

Box 32

Folder 5. MR 210 Control Commissions (1)—
Allied Control Commission for Italy;
European Advisory Commission,
24 August 1943—17 November 1944.

Map Room
Box 32

COPIES OF FOLLOWING MESSAGES FILED HEREIN:

STALIN-POTUS, 22 August 1943
STALIN-POTUS, 26 August 1943
POTUS-STALIN, 4 September 1943
POTUS-STALIN, 9 September 1943
STALIN-POTUS, 12 September 1943
STATE-MOLOTOV, 21 September 1943
STALIN-POTUS, 26 September 1943
POTUS-STALIN, 16 October 1943

POTUS-PM, 352, 20 September 1943
POTUS-PM, 362, 27 September 1943
POTUS-PM, 370, 4 October 1943
PM-POTUS, 442, 8 October 1943
POTUS-PM, 382, 9 October 1943
PM-POTUS, 463, 16 October 1943
POTUS-PM, 390, 16 October 1943
PM-POTUS, 468, 20 October 1943

POTUS-EISENHOWER, 8432, 23 September 1943

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

- IVI

PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Mein, Versailles, France
Nr: FX 53734 NAF 815 17 November 1944

To AGWAR for CCS. Central District UK Base Section
London for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, ALCOM for infor-
mation FX 53734 signed Wilson cite FHGEG this is NAF 815.

Paragraph 3 of NAF 796 requested specific guidance
on whether in connection with the naming of direct represen-
tatives by Italy such representatives are to be allowed
secret communication with their government. Imminence of
such representatives taking up their posts makes guidance
necessary at once and it is requested a reply be given on
this point alone if not possible yet to reply fully to the
whole cable.

End

Note: NAF 796 is CM-IN-4471 (5 Oct 44) CCS

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell

Adm King
C of S

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RHP 11-17-71

CM-IN-16936

(17 Nov 44)

2022Z

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210 CC d

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

8 November 1944

Commanding General,
Allied Force Headquarters,
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main Echelon,
Versailles, France

Commanding General,
United Kingdom Base Section,
London, England

Number: WARI 59626

Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAX 449 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. An announcement of the appointment of MacMillan will shortly be made in the following terms. It is presently proposed that the announcement will be released at 12 noon Eastern War Time 10 November 1944.

2. Begins: As already announced, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain recently reviewed the situation in Italy and agreed on a general policy to meet the many economic and other difficulties of that country. In order to facilitate task they have agreed that the right honourable Harold MacMillan, M.P. British Resident Minister at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean should in addition to his present post become the responsible head of the Allied Commission. In order to effect this, General Wilson will delegate to Mr. MacMillan his functions as President of the Commission. Commodore Stone of the United States Navy at present acting Chief
CM_OUT 59626 (8 Nov 44)

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210 ACC-Italy

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Number: WARX 59626 8 November 1944 Page 2

Commissioner will be appointed Chief Commissioner. Mr. MacMillan as acting president will be specially charged with the duty of supervising development of new measures together with any change in structure of the Commission necessary to carry them out. Ends.

3. A new directive is necessary and is being prepared. It will follow as soon as possible.

End.

ORIGINATOR : CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Hilldring
Adm. King
C of S

CM_OUT-59626 (8 Nov 44) 2300Z hy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CUM

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: F 46919 1 November 1944
F 46919 signed McNarney cite WAGAP.

Topic this message is Replacement Military Personnel
Allied Control Commission by Foreign Economic Administration
Civilian Personnel.

Wherever possible, officers supplanted by such replacement will be utilized elsewhere in this Theater, providing suitable assignments exist. Further, a number of Allied Control Commission officers could be released from active duty here to accept appointment as Foreign Economic Administration officials if authority is granted for such release. This procedure would reduce travel and increase speed of military withdrawal considerably. It is apparent that in most cases no suitable assignment will be found for these officers, in that majority have very little military background. To avoid added administrative work necessary in declaring such officers surplus under War Department Circular number 341, request authority to return to the United States those officers who become surplus and for whom no suitable assignment is in prospect, in order that their ultimate disposition may be determined through Civil Affairs Division of War Department.

ACTION: G-1

End

INFO : ASF, OPD, G-2, CAD, COL PARK, C OF S

CM-IN-1343 (2 Nov 44) 0436Z mcs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

210 aad

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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~~SECRET~~ IVI

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To : War Department
CG United Kingdom Base Section London England
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France
Nr : FX 44643 NAF 805 27 Oct 44

FX 44643 to AGWAR for CCS and to Central District
UK Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff repeated
SHAEP for information signed Wilson cite FHGEG reference FAN
427 of 23 Sept 44 this is NAF 805.

Soviet Representative has only brought in 5 Staff
officers out of 8 approved. 4 of these are observing work
of Subcommissions and the other acts as Chief Clerk to
Soviet member who has ADC in addition.

Names of officers and details of Subcommissions to which
the officers are attached are as follows:

- (1). Lt Col Savko, Displaced Persons and Repatriation,
Education, Legat, Local Government, Monuments, Fine Arts and
Archives, Patriots Branch, Public Health, Public Safety, Army.
- (2). Eng Maj Leonidov, Agriculture, Commerce, Finance,
Food, Industry, Labour, Public Work and Utilities, Shipping,
Transportation, Air Force.
- (3). Lt Comd Golubev, Naval, War Material Disposal
and Italian POW. (Note this officer also acts as assistant

CM-IN 26223

(28 Oct 44)

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210 Central Cinema Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 IVI

Page 2

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr : FX 44643 27 Oct 44

to Savko in all his duties except in connection with the Army Sub Commission).

(4). Sen Lt Filabov, assists Leonidov in all duties except in connection with Air Force Sub Commission.

End

ACTION: CCS

INFO: ADM. LEAHY
CGAAF
OPD
G-2
ADM. KING
LOG

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CM-IN 26223

(28 Oct 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

October 19, 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England.

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France.

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England.

Number: WARX 49077

Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 438 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Your NAF 796 is under urgent consideration here and you will receive instructions shortly. In the meantime, you should forthwith amend the name of the Allied Control Commission to "Allied Commission".

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

Adm. Leahy

Gen. Arnold

OPD

Gen Bissell

CCAC

Adm. King

Log

CM-OUT-49077

(19 Oct 44)

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16-50000-1 GPO

210 cc 2

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JL
[REDACTED] TOT *JS*

PRIORITY

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy

To: War Department

Nr: F 36393 9 October 1944

F 36393 signed Wilson cite FHGEG

Excerpts from Signal to TROOPERS from Air Vice Marshall Stevenson of British ACC Mission to Rumania are paraphrased to you.

"Billets for officers and men, American cars, garage and gasoline facilities requisitioned. Due to weather at Bari, arrival of remainder of party delayed.

"After meeting with Marshal Malinovski or Chief of Staff Major General Vasilev I shall report on details of Russian ACC. Vasilev expected to run ACC while Marshal is fighting. Have met Major General Yakdvlev who arrived with wife and daughter. Other Russian members arriving slowly. General Vinogradov, Marshals deputy is understood to be still in Moscow. First sitting of commission to be arranged after my meeting with Marshal, probably shortly.

"The high powered Russian representation is noteworthy. Relations are friendly cordial and efficient between our Liaison Officers. Hoping to go on tour within next few days.

"Although too early to form opinion about conditions, public utilities appear working smoothly, streets are crowded but few Russians, shops and markets are well stocked. Withdrawal of Russian currency helpful. Black Market price of foreign exchange fallen in last few days." Paraphrase ends.

End

ACTION: CAD

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Col Park, Mr McCloy, Log

CM-IN-8839

(9 Oct 44)

2115Z

ejm

[REDACTED] DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

210 Central Commission

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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~~SECRET~~ TOT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: F 36292 9 October 1944

F 36292 for JCS signed Devers cite NAGCT.

Military representation on control commission for Rumania reference your W 38740 of 29th September is subject.

Will military representatives be furnished from theater resources or are they to be furnished by the War Department?

No information is available ther as to the composition or mission of the control commission. If theater is to furnish military representatives can information be furnished at this time as to when they may be required and what will be their functions and responsibilities?


End

ACTION: JCS

INFO : Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Adm King
CGAC
C of S

CM-IN-8795 (9 Oct 44) 2001Z ejs

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DSD letter, 5-3-72
by DBS, 2-23-73

~~SECRET~~

210 Central Commission

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
W.D. 77500 Col. C.R. Peck

22 September 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX-35218

Book message to Wilson for action, SHAEF London for Eisenhower, Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Communication Zone Main for information, FAN 427 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

NAF 765 is the reference.

Soviet proposal to attach 8 staff officers to the Allied Control Commission for Italy as personal assistants to the Soviet representative on the commission to observe the work of the subcommissions, in addition to the Soviet representative and his aide-de-camp, is approved. You should report if they attempt to participate in, as distinguished from

CM-OUT-35218

(23 Sept 44)

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11-17-71

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Number: WARX-35218

22 September 1944

Page 2

observe, the work of the subcommissions, as this might involve a modification of the existing agreement.

Please report details of assignment of these officers when completed.

Please explain reference in your Paragraph 4 to "agreed model" for Allied representation in Rumania; we know of no agreement on this subject. Presume you do not contemplate any discussion with Soviet representative in Italy linking question of Soviet representation on ACC/I with question of Allied representation on any control body to be set up in Rumania.

End

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RHP 11-17-71

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell,
Gen. Hilldring, Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-35218

(23 Sept 44)

0317Z

WG

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*Take to
delegation*

[REDACTED] IVI
URGENT

74

[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward on Continent

To : War Department

No : FWD 13854

5 September 1944

TOP SECRET FWD 13854 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee repeat for information to SHAEF Main for G-5 and BC/S signed Eisenhower reference Gov 103 this is SCAF *74*

My main comment.

1. In general is that during the active military phase I must rely on agreed Combined Chiefs of Staff policies and on my existing staff in controlling western Europe. Full use will be made of the Nucleus Control Commission/Council, both in planning and ultimately in an executive capacity under my control for matters concerning Germany. While fully appreciating that ultimately the Control Commission and Control Council will act independently on a national basis yet during my period of responsibility I will not be able to depart from the Allied concept of my authority and responsibility, nor from the need of appointing a coordinator for each sphere of activity, for example, legal, movements, finance, disarmament, et cetera. All activities in Germany during the period of SBAEFS responsibility will, in so far as the military situation permits, be in conformity with the known desires of the Nucleus Commission/Council for the longer term.

2. The following comments apply to the renumbered paragraphs in the appendix to CCAC 119/1:

CM-IN-4402 (6 Sep 44)

[REDACTED]

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RHP

210 Control Commission

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URGERENT

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward on Continent

No : FWD 13854

5 September 1944

4. During the period of SCAEF'S control planning must be the responsibility of SHAEF. Our relations with the Control Commission/Council are such that they can afford great assistance to SHAEF in formulating plans. It is agreed that the Control Commission or the Control Council should represent their governments, and through them to the CCS any points on which there are policy disagreements, but pending a decision by the CCS, SCAEF'S decision must be binding.

5. 6. It is agreed that the Nucleus Council should be set up in Berlin as soon as conditions permit and that when set up it will operate under SHAEF and will be the channel through which orders are conveyed to the German central authorities. During the march (or fight) in, however military government must follow the normal chain of command. SCAEF cannot place the Commission/Council in a position of executive authority in Berlin until stability has been effected and adequate communications established.

7. It is assumed that this paragraph in no way interferes with SCAEF'S prerogative to decide on the composition of the Nucleus Control commission * * * , or of his appointment of coordinating authority.

End

* Being Serviced

GOV 103 is CM-OUT-24564 (3 Sep 44) CCAC

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hendy, Gen Bissell,
Gen Hildring, Adm King, Mr McCloy, CofS

CM-IN-4402 (6 Sep 44) 0120Z bjm

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NOV 17 1971

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E. O. 12356,
NLB 101

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ "TOT"
PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in European Theater of Operations
London, England
CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: FX 88204 26 August 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info USFOR for
British Chiefs of Staff info UNITY signed Wilson cite FHGEG
this is NAF 765 FX 88204

1. By agreement with the US and British Govts the Soviet Government is represented on the Allied Control Commission by a Soviet member and appointed to this position is Major General Solodovnik who has been assisted by an ADC.
2. Soviet Government are now replacing Solodovnik by Major General Suslaparov. Latter has arrived in Rome accompanied by the ADC and four staff officers whom he wishes to act as his personal assistants in observing the work of subcommissions. He states that four more staff officers with the same functions are to arrive later.
3. I have informed ACC that they may accept Suslaparov as the replacement of Solodovnik but that the appointment of the additional staff officers, which would change the agreed basis of Soviet representation on the ACC, cannot be accepted pending further instructions which I am asking from you.

CM-IN-24393 (27 Aug 44)

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11-17-71

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~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: FX 88204

26 August 1944

4. There seems no genuine need for Soviet representation on the ACC on such a large scale, and the despatch of the extra staff officers to Rome without the concurrence or even the knowledge of the Allied Governments is clearly an incorrect procedure. On the other hand I suggest that it may be politic to accept with good grace the increase of Soviet representation on the ACC in Italy. Soviet representation in Italy on the political side is the agreed model for our own representation in Rumania under armistice conditions. Our compliance in this case may well help to pave the way for Soviet acceptance of our own proposals for the despatch of Allied staff officers to Rumania. In our own tentative consideration of this question here one of the difficulties has seemed to be that whereas the Russians appear to be content to provide a Major General only with an ADC we should certainly wish to send a number of staff officers to assist the head of any mission sent into Rumania.

End.

ACTION: CCS
INFO : GEN BISSELL
ADM LEAHY
CG AAF
OPD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING
LOG

CM-IN-24393 (27 Aug 44) 0029Z ~~SECRET~~ mcs

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RHP
11-17-71

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSP 2405 - 77500

3 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR-75375

[REDACTED] to Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to your letter dated June 20, 1944, subject "Post Hostility Planning", the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached the following conclusions:

- (1) That appropriate United States personnel should be assigned at an early date as a nucleus of the United States group of the Control Council.
- (2) That the United States personnel so assigned should formulate plans for the control of Germany in accordance with such directives as may be issued as a result of recommendations made by the European Advisory Commission. In the absence of such directives, they should give full consideration to such United States views as may be pending before the Commission. While the exact form which the organization will take must await action by the European Advisory Commission, the United States group should work in close liaison with their British and Soviet counterparts as soon as tripartite groups are organized.
- (3) That personnel assigned to the United States group should function under the direct control of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations.
- (4) That the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations, should recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the composition of the nucleus United States group of the Control Council and, when requested to do so by the theater commander, the War and Navy Departments

CM-OUT-75375 (4 Aug 44)

[REDACTED]
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\ JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974 33

210 Central Comm, [REDACTED]

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR-75375

August 3, 1944

Page 2

should provide assistance in the selection of personnel

(5) That while such personnel will ultimately function in Germany under the United States Theater Commander, they should, in the initial stages of the occupation of Germany and until the combined command is terminated, function under the command of SCAEF in implementing on behalf of the United States and United Kingdom Governments the policies agreed upon by the three governments.

With respect to your proposal to assign Brigadier General C. W. Wickersham as Acting Deputy to the Chief U. S. representative on the Control Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the assignment of a general officer of the Army to this position. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the selection of a particular officer for this position should be made by the War Department on your recommendation. The War Department approves your selection of General Wickersham for this assignment.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen McFarland (JCS)

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
Log

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

CM-OUT-75375 (4 Aug 44)

0212Z

met

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMGEN AF HDQTRS ADVANCE COMMAND POST CASERTA	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		WAR DEPT	PRIORITY PPR
DATE	16 JULY 1944	franklin D. Roosevelt Library	ROUTINE
TOR CODE/ROOM	1558	DECLASSIFIED	DEFERRED
DECODED BY		DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)	
PARAPHRASED BY	GROSS	Date- 11-17-71	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY	HARRINGTON	Signature: <i>[Handwritten]</i>	ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED
PAGE 1 OF 2			
NO. BX 13888			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
15 JULY 1944			<input type="checkbox"/>
NCR 15909			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ OCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(RECEIVED BY HAND FROM ARMY)

FROM AFHQ ADV CP FHCOS FOR ACTION TO TROOPERS FOR
INFO AGWAR; AFHQ SIGNED WILSON CITE FHCOS BX 13888

SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE MADE
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ROME, ALGIERS, LONDON AND WASH-
INGTON 1200 HOURS ON 20TH, REFERENCE 59778 DCA OF
13 JULY.

IT IS WITH REGRET THAT THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-
MANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE ANNOUNCES THAT LT.
GENERAL SIR NOEL MASON MACFARLANE HAS BEEN OBLIGED
TO UNDERGO A PROLONGED COURSE OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
AND HAS ACCORDINGLY RELINQUISHED HIS APPOINTMENT
AS CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COM-
MISSION FOR ITALY. CAPTAIN ELLERY STONE, US NAVY

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-03	24
F-04	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
TG-00	42
TCNO	43
	44
	45
	46
	47
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	49
	50
	51
	52

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-68 210 Control Comm.

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 2 15 JULY 1944 NCR 15909			<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HAS BEEN APPOINTED ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER
PENDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR.

CM IN 12832 (16 JULY 1944)

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 11-17-71

Signature- *PHERS*

COMINCH...COG

12...13...50E....

ADD : CNO...BUPERS...*OPR*...

NAVAIDE.....(PER 19)

ADD 200P.....(PER 20P6)

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-35	35
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS
"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
CG, US Army Forces in the European Theater of
Operations, London, England
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: BX 13657 13 July 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeat to SHAEF for
information BX 13657 signed Wilson cite FHCOS. This is
NAF717.

The Polish Government have informed the United
States Department and the British Foreign Office that
they have appointed as their "Representative to the
Allied Authorities in Italy" Minister Loret, now in Rome.

The question was discussed at my political
committee this morning. It was agreed that any problem of
diplomatic representation in Rome of countries which are
neither (A) neutral, nor (B) members of the Advisory
Council for Italy should be treated as a whole and a line
of policy agreed.

If they are allowed to come, they should not be
formally accredited to the Allied Control Commission although
they should be allowed to discuss matters of interest to

CM-IN-11099 (14 July 44)

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Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command
Post, Caserta, Italy

Nr: BX 13657

13 July 1944

themselves with the chief commissioner and the political section. They could have informal relations with the Italian Government, but so long as the Allied Control Commission operates under the armistice conditions, they would be informed that they should raise questions with the Italian Government through the machinery of the control commission. There are perhaps special reasons why the Poles might be favourably treated, since they have two divisions fighting in Italy, Poland is an important Catholic power, and the Poles have a long tradition of friendship with the Italian people. But I should like at the same time to have from you a ruling which would apply to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and any other state which is a member of the United Nations.

So far as I am concerned, I see no objection to the Polish request being acceded to.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : ADM. LEAHY
CGAAF
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. HILLDRING
ADM. KING
C of S

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RAH
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CM-IN-11099 (14 Jul 44) 0653Z jf

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS "IVI"
TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
To: War Department,
CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.
CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations,
London, England
CG Air Force Command Post, Caserta, Italy
CG Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta Italy.
Fr: FX 69553 7 July 1944

FX to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff rptd UNITY rptd HQ
MAAF rptd APHQ ADV CP signed Wilson cite FRGEG this is NAF 73

Herewith report 2 developments in relation to Italian
Government.

1. In accord with recommendation of Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission, I have authorized the move-
ment of the Italian Government from Salerno to Rome, as soon
as militarily convenient. This will greatly improve effect-
iveness of Italian Administration and increase the prestige of
the government. Advisory Council has approved. Allied
military government over cite of Rome must be continued for
some time, but this is no obstacle to the move.

Chief Commissioner also recommended further transfer
of territory to administration of Italian Government on same
terms as those for the original transfer on 11 February. Prop-
osal embraced following provinces: Naples, Benevento, Avellino,
Poggia, Cambobasso, ROMA, Lottoria and Frosinone, Perhaps also 1 or

CM-IN-6384 (8 Jul 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 2

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: FX 69553

7 July 1944

more additional provinces east of Appenines, if progress of 8th Army permits. Restoration to be progressive by areas. I have approved this measure in principle and authorized execution subject to favorable reply by Advisory Council, whose recommendation I have requested. One result of restoration of further territory will be a thinning of civil affairs personnel, needed for military government in areas now being recovered from the enemy.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO. : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log
Gen Hilldring
Mr. McCloy
Adm Leahy

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REF: ASSIFIED JCS 29-71
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CM-IN-6384 (8 Jul 44) 1549Z ejm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a very encouraging radio from General Eisenhower.

Chief of Staff.

It is my belief that the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that greater results in support of OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste rather than to await ANVIL. They are aware, of course, of the definite purpose of the United States Chiefs of Staff to mount an ANVIL and I have been ever most explicit in my support of this operation. I have your telegram on the subject. I have the further impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince you of the value of the Trieste move, they will not permit an impasse to arise, and will, consequently, agree to ANVIL. In this event, I believe that they will propose a stronger operation than previously conceived by including in it a number of the experienced British divisions now in the Mediterranean and with the further recommendation that Alexander take over responsibility for ANVIL as the principal offensive operation in that theater. I feel that their idea would be to keep intact the tactical ground and air staff that has been functioning so well in Italy. They would then frankly recognize the Italian area as a secondary one and turn over the troops there to General Clark or other qualified officer.

Document found in the O'Connor-Farher Collection of Materials relating to FDR's Estate. Opened for research July 22, 1987.

O [REDACTED] D

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALLS EYES ONLY

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

To: War Department

Nr: S 54760 29 June 1944

S 54760 for General Marshalls Eyes Only from
Eisenhower. ~~TOPSECRET~~

It is my belief that the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that greater results in support of OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste rather than to mount ANVIL. They are aware, of course, of the definite purpose of the United States Chiefs of Staff to mount an ANVIL and I have been even more emphatic in my support of this operation than have your telegrams on the subject. I have the further impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince you of the value of the Trieste move, they will not permit an impasse to arise, and will, consequently, agree to ANVIL. In this event, I believe that they will propose a stronger operation than previously conceived by including in it a number of the experienced British divisions now in the Mediterranean and with the further recommendation that Alexander take over responsibility for ANVIL as the principal offensive operation in that theater. I feel that their idea would be to keep intact the tactical ground and air staff that has been functioning so well in Italy. They would then frankly recognize the Italian area as a secondary one and turn over the troops there to General Clark or other qualified officer.

CM-IN-24126

(29 Jun 44)

DECLASSIFIED
Printed in Papers of DDSEisenhower
EYI, 1958-59 NARS, Date

[REDACTED]
EYES ONLY
[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALLS EYES ONLY
Page 2

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54760 29 June 1944

All the above is fact tinged with conjecture but does represent the impressions gained by me and by General Smith in separate conversations with the Prime Minister.

I would personally be quite happy to see General Alexander in command of the operation. I consider him a most able soldier with particular qualifications in commanding ground forces of several nationalities. Moreover, I would like to see the plans in the Mediterranean drawn on the basis of making ANVIL just as strong as possible even up to something like 16 or more divisions. Since, in the long run, France is going to be more the business of Great Britain than ourselves, I would be delighted to see more British divisions in that country. Another consideration is the fact that with Alexander in command there will be no holding back in the Mediterranean of resources that can make the operation a success. If this proposal should be made and accepted, I suggest that reminder be included that when ANVIL proceeds sufficiently far so that I believe I can exercise direction over it, the whole force is to become part of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

If there should develop some unforeseen rapidity with respect to our own advance here allowing us to gain additional ports to the southward of Cherbourg quickly, we could always then divert any divisions scheduled for the later phases of ANVIL buildup directly into this area.

CM-IN-24126 (29 Jun 44)

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

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[REDACTED]

URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALLS EYES ONLY
Page 3

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54760 29 June 1944

The main factor now is the necessity for speed in
decision.

All the above is for your confidential information
and is merely to apprise you in person of what I believe to
be the situation here and of my own reactions.

The weather here continues to be abominable.

End

ACTION: General Handy

INFO : [REDACTED]
C of S

CM-IN-24126 (29 Jun 44) 2129Z ejv

[REDACTED]
EYES ONLY

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P R I O R I T Y

From: CG, US Army Forces in North African Theater
of Operations, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

Nr: P 45181 13th May, 1944

P 34583, 19 April, NAF 679 to Combined Chiefs of
Staff and F 35124 to AGWAR. P45181 signed Devers cite
NAGAP to AGWAR.

Again request status of our request for increased
allotment to Allied Control Commission (Army Sub Commission)
to implement paragraph (2) of FAN 338. No reply received
concerning this request nor to our 2 follow-ups F 39469, 30
April and F 42385, 6th May.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: FAN 338 is CM-OUT-10903 (25 Feb 44) CC/S
39469 is CM IN-22466 (30 Apr 44) ASF
42385 is CM-IN-4645 (6 May 44) ASF

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King
Col. Park, Gen. Somervell, Log

CM-IN-9645 (13 May 44) 1526Z jb


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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-4450/60925 NAF 641- 6 March 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFCR for British Chiefs of Staff, Fairbanks, Unity London signed Wilson cite PHMGS this is NAF 641.

This message supplements NAF 607.

The matters of routine on which direct communication between Allied Control Commission and British and United States Governments as is authorized are for the present limited to the following categories: Listing of displaced persons; inquiry concerning whereabouts and welfare of individual civilians; condition of private property; statistical and like technical information, such as criminal records, public health records, agricultural and industrial reports; procurement of publications; routine reports required by AFHQ to be rendered periodically; civil postal administration.

Where direct communication takes place the appropriate Vice President or Director of Allied Control Commission must authorize.

Above enumeration is result of attempt to delimit "Routine matters". It has assent of ACC, which was invited to submit its recommendations.

Request the enumeration be brought to attention of the two governments.

NAF 607 is CM-IN-18887 (28 Jan 44)CC/S No Sig
ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, General Bissell, General Arnold, Log,
General Hilldring, Colonel Mathewson,
Admiral King

CM-IN-4236 (7 Mar 44) 0101Z med

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~~SECRET~~

15 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 579

Filed 150940Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and most
secret. Number 579. Your 466.

Thank you so much.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
by R. H. Parks Date 5-10-72

~~SECRET~~

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INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
NO : 466, 14 FEBRUARY 1944

COPY

Your 560. (30 Jan 44)

I have agreed to the appointment of a French representative on the Control Commission for Italy and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have issued the necessary authority to General Wilson. So endeth the first lesson.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

[REDACTED]

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

February 13, 1944

FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 9690

BOS USFOR, LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-9338

For Wilson Freedom Algiers, this is FAN 336, from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Changes recommended by you in organization of Allied
Control Commission for Italy in your NAF 590 as sup-
plemented by your NAF 595 are approved with the
exception of the titles for the Joint Heads of the
Political Section. As to the Political Officers, be
guided by our FAN 332 which it is assumed you had not
seen before your NAF 595 was dispatched and which
otherwise approved your recommendations. The appoint-
ments recommended in para E of your NAF 595 as amended
by your NAF 598 are also approved.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hillaring
White House
OPD
LOG

CM-OUT-5659 (13 Feb 44)

1915Z AMR

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

February 12, 1944

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 9628

CG USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 9314

For Wilson, Freedom Algiers, FAN 335, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff

The appointment of a French member to the Allied Control
Commission for Italy, reference NAFs 593 and 613, is
approved.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (Capt Royal USM)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hildring
Log

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CM-OUT-5386

(12 Feb 44)

2234Z

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

P R I O R I T Y
S E C U R I T Y C O N T R O L

From: Algiers
To: War

Number: W-2289/49485 9 February 1944

To AGWAR for combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson
cite FHMGS reference NAF 593. This is NAF 613.

I should like to add my personal view in favour of
French participation in the Allied Control Commission on the
same basis as the Russians. The French troops are fighting
gallantly and pulling their weight in the battle. The French
committee already participates equally in the advisory council.
The point at issue is therefore mainly one of prestige for
the French and it seems ungracious to refuse to meet them.

No Sig

~~notified~~
NAF 593 is CM-IN-4346 (6 Feb 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, General Bissell, General Arnold,
General Hilldring, Admiral King, White House,
Log

CM-IN-6393 (9 Feb 44) 2220Z med

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: W-2012/48126 6th February, 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS this is NAF 593.

Subject is proposed French member on Allied Control Commission. Following transmitted for information. Advisory Council of Allied Control Commission at meeting 24th January adopted motion part as follows:

The British, Soviet and French members of the council are in favour of the participation on the same basis as the Soviet representative of a representative of the French Committee of National Liberation. The American member has stated that this question is still under discussion in Washington.

The Council accordingly recommends as regards French participation that the Commander in Chief should intervene with the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a view to the early solution of this question. End of motion.

Refer to NAF 541 and FAN 325 in connection with above.

No Sig.

541 is CM-IN-4915 (8 Dec 43)CC/S
FAN 325 is CM-OUT-8562 (22 Jan 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, General Bissell, General Arnold,
Admiral King, General Hilldring, White House,
Log

CM-IN-4346 (6 Feb 44)

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210 Control Commission

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P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-1755/46672 NAF 595, 3 Feb 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson
cite FHMGS this is NAF 595

Supplementing NAF 590 and incorporating changes
therein proposed with further organizational changes in ACC
now desired, request modification of directive in FAN 248
is amended as follows:

A. Authorization of the position of deputy to the
Deputy President with title of Vice President. Because of
dispersion of organization supervised by ACC, considered
essential that Deputy President have personal deputy to act
in his absence.

B. Organization. The commission will be divided
into 4 sections plus 6 independent subcommissions as follows:

1. Economic.
2. Administrative.
3. Regional Control and Military Government.
4. Political. Independent Subcommissions:

1. Navy
2. Army.
3. Air

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CM-IN-1973

(3 Feb 44)

White House

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Page 2

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-1755/46672 NAF 595, 3 February 1944

4. War Material Disposal
5. Telecommunications.
6. PW and Displaced Persons.

Comments:

(A). Experience has shown combined administrative and economic section too big and unwieldy to be effectively operated as single entity.

(B) New section for regional control and military government will deal with AMG and control work in field, will be responsible for security and internal administration, and will take over many duties now done by Chief of Staff. Work of this section fully justifies constitution as separate section with Vice President as head.

(C) With transfer of internal transportation and shipping subcommissions to economic section (see paragraph C following) no justification for a communications section any longer exists.

(D) The independent subcommissions do not fit naturally into any of the main sections and it is considered will best operate independently under direction of Deputy President through appropriate assistants. The PW subcommission and displaced persons subcommission are fused for economy of manpower and will permit exchange of personnel

CM-IN-1973

(3 Feb 44)

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Page 3

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-1755/46672 WAF 595, 3 Feb 1944

as changing conditions require. The military section will accordingly be eliminated.

C. The economic and administrative sections will be divided into subcommissions as follows:

(A) Economic:

1. Industry and commerce.
2. Labor
3. War factories
4. Agriculture
5. Food
6. Public Works and Mines
7. Finance
8. Internal transportation

9. Shipping. Comment: Internal transportation, shipping and war factories subcommissions have been included in economic section because their functions are so clearly allied to and interlocked with those of other subcommissions in this section.

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(3 Feb 44)

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Page 4

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-1755/46672 NAF 595 3 Feb 1944

(B) Administrative:

1. Interior
2. Public Safety
3. Public Health
4. Legal
5. Education
6. Property Control
7. Monuments and Fine Arts.

D. Personnel. There will be four vice presidents holding following positions:

1. Deputy to the Deputy President.
2. Head of Economic Section.
3. Head of Administrative Section
4. Head of Regional Control and Military Government Section. The position of Deputy Vice President to be abolished. Political section to function under Joint British and American directors as it has been doing.

CM-IN-1973

(3 Feb 44)

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page 5

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-1755-46672 NAF 595 3 Feb 1944

E. Balance of British and American appointments at top level approximately equal; Stone (US) Vice President, Deputy to the Deputy President; Stansgate (BR) Vice President Economic Section; Grady (US) Vice President Administrative Section; Lush (BR) Vice President regional control and military government section. Reber (US) and Caccia (BR) joint directors political section. The principal assistant alternates in nationality with his chief except in administrative section.

F. General order has been issued by this Headquarters to implement para 6 of NAF 590.

The foregoing proposal, put forward by the Deputy President, has the indorsement of General Alexander.

I. Recommend approval by the CCS of the organizational changes and the appointment of officers set out herein.

FOOTNOTE: NAF 590 is CM-IN-14586 (22 Jan 44) CC/S. ^{NO Sig}

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen'l Strong, Gen'l Arnold, Adm. King, Mr. McCloy, Gen'l Hilldring, White House, Log.

CM-IN-1973 (3 Feb 44) 1749Z jt

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Sign
SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
FAN 332 71469

SECURITY CONTROL

February 1, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER 8625

CG
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER R 8828

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, **FAN 332**, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff

Changes recommended by you in organization of Allied Control Commission for Italy in your NAF 590 are approved, with the exception of the title of the heads of the political section. It is considered that if the ranking political officers are directors it puts them on a lower level than the heads of the Economic and Administrative Section; the effect might be to cause embarrassment in connection with their relations with the Italian Government and to impart inferentially to the Advisory Council a stature not intended in its terms of reference. It is suggested for your consideration that they should be called Joint Vice-Presidents of the Political Section. Please forward your comments on this proposal. We assume that posts of Economic Director and Administrative Director are to be abolished when Vice-President of Economic Section and Vice-President of Administrative Section are appointed. Your recommendations for appointment in Paragraph 7 your cable are also approved.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

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INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
White House
LOG

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CM-OUT-211 (1 Feb 44) 1848Z mlc

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
FAN 331 71469

February 1, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER: 8626

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: R 8829

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 331, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

There is some doubt here as to the status of individuals of various Allied nations who we understand are working in conjunction with the Displaced Persons Subcommittee of the Allied Control Commission. There is no objection to the acceptance of the duly accredited liaison officers from any of the United Nations working with the Displaced Persons Subcommittee. It should be quite clear, however, that no such persons should be appointed as members of the subcommittee.

Please advise us what nationals of United Nations other than British and American are at present working in conjunction with the Displaced Persons Subcommittee and advise us in the future when any other such arrangements are made.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S Capt Royal USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
White House
LOG

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RHP

CM-OUT-212

(1 Feb 44)

1848Z

ejm

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Central Commission

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~~SECRET~~

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 560

January
Filed 30/1640Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret.

Thank you for consulting me about the representation of France on the Control Commission for Italy (your memorandum of December 31).

My own feeling is that this is not a particularly important point. I am assured by MacMillan that all that is involved is the performance of Liaison work and that the French (like the Soviet) representative would have no effect on the structure or the working of the Control Commission.

After all, we both agreed to French representation on the Advisory Council for Italy on the same basis as the United States, British and Soviet representative. I myself would regard the present French request as a gnat compared with this fairly substantial camel.

It would be rather a smack in the face for the French if their candidature were now turned down, since their man sat on the Advisory Council for Italy when the recommendation was made. They have got a corps in action fighting well.

So my view is that we ought to let it go.

*Answered by POTUS # 466
14 February 44.*

~~SECRET~~

No Sig

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E. O. 12356

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

Jan. 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Commander Freesman reports that the recommendation for Soviet and French representation on the Allied Control Commission for Italy was brought up at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on Jan. 21 and that the Soviet representation was approved but the French was not.

djb

Handwritten notes:
...
... part of the file ...
... of the ...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Gray of the State Department telephoned ^{to me} that on December 31 you sent to Secretary Hull a short memorandum enclosing copy of a message you had sent to Mr. Churchill. It related to having a French member on the Control Commission for Italy. He says the British and Russians are pressing them pretty hard for some word on this subject.

Have you had an answer from the Prime Minister in regard to it and if so, may I get it from the Map Room and convey it to Mr. Gray?

G.

No answer as yet -

(The rest of the file referred to is in the Map Room 1/31/44.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1944.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the attached messages concerning French and Soviet representation on the Allied Control Commission for Italy, on December 31, 1943, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as follows:

"Any objections to a Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Italy should be withdrawn, but representation of the French National Committee on the Commission is disapproved".

This recommendation will be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, January 21st. There are indications that the British Staff Representatives under instructions from the British Chiefs of Staff in London will oppose the recommendations of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

W.H.S.

January 20, 1944.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the attached messages concerning French and Soviet representation on the Allied Control Commission for Italy, on December 31, 1943, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as follows:

"Any objections to a Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Italy should be withdrawn, but representation of the French National Committee on the Commission is disapproved".

This recommendation will be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, January 21st. There are indications that the British Staff Representatives under instructions from the British Chiefs of Staff in London will oppose the recommendations of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

W. D. L.

The original of ~~the xxxxxxxxxx~~ this memorandum, together with the attached messages a POTUS and PRIME were passed to Miss Tully for her to take the matter up with the President. She has been requested to return all three to the Map Room when finished with the same.

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: AFHQ Command Post, Italy
To : War - 395
USFOR London - No #
Algiers - No #

22nd January 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, Freedom for Whiteley from Fairbanks from Wilson cite FHGCT. This is NAF 590.

As result of practical experience I wish to make the following changes in the organization of the Allied Control Commission:

1. Appointment of a deputy to the deputy president.
2. Division of the Economic and Administrative Section into an Administrative Section and an Economic Section each under a vice president.
3. Abolition of the appointment of vice president Military Section. This section will deal direct with the deputy president through the Chief of Staff.
4. Reduction of the status of the vice presidents of the Political Section and the Communications Section to any rank of director.
5. All deputy vice presidents to be abolished.
6. I propose to abolish headquarters Allied Military Government with HQ ACMF. Allied Military Government will continue only in the Fifth Army area and 8th Army area. Operational control of AMG in these

CM-IN-14586 (22 Jan 44)

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RAH

Control Commission [REDACTED]

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E O 12858

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: AFHQ Command Post, Italy
To : War - 395 NAF 590
(And all other listed addresses)
22nd January 1944

Page 2.

two areas will be exercised by these respective Army Commanders. Technical and administrative control will be exercised by Headquarters ACC which will absorb the necessary personnel from Headquarters AMG ACMF now to be abolished.

7. I am now deciding upon the personnel for the higher appointments in ACC. I wish to make the following appointments and will forward my suggestions for those now omitted at a very early date:

Deputy to Deputy President, Captain E. Stose, US Navy at present Vice President of the Communications Section. He will retain title of Vice President,

Vice President Administrative Section, Lord Stansgate,

Vice President Economic Section, Mr. Henry Gardy,

Joint Directors of Political Section, Mr. Caccia and Mr. Rebert.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. STRONG
MR. MCCLOY
~~WHITE HOUSE~~
GEN. HILLDRING
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
LOG

CM-IN-14586 (22 Jan 44) 2031Z cng

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

fm

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

January 21, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER: 7802

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: R 8420

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 324, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A food commission should be set up in the economic subsection per Allied Control Commission organization provided for in FAN 248, unless you see reasons why it should not be done, in which case you should report giving your reasons. Food Sub-commission should be responsible for whole field of food policy, including rationing, import and export, agricultural production and comprehensive policy of fixing prices to merchants, processors, distributors, retailers, and consumers. Rationing of fuel should be controlled by Fuel Sub-Section, Allied Control Commission. The Subcommittee of Industry and Commerce should have control of rationing of clothing and other necessary goods.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CCG/S Capt Royal USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
White House
LOG

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RAH

CM-OUT-8564 (22 Jan 44) 0050Z e jm

Control Commission

35

W. H. H. H.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

January 21, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER: 7801

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: R-8419

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 326, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

To assist you in explaining nonreceipt of simultaneous approval for appointment of French as well as Russian member to Allied Control Commission reference FAN 325 following is sent: Approval of appointment of Soviet member before that of a French member is based on the fact that the full armistice terms with Italy were signed in the name of the British, American and Soviet Governments "Acting on behalf of the United Nations." This places the Soviet Government in a separate category from other governments and for the purpose of representation on the control commission Soviet Government may be held to rank with United States and British Governments.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/3 Capt Royal USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
White House
LOG

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fm
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff 71469

January 21, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER: 7800

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: R-8418

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 325, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The appointment of a Soviet member to the Allied Control Commission for Italy is approved. The question of the appointment of a French member is still under consideration by US and British Governments.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S Capt Royal USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
Adm King
White House
LOG

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CM-OUT-8562 (22 Jan 44) 0050Z ejm

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

CG Army Air Forces 2964

6 January 1944

CG AAF ETO
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7776

To Eisenhower for Spaatz from Arnold.

Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that adequate military and naval personnel will be provided in London and in Washington for liaison with European Advisory Commission. In connection with termination of hostilities in Europe, this commission is likely to be concerned with such matters as size and utilization of air forces of Allied and liberated powers, disposition of enemy air forces and equipment, military aviation production in Europe, air forces required by Army of Occupation and similar problems. Appointment of one Army Air Force Officer for service in London is contemplated. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick S Wildman now on duty with Plans Division, Headquarters Army Air Forces, is being considered for assignment to London. Request your comments on this appointment, including name of Air Corps Officer available in your theater who may be better qualified for this work.

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

AF 479

INFORMATION: OPD
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72
Jan. 4, 1973

CM-OUT-2242 (7 Jan 44) 0030Z mcs

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Advisory Comm ~~SECRET~~

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Combined Chiefs of Staff

January 3, 1944

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 6268

CG, USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R 7621

For Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 294, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The British Government has appointed reference FAN 293 Lt Gen Mason MacFarlane to be Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. You are requested to announce the new appointment before you leave and to inform London direct of the date and hour at which you intend to make the announcement.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Adm King
General Hilldring
LOG

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CM-OUT-662 (3 Jan 44) 1750Z mew

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff

January 3, 1944

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 6267

CG, USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R 7620

For Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 293, from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff

Your suggestion that the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy be of the same nationality as the Commander in Chief is approved. The British Government will be requested that a replacement for General Joyce be immediately selected and that he arrive at the Headquarters of the Allied Control Commission prior to the 10th day of January. General Joyce will be instructed by the War Department to remain as a collaborator as long as his British replacement may require his services.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
Adm King
General Arnold
General Hilldring
LOG

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CM-OUT-658 (3 Jan 44) 1740Z mew

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Civil Affairs Comm

December 27 1943

CG
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
FREEDOM ALGIERS Number 5767

CG
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND Number R 7350

TAM 116 to Eisenhower for FHMGs from CCS cite CCAC repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff.

Library and archival material collection. Pursuant
to your request in MAT 70, archivist of the United States
has recommended Mr. Fred Shipman to be attached for 3 months
to fine arts monuments and archives subcommission of allied
control commission for Italy. Shipman who is director of
the Hyde Park Library will collaborate with Manuel Sanchez
who has already been directed to report to you by Librarian
of Congress. See our TAM 107. After he report to AFHQ,
Shipmans status will be similar to that of Sanchez and we
understand you will then issue travel orders and make other
necessary arrangements for him to perform his duties.

ORIGINATOR: CC AC
INFORMATION ASF
OPD
G-2
Adm. King
CCS (Capt. Royal USN)
Mr. McCloy

CM-OUT- 9846 (27 Dec 43) 1919Z omj

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RAF

White House
51

Central Commission

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INCOMING MESSAGE

fu

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-8593/19385 26 December, 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower.
This is NAF 564.

After some weeks of experience it is my conviction that the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission in Italy should be of the same nationality as the Commander in Chief. I recommend that a suitable British replacement for General Joyce be immediately selected and sent here with the least practicable delay. It is highly desirable that I should announce this change before leaving here and if at all possible I request that General Joyces' replacement arrive here before January 10th. General Joyce should remain as a collaborator as long as his British replacement may require his services.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. ARNOLD
GEN. HILLDRING
GEN. STRONG
ADM. KING
LOG

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CM-IN-16404 (27 Dec 43) 0023Z cng
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Full

Combined Chiefs of Staff

December 19, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 5279

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND FOR BRITISH C OF S

Number R 7118

To Eisenhower, Freedom Algiers, FAN 285, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Your proposal to designate Admiral McGregor as acting Vice President of Military Section is approved. Reference NAF 516. You are also authorized to appoint U S Army Officer as acting Deputy Vice President, Military Section. Your further recommendations, first: to eliminate Deputy Directors in Economic and Administrative Section, and second: to designate an American as 1 of the 2 directors in that section, cannot be acted upon as yet.

Allied Control Commission for Italy

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG

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(19 Dec 43)

1822Z

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War Room

Civil Affairs Division

December 19, 1943

CG NATO
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 5278

To Eisenhower for Holmes from Hilldring signed Marshall

Soviet representation on Allied Control Commission. Refer to your NAF 541. A paper is being considered for presentation to highest level through JCS recommending that objections to Soviet representation on ACC be withdrawn. This action is believed to be advisable in view of the reports received from your Headquarters and from State Department representatives in Algiers of Soviet requests for representation on ACC and their reference to some understanding reached at Moscow conference. Your comments on the foregoing proposal are requested as a matter of urgency.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
by RHP Date 1-4-73

ORIGINATOR: GEN HILLDRING

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
CCS
LOG

CM-OUT-7483 (19 Dec 43) 1822Z pp

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P R I O R I T Y
CORRECTED COPY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-7080/10996 NAF 541 7 December 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and USAFIME signed Eisenhower cite PHMGS NAF 541.

Matter of United Nations representation in Allied Control Commission. Report from Murphy at Cairo summarized herewith: on 3rd December Advisory Council met at Brindisi. Vyshinski there maintained it was understood at Moscow by American and British Governments that Soviet Government had right under article 37 to appoint representatives to ACC recalling appointments already made with information to the 2 Governments.

Massigli stated French Committee took similar view regarding French Representation on ACC.

Advisory Council decision decided to inform Allied C in C of foregoing and refer question to respective Governments. Russians evidently attack importance to their status on Commission. End of Summary.

In event modification of existing system of ACC should come under review, this Headquarters would wish opportunity to express it's view.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-4915 ^{No Sig} (8 Dec 43) CCS *destroyed 2/9*

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong, General Arnold, Admiral King, General Hilldring, Admiral Horn

CM-IN-5025 (8 Dec 43) 1419Z med

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SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 29, 1943

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SECURITY CONTROL

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3756

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 6328

SEXTANT

Number 1131

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN number 300, from Combined Chiefs of Staff

Intergovernmental Refugee Committee London has proposed that its Vice Director, Patrick Malin (American), visit Italy for purpose of offering cooperation of the committee in solving non-material problems in connection with refugees such as status, ultimate destination and resettlement, communications with relatives, et cetera. In supporting this proposal, the British Foreign Office has recommended that there would be great advantage in having a committee representative serve with the civilian internees and displaced persons subcommission of political section of control commission. Our position is that proposed visit would be desirable for purpose of establishing Liaison and providing IGC with accurate information concerning scope and nature of refugee problem in Italy, leaving open for time being question of resident representative of committee in Italy. Please transmit your views.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Hilldring
Gen. Strong
Adm. Horne
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King
SGS
LOG

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CM-OUT-11413 (29 Nov 43) 2253Z fbh

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26/1245Z
AB

DDC
26 Nov
1603

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: SEXTANT
To: Algiers **FP8**
AGWAR **(10052)**
USFOR London **MP26**

*Done at
FAN 297*

26 November, 1943

To Eisenhower Freedom Algiers USFOR London for British Chief of Staff repeated to AGWAR, FAN 280, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Advisory Council for Italy. Referring to your NAF 526 the following terms of reference were approved at the Moscow Conference and constitute our directive to you. An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith composed in the first instance of Representatives of The United Kingdom, The United States, The Soviet Union and The French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable in view of special interests of these 2 countries arising from aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

Each representative will be assisted when necessary by a small Staff of technical advisors, Civilian and Military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as Headquarters of Allied Commander-In-Chief.

The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy,

CM-IN-16108 (26 Nov 43)

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E.O. 12356

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INCOMING MESSAGE
URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL
Page 2

From: SEKTANT
To: Algiers FP8
 AGWAR 10052
 USFOR London MP26
26 November, 1943

other than military operational problems. Members of the Council will be supplied by their respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several representations to their Government or to the French Committee of National Liberation but will not have the power to make final decisions. They will not of course concern themselves with the military functions of the Allied Commander-In-Chief.

The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing terms of surrender.

The Council will advise the Allied Commander-In-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-In-Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters relating to the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical Inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

The Allied Commander-In-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-In-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control over Italy to an end, the Commander-In-Chief will relinquish the Presidency of the Allied Control Commission.

CM-IN-16108 (26 Nov 43)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SECRET UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE
URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SEXTANT
To: Algiers
AGWAR
USFOR London
26 November, 1943

FP8
10052
MP26

The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume the direction of the work of Allied Control Commission.

No Sig.

NAF 526 is CM-IN-13062 (21 Nov 43) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
SGS
Gen Hilldring
Adm Horne
Adm King
LOG

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CM-IN-16108 (26 Nov 43) 1744Z flw

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

CCS

November 25, 1943

SEXTANT

Number 1085

CG, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3441

CG, USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 6186

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 297, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Advisory Council for Italy. Full details regarding constitution of Advisory Council as requested by your NAF 526 not yet determined. Will be communicated to you as soon as possible. Terms of reference as approved at the Tripartite Conference at Moscow are as follows:

"1. An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith, composed in the 1st instance of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable, in view of the special interests of these 2 countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

"2. Each representative will be assisted, where necessary, by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief.

"3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than Military Operational questions. The members of the Council will be supplied by the respective governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work. They will make

CM-OUT-9944 (25 Nov 43)

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

November 25, 1943

Page 2

joint or several recommendations to their governments or to the French Committee, but will not have power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, concern themselves with the military functions of the Allied Commander in Chief.

"4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing the terms of surrender.

"5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander in Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander in Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

"6. The Allied Commander in Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and the United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

"7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander in Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of the Italian Administration to an end, the Commander in Chief will relinquish the presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume the direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission."

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN HILLDRING
GEN ARNOLD
ADMIRAL KING
GENERAL STRONG
SGS
LOG

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REF ASSIFIED JS 2971

NOV 17 1971

RRP

CM-OUT-9944 (25 Nov 43) 19562 mjo/vc

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SM
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

CCS

November 24, 1943

CG, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3354

CG, ETO USFOR LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R 6144

SEXTANT

Number 1069

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 296, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Appointment to Control Commission. Reference your W 5837 to AGWAR. Appointment of Captain Ellery W Stone, USNR, as Vice President of Communications Section is approved. Request is being made for Naval orders.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Admiral King
Admiral Horne
SGS
LOG

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NOV 17 1971
RHP

CM-OUT-9490 (24 Nov 43) 1837Z vd/vc/jb

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19
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JDJD C 42
21/1314A
dm

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
21 Nov
1433 Z

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-5743/3750 21 November, 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for
British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FEMGS
NAF 526.

Grateful for details urgently regarding directive
and constitution concerning advisory council for Italy
particularly since Russian delegates are now said to be
on their way to Algiers.

No Sig

ACTION: CG/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Hilldring
Gen Arnold
Adm King
LOG

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NOV 17 1971

RAF

CM-IN-13062 (21 Nov 43) 1523Z flw

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Central Commission
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1943.

Memorandum for:

The President.

In my opinion, there is nothing to do with respect to the attached until the Combined Chiefs of Staff act upon my recommendation contained in the attached message. If they concur in my recommendation, they will, presumably, submit the matter to the Heads of the two Governments for final approval before it is placed in effect.

Eisenhower.

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOVEMBER 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL EISENHOWER.

TAKE UP WITH GENERAL MARSHALL
AND ADMIRAL KING AND LET ME KNOW
WHAT WE DO NEXT.

F.D.R.

General Brown

*While I don't think
you attached message
answers your
question in full it
is the nearest approach
to an answer that
we have received*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Colonel Mathewson.

In connection with a spot promotion recommended for the U.S. Naval representative on the Allied Control Commission to Italy, the President has asked what rank will be held by U.S. Army and British Army and Naval officials. Can you obtain this information for me?

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Admiral Brown

While I don't think
the attached message
answers your
question in full it
is the nearest approach
to an answer that
we have received
Wm.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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JDJD C42
191503A
BMS

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
1455Z
19 Nov

URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War

No: W-5584 19 November 1943

Personal for Hilldring from Smith signed Eisenhower cite
PHCOS further reference your 2183.

Senior United States Army and British Army officers
on Control Commission will be Major Generals. Senior
British Naval officer will be Rear Admiral. Believe
rank of Commodore should be given senior United States
Navy representative, Captain H W Zirolli, USN, now acting.
On 29 October, Admiral Hewitt recommended him to COMINCH
as permanent United States Navy member and for promotion
to flag rank.

Greatly appreciate your attitude in regard to
McGregor. I am quite sure we have made no mistake.

No Sig

2183 is CM-OUT-3812 (10 Nov 43) CAD
See CM-OUT-6882 (17 Nov 43) GEN HILLDRING
See CM-IN-9197 (15 Nov 43) GEN HILLDRING

ACTION: GEN HILLDRING
INFORMATION: OPD
C OF S
G-1
MR McCLOY

CM-IN-11744 (19 Nov 43) 1552Z ms

~~SECRET~~

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JDJD C33
13/1557A
DLB

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

NR: W-5128/332, 13th November 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated Fatima signed Eisenhower cite FHMGS NAF 516.

Allocation of principal posts of Allied Control Commission given in FAN 273 of 7th November. Considering relative importance of Italian naval units and facilities among assets derived from Armistice, I am convinced on examination that Military section should be under Naval Officer. Propose he be British and Deputy be US Army Officer. I strongly recommend that the directive be amended accordingly.

I believe further that economic and administrative section with British Vice President and American Deputy, with 2 British Directors and American Deputy Directors underneath, is too heavy superstructure, and that some simplification and alternation in nationality is desirable. I therefore recommend that there be no Deputy Directors, and that 1 Director be American and selection of Officers be made on this basis. Pending approval of above I propose to organize the Military Section as I have indicated, designating Admiral McGregor, now Flag Officer Liaison (Italy), as Acting Vice President of Military Section.

No Sig.

273 is CM-OUT-2879 (7 Nov 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN HILLDRING, ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD, LOG

CM-IN-8170 (13 Nov 43) 1914Z mcs

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 9, 1943

CG, NATO
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 2115

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 5499

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 274, from The Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Appointees as directors of administrative and economic
subsections, reference last sentence NAF 509, will be
selected by governments and you will be notified.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD
GEN HILLDRING

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NOV 17 1971

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CM-OUT-3470 (9 Nov 43) 1942Z vc

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SECURITY
CONTROL

Control Commission

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 6, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 1974

COMMANDING GENERAL
USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R-5430

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 273, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Directive for Allied Control Commission for Italy as
furnished you in FAN 248 lacks agreement on the question of
allocation by nationality of the principal posts on the
Commission. Agreement on this question has now been reached
as follows:

Deputy President of the Commission - U S

Vice-President in charge of the Military Section - U S

Vice-President in charge of the Political Section - U K

Vice-President in charge of the Economic and Adminis-
trative Section - U K

Economic Director - U K

Administrative Director - U K

Vice-President in charge of the Communications Section
- U S

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Admiral King
General Arnold

Gen Hilldring
Gen Strong
LOG

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NOV 17 1971

RHP

CM-CUT-2879 (7 Nov 43) 1610Z med

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD C 69
052040A
glw

WDCC
6th Nov
2200Z

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr.: W 4501/7479 6th November 1943

To AGWAR for the combined Chiefs of Staff and repeated to USFOR for British Chief of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHMGS NAF 509

We had understood from previous telegrams FAN 217 and AGWAR 7513 and FAN 248 that the allocation of posts as between British and American would be agreed between the 2 governments and appointments made by them. We have not been officially informed of these allocations which we should like to have on the assumption that the vice president economic and administrative section is to be British the ranking United States economic post would be the deputy vice President of that section and Mr Henry F Grady's appointment can be made accordingly. Will the Governments also appoint the directors of the administrative and economic sub stations.

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)

No sig

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING
LOG

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RHP

CM-IN-3891 (7 Nov 43) 0002Z vo

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 5, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 1780

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-5314

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 270, from The Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary of State has recommended to the President
and received the latter's approval to the appointment of the
former Assistant Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry F
Grady, to the ranking U S economic post on the Allied control
commission for Italy.

It is our assumption that the ranking U S economic post
on the commission is that of deputy Vice President of the
economic and administrative section. Unless our assumption
is incorrect or unless you have comments you desire to make
on the matter, please announce Mr. Grady's appointment on
his arrival at your headquarters.

It is contemplated that Mr. Grady will continue his status
as a civilian, which is permitted under the terms of the
agreement.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING
LOG

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NOV 17 1971

RHP

CM-OUT-1775 (5 Nov 43) 1513Z vo/ejm

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 5, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 1781

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-5315

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 269, from The Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary of State has approved the provisional
appointment of Mr. Samuel Reber as deputy Vice President of
the political section of the Allied control commission for
Italy.

The State Department understands that you have expressed
the desire to keep Reber on your staff for services in Italy.
Providing this understanding is correct and unless you have
comments to make on the matter, please announce Mr. Reber's
provisional appointment at such time as you consider
appropriate.

It is contemplated that Mr. Reber will continue his
status as a civilian, which is permitted under the terms of
the agreement.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING
LOG

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NOV 17 1971

PHD

CM-OUT-1776 (5 Nov 43) 1513Z vo/ejm

18

Central Commission

COPY No.

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Secretary of State,
Washington.

Moscow
Dated November 1, 1943
Rec'd 11:15 a.m., 2nd.

1814, November 1, 5 p.m.

DELAM 54

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

Referring to Wilson's telegram No. 1863, October 29, 5 p.m. from Algiers to the Department. We are now able to give you the terms of reference of the commissions provided for by the Conference as they were agreed to at the closing session.

On the proposal of the British the functions of the Political Military (Mediterranean) Commission have now been divided between two commissions known as the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission. The first is to have its headquarters near the Allied Commander in Chief in Italy and the second to sit in London.

The Advisory Council for Italy will be composed in the first instance of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation. Provisions made for the addition to the council as soon as practicable of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in viewing their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This council will deal with day to day questions other than military questions. The members will consult among themselves and refer to their Governments matters on which they desire political direction and may give advice to the Allied CINC with regard to matters other than military operations. They may also make separate recommendations with regard to any action they feel should be taken by the CINC or the control commission requesting the British and United States Governments to ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct the Allied CINC accordingly. They are specifically expected to keep a watch over the operations of the Allied Control Commission and its functions. Furthermore it is provided that the Advisory Council will assume the direction of the Control Commission at such time as the Allied CINC believes it possible to turn over control to it by reason of cessation of active military operations in Italy or termination of need of military control.

In a separate public declaration the Conference here placed itself in favor of the progressive democratization of Italy, the timing for putting such measures into effect being left to the Allied CINC under instructions received from the combined Chiefs of Staff. The Conference further agreed, however, that the three Governments would consult with one another on the matter of timing at the request of anyone of them.

The European Advisory Commission which is to have its headquarters in London will be composed of representatives of the three Governments in the first instance, with a proviso that other Governments may be added later or may be brought in for participation in the discussion of matters of concern to them. This Commission is charged with the drawing up terms of surrender and provisions for execution of such terms with respect to enemy states and deciding upon the functions and jurisdiction of the control machinery required for such execution. In its work of drawing up the terms of surrender and methods of control, the Commission is to use as a basis the British aide memoire of July 1 on the subject and is also to select as it finds appropriate whatever material it may find useful in the United States proposals with regard to the treatment of Germany as contained in the papers submitted by us here on item seven of the conference agenda.

The Conference has also sent to the London Commission for its consideration the statement proposed by the British here on liberated areas a copy of which was received by us in Washington before we left and the Washington document entitled "Civil Affairs for France" which resulted from discussion between the Department and the British Embassy in Washington and which received the oral approval of the President on October 6.

The members of both of these commissions will be expected to make recommendations to their governments but they will not have the power of final decision.

It is provided that each commissioner member of either of these commissions is to have technical assistants, civilian and military.

It will be noted that the only information with regard to these commissions which is authorized to be made public by the conference is the references to them contained in the official communique of the conference.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy and Wilson and to London. For the Ambassador and Phillips.

HARRIMAN

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

October 23, 1943

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 762

FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF
STAFF USFOR LONDON
ENGLAND

Number R 4813

For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 258, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff

The Allied Control Commission for Italy is the
approved title requested as a matter of urgency in your
NAF 483

ORIGINATOR: OCS (Capt. Royal-USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

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PAH

CM-OUT-10384 (23 Oct 43) 2130Z mjc
CM-OUT-10385

Control Commission

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SECURITY
CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

October 23, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

CG

FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 760

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number R 4811

For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 257, from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This is reply to your NAF 474. Information as to the President's views regarding certain phases of the Mediterranean Commission were set forth in a cable to the American Embassy in Moscow, a copy of which was delivered to Ambassador Wilson by General Joyce. The final agreement as to the exact functions of the Mediterranean Commission will probably evolve during discussions at the present Moscow conference and until these discussions have been concluded, no further information can be furnished you with respect to this matter.

Your comments in NAF 474 regarding the operation of the Control Commission have been noted and are concurred in by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Your views as to the establishment of an advisory council are under consideration.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal-USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG

CM-OUT-10386

CM-OUT-10387 (23 Oct 43) 2131Z law

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NOV 17 1971

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Control Commission

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INFLAM #13.

From: The Secretary of State (Moscow).
To: The President and the Acting Secretary of State.
No: 1693, 22 October 1943.

Today at the regular session of the conference, before proceeding to the consideration of Item 3 of the agreed agenda, it was decided, in order to accelerate the business of the conference, to appoint a drafting committee composed of representatives of the 3 countries. As United States representatives on this committee I designated Hackworth and Dunn. In submitting the British proposal on Item #3, "the setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close cooperation with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers", after pointing out the real need for some machinery for close consultation between the three governments, Mr. Eden stated that his government envisaged two aspects of the question:

(1) The setting up in London of a Politico-Military Commission which would have broad terms of reference to deal with any problem of an European nature other than military operational questions arising from the prosecution of the war. This Commission would not have executive powers but would have very broad consultative powers. In view of the enlarged scope of the proposed Commission, which went far to meet the suggestions of the Soviet government, Eden pointed out that it was obvious that it could not conveniently sit in Italy or in Algiers. Then the question was raised by Eden of whether the French Committee of Liberation should

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SECRET
SECRET

be represented as one of the permanent members of the Commission, or whether such membership should be limited to the three powers represented at the conference. Concerning the question of participation of the French Committee, neither Molotov nor I made any observations. When this question is raised at tomorrow's session I intend to propose that it be referred to the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of state for their decision.

(2) The second aspect of the British proposal which deals with the mechanism of Allied control of the Italian armistice terms was then outlined by Mr. Eden. Three periods for the exercise of Allied control in regard to Italy were suggested in the proposal. The first period would run from the present time until the Italian government is established in Rome, which it is hoped would occur within a very brief period. There would be an Allied Control Commission under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces during this first period.

From the establishment of the Italian government in Rome until the end of the campaign in Italy or until the military supervision of the Control Commission was no longer considered necessary by the three governments would be the second period. The Allied Control Commission during the second period would be in full operation under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief, but alongside this Allied Control Commission there would be an Inter-Allied Advisory Council composed of high commissioners representing the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and if considered desirable, the French Committee, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as president of the Inter-Allied Control Commission would be advised by this council. Eden added that he thought that everyone present would agree that the Commander-in-Chief

should have final authority during the period of military operations. He pointed out that the high commissioners of the countries represented would also care for the interests of their respective governments and nationals.

The Commander-in-Chief would relinquish the presidency of the Allied Commission of Control and the high commissioners would assume in his place the executive direction of the work of control with the opening of the third period. In explaining the relations between the Politico-Military Commission sitting in London with broader terms of reference and the Inter-Allied Advisory Council, composed of the high commissioners of the countries represented, which would be set up in the second period, Eden stated that in the view of the British government the Inter-Allied Advisory Council would concern itself solely with problems arising out of the putting into force of the terms of surrender, while the Politico-Military Commission would deal with the broader questions of policy affecting Italy.

The question of the relationship of the proposed Politico-Military Commission in London and the suggestion for a United Nations Commission contained in a memorandum given by the British government to the Soviet Ambassador in London on July 1, was raised by Mr. Molotov. (This refers to a document received by us from the British on July 16 dealing with conditions for the termination of hostilities in Europe). Eden considered that the principles set forth in this memorandum of July 1 were still valid, although he pointed out that the memorandum given to Malysky represented the view of the British government at that time and the present proposal represented to some extent a development arising out of this memorandum. I was then asked by Molotov to tell him the views of my government concerning the British memorandum of July 1. I replied that

this memorandum had been given appropriate study and that while my government in general was favorably disposed towards the principles outlined in it, it would be necessary to give further and more detailed consideration to its contents before making any further statement on the subject. It was agreed at Mr. Molotov's suggestion to postpone consideration of the British proposal under Item three of the agenda until tomorrow's session.

The conference proceeded, at Molotov's suggestion, to consider item four of the agenda--the British proposal concerning an exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans. However, since there was to be some delay while the necessary papers were being collected, I suggested that it might be possible to dispose briefly of Item 5 on the agreed agenda--the United States proposal concerning methods of dealing with current economic and political issues and those which may arise as the war progresses. I then read the explanatory note which was set forth under Item 4 of our agenda as submitted to the Soviet government before the opening of the conference. I assured Eden, in reply to his inquiry, that our proposal did not in any sense mean opposition to the establishment of the commissions set forth in the British proposed procedure on Item 3 of the agenda.

A number of questions were asked by Molotov in regard to the wording of our proposal for consultation between the three governments thru diplomatic channels, particularly as to whether this was designed to create new machinery apart from the commissions proposed by the British to insure close consultation between the three governments. Our main purpose, I explained, was to insure that as they arose all questions might receive

considerations at the same time by the three governments, either in Washington, Moscow, or London as may be decided, to supplement on all questions of common interest the usual bilateral diplomatic exchanges. The conference agreed to refer my proposal to the drafting commission. In regard to the exchange of views on Italy and the Balkans, Eden stated that he had nothing further to add on the subject of Italy beyond what he had already said with regard to the carrying out of the armistice terms. Some surprise at this was expressed by Molotov who stated that the Soviet government had some general observations and specific proposals to which it attached the greatest importance to make on the subject of Italy. He stated that the absence of a representative on the spot who would be able to provide the Soviet government with the necessary information regarding developments of the greatest importance in every field had handicapped the Soviet government in its consideration of the Italian problem and it was for this reason that the creation of a Political-Military Commission was suggested by the Soviet government in the first instance. This absence of accurate firsthand information, he pointed out, had led to misunderstandings. He said that the putting into effect of the terms of surrender should be on a basis approved jointly by the three countries as the Soviet government was vitally interested in obtaining such information regarding the course of events in Italy affecting the political, economic and military situation. Eden and I were then asked whether we felt that there was sufficient guarantee that the terms of Italian surrender would be properly complied with and applied.

Eden then said that changes in the terms could only be made through the collective agreement of all three governments; that it was precisely to provide the Soviet Union with this much needed information that the

proposals for the appointment of high commissioners to the Inter-Allied Advisory Council had been made and in-so-far as the terms of surrender were concerned it had been made clear to the Italian government that the acceptance of Italy as a co-belligerent, which was done as a political convenience, in no sense involved any change in the conditions of surrender. He added that according to their information only passive cooperation was being received from the Italians and little help of a military nature could be expected from that quarter. The policy of the British government in regard to Italy was in accordance with the doctrine of payments by results approved by the Prime Minister.

Molotov then proceeded to read seven urgent political measures which the Soviet government desired to see our three governments put into effect in Italy. These proposals will be telegraphed as soon as received in written form. In general they deal with the elimination of all remnants of the Fascist regime, the establishment of democratic institutions and democratic rights and political activity in Italy, the release of political prisoners, the arrest of war criminals, etc. Molotov said that he felt it to be of the highest political importance for the three governments to agree jointly to the acceptance of these general proposals, which, however, could be amended during the course of the discussions.

In general, Eden said, many of these principles had been put in force already under AMGOT and that there was a general desire to include liberal and socialist elements in the Italian government almost immediately according to recent information from MacMillan and that following the signature of the protocol it was possible that Badoglio would resign as Prime Minister. The difficulty in this connection, he pointed out, was to find after twenty

years of Fascist rule authoritative leaders who were non-Fascist.

I stated, in response to Molotov's request for my views on the subject of the proposal, that I would have little to add of a definite nature to Eden's remarks and that he and I together or separately would be prepared to present tomorrow a chronological and detailed list of Allied policies in Italy since the invasion of Sicily; that there was nothing secret about these policies which had been carried out openly and that I was glad of the opportunity to give the Soviet government the fullest information on the subject. I then stated that on general grounds this war was being fought for the purpose of destroying every vestige of Fascism and Nazism and to uproot those doctrines and policies, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter and in other declarations of the United Nations. However, it was not yet clear as to the question of how far the Allies are going in the direction of setting up of governments of the type they desire to see established and in the use of force for this purpose. Regarding the punishment of war criminals, I stated that in my opinion Tojo, Hitler and Mussolini and their accomplices should be given a drumhead courtmartial and at sunrise on the following day there would occur an historic incident. (The Soviet delegation greeted this remark with great satisfaction). I then said that our primary task here was to set up as quickly as possible adequate machinery to insure the closest collaboration of all three nations in the task and that the complete eradication of Fascism was a task requiring immense effort and great organizations

After expressing pleasure at the statements which Eden and I had made, Mr. Molotov introduced an additional Soviet proposal for the turning over to the Soviet Union of the following Italian ships which had been

surrendered to the Allies; forty thousand tons of merchant shipping to proceed to Soviet Black Sea ports; one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines to be sent immediately to the northern ports of the U.S.S.R. This request was justified by the explanation that the Italian participation in the war against the Soviet Union had done incalculable damage to the Soviet Union and particularly to the Soviet naval and merchant fleet. Eden and I both agreed to submit this request immediately to our governments and urge upon them sympathetic consideration on a fair and equitable basis. Your early instructions as to the reply I should make on this last point will be appreciated.

HAMILTON

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

October 21, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 587

USFOR, LONDON ENGLAND
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number R-4702

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 253, from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Following is composite reply to your MAT 53, your
NAF 470 and your personal reply to McCloy:

The official title of the Control Commission will be transmitted to you at an early date. The directive contained in our FAN 248 should be amended as follows: Appropriate sentence in paragraph 1 (1) should now read "It is contemplated that only rear AMG responsibility for the control of Civil Affairs will be merged into the Control Commission for Italy." In same paragraph, following statement, in parentheses, should be deleted: "And appoint a Deputy President who will also be the Military Governor of occupied Italy." Paragraph 6, which states as follows, should be deleted: "The Vice President of the Economic and Administrative Section will be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government." Former paragraph 7 should now be paragraph 6. In paragraph 3 F (2) add "Civil" before "Air Transportation."

ORIGINATOR: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
LOG

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RHP

CM-OUT-9344 (21 Oct 43) 2240Z flw
CM-OUT-9345

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rmt

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
22 Oct
025Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-3082/574, 21 October 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHMGS from Holmes NAF 483.

Need decision on name of commission reference our NAF 470 in connection issuance of necessary directions and order constituting commission. Reply not later than 25 October would be appreciated.

Sig

NAF 470 is CM-IN-9967 (17 Oct 43)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
General Hilldring

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CM-IN-13027 (22 Oct 43) 0158Z med

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FROM: The Prime Minister

TO : The President

NO : 468, 20 October 1943

Your 390. Thank you very much. More important to me than the composition of the Commission is whether it should have executive and administrative powers. To this I should find constitutional difficulties in the House of Commons as well as personal objections. Our memorandum, which by agreement with Hull has now been communicated to the Soviet, proposes that the scope of the Commission should in the first instance be confined to Italian problems and its functions to making joint or several recommendations to Governments. I hope I may count on your support in urging the Soviet to accept these proposals.

If scope and functions of Commission are limited in this way, I would like to accord France full membership, as I understood was your intention when we discussed this in Washington in September. If, however, scope of Commission is subsequently enlarged, I agree that French representation should then be altered to correspond to that accorded to other United Nations.

(Finished by action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No executive authority was given to the French representative.)

JDJD B 52
181606A
HJN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
18 Oct
2049Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War

No: W2788/8917, 18 October 1943

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and the personal attention of Major General Walter B Smith and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff information Mideast from AFHQ signed Eisenhower W2788/8917 18 Oct nil.

These are 6 views on the relationship between the Politico-Military Commission, Allied CINC and Allied Control Commission B. The foregoing was .

1. This is NAF 474.

2. Whilst there is no objection to the Politico-Military Commission obtaining information from this headquarters on matters which concern them, Allied CINC must continue to receive instructions, whether political or military, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from them alone.

3. As regards the Allied Control Commission, experience in North Africa goes to show that so long as active military operations are being carried on, final authority regarding the political relations between the occupying armies and the local administration should remain with the Allied Commander in Chief.

4. When operations have ceased, the Commander in Chiefs interest is reduced to the safety of any bases and the security of any lines of communication on which he may be relying and normal diplomatic machinery can safely be allowed to function.

5. In applying this analogy to Italy, there would be 3 periods.

CM-IN-10939 (18 Oct 43)

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Control Commission.

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E. O. 12356

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To : War

No : W2788/8917, 18 October 1943

6. During the first period (from the present moment until the Badoglio government is in a position to exercise authority) it is thought that skeleton arrangements be made for a control commission .

7. Period 2 will be reached when the Badoglio government is in a position to exercise effective authority. During this stage, operations in Italy will be continuing, and the maintenance of the Commander in Chief's authority remains the governing factor. At this point, the Control Commission will become fully operative, and as soon as this happens the Russians and French, and also the Greeks and Yugoslavs, will have to be .

(Part two follows).

No Sig

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CM-IN-10939 (18 Oct 43)

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HJN

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CCWD
18 Oct
2051Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To : War

No : W-2788/8917, 18 October 1943

Second part of our W-2788/8917.

Associated with it. The following arrangement is recommended. Commander in Chief will be President of the Control Commission. His deputy will be day-to-day managing head. Advisory council to the Commander in Chief (in his capacity as President of the Control Commission) to be formed of high commissioners representing the USA, UK, USSR, French committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. They would meet and act as a body and make their own arrangements as to which high commissioner should be chairman (either the most senior or in rotation).

Para 8. The dual function of this advisory council should be to advise the President of the Control Commission on general policy and to take care of any special interests of the States represented on it or their nationals.

Para 9. Period three would not arrive until either the Campaign in Italy was at an end or, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the Allied Governments could bring the direct military control of the Italian government to an end.

ACTION: CC/S

No Sig

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
General Hilldring
Admiral King
Log

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(18 Oct 43) 2333Z

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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CCWD
17 Oct 43
422

INCOMING MESSAGE

Hold for the Pres

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 2674/8321, NAF 470, 16 October 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and for the personal attention of General Walter E Smith and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated Fatima signed Eisenhower cite FHMGS reference FAN 248, your 8432 of 23rd September and our MAT 53 this is NAF 470.

1. Need advice soonest what will be name of Commission. Directive in FAN 248 speaks of Control Commission, following Article 37 of Surrender. But the President and Prime Minister's Directive of 23rd September, reference number 8432, Paragraph 4, prescribed the title Allied Commission which we recommend.

2. FAN 248 presumably crossed our MAT 53 in transmission. Plans here consistent with essentials of Directive, but request your reconsideration of certain points. Our Paragraph 3 explained separation necessary between Mobile AMG 15th Army Group responsible for Military Government in Combat Zones and Static AMG in rear areas. Latter is already preparing for its own transformation, as to both responsibilities and personnel, into Commission. The Commission and arrangements for its assumption of responsibilities must be under immediate direction of Allied Commander in Chief and the Deputy President. On the other hand Commander in Chief 15th Army Group must have Command over Military Government in Combat Zone, with local freedom of action to insure that civil affairs are so conducted as to meet Military requirements on the spot. Necessary Directives to all concerned and coordination will continue under this Headquarters.

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CM-IN-9967 (17 Oct 43)

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E. O. 12356

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

Page #2

No. W 2674/8321, NAF 470, 16 October 1943

3. Accordingly submit most strongly:

- (A) That it is only the Static AMG whose responsibilities will be merged into Control Commission;
- (B) That Deputy President of Commission should not be required to assume title of Military Governor of Occupied Territory;
- (C) That Vice President of Economic and Administration Section should not be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of AMG.

As regards (A), we agree that functions of Static AMG in rear and Commission must be coordinated under Allied Commander in Chief, and that the former should be merged into the latter without disruption of Administration or dispersal of personnel.

As to (B), to announce a new Military Governor at this time would lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Considering the short time during which AMG is expected to continue in rear areas, the adverse effect on Italian morale or announcing a new Military Governor, and the desirability of maintaining clear distinction between Military Government and new situation where Italian Government will administer under Commissions Control, it had already been arranged for Alexander to remain nominal Military Governor over all territory subject to Military Government. Alexander has agreed to this.

As to (C), for like reasons objectionable and confusing to designate Commission Vice President by a Military Government title.

4. Request that Directive in FAN 248 be amended so that only Rear AMG will be merged into Commission, and that the Officers of Commission mentioned in Paragraph 3 above be not designated for any Posts in Allied Military Government. It is believed arrangements summarized in MAT 53 which are now in hand achieve the smooth transition from AMG to Control by Commission which is object of your Directive.

CM-IN-9967 (17 Oct 43)

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E. O. 12356

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

Page #3

No. W 2674/8321, NAF 470, 16 October 1943

As execution of program in MAT 53 is already under way,
prompt reply urgently requested.

No Sig.

NOTE: FAN 248 is CM-OUT-6210 (14 Oct 43) CC/S
MAT 53 is CM-IN-8874 (15 Oct 43) CCAC

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING

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CM-IN-9967 (17 Oct 43) 0353Z vc

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E. O. 12356

16 October 1943

Follows message for the Secretary of State from Hamilton, Charge d'Affaires, Moscow:

"1619, October 15.

"A note from Molotov dated October 14 informs me that British Ambassador in Moscow has informed Soviet Government that British Government would like the representatives of Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain on the Political Military Commission to deliver to French Committee of National Liberation in names of their governments identical notes containing an official invitation to the representative of the French Committee to participate in work of the Commission. The note states that in the draft proposed by British Government for the identical notes 'it is stated with reference to the competence of the Political Military Commission that the representatives of the three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation would give joint or separate advice to the three governments or to the Committee of Liberation but would not have powers to make final decisions nor would they of course interfere in the military functions of Allied commander-in-chief!'"

Now comes message from Hull for the President and Acting Secretary only:

"It would be well also to suggest for the President's consideration a message from him to Stalin clarifying limitation of French representative of that Commission in accordance with the President's view. As stated at our conference in his office of October 8th, that French representation would be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments decide that France has a direct interest and that the French are not to function as full members.

"As the arrangements for this political military commission were made in correspondence between the President, the Prime Minister and Stalin, it would be helpful to me at Moscow if clarification of this matter were undertaken before my arrival there."

State Department recommends following be sent from President to Stalin:

"In view of Mr. Molotov's note to the American Charge d'Affaires of October 14 and in order that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political Military Commission I think I should make clear that as indicated in my telegram to you of September 5 I feel that French representation should be restricted to

matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three governments establishing the Commission decide that France has a direct interest. I feel that in this regard French representation should correspond to that which I suggested in my message of October 13 should be accorded to the Governments of China, Brazil, Greece and Yugoslavia or to any other governments which may be mutual agreement be invited to participate. It was never my intention that the French Committee of National Liberation should function on the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States or enter into its deliberations on all subjects."

Note from Harry Hopkins. I have talked to Stettinius and Mathews about this and I think this message is all right. The State Department is anxious to get it off to Moscow tonight in order that it precede Hull's arrival. If you approve, I believe this message should be repeated to London.

From: The President
To: Marshal Stalin

No: Unnumbered, 16 October 1943

From the President to Marshal Stalin secret and personal.

In view of Mr. Molotov's note to the American Charge d'Affaires of October 14 and in order that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political Military Commission, I think I should make clear that, as indicated in my telegram to you of September 5, I feel that French representation should be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy, in which the three Governments establishing the Commission decide that France has a direct interest. I feel that in this regard French representation should correspond to that which I suggested in my message of October 13 should be accorded to the Governments of China, Brazil, Greece and Yugoslavia, or to any other governments which may by mutual agreement be invited to participate. It was never my intention that the French Committee of National Liberation should function on the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States or enter into its deliberations on all subjects.

Roosevelt

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President

No: 463, 16 October 1943.

Molotov's proposed amendment, making the Mediterranean Commission what is virtually an executive and governing body, goes far beyond what we had in mind. I am not prepared to agree to this extension of Russian and, as it would now be, De Gaullist powers of interference in a theatre where they have no troops and where all the burden is borne by us. We are also advising you officially through the State Department.

*Sent to the President
as White 3 - Shanghai La.*

SECRET

16 October 1943

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 390

Your 463. The following is a paraphrase of a message today sent to Marshal Stalin.

"In order to avoid misunderstanding with respect to representation on the Political Military Commission, and in view of Mr. Molotov's October 14 note to the American Charge d'affaires, I think I should make clear that, as indicated in my message to you of September 5, I feel that French representation should be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy, in which the three governments establishing the commission decide that France has a direct interest. In this regard I feel, as I suggested in my message of October 13, that French representation should correspond to that accorded to the governments of China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Brazil, or to any other government which by mutual agreement may be invited to participate. That the French Committee of National Liberation should enter into its deliberations on all subjects or should function on the same plane as the governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States was never my intention".

Roosevelt.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By _____

Date _____

A

DAD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 15, 1943

Rec'd 10:12 p.m.

No 1

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S.URGENT

1619, October 15, 11 a.m.

*from Dimitro
Moscow*

~~SECRETARY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY

A note from Molotov dated October 14 informs me
that British Ambassador in Moscow has informed Soviet
Government that British Government would like the
representatives of Soviet Union, the United States,
and Great Britain on the Political Military Commission
to deliver to French Committee of National Liberation
in names of their governments identical notes contain-
ing an official invitation to the representative of
the French Committee to participate in work of the
Commission.]¹]² The note states that in the draft pro-
posed by British Government for the identical notes
"it is stated with reference to the competence of the
Political Military Commission that the representatives
of the three governments and of the French Committee
of National Liberation would give joint or separate
advice

Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943
Vol. I, the Political - Military Commission
Page(s) 796.

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-2- #1619, October 15, 11 a.m., from Moscow

advice to the three governments or to the Committee of Liberation but would not have powers to make final decisions nor would they of course interfere in the military functions of Allied commander-in-chief." *Fokers*

Molotov states that in replying to the British Government the Soviet Government has agreed to official invitation to the representative of the French Committee to participate in Commission and Molotov continues "with reference to definition of the competence of the Political Military Commission the Soviet Government has proposed to make a change in the British draft of the official invitation to the effect that Political Military Commission should direct and coordinate activity of all military organs and of any civil authorities of Allies which are organized on enemy territory concerning questions of armistice and of control over fulfillment of the armistice and that in accordance with this the Political Military Commission can also issue from time to time instructions and directives to Government of Italy and, in analogous circumstances, to governments of other Axis countries, while military operational questions remain completely under the direction of the Allied commanders-in-chief."

HAMILTON

EL
WWC

USS PHOENIX via Navy ✓

Dated October 15, 1946

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

(B)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

[To the Secretary of State. Hicom very secret.] For the President and Acting Secretary only [Passed by Phoenix.]

DEIAM NO. 1

Hull

Appreciate receiving your Amdel three as the President's action will be most helpful in clarifying jurisdiction of political and military commission meeting at Algiers.

It would be well also to suggest for the President's consideration a message from him to Stalin clarifying limitation of French representative of that Commission in accordance with the President's view. As stated at our conference in his office of October 5th, that French representation would be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments decide that France has a direct interest and that the French are not to function as full members. (see President's message to Stalin of September 5th, on this subject).

OK
E

If the President also approves, the suggestion might be made to Soviets (and British as well) that China Brazil Yugoslavia and Greece might be invited to similarly limited representation of the political
military

-2-, DEIAM NO. 1, October 15, 2:50 p.m., from USS
PHOENIX via Navy.

cont
military commission at Algiers, You may wish to
keep Wilson informed of all these messages for his
strictly confidential information. |

[Handwritten initials]
Referring to Amdel No. 8 I am in agreement with
the memorandum which the British propose sending to the
Soviet Government prior to the conference, except that
the granting of full membership status to the French
Committee in either London or Algiers is not in accord
with my understanding of the President's position in
this matter. If the President sends the message to
Stalin, suggested above, it will clarify the question
of French representation as well as that of other
nations which have requested representation.

It should be clearly reiterated throughout that
military functions of the Commanders-in-Chief must not
be interfered with."

B2
" As the arrangements for this political military
commission were made in correspondence between the *B2*
President, the Prime Minister and Stalin, it would be
helpful to me at Moscow if clarification of this matter
were undertaken before my arrival there."

Signed HULL
end part 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

October 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In the attached telegram from Secretary Hull dated October 5 he suggests that the President should convey a message to Stalin clarifying the limitation of French representation on the Political Military Commission in accordance with the President's view as expressed at his conference on October 5. There is also attached a telegram no. 1619 from our Embassy at Moscow part of which deals with the same question of French representation on the Commission. If the President concurs that the action suggested by Secretary Hull is desirable there is attached a suggested draft message for transmission to Moscow. In such case it should be repeated to London for the Prime Minister.

A separate memorandum will be transmitted covering the further point raised by Mr. Molotov.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

~~Secret~~ ✓
TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PARTAIR
PLAIN

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Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

October 16, 1943

Charge to
\$

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

(C)

US. URGENT

~~HIGH CONFIDENTIAL~~

Please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin
from the President.

Quote

In view of Mr. Molotov's note to the American Chargé
d'Affaires of October 14 and in order that there may be no
misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political
Military Commission I think I should make clear that as
indicated in my telegram to you of September 5 I feel that
French representation should be restricted to matters other
than the military occupation of Italy in which the three
governments establishing the Commission decide that France has
a direct interest. I feel that in this regard French representa-
tion should correspond to that which I suggested in my message
of October 13 should be accorded to the Governments of China,
Brazil, Greece and Yugoslavia or to any other governments which
may by mutual agreement be invited to participate. It was

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

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E. O. 12356

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

-2-

never my intention that the French Committee of National Liberation should function on the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States or enter into its deliberations on all subjects.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

October 14, 1943

CG, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 97

USFOR, LONDON ENGLAND FOR BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF

Number R-4397

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 248, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The following is your directive from The Combined Chiefs of Staff for The Control Commission For Italy:

"Para 1. It is of the utmost importance that The Control Commission For Italy set up under Article 37 of the Additional Terms of Surrender and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure and that their functions be completely coordinated under one supreme authority. It is contemplated that AMG's responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into The Control Commission, but while the two organizations are functioning their personnel should be as nearly the same as practicable. In conformity with this, you will announce yourself as President of The Control Commission, (and appoint a Deputy President who will also be the Military Governor of Occupied Italy.) (Matter in parenthesis immediately preceding not yet agreed to by US and UK.)

Para 2. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT. The directives for AMG for Husky will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and Italian Government with the areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction. It is anticipated that those areas will be reduced to a minimum and that the responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into the Control Commission as soon as practicable.

Para 3. CONTROL COMMISSION.

A. FUNCTIONS

(1) To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under your orders and general directives.

CM-OUT-6210 & 6211 (14 Oct 43)

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Book Message

October 14, 1943

Page two

(2) To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.

(3) To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.

B. ORGANIZATION. The Control Commission will be divided into 4 sections:

- (1) Military
- (2) Political
- (3) Economic and administrative
- (4) Communications.

Each section will be in charge of a Vice President, and will be divided into subcommissions as indicated below:

C. The Military Section, 6 subcommissions:

- (1) Naval Forces
- (2) Land Forces
- (3) Air Forces
- (4) Prisoners Of War
- (5) War material factories
- (6) Material disposal

D. The Political Section, 3 subcommissions:

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Book Message

October 14, 1943

Page three

- (1) Foreign and internal political affairs
- (2) Civilian internees and displaced persons
- (3) Information, press, censorship

E. The Economic and Administrative Section, 2 subsections:

A. Economic :

B. Administrative, each under a director.

(A) The Economic sub-section, 8 subcommissions:

1. Finance
2. Foreign trade
3. Industry and commerce
4. Public works and utilities
5. Fuel
6. Food
7. Agriculture, forests and fisheries
8. Labor

commissions:

(B) The Administrative sub-section, 6 sub-

1. Interior
2. Legal
3. Public safety
4. Education, fine arts and archives

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SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Book Message

October 14, 1943

Page four

5. Public health

6. Property control

F. The Communications Section, 3 subcommissions:

1. Shipping and ports
2. Inland and air transportation
3. Posts and tele-communications

G. Each government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes.

H. The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander in Chief, through The Combined Chiefs of Staff. This is not intended to prevent direct communication on routine matters between the commission and London and Washington. All such direct communication would, of course, be authorized by the respective heads of sections and subcommissions, and a copy of every such communication made a part of the records of the commission.

Para 4. PERSONNEL

A. ALLOCATION OF POSTS BETWEEN U S AND U K. The commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in numbers of 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.

B. The allocation of the principal posts between U S and U K is as follows: (agreement not yet reached)

The Deputy Vice President of each section will be of opposite nationality to that of the Vice President.

The nationalities of heads of the subcommissions will be left to your decision and, in so far as possible, these posts will be distributed equally between the U S and U K; The assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality.

CM-OUT-6210 & 6211 (14 Oct 43)

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~~SECRET~~
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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Book Message

October 14, 1943

Page five

Para 5. Generally speaking the personnel of the Military, Economic and Administrative, and Communications Sections should have military status and the personnel of the Political Section should have civilian status. Military personnel may at the outset be used in the Political Section, but should be replaced with civilian personnel as soon as practicable. Arrangements may be made where necessary to employ civilian experts within the Control Commission.

Para 6. The Vice President of the Economic and Administrative Section will be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government.

Para 7. It is contemplated that provision will be made for representatives of the Dominions and the other interested United Nations to have access to The Control Commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point."

ORIGINATOR: CC/S


INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
LOG

CM-OUT-6210 (14 Oct 43) 2223Z JB
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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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
COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN


From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 582, 9 October 1943

State Department has sent to Molotov message in my Number 370
to you.

Roosevelt



DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

CCWD
8 October 1943
1014 Z

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 442 Filed: 08/0958 Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and most secret.

Your number 370 of October 5th.

Para 1. I agree with your proposed answer to
Molotov.

Para 2. Since we are in fact rejecting the Soviet
proposal it would be a good thing to tell Molotov that
we understand the Soviet Governments desire to play their
part in the control of Italy, and that we hope to propose
a scheme to them in the near future which we trust will
meet their requirements.

Para 3. I suggest that Eisenhower should be asked
to submit a scheme for consideration. I understand from
MacMillan who is here that this could be done without un-
due difficulty.

No Sig

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R.H.Parks Date May 10, 1972

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

No: 370, 4 October 1943

Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943, I suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean Area:

"To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State.

"Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.

"There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set up by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document agreed to by the three governments.

"The Control Commission acts directly under the Supreme Allied Commander to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so the commission must act under his direct control.

"On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of 'considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves with Germany.' Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore."

I will await your reply before asking the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

Roosevelt

041855 NCR 4310

- 1 -

[Printed in FRUS, 1943, II,
382-383]

WJL

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

2 October 1943.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Military-Political Commission
in the Mediterranean Area.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are informed that in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the so-called "Military-Political Commission in the Mediterranean Area" should perform all the functions assigned to the Control Commission to be established under Article 37 of the comprehensive surrender terms, and that military operational questions only should be under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The military implications of the Soviet proposal are of such importance that the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to bring this matter to the attention of their respective governments. It is their opinion that the new Military-Political Commission in the Mediterranean Area is in no sense a substitute for the Armistice Control Commission and should not be authorized to interfere in any way with or to infringe the duties of that Commission or of the theater commanders concerned.

One of the main objectives in establishing the Armistice Control Commission under the authority of the Allied Commander in Chief is to ensure his complete military control throughout Italy under the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the period of operations. This objective would not be accomplished if the Mediterranean Commission were to assume the functions of the Control Commission. It is intended that the Control Commission have attached to it an Advisory Council on which the Soviet Government and other interested Allies will be represented.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.J. Stewart Date 5-4-72

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A copy of this memorandum has been sent to London for submission to the Prime Minister.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date 5-4-72

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1 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

In accordance with your request, there is enclosed a brief of all correspondence available in the Map Room concerning the setting up of a "Control Commission" under General Eisenhower and a "Political Military Commission" for the Mediterranean area.

It appears from this correspondence that the idea of the "Control Commission" originated with the British in their first draft of the long terms and was formally agreed upon by the United States, the British, and the Russians in Paragraph 37 of the long term surrender document of Italy (See Paragraph 5 in inclosure). When it was decided not to have the long term document signed, and in response to General Eisenhower's inquiry, the short directive was sent to General Eisenhower (See Paragraph 7 in inclosure). Paragraph 4 of the short directive embodied a substitution for Paragraph 37 in the long term document. This provision in the short directive was slightly broader in scope than in the long term document because, without all the provisions of the long term document being in effect, the "Control Commission" had to have slightly broader power as it would not be administering an armistice but would in most cases be acting on the spot. However, notwithstanding the above, the "Control Commission" was still supposed to be strictly acting under the Commander-in-Chief in the field.

When the Russian government was informed of this short directive it stated (See Paragraph 8) that this "Control Commission" was unnecessary in view of the "Military Political Commission", which was proposed by

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
by W. J. Stewart, 1-1-73

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Marshal Stalin on August 22 and agreed to by the President on September 9. It appears from this that the Russian government is confused as to the true part each of these commissions is to play in this particular theater of war. It is evident from Stalin's own statements (See Paragraphs 1 and 2 in inclosure) that he expects the "Military Political Commission" to consider "the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves from Germany", that is, the broad overall military-political concept in the Mediterranean basin. Such a concept would in no way conflict with the much narrower function of the "Control Commission" under the Commander-in-Chief, which would deal only with particular problems in the particular areas which had been liberated by the Anglo-American armies.

I discussed this whole question informally with the American members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy; General Hildring; and Mr. Dunn). They said that the present American view, which is in line with the British view, is that the two commissions in no way conflict with each other. The "Control Commission" acts under General Eisenhower to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time on specific problems in those portions of Italy actually liberated by the Anglo-American armies. On the other hand, they consider that the members of the "Military-Political Commission" should discuss, study, and advise their governments on general military and political principles touching not upon just those liberated areas of Italy but rather upon all areas in the Mediterranean basin. This commission would have no plenary powers but merely refer its views and advice back to the three governments. This was the view set forth by the President to Marshal Stalin when he agreed to the establishment of the "Military-Political Commission". These three governments, acting upon such recommendations and advice, would then

arrive at a decision amongst themselves, which joint decision, if it affected General Eisenhower, would then be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be passed on to General Eisenhower. It was pointed out by General Hilldring that if this "Military-Political Commission" was placed directly over General Eisenhower and could issue directives to him, as proposed by Russia, (See Paragraph 8 in inclosure) he would in effect be serving two masters who would have no direct contact with each other. One would be the Combined Chiefs of Staff sitting in Washington, and the other would be the "Military-Political Commission" sitting in Sicily.

It thus appears that to accept the Russian proposal would eliminate the very important "Control Commission" agreed upon by the three governments in the long term surrender document and would place General Eisenhower directly under the "Military-Political Commission". To accept such a proposal would be wholly impractical and set a dangerous precedent for future operations.

The American members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee therefore requested informally that we should remain adamant in our position in having the two committees set up to operate in their respective spheres as outlined above, and that this correct relationship of the two committees should be set out for the benefit of the Soviet Government.

Accordingly, I suggest that the enclosed message be sent to the Prime Minister for his concurrence or comment and then be sent to M. Molotov.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls. -
Incl.1 - Brief of correspondence.
Incl.2 - Draft of message to Prime Minister.

~~SECRET~~

1. On 22 August 1943, Marshal Stalin, in a message to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, said:

"I believe that the time is ripe to organize the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: the United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer."

2. On 26 August 1943, Marshal Stalin, in a message to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, said:

". . . I think the information so far received is quite insufficient in order to be able to judge what measures are necessary on the part of the Allies during negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity for participation of a Soviet Representative in taking decisions in the course of negotiations. Therefore I think that the time has fully come for establishment of a Military-Political Commission of representatives of the three countries which I mentioned to you in my message of August 22nd."

3. On 4 September 1943, (CITE 060108/09 to Alusna Moscow), the President in a message to Marshal Stalin said:

"Turning now to a commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject."

4. On 9 September 1943, (CITE 100240/09 to Alusna Moscow), the President in a message to Marshal Stalin said:

"I agree on the immediate setting up of the Military-Political Commission but I think Algiers better than Sicily on account of communications and, therefore, suggest that they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, September twenty-first. They will be given full information in regard to progress of current and future negotiations but, of course, should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their Governments before final action.

"I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this Commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained."

~~SECRET~~

5. In the meantime, on 26 August 1943, the comprehensive surrender terms with Italy as approved by the President and the Prime Minister and agreed to by Russia were sent to General Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CITE FAN 203 to Algiers, 26 Aug '43). In these terms was included the following:

"Para 37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."

6. On 18 September 1943 (CITE NAP 409 from Algiers, 18 Sept 1943), General Eisenhower made certain suggestions relative to this question:

"Acceptance of an Allied organization in the nature of an Armistice Commission, but possibly with a different title from which the Italian administration would accept guidance and ultimate instructions. Allied Military Government would gradually disappear and its personnel be integrated where necessary in the new organization, while we might agree to suspend the application of certain rights under the Armistice and regard the reformed and liberated Italy as a co-belligerent."

7. Then on 23 September 1943 (CITE FREEDOM #8432 to Algiers, 23 Sept '43) in response to General Eisenhower's suggestions, the following directive, agreed upon by the President and the Prime Minister was sent to him by the President:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions."

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander-in-Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio government on military, political and administrative matters."

To the above was attached a commentary by the Prime Minister of his views, which included the following:

"Badoglio can be told that it is no part of our plan to install Allied Military Government everywhere. If he will cooperate we are ready to hand over territory to his government as quickly as it is free from the enemy. This offer applies to the historic mainland of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The dealings of the United Nations with the Italian government in the territories which they are allowed to administer will be carried out through a Control Commission."

Thus at the present time the above mentioned directive and commentary are General Eisenhower's current instructions.

8. On 26 September 1943 (CITE State Dept #1470 from Moscow), Mr. Molotov, in a message to Secretary Hull after having been furnished a copy of the above mentioned directive to General Eisenhower, stated:

"The Soviet Government considers that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the functions and powers set forth in point four of the message is not necessary in view of the fact that, as is well known, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms there was established by the decision of the three governments the Military-Political Commission, as a result of which the question of a control commission envisaged in Article 37 of the detailed terms should be considered as falling away. Therefore, in opinion of Soviet Government there should be included in the work of the Military-Political Commission the coordination and direction of the activities of all military organs organized won enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities with regard to questions of the armistice and of control over the execution of the terms of the armistice and consequently there should be included in the functions of the Military-Political Commission the issuance from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative questions for the Badoglio Government while military operational questions remain entirely under the direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Soviet Government, therefore, sees no reason for establishment of an Allied Commission under the direction of General Eisenhower with above mentioned functions."

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PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943, I suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean area.

Message begins. To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State.

Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.

There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set up by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document agreed to by the three governments.

The Control Commission acts directly under General Eisenhower^(*) to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so the commission must act under his direct control.

On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of "considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves from Germany." Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects General Eisenhower^(*), he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore. End message.

I will await your reply before ^(**)directing the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

ROOSEVELT

This message sent to the Prime Minister as # 370, 4 October 1943. Also sent to Molotov via State Department.

() "General Eisenhower" changed to "the Supreme Allied Commander" by Adm. Leahy*

*(**) "Directing" changed to "asking"*

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

No: 362, 27 September 1945

I am sending you for your information a message I have just received from Molotov. You will notice that Paragraph 4 is exactly the opposite of the view expressed by Uncle Joe in his message to you which you passed on to me in your No. 420. I am having the State Department check Paragraph 4 to see if it is an error in coding or transmission, and if necessary, to go to Molotov to see if it is an error originating in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Message for the Secretary of State from Moscow dated September 25 begins:

"A secret message dated September 25 was delivered at the Embassy this morning, addressed to the Secretary of State and signed by Molotov. As translated by an officer of the Embassy, the message reads as follows:

"Having considered your letter of September 22, 1945, which gives the contents of the President's proposed message to General Eisenhower concerning Italy, it is considered necessary by the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of the following:

"1. In view of the situation existing in Italy at the present time, the Soviet Government considers it particularly necessary to expedite the signature with Italy of detailed armistice terms.

"2. Obviously, the Allies must be concerned with the strict execution by Italy, under Allied control, of the detailed terms of the armistice ratified and agreed upon by them. The Soviet Government therefore, sees no reason, as is proposed in point two of the message, for giving instructions dealing with the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy, especially since from the contents of point two, it is not exactly clear what lightening of the terms is being considered. It should also be borne in mind that a change in the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments can take place obviously only with the agreement of the Governments concerned.

"3. It is considered by the Soviet Government that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the powers and functions described in point four of the message is not necessary. As is well known, the Military Political Commission was established by decision of the three governments, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms. As a result of this, a controlled commission as proposed in Article 37 of the detailed terms should not be needed. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, therefore, the work of the Military Political Commission should include the direction and coordination of the activities of all military bodies

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

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organizing conquered enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities concerned with the armistice and control over execution of the armistice terms. Consequently, in the functions of the Military Political Commission, there should be included the issuance from time to time of directives and instructions on military, administrative and political questions for the Badoglio Government. Operational military questions should remain entirely under the Allied Commander in Chief's direction.

"Therefore, the Soviet Government sees no reason to establish an Allied Commission with the above mentioned functions under the direction of General Eisenhower.

"4. The Soviet Government is opposed to Italy's fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany.

"5. The inalienable right of the Italian people, as expressed in point three of the message, to decide the form of government which they will adopt eventually is agreed upon by the Soviet government, as are points five and six of the proposed statement."

End of message from Molotov.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By _____

Date NOV 1 1971

Moscow
Dated September 26, 1943
Rec'd 9:55 a.m., 27th

To: Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S. URGENT

1470, September 26, 1 p.m.

Your 881, September 21, 11 a.m.

There was delivered at the Embassy this morning a secret Communication dated September 25, signed by Molotov, reading in translation made by an officer of the Embassy as follows:

.

3. The Soviet Government considers that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the functions and powers set forth in point four of the message is not necessary in view of the fact that, as is well known, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms there was established by the decision of the three Governments the Military Political Commission, as a result of which the question of a control commission envisaged in Article 37 of the detailed terms should be considered as falling away. Therefore, in opinion of Soviet Government there should be included in the work of the Military Political Commission the coordination and direction of the activities of all military organs organized won enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities with regard to questions of the armistice and of control over the execution of the terms of the armistice and, consequently there should be included in the functions of the Military Political Commission the issuance from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative questions for the Badoglio Government while military operational questions remain entirely under the direction of the Allied Commander-in-chief.

The Soviet Government, therefore, sees no reason for establishment of an Allied Commission under the direction of General Eisenhower with above mentioned functions.

v

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From: War
To: Algiers

No: FREEDOM 8432, 23 September 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By ASJ
Date FEB 23 1973

From the President of the United States to General Eisenhower.

In reply to your NAF 409 and NAF 410, the following directive has been agreed upon by the Prime Minister and myself:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions.

"2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians, within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany.

"3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

"4. The Allied military government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied

Commander-in-Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5. You will encourage, in all practicable ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany.

"6. You are authorized to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable."

Following is message Number 418 from the Prime Minister to me on the same subject which I send to you as commentary. Begins.

"Following are our comments as sent to MacMillan. Following from Prime Minister to Resident Minister Algiers:

"1. After considering your telegram Number 1812 and NAF 409 I and my colleagues in the War Cabinet have come to the following conclusions.

"2. It is vital to build up the authority of the King and the Brindisi Administration as a government and have unity of command throughout Italy. The way to do this is indicated in the Foreign Secretary's telegram Number 1928. Despite Badoglio's broadcast tonight we still feel it is essential that the King should go to the microphone at Bari, tell the Italian people he is there and proclaim that Badoglio is carrying on the legitimate government of Italy under his authority. This is needed not only for the Italian people but for the Italian representatives and garrisons abroad.

"3. The King and Badoglio should be told that they must build up the broadest based Anti-Fascist coalition government possible. Any healthy elements that can deliver some good should be rallied in this crisis. These points should be made plain in the King's broadcast.

It would be very useful if Count Sforza and the professors who claim to represent the six parties were willing to join in the common effort.

"4. It must however be clearly understood that none of these provisional arrangements dictated by war needs, will stand in the way of the full choice by the Italian people of the form of democratic government which they prefer.

"5. The question of giving the Badoglio government an allied status does not come into our immediate programme. Co-belligerency is good enough. On this footing we should work for the gradual conversion of Italy into an effective national force against Germany, but, as we have said, she must work her passage. Useful service against the enemy will be recognized by us in the adjustment and working of the armistice terms.

"6. In return we expect Badoglio to continue to work for the Allies on the basis of the armistice. Our principle will be payment by results.

"7. Badoglio should be free to declare war on Germany, and by doing so he would at once become, though not an ally, a co-belligerent.

"8. Badoglio can be told that it is no part of our plan to install Allied military government everywhere. If he will cooperate we are ready to hand over territory to his government as quickly as it is free from the enemy. This offer applies to the historic mainland of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The dealings of the United Nations with the Italian government in the territories which they are allowed to administer will be carried out through a Control Commission.

"9. It would make it much easier for us all if the instrument of surrender even though somewhat superseded could now be signed. It is

true that many of the clauses could not be operated by the Brindisi administration in their present situation. But as we go up the peninsula and turn over territory to the Italian government, these questions will become real. We do not want to put ourselves in the position of having to haggle over every requirement with the government. The longer we leave it, the more difficult it becomes to get the instrument signed, so I hope Eisenhower will get Badoglio's signature to it as soon as possible on the basis suggested in the Foreign Secretary's telegrams (NO's 1905 to Algiers and 6275 to Washington).

"10. The stipulation about Mussolini was of course governed by physical facts; but should certainly stand for the record.

"11. This programme should be put to the King and Badoglio at once. The first essential is that the King should make the public announcement suggested. This should not surely await final refinements of policy.

"12. I am asking the President, if he agrees with this programme, to instruct General Eisenhower accordingly. I am also informing the Soviet government. Meanwhile you should without waiting urge the King to broadcast at once as proposed in Para's 2 and 3."

ROOSEVELT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

September 21, 1943

11 a.m.

US URGENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

MOSCOW, (U.S.S.R.).

881.

At the direction of the President and in view of the military situation in Italy, you are instructed to inform the Soviet Government that it is proposed to send the following message to General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater. In conveying this message to the Soviet Government you should transmit a very close paraphrase:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5." (For complete directive to General Eisenhower, See FREEDOM #8432, 23 Sept 43)

HULL

20 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

In accordance with the recommendation made this date by you and the Secretary of War, the President is today requesting concurrence by the Prime Minister of Great Britain with the following message for General Eisenhower.

He desires that you inform Moscow without delay that this government proposes in view of the military situation in Italy to send to the Supreme Allied Commander General Eisenhower the following message:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions.

"2.

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5. (For complete directive to General Eisenhower, See FREEDOM #8432, 25 Sept 1943)

"6. "

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

No: 352, 20 September 1943

I will send the following message to General Eisenhower immediately upon your concurrence.

In view of the existing situation in Italy the earliest practicable action is important.

"1. You will withhold long term armistice

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5."(For complete directive to General Eisenhower, see FREEDOM #8432, 25 Sept 43).

Roosevelt

From: Premier Stalin
To: The President

No: Unnumbered, 12 Sept 1943

I have received your message of September 10th.

1. The question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission we may consider in general to be solved. Vice-Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, whom you know well, was appointed by the Soviet Government as its plenipotentiary. Mr. A. E. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the USSR to the Allied Governments in London was appointed as Vice-Plenipotentiary. They will take with them the group of the responsible Military and Political experts and the small technical staff.

I think that the beginning of work of the Military-Political Commission can be set for September 25-30. I have no objections regarding Algiers as the place of work of the Commission at the beginning, having in view that the Commission itself will decide the question of expediency of its going to Sicily or to any other place in Italy.

I find that the consideration of the Prime Minister regarding the functions of the Commission are sound, but I consider that some time later, we shall be able to determine more precisely the functions of the Commission regarding Italy as well as other countries, taking into consideration the first experience of the Commission's work.

2.

From: The President
To: Marshal Stalin

No: Unnumbered, 9 Sept 1943

Thank you for your message received today.

1. I agree on the immediate setting up of the Military-Political Commission but I think Algiers better than Sicily on account of communications and, therefore, suggest that they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, September twenty-first. They will be given full information in regard to progress of current and future negotiations but, of course, should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their Governments before final action.

I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this Commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained.

2.

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Combined Chiefs of Staff

September 6, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL FREEDOM ALGIERS Number 7023

USFOR, LONDON, FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF Number R-2740

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 217, from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Part 1.

Your plan for armistice control contained in NAF
350 conforms generally to the requirements of the sit-
uation. The Control Commission should operate through
its various agencies both in occupied and unoccupied
territory.

The following outline of organization and functions
of the Control Commission has been agreed to and is commu-
nicated for your guidance. Fuller directive will follow.

Para 1. Functions.

(A) To regulate and execute the instrument of
surrender under the orders and general directions of
the Allied Commander In Chief (General Eisenhower).

Part 2.

Para 2. Organization.

(A) The Allied Commander In Chief (General Eisen-
hower) will be Ex Officio President of the Commission
and will receive his instructions from the U S Govern-
ment and H M G through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A
senior officer will be appointed who will serve as his
deputy on the Commission.

(B) The Commission will be divided into 4 sections
each in charge of a Vice President. 3 sections will be
(1) Military, (2) Economic, and Financial, (3) Political.
It has not yet been decided whether transportation or
information should form the fourth separate section. Hope

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Sept. 6, 1943

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to let you have an early decision.

(C) The Military Section will be divided into the following subcommissions. (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, (6) Material Disposal.

(D) Amongst other subcommissions or subsections under the Vice President of the Economic and Financial section will be the following:

- Para 1. Interior.
- Para 2. Justice (Law, Order, Police, Prisons)
- Para 3. Finance.
- Para 4. Foreign Trade.
- Para 5. Industry and Commerce.
- Para 6. Public Works and Utilities.
- Para 7. Fuel.
- Para 8. Food.
- Para 9. Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries.
- Para 10. Public Health.
- Para 11. Labor.

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The above subdivisions are based on the groupings of the Italian Administration.

(E) Where the functions of the Military and the Economic section overlap, liaison and, if necessary, exchange of personnel, will be arranged between the subcommissions concerned.

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Part 3.

Para 3. Personnel.

(A) Allocation of posts between the U S and the U K.

(1) The President of the Commission will be the Allied Commander In Chief (General Eisenhower).

(2) The Commission will be organized throughout on an Anglo-American basis according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in numbers of 50 oblique 50 at any rate in the higher posts.

(3) The allocation of the posts of the 4 Vice Presidents will be a matter for discussion between H M G and the U S Government.

(4) The Deputy Head of each section and subcommission of the Control Commission will be a representative of the government which does not provide the head of that section or subcommission.

(B) Status of personnel employed in the economic and political sections. It is proposed that the personnel of the military and economic sections should have military status except in special cases; that the political section should be on a civilian basis.

Para 4. Division between the Control Commission and Allied Military Government.

It appears impracticable and unnecessary to lay down either a geographical or a functional line of demarcation between the Control Commission and A M G and the 2 organizations should be made to work as a single machine. It is therefore suggested that the personnel of the Civil Affairs Staff should be available equally to act as members of A M G or of the Control Commission.

Para 5. Request you will communicate your views regarding the number of personnel who will be required

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to give effect to the above plan, specifying what numbers you already have available or over and above those requisitioned in your NAF 296 and NAF 341.

Para 6. It is contemplated that provision will be made for representation of the interested United Nations at the Headquarters of the Control Commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Strong
Cofs

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CM-OUT-2704 (6 Sept 43) 2102Z flw
CM-OUT-2705

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From: The President
To: Marshal Stalin

No: Unnumbered, 4 September 1943

1.

8. Turning now to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?

9. I have no objection to adding a French member of their meetings because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with the surrender terms already signed I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

10. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.

Roosevelt.

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30 AUG 1943
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-8720 30 August 1943

Date- 2-15-61

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

Part 1.

Paragraph 1. Developments since opening of operations HUSKY have indicated need for plans for (A) Military Government and (B) Armistice control, to be available for use either concurrently or alternatively in accordance with tactical and political situation.

Paragraph 2. My NAF 295 gave outline plan for Military Government up to and including Rome in conformity with approved operational plans at that stage which did not take into account probability of an armistice.

Paragraph 3. (To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHMGS NAF 340) Situation is now difference.

Paragraph 4. My Staff is preparing to deal with an early Armistice.

Paragraph 5. We have prepared a plan, having in mind the following factors:

Subpara A. Certainty that Italy will remain an active theater of operations and that continued German opposition may be expected as we press forward;

Subpara B. Desirability of producing a situation wherein a national government responsive to Italian public opinion would be in conspicuous exercise of its authority;

CM-IN-23780 (31 Aug 43)

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From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W-8720

30 August 1943

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Subpara C. The need, however, to take whatever action might be necessary to enforce the Armistice and to maintain conditions and services essential to our military needs;

Subpara D. The supply responsibilities inevitably incident to the occupation;

Subpara E. The limiting factor of personnel, since it appears that any Armistice control authority must rely at least at the outset chiefly on personnel requested in my NAF 296.

Part 2.

Paragraph 6. In the absence of any special directive I have given authority for planning to proceed on the following basis.

Paragraph 7. Outline plan post Armistice situation would necessitate (A) allied military government organization to follow closely behind combat troops and organize and administer territory as occupied, and (B) an Armistice control authority (ACA) answerable to Commander in Chief to supervise the administration by the Italian Government of territory not subject to military government. This area would expand as Army advanced.

Paragraph 8. Armistice control authority would have military, Naval and Air disarmament divisions to be staffed by service officers representing those forces in this theater. It would also have sections corresponding generally to the Italian government departments. These sections would supervise activities of the Italian government (A) to oversee the execution of the terms of the Armistice, (B) to insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conformed to the requirements of an allied base of operations, especially transportation

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From: Algiers
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and communications, and (C) to carry out any directives the allied governments might give. The plan provides for a thinly-spread control over local administration in the field. Experience in Sicily shows that with Fascist party ousted public administration and economy are temporarily paralyzed; but situation on the mainland may not be the same. During initial period when dislocations are to be expected, regional authorities with expert staffs would be established to apply control where necessary. When conditions approached normal they would be eliminated. Thereafter Armistice control authority would conform to Italian system of direct control of provinces from centre of government.

Paragraph 9. Staff for the divisions of the ACA, other than for disarmament, will be found largely from personnel originally requested for POST-HUSKY military government, some of whom have arrived. Officers have already been charged with development of ACA plans and training in order that this headquarters may be prepared promptly to take essential steps if an Armistice should be made.

Paragraph 10. Detailed execution of the plan. In event of an Armistice allied military governments for regions 2 and 3 would be converted to Armistice control as soon as possible and AMG Sicily would also conform. Projected national headquarters of AMG would be organized as central office of Armistice control authority. From military government personnel now available or requested regional teams would be prepared to act for Armistice control authority in territory as it was cleared and placed under Italian administration.

Paragraph 11. Number of personnel required for armistice control must depend upon conditions in Italy and the effectiveness of Italian administration. It is estimated however that number already requested for

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From: Algiers
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POST-HUSKY will suffice.

Paragraph 12. It is requested at least 1 senior American and 1 senior British official should be elected and sent to AFHQ without delay to assist in existing planning for ACA and who should subsequently become senior executives in the ACA organization.

No Sig

NAF 296 is CM-IN-14313 (20 Jul 43) CCS
U295 is CM-IN-13772 (19 Jul 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
GEN HILLDRING
ADM KING
LOG

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-15-61

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

CM-IN-23780 (31 Aug 43) 2307Z mcs

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From: The Combined Chiefs of Staff
To: General Eisenhower
No: 6109, 26 August 1943.

Long Term Surrender Document (Extract)

Following is text of comprehensive surrender instrument terms with Italy which has been approved by the Prime Minister and the President:

.....

"Para 37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."

CM-OUT-10995 and 10996, 26 Aug 43)

From: Marshal Stalin
To: The President and the Prime Minister
No: Unnumbered, 26 August 1943.

. . . I think the information so far received is quite insufficient in order to be able to judge what measures are necessary on the part of the Allies during negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity for participation of a Soviet Representative in taking decisions in the course of negotiations. Therefore I think that the time has fully come for establishment of a Military-Political Commission of representatives of the three countries which I mentioned to you in my message of August 22nd.

Text of telegram received by Foreign Office from His Majesty's
Ambassador at Moscow dated August 24th.

~~SECRET~~

I asked Molotov last night what he thought of the latest peace feelers and the way they were being handled.

2. He said that Stalin was preparing an answer to the message from the Prime Minister and the President. It would be to the effect that the Soviet Government "considered it necessary" to set up an Anglo-Soviet-American politico-military commission to examine the terms of surrender of Italy and of all the other countries likely to fall away from their allegiance to Germany. The commission should be established in Sicily and should get to work at once. The Soviet Government were making this suggestion because they were conscious of their aloofness from such questions and felt that they should properly take a part in them. They recognized that they had been kept fully informed of decisions taken, but they thought the time had come for them to play a part in the taking of them. I asked if he had any criticisms to make of terms of surrender. He said "No".

3. Some such suggestion as this was bound to come sooner or later. Here we had some sense of its likelihood. It has probably now been brought to a head by Quebec meeting and by discussion in Anglo-American press of the absence of a Soviet representative. An article entitled "Quebec and the Soviet Union" in the current number of "War and the Working Classes", which you will doubtless have seen, (Reuters' correspondent covered it fully) shows which way the wind is blowing

~~SECRET~~
- 1 -

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by J.S. Date 5-4-72

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4. I expect that at first sight Soviet Government proposal when made will be unwelcome to you, because at this stage presence in our councils of a Soviet representative (suspicious and probably inarticulate until prompted from Moscow) will be a nuisance. But for myself I feel strongly that we should face this nuisance and accept the proposal without demur, because it seems to me that immediate and full Soviet participation in our debates about Italy would go a long way not only towards stilling grievances but, more important, towards laying the foundations of real cooperation in the settlement of Europe. Admission of the Soviet Government to our present councils would open the door to ourselves and Americans when the time came to provide for the future of Finland and Eastern Europe.

Sent to the President at Quebec Conference as WHITE 137, 27 Aug 45.

~~SECRET~~
- 2 -

COPY

From: Marshal Stalin
To: The President

No: Unnumbered, 22 August 1943.

.

I believe that the time is ripe to organize ^{a?} the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: the United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer.

I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

.