

*Box 20*

Folder 6. MR 210 Moscow Conference (1)  
Sec. 1. 18-28 October 1943.  
(October 6-28, 1943)

*Box 20*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Sealed by order of the President on 6 November, 1943

Concerns Secretary Hull's special report  
of conversations with Stalin.

Box 32

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER  
TRAFFIC DIVISION CODE CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300

**SECRET**

*I am the only one who has  
seen this. I have sent an acknowledgment  
to Cairo <sup>US</sup>.*

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

4 November 1943

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ONLY

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered,

Filed 022226

Most secret for the President only from Hull.

In the far East after German defeat (this ends  
a message in another code). Please flash acknowledge-  
ment to me at Cairo.

No Sig

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

*for*  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

Operations Division, WDGS  
Executive Office TTH

October 28, 1943

*WAT*

SECURITY CONTROL

MA  
MOSCOW RUSSIA

Number 792

For Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff reference your number 24 of October 28

For your information the US Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the situation in Italy is such that it would cause a delay much less an abandonment of OVERLORD. Our view is that in Alexander's estimate insufficient weight has been given to our great naval supremacy and complete dominance of the air. We are now reexamining the situation in regard to landing craft with a view to giving Eisenhower all possible support without prejudice to OVERLORD. Discuss this with Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden and Ismay and use it as you deem advisable in discussion with Soviet authorities.

ORIGINATOR: GENERAL HANDY  
INFORMATION: JCS - ADMIRAL LEAHY  
ADMIRAL KING  
GENERAL ARNOLD  
SGS  
LOG

CM-OUT-12663 (28 Oct 43) 2017Z law

**SECRET**

COPY No. 5

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

**SECRET**

SECRET, PRIORITY *OP*

28 October 1943

*WSE*

From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, Moscow

For the eyes of Secretary Hull only from the President.

I am made very happy by your splendid achievement in putting things through. I know the China part of it was due to your personal insistence.

Very confidentially I expect to turn up in North Africa shortly and would have to leave here by November ninth at the latest. I understand you are due back November seventh and I hope much that you can keep this schedule. It is imperative that you and I talk before I go. I would want to take Bohlen with me so you can use your judgment as to whether he should return with you and make an immediate turn around or whether you should leave him in North Africa to join me on my arrival there.

If the Marshal finds it impossible to meet me I suggest he fly as far as Basra even for one day. This is of supreme importance. The rest of the time I hope he would let Mr. Molotov sit with Mr. Churchill and me.

The Generalissimo will, I hope, meet us at close of the meetings.

All good luck and congratulations again.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1300, EWT, 28 October 1943

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.F.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

281725 NCR 8682

SECRET  
SECRETARY HULL AS

WS

October 28, 1943

Send to the Naval Attache in Moscow (for the eyes of Secretary Hull only: 2 / 6)

FOR: SECRETARY HULL

I am made very happy by your splendid achievement in putting things through. I know the China part of it was due to your personal insistence.

Very confidentially I expect to turn up in North Africa shortly and would have to leave here by November ninth at the latest. I understand you are due back November seventh and I hope much that you can keep this schedule. It is imperative that you and I talk before I go. I would want to take Bohlen with me so you can use your judgment as to whether he should return with you and make an immediate turn around or whether you should leave him in North Africa to join me on my arrival there.

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The Generalissimo will, I hope, meet us at close of the meetings.

All good luck and congratulations again.

ROOSEVELT

281725



**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

*fu*  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

October 27, 1943

MILITARY ATTACHE AMEMBASSY  
MOSCOW RUSSIA

Number 788

General Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff in reply to the last paragraph of your dispatch number 9

It is our understanding that you now have latest information on the projected buildup of United States forces for OVERLORD. Information as to status of construction in preparation for OVERLORD and details concerning British Forces are not available to us. For security reasons, we do not feel that a weekly or biweekly report should be sent you concerning details of the buildup for OVERLORD. As changes take place in projected movements which result in difference between actual strength from presently projected strength in major components, you will be informed. It is believed that this will keep you sufficiently informed at all times on this matter. If at any time you feel that additional information is necessary, advise us what information is desired.

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: GEN HANDY  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-OUT-12098 (27 Oct 43) 20202 ejm

**SECRET**

COPY No.

12

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

**SECRET**

SECRET  
PRIORITY

27 October 1943

*WLI*

From: Opanav  
To: Alusna, Moscow

For the Secretary from the President.

My 262234.

First sentence should read QUOTE In regard to turning over naval vessels and merchant ships to the Soviet, the President desires that Italian shipping, both naval and merchant now in Allied possession, be used wherever REPEAT wherever it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause, etc. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 0935, EWT, 27 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

271356  
NCR 8449

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>RDO WASHN</u>		MAPROOM	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY <u>LT COMDR KELLY</u>			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

RC7 SVC MSG, 8449  
 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

RCA ADVISES DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
 ADDRESSED TO US NAVAL ATTACHE MOSCOW,  
 NSS 271356 NCR 8449 AT 0550 GMT, 28TH.

MAPROOM....ACT  
 FILE.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-0000-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL  
WS  
fw  
WASL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECURITY CONTROL

October 26, 1943

MILATTACHE AMEMBASSY  
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Number 785

For Deane Moscow Russia, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire you to explore the subject (your CM IN 13360, October 22, 1943) on the premises stated herein and to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Shuttle bases for U S aircraft-we visualize shuttle operations when special weather and operating conditions dictate rather than as a standard practice. Our requirements are estimated at approximately 10 bases, so located as to provide best shuttle for heavy bombers striking appropriate targets from U K and Italy, as well as being properly located to strike appropriate targets before returning to U K and Italy. Possibly best estimate of division is 5 in North and 5 in South. It is appreciated that plans for locations must be kept revised to capitalize on moving bases forward with Russian advance. We desire Russians furnish gas, oil, bombs, ammunition and houseing. As we desire to keep permanent U S ground personnel on these bases to a minimum, consideration must be given in selection of bases to ease with which Russians can accommodate, say not to exceed 3 Combat Wings arriving from 1 mission. For planning purposes, our estimate of total ground personnel required (both U S and Russian) is 6 per airplane, including medicos, mechanics, specialists, bomb and gas servicers, communications, weather, administration, military police and house-keeping. Provision for security from Russian fighters and AA should also be made in case individual airplanes or separated AAF units are diverted by weather and forced into Russian bases.

Weather-we desire all Russian basic weather ciphers so that all Russian weather broadcasts can be interpreted by U S. In exchange for this, we will give Russia our ciphers for any of our weather broadcasts Russia desires. This is,

CM-OUT-11636 (26 Oct 43)

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Deane's  
# 7

90-100 planes in each wing

SECRET

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

SECURITY CONTROL

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

Page 2.

Number 785

October 26, 1943

felt to be the only completely satisfactory solution. In this connection, due consideration has been given to the possibility of our weather data reaching Japanese because of wider distribution of our ciphers. Failing in above suggestion, we desire to receive weather data concerning certain additional areas on exchange basis using special cipher therefor. Such limited service now being received on part of the Siberian route, but is inadequate for our Alaskan, Aleutian, and Chinese operations. Our interest in the Russian weather for (A) shuttle bombing and for (B) transport route north of Teheran requires all soviet weather data west of longitude 75 degrees east; for (C) Chinese operations, all weather from 60 degrees to 160 degrees east; for (D) Siberian route weather from 90 degrees to 180 degrees.

Air Transport-relative military importance and urgency of routes and services outlined in special report given you prior to departure are; 1st, and by far of greatest importance, is ALSIE route, in accordance JCS 392 and Secstate, instructions, August 5, 1943, to AMEMBASSY. 2nd in importance, because of short distance, is service from U S to Moscow via U K and possibly Stockholm. 3rd, extension of present service north from Teheran to Moscow, in accordance previous diplomatic negotiations. 4th, execution of agreement for improved connecting services at Teheran, in accordance with terms already suggested to Soviet Government by Ambassador Standley. Any agreement relating to service to or through Teheran should include some arrangement for improving the facilities and operations of U S aircraft at the Russian controlled Qualeh Morgeh Airport at Teheran. Authorization for any of the above services should be on a minimum frequency basis of 1 round trip weekly with minor technical details left for subsequent agreement between participating services

ORIGINATOR: JSC (Capt Royal-USN)

INFORMATION: GENERAL HANDY, GENERAL ARNOLD,  
ADMIRAL KING, LOG

CM-OUT-11636

(26 Oct 43)

2209Z mjc

**SECRET**

COPY No. 16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

**SECRET**

SECRET  
OF PRIORITY

October 26, 1943

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In regard to turning over naval vessels and merchant ships to the Soviet, the President desires that Italian shipping, both naval and merchant now in Allied possession, be used when-  
ever it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause (with due reference to the terms of the Admiral Cunningham Agreement if and as amended), without any final transfer of title to any Nation at the present time. \*

The question of permanent title to ships and other material surrendered by Italy while in an enemy status or by other enemy countries hereafter can be determined at a later date without prejudice to the interest of the allied nations, and without adversely affecting the present and prospective Italian war effort against Germany.

ROOSEVELT

\* should be "whenever"  
See covering message

Released from the White House Map Room  
1810, EWT, 26 October 1943.

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

ACR 2399  
26 2234

**SECRET**

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED

Collect (Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter)

TELEGRAM SENT

SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Charge Department:  
Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge to  
\$

October 26, 1943

NO DISTRIBUTION

*of memo* ~~AMERICAN EMBASSY,~~  
*ad usum* MOSCOW.

~~AMDEL No.~~

~~SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE PRESIDENT AND  
ACTING SECRETARY.~~

In regard to turning over naval vessels and merchant ships to the Soviet, the President desires that Italian shipping, both naval and merchant now in Allied possession, be used wherever it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause (with due reference to the terms of the Admiral Cunningham Agreement if and as amended), without any <sup>final</sup> transfer of title <sup>to any nation</sup> at the present time, ~~when, Italy is a co-belligerent with us.~~

The question of permanent title to ships and other material surrendered by Italy while in an enemy status or by other enemy countries hereafter can be determined at a later date without prejudice to the interest of the allied nations, and without adversely affecting the present and prospective Italian war effort against Germany.

*Roosevelt*  
~~King~~

PA/D:RA:ACK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

26 October 1943

*WZT*

From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, Moscow

Secret for the Secretary from the President.

The following is the point of view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as regards paragraph b and c of ALUSNA 192114.

It would not be deemed advisable to push Turkey at this moment into a declaration of war on the side of the Allies since the necessary compensation to the Turks in war material and war supplies including armed forces and ships would divert too much from the Italian front and the proposed Overlord operation. However, inquiries could be started on basis of lease by Turkey as a neutral of airbases and transportation facilities.

Sweden should not be asked at this time to make a large system of air bases available to Allied use since the necessary employment of Allied defending forces and Allied war material together with equipment and maintenance supplies and personnel would cause too great a diversion from Overlord operations. This would not debar later consideration of seeking lesser air bases from Sweden along the line of those recently obtained in the Azores.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1815, EWT, 26 October 1943.

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

NCR 8398  
212229

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET ✓  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Collect { Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,  
October 26, 1943

Charge Department:

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to  
\$

AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
MOSCOW.

AMDEL

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING  
~~SECRETARY~~

The following is the point of view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs  
of Staff as regards paragraph b and c of ALUSNA 192114.

It would not be deemed advisable ~~at this time~~ to push Turkey  
*at this moment* into a declaration of war on the side of the Allies since the  
necessary compensation to the Turks in war material and war  
supplies including armed forces and ships would divert too much  
from the Italian front and the proposed Overlord operation.

Sweden should not be asked at this time to make *large*  
*a large portion of* air bases available to Allied use since the necessary employment  
of Allied defending forces and Allied war material together with  
equipment and maintenance supplies and personnel would cause too  
great a diversion from Overlord operations. This would not debar  
later consideration of seeking lesser air bases from Sweden  
along the line of those recently obtained in the Azores.

*Howson inquiries could be started on basis of base by Turkey  
as a neutral of air-bases and transportation*  
Roosevelt  
*facilities.*

PA/D:RA:FHH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

**SECRET**

SECRET  
PRIORITY, OPERATIONAL

26 October 1943

*WSE*

From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, Moscow

Secret for the Secretary from the President.

The seven points of policy outlined in the Soviet proposal, your DELAM 13 and 14, are in conformity with this Government's policy towards Italy. It would appear advisable, however, that the acceptance thereof be conditional on such preamble as indicated by you in your 1715, October 24, 1 p.m.

It may be well to make two observations for your guidance. First, that the time when these seven points of policy can be made effective must be governed by military factors in Italy, and, secondly, in the carrying out of point 6, no steps should be adopted, even in this early stage, which would not meet with the prior approval of the supreme allied commander-in-chief or would run contrary to our announced policy of permitting the people (in this case, of Italy) ultimately to choose their own form of democratic government.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1805, EWT, 26 October 1943

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

NCR 8397  
262226

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

CLEAR

AIRGRAM

Collect ( Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge Department: **X**

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

**S AMERICAN EMBASSY,**

**MOSCOW.**

**AMDEL no.**

**SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE PRESIDENT AND  
ACTING SECRETARY.**


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PA/D:RA:ACK:EJD

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



**SECRET**

SECRET  
OF PRIORITY

October 26, 1943

*WAC*

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY HULL. FROM THE PRESIDENT.

The reports of your Moscow conversations are both helpful and stimulating, and I am delighted with the way you are handling these important negotiations and with the progress you are making.

Warm regards to you all.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1805, EWT, 26 October 1943.

*George M. Elsey*  
GEORGE M. ELSEY  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

**SECRET**

NCA 8400  
26 2240

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED

SECRET ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

CLEAR

AIRGRAM

# TELEGRAM SENT

Collect { Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

\$

*OP Printy*

## Department of State

*Washington,*

October 26, 1943

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY HULL FROM THE PRESIDENT.

The reports of your Moscow conversations are both helpful and stimulating, and I am delighted with the way you are handling these important negotiations and with the progress you are making.

Warm regards to you all.

~~Acting~~

*Roosevelt*

PA/D:RA:ACK

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

26 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Herewith for your information are copies of four messages which have been sent this date by the President to the Secretary of State.

Your attention is invited to the fact that these messages have not been paraphrased, and therefore must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

4 Incls.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

26 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

Herewith for your information are copies of four messages which have been sent this date by the President to the Secretary of State.

Your attention is invited to the fact that these messages have not been paraphrased, and therefore must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

4 Incls.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>NAVY CODE ROOM</u>	<u>NSS</u>	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY <u>LT COMDR KELLY</u>	FOR ACTION	MAP ROOM	PRIORITY
DATE _____			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

(SERVICE MESSAGES RCA, NCR NUMBERS: 989, 988, 994, 1035)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE FOLLOWING INFO HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM RCA ADVISING DELIVERY OF MESSAGES INDICATED TO ALUSNA MOSCOW AT TIMES SET FORTH:

NSS	262226	NCR 8397	DELIVERED AT 27/10	0930 GMT
	262229	8398		1255 GMT
	262234	8399	27/10	1050 GMT
	262240	8400	27/10	1050 GMT

NOTE: NO ADVICE HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED AS TO DELIVERY OF NSS 271356 NCR 8449.

CC TO FILE.....MAPROOM.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

BJR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 28, 1943

Rec'd 12:47 p.m. 29th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1765, October 28, 11 a.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY.

At yesterday's meeting after again postponing the consideration of the Soviet proposal for shortening the war until today's session, Molotov inquired whether Eden and I had received any instruction from our Government's in regard to the seven political measures which the Soviet Government had proposed concerning (\*) that he had just circulated letter which he regarded as a joint Anglo-American document outlining the principles which the Allied Command in Italy was following in the political field. Molotov then suggested that the Soviet proposals, together with Eden's letter, be sent to the drafting committee for them to prepare for submission to the conference a short resolution setting forth in general the political principles which our three Governments agree should be applied in Italy. He said he did not believe we should attempt at the present time to go into great detail in regard to the activities of  
the political

-2- #1765, October 28, 11 a.m., from Moscow.

the political authorities in Italy at this conference but to confine ourselves to a short general resolution which could be published. I stated that it was my belief that the substance of the seven measures which the Soviet Government had proposed in regard to Italy were generally in harmony with the policies of the U. S., but he added that it must always be remembered that the military situation was still dominant in Italy and that it might be well therefore to consult the Allied Commander in Chief before making definite decision. It was decided to postpone final decision on whether or not to publish any resolution which might be agreed upon on the subject of Italy until the drafting committee had presented the text. There was a general feeling, however, that it would be extremely beneficial to publish any such resolution.

Eden then introduced a draft of a declaration regarding common policy on the question of the liberated areas (this draft was submitted to the Department of State prior to my departure). He suggested that after exchange of views on general policies involved that this document be turned over to proposed London Commission for consideration. I agreed with Eden's proposal and said that I saw a connection between the question of  
the liberated

-3- #1765, October 28, 11 a.m., from Moscow.

the liberated areas and the attitude towards the French Committee which was the next point on the agenda. I then went on to say that in regard to most of the questions of the liberated areas in France the question will continuously arise in discussions between our Governments as to how far the Allied Governments are willing to go in setting up by force, if necessary, the type of government in these countries which we would all desire to see. I said I thought that there could be no question that our three Governments would desire to see democratic institutions established in these countries, but there were times we felt in view of the varying conditions and varying opinions on the length to which we could go in actually setting up and maintaining such governments, that a very flexible attitude should be maintained. I said I thought it was a very appropriate question to be considered by the London Commission which would be composed of able, experienced officials in close touch with their governments.

Molotov said that while he thought we could agree on the general line he agreed with the suggestion to refer the question of the liberated areas for detailed study to the London Commission.

Returning to

-4- #1765, October 28, 11 a.m., from Moscow.

Returning to the question of a common attitude towards the French Committee, Eden stated that the difficulty lay in the fact that there was no recognized Government of France and whether or not the French Committee was transformed into a government would depend in the last analysis upon the wishes of the French people following their liberation. He then submitted the document which was prepared in Washington entitled "Civil Affairs for France" on the manner of associating the military representatives of the French National Committee in the planning for civil administration when Allied military operations begin in France. After some technical discussion as to the exact mechanics of this arrangement it was agreed to submit the question to the London Committee.

The Conference adjourned until four o'clock October 28, when we would discuss the Soviet proposals for shortening the war in restricted session.

HARRIMAN

WFS  
(\* ) apparent omission

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

MK 2  
281014Z  
lm

INCOMING MESSAGE

*fu*  
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No. 24 28 October 1943

From Deane for J C of Staff.

First item on today's agenda was to be further Soviet questioning on the statements made by Ismay and me concerning OVERLORD. I did not hear the questioning because we had simply given them a frank statement of quadrant decisions and a statement of the preparations now underway for OVERLORD. In answer to their questions we could only have repeated and possibly expanded on what we had previously said. One hour before the meeting—me—Eden and Ismay called on Mr Hull and informed him of a telegram they had received from the Prime Minister which quoted a message from Eisenhower which in turn included a full quotation of Alexander's estimate of the Italian situation which had been presented at a Commanders conference yesterday or the day before. The Prime Minister instructed Mr Eden to show this complete telegram to Mr Stalin. This Mr Eden is to do tonight. In view of the above it was decided to ask postponement of today's discussion of OVERLORD. Until the reaction of Mr Stalin to Alexander's estimate are known, one cannot tell what future developments will be. Cutting of the discussion today and presenting the message tonight will, in my opinion, carry the inference to the Soviets that OVERLORD will be delayed or possibly abandoned because of the Italian situation.

No Sig

ACTION: JCS (CAPT. ROYAL USN)  
INFORMATION: OPD  
SGS  
GEN. ARNOLD  
ADM. KING  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

CM-IN-16983 (28 Oct 43) 18057 ong

SECRET

COPY No. 16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394A800

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, S

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <b>28 OCT. 1943</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODERSON <b>0656/28</b>	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <b>HATCH/ALLENSWORTH</b>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ALLENSWORTH</b>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT. COMDR. CARLSON 271123 NCR 933-1003-1114-978-993-1008

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (PAGE 1 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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TEXT

PART 1 271123 NCR 1003	PART 4 271316 NCR 978
PART 2 271123 NCR 993	PART 5 271414 NCR 993
PART 3 271145 NCR 1114	PART 6 271646 NCR 1008

(PERSONAL NAD SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN)

I AM SURE YOU WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LED UP TO ACCEPTANCE BY SOVIETS OF FOUR NATIONS DECLARATIONS AND PARTICULARLY THE INCLUSION OF CHINA.

AT THE FIRST FORMAL MEETING MOLOTOV SUBMITTED AN AGENDA WHICH INCLUDED ALL OF POINTS PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY EACH GOVT

EXCEPT THE DECLARATION. WHEN SECRETARY POINTED THIS OUT MOLOTOV SAID IT HAD BEEN OMITTED BECAUSE AS HE HAD HAD NO

REPLY TO THE SOVIET CABLE OBJECTION TO A FOUR NATION DECLARATION COMING OUT OF A THREE NATION CONFERENCE HE HAD ASSUMED

WE WERE NOT PRESSING THE SUBJECT. HE READILY AGREED TO ITS INCLUSION HOWEVER AND IT WAS PLACED SECOND ON THE AGENDA.

AT THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WHEN THE DECLARATION WAS TAKEN UP THE SECRETARY PRESENTED A BRIEF BUT CLEAR AND FORCEFUL

ORAL STATEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DECLARATION AND TIMELINESS OF ITS ACCEPTANCE AT THIS CONFERENCE. MR. EDEN FULLY SUPPORT-

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-80520-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

271123 NCR 933 - 1003

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (PAGE 2 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

ED SECRETARYS STATEMENTS. MOLOTOV STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR A FOUR NATION DECLARATION TO RESULT FROM A TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE BUT HE WAS READY TO CONSIDER A TRIPARTITE DECLARATION TO WHICH CHINA AND PERHAPS OTHERS MIGHT ADHERE TO AT A LATER TIME THE SECRETARY AGAIN FORCEFULLY DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL WHY CHINA WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE DECLARATION AND THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ADVANCED BY MOLOTOV ON WAYS AND MEANS BY WHICH A TRIPARTITE DECLARATION MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA. BUT HE CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE THE IN-APPROPRIATENESS OF THE INCLUSION OF CHINA AT THIS MEETING AND THE MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING COMMENT. THE SECRETARY STOOD FIRM IN HIS POSITION AND STATED THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A DECLARATION FROM THIS MEETING TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD ADHERE WITHOUT CHINA. HE SUGGESTED HOWEVER THAT THE QUESTION OF CHINA BE HELD IN ABEYANCE AND THAT THE DECLARATION BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH A VIEW TO ASCERTAINING WHETHER AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AS TO THE SPECIFIC TERMS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVREGS.)

FORM 13

16-50820-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

271123 NCR 933 - 1003

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (PAGE 3 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

THE POINTS OF THE DECLARATION WERE THEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AND IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ALTHOUGH THERE WERE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE INTENT AND LANGUAGE OF THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION TO THRASH OUT BEFORE REACHING AN AGREEMENT. IT WAS EVENTUALLY DECIDED THAT A DRAFTING COMMITTEE SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THESE POINTS AND REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE.

AFTER A GOOD MANY HOURS DISCUSSION LASTING OVER SEVERAL DAYS THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE POINTS UNDER QUESTION THE FINAL LANGUAGE OF WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED. IN THE MEANTIME THE SECRETARY TOOK EVERY OCCASION THAT PRESENTED ITSELF BOTH DURING AND AFTER THE FIRST LUNCHEON GIVEN BY OUR HOST, AT INFORMAL MEETINGS DURING THE RECESS PERIODS OF THE CONFERENCES AND DURING A PERSONAL CALL ON MOLOTOV IN THE KREMLIN TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SINCERITY OF OUR DESIRE TO DEVELOP INTIMATE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND TO DEVELOP AGREEMENTS AND METHODS OF WORKING TOGETHER IN

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

**SEALED SECRET**

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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271123 NCR 933 - 1003

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (PAGE 4 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

THE INTERESTS OF WORLD SECURITY AND FOR THE SOLUTION OF OTHER WORLD PROBLEMS. AS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THESE TALKS AND THE

ATMOSPHERE OF THE CONFERENCE WERE MAKING REAL PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING A SPIRIT OF FRIENDLINESS THE SECRETARY URGED UPON

HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINA IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS AND AS AN ORIGINAL SIGNATORY OF THE DECLARATION. YESTERDAY AT THE

FORMAL MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE MOLOTOV ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THE INCLUSION OF CHINA AS AN ORIGINAL SIGNATORY PROVIDING IT WERE PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN HER ACCEPTANCE BEFORE THE CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. ON THE OTHER HAND HE POINTED OUT THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DELAYS OTHER WAYS SHOULD BE FOUND TO OBTAIN HER SIGNATURE TO THE END THAT THE DECLARATION BECOME A FOUR NATION DECLARATION AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE CONFERENCE. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT PRESSING THE ALTERNATIVE AS HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT A PROMPT ANSWER COULD BE OBTAINED FROM CHUNGKING AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW EMPOWERED TO SIGN BEFORE THE CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

10-5020-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

271123 NCR 933 - 1003

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (PAGE 5 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

MIND OF ANY OF US HERE THAT THE SINCERITY AND DETERMINATION OF THE SECRETARY HAVE BEEN THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN BREAKING DOWN SOVIET RESISTANCE TO THE INCLUSION OF CHINA. WE RECOGNIZE THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AS BEING A GREAT PERSONAL ACHIEVMENT ON THE PART OF THE SECRETARY. MR. EDEN HAS SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY FULLY THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS AND COOPERATED IN EVERY WAY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE.

IT SEEMS PLAIN TO US THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO JOIN IN A THREE NATION DECLARATION BUT RELUCTANT TO INCLUDE CHINA IN THE FIRST INSTANCE FOR REASONS NOT FULLY CLEAR. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW FAR THE FEAR OF EMBROILING THEMSELVES WITH JAPAN PLAYED A PART OR WHAT EMPHASIS THEY PLACED ON THE INCREASED PRESTIGE THAT WOULD COME TO THEM BY LIMITING IT TO THE THREE NATIONS. I BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT THEY WERE NEVER AVERSE TO CHINA PLAYING A CERTAIN PART AT SOME FUTURE TIME.

THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THE VICTORIES OF THE RED ARMY AND THE GROWING SENSE OF STRENGTH AND SECURITY HAVE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

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NCH 18

16-50620-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
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DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

271123 NCR 933 - 1003

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE. (PAGE 6 OF 6)

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

HAD AN INFLUENCE IN SETTING ASIDE THEIR FEARS OF OFFENDING JAPAN. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS GIVEN TO US THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS DISPOSED TO COOPERATE TO SOME EXTENT AT LEAST IN THE PACIFIC WAR AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF GERMANY. THEY APPEAR NO LONGER TO FEAR JAPAN AND I HAVE THE FEELING THAT THEY WANT THE PACIFIC WAR ENDED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN EUROPE.

PIA.....ACTION

FILE.....

*copy sent to State Dept via Op 13 by direction Adm Brown*  
*Copy given to Admiral Leahy by Map Room*

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50500-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

RF  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Chungking

Dated October 27, 1943

Rec'd 5:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2032, October 27, 10 p.m.

Foreign Office requests me to inform Secretary  
Hull that full powers are being telegraphed to  
Chinese Ambassador to sign four power declaration  
and to express thanks of Chinese Government to  
Mr. Hull for what he has done for China in this  
connection. Please inform Moscow.

G.USS

KLP

NMC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 27, 1943

Rec'd 10:55 a.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1755, October 27, noon

DELAM 34

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY

The substance of the important decision of the Conference at its meeting yesterday to accept virtually unchanged the text of the Four Nation Declaration with the participation of China as an original signatory was reported in my telegram DELAM 31 last night. I would merely like to add that the discussion, while entirely friendly, at times encountered certain obstacles which were only with difficulty overcome. The Soviet Government was particularly interested in ascertaining whether Article Six, in which the signatories bound themselves not to employ their armed forces after the termination of hostilities within the territory of other states except for purpose of the Declaration, would

-2- #1755, October 27, noon, from Moscow

would apply to air and naval bases resulting from the existing or future treaties between any one of the signatories and any other power. I confined my reply to the statement that I thought that Article six, taken in conjunction with the preceding articles and with the whole intent of Declaration was sufficiently clear and that it was in the nature of a self denying ordinance which the Great Powers voluntarily assumed in order to allay any suspicions which might on the part of the smaller nations. I purposely avoided being drawn into a flat statement in regard to any specific instances on this point. My general explanation of meaning and intent of the Declaration, of which Article six is an important part was finally accepted by Molotov.

In regard to Article eight of revised draft as communicated to you in DELAM 25 Molotov was interested to find out whether or not the phrase "existing relationships" applied equally to published and unpublished agreements defining such relationships and said if it did it would mean that we would have to exchange information in regard to any  
unpunished

-3- #1755, October 27, noon, from Moscow

unpublished agreements which any of the signatories might have or would conclude with other states. Since we had included that article in order to allay any (repeat allay any) Soviet suspicion in view of their relations with Japan and Molotov seemed somewhat concerned over the entire article, I suggested that it be eliminated, to which he readily assented and Conference agreed.

After adoption of text of the Four Nation Declaration and agreement to include China as an original signatory Molotov said that he would like to present a resolution which would be considered and adopted by the Conference, in connection with it. He suggested that under article that a committee composed of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain be created to work out plans for the creation of a world organization in order not to imperil results already achieved and not to delay the proceedings further. I agreed that that was an interesting suggestion and might well be considered subsequently by the Conference.

In addition to Four Nation Declaration the  
Conference

-4- #1756, October 27, noon, from Moscow.

Conference considered British proposal on subject of general responsibility as against separate areas of responsibility in Europe. Mr. Eden said that his Government was very decided in its opposition to the creation of separate spheres of influence in Europe or for that matter anywhere in the world on part of the Great Powers. I took occasion during this discussion which preceded the adoption of Four Nation Declaration to emphasize view of the United States Government that the proper approach to international problems was to agree on general set of principles which would guide us all in consideration of individual questions which merely form a part of the general problem. In every sphere of international collaboration these general principles should precede and not follow the consideration of any set of questions. After this general statement I said that on this particular question my Government hoped there would be no decision adopted at Conference in favor of separate spheres of responsibility.

Eden said they attached special importance to the first and last articles of their proposals, first of which sets forth principle that each people has the

-5- #1756, October 27, noon, from Moscow

has the right to choose for itself its form of government and way of life provided it respects equally the rights of other peoples, and second, which would bind the Three Powers not to seek to create separate areas of responsibility in Europe and not to recognize such for others, but to affirm a common interest in the well being of Europe as a whole.

Molotov fully shared views expressed by Mr. Eden and it was first decided that Articles one and four outlined above might be included in Four Nation Declaration. This suggestion however, was subsequently dropped in order to permit a final agreement on the Declaration.

The Conference then turned to general question of federations. Molotov read Soviet statement subsequently circulated in writing which very strongly opposed as premature in every sense any attempts at the present time to plan for or encourage schemes of federations in Europe. The general argument was that there was no opportunity under present conditions for peoples concerned to give free expression to their desire on this point and that the governments  
in exile

-6- #1756, October 27, noon, from Moscow

in exile or even governments immediately constituted after liberation would not be in a position to speak authoritatively for their peoples on such a question. The Soviet statement however said that the Soviet Government would be willing at the proper time to give further study to this question in the light of the experience of post war cooperation with other members of the United Nations and conditions existing after the war.

The Soviet statement pointed out that some of the schemes of federation being talked about were unpleasantly reminiscent of the former cordon sanitaires against the Soviet Union. Eden remarked that it was hardly necessary to state that his government was not interested in any cordon sanitaires against the Soviet Union but was very much interested in one against Germany. He said that he agreed in general with Mr. Molotov's observation and therefore, did not insist on his proposal but in his view it was largely a matter of timing and that further exchanges at an appropriate moment might be made on this question. I confined myself to a statement on the question of confederation

-7-, #1756, October 27, noon, from Moscow.

confederation that the United States Government, while it had not gone into this question in great detail, attached the greatest importance to the rights of small nations to have full liberty of action to develop such matters between themselves particularly in economic sphere as might be necessary for their mutual welfare provided, of course such measures did not constitute any threat to peace.

HARRIMAN

WFS

27 October 1943

**SECRET**

SECRET telegram must be  
fully paraphrased be-  
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS  
to subject. (S)

Moscow

Dated October 26, 1943

Rec'd 1:17 p.m., 28th.

**SECRET** In reply to your query of this morning,

I am informed by the State Department that the

"U.S. proposal on the treatment of Germany after

the war" was apparently drafted by Mr. Hull and  
his party aboard ship. There is no copy of this

proposal presently in Washington.

RUSH SKINS.

Reference DeLam No. 26 and 25.

At the session this afternoon after considerable  
discussion of the **L. MATHEWSON,**  
**Colonel, General Staff,** adopted an

approved text of the Four Nation Declaration with  
minor changes which I will give below. Molotov agreed  
on behalf of the Soviet Government to the participation  
of China as an original signatory. He voiced doubt

however, as to whether the Chinese Government would be  
able to send the necessary powers to the Chinese  
Ambassador here to sign declaration before Conference

closed. I regard **SECRET** of the very highest importance  
that every effort be made to ensure that Chiang Kai  
Shek send these powers to the Chinese Ambassador in  
Moscow instantly. I saw the Chinese Ambassador

immediately

CORRECTED COPY

HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 26, 1943

Rec'd 1:17 p.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1749, October 26, 4 p.m. Delam 31.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

RUSH SKINS.

Reference Delam No. 26 and 25.

At the session this afternoon after considerable discussion of the text the Conference adopted an approved text of the Four Nation Declaration with minor changes which I will give below. Molotov agreed on behalf of the Soviet Government to the participation of China as an original signatory. He voiced doubt however, as to whether the Chinese Government would be able to send the necessary powers to the Chinese Ambassador here to sign declaration before Conference closed. I regard it as of the very highest importance that every effort be made to ensure that Chiang Kai Shek send these powers to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow instantly. I saw the Chinese Ambassador immediately

-2-, #1749, October 26, 4 p.m., Delam 31, from Moscow.

Immediately after close of today's session and impressed on him with great earnestness the extreme urgency of the matter both in the interests of all of us and particularly in interests of China that he should be empowered to sign before the end of the conference which I told him might well be before the end of this week. He is telegraphing immediately direct to Chungking for immediate authorization to sign the declaration.

The following are the unimportant modifications made at today's session when the declaration was adopted in the text as communicated to you in delam No. 25. The preamble remains the same except for the addition of the words "of America" after "the United States". Articles one, two, three, four, five and seven remain unchanged. In Article six the words "after the termination of hostilities" were substituted for "following the defeat of the enemy." Article eight was dropped at my suggestion following Molotov's apparent doubt as to exact meaning of the wording.

Please communicate instantly to Chungking for transmission to Chiang Kai Shck the additional unimportant changes which were introduced in the text before the declaration was finally adopted, and please  
instruct

-3-, #1749, October 26, 4 p.m., from Moscow.

instruct the Ambassador to urge upon the Generalissimo, the vital importance of the immediate despatch of full powers by cable to his Ambassador here to sign this declaration.

HARRIMAN

HPD

*File*

BE  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 26, 1943

Rec'd 1:30 p.m., 27th

Secretary of State

Washington

1749, October 26, 4 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND (?) (?) (?) (?)

However as to whether the Chinese Government  
would be able to send the necessary powers to  
the Chinese Ambassador here to sign declaration  
before Conference closed. I regard it as of  
the very highest importance that every effort  
be made to ensure that Chiang Kai Shek send  
these powers to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow  
instantly. I saw the Chinese Ambassador immediately  
after close of today's session and impressed on  
him with great earnestness the extreme urgency  
of the matter both in the interests of all of  
us and particularly in interests of China that  
he should be empowered to sign before the end  
of the conference which I told him might well  
be before the end of this week. He is telegraphing  
immediately direct to Chungking for immediate  
authorization to sign the declaration.

The

*See reverse side for  
President's pencilled  
draft of message  
to Generalissimo.  
Relay from  
White House  
Room at 1920 EWT  
Oct 27, 1943.  
Matthewson  
(See State  
telegram # 788  
Oct 25 1943)  
for above  
message*

-2- #1749, October 26, 4 p.m. from Moscow

The following are the unimportant modifications made at today's session when the declaration was adopted in the text as communicated to you in delam No. 25. The preamble remains the same except for the addition of the words "of America" after "the United States". Articles one, two, three, four, five and seven remain unchanged. In Article six the words "after the termination of hostilities" were substituted for "following the defeat of the enemy". Article eight was dropped at my suggestion following Molotov's apparent doubt as to exact meaning of the wording.

Please communicate instantly to Chungking for transmission to Chiang Kai Shek the additional unimportant changes which were introduced in the text before the declaration was finally adopted, and please instruct the Ambassador to urged upon the Generalissimo, the vital importance of the immediate despatch of full powers by cable to his Ambassador here to sign this declaration.

HARRIMAN

HPD

Have asked Moscow to repeat undecipherable first part of above message.

TELEGRAPH SECTION

BE  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 26, 1943

Rec'd 11:45 a.m., 27th

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S. URGENT

1741, October 26, 1 p.m. DELAM 29

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM THE SECRETARY

Reference Embassy's 1724 October 25, Noon,  
and delam's 22 of October 25.

The presentation of the text of the proposed  
Soviet Czechoslovak treaty (\*) (\*) (\*) (\*) and  
the plan for its signature here at a very early  
date may give rise to the supposition that this  
project has been endorsed by the three Governments  
participating in the Conference.

If the announcement of this threat in the  
United States should lead to queries concerning  
the attitude of the American Government, the  
Department may wish to reply that it is a matter  
of common knowledge that the negotiations between  
the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments have  
been in course for many months. It might also be  
mentioned

-2- #1741, October 26, 1 p.m. DALAM 29 from Moscow mentioned that the text of the treaty had been agreed to before the present Three Power Meeting. There has therefore been no occasion for an expression of any views on the part of this Government.

I think, however, that any comment should be made entirely on the basis of departmental view without reference to communications from me on the subject.

HARRIMAN

HPD

Have asked Moscow for repetition of missing portion of above message.

TELEGRAPH SECTION

HEL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 26, 1943

Rec'd 2:54 p.m.

*W.A. fm*

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT RUSH SKINS

1729, October 26, 5 a.m.

Delam 25.

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

Reference Delam No. 10.

In order to be prepared to expedite the signature of the Four Nation Declaration in the event it is accepted at today's meeting, please inform the American Embassy in Chungking of the single change in the preamble and send them the final draft of the text of the numbered paragraphs and ask Gause to hold it in strict confidence himself until he is requested to transmit it to the Chinese Government either by instructions from you or myself or upon request of the Chinese Government.

If the text is accepted by the conference this afternoon, I shall immediately inform the Chinese Ambassador here telling him that the final text is available

-2-, #1729, October 26, 5 a.m., from Moscow.

available at our Embassy at Chungking. I shall also immediately authorize Gauss to release it to the Chinese Government for their confidential information and in order that they may sign in such manner as may be agreed upon, if the text meets with their approval.

HARRIMAN

WFS

GBS 173  
27/0135  
lmn

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL  
SCC  
17 Oct 43

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No. 23, 26 October 1943

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane

Four Power Declaration agreed upon today. As the exact text will be sent to the President, I shall give you only a paraphrase. It follows:

Three governments are determined in conformity with the declaration of 1 January 1942 and by declarations made thereafter to press the war against those powers of the Axis with whom they are at war respectively until they have unconditionally surrendered.

They feel that they are responsible to liberate themselves and all others from aggressive threats.

They recognize the necessity for a quick and orderly change to a peace status and for providing that there shall be the least of the world's resources for arms.

They therefore declare jointly:

1. To continue the war against respective enemies in order to insure maintenance of security and peace.
2. In the case of a common enemy they will act together until his surrender and disarming.

CM-IN-16424 (27 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

16

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 23, 26 October 1943

page 2

3. That they will do everything necessary to insure no violations by the enemy of surrender terms.
4. They recognize that general international organization should be set up as soon as possible. This to be based on sovereign equality of all peace loving states and will be open to all such states in order to maintain security and peace.
5. So that peace will be maintained before law and order is reestablished and before a system of general security can be inaugurated, they will meet with each other in consultation in order to take joint action on behalf of community of nations.
6. That immediately upon the cessation of hostilities they will not use their armed forces inside the territory of other nations except as necessary under the terms of this declaration and then only after they have consulted together.
7. That they will consult and cooperate with each other and with other nations of the United Nations in order to effect a practical agreement for the post war period as to regulating armaments.

End of paraphrase.

Secretary Hull was elated at his success. He was profuse in his expression of thanks and appreciation to

CM-IN-16424 (27 Oct 43)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

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E. O. 12356

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 23, 26 October 1943

page 3

both Molotov and Eden. The problem remains to obtain quick acquiescence from the Chinese in order to conclude the business before the conference adjourns. This is under way.

Soviet delegates have indicated that they wish to speak further tomorrow on subject of means to hasten the conclusion of the war. This means they will undoubtedly question Ismay and me concerning our earlier statements on OVERLORD. I will have Vandenberg with me to answer questions pertaining to air. There have been no Naval questions brought up at the conference other than the Russian request for part of Italian Naval and merchant shipping. Admiral Duncan and Commodore Olson have been most helpful in their advice on Naval matters.

No Sig.

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-IN-16424 (27 Oct 43) 1949Z vc

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

16

~~SECRET~~  
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24-53394ABC0

SECRET

26 October 1943

From: Moscow  
To: Mr. Harry Hopkins

Number SD 1, Filed: 26/0505Z

Personal to Hopkins from Harriman.

No reply has been received to any of our requests for instructions. The British are receiving them from London and it is becoming increasingly embarrassing particularly as to Turkey and Sweden.

No Sig

Moscow file

SECRET

DIA  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 25, 1943

Rec'd: 2:55 p.m.

US  
fin

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1728, October 25, 4 p.m.

DELAN 25.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING  
SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

The drafting committee this afternoon reached  
agreement as to the final form in which the  
proposal of the United States for a four nation  
declaration will come before the regular meeting  
of the three Foreign Ministers on October 26.

The preamble remains unchanged except that  
"the United Kingdom" is substituted for "Great  
Britain" in the first paragraph. The numbered  
articles in the language agreed to by the draft-  
ing committee read as follows after "jointly  
declare:"

One. That their united action, pledged  
for the prosecution of the war against their  
respective enemies, will be continued for the  
organization and maintenance of peace and  
security.

Two. That those

-2- #1728, October 25, 4 p.m. from Moscow.

Two. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

Three. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

Four. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Five. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

Six. That

-3- #1728, October 25, 4 p.m. from Moscow

Six. That <sup>after the termination of hostilities</sup> ~~(following the defeat of the enemy)~~ they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

Seven. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post war period.

Eight. That this declaration is without prejudice to the relationship between the respective signatories and nations with which such signatories are not at war.

It will be recalled that the discussion of this declaration has proceeded with the question of whether China would be admitted as an original signatory held in abeyance. This question will presumably come up at the regular meeting on the twenty-sixth when the drafting committee's agreed text is considered, at which time I shall press for China's inclusion as an original signatory.

HARRIMAN

CSB

WA 11  
26/0058Z  
md

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC  
27 Oct  
0119Z

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*US.  
for*

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

No. 18, 25th October 1943

From Deane for J C of Staff.

Discussion of Four Power declaration postponed until tomorrow.

Mr Hull presented a paper entitled "American proposals on treatment of Germany". The document is too lengthy to cable so McCarthy will bring a copy to you. It includes 9 basic proposals regarding terms of surrender; provides for Armistice Commission and treatment of Germany during armistice; and finally, includes proposals on the permanent status of Germany. Mr Molotov did not think it was tough enough. It was agreed that the document should receive general approval by the conference and then referred to the new London Military Political Commission as a skeleton outline for expansion into a complete document for approval of the Three Governments.

Indications are that conference will approve a declaration concerning independence of Austria redeclaration does not recognize the Austria-German union of 1938. It calls on Austrian people to contribute to their own liberation and states that account will be taken of their efforts.

Drafting Committee directed to work out wording of agreement regarding consultation among Three Powers on peace feelers that any one country might receive. Mr Molotov said that negotiations with countries with which we are at war can only be on the basis of unconditional surrender, and mentioned Hungary, Rumania, and Finland.

Tomorrows discussions will be on Four Power declaration; joint responsibilities for peace in Europe; and

CM-IN-16042 (27 Oct 43)

18

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

Page 2

No. 18, 25th October 1943

further discussion on bringing Turkey into the war.

I believe conference will be concluded Thursday  
or Friday.

No Sig


ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-IN-16042 (27 Oct 43) 0252Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

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HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MOA)

Moscow

Dated October 25, 1943

Rec'd 1:09 p.m.

W.S.  
K.M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1727, October 25, 1 p.m.

Delam 24.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE  
ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

At the opening of the regular session this afternoon Vyshinski reported for the drafting committee that there were a few minor changes of no substance which remained to be made in the final text of the Four Nation Declaration and suggested that it be submitted to the conference at tomorrow's session.

Mr. Molotov then turned to the consideration of item seven, the United States proposal on the treatment of Germany after the war. I pointed out that this paper was not designed to be all inclusive but merely an outline of our general views on various questions relating to the treatment of Germany. At Eden's suggestion the document was considered by sections. Eden suggested and I agreed that the question of inter-Allied control might well be referred to the political military committee

-2-, #1727, October 25, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

committee in London if set up as he had proposed on the basis of the British memorandum of July 1. He suggested also that the question of extermination of the Nazi party and of reparations might likewise be referred to the London commission. I observed that in view of the complication of the whole question of reparations it might be well to set up some form of commission which might work under the London commission.

Molotov was anxious to find out exactly how this document should be regarded, whether as a definite final proposal or as a basis for discussion and whether it represented the limits to which the United States Government was willing to go in its treatment of Germany. I repeated that this was not an exhaustive study but merely an outline which could be subjected to detailed study by any commission or agency appointed by the three Governments for that purpose. Molotov then raised the question whether publicity should be given to any decision in principle on the various aspects of the treatment of Germany in the post war period and I suggested that it might be well to form a special committee which would review for submission to the three Foreign Ministers the entire question of what part of our work should be given publicity. Mr. Molotov referring to the specific question

-3-, #1727, October 25, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

question of Germany said that in the opinion of his Government it would be most undesirable to give any publicity to the treatment to be meted out to Germany after victory since to do so might only spur the German people to continued effort and play into the hands of Hitler. Both Mr. Eden and I concurred in that general view.

Mr. Eden then said that he would like to obtain the views of the Soviet Government in regard to the question of dismemberment of Germany. The British Government was in general agreement on the general desirability of such dismemberment and proposed to encourage any separatist tendencies which might emerge in Germany after the war but at the same time there were differences of opinion within the Government as to the desirability of attempting to achieve this dismemberment by forcible means. Molotov remarked that the Soviet Government fully approved of all measures to render Germany harmless in the future. Molotov again inquired whether the present draft which we had submitted was to be regarded as a minimum of what the views of the United States were on the question of dismemberment. I replied that I had little to add to the document itself at this time and that then my Government had begun to examine the question it had been

struck by

-4-, #1727, October 25, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

struck by the widely divergent views held by the Allied Governments on this question. In the highest quarters there had been a disposition to favor the dismemberment of Germany but after various points of view were considered with very convincing arguments to back up each position there developed a gradual tendency to keep an open mind on this question and to give it further detailed study.

Molotov said that the Soviet Government seemed to be somewhat behind in their study of the question of Germany due to the greater preoccupation of their leaders with the prosecution of the war. Molotov then went on to say that to the United States and to Mr. Hull in particular belongs the honor of having set forth the first outline of proposals in regard to the attitude towards Germany and that the Soviet Government is favorably disposed towards the program outlined by Mr. Hull and regards it, however, as in the nature of a minimum and not a maximum program. Turning to the question of dismemberment Molotov said that the Soviet Government had to consider its own public opinion and that of its Allies as well as the political advisability of such measures and that all he would say at this time was that his Government definitely did not exclude the possibility of the  
dismemberment

-5-, #1727, October 25, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

dismembership of Germany.

Before the intermission Eden took occasion to state that since the views of the Soviet Government and British Government on the question of Germany appeared to be in harmony he saw no need to reply to Mr. Molotov's observations on the comparative activity of their respective leaders.

After the intermission Molotov observed that the question of frontiers - in the United States proposal - is said to fall in the purview of the final settlement. Both Mr. Eden and I agreed that it was accepted with the question that Germany must return to the pre-Anschluss frontiers and that the question of East Prussia was also pretty generally agreed on. Molotov stated there could be no two opinions on forcing Germany to discourage her conquests. No special arrangements were made by the conference at this session as to the instrumentality for further study of the German question at the conference.

The conference then turned to the consideration of peace feelers from the enemy states. Eden outlined the approaches that the British Government had already received from smaller enemy countries. In connection with the Rumanian question Molotov said that the Soviet Government was strongly in favor of accepting only unconditional

surrender

-6-, #1727, October 25, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

surrender from the satellite powers with which it was at war and was definitely against any form of negotiation except on that basis and felt it useless to have contacts with dissident groups or any half way measures whatever. He made specific mention of Finland in this connection.

Eden said that in regard to those enemy countries which are actively engaged in waging war against the Soviet Union that the British Government was inclined to leave the decision on such matters affecting these countries to the Soviet Government. Eden then said that on the general subject he would like to submit proposals whereby the three powers represented here would keep each other informed with regard to any peace feelers received from enemy powers either from Government groups or individuals and that the three Governments should agree among themselves, to concert their policy in each individual case. Throughout this discussion Molotov referred constantly to Rumania, Hungary and Finland.

At the close of the meeting Eden suggested that he and Molotov should discuss separately the question of sabotage and other activities in Rumania after Eden would have an opportunity to discuss the matter with the British General Staff.

HARRIMAN

WFS

JG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

WJ  
Moscow c  
Dated October 25, 1943  
Rec'd 5:27 p.m. 26th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1726, October 25, 2 p.m. DE LAM 22

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY

At the regular meeting yesterday afternoon  
Molotov suggested that we again postpone the discussion  
of the U.S. proposal in regard to the treatment of  
Germany to give further time for study.

Eden then took up the item in the British agenda  
dealing with the question of agreements between major  
and minor Allies on postwar questions. He said that he  
had obtained the impression while Molotov was in  
London in June 1942 which had been subsequently confirmed  
by Maisky that the British and Soviet Governments were  
in general agreement as to the general undesirability  
of any of the major Allies concluding agreements during  
the war with smaller Allies powers relating to the postwar  
period. He added that he understood that there must be  
exceptions and the Soviet Government had already made  
one of which the proposed Soviet Czech treaty would be  
one. He added that the British proposal was designed  
to ensure consultation and agreement before such  
treaties

-2- 1726, October 25, 2 p.m. DELAM 82 from Moscow  
treaties were made in the future in order to avoid a  
race between the larger powers to acquire special  
relations with smaller countries. Molotov then stated  
then stated that this had been the subject of negotiations  
for a year and a half between the British and Soviet  
Governments and he was not aware whether the U.S.  
Government was fully acquainted with the details.  
He would like to know whether it was proposed that  
Mr. Eden's suggestion be an agreement between the three  
powers represented here.

I replied that while I was not familiar with all  
the details my government had followed with interest  
the negotiations between the British and Soviet  
Governments on this question but that I felt that  
I would have little to contribute on this question  
at this time.

Eden said while he would be glad to turn over to  
me all the detailed information and he was sure there  
would be no objection to the U.S. participation in any  
such agreements he has envisaged the question as of more  
direct interest to the British and Soviet Governments.  
He emphasized that he had not in mind a definite treaty  
but a workable practicable arrangement to ensure con-  
sultation.

After a long but friendly discussion between

Molotov

-3- 1726, October 25, 2 p.m. DELAM 22 from Moscow  
Molotov and Eden regarding the background and circumstances  
of the negotiations of the Soviet-Czech treaty with  
particular reference to the question of the visit  
of Benes to Moscow Eden stated that after having  
examined the treaty he was convinced that his government  
would have no objection to its signature nor to the visit  
of Benes to Moscow for the purpose of signing the treaty,  
He merely requested sufficient time to inform the Prime  
Minister of his opinion before a definite invitation  
was extended to Benes to come to Moscow for that purpose  
to which Molotov agreed.

It was then decided that the British and Soviet  
delegates would each appoint a representative to a small  
committee to consider a draft. The British proposal  
in short was that there should be no treaties between  
the major and minor Allies relating to the postwar period  
made during the war except following prior consultation  
and agreement between the British and Soviet Governments.  
Molotov then read the Soviet proposal which in essence  
accepted the British proposal for consultation and  
agreement in regard to non-bordering states but reserved  
the right for both states to conclude such treaties  
directly connected with the security of their frontiers  
with border states without prior consultation and  
agreement. These proposals were referred to the smaller  
British Soviet committee.

The conference

-4- 1726, October 25, 2 p.m. DELAM 22 from Moscow

The conference then proceeded to consider the British item on the agenda concerning a common policy in Iran.. Molotov stated that prior to the meeting the Iranian Ambassador had drawn his attention to the existence of an Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty which envisaged the presence of an Iranian representative at any conference in which Iranian questions were being discussed. Eden made clear that there was no intention to take any decisions which would affect Iran but merely to try and develop among ourselves a common approach to the many difficult questions in connection with Iran. It was agreed to refer the Iranian question to a sub-committee on which the U.S. representatives would be Allen and Jernegan the Soviet representatives Kavtaradze and Smirov and the British representatives Holman and Iliff.

Turning then to the British item concerning the question of the confederations and of joint responsibility in Europe as against separate areas of responsibility which had been agreed should be considered together Eden stated that it was impossible at this time to decide whether or not confederations of smaller states would be desirable or possible but his government felt that in consideration of this question the conference should be guided by four principles: (one) no interference with forms

45- 1726, October 25, 2 p.m. DELAM 22 from Moscow  
with forms of government; (two) association to be  
based on mutual welfare; (three) great powers to give  
their support in the general interest of prosperity,  
and (four) no separate areas of responsibility on  
the part of the great powers.

The conference then adjourned until 4 p.m. today  
at which time it was agreed that the U.S. proposal  
in regard to the four nation declaration would be  
discussed and completed since the drafting committee  
had agreed upon a text and also the question of the  
treatment of Germany and any other questions for  
which there might be time.

I am sending a separate telegram in regard  
to the question of the proposed Soviet-Czech treaty  
and Mr. Bénéš forthcoming visit to Moscow.

HARRIMAN

RR

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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(LT.CDR. GERMAN) 251023 NCR 9299

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT	PART 1 251017	NCR 9316	
	PART 2 251019	NCR 9304	
	PART 3 251023	NCR 9299	

(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN)

I BELIEVE YOU WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE SOME COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM GEN. DEANE, ADM. DUNCAN, COMMODORE OLSEN AND MYSELF ON THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR ITALIAN NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS.

1. COMMENTS:

WE BELIEVE THAT THE REQUEST WAS MADE PRIMARILY FOR THE MORALE EFFECT THE ACCEPTANCE WOULD HAVE ON THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND WITH LITTLE CONSIDERATION FOR THE PRACTICAL USEFULNESS OF THE VESSELS TO THEM. IT WOULD BE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THAT THE THREE POWERS WERE COLLABORATING TOGETHER, THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRESSURE ON THE GERMANS BY THE RED ARMY CONTRIBUTED TO OUR SUCCESS IN ITALY (TO QUOTE MOLOTOV'S WORDS "TO SOME SMALL EXTENT AT LEAST"), AND THAT

WE RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING A STRONG RUSSIA AFTER

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50590-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
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DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

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SHEET TWO ALUSNA MOSCOW 251023 NCR 9299

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

THE WAR. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SUSPICIONS ARE STILL IN THE MINDS OF MANY IN SOVIET OFFICIALDOM AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AS TO THE ATTITUDE IN THE UNITED STATES TOWARD RUSSIA. THEY HAVE BEEN READING FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS THE COMMENTS AND EDITORIALS IN OUR PRESS CRITICAL OF RUSSIA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS REQUEST WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO ALLAY THESE SUSPICIONS.

THE RUSSIAN SUCCESS ON THE EASTERN FRONT IS DEVELOPING A NEED FOR INCREASED SHIPPING IN THE BLACK SEA. THE AMOUNT REQUESTED WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAMPER OUR SHIPPING TOO GREATLY AND WOULD BE OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THEM.

THE QUESTION OF SAFE ENTRY TO THE BLACK SEA HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. AS TO THE USE OF NAVAL VESSELS IN THE NORTH THE SOVIETS MAY CLAIM THAT THE VESSELS WOULD ASSIST IN CONVOYING TO NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS. HOWEVER IT IS THE OPINION OF ADM. DUNCAN AND COMMODORE OLSEN THAT THEIR PRIMARY PRACTICAL REASON FOR REQUESTING THESE VESSELS IS TO HAVE AVAILABLE FOR STUDY AND TRAINING THE LATEST IN ITALIAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT.

BASES AND REPAIR FACILITIES IN THE NORTH ARE ENTIRELY

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

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NCR 18

16-50020-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
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SHEET THREE ALUSNA MOSCOW 251023 NCR 9299

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

INADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN THESE VESSELS IN WAR OPERATIONS, EXCEPT FOR DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES, AND DUNCAN'S INSPECTIONS CONVINCED HIM THEY ARE UNABLE TO PROPERLY SERVICE THE ADDITIONAL LIGHT CRAFT.

CONSIDERING PREVIOUS MEAGER EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SURFACE CRAFT IN THE NORTH IT IS UNLIKELY THEY REALLY CONTEMPLATE MAKING USE OF ITALIAN SHIPS. TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACE US AND BRITISH NAVIES IN OPERATING THESE SHIPS ARE MULTIPLIED IN POSSIBLE SOVIET OPERATION.

2. - RECOMMENDATIONS:

AS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS REQUEST SHOULD BE GRANTED WE SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THERE ARE LOGICAL REASONS WHY WE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING THE REQUEST FOR MERCHANT SHIPS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT ITALY IS A SHIPPING LIABILITY IN SPITE OF THE SMALL WINDFALL OF ITALIAN SHIPS, AND THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRING TO THE RUSSIANS AND ALLOCATING TO THEIR SERVICE AN ENORMOUS TONNAGE FROM OUR OWN SHIPPING RESOURCES.

THIS MOMENT IS NOT, IN OUR VIEW, THE TIME TO

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

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NCR 18

16-50930-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
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DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

SHEET FOUR OF FOUR SHEETS ALUSNA MOSCOW 251023 NCR 9299  
 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

BE LOGICAL. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS.

WE RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT THE REQUEST FOR MERCHANT SHIPS BE ACCEPTED NOW, TO BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET THEM TO THE BLACK SEA WITH REASONABLE SAFETY.

(B) AS TO THE NAVAL VESSELS OUR PRIMARY VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD MAKE SOME GESTURE IN THIS RESPECT.

WE RECOMMEND FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS THAT THE REQUEST AT LEAST FOR THE BATTLESHIP AND CRUISER BE ACCEPTED AT ONCE AS IS AND THAT THE DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES BE APPROVED IF AND WHEN NOT REQUIRED IN OUR OWN SERVICE.

DISTRIBUTION:  
 P1A.....ACTION.

FILE.

*Copy delivered to Adm Leahy  
 1000/26th*

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50220-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**PRIORITY**

RC3  
24/2012Z  
ecm

*See has a copy*  
**SECURITY CONTROL**  
*WAT*

From: MOSCOW  
To: AGWAR

No. 15 24 October 1943

For Joint C of S from Deane.

H  
Conferences yesterday and today purely political with no conclusive results. Drafting committee working on terms of reference for local advisory committee for Italy. Idea seems to be developing that advisory committee should also be set up in London to work on terms of German armistice and methods of enforcement. Additionally it appears that for miscellaneous political matters discussions will be held in Washington London and Moscow by the Foreign Minister or Secretary and the Ambassadors be each of other two countries depending on where the discussion is held.

In exchange of views on Balkans in which no conclusions were reached I indicated our desire to extend OSS subversive activities in the Balkans in order to increase the military burden of Germany in maintaining order. Soviet delegates were not prepared to express a view on this but will do so later. Ismay is to present a statement of British SOE activities in the area. This action was taken to avoid future Soviet suspicion that our OSS activities in the Balkans have political significance and are being done without their knowledge.

Last night General Vandenberg made presentation to 15 Soviet generals on effect of combined bomber offensive. He acted for both American and British. The presentation was well documented with pictures and made a great impression.

(CM-IN-14969 25 Oct 43)

**DECLASSIFIED**

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

**COPY No.**

16

**SECRET**  
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394ABCD

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 15 24 October 1943

Today in a discussion as to post war treaties between major and minor allies the indications were that such treaties would not be made without prior consultation. The drafting committee is now preparing something along these lines. It was practically concluded however that a Russian Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty would be consummated with British approval.

The drafting committee was also directed to prepare a statement of common policy as between the three nations with reference to post war treatment of Iran.

Tomorrow the four power declaration, the treatment of Germany, and the subject of peace feelers will be discussed.

no sig

ACTION: JCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD  
Adm King  
Gen Arnold  
Log

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

CM-IN-14969 (25 Oct 43) 0950Z sib

16

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394ABCD

HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 24, 1943

Rec'd 10:07 a.m., 25th.

*Am*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1715, October 24, 1 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY.

Referring further to the seven point proposal of  
Mr. Molotov in regard to political policies in Italy,  
I am wondering whether you want us to consider prefacing  
our reply to Mr. Molotov by saying that military consider-  
ations must be considered uppermost when enemy territory  
is occupied, until the need for military occupation  
ceases and the area is ready to be turned over to a Civil  
Commission or other agency of Government. In the second  
place, the attitude of the United Nations with respect  
to the political policies that should be applied to Italy  
is that the utter destruction of Fascism and all traces  
of it is the supreme political consideration and that  
any list of proposals undertaken to embody this broad sup-  
reme political objective such as Mr. Molotov sets forth  
in his seven points are in complete harmony with the ob-  
jective of destroying Fascism and substituting the  
best obtainable

-2-, #1715, October 24, 1 p.m., from Moscow.

best obtainable or available elements and agencies calculated to maintain law and order and improve benefits of Government. In some enemy areas the fact is recognized that on account of differing conditions the foregoing transition steps may require more or less time as the circumstances may make necessary.

The foregoing might be made a preface to Mr. Molotov's seven point proposal so as to give a broader setting to the entire set of problems involved.

HARRIMAN

WFS

HEL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 23, 1943

Rec'd 1 p.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT

1712, October 23, noon.

Delam 18.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY.

At the regular session this afternoon since both Eden and I said we were awaiting instructions from our Governments pertaining to the Soviet proposal on Italy, the conference turned to the consideration of an exchange of views on the Balkans.

Eden read statement on subject of resistance movements in Yugoslavia in which he said it was the desire of British Government to see Yugoslavia restored to freedom and independence and composed of the three kingdoms of Serbia, Slovakia and Croatia. He said British Government had been maintaining contact with both resistance movements in Yugoslavia, the Mikhailovic partisans and that when he had been in Cairo he had discussed with King Peter and Yugoslav Government the attitude of Mikhailovic and had  
proposed

-2-, #1712, October 23, noon, from Moscow.

proposed two operations which the British felt Mikhailovic could carry out; namely; destruction of Boer copper mine and cutting of strategic railroad between Belgrade and Nish. King Peter had agreed that if this conference was able to work out common policy towards Yugoslavia he would immediately order Mikhailovic to carry out these operations. It was made clear to King if these orders were not carried that Great Britain would have to reconsider her attitude towards Mikhailovic and question of sending him further supplies. He then said that the British proposed in this connection to agree on measures which would unite the two resistance movements in Yugoslavia and have them both fight only the enemy and not each other, which he felt would not be difficult as they did not operate in same regions of Yugoslavia. I said I had nothing to add to the British proposal but Molotov said that this was the first time he had heard of two operations proposed for Mikhailovic and he would have to study them before making recommendations.

In regard to general policy Eden stated that (\*) strategic services was prepared to penetrate the regions by air and other means and to organize sabotage in centers of disturbances. He added that he would like to have the Soviet opinion on this project and he wished to assure

the Soviet

-3-, 1712, October 23, noon, from Moscow.

the Soviet Government that these operations would have only a purely military purpose.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this question be postponed until a later session until they had received fuller information on the question. Mr. Eden said that he would ask General Ismay to write a document setting forth sabotage operations in the Balkans.

Molotov then turned to question of British proposal for the setting up of a political military commission in London and the machinery for Allied control of the Italian armistice terms he suggested that since the Italian question was the more urgent it be discussed first. He again repeated fact that there had not been a Soviet representative in area although question of commission for Italy had been discussed for some time. He then suggested that the British memorandum of July 1 be used as a basis for drafting the proposal in regard to the Allied machinery to control Italian armistice terms.

Mr. Eden said that he had recommended to his Government that the Inter-Allied Advisory Council be set up at once without waiting for the beginning of the beginning of the second period and he added that his Government had already commenced action along those lines.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that the British memorandum

July 1 be

-4-, #1712, October 23, noon, from Moscow.

July 1 be submitted to the drafting commission as a basis for consideration taking into account the observations made yesterday by Mr. Eden. Molotov seemed disposed to question advisability of giving too broad terms of reference to the political military commission which might be set up in London, since he felt that there was merit in the suggestion which I had advanced yesterday (revised text in my immediately following telegram) for the setting up of machinery for consultation in three capitals through existing diplomatic machinery. He envisaged possibility when the need arose of a Three Power Conference between the two Ambassadors and the Foreign Minister of the country whose capital was selected.

At this meeting I submitted to the conference a draft proposal in regard to the treatment of Germany in accordance with point two on our agenda and it was decided that if the document had been sufficiently studied by then that the question would be discussed tomorrow.

At this session Molotov appointed as Soviet representatives on the drafting committee Vyshinski and Golonski, a Foreign Office official, and the committee is meeting this evening at ten o'clock.

Prior to today's meeting I had an hours satisfactory conversation

-5-, #1712, October 23, noon, from Moscow.

conversation with Molotov, which was general in character dealing with broad questions of mutual interest.

ARRIM.N

(\* Repetition requested for undecipherable part of message.

WFS

CAM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MOA)

Moscow

Dated October 23, 1943

Rec'd 2:35 a.m., 24th

*hm*  
*WAL*

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

1711, October 23, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY.

DELAM number seventeen

Reference DELAM numbers thirteen and fourteen  
Soviet proposal in regard to Italy.

For the purpose of making reply to the Soviet proposal for a Tripartite Declaration here on democratic freedoms in Italy I would appreciate having your comment and that of the War Department if you consider it appropriate.

HARRIMAN

HTM

BJR  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Governmental  
agency. (BR)

Moscow

Dated October 23, 1943

Rec'd 4:22 a.m. 24th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1699, October 23, 9 a.m.

Delam 16.

FROM THE SECRETARY

Beautiful weather everyone well.

HARRIMAN

RR

SFG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 23, 1943

Rec'd. 4:25 a.m. 24th

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

1702, October 23, noon

FROM THE SECRETARY (DELAN 16)

Your action as stated in your AMDEL No. thirty-five  
is much appreciated and is helpful to us in indicating  
to Soviet Government disposition to meet their desire  
for early association with developments in Italy.

HARRIMAN

HTM

JG  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA.)

Moscow

Dated October 23, 1943

Rec'd 7:55 a.m. 24th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1704, October 23, 2 p.m.

Delam No. 14

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND  
THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

Following is our translation of the Soviet  
proposals presented at yesterday's meeting (reference  
Delam 13) in regard to Italy which we have now  
received in written form.

"Proposal of the USSR in regard to Italy

I. The Soviet Government considers it desirable  
in relation to Italy that our three Governments jointly  
declare themselves on favor of the putting into effect  
of the following urgent political measures:

✓ One. Democratization of the Italian Government  
by means of the inclusion of representatives of anti-  
Fascist parties.

✓ Two. The establishment of democratic freedoms:  
Freedom of conscience freedom of religion of the  
press of speech and of association of anti-Fascist  
groups.

Three.

-2- 1704, October 23, 2 p.m., from Moscow

✓ Three. The liquidation of the institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime which up to this time have not been liquidated by the Government of Badoglio - corporations auxiliary organizations of the Fascist Party in particular sport organizations etc..

✓ Four. The removal of Fascist and pro-Fascist elements from organs of administration institutions and social organizations.

✓ Five. Amnesty for political prisoners.

✓ Six. The creation of democratic organs of local government.

✓ Seven. The arrest of the chief war criminals with their subsequent delivery into the hands of justice.

II. The Soviet Government considers it also necessary in the interest of the intensification of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany to transfer immediately to the Soviet Union from the total number (\*)erred to the Allies by reason of the capitulation of (\*) following war vessels: one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines to be dispatched right away to the northern ports of the Soviet Union and also 40,000 displacement tons of merchant ships out of the total of more than 150,000 displacements

tons

-3- 1704, October 23, 2 p.m., from Moscow  
tons of ships which passed to the control of the  
Anglo-American armed forces as a result of the  
capitulation of Italy for immediate despatch to  
the Black Sea".

HARRIMAN

(\*) Omission

WFS

23 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

By direction of the President the attached message from Mr. Harriman to the President, dated 21 October, is forwarded for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Harriman-President #6, 21 Oct 43.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

23 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

By direction of the President the attached message from Mr. Harriman to the President, dated 21 October, is forwarded for your information.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Harriman-President #6, 21 Oct 43.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

**SECRET**

21 October 1943

*WHL*

From: Moscow  
To: The President of the United States

Number 6 Filed: 22/0335Z

From Harriman for POTUS personal.

Supplementing our report of last night on yesterday's conference of October 20th, I believe that you would be interested in the background of events to date.

Mr. Hull has stood the trip well under the careful eye of his capable doctor. He's conserving his strength in every way for the business of the conference. The days have been bright and crisp, the finest New England November football weather.

Molotov and our Soviet hosts have been extremely hospitable and friendly. Yesterday's conference, which considered the only point on the Soviet agenda, namely the war and the second front, was opened by a luncheon banquet in characteristic Russian style. The many toasts by Molotov were carefully worded to show perception of the character of your leadership and the war effort of the United States in production and in the field, interspersed with a little friendly humor. Mr. Hull was most gracious and understanding in his responses.

The meeting was set for 3 o'clock but we did not convene for business till 4, the Russians showing complete disregard for time. Then, half an hour was spent by Molotov arguing and insisting that Mr. Hull take the chair for this conference because it dealt with the Soviet proposal. He finally gave way and followed Ismay and Deane to proceed with their presentation.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

From: Moscow . Page 2  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 6 Filed: 22/0335Z

This had been prepared after conferences between them, Eden and myself and both officers did an extremely competent job in outlining and explaining our plans and showed willingness to answer freely any and all questions. Deane was precise in defining the conditions which must be precedent to their fulfillment. At the same time he explained in such detail the preparations now under way that he appeared to satisfy and win the confidence of the Soviet delegates.

In personal conversation with me, Molotov indicated there might be further questions they would like to ask and hoped that we would feel free to decline to answer them if they were in any way embarrassing. I explained that General Deane and the other members of his military mission had been sent to Moscow by you and the United States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of being available to provide the fullest information desired not only during the conference but also currently thereafter. He expressed gratification and thanks to you and to me as well for bringing the mission.

There may be difficulties ahead after the Soviets have had a chance to analyze the written statements but there is no indication that they are not convinced of our intentions and desire to collaborate closely with them. From past experience I am not ready to say that we are finished with the subject. On the other hand, I must say that, thus far, they have given us every indication that they have made up their minds they want to do business with us.

From a personal standpoint my Soviet friends have gone out of their way to be cordial to me.

No Sig

**SECRET**



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
note & return  
to Col. Mathewson  
noted H.H.

October 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL L. MATHEWSON

There is attached herewith in accordance with your telephone request a copy of the four nation declaration which was included in the American agenda for the Moscow Conference. There is also enclosed a revised text based on Delam no. 9 received from Secretary Hull yesterday.

*H. Freeman Matthews*  
H. Freeman Matthews,  
Chief, Division of  
European Affairs

Enclosures:

1. Copy of four nation declaration.
2. Revised text.



*Original*  
Secret

August 11, 1943.

PROVISORY DRAFT OF A  
JOINT FOUR-POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain,  
the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with  
the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942,  
and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities  
against those Axis powers with which they respectively  
are at war until such powers have laid down their arms  
on the basis of unconditional surrender:

conscious of their responsibility to secure the  
liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with  
them from the menace of aggression:

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and  
orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing  
and maintaining international peace and security with the  
least diversion of the world's human and economic resources  
for armaments:

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the  
prosecution of the war, will be continued for the  
organization and maintenance of peace and security.
2. That those of them at war with a common  
enemy will act together in all matters relating to  
the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to  
any occupation of enemy territory and of territory  
of other states held by that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by  
them to be necessary to provide against any violation  
of the requirements imposed upon their present  
enemies.
4. That they recognize the necessity of estab-  
lishing at the earliest practicable date a general  
international organization, based on the principle  
of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open  
to membership by all nations, large and small, for  
the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.

6. That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

7. That they will cooperate with each other in bringing about a practicable lightening of the burden of armaments for themselves and for the world.

8. That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

SECRET

*Revised on basis of Delam No. 9 from Moscow*  
Second Moscow Draft (Delam No. 9)

TENTATIVE DRAFT OF A  
JOINT FOUR-POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States, (United Kingdom,) the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and of territory of other states held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their enemies.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That

Reserved  
for later  
discussion.

7

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of Nations.

6. That in the post-war period they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable lightening of the burden of armaments for themselves and for the world.

8. That this declaration is without prejudice to the relationship between the respective signatories and nations with which such signatories are not at war.

LC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 22, 1943

Rec'd 3:15 p.m. 23 rd.

WB

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1693, October 22, midnight (SECTION ONE)

(Delam 13)

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING  
SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE SECRETARY.

At the regular session of the conference <sup>22nd</sup> today, before  
proceeding to the consideration of item three of the agreed  
agenda, it was decided to appoint a drafting committee  
composed of representatives of the three countries in order  
to accelerate the business of the conference. I design-  
ated Hackworth and Dunn as United States representatives  
on this committee. In submitting the British proposal on  
item three, "The Setting up of Machinery for Dealing with  
Questions Requiring Current and Close Collaboration with  
Particular Reference to the Functions and Scope of the  
Politico-Military Commission in Algiers", Eden, after  
pointing out the real need for some machinery for close  
consultation between the three Governments said his Govern-  
ment envisaged two aspects of the question: (One) The  
setting up of a politico-military commission in London,  
which would

-2- #1693, October 23, midnight (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

which would have broad terms of reference to deal with any problem of a European nature other than military operational questions arising out of the prosecution of the war. This commission would have very broad consultative but not (repeat not) executive powers. Eden pointed out that in view of the enlarged scope of the proposed commission which went far to meet the suggestions of the Soviet Government, it was obvious that it could not conveniently sit in Algiers or in Italy. Eden then raised the question of whether the French Committee of Liberation should be represented as one of the permanent members of the commission or whether such membership should be limited to the three powers represented at the conference. Neither Molotov nor I made any observations concerning the question of participation of the French Committee, but at tomorrow's session when this question is raised I intend to propose that it be referred to the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of State for their decision.

Eden then outlined the second aspect of the British proposal which deals with the mechanism of Allied control of the Italian Armistice terms. The proposal suggested three periods for the exercise of Allied control in regard to Italy. The first period would run from the present time until the establishment of an Italian Government in

Rome

-3- #1693 , October 22, midnight (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

Rome which it is hoped would occur within a very brief period. During the first period there would be an Allied control commission under the direct control of the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces.

The second period would be from the establishment of the Italian Government in Rome until the end of the campaign in Italy or until the military supervision of the control commission was no longer considered necessary by the three Governments. (During the second period) the Allied control commission would be in full operation under the Presidency of the Commander in Chief but alongside this Allied control commission there would be an inter-Allied advisory council composed of high commissioners representing the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and if considered desirable, the French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. This council would advise the Commander in Chief in his capacity as President of the inter-Allied control commission. Eden added that he thought that everyone present would agree that during the period of military operations the Commander in Chief should have final authority. He pointed out that the high commissioners of the countries represented would also care for the interests of their respective Governments and nationals.

With the opening

-4- #1693, October 22, midnight (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

With the opening of the third period, the Commander in Chief would relinquish the Presidency of the Allied commission of control and the high commissioners would assume in his place the executive direction of the work of control. In explaining the relations between (the inter-Allied advisory council, composed of the high commissioners of the countries represented which would be set up during the second period,) and the politico-military commission sitting in London with broader terms of reference, Eden stated in view of the British Government the inter-Allied advisory council would concern itself solely with problems arising out of the putting into force of the terms of surrender, while the politico-military commission would deal with the broader questions of policy affecting Italy.

Molotov raised the question of the relationship of the proposed politico-military commission in London and the suggestion for a United Nations commission contained in a memorandum given by the British Government to the Soviet Ambassador in London on July 1. (This refers to a document received by us from the British on July 16 dealing with conditions for the termination of hostilities in Europe). Although Eden pointed out that the memorandum of July 1 given to Maisky represented the view of the  
**British Government**

~~2~~ #1693, October 22, midnight (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

British Government at that time and the present proposal represented to some extent a development arising out of this memorandum, he nevertheless considered that the principles set forth in the memorandum of July 1 were still valid. Molotov then asked me to tell him the views of my Government concerning the British memorandum of July 1. I replied that this British document had been given appropriate study in Washington and that while my Government in general was favorably disposed towards the principles outlined therein, it would be necessary to give further and more detailed consideration to its contents before making any further statements on the subject. At Molotov's suggestion, it was agreed to postpone consideration of the British proposal under item three of the agenda until the session tomorrow.

*item 4* At Molotov's suggestion, the conference proceeded to consider item four of the agenda - the British proposal concerning an exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans, but since there was to be some delay while the necessary papers were being collected I suggested that it might be possible to dispose briefly of item five on the agreed agenda - the United States proposal concerning methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses.

I then read

<sup>4</sup>  
-4- #1693, October 22, midnight (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

I then read the explanatory note which was set forth under item four of our agenda as submitted to the Soviet Government before the opening of the conference. In reply to Eden's inquiry I assured him that our proposal did not in any sense mean opposition to the establishment of the commissions set forth in the British proposed procedure on item three of the agenda.

HAMILTON

EJH

MC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 22, 1943

Rec'd 7:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

1694, October 22, midnight.

SECRET

There follows section two of our 1693:

Molotov asked a number of questions in regard to the wording of our proposal for consultation between the three governments through diplomatic channels particularly as to whether this was designed to create new machinery apart from the Commissions proposed by the British to ensure close consultation between the three governments. I explained that our main purpose was to ensure that all questions as they arose might receive consideration at the same time by the three governments either in Moscow London or Washington as may be decided to supplement on all questions of common interest the usual bilateral diplomatic exchanges. It was agreed by the conference to refer my proposal to the drafting commission.

Eden stated in a

-2- #1694, October 22, midnight, from Moscow

Hum 3

Eden stated in regard to the exchange of views on Italy and the Balkans that he had nothing further to add on the subject of Italy beyond what he had already said with regard to the carrying out of the armistice terms. Molotov expressed some surprise at this and stated that the Soviet Government had some general observations and specific proposals to make on the subject of Italy to which it attached the greatest importance. He stated that the Soviet Government had been handicapped in its consideration of the Italian problem by the absence of a representative on the spot who would be able to provide the Soviet Government with the necessary information regarding developments of the greatest importance in every field and that it was for this reason that the Soviet Government had suggested the creation of a political military commission in the first instance. He pointed out that this absence of accurate firsthand information had led to misunderstandings. He said the Soviet Government was vitally interested in obtaining such information regarding the course of events in Italy affecting the political, economic and military situation and that in the opinion of the Soviet Government the putting into effect of the terms of surrender should be on a basis approved jointly by the three countries. He then inquired of Eden and me whether

-3- #1694, October 22, midnight, from Moscow

of Eden and me whether we felt that there were sufficient guarantees that the terms of Italian surrender would be properly applied and complied with.

Eden replied that it was precisely to provide the Soviet Union with this much needed information that the proposals for the appointment of High Commissioners to the Interallied Advisory Council had been made and in so far as the terms of surrender were concerned it had been made clear to the Italian Government that the acceptance of Italy as a cobelligerent which was done as a political convenience in no sense involved any change in the conditions of surrender; that changes in the terms could only be made through the collective agreement of all three governments. He added that according to their information we were only receiving passive cooperation from the Italians and that little help of a military nature was expected from that quarter. The policy in regard to Italy of the British Government was in accordance with the doctrine approved by the Prime Minister of payments by results.

Molotov then proceeded to read seven urgent political measures which the Soviet Government desired to see put into effect in Italy by our three governments. These proposals are to be submitted in written form and will be telegraphed as soon as received. In general they deal with the

-4- #1694, October 22, midnight, from Moscow

with the establishment of democratic institutions and democratic rights and political activity in Italy, the elimination of all remnants of the Fascist Regime the arrest of war criminals, the release of political prisoners, etcetera. Molotov observed that he felt that it was of the highest political importance that the three governments agree jointly to the acceptance of these general proposals which however could be amended during the course of the discussions.

Eden stated in general many of these principles had already been put in force under AMGOT and that according to recent information from MacMillian there was a general desire to include liberal and socialist elements in the Italian Government almost immediately and that it was possible that Badoglio would resign as Prime Minister following the signature of the protocol. He pointed out that the difficulty in this connection was to find authoritative leaders who were non-fascist after twenty years of fascist rule.

At Molotov's request for my views on the subject of the proposal I stated that I would have little to add of a definite nature to the remarks of Eden and that he and I together or separately would be prepared to present

tomorrow.

-5- #1694, October 22, midnight, from Moscow

tomorrow a detailed and chronological list of Allied policies in Italy since the invasion of Sicily; that there was nothing secret about these policies which had been carried out openly and that I was glad of the opportunity to give the Soviet Government the fullest information on the subject. I then stated that on general grounds as set forth in the Atlantic Charter and in other declarations of the United Nations this war was being fought for the purpose of destroying every vestige of Fascism and Nazism and to uproot those doctrines and policies. However, as to the question how far the Allies are going in the direction of setting up of governments of the type they desire to see established and in the use of force for this purpose was not yet clear. In regard to the punishment of war criminals I said that in my opinion Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo and their accomplices should be given a drumhead courtmartial and at sunrise on the following day there would occur an historic incident. (This remark was greeted with great satisfaction by the Soviet delegation.) I then said that the complete eradication of Fascism was a task requiring immense effort and great organization and that our primary task here was to set up as quickly as possible adequate machinery to ensure

the

-6- #1694, October 22, midnight, from Moscow

the closest collaboration of all three nations in this task.

Mr. Molotov expressed pleasure at the statements which Eden and I had made and then introduced an additional Soviet proposal for the turning over to the Soviet Union of the following Italian ships which had been surrendered to the Allies: one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines to be sent immediately to the northern ports of the USSR; also forty thousand tons of merchant shipping to proceed to Soviet Black Sea ports. He justified this request by explaining that the Italian participation in the war against the Soviet Union had done incalculable damage to the Soviet Union and particularly to the Soviet naval and merchant fleet. Both Eden and I agreed to submit this request immediately to our governments and urge upon them sympathetic consideration on an equitable and fair basis. I will appreciate your early instructions as to the reply I should make on this last point.

HAMILTON

EL  
WVC

SR 184  
23/1459  
lmn

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No. 9, 22 October 1943

From Deane for J C of Staff

During conference today Drafting Committee was set up to rework 4-Power Pact and other papers that might appear before the conference.

Mr Eden suggested a Political Military Commission be set up in London with rather wide advisory powers to their respective governments and at the same time a local committee be set up in Italy in general accord with Gen Eisenhower's recommendations. He did suggest however, that it be set up at once.

The next subject on the agenda was "Exchange of Views on the Situation in Italy and Balkans". It had been suggested as a topic of discussion by the British. Mr Eden started his discussion by saying that he did not consider it necessary to express any views on the situation in Italy as he felt that it had been clarified. This was apparently unacceptable to Molotov who made a proposal that the 3 nations should go on record as to the treatment they should afford Italy. He suggested several statements of policy concerning treatment particularly of the Fascist Government nearly all of which are included in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was agreed that Mr Hull and Mr Eden would present statements tomorrow of how Allied Military Government

CM-IN-14019 (23 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

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24-53394ABCD

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 9, 23 October 1943

page 2

has been administered and what policies are being carried out. Mr Molotov then proposed that Italy should be requested to surrender to the Soviet Government immediately, 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, and 4 submarines sailing now to northern ports of the Soviet Union. They should surrender also 40,000 tons of merchant shipping out of a total of 140,000 which he understood had been passed to Allied control. The merchant shipping to be turned over to the Soviet at ports in the Black Sea. Both Mr Hull and Mr Eden said they would communicate this proposal to their governments.

1st and 2nd operations summaries received today.

Request that I be furnished a weekly or bi-weekly summary of progress of preparations for OVERLORD, as to divisions, air units, construction and other items of interest. I feel certain that it will insure Soviet cooperation at the appropriate time if they can be kept informed.

No Sig.

ACTION: JCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM KING  
GEN ARNOLD  
LOG

CM-IN-14019 (23 Oct 43) 1631Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

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24-53394ABC0

SECRET

*fm*

22 October 1943

From: Moscow  
To: The President of the United States

Number 8 Filed 22/1610Z

Personal for POTUS only from Harriman.

The first part of the conference yesterday, October 21, was a short restricted session at which Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Eden and myself whether we had anything further to say on the Soviet proposals. Mr. Eden and I both explained that we had asked our respective governments for instructions as to Turkey and Sweden but time had not yet permitted replies. Molotov again raised the question of whether the intentions regarding the second front as expressed in the President's and Prime Minister's June cable to Marshal Stalin still remained valid. Mr. Eden and I both explained that we had thought the statements of Generals Ismay and Deane of the day before describing the decisions of the Quebec conference answered this question. After reviewing a part of General Ismay's statement, Mr. Molotov indicated he was entirely satisfied that his question had been answered. He said that, as the written statements of the Generals had only been submitted shortly before the opening of the meeting, he and his associates had not had time to study them. He asked permission to raise at a subsequent meeting any questions that might occur to them. He expressed his satisfaction with the information given by Generals Deane and Ismay regarding the energetic measures now being taken in preparation for the operation, and indicated that he thought further questions unlikely.

Mr. Molotov also stated that the Soviet Government was ready to give favorable consideration to our proposal regarding use of air bases

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DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

**SECRET**

From: Moscow Page 2  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 8 Filed 22/1610Z

for the shuttle bomber service, etc, and asked that we explain exactly what was desired. We suggested, as the details were of a technical nature, that the matter might best be discussed between Generals Deane and Vandenberg with appropriate Soviet officers. This, Mr. Molotov agreed to and indicated he would appoint officers to carry on the discussion.

No Sig

Note: Reason for delay of message being determined.  
WDCC

**SECRET**

SECRET

WDL (a)  
WB

RC 7  
22/1156  
erb

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL  
22 Oct 1943  
WSE

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No: 7, 22nd Oct 1943

For J C of Staff from Deane.

Mototov today approved in principle the United States proposals regarding use of USSR bases by U S aircraft for shuttle bombing;

The establishment of more effective interchange of weather information;

And improvement of the air transport between our two countries.

He stated he would arrange to have Soviet Representatives meet with Vandenburg and me to work out details. Request early receipt of any instructions you may have in this regard.

Four power declaration along lines of copies I furnished to you prior to departure from Washington was then discussed. Soviet does not desire China to participate. Reason given is that final document should be produced at this conference and China is not represented. They agreed to contents of declaration with minor amendments and question of Chinese participation is reserved for further discussion. My impression is that all agreed declaration will be reached and that some method for Chinese participation will be arranged. Complete text will be forwarded when final agreement is reached.

No Sig

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD, SGS, GEN ARNOLD ADM KING, LOG

CM-IN-13360 (22 Oct 43) 1503Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

COPY No. 16

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24-53594ABCO

22 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Attached is a corrected copy of message No. 3 from the Secretary of State to the President, dated 21 October 1945, a copy of which was previously sent to you for preparation of a reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Sec of State-Pres. #3, 21 Oct 45.

22 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

Attached is a corrected copy of message No. 3 from the Secretary of State to the President, dated 21 October 1943, a copy of which was previously sent to you for your information.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.  
Sec of State--Pres. #3, 21 Oct 43.

SECRET

WSB  
"2102"

21 October 1943

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States

Number 3 Filed 210535Z

For the President's eyes only from Secretary of State.

Today at restricted session of conference the three Soviet proposals for hastening the conclusion of the war were considered. I was accompanied by Mr. Harriman, Generals Deane and Vandenberg.

With respect to the first proposal, the British and American military advisors presented the Quadrant decisions, particularly those concerning cross-Channel operations. We informed the Soviet delegates of the conditions which must be created to make the operation possible. The intensive logistical preparations and the plans for the buildup in England were described in detail. The Soviet representatives appeared to be satisfied with the sincerity of our intentions. The papers from which the oral presentations were given are being submitted to the Soviet delegates with the understanding that after study further questions may be put forward.

The importance of the bomber offensive was emphasized and it was proposed that a special -----  
-----\* United States military representative proposed that, with a view to shortening the war, the Soviet Government agree that bases be made available in the USSR on which United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed in -----  
-----\* asked, and the whole discussion were in most friendly atmosphere.

The discussion then turned to the second proposal made by the Soviets, that efforts be made to bring Turkey into the war immediately. Mr. Eden explained in detail and frankly their understandings with Turkey and emphasized that if the Turks moved into the Balkans to attack German forces the British Government would have no interest in Turkey's participation in the Balkans after hostilities against Germany had ceased. This statement was received by the Soviet delegation with

SECRET

**SECRET**

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States Page 2  
Number 3 Filed 210535Z

hearty approval. Mr. Eden further stated that in his view Turkey did not have any considerable offensive strength and explained that under the British-Turkish agreement the British would have to provide 28 fighter squadrons which in his opinion would make Turkish participation at this time more of a liability than an asset. He said the importance of the use of Turkish air bases had diminished with the acquisition of the Foggia area and the prospect of moving up to Rome. Mr. Eden said however, that the British Government had no inflexible ideas on the subject and would be glad to consider the reasons for which the Soviet Government put forth the proposal. I indicated that the question was military in character but that I presumed the views expressed by Mr. Eden would also reflect those of our government. The matter was left for further consideration and I would appreciate any instructions you wish to give me on this subject.

The third Soviet proposal with reference to inducing Sweden to permit the Allies to use her air bases was then considered. Mr. Eden stated that this proposal had not received prior consideration by his government but he felt that the subject should be explored. He indicated that the possibilities of success in obtaining the use of these facilities would be enhanced if the Soviet Government would at the same time give a favorable indication as to the future status of Finland. Mr. Molotov stated that the suggestion regarding Finland presented a complication which he had not previously considered.

Mr. Eden further stated that recent experience with Portugal in obtaining the use of the Azores would indicate that acquiescence could not be expected from Sweden without some guarantees of protection. He suggested that the scale of protection that would be required should be the subject of study by the military staffs of the three nations and that his government would appreciate having the views of the Soviet Government on the subject. Mr. Molotov indicated that he hoped the British Government would have constructive suggestions in the light

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

From: Moscow

For: The President of the United States

Page 3

Number 3

Filed 210535Z

of their success in dealing with Portugal. Mr. Eden then explained that they did not have a similar historic alliance with Sweden as in the case of Portugal.

Mr. Molotov then asked me for my views on this subject and I replied that I would like to have the opportunity to communicate with my government since the issues involved were primarily military in nature. As Mr. Eden is asking his government to give consideration to the subject and as it will be necessary for me to present the views of my government, I would appreciate having any instructions you may wish to give me as to our position. //

No Sig

\* Omissions being serviced. Garbled in transmission.

**SECRET**

FROM Secretary HULL

TO The President

SERIAL #3

DATE 21 October 1943

DATE/TIME

21/0535Z

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 21 Oct 43

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Report on 3-power conference in Moscow.

ACTION To President via Miss Tully.

By direction of The President, copy given to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply by Joint Chiefs of Staff; copy to Acting Sec of State for information.

(Service on message requested repeatedly by Colonel Jones)

COPIES TO:

Admiral Leahy (For JCS)

DATE:

22 Oct 43

BY DIRECTION OF:

The President

Acting Sec of State

22 Oct 43

The President

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

This cable was sent in confidential Code,  
it should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. MCA

U. S. URGENT                      SECRET

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.  
1049  
AMDEL (35)

October 21, 1943

For Dunn from Atherton.

Refer to our AMDEL 30.

In paragraph four, General Eisenhower recommended that the Advisory Council of the Allied Control Commission be set up only after QUOTE period two UNQUOTE had been reached (presumably Rome). I recommended at the American meeting of the CCAC yesterday that a skeleton advisory council, including the Russians, French, Greeks, and the Yugoslavs, be established and attached to the skeleton Allied Control Commission suggested for period one which would take care, in our opinion, of the immediate wishes of these United Nations with respect to the Italian surrender. This point was accepted by the War Department members, and will be included in the telegram of reply to the General.

STETTINIUS  
ACTING

*Since given to the President - 23 Oct*  
*File*  
*W.S.*

HEL

This tele. ram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 21, 1943

Rec'd 12:11 p.m., 22nd.

*for*

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1672, October 21, 11 p.m.

Delam 9.

At its regular meeting this afternoon, the Conference proceeded to the consideration of point two of the agreed agenda, proposal for a Four Power Declaration. In submitting this declaration as a United States proposal I have a broad general outline of the importance of continuing the wartime collaboration in the peacetime period. Eden stated that the British Government welcomed the Four Power Declaration as an important step in the right direction and Mr. Molotov associated himself in full with the principles set forth in the declaration. Before going into detailed consideration of the document Molotov stated that in the view of the Soviet Government's consideration of a Four Power Declaration with one of the intended signatories not represented at the Conference would present any practical difficulties and that to confine the work of the Conference to the consideration of a Three Power Declaration to which China could complete and sign finished document

whereas

-2-, #1672, October 21, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

whereas the necessity of consulting a Fourth Power not represented at the Conference would mean that no decision could be reached on this declaration at this meeting. After considerable discussion of this subject during which I pointed out that my Government considered it of primary importance to have China as one of the important nations contributing its part to the war on the side of the United Nations included in this declaration not only because of the effect upon the contribution to the war but also for its contribution in the period after the war. Finally, at my suggestion, it was agreed that the question of China's signature would be left in abeyance for the present and we would proceed with the discussion of the contents of the declaration reverting to the question of China's participation at such time as might be found agreeable and appropriate as we progressed in the discussion.

The Conference then proceeded to a detailed discussion, of the declaration itself. With the exception of the substitution of the words United Kingdom for "Great Britain" at Mr. Eden's suggestion the preamble was approved without change.

In article one at my suggestion the words "against their respective enemies" were inserted between "the war" and "will

-3-, #1672, October 21, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

and "will be continued"; No other change was made in this Article.

In Article two in view of the Soviet proposal that any reference to the occupation of enemy territory or liberated territory be omitted since they seemed to feel that this might be construed as interfering with the progress of the active military operations the entire Article was reserved for further discussion at a later meeting.

The only changes in Article three were the substitution of the word "for requirements" and the elimination of the word "present";

In regard to Article four the only change was the substitution in the only two places where it appears of the word "states" for "nations" and the addition of the word "peace loving" in the phrase "the sovereign equality of all peace loving states".

In Article five the last phrase was altered to read: "They will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations."

The Soviet Delegation proposed that Article six be omitted entirely for the reason that the inclusion of

China

-4-, #1872, October 21, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

China might create difficulties for the Soviet Union in its relations with Japan. Both Mr. Eden and I thereupon accepted the deletion of this article.

The next Article which was numbered seven in the draft declaration which I submitted will hereafter be known as Article six in view of the agreed deletion of the former Article six. In the revised version presented this Article read as follows:

"That following the defeat of the enemy they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement."

Mr. Molotov proposed the following change; after the word "that" delete "following the defeat of the enemy" and substitute "in the post-war period" and also the elimination of the words "and after joint consultation and agreement". After considerable discussion it was agreed to reserve this Article for further study with the exception of the elimination of the words "and agreement" the deletion of which was approved by Mr. Eden and myself.

The only change in the succeeding Article eight as submitted, now Article seven, was the insertion of the words "with one another and with other members of the

United

-5-, #1672, October 21, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

United Nations" between the words "cooperate" and "to bring about".

The final Article of the declaration now Article eight was added and reads as follows:

"That this declaration is without prejudice to the relationship between the respective signatories and nations with which such signatories are not at war". This Article was approved by the conference.

The discussions were carried on in an informal and frank manner. Careful consideration was given to the substance and implication of each sentence.

As will be noted there remain two important points for further discussion as well as the matter of the inclusion of China as an original signatory of the declaration.

HAMILTON

WFS

DECLASSIFIED SECRET



## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	URGENT PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>21 OCT. 1943.</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 2.

211416

NCR 7085

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

IS MADE THAT ALL THREE NATIONS HAVE TROOPS AND EMBASSIES AT TEHERAN AND THAT THE FLIGHT FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST FROM SUCH POINT AS ALEXANDRIA FOR EXAMPDE WOULD BE THE SAME AS A FLIGHT FROM CAIRO AND THAT THIS WOULD AVOID AN OCEAN VOYAGE BY YOU AS FAR AS BEIRUT OR ALEXANDRIA OR OTHER NEIGHBORING POINT.

I SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS THIS MATTER FROM EVERY POSSIBLE ANGLE AS THE CONFERENCE GOES ON. IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS THEY WILL BE WELCOMED.

IT LOOKS TODAY IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING, THAT WE MAY COME ALONG WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN CONTENTION ABOUT SHORTENING THE WAR WITHOUT ANY FLAREUP AND POSSIBLY HARMONIOUSLY ALTHOUGH ONE CANNOT PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY. THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION WILL PROBABLY COME UP THIS AFTERNOON. IT WILL BE PRESENTED FULLY AND BASICALLY.

I AM NOT SURE JUST WHAT THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE MAY BE, BUT AM APPROX

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

# SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 15

15-0020-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	<del>URGENT</del>
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>21 OCT. 1943.</u>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 3

211416

NCR 7085

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

HENSIVE IN RESPECT TO INCLUSION OF CHINA.

ON THE OTHER HAND IN GENERAL CONVERSATION WITH MOLOTOV

HE PROMISES ME THAT HE WILL DO HIS BEST TO AID IN LAUNCHING

A GENERAL FORWARD MOVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

NATURALLY THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION WOULD BE THE BASIS OF

SUCH MOVEMENT WHILE ALL MINOR QUESTIONS RELATING TO GOVERNMENT

BEHIND THE LINES ETC. ETC. WOULD FOLLOW ALONG

THIS IS A CORRECTED PAGE 3 OF ALUSNA MOSCOW 211416 NCR 7085

~~OF 15 (3 COPIES, INCLUDING DELIVERY TO ASTSECSTATE).~~

NAVAIDE (2 COPIES)

*Copies not  
delivered*

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

# SEALED SECRET

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NCR 16

16-30620-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WA 55  
211522Z  
1g

INCOMING MESSAGE

*fw*  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

SECURITY CONTROL

No: 4, 21 October 1943

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.


Three proposals submitted by Soviets for speeding the conclusion of the war were considered at the session last night. The Secretary, Harriman, Vandenberg and I were present.

Concerning the first proposal that urgent preparations be undertaken in 1943 to insure invasion of Northern France Ismay and I presented the QUADRANT decisions particularly those in connection with OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. We placed considerable emphasis on the condition which must be created for OVERLORD indicating our confidence that these conditions would exist. The logistical preparations and the plans for a buildup in England were presented in detail. Soviet representatives Molotov and Boroshilov appeared to be convinced of the sincerity of our intentions. They wish to know if the Trident conditions concerning the OVERLORD had, been confirmed, amended or rejected at QUADRANT. I informed them that the decisions had been reaffirmed at Quebec and that all preparations were actively and urgently under way. I pointed particularly to the expansion being undertaken in the landing craft program, the effects of which are being felt over the entire US in shipyards as far west as California and engine factories in the Middle West. I emphasized this as evidence of the sincerity and firmness of purpose with which preparations

CM-IN-13062 (22 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

  
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**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Page 2 **INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

were being made. The importance of the bomber offensive was emphasized and we suggested that a special presentation be arranged for the Soviet delegates and members of their Air Staff.

Vandenbergh showed them a few pictures of the bombing results as a preview to the formal presentation and the Soviets were most enthusiastic. In accordance with request submitted by General Arnold we then proposed that the Soviets agree that bases be made available in the USSR for shuttle bombing of industrial Germany in order that US aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired and rearmed; also that most effective mutual interchange of information concerning weather be arranged and that communication between the US and USSR be strengthened for this purpose.

Finally that the air transport between the two countries be improved. Soviet delegates are now considering these proposals.

Ref second proposal by Soviet that efforts be made to bring Turkey into the war immediately, Mr. Eden explained the British understanding with Turkey and gave the General impression that in view of the commitment to provide 28 fighter squadrons to Turkey upon her entry into the war and because of the limited offensive strength of Turkey she might prove to be more of a liability than an asset. He pointed out that the importance of Turkish air bases has diminished with the acquisition of Southern Italy. Subject was left open and Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull are to wire Governments for instructions.

Ref third Soviet proposal to induce Sweden to permit use of her air bases Mr. Eden suggested that possibilities of success would be enhanced if Soviets would give favorable indications as to future status of Finland. Mr. Molotov said this presented a complication not previously considered. Mr. Eden suggested that noise of protection which Sweden would require should be studied by Military Staffs of the three nations. Both he and Mr. Hull have asked for instructions from their Governments.

Atmosphere of conference is extremely friendly.

**SECRET**  
**DECLASSIFIED**

OM-IN-13062 (22 Oct 43)

EX-105 GROUP, 1-4-74  
By NRP, NLE, Date APR 24 1974

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**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Page 3 (#4, Moscow to AGWAR)

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL) USN

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN ARNOLD  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

\ JCS memo, 1-4-74  
Δ By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

CM-IN-13062 (22 Oct 43) 0407Z vc

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24-53394A9C0

21 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached messages be forwarded for the information of the Acting Secretary of State.

Very respectfully,

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.

Sec of State-Pres #3, 21 Oct 43.

Sec of State-Pres #5, 21 Oct 43.

**SECRET**

- 1 -

21 October 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President has directed that the attached messages be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of reply.

L. MATHEWSON,  
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.

Sec of State-Pres #3, 21 Oct 43.

Sec of State-Pres #5, 21 Oct 43.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

22 October 1943

**CORRECTED COPY**

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States

**Number 3**

Filed 210535Z

For the President's eyes only from Secretary of State.

Today at restricted session of conference the three Soviet proposals for hastening the conclusion of the war were considered. I was accompanied by Mr. Harriman, Generals Deane and Vandenberg.

With respect to the first proposal the British and American military advisors presented the QUADRANT decisions, particularly those concerning cross-Channel operations. We informed the Soviet delegates of the conditions which must be created to make the operation possible. The intensive logistical preparations and the plans for the buildup in England were described in detail. The Soviet representatives appeared to be satisfied with the sincerity of our intentions. The papers from which the oral presentations were given are being submitted to the Soviet delegates with the understanding that after study further questions may be put forward.

The importance of the bomber offensive was emphasized and it was proposed that a special presentation be arranged for the Soviet delegates and members of their air staff on the current results and future prospects of the combined bomber offensive. Complete material has been brought for this purpose.

United States military representative proposed that, with a view to shortening the war, the Soviet Government agree that bases be made available in the USSR on which United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany; further, that a more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented and that United States and USSR communications be strengthened for this purpose; finally, that improved air transport be effected between the two countries. The Soviet delegates took these proposals under consideration. These were made at the request of General Arnold.

**SECRET**

*Portion previously garbled  
or omitted — continued  
on following page.*  
FILE COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

**SECRET**

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 3 Filed 210535Z

Page 2

At the conclusion of the discussion the Soviet representatives asked if the decisions made at TRIDENT regarding cross-Channel operations were confirmed, amended, or rejected at QUADRANT. They were informed that the TRIDENT cross-Channel decision was confirmed at QUADRANT. However, it was emphasized that the operation was dependent on the existence of the stated conditions which we confidently expected would be fulfilled. This answer appeared to be satisfactory to the Soviet delegates. The manner in which the statements were received, the character of the questions asked, and the whole discussion were in a most friendly atmosphere.

The discussion then turned to the second proposal made by the Soviets, that efforts be made to bring Turkey into the war immediately. Mr. Eden explained in detail and frankly their understandings with Turkey and emphasized that if the Turks moved into the Balkans to attack German forces the British Government would have no interest in Turkey's participation in the Balkans after hostilities against Germany had ceased. This statement was received by the Soviet delegation with hearty approval. Mr. Eden further stated that in his view Turkey did not have any considerable offensive strength and explained that under the British-Turkish agreement the British would have to provide 28 fighter squadrons which in his opinion would make Turkish participation at this time more of a liability than an asset. He said the importance of the use of Turkish air bases had diminished with the acquisition of the Foggia area and the prospect of moving up to Rome. Mr. Eden said however, that the British Government had no inflexible ideas on the subject and would be glad to consider the reasons for which the Soviet Government put forth the proposal. I indicated that the question was military in character but that I presumed the views expressed by Mr. Eden would also reflect those of our government. The matter was left for further consideration and I would appreciate any instructions you wish to give me on this subject.

The third Soviet proposal with reference to inducing Sweden to permit the Allies to use her air bases was then considered. Mr. Eden stated that this proposal had not received prior consideration by his government but he felt that the subject should be explored. He indicated that the possibilities of success in obtaining the use of these facilities would be enhanced if the Soviet Government would at the same time give a favorable indication as to the future

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
E O 12350

**SECRET**

From: Moscow  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 3 Filed 210535Z

Page 3

status of Finland. Mr. Molotov stated that the suggestion regarding Finland presented a complication which he had not previously considered.

Mr. Eden further stated that recent experience with Portugal in obtaining the use of the Azores would indicate that acquiescence could not be expected from Sweden without some guarantee of protection. He suggested that the scale of protection that would be required should be the subject of study by the military staffs of the three nations and that his government would appreciate having the views of the Soviet Government on the subject. Mr. Molotov indicated that he hoped the British Government would have constructive suggestions in the light of their success in dealing with Portugal. Mr. Eden then explained that they did not have a similar historic alliance with Sweden as in the case of Portugal.

Mr. Molotov then asked me for my views on this subject and I replied that I would like to have the opportunity to communicate with my government since the issues involved were primarily military in nature. As Mr. Eden is asking his government to give consideration to the subject and as it will be necessary for me to present the views of my government, I would appreciate having any instructions you may wish to give me as to our position.

No Sig

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

**SECRET**

W.D.  
H.H.  
"2101"

21 October 1943

From: Moscow

To: The President of the United States

NR. 5

Filed 2111,12

For the President of the United States eyes only  
from Sec of State.

In my cable Nr 3 of last night I omitted a statement I made when the Turkish and Swedish matters were discussed by Mr Eden. I stated that as these matters were of a military nature they should be left for settlement by the heads of the governments in consultation with their Chiefs of Staff. I indicated, however, that I would communicate with my government on these matters.

No Sig

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

FROM Secretary HULL

TO the President

SERIAL #5

DATE 21 October

DATE/TIME  
OR FILE NUMBER 21/1141Z

TOR MAP ROOM 21/1745 EWT

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT

Report on 3-power conference in Moscow.

ACTION

To President via Admiral Brown.

(Continuation of #3 from Hull.) By direction of the President, copy given to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply by JCS in conjunction with #3; copy to Acting Sec of State for information.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

Admiral Leahy (for JCS)

22 Oct 43

The President

Acting Sec of State

22 Oct 43

The President

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

JH  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

MOSCOW

Undated

Rec'd. Oct. 20, 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

URGENT SECRET FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM HULL.

At the meeting at 1300 October 19th Molotov presented  
following proposals on point one of agenda.

(A) British and American Governments to undertake  
during 1943 the necessary measures which will insure that  
Anglo American forces will invade North France which  
together with the powerful pressure of the Red Army on the  
Eastern Front against the principal forces of Germany will  
basically weaken Germany's military and strategic position  
and cause a radical curtailment of the war. With reference  
to the foregoing the Soviet Government considers it necessary  
to find out if the statements made in June this year by the  
President and Prime Minister that North France would be

*Also received via Navy channels -  
Alusna Moscow - CNO 192114 NCR 6023-6073,  
copy of which was destroyed. (See "NOTE" on Page 2)*

invaded by British and American forces in the spring of next year remain in force.

(B) Britain the United States and the USSR propose to Turkey that she immediately declare war on the side of the Allies.

(C) Sweden be invited by the Three Powers to allow Allied use of air bases on her territory for operations against Germany.

HULL

Note: Received by the Chief of Naval Operations from the Naval Attaché at Moscow.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

RC 2  
filed  
fb

02552

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

OCT 20 1943  
0500

URGENT

*WZ*

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No. 2 19 October 1943

From Deane for Joint C of S.

At first regular session of Conferences Soviets presented question of steps to be taken for hastening the conclusion of the war which was accepted as the first item on the Agenda. They made three proposals:

First. That the three nations should make immediate preparations in 1943 which will insure an invasion of Northern France (Note that the proposal calls for preparations in 1943 but not the actual invasion).

Second. That the three nations take steps to induce Turkey to enter the war immediately.

Third. That steps be taken to induce Sweden to permit use of her air bases.

At tomorrows session General Ismay and I will present Quadrant decisions regarding Overlord and indicate the intensity of preparations now being undertaken with particular stress on bomber offensive. We shall indicate conditions which must be created before Overlord can be launched and indicate necessity for Soviet cooperation in this regard. We shall be prepared to answer questions on present plans and I shall submit Soviet views to you.

From wording of proposal it appears as though there should be no difficulty with reference to proposal number

CM-IN-11822 (20 Oct 43) 0613Z

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974  
12

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53994A800

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
SECURITY CONTROL  
MESSAGE CENTER

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Mo  
To: AGWAR  
No. 2 19 October 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

one.

With reference to proposal two we shall inform Soviets of Quadrant decision and the Soviet views will be communicated to our Governments.

With reference to proposal three we shall discuss commitments to Sweden that would be involved in proposal and submit Soviet view to our Governments.

Conference extremely amicable. This is sent for your info as Secretary has already communicated with the President.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

CM-IN-11822 (20 Oct 43) 0613Z ejm

12

**SECRET**

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394ABCD

HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 19, 1943

Rec'd 6:14 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT

1648, October 19, 11 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM THE SECRETARY.

Delam - five.

We had fairly satisfactory talks with the British  
at Tehran in preparation for the discussions here.

We had no further indications from the Soviet  
Government of the proposals they wished to bring up  
until the meeting which was held at four o'clock this  
afternoon.

The meeting was opened on a cordial note by Mr.  
Molotov and the following preliminary arrangements were  
agreed to:

- One. That Mr. Molotov would be chairman.
- Two. That a meeting would be held daily at four  
o'clock to continue until the subjects undertaken were  
fully discussed each day.
- Three. That there might be proposals agreed upon  
here for

-2-, #1648, October 19, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

here for submission to a decision of Chiefs of State at their meeting and that there might be subjects upon which information undoubtedly would be exchanged for further presentation to the Chiefs of State meeting but that in all instances the Foreign Ministers here would have the right to refer to their Governments at any time during the development of the discussions on any particular subject.

Four. That with regard to the press nothing with respect to the proceedings of the Conference would be released during the conversations but that matters of interest other than the proceedings authorized for publication by the Foreign Ministers in agreement could be released for the present. For this purpose each Foreign Minister is appointing a representative in order that the three representatives may concert together with regard to material to be released it being understood as above that no information regarding the proceedings of the Conference will be given out.

Mr. Molotov presented a draft agenda which set down as a first item the Russian proposal that measures for the shortening of the war be considered and was made up otherwise of a combination of the suggestions for the agenda made by the United States and British Governments. Item number one on our suggested agenda (the four nation  
declaration)

-3-, #1648, October 19, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

declaration) was omitted from the Soviet suggested agenda. In my request supported by Mr. Eden the four nation declaration was restored to the agenda. After some discussion the first five items of the agenda which were accepted and agreed upon were as follows.

(One) The consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her Allies in Europe (U.S.S.R.).

(Two) The four nation declaration on general security (U.S.A.).

(Three) The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Political, Military Commission in Algiers. (Great Britain - number two on the latest British agenda).

(Four) Exchange of views on the situation in Italy (??)(?) those which may arise as the war progresses (U.S.A. - number four on our agenda).

After the discussion of these subjects in the order given above further consideration will be given to the order in which the balance of the items as suggested by the British and the United States for the agenda will be taken up.

On the suggestion of Mr. Molotov it was then

agreed

-3-, #1648, October 19, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

agreed that as to point one proposals would be made in writing and any decisions arrived at would be likewise reduced to writing.

Mr. Molotov then presented written proposals on point one which are being communicated through other channels.

It was decided that for the purpose of discussing these proposals a meeting would be held tomorrow, October 20 at 3 p.m. attended only by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vychinsky, Marshal Voroshilov and a member of the Soviet General Staff, Mr. Eden, General Ismay, Mr. Harriman, General Deane and myself. The atmosphere of the discussions has been friendly.

HAMILTON

HPD

Have requested Moscow to furnish repetition of unintelligible portion of above message.

Telegraph Section.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPART

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		NILID	PRIORITY
DATE 19 OCTOBER 1943			ROUTINE
TON CODEROOM 2103			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY ROWLAND			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

NR: 373

18 OCTOBER 1943

NCR 17638

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TO OPD WD FOR JOINT C OF S. SIGNED DEANE.

FIRST CONFERENCE MEETING AT KREMLIN AT 18 HRS  
 (1902)  
 DAY OF ARRIVAL. MOLOTOV, VYSHINSKY, EDEN STRONG,  
 CARR, ISMAY, HULL, HARRIMAN, DUNNE AND DEANE PRES-  
 ENT. AGREED ON PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING ARRIVAL  
 AND PARTICIPANTS NO FURTHER PRESS RELEASES UNTIL  
 CONCLUSION OF CONFERENCE EXCEPT BY AGREEMENT. FIRST  
 REGULAR MEETING 16 HRS 19 OCTOBER. SECRETARY HULL  
 IN BEST OF HEALTH AND TOOK LEAD AT CONFERENCE.  
 PLEASE START OPERATIONS REPORTS.

NO SIG.

DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-11072

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IG-00	42
VCNO	43
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
 OPNAV-NCR-16 A 33052

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 2, 1943

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to the letter of Mr. Hamilton, Chargé  
d'Affaires of the United States of America in the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated September 20  
and addressed to Mr. V. N. Molotov, People's Comissar  
for Foreign Affairs, regarding the proposed by the  
Government of the United States agenda for the three  
partite conference, I have the honor to inform you  
that the Soviet Government has instructed me to bring  
to the knowledge of the United States Government the  
following:

The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with  
the suggested by the United States Government agenda  
for the conference of representatives of the Governments  
of

The Honorable

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State

Department of State

Washington, D.C.

of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government having expressed, in due time, its consent to the arrangement of the conference, then and there advanced its point of view that for the success of this conference it was desirable to receive, from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America, a list of questions to be considered at the conference as well as suggestions on those questions.

This proposal of the Soviet Government did not meet with any objections, however, up to the present time, the United States Government, on its part, did not present any proposals with the exception of that of the declaration of four nations.

On its part the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To consider measures of shortening the war against Germany and her allies in Europe.

In view are such urgent measures to be carried out yet in 1943 by the Governments of Great Britain and the United

United States, which will secure the invasion of Western Europe, across the English Channel, by the Anglo-American armies and which, with simultaneous mighty blows of the Soviet troops upon the main forces of the German Army at the Soviet-German front, are to undermine fundamentally the military-strategic position of Germany and lead to a decisive shortening of war.

2. The Soviet Government has no objections against the discussion of questions, proposed by the United States Government concerning European countries. The Soviet Government considers it, however, desirable that the Government of the United States of America transmit in advance its proposals on the questions presented for concordance of those proposals among the three Governments.

Besides, the Soviet Government draws the attention of the United States Government to the fact that this conference, as it was agreed upon, must be a conference of representatives of three countries - the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, that is the reason why the Soviet Government does not see any ground

to

to include into the agenda, point 1, containing the draft of the Joint Declaration of Four Nations.

3. The Soviet Government considers that the conference of the representatives of the three Governments is to be of a preliminary character and has to work out the proposals for consecutive decisions of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept, dear Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

Andrei A. Gromyko  
Chargé d'Affaires

Final

~~DRAFT~~

September 14, 1943

AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE

1. General security (four-nation declaration).

As a basis for the maintenance of peace and security in the world after the end of hostilities, it is suggested that the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China enter into a four-nation arrangement which would provide for consultation and cooperation in carrying out the responsibilities of those four nations for the maintenance of peace by continuing after the war the present collaboration in the prosecution of the war.

A tentative draft of such declaration is attached hereto.

2. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.

- (a) During armistice period, international military, political, and economic control over Germany.
- (b) Steps towards ultimate settlement:- length of armistice period, future status of German Government, frontiers, and other questions.

3. Economic matters for reconstruction.

- (a) Question of reparations.
- (b) Cooperation in rehabilitation of war damage in U.S.S.R.
- (c) Joint action for assistance to other countries.
- (d) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and I.L.O.
- (e) Any specific matters either of the other Governments wishes to raise.

4. Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses.

Our proposal is that matters on which it is found desirable for the three Governments to consult should be dealt with in Moscow, London, or Washington as may be most appropriate on an ad hoc basis by the permanent diplomatic representatives in each capital. Experts could be sent if desired to participate depending upon the character of the subjects under discussion. This is not intended to preclude the holding of international or tripartite conferences as occasion may make desirable.

We will be prepared to discuss at the October Moscow Conference any current issues proposed by either of the other two Governments on which it may be found timely to consult.

*Adm Leahy  
has seen 79.*

September 23, 1943

**FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

Pursuant to our conversation on the telephone this morning I am attaching hereto a draft of a message to Prime Minister Churchill regarding the possibility of changing the place of meeting of the Tripartite Conference from Moscow to Washington or London.

The personal references to myself in this draft message were written and pushed on me by my associates in the Department.

C.H.

September 23, 1943

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

It was my understanding that the Soviet Government were unalterable in their desire to have the forthcoming Foreign Office Tripartite Conference at Moscow. However, I have just learned that while Moscow was their preference that they were not as strongly insistent upon that place as I thought. It has always been my wish that Mr. Hull would attend. Of course, he is available in Washington and he is and has been ready to go to London or some place not too far away. He is not a good flyer especially during the Equinoxial storms now existing in the Near and Middle East.

I would like very much to reopen the question of the site of that meeting and endeavor to have it convene at either Washington or London if at all possible. I consider it extremely important in view of all the issues involved to have Mr. Hull represent us at this meeting, especially in view of the fact that the Soviet and British Governments will be represented by their

respective

respective Foreign Ministers. I feel that the effect upon public opinion in this country of Mr. Hull's presence would be of such help for our common objectives that every effort should be made to have the meeting called for Washington or London or some other place not too distant.

In view of the urgency of this matter please let me know as soon as possible whether you would agree to our both approaching Uncle Joe immediately with a view to reopening the place of meeting.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

COLONEL HAMMOND.

I do not know whether you have kept a copy of telegram CONCRETE 725 being the suggested list of questions which your Government and ours might put on the agenda of the projected meeting of Foreign Ministers. I send you one herewith as you may find it useful to have among your records.

TK

6. 9. 43.

AT: THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

*"Concrete 725"*

The attached telegram, which the Prime Minister has marked for the President to see, gives the Foreign Secretary's suggestions for a rough list of questions which the U.S. Government and H.M.G. might show willingness to put on the Agenda for the projected meeting of Foreign Ministers.

W.B.

5. 9. 43

Copy No.....!

To : Joint Staff Mission

From: War Cabinet Office

Dated: 3 Sept. 1943

MOST SECRET

CONCRETE 725

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

My immediately preceding telegram. *Below*

Following is list of possible subjects:

- ✓
- A. Military.....Italian and Balkan situations.
  - B. Political issues which may arise as the war progresses.
    1. Functions, scope and location of proposed Three-Power Commission.
    2. Common policy to prevent Allied territories evacuated by Germans from falling into chaos in the absence of liberating Allied armies.
    3. Common policy towards resistance movements in Yugoslavia.
    4. Resumption of relations with Poland, constitution of union of Polish patriots, and general policy in relation to Poland.
    5. Attitude towards French committee with special reference to its position in metropolitan France, and establishment of eventual French Government.
    6. Policy towards Turkey and question of our modifying our relations with her.
    7. Question of getting Finland out of the war.
    8. Post-war control of the entrance to the Baltic (Stalin raised this in 1941).
    9. Policy towards Persia.
    10. Setting up of special machinery for dealing promptly and jointly with questions requiring current and close collaboration.

*The President  
to see*

C. Political problems after the termination of hostilities.

1. Proposed Four-Power declaration.
2. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate spheres of influence.
3. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries
  - (a) During the armistice period, e.g., control commission, etc.
  - (b) At the peace settlement, e.g., frontiers, military occupation, reparations, decentralization of German government, etc.
4. Possibility of Soviet co-operation in international bodies dealing with such matters as finance, transport, aviation, etc. and I.L.O.
5. Economic matters insofar as this is possible as a result of present talks in Washington about Article VII.
6. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including question of confederations

032350Z

Distribution

Mr. Martin  
Sir A. Cadogan

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

This tele. is also  
obviously dated  
wrong - November

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA, MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION <b>OPNAV</b> <i>WJ</i>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>4 OCTOBER, 1943</b>			ROUTINE <b>RRR</b>
TOR CODEROM <b>Ø153</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>ROBINSON</b>			
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ROBINSON</b>		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

LT COM ROBINSON

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

530707

NCR 5551

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

THE SECRETARY LEFT MOSCOW AT DAYBREAK THIS MORNING,  
SHORTLY AFTER 7-0'CLOCK. EDEN LEFT 15-MINUTES LATER. MOLOTOV  
AND A NUMBER OF THE VICE-COMMISSARS INCLUDING NISHYNSKI,  
MAISKY AND LITVINOV SAW THEM OFF; ALSO MOLOTOV AND A NUMBER OF  
VICE-COMMISSARS. THE CEREMONY INCLUDED REVIEW OF THE GUARD OF  
HONOR AND PLAYING OF THE NATIONAL ANTHEMS. WEATHER PERMITTING,  
THE SECRETARY WILL SPEND ONE NIGHT EACH AT TENERAN AND CAIRO,  
ARRIVING ALGIERS ON THE 5TH. HE IS ASKING THE CRUISER TO STAND  
BY, ALTHOUGH HIS PRESENT PLAN IS TO FLY THROUGH TO WASHINGTON  
VIA DAKAR, BELEM AND BORINQUEN. THE SCHEDULE ARRANGED BRINGS  
HIM TO WASHINGTON ON THE 9TH. HE INTENDS TO CABLE YOU FROM  
ALGIERS HIS DEFINITE DECISIONS. HE IS IN GOOD HEALTH AND  
SPIRITS. BARRING CATCHING A BAD COLD THE DOCTOR FEELS HE WILL

ACTION

F-0		23
F-01		24
F-02		25
F-05		26
F-07		27
F-1		28
F-2		29
F-20		30
F-3		31
F-30		32
F-31		33
F-32		34
F-33		35
F-34		36
F-4		37
FX01		38
FX30		39
FX37		40
FX40		41
IG-00		42
VCNO		43
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**SECRET** (CONTINUED ON SECOND SHEET)

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA, MOSCOW</b>	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES  <b>OPNAV</b>	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	FOR INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

~~030707~~ (SHEET TWO) NCR 5551

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**SECOND SHEET:- PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN**

**BE ABLE TO STAND THE SCHEDULES, TRIP FLYING EACH DAY AND LAYING OVER AT NIGHT.**

**ACTION: P1A.....**

**FILE.**

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

SECRET

WHL  
WIS

3 November 1943.

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S EYES ONLY

From: Teheran  
For: The President of the United States

Unnumbered,

Filed 031145Z

For the eyes of the President only from Hull.

Arrived Teheran 4 PM today local time. Reference your AMPSC 1757 AMSME 7723 priority. Planning airplane flight straight thru via Dakar and should reach Washington by 9th, even allowing for delays should certainly arrive Washington by 11th. Holding cruiser as extreme precaution until reach Algiers. Will keep you informed promptly of any delay or departure from schedule. Should reach Cairo 4th, Algiers 5th, Dakar 6th, Belem 7th, Borenquin Field 8th and Washington 9th. You can contact me accordingly with any further suggestions.

No Sig

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

*ad L and Mr. H  
have seen.*

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COMNAVEU		COMNAVNAV USS BOISE	PRIORITY
FROM			ROUTINE
RELEASED BY			DEFERRED
DATE			
2 NOVEMBER 1943.			
DATE			
625/2.			
TOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY
WHITE			ROUTINE
DECODED BY			DEFERRED
GERMAN			
PARAPHRASED BY			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

(LT. CDR. GERMAN) Ø12326 NCR 4142

*White 35*

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

- INTERCEPT -

(COMNAVEU SENDS ACTION COMNAVNAV)

DUE TO WEATHER DEPARTURE SPECIAL PARTY FROM MOSCOW  
DELAYED.

DEPARTURE WEDNESDAY POSSIBLE WILL ADVISE LATER.

THIS IS ALUSNA MOSCOW Ø11326.

DISTRIBUTIONS

8: GARBLED CALL. HAS BEEN SERVICED.

P1A.....COG.

FILE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50630-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>MOSCOW</u>		AGWAR	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>NOV 2 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>0920</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>YORK</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

NO. 36 1 NOV 43

NCR 17788

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

(RECEIVED FROM ARMY VIA SCRAMBLER)

MARSHALL FOR HANDY FROM MCCARTHY SIGNED DEANE.

DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW DELAYED DUE TO WEATHER.  
ADVISE CONNOLLY ROYCE EISENHOWER AND COMNAVNAV.\*  
FURTHER INFO WHEN AVAILABLE.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

\* WAR HAS PASSED THIS DISPATCH TO TEHERAN CAIRO AND ALGIERS.

CM-IN-614 2 NOV

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

15-50520-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

*fm*

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA MOSCOW			OPNAV	URGENT
FROM		FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE	30 OCTOBER 1943		DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM	1600/30	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY	ALLENSWORTH		ROUTINE	
PARAPHRASED BY	ALLENSWORTH		DEFERRED	

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

301055 NCR 2438

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

(SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HULL)

*Reference White one*

MY 292320. IN FURTHER APPRAISING THE SITUATION IN WEST AFRICA, WHERE I MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO SPEND TEN DAYS

OR TWO WEEKS IN AWAITING YOUR ARRIVAL FOR A CONFERENCE I FIND THAT ONE IS DEFINITELY EXPOSED IN THAT AREA TO SUCH

DISEASES AS MALARIA, DYSENTERY, ETC AND THAT I CAN NOT AFFORD TO CONTRACT ANY OF THESE DISEASES. I HAVE HAD NO

VACCINATIONS OR IMMUNIZATIONS. FOR SOME REASONS FLIGHT TO DAKAR AND NATAL TO BRING ME TO WASHINGTON EARLIER

SEEMS UNWISE. FOUR MEMBERS CREW CONTRACTED MALIGNANT MALARIA ON WAY HERE AND WILL BE UNABLE TO RETURN. I AM

WONDERING WHETHER YOU COULD WORK OUT YOUR SCHEDULE TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON UNTIL ABOUT THE ELEVENTH ON WHICH

DATE I WOULD PLAN TO REACH THERE. PLEASE WIRE ME AT TEHRAN AND CAIRO. I AM ASSUMING TOO THAT HARRIMAN,

GENERAL DEANE AND BOHLEN WILL JOIN YOUR CONFERENCE.

P1A.....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

*White 6*

10-0000-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WB 358  
28/1535Z  
lmn

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

WDC  
29 Oct  
1718Z

*fm*

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR

No. 27

28 October 1943

To NATOUSA for Eisenhower from Mc Carthy signed Deane

Weather has delayed departure. Present indications that party will depart here 31 Oct arriving Tunis afternoon Nov 2nd. Please advise COMUNAV NAW USS Boise and COMINCH.

No Sig.


Note: This message has been paraphrased and relayed to Algiers by War Department Code Center.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS  
WHITE HOUSE  
NAVY (CAPT FISCHLER)  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

CM-IN-17703 (29 Oct 43) 1955Z mcs

 COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

*Pres*

HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated October 18, 1943

Rec'd 3:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT.

1634, October 18, 1 p.m.

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL.

The Secretary of State and Mr. Harriman and  
their parties arrived this afternoon. The Secretary  
was welcomed at the airport by Mr. Molotov and other  
officials of the Soviet Government and by a Soviet  
Guard of Honor.

The Secretary, Mr. Harriman and all members of  
the party are well.


The question raised in your 1001 October 16, 5 p.m.  
will be the subject of a subsequent telegram.

HAMILTON

WFS

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
SAN JUAN, P.R.		WAR	<b>PRIORITY</b>
FROM		<div style="text-align: center;">  </div>	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE	OCTOBER 9, 1943		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	0105		PRIORITY
DECODED BY	NILES		ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

NO. AG 6111 OCT 8/43 NCR 17593-S

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

-RECEIVED FROM ARMY VIA SCRAMBLER-

PERSONAL TO MARSHALL FOR HANDY FROM MCCARTHY SGD  
PATCH ANTD ACTING. PASS TO FISCHLER COMINCH.

SPECIAL PARTY DEPARTED SAN JUAN ABOARD PHOENIX  
1845Z 8TH OCTOBER. PRINCIPAL IN GOOD SHAPE AND ENJOYED  
FIRST PART OF TRIP. BALANCE OF PARTY DEPARTING BY AIR  
0700Z 9TH OCTOBER CURRENT YEAR.

*Secretary Hull*

ACTION: F-30

CM-IN-4961

INFO: ADMIRAL KING GENERAL STRONG (STATE DEPT.)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974


No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED**



Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 14

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMINCH</b>		<b>CINCLANT</b>	<del>PRECEDENCE</del>
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <b>6 OCTOBER 1943</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	<b>PHOENIX COMCARIBSEAFRON CTF 23 CINCAF COM 8TH FLT COMORSEAFRON</b>	<del>PRECEDENCE</del>
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

**OPERA**

06 2125

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME                      DATE                      TIME                      GCT

TEXT

**INCREASE NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN SECRETARY'S PARTY FROM SIX TO EIGHT X MYDIS 041848**

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
F31			
FROM <b>COMINCH</b>	FOR ACTION	<b>CINCLANT</b>	<b>OP</b>
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <b>4 OCTOBER 1943</b>	INFORMATION	<b>PHOENIX - WALKER</b> <b>COMCARIBSEAFRON</b> <b>CTF 23 - CINCPAC</b> <b>CINCAF - COM 7TH FLT</b> <b>COM 8TH FLT</b> <b>COMORSEAFRON</b>	<b>OP</b>
TOR CODEROOM _____			ROUTINE
DECODED BY _____			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY _____			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

041848

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

**DIRECT PHOENIX ARRIVE SAN JUAN DURING DAYLIGHT SIX OCTOBER X  
 EMBARK SECRETARY OF STATE AND SIX MEMBERS OF PARTY AT ABOUT  
 1300 EIGHTH AND PROCEED IMMEDIATELY (OR AS DIRECTED BY  
 SECRETARY) TO CASABLANCA AT BEST SPEED CONSISTENT COMBINED  
 FUEL ENDURANCE OF PHOENIX AND ESCORT X PRIOR DEPARTURE REPORT  
 ROUTE AND ETA X DESIGNATE TWO DESTROYERS TO ESCORT PHOENIX X  
 AUTHORIZED USE WALKER AND ONE OTHER PACFLT DD IF NO OTHERS  
 AVAILABLE X WHEN RELEASED BY SECRETARY OF STATE AT DESTINATION  
 PHOENIX AND PACFLT DESTROYERS PROCEED CANAL ZONE REPORT FOR  
 DUTY PHOENIX TO COM7THFLT DESTROYERS TO CINCPAC X OTHER  
 DESTROYERS IF ANY PROCEED AS DIRECTED BY CINCLANT**

7F 27.3

*Naval's copy*

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

15-50620-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Admiral Brown  
Juce.

The passenger  
has approved this  
and Admiral Edwards  
has a copy  
Franklin C. Curtis

**SECRET**

ITINERARY

(By Land Plane and Naval Vessel)

<u>Place to Place</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Local Time</u>	<u>Schedule Date</u>	<u>Layover</u>	<u>Accommodations</u>
Lv. Washington	1200	6.00	12:00 Noon	Oct 7		
Ar. Morrison Field West Palm Beach			6:00 P.M.	Oct 7	14	Commanding Officers' Quarters
Lv. Morrison Field	1063	5.15	8:00 A.M.	Oct 8		
Ar San Juan		1:15 P.M.	Oct 8			
Lv San Juan		(Board U.S.S. PHOENIX. Trip by sea is estimated to take from 5½ to 6 days. Accommodations aboard for 6 of party)*				
Ar. Casablanca			Morning	Oct 14		
Lv. Casablanca	600	3.00	Noon	Oct 14		
Ar. Algiers			3:00 P.M.	Oct 14	3	
Lv. Algiers	1808	9.30	7:30 P.M.	Oct 14		
Ar. Cairo			7:00 A.M.	Oct 15	28	Stay with Minister Kirk or the Commanding General.
Lv. Cairo	1360	7.00	11:00 A.M.	Oct 16		
Ar. Teheran			7:00 P.M.	Oct 16	14	Stay with Minister Dreyfus
Lv. Teheran	1720	8.30	9:00 A.M.	Oct 17		
Ar. Moscow			5:30 P.M.	Oct 17		

**SECRET**