/50 plus himself the western world would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish government had been set up. Stalin at
first replied he would be content with 50/50 but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mik had previously explained to me that there might be an announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin government and a different arrangement among the Poles behind the scenes.

Para 4. Apart from the above Mik is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Gurson line including Jawo for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed.

Para 5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in International law but he replied if there were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. In face of this view from this quarter I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn.

Para 6. We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland and Russia to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of south-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemburg and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has
always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.

Para 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.

Para 8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a triple meeting towards the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

Para 9. U. J. also raised formally the Montreux Convention, wishing for modification for the free passage of Russian warships. We did not contest this in principle. Revision is clearly necessary as Japan is a signatory and Inoue missed his market last December. We left it that detailed proposals should be made from the Russian side. He said they would be moderate.

Para 10. About recognizing the present French administration as the provisional government of France, I will consult the cabinet on my return. Opinion of UK is very strongly for immediate recognition. De Gaulle is no longer sole master, but is better harnessed than ever before. I am sure he will make all the mischief he can, but I still think that when Eisenhower proclaims a large zone of the interior for France it would not be possible to delay this limited form of recognition. Undoubtedly he will have the majority of the French nation
behind him and the French government hold support against potential anarchy in large areas. I will however cable you again from London. I am now in the air above Alamein of blessed memory. Kindest regards.
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<td>TO MAP ROOM</td>
<td>221L372</td>
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<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>Further report on Moscow conference.</td>
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**ACTION:**

1. Answers FRUS-PM #631, 19 Oct 44.
2. To President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-486 (2215156).
3. WH-OUT-486, 22 Oct 44, Admiral Leahy transmitted to President suggested reply.
4. WH-12-173, 22 Oct 44 (2219092), President stated, "WH-OUT-486 approved with following modifications..."
5. To PM as FRUS-PM #652, 22 Oct 44, which also acknowledged PM-PEES #795, #796, #797, and #900.

**COPIES TO:**

- 210 Churchill-Taglin Conference

**COPY**

- 052 Polish-Russian Relations: 210 (2); 000-5; 371; 082; OII France.
October 21, 1944

From Moscow

W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to Russia, arrived here by plane from Moscow today to report to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull on the Stalin-Churchill conversations.

Mr. Harriman, while not officially a participant in the talks, conferred with both of the principals several times and acted as the State Department's observer.

The Ambassador made an unusually fast trip from the Russian capital to Washington. He left Moscow at 7 a.m. Thursday and arrived at 8 a.m. today.

He is expected to give Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull up-to-date information on the Anglo-American efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the Polish government in exile in London and the government.
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALVIRA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1944
TKW CODE: 210433
DECODED BY: BALDWIN
PARAPHRASED BY: BALDWIN
RPTED BY: BALDWIN

TO: CNO

ASTERISK (*) PRIORITY ADDRESS
PRIORITY 2
DEFERRED 6
BASED 7
PRIORITY 9
ROUTINE 10
DEFERRED 12
BASED 14

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

On outgoing dispatches, please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.

TOP SECRET FOR AMBASSADOR HARIMAN ONLY FROM HENRIK

FROM WHAT CLARK-HENRIK TELLS ME I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING MORE WAS SAID ON THE MATTER YOU MENTIONED TO ME AT THE AIRPORT BEYOND WHAT YOU KNEW. TO HIS KNOWLEDGE THE LAST TIME THIS WAS DISCUSSED WAS ON THE NEXT TO LAST EVENING BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE AND HE UNDERSTOOD IT WAS TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT A MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE LATER PART OF NOVEMBER.

HARIMAN

NAVIGATION SYSTEM

MAYBE SOMEONE ELSE. I WOULD THINK <- NO MENTION THIS BEFORE THE MEETING, BUT I WOULD THINK THE MEETING BY THE NAVIGATION SYSTEM.

ACTION IN MR. HOPKINS OR DELI TO MR. HARRISON 3/12/12

TOP SECRET
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN
TO: THE PRESIDENT
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1944

1. During the stay of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Moscow we have exchanged views on a number of questions of mutual interest. Ambassador Harriman has, certainly, informed you about all important Moscow conversations. I also know that the Prime Minister had to send you his estimate of the Moscow conversations. On my part I can say that our conversations were extremely useful for the mutual ascertaining of views on such questions as the attitude towards the future of Germany, Polish question, policy in regard to the Balkan States, and important questions of further military policy. During the conversations it has been clarified that we can, without great difficulties, adjust our policy on all questions standing before us, and if we are not in a position so far to provide an immediate necessary decision of this or that task, as for example, on the Polish question, but nevertheless, more favourable perspectives are opened. I hope that these Moscow conversations will be of some benefit from the point of view that at the future meeting of three of us, we shall be able to adopt definite decisions on all urgent questions of our mutual interest.

2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me about his recent conversation with Mr. Hopkins, in which Mr. Hopkins expressed an idea that you could arrive in the Black Sea at the end of November meet with me on the Soviet Black Sea coast. I would extremely welcome the realization of this intention. From the conversation with the Prime Minister, I was convinced, that he also shares this idea. Thus the meeting of three of us could take place at the end of November in order to consider the questions which have been accumulated since Tehran. I would be glad to receive a message from you on this matter.

STALIN
FROM: Marshal Stalin  
TO: The President  

DATE: 19 October 1944  

SUBJECT: Churchill-Stalin meeting; 3 power meeting.  

ACTION:

1. Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WE-OUT-4/91, 22 Oct 44.
2. WE-18-176, 22 Oct 44, from the President to Admiral Leahy stated: "Re WE-OUT-4/91. Please prepare reply for me to send Tuesday morning."
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved without change by the President; dispatched as PRES-STALIN #100, 24 Oct 44.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.
TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.
NO: 21419, 18 October 1944.

List given by Stalin to Deane on needs for bringing in two months supply of stores for build-up prior to Russia's entry in war against Japan.

CM-IN-17645 (19 Oct 44)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 210 JAPAN."
18 October 1944

From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
For: The President of the United States
Number: 800

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 800.

This is text referred to in Paragraph One of my immediately preceding telegram. Text begins:

"British and Soviet Governments, upon conclusions of discussions at Moscow in October 1944 between themselves and with Polish Government, have reached the following agreement.

"2. Upon unconditional surrender of Germany, territory of Poland in west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia, West and South Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and lands desired by Poland to east of line of the Oder. It is further agreed that possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by Soviet and British Governments. It is understood that Germans in said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

"3. In consideration of foregoing agreement, the Polish Government accept Curzon Line as basis for frontier between Poland and USSR."
"4. Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and repatriation of population of both countries and release of persons detained. It is agreed that necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

"5. It is agreed that a Polish Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Mikolajczyk will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian arms.

"6. The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting establishment within the territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with Polish Government, which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

"7. The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally." End of text.

Herewith amendments to text:

Paragraph Five should read as follows:

It is agreed that Polish Government of National Unity in accordance with agreement (or understanding) reached between the
Polish Government in London and Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian armies. (Amendment to Para Five ends).

(Further amendment). Note reference to second amendment Stalin said he agreed that M. Mikołajczyk should be Prime Minister. End of amendment.

End
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SOCIAL or FILE NO.  800, 18 Oct 44.

DATE  18/15122  VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Agreement between British and Soviet Governments on Poland.

ACTION:

1. Further to PM-PRES #799, 18 Oct 44.
2. To President via usher.
3. Answered by PRES-PM, #532, 22 Oct 44, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Hyde Park as MH-OUT-632; approved with minor changes by President in wk-18-173.
18 October 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number: 799

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 799.

I send you in my immediately following text of document to which Nikolajczyk's delegation agreed together with two amendments on which Stalin insisted. Nikolajczyk said that if he accepted the first of these amendments he would be repudiated by his own people. Stalin's position is that in this case it is not worth while proceeding to the difficult discussions arising out of the second amendment. These could probably have been surmounted had the first been accepted.

2. Both the London and the Lublin Poles will now return home to consult their colleagues on outstanding points and our communiqué from here will explain that progress has been made and differences narrowed. Meanwhile, only the London Poles and Russians know of this document and every endeavour will be made to prevent it leaking out, though London Poles will have to consult some of their people.
3. You will see I have not gone at all beyond the position adopted by His Majesty's Government in your presence at Tehran, though possibly the regions to be ceded by Germany have been more precisely stated. I have made it clear throughout that you are not committed in any way by what I have said and done. It only amounts to a promise on the part of His Majesty's Government to support the Curzon Line and its compensations at the armistice or peace conference, which alone can give a final and legal validity to all territorial changes. I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east, and our twenty year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasised his earnest desire for your return at
the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

5. Meanwhile, in other directions, considerable advantages have been gained. You have already been informed about the obvious resolve of the Soviet Government to attack Japan on the overthrow of Hitler, of their detailed study of the problem and of their readiness to begin inter-Allied preparations on a large scale. When we are vexed with other matters, we must remember the supreme value of this in shortening the whole struggle.

6. Arrangements made about the Balkans are, I am sure, the best that are possible. Coupled with our successful military action recently we should now be able to save Greece and, I have no doubt that agreement to pursue a fifty-fifty joint policy in Yugoslavia will be the best solution for our difficulties in view of Tito's behaviour and changes in the local situation, resulting from the arrival of Russian and Bulgarian forces under Russian command to help Tito's eastern flank. The Russians are insistent on their ascendancy in Roumania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea countries.

7. Although I hear most encouraging accounts from various quarters about United States politics, I feel the suspense probably far more than you do or more than I should if my own affairs were concerned in this zone. My kindest regards and utmost good wishes.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SECRET or FILE NO. 799, 18 Oct l4.

TOR MAP ROOM 18/15112 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Conference between Churchill and Stalin; Poles, Russia's part in war against Japan, BALAKLAVA.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by FRUS-PM 4632, 22 Oct 44, which was prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-632; approved with minor changes by President in WH-18-173.

COPY: TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
"210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"

"to Japan"

052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 310 JAPAN; 051 BALAKLAVA; 000.1; 210 (2)

COPY COPY
GENERAL DEANE AND I HAD A LONG SESSION THIS EVENING WITH MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERAL ANTONOV ON THE SUBJECT OF DETAILED PLANNING FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION AND COOPERATION IN THE PACIFIC WAR. STALIN GAVE US IN CONSIDERABLY GREATER DETAIL THE SOVIET STRATEGY INDICATING QUITE FRANKLY HIS WEAKNESS IN CERTAIN AREAS IN THE EVENT OF PREMATURE ATTACK BY JAPAN.

AND ON THE OTHER HAND, OUTLINING HIS GENERAL PLANS FOR A STRONG LAND OFFENSE TO ENCIRCLE AND KNOCK OUT THE JAPANESE FORCES IN MANCHURIA. GENERAL DEANE WILL SEND A FULLER CABLE TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF AND I WILL REPORT TO YOU AND THEM ON MY RETURN. ONE SUBJECT THAT HE ASKS BE GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION IS COOPERATION FROM US IN THE BUILD UP OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE FAR EAST THROUGH PACIFIC PORTS PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. HE GAVE US THE DETAIL—
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**DATE**

18 OCTOBER

**CSC**

(Use G. C. T.)

**PAGE 2 OF 3** 1771242  NCR 6765

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ED LIST OF REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH GROUND FORCES AND TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC AIR FORCES FOR TWO MONTHS STOCKING OF CERTAIN

ITEMS AND PROVISION OF NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TOTALING IN ALL ABOUT A MILLION TONS. OTHER SUPPLIES HE IS PLANNING TO STOCK FROM THE WEST. HE WILL LET US KNOW WITHIN TWO WEEKS WHEN HE WISHES THE FLOW OF 4-ENGINE BOMBERS AND TRAINING OF HIS CREWS TO BEGIN. HE UNQUALIFIEDLY ASSERTED THAT THIS STRATEGIC AIR FORCE WOULD BE BUILT UP FOR USE ONLY IN THE FAR EAST. HE HOPES FOR HELP FROM OUR NAVY AND SPECIFICALLY OFFERED US THE USE OF PETROPAVLOVSK AS A BASE. HE IS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH DETAILED PLANNING OF ALL ASPECTS OF OUR MUTUAL COOPERATION GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL, AND AGREED TO AUTHORIZE HIS ARMY AND NAVY STAFFS TO PROCEED ACCORDINGLY WITH OUR MILITARY MISSION IN MOSCOW. HE EMphasized THE NEED FOR SECRECY AND THE MUTUAL DISADVANTAGE OF AROUSING PREMATURELY JAPANESE SUSPICIONS. HE REFERRED TO HARRY'S TALK WITH GROMYKO.
REGARDING A MEETING WITH YOU IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER AND SAID THAT YOU AND HE COULD THEN COME TO A DEFINITE AGREEMENT ON THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE MILITARY ASPECTS. IN THE MEANTIME HE AGREED THAT PLANNING SHOULD PROCEED PREPARATORY TO YOUR MEETING. HE GENERALLY APPROVED OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF'S SUGGESTIONS PRESENTED BY DEANE FOR RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE WAR ALTHOUGH HE PLACED GREATER IMMEDIATE EMPHASIS ON THE ACTION OF HIS GROUND FORCES. HE IS EVIDENTLY ALREADY BEGINNING TO STRENGTHEN HIS FORCES IN THE FAR EAST. HE SHOWED THAT HE HAD CLEARLY GRASped DEANE'S PRESENTATION OF OUR GENERAL STRATEGY AND EXPRESSED APPROVAL AND APPRECIATION. HE SPOKE ENTHUSIATICALLY ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO ASSIST IN ENDING THE WAR QUICKLY AND SAID "BREAK JAPAN'S SPIKE. I PLAN TO LEAVE THURSDAY MORNING AND WITH A BREAK IN THE WEATHER SHOULD ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON EARLY SATURDAY MORNING, OCT 21."
To President via usher.

2. No reply. State Department notified of Harriman’s plans to leave Moscow on Thursday morning with arrival in Washington Saturday morning, 21 Oct 44.

Churchill-Stalin Conference; participation in Pacific war.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D.C.
NO: 21422, 17 October 1944.

"Report of meeting between Americans and Russians on Far Eastern operations."

CM-IN-16662 (18 Oct 44)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 210 JAPAN."

"Show classification number and date of communication on first line. Drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document."
SECRET

SECRET

PRIOITY

FROM: Opray

TO: Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 87. SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Receipt is acknowledged of your 101131, 111140, 111147, 1111525, 1111705, 151130, 1511517, 1511521, 152136 and 152142.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1145, EWT, 16 October 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

16 October 1944

File Copy

16/620, NCR 122
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Receipt is acknowledge of 11140, 111947, 111625, and

111705
(a) 15 2 /36
(b) 15 15 21
(c) 15 15 17
(d) 15 15 3 0

Roosevelt

10/81
16 October 1944
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MESSAGES.

ACTION:

1. Admiral Leahy directed that Colonel Park send acknowledgment of all unacknowledged Harriman messages outstanding as of 0900 16 October 1944 and send with the President’s signature.

2. Sent as No. 87
INDEX SHEET

FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.
TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.
NO: 21391, 16 October 1944

Report of second meeting, 16 Oct 44, of Russians-Americans-British on Far Eastern operations.

CM-IN-15444 (16 Oct 44.)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 210 JAPAN."
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**RELEASED BY:** 16 OCTOBER 1944

**TOR CODEROOM:** 152241

**DECODED BY:** BALDWIN

**PARAPHRASED BY:** BALDWIN

**ROUTE BY:** BALDWIN

**PAGE 1 OF 4**

**1521427**

**MCR 4593**

**TOP SECRET**

**FILE COPY**

**No. 1 ADMIRAL**

**No. 2 FILE**

**No. 37-1 OR CHARTROOM**

**No. 4 SPECIAL**

**Intelligence**

**Note:** This dispatch contains top secret information.

Eden substituted for the Prime Minister today in our meeting with Stalin to hear the outline of the Soviet position in the Far East. General Antonov presented the Soviet intelligence regarding Japanese strength in Manchuria and the Japanese capacity to reinforce in the event of hostilities with Russia. This was greater than we gave the Japs.

Antonov then explained the possible avenues of attack open to the Russians and explained that it would be necessary before attacking Japan to build up the Russian forces by 50 divisions which with the 30 they now have in the Far East would give a total strength of 80 divisions. This build up can be accomplished it was stated within two and a half to three months after the collapse of Germany. Stalin then personally answered the questions which he put to him. It be-
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

AFTER			EXT.
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Released by
DATE
16 OCTOBER 1944
TOR CODEROOM
Decoded by
Paraphrased by
Routed by

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**ROUTINE**

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**DEFERRED**

**BASEGRAM**

**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**PAGE 2 OF 4**

**1521427**

**NCR 4893**

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G.C.T.)

ON OUTGOING Dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.

ELOPED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BUILD UP BEGINNING AT ONCE A 2 TO 3 MONTHS STOCK OF FOOD FOR THE ARMY FUEL FOR THE AIR FORCE AND GROUND TRANSPORT ALSO RAILS AND RAILROAD EQUIPMENT TO COMPLETE THE SVERDLOVSK-RKOMSOMOLSK RAILROAD.

A detailed explanation of the logistic was not given but it was stated that the Trans Siberian railroad could handle about 25,000 tons a day eastbound of which about 60 per cent was needed to supply the civil population and for the operation of the railroad. Stalin expressed the opinion that the Japanese war would be of short duration after Russia attacked and if stores could be built up now the attack could be made in 2 or 3 months after Germany's collapse, he said he was not ready to give a definite date but that planning should begin at once. Furthermore there were political aspects which would have to be given consideration. Stalin expressed confidence that with the present Soviet forces

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.
ACCUMULATED STOCKS COULD BE PROTECTED AND INDICATED THAT
HE WOULD BE PLEASED IF THE JAPS ATTACKED AS ALTHOUGH THERE
MIGHT BE EARLY REVERSES IT WOULD ASSIST THE MORALE OF THE
RUSSIAN PEOPLE, STALIN SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RE-
CEIVE 4-ENGINE BOMBERS AND INSTRUCTORS TO TRAIN A STRATEGIC
AIRFORCE FOR SOVIET USE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. I TOLD
HIM THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TRAINING OF CREWS COULD
COMMENCE AND THE PLANES BE PROVIDED PROMPTLY AS SOON AS
AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED REGARDING THEIR USE, STALIN
INDICATED THAT AIRFIELDS AT PETROPAVLOVSKOY WOULD BE PRO-
VISED FOR OUR USE AS WELL AS IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES, HE
SAID THAT THE AIRFIELDS HOUSING AND SUPPLIES FOR A STRATE-
GIC AIR FORCE SHOULD BE BUILT UP IN ADVANCE OF HOSTILITIES
AND THE PLANES Brought IN IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ACTION WAS
STARTED. WE GOT NO CLEAR INDICATION HOWEVER AS TO JUST WHAT
AIR FORCE IN ADDITION TO THE GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE SUPPLY.
OP SECRET DISPATCH

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 10-78

1521422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1944

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
MAP ROOM:

Messages Navy 151330Z and Navy 152142Z, from Ambassador Harriman to the
President, were this date referred by
Admiral Leahy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for their information.

J. V. Smith
Commander, U.S.N.
Aide
FROM
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

TO
THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL OR FILE NO.
NAVY 1521422, MCR 4093

DATE

TO
MAP ROOM 1602352

VIA
Navy Courier

SUBJECT:
Russian Participation in war against Japan

ACTION:
1. To President via umbers.
2. One Copy to Admiral Leahy for forwarding to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

DATE: 16 Oct 44

SIGNATURES:

Copy, "Mr. St. John"

Copy, "Mr. 310 Japan"

310 Japan
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**DATE** 16 OCTOBER 1944

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**INFORMATION**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DELETED PRECEDENCE 50% AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**1521362**

**NCR 4887**

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 96, Navy Regulations.

---

**The Prime Minister is laid up today with a temperature of about 100 which may be caused by an attack of Moscow diarrhea. It is hoped that he will be around again tomorrow but naturally his doctor is watching his lungs carefully to be sure it is not causing trouble again.**

**NAVAIDE (61 & 62).......ACTION**

Need 160510

To President via ambre

---

**File Copy**
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 152136Z, NCR 4887
DATE 160510Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's illness.

ACTION:

1. To President via the ushers.
2. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.
**OP SECRET Dispatch**

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- BASE

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8. BASE
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**PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES**

**TOP SECRET**

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- Asterisk (*) mailgram address
- Priorities: Priority 1, Routine 2, Deferred 3, Basegram 4

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 78, Navy Regulations.
16 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that
the attached messages from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished you for
your information.

F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, A.O.D.

Enc. (3)
1. Msg Harriman to the
   President, 15 Oct 44
2. Msg Harriman to the
   President, 16 Oct 44

# 1515212

# 1515172
TOP SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT

16 October 1944

The proposed meeting between the two Polish groups has not yet occurred. This is because Churchill and Eden have found it impossible, since the meetings reported in my message of the 11th, to devise any formula regarding the boundary question which is acceptable to both Stalin and Mikolajczyk. In a long personal talk between Churchill and Stalin the latter explained more clearly his view that the Curzon line must be accepted as the basis for the boundary, with certain minor adjustments of seven or eight kilometers but no major alteration. Stalin made no comment to the Prime Minister's suggestion that although he did not know your position, at the final settlement you might well wish to make a strong appeal for generosity toward the Poles by permitting them to retain Lwów. An amicable agreement between Stalin and Churchill was reached, to the effect that if no settlement could now be made between the Poles, both groups would return to their respective seats of government, and that public announcement would be made that both groups had returned for consultation with their associates after useful conferences had been held. There would be no breaking of negotiations and at a later time further steps could be taken.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRITAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 151521Z, NCR 4844

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 160135Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Meetings with the Poles

ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/16/44.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

COPIES TO: Sec State

DATE: 16 Oct 44 BY DIRECTION OF: The President
### TOP SECRET DISPATCH

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**DATE**

16 OCTOBER 1944

**TOP CODEWORD**

**DECODED BY**

GARDNER

**PARAPHRASED BY**

BALDWIN

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BALDWIN

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2. PRIORITY
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**FOR ACTION**

CNO

**INFORMATION**

FILE

**PAGE 1 OF 5**

**151330Z**

**NCR 4846**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**TOP SECRET**

**HANDLE ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH "Top SECRET" INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 78, NAVY REGULATIONS.**
**OP SECRET DISPATCH**

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

STAFF PRESENTED THE RED ARMY POSITION. AN OFFENSIVE IS NOW UNDERWAY IN THE EXTREME NORTH. THE RED ARMY IS ONLY 2 MILES FROM PETSAND WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN VERY SOON. REMNANTS OF THE 3 GERMAN DIVISIONS IN THIS AREA MAY WITHDRAW TO NORWAY. AN OFFENSIVE IS PLANNED AGAINST THE 5 GERMAN DIVISIONS IN NORTH CENTRAL FINLAND WHO MAY ALSO ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW TO NORWAY. STALIN SUGGESTED A JOINT BRITISH AND RUSSIAN OPERATION AGAINST NORWAY TO CUT THESE UNITS OFF. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH HAVE NO GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE BUT WAS READY TO DISCUSS NAVAL COOPERATION. ANTONOV EXPLAINED THAT ABOUT 30 DIVISIONS WERE NOW ISOLATED IN THE WESTERN LATVIAN PENINSULA WHICH WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO LIQUIDATE. NEXT HE EXPLAINED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY AND YUGOSLAVIA STATED THAT THE RED ARMY WOULD NOT ADVANCE FURTHER WEST IN YUGOSLAVIA AFTER BELGRADE IS CAPTURED AND WOULD CONCENTRATE ON OCCUPYING HUNGARY AND ENCIRCLING AS

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PAGE 3 OF 5

151330Z NCR 4846

TOP SECRET

MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE GERMAN FORCE OF 23 DIVISIONS IN HUNGARY, STALIN EXPLAINED THAT THE DRIVE IN THIS SECTOR WILL BE THEIR IMMEDIATE MAJOR OFFENSIVE ADVANCING THROUGH AUSTRIA TO TAKE VIENNA. THIS WILL OPEN A NEW ROUTE INTO GERMANY TO THE WEST OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THEN TO THE NORTHWEST IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ODER AT BRESELN. ON THE CENTRAL SECTOR FROM LITHUANIA TO THE CARPATHIANS WHERE THE GERMANS HAVE SOME 120 DIVISIONS THE RUSSIANS ARE MAINTAINING CONSTANT PRESSURE. THE TIMING OF THE ATTACK AGAINST EAST PRUSSIA AND THE ENCIRCLING OF WARSAW WILL DEPEND UPON THE PROGRESS OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE 2 FLANKS; STALIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH HAD OFFERED A NEW APPROACH TO GERMANY WHICH APPEARED ATTRACTIVE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF GERMAN PREPARED DEFENCES IN THAT AREA. THE FINAL OUTCOME MAY BE A DRIVE FROM BOTH THE CENTRAL SECTOR AND PENETRATING OF GERMANY FROM THE SOUTH OR FROM EITHER OF THEM DEPENDING ON THE

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
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TOP SECRET

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**PAGE 4 OF 5** 1513302 NCR4846

**TOP SECRET**

**DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION**. STALIN STATED HE HAD IN ALL 300 DIVISIONS AT HIS DISPOSAL IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. IN DISCUSSING WHEN GERMANY MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BE DEFEATED. STALIN STATED THAT AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IN JANUARY "WE WILL BE ABLE TO JUDGE." GOING BACK TO AN EARLIER INQUIRY OF CHURCHILL STALIN SAID THAT CHURCHILL COULD NOW SEE THAT THE SECONDS WOULD BE UNABLE TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM THE EAST TO REINFORCE THE WEST. GENERAL BROOKE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN BURMA.

THROUGHOUT GENERAL DEANE’S PRESENTATION, LIEUT GENERAL SHEVHENKE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE FAR EASTERN COMMANDER WAS PRESENT. AS THE HOUR WAS LATE EVEN FOR MOSCOW IT WAS AGREED THAT THE RUSSIAN POSITION IN THE FAR EAST SHOULD BE PRESENTED AT A MEETING TODAY.

NAVSAIDE(#1-2)......ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR

NAP ROOM:

Messages Navy 151350Z and Navy 152142Z, from Ambassador Harriman to the President, were this date referred by Admiral Leahy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.

W. Brown
Commander, U.S.N.
Aide
FROM AMBASSADOR HASEIDAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 152302, NCR 4846.

DATE OCT 14 1944

TO MAP ROOM 1520532 VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Russian participation in Pacific War

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. One copy to Admiral Leahy for forwarding to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

DATE: 16 OCT 1944

BY DIRECTION OF: Admiral Leahy

COPIES TO: Chief of Staff
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1944.
TOR CODEROOM: 1737/15.
DECODED BY: GERMAN
PARAPHRASED BY: GERMAN
ROUTED BY: GERMAN

INFORMATION: CND
FOR ACTION: PRIORITY
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PRECEDENCE:

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PRIORITY:
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND NO ADMINISTRATION.

151517Z NOG 4622

STALIN WAS IN HIGH HOG WISE. YESTERDAY, HE PAID CHURCHILL AN UNUSUAL AND SIGNIFICANT COMPLIMENT BY ATTENDING THE BALLET AND

RED ARMY CONCERT AT THE OPERA HOUSE. I UNDERSTAND STALIN HAS NOT BEEN AT THE OPERA SINCE THE WAR.

CHURCHILL AND STALIN RECEIVED A TERRIBLE DAVATION FROM THE AUDIENCE. IN THE LONG ENTRANCE STALIN ENTERTAINED AT A VERY

SMALL SUPPER FOR CHURCHILL, EDEN AND BROOKE INCLUDING KATHLEEN AND MYSELF. WE HAD GOOD HUMOR IN ALL OF US. KATHLEEN

HAS THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE OFFICIAL BOX AND AT THE SUPPER, STALIN IS SHAVING ON EVERY OCCASION HIS APPRECIATION TO CHURCHILL FOR

HIS VISIT.

ORIGINAL NOG DISTRIBUTION:

NAV. ID(19-19)......ACTION FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT

FILE: ReU 1518552 8.

To President's Band

TOP SECRET

Paraphrase to be inserted for signature.

File Copy
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARKIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT

15 October 1944

In high mood yesterday Stalin paid the Prime Minister an unusual and significant compliment by appearing at the Opera House and attending the ballet and Red Army Concert. It is my understanding that since the War started, the Marshal has never been seen at the Opera.

The audience gave Churchill and Stalin a tremendous ovation. During the long interlude between acts, Stalin entertained and included Kathleen and myself in a small supper and in the official box. Stalin made good humored fun of all of us at supper. On every occasion Stalin is demonstrating his appreciation for Churchill's visit to Moscow.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 151517Z, NCR 4622

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 151855Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Stalin and Churchill's attendance at opera

ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrased copy to Secretary of State for information, 10/16/44.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

DATE: 160144

BY DIRECTION OF:
The President

(Sec covering memo filed with 151521)

THE MEETING OPENED WITH FIELD MARSHAL BROome PRESENTING A RESUME OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AND THE SITUATION IN ITALY. IT WAS A VERY FAIR PRESENTATION AND PRESENTED A GOOD PICTURE OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN COLLABORATION.

WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN FRANCE MARSHAL STALIN SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION THROUGH SWITZERLAND IN ORDER TO OUTFLANK THE DEFENDED LINE. IN CONNECTION WITH THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN MARSHAL STALIN SAID THAT SOVIET FORCES DID NOT INTEND TO ADVANCE WESTWARD THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA AND INDICATED HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT JOIN UP EVENTUALLY.
IN THE VICINITY OF VIENNA.

THE PRIME MINISTER THEN GAVE A COMPLETE RESUME OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR INDICATING THAT THEY HAD THE EQUIVALENT OF 12 DIVISIONS INVOLVED INCLUDING OF COURSE THE HOME FORCES AND SEPARATE AND FOREIGN GARRISONS.

FIELD MARSHAL BROKE THEN EXPLAINED THE BURMA CAMPAIGN. VIENNA IT IN CLOSELY WITH OUR OPERATIONS OVER THE HUMP AND THE GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS IN CHINA. AGAIN HE MADE A VERY FAIR PRESENTATION.


I THEN GAVE THEM THE INFORMATION ABOUT PROPOSED OPERATIONS WHICH YOU SENT TO ME IN YOUR LAST TELEGRAM, IN THIS CONNECTION.

C

TOP SECRET

(document redacted)
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AUTHORIZED BY: ___

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH THE PRECEDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA SHOWN ON THE FOLLOWING SHEETS.

**EMPLA**

THAT THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED TO BE OF URGENT IMPORTANCE THAT COMBINED PLANNING BE STARTED AT ONCE AND THAT WHATEVER PREPARATORY MEASURES WERE PRACTICABLE SHOULD BE STARTED NOW INDICATING TO THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENT THAT SOME OF THE PREPARATORY MEASURES MIGHT BE...

I CONCLUDED BYfähUSTING THAT THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE HOST.

---

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 75, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-76
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

FROM: ALBABA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY: 

DATE: 

TOX CODEWORD: 

DECODED BY: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

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**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

OCTAV 19-70

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**CONCERNED IN THE ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:***

(1) **HOW SOON AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY WILL WE EXPECT JAPANESE-RUSSIAN HOSTILITIES TO BEGIN.**

(2) **HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO BUILD UP SOVIET FORCES TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE.**

(3) **WHAT PART OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD CAN BE DEVOTED TO THE BUILDING UP OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN AIR FORCE.**

(4) **IS THE SOVIET UNION PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE BUILDING UP OF SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR FORCE AND UNDERTAKE A TRAINING PROGRAM. I STATED AGAIN THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ALLOCATE THE FOUR ENGINED BOMBERS AT ONCE.**

MARSHAL STALIN APPARENTLY AGREED WITH THE STRATEGY ADOPTED AND INDICATED ONCE A BLOCKADE IS EFFECTIVE JAPANESE SOUTHERN CONQUESTS WILL FALL OF THEIR OWN WEIGHT. HE SAID THEY WERE IN A SERIOUS PLIGHT WITH ALL THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION EXPOSED.

IT WAS AGREED THAT MARSHAL STALIN AND THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF WILL STATE THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE FAR EAST AT A MEETING TOMORROW NIGHT.

FOLLOWING MY TALK, GENERAL ANTONOV GAVE A RESUME OF THE PRESENT

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_United States Secret Intelligence Service_
SITUATION ON THE SOVIET FRONT. IN BRIEF HE SAID THAT OPERATIONS WERE GOING TO CONTINUE IN THE BALTIc STATES WHERE 35 DIVISIONS WERE CUT OFF FROM ANY ESCAPE EXCEPT BY SEA. THESE DIVISIONS ARE TO BE ENTIRELY Liquidated. THEY ARE GOING TO CONTINUE THESE OPERATIONS AND ALSO OCCUPY HUNGARY BEFORE THEY START AN OFFENSIVE FOR THE INVASION OF GERMANY FROM THE EASTERN FRONT. HE SAID THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY OPENS A NEW POSSIBILITY OF ATTACKING GERMANY FROM THE SOUTH. HE SAID THE ATTACK MIGHT BE SIMULTANEOUS FROM THE EAST AND SOUTH BUT THE SOUTH OFFERED POSSIBILITIES BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF GERMANS PREPARED DEFENSES IN THAT DIRECTION IMMOBILIZING FORCES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND MAINTAINING CONSTANT PRESSURE AND GENERAL ANTONOV STATES DEFINITELY THAT THE GERMANS ARE UNABLE TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM THE FRONT. THEY PLACE AXIS STRENGTH AT 185 GERMANS AND 26 HUNGARIAN DIVISIONS, APPARENTLY THE PEACE FEELERS BY HUNGARY ARE NOT GOING WELL AND THEY ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH THE CONDITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN PRIOR TO THE CONSIDERATION OF ARMISTICE TERMS.

MARSHAL STALIN SAID THEY WILL EITHER COMPLY IN TWO DAYS OR THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE OPERATIONS IN HUNGARY. APPARENTLY THE DIRECTION
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**From:** ALUSHA LIOBOW

**Released By:**

**Date:**

**TOP Code/No.:**

**Decoded By:**

**Paraphrased Checked By:**

**Routed By:**

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**Asterisk (*) Mailgram Address:**

**For Action:**

**Precedence:**

1. PRIORITY
2. ROUTINE
3. DEFERRED
4. BASELINE

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**IN THE DIRECTIO:**

**Of the main attack in Hungary is to be in the direction of Budapest and Vienna although they are going to continue the encirclement of German forces trapped in Transylvania by continuing the attack north-ward from the Debretzen area.

When pressed by the Prime Minister as to when the invasion of Germany proper would start, Marshal Stalin seemed more optimistic than General Antonov but even he said he thought the Germans would not be defeated this year and that a winter campaign would be necessary.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill were talking about the German divisions in Finland. Stalin indicated that there were 3 divisions in the Petsamo area which probably were birtheraining to Norway. He suggested in a general way that the British and Russians might collaborate in an operation in northern Norway.

The Prime Minister said the British could not send any divisions but could assist in operation by naval action. The subject was dropped with the understanding that both principals would think it over.

Tomorrow night's meeting on the Pacific should be productive of information we have been seeking for a long time and I shall record it fully.

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**TOP SECRET**

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**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT**

**TOP SECRET DISTRIBUTION:***

AGWAR(1)......ACTION(FOR DELIVERY TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

COMINCH(#2 THRU #9)....FILE.

PER COMINCH, ADD: NAVAIDE(#18 & #11).......

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COPY No. #10

OPNAV 19-78
FROM: General Deane
TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 153900Z NGR 4463, 15 Oct 44.

DATE: 

TO: MAP ROOM: 15/1852Z VIA: Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Stalin-Churchill Conference.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. No action taken by President.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
15 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
The President has directed that the attached messages from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished you for your information.

RICHARD PAINK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosure
1. Two messages from Harriman to the President, 14 Oct 44.
   # 141705Z
   # 141625Z
### QANTER

**DISPATCH**

**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

**FROM:** ALUSNA MOSCOW  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** 14 OCTOBER 1944  
**TOR CODEWORD:**  
**DECODED BY:** COOK/BALDWIN  
**PARAPHRASEd BY:** BALDWIN  
**ROUTED BY:** BALDWIN  
**FOR ACTION:** CNO  
**PRECEDENCE:** PRRRRRRRR

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**PAGE 1 OF 5**  
**141052**  
**NCR 3899**

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**STALIN AND CHURCHILL MET WITH MIKOLAJCZYK AND HIS ASSOCIATES YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. MOLOTOV AND EDEN WERE PRESENT. I WAS INVITED AS AN OBSERVER AND TOOK NO PART IN THE DISCUSSION. MIKOLAJCZYK WAS FIRST GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OUTLINE HIS POSITION. HE PRESENTED THE MEMORANDUM OF HIS PROPOSALS OF AUGUST 30 HANDED TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, WITH SOME DIFFICULTY CHURCHILL FORCED MIKOLAJCZYK TO ALLOW GRABSKI TO OUTLINE THE ORAL STATEMENT HE HAD MADE AT THAT TIME TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. I UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE COPIES OF THE MEMORANDUM AND ORAL STATEMENT REFERRED TO. STALIN STATED THAT THERE WERE 2 GREAT DEFECTS IN THE MEMORANDUM WHICH WOULD PREVENT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THAT BASIS, FIRST IT UNREALISTICALLY IGNORED THE EXISTENCE OF THE POLISH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, SECOND IT FAILED TO ACCEPT THE CURZON LINE AS THE SOVIET POLISH**

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**FILE COPY**

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**TOP SECRET**

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**FILE COPY**
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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** Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative. **

**PAGE 2 OF 5 141606Z NCR 3899 141709Z **

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use 6. C. C.) **

**Boundary. He said that there were good points in the memorandum especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Churchill supported unequivocally Stalin's position in regard to the Curzon line as the basis for settlement. Mikolajczyk denied that he intended to ignore the committee but indicated that in his memorandum it was intended that the settlement should go deeper than one between the members of the committee and of the government in London and that the new government should be based on the 5 democratic parties in Poland. He explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill/Mikolajczyk that he must accept the Curzon told line as the de facto line of demarcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the poles to present their case. **

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**NO. 1 ADMIRAL. NO. 2 FILE. NO. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. NO. 4 SPECIAL.**

**TOP SECRET**

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UP'SICR IT DISPATCH:

ALUSNA MOSCOW

FROM

RELEASED BY

DATE

14 OCTOBER 1944

TOR CODED

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PARAPHRASED BY

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FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

CNO

PAGE 3 OF 5 141602

NCR 3899 1417052

FOR ADJUSTMENT AND FINAL SETTLEMENT AT THE PEACE TABLE, HE WARNED MIKOLAJCZYK HOWEVER THAT HE AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THE CURZON LINE AS THE BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT AND BLUNTLY TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS NO TIME FOR THE POLES IN LONDON AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SEPARATE, BOTH CHURCHILL AND STALIN COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS OF POLAND IN THE WEST INCLUDING EAST PRUSSIA AND WEST OF KONIGSBERG AND THE LINE OF THE ODER INCLUDING STETTIN, WOLOTOV INTERJECTED THAT THE CURZON LINE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE 3 MAJOR ALLIES SINCE AT TEHERAN YOU HAD INDICATED THAT YOU CONSIDERED THAT THE CURZON LINE WAS RIGHT ALTHOUGH YOU DID NOT CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE TO MAKE YOUR POSITION PUBLIC, HE ADDED THAT HE RECALLED NO OBJECTION ON YOUR PART TO THE POLISH CLAIMS IN THE WEST AS OUTLINED. WOLOTOV DID NOT REFER TO ME FOR CONFIRMATION AND I DECIDED IT WOULD ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE IF I BEING PRESENT AS AN OBSERVER HAD ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT HIS STATEMENT. I TALKED

TOP SECRET

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**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

**FROM:** ALUSNA MOSCOW

**RELEASED BY:**

**DATE:** 14 OCTOBER 1944

**TO CODEBOOK:**

**DECODED BY:**

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**FOR ACTION:**

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**ORIGINATOR TELL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP (USE G. C. T.)**

**TOP SECRET**

**REMEMBER:**

**ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.**

**TO CHURCHILL ABOUT MOLOTOV'S STATEMENT AFTERWARDS AT DINNER.**

**HE RECALLS AS CLEARLY AS I DO THAT ALTHOUGH YOU SHOWED INTEREST**

**IN HEARING THE VIEWS OF STALIN AND CHURCHILL IN THE BOUNDARY QUESTION YOU HAD EXPRESSED NO OPINION ON IT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AT TEHERAN. I INTEND TO TELL MOLOTOV PRIVATELY AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY THAT I AM SURE YOU WILL WISH THAT YOUR NAME**

**NOT BROUGHT INTO THE DISCUSSIONS AGAIN IN REGARD TO THE BOUNDARY QUESTION IN REPLY TO THESE STATEMENTS MIKLACZYK SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT THE CURZON LINE AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE EVEN STILL HOPED FOR LVOV. STALIN SAID THAT A MAJOR ADJUSTMENT OF THIS KIND COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND WERE DIFFERENT. IT WOULD CAUSE GREAT HARDSHIP TO SOCIALIZE THESE AREAS AND THEN GO BACK TO ANOTHER SYSTEM. HE SAID THAT THE CURZON LINE MUST BE THE BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT HE AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE MINOR ADJUSTMENTS UP TO SAY 7 OR:**

**1 ADMIRAL**

**2 FILE**

**3F-I OR CHARTROOM**

**4 SPECIAL**

**TOP SECRET**

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**COPY NO.**

**OPMAY 19-78**
Top Secret Dispatch

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Page 5 of 5 141600Z NCR 3899 141705Z

Originator fill in DATE and TIME GROUP

OR OUTGOING dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text or 8 kilometers when the boundary was finally fixed. The meeting broke up with the understanding that Nikolajczyk would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden. Churchill made it very plain that his government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by providing a home for the poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was the objective not only of the British government but also the Soviet government. Stalin unequivocally endorsed this declaration.

Top Secret

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TOP-SECRET

14 October 1944

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT

Yesterday afternoon Stalin and Churchill met with Mikolajczyk and his associates. Present were Molotov and Eden. I took no part in the discussion and was invited as an observer.

Mikolajczyk was first given the opportunity to outline his position. He presented the memorandum of his proposals of August 30 handed to the Soviet Ambassador in London. Churchill, with some difficulty, forced Mikolajczyk to allow Grabaki to outline the oral statement he had made at that time to the Soviet Ambassador. Copies of the memorandum and oral statement referred to you have, I understand. Stalin stated that in the memorandum there were two great defects which would prevent an understanding on that basis. First the existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation was unrealistically ignored. Second it failed to accept the Curzon line as the Soviet Polish boundary. There were good points in the memorandum he said, especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Stalin's position in regard to the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement was supported unequivocally by Churchill. Mikolajczyk denied that he intended to ignore the Committee but indicated that in his memorandum it was intended that the settlement should go deeper than one between the members of the Committee and of the Government in London and that the new Government should be based on the five Democratic parties in Poland. At great length he explained why he could not accept
the Curzon Line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Nikolajczyk was told by Churchill that he must accept the Curzon Line as the de facto line of demarcation. On this basis he suggested a formula which would allow the Poles to present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. Churchill warned Nikolajczyk however that he and the British Government were committed to support the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement. Huntly he told him that this was no time for the Poles in London and the British Government to separate. Stalin and Churchill both committed themselves to support the claims of Poland in the west including East Prussia and west of Königsberg and the line of the Oder including Szčecin. The Curzon Line had the support of the three major allies, Molotov interjected, since at Teheran you had indicated, although you did not consider it advisable to make your position public, that you considered that the Curzon Line was right. He recalled no objection on your part, he added, to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for confirmation and being present as an observer I decided it would only make matters worse had I attempted to correct his statement. Afterwards at dinner I talked to Churchill about Molotov's statement. As clearly as I do, he recalls that although you showed interest in hearing the views of Stalin and Churchill in the boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at Teheran. At the next opportunity I intend to tell Molotov privately that I am sure you will wish that your name not be brought into the discussions again in regard to the boundary question.
TOP-SECRET

Mikolajczyk said, in reply to these statements, that he was not authorized to accept the Curzon Line and that he understood that the members of the Committee even still hoped for Lwow. Stalin said that a major adjustment of this kind could not be possible if the economic systems of the Soviet Union and Poland were different. To socialize these areas and then go back to another system would cause great hardship. The basis for settlement must be the Curzon Line. When the boundary was finally fixed he agreed that there could be minor adjustments up to say seven or eight kilometers.

With the understanding that Mikolajczyk would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden, the meeting broke up. Churchill made it very plain that his Government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by providing a home for the Poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was not only the objective of the British Government but also the Soviet Government. This declaration was unequivocally endorsed by Stalin.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 1417052, NCR 3699
DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 1423452 VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Polish boundary dispute

ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Captain Graham. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/15/44.
3. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request.
4. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.
IN THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, HAPRIWAN, BEIRUT, LEBANON

TO: Mr. J. F. Byrnes, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

CC: Mr. W. H. Bullitt, U.S. Special Representative for European Affairs

RE: Update on the Negotiations with the Polish Commandant

DECEMBER 27, 1945

From the Security Council,

Subject: Polish Negotiations

Dear Mr. Byrnes,

I am pleased to report on the latest developments in the negotiations with the Polish Commandant. As you know, a meeting was held yesterday evening with representatives of the Polish government, led by General Zymbierski, and the General Secretary of the Polish Committee, President W. C. von Hammerstein.

The key topics discussed included the adoption of the 1921 constitution and the speed of land reform. The Polish negotiators expressed concern over the pace of the process and its impact on national security. They also raised questions about the handling of the refugees and the possibility of international intervention.

We have agreed to continue meeting regularly to address these issues. The Polish side has shown a willingness to compromise, which is a positive development.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

[Name]
Assistant Secretary of State

File Copy

Paraphernal copy & cast state for info.

[Handwritten note: Signatures of officials]
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

**FROM**
ALBESNA MOSCOW

**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**
14 OCTOBER 1944

**TOR CODEBOOK**

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**INFORMATION**

**PAGE TWO OF THREE**

**1416427**

**NCB 373** (Use G. C. T.)

**OR OUTGOING DISPATCHED** PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT


IT WAS AGREED THAT A MEETING PRESIDED OVER BY EDEN AND MOLOTOV SHOULD BE ARRANGED BETWEEN THE TWO POLISH Factions.

EDEN IS NOW TRYING TO PERSUADE NIKOLAJOVICZ TO ATTEND, DIFFICULT AS SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES ARE THE STRONG FEELINGS AND SUSPICIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO POLISH GROUPS APPEAR NOW TO BE THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO THE FORMATION OF A

**TOP SECRET**

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PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND,

CHURCHILL AND STALIN ARE DETERMINED TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT

IF AT ALL POSSIBLE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PROSECUTION OF THE

WAR AND HARMONY IN EUROPE.
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT

This is a supplement to my message of 14 October.

Later in the evening yesterday a meeting was held with the Polish Committee represented by Beiruk President of the Council, Morawski President of the Committee and General Zymierski Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. The principal differences in the talks with Nikolajczyk two months ago had been the adoption of the 1921 Constitution and the speed of the land reforms Beirut indicated. Nikolajczyk was accused by Morawski with passion of encouraging terrorism in liberated Poland and sabotage of the Committees work. On such subjects as whether there was real necessity for speed in land reforms and whether General Bor was a patriot or a criminal there were protracted arguments. The Committee was given a sound and useful drubbing by Churchill along the lines that all the Allies were united to beat Hitler except for the Poles who were fighting among themselves and that if this continued it would not be long before the Poles would lose the respect of the world. Although he supported the Committee members in the opinions they expressed Stalin agreed with Churchill that the differences were small as compared to the major objective of a settlement being reached between the Poles. The Curzon Line was unqualifiedly accepted by Beirut as the proper basis for the settlement of the Soviet Polish boundary thus
TOP-SECRET

creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of friendship between the peoples of the two countries. In the return to the Poles of their historic lands in the north and the west he asked for support of the Allies. It was stated by Churchill that he and Stalin agreed to support these Polish claims. Presided over by Eden and Molotov, it was agreed that a meeting should be arranged between the two Polish factions. Eden is trying now to persuade Nikolajczyk to attend.

Difficult as some of the specific issues are the greatest obstacle to the formation of a partnership in the new Government appears now to be the strong feelings and suspicions that exist between the two Polish groups. On the other hand if at all possible in the interests of the prosecution of the war and harmony in Europe Churchill and Stalin are determined to force a settlement.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 141625, NCR 3213

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 1423452 VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Meeting with Polish Committee

ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Captain Graham. Paraphrased copy to Secretary of State for information, 10/15/44.
3. Copy to Admiral Leahy at his request.
4. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

COPIES TO: Sec State

DATE: 15 Oct.

BY DIRECTION OF: The President

(See covering memo attached to 141705)
SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, Moscow

NUMBER 84. SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 121225, 121259 and 131014 received.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1130, EWT, 13 October 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

SERIAL or FILE NO. 84

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of messages.

ACTION:

1. Written by Admiral Leahy who directed it be sent with the President's signature.
2. Reply sent as No. 84.
President E. Harriman
Your 12/22, 12/26, and 13/014
received
P.M. Roosevelt
W.H.
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO: MR. HARRY HOPKINS
NO: 1024, 13 OCTOBER

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal and Top Secret.

My telegram dated 11th October 44.

Matters improved a great deal yesterday. Balkan affairs are being straightened out. Averell and Winant for EAC are being kept informed.

PRIME
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State.

The President has directed that the attached messages from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished you for your information.

RICHARD PEARL, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

Rsc. (SM)

1. Two messages from Harriman to President, 12 Oct 44.
2. Msg. Harriman to President, 13 Oct 44.

12/22/44
12/25/44
13/10/44
TOP SECRET

Original Non-Distribution

ANY QUIETLY.

Touhy with things at home and not worried about getting
covering the distance in five hours. He is therefore in
a daily mail delivery from London by magadio planes.
Although a bit tired is well and in good spirits. He has
TODAY I Dined alone last night with the prime minister who
with the committee group. Preliminary to joint meetings

Westen millions generally a day off except for takes 7000

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARIANIN

OPINION FOR 1111 DATE AND TIME GROUP

1113GD 1111 NON-STAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>1114</td>
<td>12:00</td>
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</table>

From: ALMA MOSCOW

Re: SECRET DISPATCH

[Table containing additional information]

[Handwritten note]
13 October 1944

TOP-SECRET

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Except for conversations with the Poles by Eden with Nikolajczyk and the Soviets with the Committee Group, yesterday was generally a day off, preliminary to joint meetings today. Last night I dined alone with Churchill who is well and in good spirits although a bit tired. Mosquito planes which cover the distance in five hours bring him a daily mail delivery from London. Therefore he keeps in touch with home affairs and has no worry about getting away quickly.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 131042, NCR 2791

TO MAJ ROM 1312502 VIA Navy Courier


ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase copy prepared by Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrase copy to Secretary of State for information, 10/13/44.
3. Verbatim copy to Admiral Leahy at his request.
4. Acknowledged by No. 34, 13 October 1944.

COPIES TO: [Signature]

DATE: 13 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF: [Signature]
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

IN A SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS DURING AND AFTER DINNER LASTING IN ALL 6 1/2 HOURS THE FOLLOWING WERE THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS DISCUSSED:

1. POLAND. STALIN EXPLAINED WHY WARSAW COULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN. IN THE FIRST DRIVE HE HAD HOPED THAT THE RED ARMY COULD OVERRUN WARSAW BY THE IMPETUS OF THEIR RAPID ADVANCE. IN THIS THEY HAD FAILED BECAUSE THE GERMANS PUT UP STRONG OPPOSITION AND THE RED ARMY NATURALLY RUN AHEAD OF THEIR SUPPLIES. WARSAW WAS ON HIGHER GROUND THAN PRAGA AND THIS MADE A FRONTAL ATTACK ACROSS THE VISTULA IMPOSSIBLE OR UNJUSTIFIABLY COSTLY.

TO OUTFLANK THE CITY WILL REQUIRE 50 DIVISIONS AND IT THUS BECAME NECESSARY TO CLEAN THE GERMANS OUT OF THE

SECRET

Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76, 6. NAVYRG)
BALTIC STATES TO PROTECT THE RIGHT FLANK AND TO RELEASE THE
NECESSARY FORCES. HE SHOVED HIS RESENTMENT OF THE "SCRIBBLERS" IN
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES WHO HAD DOUBTED RUSSIA'S GOOD FAITH.
AFTER SOME REMARKS OF THE PRIME MINISTER REGARDING THE AID TO WARSAW
FROM THE AIR THE QUESTION OF MIKOLAJOZYK'S VISIT WAS DISCUSSED. IT
WAS AGREED THAT THE BRITISH AND RUSSIANS WOULD PUT THE MAXIMUM
PRESSURE ON BOTH MIKOLAJOZYK AND THE LEADERS OF THE POLISH COMMITTEE
TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT. IF HOWEVER AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED AS
THE RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE POLES, THE RUSSIANS AND
BRITISH SHOULD AGREE BETWEEN THEMSELVES OR AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION.
BOTH OF THEM WOULD THEN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE POLES TO ACCEPT THIS
SOLUTION.

2. THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BALKAN COUNTRIES
PARTICULARLY YUGOSLAVIA, THE PRIME MINISTER TOOK STALIN TO TASK FOR
RECEIVING TITO WITHOUT INFORMING HIM. THE ONLY EXPLANATION THAT
STALIN GAVE WAS THAT TITO HAD ASKED HIM TO KEEP HIS VISIT SECRET.
STALIN EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN TITO BEFORE ALTHOUGH HE
HAD LIVED IN RUSSIA DURING 1917 AND 1918. AT TITO'S REQUEST HE HAD
PROMISED TO GIVE HIM ARMS PRINCIPALLY CAPTURED GERMAN BUT ALSO SOME
RUSSIAN. IT HAS AGREED BETWEEN STALIN AND THE PRIME MINISTER THAT
THEY SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN ATTEMPTING TO BRING THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES
TOGETHER FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG FEDERATION BUT THAT IF
IT WAS FOUND THAT SUCH A FEDERATION WAS IMPRACTICABLE WITHOUT
CONTINUED INTERNAL STRIFE SERBIA SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS AN
INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. BOTH AGREED THAT THE FORMER WAS FAR MORE
DESIRABLE AND THE LATTER WAS ONLY THE LAST RESORT. THIS LED TO AN
INTERESTING STATEMENT BY STALIN ON THE SUBJECT OF PAN-SLAVISM
WHICH HE SAID HE CONSIDERED AS AN UNREALISTIC CONCEPTION. WHAT
THE DIFFERENT SLAVIC PEOPLES WANTED WAS THEIR INDEPENDENCE. PAN-
SLAVISM IF PURSUED MEANT DOMINATION OF THE SLAVIC COUNTRIES BY RUSSIA.
THIS WAS AGAINST RUSSIA’S INTERESTS AND WOULD NEVER SATISFY THE
SMALLER SLAVIC NATIONS. HE SAID HE FELT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A
PUBLIC STATEMENT BEFORE LONG TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. IN CONNECTION WITH
YUGOSLAVIA CHURCHILL EXPLAINED THAT ENGLAND HAD NO "SORDID INTERESTS"
BUT WISHED TO SEE HER MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE YUGOSLAVS FULLFILLED.
STALIN BRUSHED THIS ASIDE SAYING THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER BRITAINS
IN YUGOSLAVIA AS SORDID. THEY WERE VERY REAL INTERESTS BOTH IN
MINERAL CONCESSIONS BUT PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE YUGOSLAVIA HAD A LONG
STRETCH OF MEDITERRANEAN COAST. PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
WAS VITAL TO GREAT BRITAIN’S WORLD COMMUNICATIONS. STALIN RECOGNIZED
AND APPROVED THESE INTERESTS. THIS TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO ITALY
AND ITS FUTURE. BOTH MEN AGREED THAT THE ITALIANS SHOULD BE FORCED
TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN EXISTENCE WITHIN THE ISTHMIUS.

5. THE BATTLE IN ITALY TURNED ATTENTION TO THE WAR IN GENERAL.
STALIN DEVELOPED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE CONCEPTION THAT IT WAS
UNNECESSARILY COSTLY TO ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE GERMAN LINES IN ITALY
AND THE SIEGFRIED LINE. A PLAN OF ENCIRCLEMENT SHOULD BE ADOPTED.
15 OF THE 25 ALLIED DIVISIONS IN ITALY COULD HOLD THE PRESENT LINE
AND 15 MIGHT BE SENT THROUGH AUSTRIA TO OUTFLANK THE GERMANS AND
ASSIST THE RED ARMS ADVANCE THROUGH HUNGARY INTO AUSTRIA.
THE SIEGREGGED LINES LEFT FLANK RESTED ON SWITZERLAND. SWITZERLAND
SHOULD BE FORCED TO ALLOW TRANSIT OF ALLIED TROOPS THROUGH HER
TERRITORY TO OUTFLANK THE GERMANS STRONG POSITION. WHEN CHURCHILL
PROTESTED STALIN SAID SWITZERLAND HAD PLAYED A FALSE ROLE IN THE
WAR AND SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO COOPERATE. HE SAID THAT YOUR INTER-
VENTION WITH SWITZERLAND WOULD OBTAIN HER AGREEMENT. IT WAS AGREED
THAT THE MILITARY MATTERS SHOULD BE TALKED OUT AT ANOTHER MEETING.
CHURCHILL EXPLAINED THAT NOT ONLY DID HE AND BROOKE WISH TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION AND VIEWS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN WAR WITH MARSHAL STALIN
AND HIS STAFF BUT ALSO GENERAL WOULD PRESENT AT THE SAME MEETING THE
SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC.

4. THIS $8 OF COURSE A BRIEF REPORT OF MANY HOURS OF CONVERSATION.
TO GIVE AN ACCURATE PICTURE I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT FREQUENTLY BOTH
MEN WERE TALKING AT THE SAME TIME AND NOT ALWAYS ON THE SAME
SUBJECT. WHEN YOU APPRECIATE ALSO THAT THE 2 INTERPRETERS WERE
ATTEMPTING TO TRANSLATE WHAT WAS BEING SAID YOU WILL REALIZE THAT
A CONCLUSION WAS NOT ALWAYS REACHED ON EACH POINT. IN GENERAL
I SHOULD ADD THAT STALIN SHOWS CLEARLY THAT HE IS GENUINELY GLAD
TO HAVE THE PRIME MINISTER IN MOSCOW AND IS USING THE OCCASION TO
ATTEMPT TO COME A MEETING OF MINDS WITH CHURCHILL ON AS MANY SUBJECTS
AS POSSIBLE.

5. DURING THE EVENING EDEN HAD A GOOD TALK WITH MOLOTOV ABOUT
THE POLES AT WHICH TIME I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HOW IMPORTANT
IT WAS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO BE
SATISFIED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING GENEROUS TO AND PATIENT WITH
THE POLES IN THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND THAT IN THE UNITED STATES
THE POLISH QUESTION WAS LOOKED UPON AS THE FIRST REAL TEST OF
COLLABORATION IN DEALING WITH WORLD PROBLEMS. EDEN AND I BOTH
GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME MOLOTOV WAS REALLY
INTERESTED IN UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC REACTION IN ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES TO THE POLISH QUESTION.

NAVISE...ACTION
FILE.
During and after dinner a series of conversations lasting 6½ hours was held. The principal matters discussed were as follows:

1. Poland. The failure to take Warsaw was explained by Stalin. He had hoped that the impetus of the Red Army's first drive would enable it to overrun Warsaw. This was not accomplished because the Red Army naturally ran ahead of their supplies and the Germans offered strong opposition. A frontal attack across the Vistula was impossible or unjustifiably costly because Warsaw is on higher ground than Praga. 50 divisions will be required to outflank Warsaw. To obtain the necessary forces, and also to protect the Soviet right flank, it became necessary to push the Germans out of the Baltic States. The "scribblers" in the United States and England who doubted Russia's good faith were rebuked by Stalin. After some remarks by Prime Minister Churchill about aid to Warsaw from the air, the next topic for discussion was Mikolajczyk's visit. The British and Russians agreed to apply maximum pressure on both the leaders of the Polish Committee and Mikola joscyk to arrive at an agreement. However, if the discussions
between the Poles failed to produce an agreement, an equitable solution would be agreed upon by the Russians and the British. A last attempt to force acceptance of this solution upon the Poles would then be made by both of them.

2. Attention was turned to the War in general by a discussion of the battle in Italy. The conception that it was unnecessarily costly to break the German Italian line and the Siegfried line was developed in considerable detail by the Marshal. Instead of a breakthrough a plan of encirclement should be adopted. The present line in Italy could be held by 15 of the 25 divisions now engaged, and the other 10 might be sent through Austria to outflank the Germans and provide assistance to the Red Army's advance into Austria through Hungary. Switzerland provides the base for the left flank of the Siegfried line, and to permit the Germans strong position to be outflanked Switzerland should be forced to allow transit of Allied troops through her territory. In answer to a protest by Churchill Stalin said Switzerland had played a false role in the war and should not be made to cooperate. He said that intervention by the President would obtain Switzerland's agreement. The walking out of military matters was deferred by agreement to another meeting. It was explained by Churchill that not only did he and Brooke wish to exchange with Stalin and his staff information and views regarding the war in Europe but also
General would at the same meeting present the Pacific situation.

3. A long discussion about the Balkan countries, particularly Yugoslavia, was held. Stalin was taken to task by Churchill for failing to inform him of Tito's visit to Moscow. Stalin said that Tito asked him to keep his visit secret, and that was the only explanation given by the Marshal. It was explained by Stalin that although Tito had lived in Russia during 1917 and 1918 he had never seen Tito before. At the request of Tito Stalin agreed to provide him with some arms, principally captured German but some Russian as well. The Prime Minister and Stalin agreed to mutual effort in attempting to establish among the Yugoslav peoples a strong federation, but if such a federation proved impracticable without continued internal strife an independent Serbia should be established. The latter was viewed as a last resort only because of the greater desirability of the former. All of this led to an interesting statement by Stalin to the effect that he considered Pan-Slavism an unrealistic conception. Independence was what the different Slavic Peoples wanted, but the pursuit of Pan-Slavism meant Russian domination of the Slavic countries. This would never satisfy the smaller Slavic nations and was against Russia's interests as well. He said that he felt that to make this clear he would
have to make a public statement before long. Churchill then explained that while England had no "sordid interests" in Yugoslavia she did wish to fulfill her moral obligations to the Yugoslavs. This was brushed aside by Stalin who said he did not consider as sordid Britain's interest in Yugoslavia. In mineral concessions and principally because of Yugoslavia's long stretch of Mediterranean coast, those interests were very real. Mediterranean protection is vital to the world communications of Britain. Stalin recognized and approved these interests. The conversation then turned back to Italy and her future. That the Italians should be forced to work out their own existence within the Isthmus was agreed by both men.

4. To give an accurate picture of this brief report of many hours of conversation I must explain that often both Churchill and Stalin were talking at the same time and not always on the same subject. With the two interpreters trying to translate what was being said, you can appreciate that a conclusion on each point was not always reached. Stalin shows clearly that he is genuinely glad to have Churchill in Moscow and is using the opportunity to attempt on as many subjects as possible to come to a meeting of minds with the Prime Minister.

5. The Polish problem was talked over during the evening by Eden and Molotov. I had an opportunity to explain the importance
to relations between the United States and Russia of satisfying the American people that the Russians were being generous and patient with the Poles, and that the first real test of collaboration in world problems was thought by Americans to be the Polish problem. Both Eden and I had the impression that Molotov for the first time was really interested in understanding the public reaction in the United States and England on this matter.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 121259Z, NCR 1898

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 122211Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Report of discussions between Prime Minister and Stalin

ACTION:
1. To the President while in Doctors Office by Captain Price.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrased copy to Secretary of State for information, 10/13/44.
3. Verbatim copy of paragraphs 3 and 5 sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information by Admiral Leahy
4. Acknowledged by No. 84, 13 October 1944.

COPIES TO: See State

DATE: 13 Oct 1944 By Direction Of: The President

(See covering memo filed with 13 Oct 1944)
PERSONAL AND S ECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

IN A SPEECH LAST NIGHT AT DINNER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY STALIN OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF THE THREE WORLD WARS IN WHICH ENGLAND AND RUSSIA HAD JOINED TOGETHER AGAINST AGRESSOR NATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT IN THE FIRST AGAINST NAPOLEON THEY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL BUT IN WORLD WAR ONE THE AID OF THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN NECESSARY FOR FINAL DEFEAT OF GERMANY.

IN THE PRESENT WAR HE EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT UNLESS THE UNITED STATES HAD THROWN INTO THE WAR ITS FULL STRENGTH INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL WHETHER VICTORY COULD HAVE BEEN WON FOR THE DEMOCRACIES. CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE COUNTRIES WAS NECESSARY TO SECURE FOR THE DEMOCRACIES

SECRET
A PEACEFUL WORLD IN THE FUTURE, HE SPOKE WITH WARM FEELING OF
YOU AND YOUR CONTINUED HEALTH AND SUCCESS. AFTER DINNER I TOLD
HIM THAT I KNEW YOU WOULD HIGHLY APPRECIATE HIS EXPRESSIONS
OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND VALUE THE HIGH TRIBUTE HE HAD PAID
TO THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAR.

YOU MAY WISH TO SEND HIM A BRIEF MESSAGE IN THE SAME
SENSE AS HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE WITH SUCH SINCERITY AND
GENTLE GROCIOUS RECOGNITION OF THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO THE
WAR.

NAVAIDE.... ACTION
FILE.
12 October 1944

SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: THE PRESIDENT #121225

The history of the three great wars in which England and Russia had joined against aggressors was outlined by Stalin in a speech presented last night during dinner at the British Embassy. This union had been successful in the first against Napoleon, he explained, but in the First World War the aid of the United States had been required for Germany's final defeat.

He expressed the opinion that in the present war it was very doubtful whether victory for the Democracies could have been won if the United States had not thrown into the war its full industrial and military strength. To secure a peaceful future world for the Democracies continued friendship between the three countries was necessary. He spoke with warm feeling of you and your continued health and success. I told him that I knew you would value his high tribute to the contribution made by the United States to the war and would greatly appreciate his expressions of personal friendship.

His statements were made with such sincerity and generous recognition of the United States war effort that you may wish to send him a brief message in the same sense.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 121223Z, NCR 2027

DATE 22350Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Stalin's speech

ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. Paraphrase prepared Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/13/44.
3. Acknowledged by No. 84, 13 October 1944.

COPIES TO: State

DATE: 13 O 144

BY DIRECTION OF: President

(See covering memo filed with 13/0/44)
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

TO: MR. HARRY HOPKINS

NO: Unno, 12 OCTOBER 1944 Filed 12/22152

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal and TOP SECRET.

Everything is most friendly here but the Balkans are in a sad tangle. Tito having lived under our protection for three or four months at Vis, suddenly levanted leaving no address but keeping sentries over his cave to make out that he was still there. He then proceeded to Moscow where he conferred and yesterday Mr. Molotov confessed this fact to Mr. Eden. The Russians attribute this graceless behaviour to Tito's suspicious peasant upbringing and say that they did not tell us out of respect for his wish for secrecy. The Bulgarians are treating our people ill, having arrested some of our officers still remaining both in Greece and Yugoslavia. I saw a tale of their having treated very cruelly American officers when prisoners of theirs. Russian attitude is that they are of course willing to indict Bulgaria for her many offences, but only in spirit of a loving parent, "This hurts me more than it does you." They are taking great interest in Hungary which they mentioned erroneously, was their neighbour. They claim fullest responsibility in Roumania but are prepared largely to disinterest themselves in Greece. All these matters are being flogged out by Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov.

Para 2. Under dire threats from us we persuaded Nikolajczyk and the Poles to accept the invitation we had extracted from the Russians. We hope they will be here tomorrow.

Para 3. We are seeing a great deal of Averell and he is giving a dinner tomorrow night on Teheran lines, i.e., only the secret ones there. He is sitting in on the military discussions and on the future of Germany talks, as well of course as the Polish conversations when they begin. We have so many bones to pick about the Balkans at the present time that we would rather carry the matter a little further a deux in order to be able to talk more bluntly than at a larger gathering. I will cable fully to the President about this in a day or two. Will you very kindly show this to him? I shall be very glad to hear from him.

PRIME
FROM The Prime Minister TO Mr. Harry Hopkins

FILE or FILE NO. 2 mags: 12/221ST, and #1024, 13094, RE.

DATE

TO OR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Stalin-Churchill Conference.

ACTION:
1. Originals to Mr. Hopkins.
2. No reply made by Mr. Hopkins.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
INDEX SHEET

FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.
NO: M 21353, 12 October 1944

"At meeting with Ismay and Jacob this morning, we agreed to recommend that the Prime Minister open the discussion on the Far East situation at the meeting with Stalin which is now to be held Saturday."

CM-IN-11474 (12 Oct 44).

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR ZIO JAPAN".
FROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.

TO: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

NO: 45440, 12 October 1944.

Broad plan for operations in Pacific.

CM-OUT-45440 (12 Oct 44)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR NIO JAPAN".
INDEX SHEET

FROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D.C.
TO: GENERAL DEANE, US MILITARY MISSION, RUSSIA.
NO: 45439, 12 October 1944.

Instructions for presenting to Russians immediately following message (WAR 45440, 12 Oct 44) re Strategy in Far East.

CM-OUT-45439 (12 Oct 44)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MK 210 JAPAN."

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. O. G. Type No. 5555
May 6-54
12 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the attached message from Ambassador Harriman to the President be furnished you for your information.

RICHARD PAKE, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosure

1. Msg. Harriman to President, 11 October 44.

11/9/47
REFERENCE ALUSNA MOSCOW 111140Z.

EDEN TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT AFTER A FURTHER SATISFACTORY TALK WITH MOLOTOV THEY HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT THAT A MEETING BETWEEN TITO AND SUBASIC SHOULD BE ARRANGED AT AN EARLY DATE AND A JOINT BRITISH SOVIET MESSAGE WHICH WAS NOW BEING DRAFTED SHOULD BE SENT TO THEM BOTH URGING THAT THEY GET TOGETHER AND WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS. EDEN HOPES THAT WE WILL AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MESSAGE, AS SOON AS I RECEIVE IT I WILL SEND IT TO SECRETARY HULL FOR HIS CONSIDERATION.

AS TO BULGARIA AND HUNGARY EDEN HAS AGREED WITH MOLOTOV THAT THE CONTROL COMMISSION FOR THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE SET UP UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET COMMANDER AS IN RHUMANIA DURING THE PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES AGAINST GERMANY BUT THAT HERE- AFTER THE CONTROL COMMISSION WOULD BE MADE GENUINE TRIPARTITE WITH EQUAL AUTHORITY OF EACH MEMBER BUT WITH SOVIET CHAIRMANSHIP. WHEN I GET THE DETAILS I WILL INFORM SECRETARY HULL.
NAVAIDE(2) .... ACTION (FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT) FILE.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET "UHR"

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
Nr: 457
11 October 1944
To MILID Washington DC number 457

Ignorance concerning continued delay on Bulgarian armistice and reasons therefor professed Tuesday by British Ambassador recently arrived from London.

Our Ambassador suspects Stalin and Churchill are making deal which includes Balkan matters and Bulgarian armistice hence delay which makes Turks somewhat suspicious of rift between Russia and Western Allies.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-10972 (12 Oct 44) 0542Z bjw

SECRET

42

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
TOP SECRET
COPY

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND PREMIER STALIN
NO: 629

Thank you for your joint message No. 794 of October 10.

It is most pleasing to know that you are reaching a meeting of your two minds as to international policies in which we are all interested because of our common, current and future efforts to prevent international wars.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: The President
TO: PM Churchill and Marshal Stalin

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 629, 11 October 1944

SUBJECT: Moscow Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM #794 (Joint message from Churchill and Stalin to the President.)
2. “Copy drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President verbatim and released.”

COPY TO: "210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

210 (2); 052 POLICE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION; 052 BALANS.

COPY
SECRET

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

11 October 1944

My message of today on the subject of what the Prime Minister and Eden have in mind working out with the Russians on the Balkan question is the reference for this.

This afternoon Eden told me that he and Molotov, after a further satisfactory talk, had reached an agreement that a meeting between Subasic and Tito should be arranged soon and that a joint Soviet-British message which was now being prepared should be sent to each of them urging that they get together and solve their problems. Eden hopes that the United States will agree to join in this communication. Immediately upon receipt of it, I will send it to Mr. Hull for him to consider.

With reference to Hungary and Bulgaria, Eden has reached an agreement with Molotov that the Control Commission for these countries should be set up under the direction of the Russian Commander, as in Rumania during the period of hostilities against Germany, but that subsequently the Control Commission would be made a genuine tripartite one, each member having equal authority but with a Soviet chairmanship. Secretary Hull will be informed by me as soon as I receive the details.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 1119472, NCR 1336

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 120220Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Tito and Subasic

ACTION:
1. To President via ushers
2. Paraphrase prepared by Lieutenant Bogue. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/12/44.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

DATE: 12Oct44

BY DIRECTION OF: The President

COPIES TO:

Sec. State
For:  The President of the United States
Number 795  Filed 111032Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
Private and Top Secret. Number 795.

We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made for Averell are I think satisfactory to him and do not preclude necessary intimate contacts which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report.

It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and
Russia, subject to further discussion and melting-down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.

I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this because otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks except to say it is barred, at your desire. However Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same luncheon animadverted harsely upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Beane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you to do.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SECRET or PRIORITY

DATE 725, 11 Oct 44.

FOR SHAP ROOM 1112142 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Churchill-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. To President via ushers.

2. To Admiral Leahy for action; paraphrased brief sent to Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy for "preparation of a draft reply covering the political aspects of this message."

3. Acknowledged in FR52-P4 #632, 22 Oct 44; no draft reply received from the State Department covering political aspects; removed from STATUS REPORT on 23 Oct 44.

COPY TO:

"210 CHURCHILL-StALIN CONFERENCE"

"310 JAPAN (1)"

210 (2); 051 BALKANS; 310 JAPAN; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.
FROM: GENERAL DEANE, US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D. C.

NO: M 21345, 11 October 1944.

"The Prime Minister plans to have discussions with Marshal Stalin on Friday on military matters and one of the subjects on the Agenda will be Pacific War...Prime Minister has had message from the President saying that I would show him the instructions which I have received from you on the subject, and I have made them available to him. Ismay, Barrows and I will meet tomorrow morning to prepare an outline of how we shall present the Pacific situation to the Soviets."

CM-IN-10534 (11 Oct 44.)

ORIGINAL FILED: "MR 210 JAPAN."
To: Ambassaor Harriman, Moscow

Your 103643 and 110907 received and read with much interest.

My active interest at the present time in the Balkan area is that such steps as are practicable should be taken to insure against the Balkans getting us into a future international war.

Regarding our war plans for the Pacific, I understand that Deane has all the information as to American plans that are available and that he has given, or will give, this information to the Soviet Staff.

If Deane has already informed the Soviet Staff and unless Deane should consider it inadvisable at the present time, I have no objection to your giving this information to Churchill.

You are correct in assuming that the Pacific campaign will remain an American command and there is no objection to Churchill's informing the Soviet that the British Fleet and British Land and Air Forces will participate in those areas, at present undetermined, where their services will be of the greatest value to the war against Japan.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1715, EWT, 11 October 1944.
TOP SECRET

October 11, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

Your 101643 and 110007 received and read with much interest.

My active interest at the present time in the Balkan area is that such steps as are practicable should be taken to insure against the Balkans getting us into a future international war.

Regarding our war plans for the Pacific, I understand that Deane has all the information as to American plans that are available and that he has given, or will give, this information to the Soviet Staff.

If Deane has already informed the Soviet Staff and unless Deane should consider it inadvisable at the present time, I have no objection to your giving this information to Churchill.

You are correct in assuming that the Pacific Campaign will remain an American responsibility and there is no objection to Churchill's informing the Soviet that the British Fleet and British Land and Air Forces will participate in those areas, at present undetermined, where their services will be of the greatest value to the war against Japan.

[Signature]
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. #83, 11 Oct 44.

DATE

FOR SAFE KEEPING VIA

SUBJECT: Balkan discussions; Pacific war.

ACTION:

1. President directed that Admiral Leahy, in conjunction with Mr. Hopkins, prepare draft reply.
2. Reply written by Admiral Leahy; Mr. Hopkins approved as drafted. Admiral Leahy presented to the President who also approved unaltered. Sent as #83.

COPY TO: Extract: "MR 310 JAPAN" DATE: BY DESTRUCTION OF:

310 JAPAN;
TOP-SECRET

11 October 1944

From: OPNAV

To: Alusma, Moscow

NUMBER 82. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Receipt is acknowledged of your 092352 and 101117.

In regard to your participation in current conferences between Churchill and Stalin it is, of course, inadvisable for you to attempt to break into the tete a tete. My desire is that you attend those conferences to which you are invited, where you should be in the position of a listener in preparation for giving me an accurate report and estimate of the results of the conference when you come to Washington.

Your status in this Churchill-Stalin conference seems to be clearly expressed in my message 041850, part of which you delivered to Stalin.

In regard to the location of the next meeting, I prefer to have it some place such as the Hague, but will go to the Mediterranean or elsewhere as necessary such as Cannes or Monaco or even Rome in order that we may have a meeting of Churchill, Stalin and myself.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 11 October 1944.

RICHARD NIXON, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

File Copy
TOP SECRET

October 10, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRiman: #82

Receipt is acknowledged of your 092152 and 101117.

In regard to your participation in current conferences between Churchill and Stalin it is, of course, inadvisable for you to attempt to break into the tete a tete. My desire is that you attend those conferences to which you are invited, where you should be in the position of a listener in preparation for giving me an accurate report and estimate of the results of the conference when you come to Washington.

Your status in this Churchill-Stalin conference seems to be clearly expressed in my message 041850, part of which you delivered to Stalin.

In regard to the location of the next meeting, I prefer to have it some place in the South, but will go to the Mediterranean or elsewhere as necessary in order that we may have a meeting of Churchill, Stalin and myself.

[Signature]

[Note: The signature is not legible in the image.]
1. In message, MR-IN-168, The President directed that Admiral Leahy prepare draft reply for his approval upon arrival at the White House from Hyde Park.

2. Message drafted by Admiral Leahy, minor changes made by the President and released 1200, EWT, 11 Oct 44.


To: The President of the United States

October 1944

Number 794

11 October 1944

Filed 1023302

To PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT from MARSHAL STALIN and PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL personal and top secret Number 794, 10 Oct 44.

In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our agreement, social and otherwise. We have invited Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish National Committee. We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two foreign secretaries together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make.

We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on prowess of United States Forces and upon the conduct of the war in the west by General Eisenhower.

CHURCHILL. STALIN.
FROM PRIME MINISTER & STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 794

TOP SECRET 1104152

SUBJECT: Progress of Churchill-Stalin conference.

ACTION:

1. Delivered to the President by Captain Putnam as the President was passing through hall returning from Hyde Park.
2. President directed Admiral Leahy to prepare draft reply for his approval. Copy to Admiral Leahy's office.
3. Reply as drafted by Admiral Leahy sent to Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as 4669, 11 Oct 44.

210 (2); 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION; 052 BALKANS.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 793, 11 October 1944

We reached Moscow from London in 36 hours, 23 hours spent in flight and on the whole I feel better for the voyage.

* * * * *
11 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the
attached exchange of messages between Ambassador
Harriman and the President be furnished you for
your information.

RICHARD PEARCE, Jr.,
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc.

1. Harriman to President nages:
   9 October 44
   10 October 44 (3 nages)
   11 October 44 (2 nages)

   092345
   101171
   101131
   101643
   110907
   111140
TOP-SECRET

11 October 1944

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Last night at dinner I obtained for the first time a more definite impression of what Churchill and Eden have in mind working out with the Soviets in regard to Hungary and the Balkan countries. Churchill has been using the unpopular term "sphere of influence" in connection with this but as Eden describes his objectives it is to work out a practical agreement on the method by which the problems of each country are going to be dealt with and the relative responsibility of the British and of the Soviets. They said that they have made it clear to Stalin and Molotov that they have no authority to commit us and that whatever agreement is reached will be submitted to us.

They believe that, on the basis of the armistice terms, Russia will have a pretty free hand in Rumania as our representatives on the Control Commission have little or no authority. In connection with the Control Commission for Hungary and Bulgaria, Eden is trying to obtain an agreement from Molotov to grant greater authority for the representatives of Britain and the United States.

With respect to Yugoslavia he is attempting to get Molotov's agreement that the Soviets should not take any action by themselves but should join with ourselves and the British in bringing the factions together and continue to collaborate with us rather than alone as has been done in the past by the Russians. Eden feels that some progress has been made by him with Molotov.

With reference to Greece Churchill feels that he has already obtained Stalin's approval to keep hands off and to use the influence of the Russians to prevent Greek Communists from being a destructive influence and to get them to plan a constructive part in a National Government. Both the Prime Minister and
Eden hope that the agreements that are worked out will be satisfactory to you and Secretary Hull as they feel that if something along these lines is not done there will be political turmoil in the countries referred to, if not civil war and most difficult situations to deal with will be found by the British. Poland they put in an entirely different category as that question requires specific solution in which we are all involved. Mikolajczyk placed conditions on coming to Moscow but after a firm message from Churchill he is now en route. For security, speed and your convenience I have been using your Navy Channels of Communications for all reports of the Prime Minister's visit here, both military and political. May I assume that information is being passed along to Secretary Hull.
FROM: AMBASSADOR BARKIN
TO: THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO.   NAVY 111160Z, NCR 785
DATE

TO NAVY ROOM 111500Z VIA Navy courier

SUBJECT:
Prime Minister's and Eden's agenda

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Paraphrased copy prepared by Captain Putnam. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/11/44.
3. Acknowledged by No. 87, 16 October 1944.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 11 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF:
OP SECRET DISPATCH

DR AFTER
FROM ALUSIA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE 11 OCTOBER 1944

TOR CODE ROOM 111300

DECODED BY BALDWIN

PARAPHRASED BY BALDWIN CHECKED BY BALDWIN SIGNED BY BALDWIN

FOR ACTION CNO

PRECEDENCE

(USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PAGE 1 OF 3

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP 1111402 MCR 785

(PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

AT DINNER LAST NIGHT I GOT FOR THE FIRST TIME A MORE DEFINITE PICTURE OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND EDEN HAVE IN MIND WORKING OUT WITH THE RUSSIANS IN REGARD TO THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND HUNGARY, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CHURCHILL HAS BEEN USING THE UNPOPULAR TERM "SPHERE OF INFLUENCE" BUT AS EDEN DESCRIBES HIS OBJECTIVES IT IS TO WORK OUT A PRACTICAL AGREEMENT ON HOW THE PROBLEMS OF EACH COUNTRY ARE GOING TO BE DEALT WITH AND THE RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RUSSIANS THE BRITISH. THEY STATED THAT THEY HAVE EXPLAINED TO STALIN AND MOLOTOV THAT THEY HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO COMMIT US AND THAT WHATSOEVER IS WORKED OUT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO US. THEY CONSIDER THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE ARMISTICE TERMS RUSSIA WILL HAVE A PRETTY FREE HAND IN RUMANIA SINCE OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE CONTROL COMMISSION HAVE LITTLE OR NO AUTHORITY. IN CONNECTION WITH THE

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 79, Navy Regulations.

File Copy

Osborne to Sec State for information.

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 31-1 OB CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPEC...
CONTROL COMMISSION FOR BULGARIA AND HUNGARY EDEN IS ATTEMPTING TO GET MOLOTOV'S AGREEMENT TO GREATER AUTHORITY FOR THE BRIT- 

ISH AND OUR REPRESENTATIVES. AS TO YUGOSLAVIA HE IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN MOLOTOV'S AGREEMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY INDEPENDENT ACTION BUT SHOULD JOIN WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN BRINGING THE Factions TOGETHER AND CONTINUE TO WORK WITH US RATHER THAN INDEPENDENTLY AS THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN THE PAST. EDEN FEELS HE HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS WITH MOLOTOV AS TO GREECE THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS HE HAS ALREADY OBTAINED STALIN'S APPROVAL TO KEEP HANDS OFF AND TO USE SOVIET INFLUENCE TO PREVENT THE GREEK COMMUNISTS FROM BEING A DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE AND TO INDUCE THEM TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. CHURCHILL AND EDEN BOTH HOPE THAT YOU AND MR. HULL WILL BE SATISFIED WITH THE AGREEMENTS THAT ARE WORKED OUT AS THEY FEEL THAT UNLESS SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES IS DONE THERE WILL BE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THESE COUNTRIES.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Army Regulations.
IF NOT CIVIL WAR, AND THE BRITISH WILL FIND MOST DIFFICULT
SITUATIONS TO DEAL WITH. THEY PUT POLAND IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CATEGORY AS THE POLISH QUESTION REQUIRES SPECIFIC SOLUTION INVOLVING ALL OF US. MIKOŁAJCZYK PLACED CONDITIONS ON HIS COMING TO MOSCOW BUT AFTER A FIRM MESSAGE FROM CHURCHILL
HE IS NOW ON HIS WAY. FOR SPEED SECURITY AND YOUR CONVENIENCE
I HAVE BEEN USING YOUR NAVY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION FOR ALL REPORTS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HERE. MAY I ASSUME THAT SECRETARY HULL IS BEING KEPT INFORMED?

NAVAFDE(1-2).....ACTION
I had a satisfactory talk with Churchill last night regarding the proposed conversations with Stalin about the Far East. We have agreed subject to your approval that there should be a meeting on Friday afternoon with Stalin and his military on one side and Churchill, Brooke, Ismay, General Deane and myself on the other. Churchill is agreed that the primary objective of the talk should be for us to draw Stalin out on the broader subjects raised by the Chiefs of Staff in their cable to Deane namely how soon after the collapse of Germany Stalin will be ready to take active measures against Japan and in general what Russia's capabilities will be. I believe that we can get from Stalin out of this meeting a general picture of the Soviet position which will be a useful preliminary to detailed con-
VERSATIONS TO FOLLOW BETWEEN GENERAL DEANE AND THE RED ARMY STAFF. I BELIEVE YOU WILL WISH IT UNDERSTOOD HOWEVER THAT THESE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS ARE TO BE SOVIET-AMERICAN AND NOT THREE CORNERED, THE BRITISH BEING KEPT INFORMED. THE PRIME MINISTER IS ANXIOUS TO KNOW FROM YOU HOW FAR HE CAN GO IN OUTLINING OUR GENERAL PACIFIC STRATEGY. HE FEELS THAT STALIN WOULD WISH TO KNOW IN GENERAL AT LEAST ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS SINCE WE ARE ASKING FOR HIS. I AM SATISFIED THAT SUCH A MEETING WITH STALIN AT THE PRESENT TIME AS DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL DEVELOP INFORMATION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN ANY OTHER WAY AT THE PRESENT TIME AND WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST RATHER THAN INTERFERE WITH DEANE'S SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS. CHURCHILL WILL OF COURSE MAKE PLAIN TO STALIN THAT ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH WILL PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE PACIFIC THE PLANNING IS NOW PRIMARILY AN AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY:
11 OCTOBER 1944

TOR CODE ROOM:

DECODED BY:
PARAPHRASED BY:
ROUTED BY:

TO:

CNO

FROM THE CONVERSATION OUTLINED ABOVE.

NAVATDE(#1-2) ACTION

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 74, Army Regulations.
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Last night I had a satisfactory talk with Churchill regarding the proposed talks with Stalin in regard to the Far East. Subject to your approval we have reached an agreement that a meeting should be held on Friday afternoon with Stalin and his military staff on one side and on the other side Churchill, Brooke, Issay, General Deane and myself. Churchill is in agreement that the primary objective of the meeting should be for us to draw Stalin out on the broader subjects raised in their cable to Deane by the Chiefs of Staff, namely, how soon after Germany's collapse Stalin will be ready to engage in active measures against Japan and in general what the capabilities of the Soviets will be at such time. I think that it will be possible for us to get from Stalin in this meeting a general picture of the position of the Soviets which will be a helpful preliminary to more detailed talks between the Red Army Staff and General Deane which are to follow. I feel that you will wish it understood, however, that these subsequent talks are not to be three-cornered but are to be Soviet-American, the British being kept advised. Churchill is anxious to know from you the extent to which he can go in outlining our general strategy in the Pacific. He believes that Stalin will wish to know, at least in general, about our intentions in view of the fact we are asking for his. I am satisfied that such a meeting with Stalin at the present time as outlined above will develop information of great importance that would not be obtainable in any other manner at this time and will materially aid rather than interfere with
the subsequent discussions by Deane. Of course Churchill will make it plain to Stalin that the planning is now primarily an American responsibility although the British will participate fully in the Pacific. I recommend that you give your approval to the conversation outlined in the foregoing.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: NAVY 1109072, NCR 742

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation

ACTION:

1. Delivered to President by Captain Putnam as President was passing through hall returning from Hyde Park.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Captain Putnam. Paraphrased copy to Secretary of State for information, 10/11/44.
3. Reply sent as No. 82, 11 October 1944

Copy made by Admiral Leahy for their confirmation.

COPIES TO: State 11/10/xx The President (See covering memo filed with 111160)

Extant: 11/10 Japan

S10 Japan.
Stalin gave a lunch today to the Prime Minister lasting in all about four hours which combined some enthusiastic speeches at lunch and interesting private discussions afterward as I sat next to Stalin I had an opportunity to talk with him and to hear his conversations with Churchill. These confirmed my feeling that if we can get the matters in which we are interested direct to him satisfactory agreements can be reached.

He paid sincere tribute to you personally, to the value of the collaboration between our three countries and to the importance of cementing our relations for the future. Churchill and Stalin had agreed last night to send you daily a joint telegram of their talks. Churchill prepared a draft of last night's discussions which is now being sent you with certain modifications by Stalin, the most important change Stalin made related to the Balkans.

(PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALUSHA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY: 

DATE: 

TOB CODE ROOM: 

DECODED BY: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

CHECKED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

ASTERISK (*) HAILGRAM ADDRESSEE:

FOR ACTION: 

PRECEDENCE:

1. PRIORITY
2. ROUTINE
3. DEFERRED
4. BASED

IF OPERATIONAL

CHECK BELOW

16

PAGE TWO OF THREE
ALUSHA MOSCOW 1016637

Originator to in DATE AND TIME GROUP

I HAVE NOT THE MESSAGE BEFORE WE BUT AFTER THE
SENTENCE THAT TELLS OF THEIR TALKS REGARDING THE BALKAN
COUNTRIES CHURCHILL HAD INCLUDED THE WORDS "HAVING REGARD
TO OUR VARYING DUTIES TOWARDS THEM."

THE IMPLICATION OF THIS PHRASE WAS CLEARLY A RECOGNIS
ITION OF A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN IN THE
SEVERAL COUNTRIES. STALIN CROSSED THE PHRASE OUT AND
CHURCHILL AGREED.

AFTER LUNCH TALKING ACROSS CHURCHILL I TOLD STALIN
THAT YOU WOULD BE VERY GLAD THAT HE HAD ELIMINATED THIS
PHRASE AS YOU BELIEVED THAT ALL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT
WITH BY THE THREE OF US. STALIN SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR
THIS AND REACHING BEHIND CHURCHILL'S BACK SHOOK MY HAND.

MOLOTOV CONFESSED TO EDEN THAT TITO HAD RECENTLY
VISITED MOSCOW. CHURCHILL THEREUPON EXPRESSED TO STALIN HIS
SURPRISE AT TITO'S VISIT WITHOUT INFORMING THE BRITISH AND
EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD HAVE HEARTILY ENDORSED IT IF HE HAD
KNOWN IN ADVANCE. STALIN REPLIED CRYPTICALLY THAT IT WAS

No. 1 ADMIRAL: 
No. 2 FILE: 
No. 37-1 OR CHART room: 
No. 4 SPECIAL: 

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALBANIA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY: 

DATE: 

TOR CODEROOM: 

DECODED BY: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

ATTN: CNO

FOR ACTION: 

INFORMATION: 

PRIORITY CABLE

ROUTINE CABLE

DEFERRED CABLE

BASECABLE

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE THREE OF THREE ALBANIA MOSCOW 1916432

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

"A FOLLY" ON TITO'S PART BUT THAT IT WAS NATIONALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE YUGOSLAVS TO BE SECRETTY AND SUSPICIOUS.

STALIN GAVE CHURCHILL NO EXPLANATION WHY THE

RUDIANS HAD CONCEALED THE VISIT FROM THE BRITISH.

I AM DINING WITH CHURCHILL TONIGHT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO GIVE HIM THE CHIEFS OF STAFFS CABLE TO DEANE ON THE

PACIFIC WAR PREPARATORY TO HIS TALK WITH STALIN ON THIS

SUBJECT. I AM GOING TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM NOT TO DO ANY-

THING THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE REACHED

WITH STALIN REGARDING STAFF TALKS BETWEEN DEANE AND THE

RED ARMY STAFF.

ORIGINAL NOR DISTRIBUTION:

HVAIDE(51, 72).......ACTION (FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT)

FILE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 15, Navy Regulations.
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

A lunch, lasting in all about four hours, was given today by Stalin to the Prime Minister. It combined some enthusiastic speeches during the luncheon followed by some interesting private discussions. I sat next to Stalin and had not only an opportunity to talk with him but also to hear his conversations with the Prime Minister. What was said confirmed my belief that if we can get matters in which we are interested direct to him, satisfactory agreements can be reached.

Stalin paid sincere tribute to you personally, to the value of the collaboration between our three nations and to the importance of cementing our relations for the future. Stalin and Churchill last night had agreed to send you a joint telegram of their talks daily. The Prime Minister prepared a draft of last night's discussions which is now being sent you after Stalin had made certain modifications. The most important change he made was in relation to the Balkans.

The message is not before me but after the sentence that tells of their conversations regarding the Balkan countries, Churchill had included the words, "having regard to our varying duty towards them." This phrase clearly implied a recognition of a sphere of influence of Britain and Russia in the various countries. Stalin deleted this phrase to which Churchill assented.

After the luncheon, talking across the Prime Minister, I told Stalin that you would be very pleased he had struck out this phrase as you were of the opinion that all questions should be dealt with by the three of us. Stalin said he was glad to hear this and, reaching behind Churchill's back, shook my hand.
To Eden Molotov confessed that Tito had recently been in Moscow. Thereupon Churchill expressed his surprise to Stalin that Tito's visit had been made without first informing the British and explained that he would have given the visit his hearty endorsement if he had known about it in advance. In a cryptic manner Stalin replied that it was "a folly" on Tito's part but that it was a national characteristic of the Yugoslavs to be suspicious and secretive.

Churchill was not given any explanation by Stalin as to why the Russians had not informed the British of the visit.

Tonight I am dining with Churchill and he has asked me to give him the cable from the Chiefs of Staff to Deane on the war in the Pacific preparatory to his talk with Stalin which will cover this subject.

I am going to attempt to persuade Churchill not to do anything which would jeopardise the agreement which has been reached with Stalin regarding Staff talks between the Red Army Staff and General Deane.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 101643Z, NCR 124

DATE: 10/16/43

TOR MAP ROOM 102254Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Luncheon for the Prime Minister

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park, MR-OUT-477.
2. Paraphrase prepared by Captain Putnam. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/11/44.
3. Answered by No. 83, 11 October 1944

Copy made by Admiral Leahy's office for their information.

COPIES TO: See State 11/06/44 The President

DATE: 11/06/44

BY DIRECTION OF: See covering memo filed with 11/11/44

Extract: "MR 310 Japan"
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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| 101312 | NCR 9676 |

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**PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.**

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM SENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO ATLEE IN THE EARLY HOURS THIS MORNING.

* IN OUR CONVERSATIONS TONIGHT MARSHAL STALIN AGREED THAT MIKOLAJOZYK, ROMER, AND GRABSKI COME TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY TO JOIN IN CONVERSATIONS DURING OUR VISIT. PARTY SHOULD LEAVE FOR CAIRO ON NIGHT OF 9TH - 15TH WEATHER PERMITTING AND COME ON TO MOSCOW BY SHORTEST ROUTE. ALL ARRANGEMENTS ON HIGHEST PRIORITY LEVEL SHOULD BE MADE BY AIR MINISTRY.*

**NAVIADE (#162)....ACTION**

Red 10/14/62
To Peab 04 471

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

**File Copy**

Paraphrase to SecState for Info.
10 October 1944

TOP-SECRET

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

Here is a paraphrase of a telegram sent in the early hours today to
Atlee by the Prime Minister:

"Marshal Stalin agreed in our conversations tonight that Mikolajczyk,
Romer, and Grabski come to Moscow immediately to participate in conversations
during our stay here. Party should leave for Cairo, weather permitting, on
the night of 9-10 October, and come on to Moscow by the shortest route avail-
able. The Air Ministry should make all arrangements on highest priority level."

TOP-SECRET
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 101131Z, NCR 9876

DATE 101131Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Mikolajczyk

ACTION:

1. To President at Hyde Park, MR-OUT-471.
2. Paraphrased by Captain Putnam. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/11/44.
3. Acknowledged in No. 87, 16 October 1944.

DATE: 10/11/44
BY DIRECTION OF: The President

COPIES TO: Sec. State

(See covering memo filed with 1111407)
SUPPLEMENTING MY DB352 FROM MY TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY I BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH CONVERSATIONS HERE ARE LIKELY TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING COURSE:

1. ON THE DUMBARTON OAKS QUESTION THE PRIME MINISTER ALTHOUGH HE WILL OF COURSE FOLLOW THE LINE OUTLINED IN MY MESSAGE YESTERDAY WILL I BELIEVE GIVE STALIN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS INCLINED TOWARD THE RUSSIAN VIEWPOINT.

2. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORSEE WHAT WILL RESULT FROM THE TALKS WITH POLAND BUT STALIN'S AGREEMENT LAST NIGHT TO ALLOW MIKOLAJCZYK TO COME TO MOSCOW AT ONCE AUGURS WELL.

3. ON MATTERS IN THE BALKANS CHURCHILL AND EDEN WILL TRY TO WORK OUT SOME SORT OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS.
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

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In accordance with the duties of the Supreme Allied Commander, I have directed that the British, in addition to their efforts in the Mediterranean, undertake the following operations:

1. The British to have a free hand in Greece and the Russians in Rumania and perhaps other countries. The British will attempt to retrieve a position of equal influence in Yugoslavia. They can probably succeed in the former but I am doubtful about the latter objective.

2. As to the Far East I am a little concerned that the Prime Ministers talks with Stalin may minimize the importance of the conferences that have been agreed to between General Deane and the Red Army Staff. We now have a full agreement from Stalin not only to participate in the Pacific War but to enter the War with full effort. The important thing now therefore is to ascertain what are the Russians capabilities in the East. In this the limiting factors are of course the

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Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 76, Navy Regulations.
LOGISTICS ABOUT WHICH WE KNOW TOO LITTLE. GENERAL TALKS ARE
NO LONGER NEEDED AND FULL DISCUSSIONS BY GENERAL DEANE ARE
THEREFORE THE NEXT ESSENTIAL STEP. THE PRIME MINISTERS TALKS
THEREFORE WITH STALIN SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
DETAILED STAFF DISCUSSIONS. I WILL TRY TO SEE THAT THE
PRIME MINISTERS CONVERSATIONS TAKE THIS LINE. I HAVE ALREADY
GENERAL ISMY'S AGREEMENT.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY SAID LITTLE ABOUT GERMANY
SO I CANNOT REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT YET.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR REACTION TO ANY OF THE
ABOVE FOR MY GUIDANCE.

NAVPAIDE(F1&2)......ACTION
From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

This supplements my message of the 9th. As a result of my talk with the Prime Minister yesterday I believe that the following course is likely to be taken by the British in their conference here:

1. Although the Prime Minister will of course follow the lines outlined in my message yesterday on the Dumbarton Oaks question, he will, I believe, give Stalin the impression that he leans toward the viewpoint of Russia.

2. Stalin's agreement last night to allow Molotovsky to come to Moscow at once augurs well, but it is impossible to foresee what will result from the discussions with Poland.

3. Churchill and Eden will try to work out some sort of spheres of influence with the Russians on the Balkan matters; the Russians to have a free hand in Rumania and perhaps other countries and the British in Greece. The British will attempt to retrieve a position of equal influence in Yugoslavia. I am doubtful about the latter objective but they can probably succeed in the former.

4. With reference to the Far East, I am a little concerned that Churchill's talks with Stalin may minimize the importance of the conferences that have been agreed to between the Red Army Staff and General Deane. Stalin has given us a full agreement not only to participate in the Pacific War but to enter the war with full effort. It is important now to ascertain the capabilities of the Russians in the East. The logistics about which we know so little are of course the limiting factors in this. Full discussions by General Deane...
are therefore the next essential step and general talks are no longer needed. Churchill's conversations therefore with Stalin should put emphasis on the importance of detailed staff discussions. I will attempt to see that Churchill's conversations fall into this line. General Ismay's agreement has already been obtained.

5. Yesterday Churchill said little about Germany so I am unable to report on this subject.

For my guidance it would be helpful to have your reaction to any of the above.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 101117Z, NCR 9892

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 101555Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Agenda for Prime Minister-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park, MR-OUT-474.
2. Paraphrased by Lieutenant Collins. Paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State for information, 10/11/44.
3. Reply sent as #82, 11 October 1944.

COPIES TO: sec state

DATE: 11 Oct 44 BY DIRECTION OF: The President

(See covering memo filed with 1114047)

Exhibit: "MR 310 Japan"

310 Japan
DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State letter, April 23, 1960
per E. R. Perkins, Editor of Foreign Relations.

May 6, 1960

[Signature]
I met the Prime Minister on his arrival today at noon about
34 hours from England. He looked remarkably well considering
his long trip. I saw him very informally late this afternoon
after his nap. He is dining tonight with Stalin. He told me
that having gone to see you he thought it would create good
feeling if he were to come to Moscow. This was his main obj-
ject in coming. He said that you had asked him not to attempt
to come to agreement on the principal outstanding question of
dumbarton oaks and that when the subject came up he would
say that it could be argued both ways and that when the 3
of you got together he felt sure the matter could be talked
out to agreement. He said that he was now somewhat open mind-
ed on the subject, that he had first felt strongly that the
great powers should not on matters affecting them but that
Since his return to England he realized there was a great deal to be said for the Russian viewpoint. He hopes to be able to find some solution to the Polish question. He has Witywajczyk on call with a plane waiting to bring him to Moscow if possible before his own departure. He wants to talk out with Stalin the Greek situation and intends that Eden should thrash out with Molotov Yugoslavia and Tito's recent strange behavior. He thinks that his presence here will expedite decisions about Hungary and Bulgaria. He is not worried about Rumania. He expects that the subject of the war with Japan will come up and asked me to brief him on the cables that have been sent to General Deane. He confessed that he knew very little about the Pacific war and agreed that the discussions with the Russians about it were primarily ours. As to my participation in his discussions here he said that he was disappointed that you did not wish
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY 10 OCTOBER 1944

TO MAKE THE DISCUSSIONS TRIANGULAR BY SENDING GENERAL MARSHALL OR STETTINIUS OR BY GIVING ME AUTHORITY TO PARTICIPATE BUT THAT YOU HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT I SHOULD BE AN OBSERVER ONLY AND THEREFORE WITH LESS AUTHORITY THAN AT THE TALKS 2 YEARS AGO, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS BETTER FOR ME NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS TETE A TETE TALKS WITH STALIN ALTHOUGH HE WOULD GLADLY INVITE ME TO THE LARGER MEETINGS. HE SAID HOWEVER HE WOULD KEEP ME FULLY INFORMED OF ALL HIS TALKS, I SAID FIRMLY THAT ALTHOUGH I FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR AND VALUE OF TETE A TETE WITH STALIN YOU WANTED ME TO BE PRESENT AT AS MANY DISCUSSIONS AS APPROPRIATE SO THAT I COULD REPORT FULLY TO YOU ON MY RETURN. THE TALK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE FRIENDLY AND WAS ON THE SAME BASIS OF INTIMACY I HAD WITH HIM DURING THE YEARS IN ENGLAND. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR HOW IT WILL WORK OUT IT IS MY GUESS THAT HE WILL HAVE MOST OF HIS IMPORTANT TALKS WITH

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 49, Navy Regulations.
STALIN ALONE AND SO WILL EDEN WITH MOLOTOV. I WILL BE ASKED IN ONLY OCCASIONALLY. I AM SURE HOWEVER HE WILL SEE ME DAILY.

... TELL ME HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HOW THINGS GO. I WOULD APPRECIATE THE Above BEING INFORMED WHETHER THE ABOVE IS GENERALLY SATISFACTORY TO YOU OR WHETHER YOU WISH ME TO URGE MY BEING INCLUDED IN MORE OF THE MEETINGS. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME OF HIS SUGGESTION TO ATTEMPT TO MET STALIN TO COME TO MEET YOU AND HIMSELF AT THE HAGUE IN NOVEMBER. HE ASKED ME ABOUT STALIN'S HEALTH. I TOLD HIM THAT IN MY LAST TALK WITH STALIN ON THE SUBJECT IT SEEMED HE WAS BEING ADVISED AGAINST FLYING PARTICULARLY AT HIGH ALTITUDES AND I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE POSSIBLE TO GET STALIN TO COME BY SEA THROUGH THE BLACK SEA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU WOULD TELL ME WHETHER YOU WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE MEETING IN THE NORTH OR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT STALIN AND HIS ADVISORS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS...
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

SECRET DISPATCH

TO:

ALUSNA MOSCOW

FROM:

Released by:

10 October 1944

Date:

TOR CODEROOM:

Decoded by:

Paraphrased by:

Checked by:

Addressed by:

CNO

INFORMATION FOR ACTION

Precedence

1. Priority
2. Routine
3. Deferred
4. Basegram
5. Privileged
6. Confidential
7. Secret
8. Confidential
9. Priority
10. Basegram
11. Confidential
12. Privileged
13. Basegram
14. Confidential

If operational check below:

Archival

Originator fill in date and time group:

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TOP SECRET

Taking strenuous trips and it may well be that the meeting would be jeopardized if the north is insisted upon.

NAVAIDE(0-2)......ACTION

No. 1 Admiral.

No. 2 Fill.

No. 3 File or Chartroom.

No. 4 Special.

Handed only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 79, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-70

100025Z
9 October 1944

From: Ambassador Harriman
To: The President

I met the Prime Minister on his arrival at noon today. Considering the long trip of about 34 hours, he looked very well. I saw him very informally late this afternoon after his nap. Tonight he dines with Stalin. I was told by him that having gone to see you he thought good feeling would be created if he were to come to Moscow. This was his main object in making the trip. You had asked him not to attempt to come to an agreement on the principle outstanding question of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he said, and that when the subject arose he would say that it could be argued both ways and he felt sure that the matter could be talked out to an agreement when the three of you got together.

At the present time he said that he was somewhat of an open mind on the subject. He said that he at first had felt strongly that the Great Powers should not (word missing) on matters affecting them, but that since his return to England he realized there was a great deal to be said for the viewpoint of the Soviets. It is his hope to find some solution to the Polish question. If possible, before his own departure, he has Nikolajevsk on call with a plane ready to carry him to Moscow. He intends that Eden should thrash out with Molotov Yugoslavia and Tito's recent strange behavior while he wanted to talk out with Stalin the Greeks, etc. He is not worried about Rumania. He feels that his presence here will expedite decisions about Bulgaria and Hungary. He asked me to brief him on the cables that have been sent to General Deane as he expects that the subject of the war with Japan will come up. He agreed that the discussions with the Russians about the Pacific War were primarily American and that he knew very little about that phase of the war. In regard to my participation in the con-
versations here, Churchill said he was disappointed that you did not wish to make them triangular by sending General Marshall or Stettinius or by giving me authority to participate but that you had made it clear that I should only be an observer and therefore have less authority than at the discussions two years ago. He said that although he would gladly invite me to the larger meetings, he thought that under the circumstances it was better for me not to participate in his tête à tête with Stalin. However, he told me that he would keep me fully informed of all his conferences. I told him firmly that although I fully understood the reasons for and the value of tête à tête with Stalin, you desired that I be present at as many discussions as possible so that I could make a full report to you on my return. The talk was on the same basis of intimacy I had with him during my years in England and could not have been more friendly. My guess is, although it is not entirely clear how it will work out, that he will have most of his important talks with Stalin alone as well Eden with Molotov. Only occasionally will I be asked in. However, I feel certain that he will see me daily and give me his impression of how things are going. It would be appreciated if you could inform me whether the above is in general satisfactory to you or whether you wish me to urge that I be included in more of the meetings. Churchill told me of his suggestion to try to get Stalin to come to the Hague in November to meet with you and himself. He inquired concerning Stalin's health. I advised him that in my last talk with Stalin it appeared that he was being advised against flying especially at high altitudes and I thought that it might be more possible to get him to come to the Mediterranean area by sea via the Black Sea. If you would tell me whether you prefer to have the Meeting in the Mediterranean or in the north, it would be helpful. It may well be that the meeting would be jeopardized if the north is insisted upon since there is no doubt that Stalin and his advisors are concerned about his taking strenuous trips.
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY NO. 092352Z, NCR 9427

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 100555Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's arrival at Moscow.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park, MR-OUT-470.
2. Paraphrased by Lieutenant Collins. Paraphrase delivered to the Secretary of State for information.
3. Reply sent as #82, 11 October 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

See State MOD THE PRESIDENT

(See covering memo filed with 1111407.)

Extract: "MR 310 JAPAN"
From: Oppen
To: Aileen, Moscow

NUMBER 80. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your 090910%. The following reply has been received from U.S.

QUOTE. Your message of October 5 somewhat embarrassed me. I supposed that Mr. Churchill was going to Moscow in accordance with the agreement reached with you at Quebec. It happened, however, that this supposition of mine does not seem to correspond in reality.

It is unknown to me with what questions Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are going to Moscow. So far I have not been informed about this by either one. Mr. Churchill, in his message to me, expressed a desire to come to Moscow, if there would not be any objections on my part. I, of course, gave my consent. Such is the matter in connection with Mr. Churchill's trip to Moscow.

In the future I will keep you informed about the matter, after the meeting with Mr. Churchill. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1045, WNT, 9 October 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
FROM: The President
TO: Ambassador Harriman

SUBJECT: Churchill-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers Harriman-Pres 0909152, Oct 44, in which Harriman requested he be advised of Stalin's reply to Pres-Stalin #78, 4 Oct 44. Harriman-Pres 0909152 sent to President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-465.

2. President directed Stalin's reply (STALIN-PRES, 8 Oct 44) be immediately sent to Harriman in WH-IN-156, 9 Oct 44, to Admiral Leahy.

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Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

If possible, I would be most helpful if I could be advised urgently of Stalin's answer to your message regarding the Prime Ministers visit to Moscow. He arrives this morning.

Naval Code (91 & 92)......Action.
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SECRET or FILE NO. NAVY 090215Z, NCR 8960

DATE

TO OR MAP ROOM 100155Z VIA Navy Courier

SUBJECT: Request for copy of Stalin's message to President.

ACTION:

1. To the President at Hyde Park, MR-OUT-165.
2. Request granted per MR-IN-166.
3. Stalin's reply (STALIN-PRES 8 Oct 44) sent to Harriman as PREO-HARRIMAN 980, 9 Oct 44.
EXTRACT

Moscow, Oct. 9 (AP)—Prime Minister Churchill flew into Moscow today for his first meeting with Premier Marshal Stalin since the Teheran Conference.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden accompanied Churchill, along with the Chief of the British Imperial Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, and Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Imsay, Military Secretary to the British War Cabinet. It was announced that Churchill and Eden would confer with Stalin and Foreign Commissar Vyachelev Molotov.

(The Announcement promptly raised speculation in London over the possibility that Stalin and Churchill would be joined later by President Roosevelt to settle problems of postwar control of Germany, and the differences in plans for maintaining peace which cropped up at the Dumbarton Oaks Discussions. There was no indication, however, that this speculation would be borne out and it was stated in London that W. Averell Harriman, the Ambassador, was representing the United States at the Conference.

(London dispatches said the Polish problem was expected to be at the fore-front of the Churchill-Stalin discussions).

Churchill's Party, which numbered just under 50 persons, arrived in two groups, yesterday and this morning. The Prime Minister and Eden came in at 11:45 a.m. today. They were met at the Airport by Molotov, Ivan M. Maisky, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrei J. Vishinsky, Soviet Representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy, and members of the Red Army General Staff.

An Russian band played "God Save the King" and then the Soviet hymn. Churchill and Eden stood at attention as the anthems were played.
It was a gray day but the sun came out for a few minutes as the Prime Minister reviewed a march of crack troops of the Moscow garrison.

Molotov was the first to greet the Prime Minister. He took off his hat and broke into a wide grin.

Churchill clasped his hand and shook it briskly as the two men met for the first time since Teheran.

Eden was beside Churchill and he moved forward. When Molotov saw him he beamed and the two Foreign Secretaries shook hands.

Through interpreters Churchill and Molotov exchanged greetings.

W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, and Major General J. Russell Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to the Soviets, were the Americans in the greeting party.

Churchill's arrival in Moscow for a second time during the war to see Marshal Stalin and Molotov was a well-kept secret.

The airport ceremony was closed to all except official guests.

As the big Rolls-Royce from the British Embassy hurried the Prime Minister through Moscow along Gorki Street, however, it attracted much attention.

"Who is that?" asked many a Russian.

There was nothing official from the U.S. Embassy on what part the United States would play in the conference. Harriman said he had nothing to say.
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN  
TO: THE PRESIDENT  
8 October 1944

Your message of October 5th somewhat puzzled me. I supposed that Mr. Churchill was going to Moscow in accordance with the agreement reached with you at Quebec. It happened, however, that this supposition of mine does not seem to correspond in reality.

It is unknown to me with what questions Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are going to Moscow. So far I have not been informed about this by either one. Mr. Churchill, in his message to me, expressed a desire to come to Moscow, if there would not be any objections on my part. I, of course, gave my consent. Such is the matter in connection with Mr. Churchill's trip to Moscow. In the future I will keep you informed about the matter, after the meeting with Mr. Churchill.
FROM: Marshal Stalin
TO: The President
DATE: 8 October 1944

SECRET or FILE NO.: 08/23432
THRU: Russian Embassy

SUBJECT: PM Churchill's going to Moscow.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-STALIN #76, 1 Oct 44. (here referred to as "yr message of October 1).
2. Sent to President at Hyde Park as WH-OUT-464, 0900142 Oct 44.
3. No reply
4. Paraphrase to Under Sec State by direction of Admiral Leahy.

COPIES TO:
Under Sec State

DATE: 9 Oct 44
BY DIRECTION OF: Admiral Leahy

"210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"
For: The President of the United States
Number 791 File 0517252
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 791. Your number 626.

1. Thank you very much for what you say and for your good wishes. I am very glad that Averell should sit in at all principal conferences; but you would not, I am sure, wish this to preclude private tete-a-tetes between me and U. J. or Anthony and Molotov, as it is often under such conditions that the best progress is made. You can rely on me to keep you constantly informed of everything that affects our joint interests apart from the reports which Averell will send.

2. I gather from your last sentence but one that you have sent some general account of your Pacific plans to your people in Moscow which will be imparted to U. J. and which I shall see on arrival. This will be most convenient.

3. Should U. J. raise the question of voting as he very likely will do, I will tell him that there is no hurry about this
and that I am sure we can get it settled when we are all three together.

End
FROM: Prime Minister
TO: The President

SPECIAL or FILE NO. 791, 5 Oct 44.
DATE

TO: MAP ROOM 051945Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's forthcoming talks with Stalin.

ACTION:

1. To the President via Miss Tully.
2. Replies to President's #626 of 4 Oct 44.
3. No further action taken by the President.

COPIES TO:

"210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE."  

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

210 (2); 310 JAPAN; 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.
AS I RECEIVED YOUR CABLE 541815 AFTER MY TALK WITH
STALIN LAST NIGHT I HAVE SENT YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM BY LETTER.
I CLEARLY UNDERSTAND YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. THERE IS ONE SUBJECT
ON WHICH I HAD BEEN HOPEFUL THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE ABLE TO
COME TO A DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING WITH STALIN, NAMELY, THE POLISH
SITUATION. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE LONGER THE SITUATION DRIFTS
THE MORE DIFFICULT A SOLUTION BECOMES. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL
HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THE PRIME MINISTER CAN WORK SOMETHING OUT
WITH STALIN PROVIDED YOU ARE NOT INVOLVED OR COMMITTED TO ANY
LINE OF POLICY AT THIS TIME. I AM TOLD THAT GENERALS BROOKE AND
ISMY ARE ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER. THERE MAY THEREFORE
BE TALKS BETWEEN THEM AND THE RED ARMY STAFF. I WILL REQUEST

TOP SECRET

File Copy

Read only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**RELEASED BY** 5 OCTOBER 1944

**DATE** 2:15

**TOR CODE ROOM** GLUNT

**DECODED BY** GLUNT

**PARAPHRASED BY** GLUNT

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**PAGE 2 OF 2** 851523Z NCR 6168

**IF OPERATIONAL**

**CHECK BELOW**

**TOP SECRET**

**Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP**

**THAT GENERAL DEANE BE INVITED TO ATTEND THESE TALKS AS AN OBSERVER AND I ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTY IN THIS RESPECT AS WHEN I WAS HERE TWO YEARS AGO THE ARMY OFFICERS WHO ACCOMPANIED ME WERE INCLUDED AT MY REQUEST IN SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS AT THAT TIME.**

**NAVAIDE(41 & 42).....ACTION**

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**HANDLE ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 'TOP SECRET' INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE TB, NAVY REGULATIONS.**
FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL or FILE NO. NAVY 051523Z, NCR 6188
DATE
TOR MAP ROOM 052345Z VIA Navy Courier
SUBJECT: Forthcoming Prime Minister-Stalin conference.

ACTION:
1. To the President via ushers.
2. Is reply to President's No. 76, 4 Oct 44.
3. Admiral Leahy informed that no reply necessary.
TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW
NO: 76

4 OCTOBER 1944

Your number 031404, received.

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

QUOTE. While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.

You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss.
You will, by this time, have received from General Deane, the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours. UNQUOTE.

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bi-lateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that when this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the discussions are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1345, EST, 4 October 1944.
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman (for Stalin)

SECRET or FILE NO. #76, 4 October 1944.

TO Map Room VIA

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Churchill-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answers Harriman-Pres 031403, 3 Oct 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President. Before its release from the Map Room, message read by Mr. Hopkins; Hopkins suggested change in message, telephoned President, who authorized Mr. Hopkins to hold up message.

3. Mr. Hopkins submitted another draft reply; approved by the President without change and dispatched.

4. Answered by Harriman-Pres 051521, 5 Oct 44; also answered by Stalin-Pres, 8 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: "ZIDO CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE" DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

COPY COPY
TOP SECRET

4 OCTOBER 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 626, 4 OCTOBER 1944, TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE
PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

I can well understand the reasons why you feel that an immediate
meeting between yourself and Uncle Joe is necessary before the three of us
can get together. The questions which you will discuss there are ones which
are, of course, of real interest to the United States, as I know you will
agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to stand by and to participate
as my observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed
Stalin. While naturally Averill will not be in a position to commit the
United States—I could not permit anyone to commit me in advance—he will
be able to keep me fully informed and I have told him to return and report
to me as soon as the conference is over.

I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared
for a meeting of the three of us any time after the elections here, for
which your meeting with Uncle Joe should be a useful prelude, and I have so
informed Uncle Joe.

Like you, I attach the greatest importance to the continued unity of
our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you, however, that
the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which
the three of us can I am sure work out together and I hope you will postpone
discussion of it until our meeting. There is after all no immediate urgency
about this question which is so directly related to public opinion in the
United States and Great Britain and in all the United Nations.

I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you our Joint Chiefs' statement to Stalin.

You carry my best wishes with you and I will eagerly await word of how it goes.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1735, EWT, 4 October 1942.

J. A. FISKE, JR.,
Commander, USN.
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SUBJECT: Meeting with Premier "Stalin"

ACTION:

1. To the President via ushers.
2. "copy prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President. Mr. Hopkins, after phoning President, directed message not be sent; draft prepared by Mr. Hopkins; approved by the President; sent to PM as memo #620, 4 October 1944.
3. See also message sent to Stalin (REFERENCE for STALIN #76, 4 Oct 44) as requested by PM.

210 (2); 310 JAPAN; 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS; 210 SECURITY COUNCIL.
AS PROMINENT PERSONAGE IS ARRIVING AT TIME I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE AN DELAYING MY DEPARTURE TILL AFTER HIS VISIT, I WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON WHAT HE EXPECTS TO DISCUSS HERE AND YOUR ATTITUDE REGARDING THESE MATTERS, I HOPE HE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A SETTLEMENT OF THE POLISH SITUATION WHICH IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY BITTER AND DIFFICULT OF SOLUTION.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION: MAVAIDE (01-2)......ACT

TOP SECRET

This is only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 78, Navy Regulations.
FROM: Ambassador Harriman  
TO: The President  

SUBJ or FILE NO.: 0314027 NCR 4529, 3 Oct 44.

DATE: Nov 44.

TOR MAP ROOM: 0319222 VIA: Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Churchill-Stalin Conference.

ACTION:

1. To President via Admiral Brown.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy at the direction of the President; draft approved by the President. Before its release from the Map Room, Mr. Hopkins read message; suggested change in message; telephoned President, who authorized Mr. Hopkins to hold up message.
3. Mr. Hopkins submitted another draft reply; approved without change by the President and released as PRES-HARRIMAN for STALIN #76, 5 Oct 44.

COPIES TO:

"210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

COPY COPY
TOP SECRET

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO: 625, 30 September 1944

Your 789. Please let me know after you hear from U. J. the date when you and Anthony will arrive in Moscow.

It is my opinion that Stalin is at the present time sensitive about any doubt as to his intention to help us in the Orient.

At your request I will direct Harriman to give you any assistance that you may desire. It does not appear practicable or advantageous for me to be represented by Stettinius or Marshall.

In regard to the French problem I will give it further consideration when the Huns are out of France or when "Zones of the Interior" are established.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1150, EWT, 30 September 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL or FILE NO. 625, 30 September 1944

DATE

TO: MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE: Recognition of French.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #789, which was referred by the President to Admiral Leahy for action.
2. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved without change by the President, 30 Sept 44.
3. See FM-PRES #790, 3 October 1944, for reply.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

COPY
29th September 144

To: The President of The United States
Nr: 789 File: 29/17262

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most especially secret. Number 789.

1. Your number 624. I am repeating this to Field Marshal Smuts who will be much gratified.

2. U.J. was most expansive and friendly in a conversation with Averell and Clark Kerr the other night. He however "grumbled about his own health". He said he was never well except at Moscow and his doctors did not like him flying. Even his visits to the front did him harm and it took him a fortnight to get over Teheran, etc.

3. In these circumstances Anthony and I are seriously considering flying there very soon. The route is shorter now. We have not yet heard from U.J. in reply to our suggestion. Our two great objects
would be, first, to clinch his coming in against
Japan and, secondly, to try to effect a friendly
settlement with Poland. There are other points too
about Greece and Yugoslavia which we would also dis-
cuss. We should keep you informed of every point.
We would of course welcome Averell’s assistance, or
perhaps you could send Stettinius or Marshall. I
feel sure that personal contact is most necessary.

4. Your number 623. You may be sure that we
shall not take any action with the French except after
full consultation with you. I hope nothing I said
yesterday embarrassed you. I see you use the expre-
sion “French Provisional Government” in your 623. It
seems to me there would not be much harm in this phrase
coming into use without any formal instrument being
agreed between the Governments. After all they are
the French Provisional Government and it is fully
admitted even in the Boniface series that they repre-
sent all France.

5. It seems to me pretty clear that Germany is
not going to be conquered this year. Omar Bradley in
a telegrann I have seen is already talking about an operation across the Rhine in the Middle of November and I see many other signs of the German resistance stiffening.

6. Off the record - I have read your speech with much gusto and was delighted to see you in such vigorous form.

Every good wish.

Prime
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL or FILE NO: 789, 29 Sept 44.  

DATE:  

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA  

SUBJECT: Meeting with Stalin; recognition of French-German campaign.  

ACTION:  
1. To President via Miss Tully.  
2. To Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.  
3. Draft reply by Admiral Leahy approved without change by President; sent to PM as PRES #622, 30 Sept 44.  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

CIC INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION: 210 PRES-PM MEETINGS; 310 JAPAN; 300 GERMANY; 000,1; 011 FRANCE; 051 Iran; 051 Yugoslavia.
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARDMAN 23 SEPTEMBER 1944
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 232038 NCR 7498

This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked General Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him personally a message regarding a future meeting. Stalin interrupted to say that he had been ill with the grippe when Hurley was in Moscow. That in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but that this time he had been ill for several weeks. He looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I explained that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November and that as it was too late for Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said that a meeting was very desirable but that he was afraid his Doctors would not allow him to travel. It had taken him two weeks to get over an ear attack he had had from his flight from Teheran and his recent illness had been due to a trip to the front. I suggested that the warm weather in the Mediterranean would do him good but he said his doctors considered any change of climate would have a bad effect. Molotov claimed that his associates felt Stalin must protect his health and that travelling was not good for him.

Stalin then said that Molotov was strong and vigorous and that as his deputy a man in whom he had great confidence he could meet you and the Prime Minister any time you wished. I assured Stalin that you liked Molotov and were always glad to see him but suggested that his doctors might later on take a different view of the desirability of a warm climate particularly if the trip would be made by sea. Jokingly I suggested also the possibility of his having some new doctors by that time. He agreed that might be a good idea but gave no further encouragement.

I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is definitely worried about his health. Although Stalin showed the effects of his grippe, I do not feel that you need have any concern over the possibility of serious illness.
FROM  The President  TO  The Prime Minister

DATE  626, 4 October 1944

TO  Map Room

SUBJECT: "Stalin-Churchill Conference.

ACTION:

1. Answer PM #730, 3 Oct 44. (See also message sent to Marshal Stalin / PRESS-HARRIMAN for STALIN #70, 4 Oct 44 as requested by PM)
2. First draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy at the direction of the President; draft approved by the President. Before release from Map Room, Mr. Hopkins read message; suggested change in message; telephoned President, who authorized Mr. Hopkins to hold up message.
3. Mr. Hopkins submitted another draft reply; approved without change by the President and released.
4. Prime Minister's reply received as #731, 5 Oct 44.

COPIES TO: "210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE"

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

210 (2); 210 Security Organisation; 310 Japan.
To: The President of the United States.
Nr: 790

Prime Minister to President. Personal and Top Secret. Number 790.

1. Anthony and I start Saturday and hope in two or three days to reach U.S. We should like you to send a message to him saying that you approve of our mission and that Averell will be available to take part in discussions.

2. Will you tell Averell or General Deane what can be said about your far eastern plans and let us know what you have told them, so that we will keep within the limits prescribed. We want to elicit the time it will take after the German downfall for a superior Russian army to be gathered opposite the Japanese on the frontiers of Manchukuo and to hear from them the problems of this campaign, which are peculiar owing to the
lines of communication being vulnerable in the later stages.

3. Of course the bulk of our business will be about the Foles, but you and I think so much alike about this that I do not need any special guidance as to your views.

4. The point of Dumbarton Oaks will certainly come up and I must tell you that we are pretty clear that the only hope is that the three great powers are agreed. It is with regret that I have come to this conclusion contrary to my first thought. Please let me know if you have any wishes about this matter, and also instruct Averell accordingly.

Prime
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 232038 NCR 7493, 23 Sept 44.

DATE: 9

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Meeting with Stalin; Stalin's health.

ACTION:
1. To President at Hyde Park via pouch.
2. No further reply to this cable by the President.

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

210 PRES-PM MEETINGS; 100 STALIN

COPY  

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